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
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STUDENT ESSAY

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UNDERSTANDING SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR

BY

CAPTAIN RICHARD A. LIFE, USN

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The author, who served in the US Embassy, Moscow, and has specialized in Soviet affairs since 1967, contends that Soviet behavior is motivated by what Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leaders respect and fear and by long range objectives set forth by Marx and Lenin. The Soviets respect raw military power, resolve to use that power and a strong, healthy economy. They fear the possibility of another war directed toward Soviet territory. Their objectives are to ensure survival of the Motherland and the CPSU and its leaders, and to lead the world socialist revolution, thus fulfilling the prophecies of Marx and Lenin.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

UNDERSTANDING SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR
INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Captain Richard A. Life, USN

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
31 May 1984

FEB 14 1985

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ABSTRACT

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The motivation for Soviet behavior in domestic issues and foreign policy is not well understood in the Free World. Because the USSR is a superpower most people who have never visited the country tend to mirror-image the Soviet standard of living, way of life and the basis for national decision making as nearly identical to that in the US and other modern industrial nations. They are absolutely wrong!

The author, who served in the US Embassy, Moscow, and has specialized in Soviet affairs since 1967, contends that Soviet behavior is motivated by what Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leaders respect and fear and by long range objectives set forth by Marx and Lenin. The Soviets respect raw military power, resolve to use that power and a strong, healthy economy. They fear the possibility of another war directed toward Soviet territory. Their objectives are to ensure survival of the Motherland and the CPSU and its leaders, and to lead the world socialist revolution, thus fulfilling the prophecies of Marx and Lenin.

By understanding Soviet motivation and uncompromising dedication to peacefully achieving their objectives, the Free World must seize every opportunity to counter Soviet efforts. First, we must remain so strong militarily and demonstrate both national and collective resolve, that Kremlin leaders will never feel secure enough to attempt military coercion. Secondly, we must combine our own strong, healthy economies with our ideology based upon religious principles and the value of each and every individual, and aggressively compete with the USSR in the Third World.

UNDERSTANDING SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR

Why? This is perhaps the question most frequently asked in the Free World about Soviet behavior both in domestic and foreign affairs. Why do the Soviets maintain some 1,000 forced labor camps in which more than two million persons are incarcerated? Why was Alexander Solzhenitsyn stripped of his citizenship and banished from the USSR while Andrei Sakharov was forced into internal exile in a city closed to foreigners? Why does the Kremlin spend an estimated 13-15% of its GNP for defense when the US spends less than 7%? Why does the USSR maintain over 5 million men in uniform and continue developing and producing new ICBMs, SLBMs, fighters, bombers, tanks, armored personnel carriers, surface-to-air missiles and other weapon systems?

In international affairs why do Soviet leaders express fear of PERSHING II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) deployment as well as concern over American plans for the MX and TRIDENT D-5 missiles, the B-1 and "Stealth" bombers and "star wars" research? Why is the Kremlin interested in returning to detente with the US and actively pursuing the normalization of relations with Peking? Why did the Soviet Army invade Afghanistan; why did Moscow rearm Syria and send some 7,000 Soviet military personnel to that country after the overwhelming Israeli victory in June 1982; why are surrogate Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia and why are Soviet civilian advisors in Nicaragua? Why did they shoot down KAL-007 and why is Moscow refusing to send a team to the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles?

These and other questions about the USSR confound and frustrate Westerners as they grapple with how to deal with the Soviet Union today. In an attempt to understand Soviet behavior it is essential to appreciate what Soviet leaders respect, what they fear, their principal objectives and how they are accomplishing these objectives. This paper reflects the thoughts and conclusions of an intelligence officer who has studied and observed Soviet affairs for some seventeen years including a two year assignment to the American Embassy, Moscow. During his tour of duty in the USSR he travelled extensively throughout the country and spoke with hundreds of Soviet citizens ranging from Grigori Romanov, now a Politburo member and major contender for the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party, numerous senior officers in the Soviet Navy and scholars in the Institute of the USA and Canada, to students, workers, collective farmers, religious believers and dissident artists.

Respect. Soviet leaders respect three factors: raw military power, resolve on the part of national leaders to use that power, and a strong, viable economy. Such respect is not uniquely Soviet. As students of history Russian Tsars were well aware that commencing even before the time of Christ all empires and states which dominated the world order did so by developing strong and diversified economies. These empires and states concurrently built armies and navies which commanded the respect of potential foes. Throughout history Chinese, Roman, Greek, Spanish, French, British, German, Japanese and American khans, emperors, kings, prime ministers and presidents have resolutely used the interdependent instruments of their economy and military power to execute foreign policy. Thus power, resolve and economic strength have been the hallmark of greatness for all superpowers, both past and present.

Fear. The Soviet people, and especially their leaders suffer from an inferiority complex. Throughout centuries of Russian history and sixty-seven years of communist party rule the country has been economically, socially and militarily backward compared to the empires and states dominating international affairs and other potential enemies. Geography and natural resources have made Russia a target for numerous invasions from both east and west. In most cases the government has not been adequately prepared to defend its territory and people. As a result they have suffered heavy losses, especially during the War of 1812, WW I and most dramatically during the "Great Patriotic War" (WW II) when over 20 million people were killed and more than 2,000 cities and towns were destroyed.

Today Soviet leaders feel they are encircled politically, socially and militarily by unfriendly neighbors and by US and allied military bases and mobile forces such as ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carrier battle groups armed with nuclear weapons. A world map shows the Soviet perception to be correct.

Looking from Moscow to the east they share a 6,000 mile common border with China. Peking considers its interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology to be more accurate and pure than the Soviet version, China has a population of more than one billion, and they now have a few ICBMs capable of reaching Moscow. Exacerbating the problem are continued low levels of armed conflict over border disputes and Chinese refusal to completely normalize relations until the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan, stop supporting Vietnamese armed aggression in Kampuchea and reduce troop levels in both Mongolia and on the Chinese-Soviet border.

To the south, poorly equipped Afghan rebels are holding their own against some 105,000 Soviet and 40,000 Afghan Army troops in what the Soviet Union describes as a counterrevolution to depose the socialist regime of Babrak Karmal. In April 1983 Ayatollah Khomeini outlawed the Tudeh Party, the Moscow-oriented Iranian communist organization, and the three and one-half year old Iran-Iraqi War has disrupted both US and Soviet foreign policy initiatives in the region. The Fundamentalist Islamic Revolution advocated by Khomeini, the charismatic Shiite leader, is considered a threat to the USSR for its potential appeal to the some 30 million Sunni Moslems in Soviet Central Asia. Also on the southern border of the USSR is Turkey, a staunch member of NATO which has total control over access to and egress from the Black Sea on which several key Soviet ports and naval bases are located.

The next contiguous countries are Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, all members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council on Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Behind closed doors Kremlin leaders must question the loyalty of these four states. Romania refuses to allow Soviet troops on its soil even during Warsaw Pact exercises, and since the 1970s President Nicolae Ceausescu has demonstrated national independence by courting both China and the US and criticizing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He also refuses to modernize the Romanian armed forces, choosing instead to sell indigenously produced weapons to Third World clients for hard currency instead of replacing older equipment at home.

The revolutionary uprisings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968, respectively, were brutally suppressed by Warsaw Pact troops led by the Red Army, and in response to the 1981-82 activities of Solidarity the Soviet Union conducted large military exercises on the

Polish border and active "shuttle diplomacy" by both political and military leaders between Warsaw and Moscow to ensure that General Jaruzelski and the Polish Communist Party resolved the issue in a manner satisfactory to the Kremlin. Interviews with many Polish and Czech citizens suggest that the historical mistrust and hatred of the Russians is at least as strong today as it was during Tsarist times. As a result, despite traditional rhetoric proclaiming the common purpose and solidarity of the Socialist Bloc, Soviet leaders and military planners must realistically consider that in time of war they probably will be deserted by large numbers of Warsaw Pact troops. It is highly likely that due to historical animosity significant numbers of East Europeans may even turn upon the Soviets and fight in support of NATO efforts.

To the northwest the Soviet Union shares common borders with Finland and Norway. Most Finns remember the Winter War of 1939-1940 when Stalin invaded Finland and annexed Karelia and the Vyborg district. Today they remain neutral in international affairs and have a special political and economic relationship with Moscow, commonly referred to as "Finlandization," whereby they do not enjoy complete autonomy over their affairs, but are to a degree required to make decisions of which Moscow will approve. Norway is the second NATO country having a common border with the USSR. It is strategically located on the southern side of the sea and air lanes through which Soviet ships and aircraft must pass when enroute the Atlantic.

As for encirclement by US and allied military bases and mobile forces the 1982 Soviet publication, Whence the Threat to Peace, accurately depicts the reason for Kremlin concern.¹ We have indeed deliberately created a 360° presence. In implementing our policy of containment, articulated in 1947 as the Truman Doctrine, we have encircled the

USSR through mutual defense treaties and our forward basing concept which supports both these treaties and other vital national interests. The Soviet perception of US and allied presence is well-founded.

Principal Objectives. The primary objective of Soviet leaders is to ensure the survival of the Motherland and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its leadership. This is being accomplished through the development of a large, modern military establishment which is so formidable in size and capability that no other military power, or coalition of forces, would dare challenge its authority. The secondary objective is to lead the world socialist revolution. They are pursuing this goal by demonstrating the superiority of socialism, achieving recognition as a world power and opportunistically and aggressively taking advantage of social, economic, political and military weakness in the Third World.

Survival of the Motherland is articulated in Article 31 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR which states,

Defense of the Socialist Motherland is one of the most important functions of the state . . . to defend the gains of socialism . . . and territorial integrity of the state, the USSR maintains armed forces and has instituted universal military service.

The duty of the Armed Forces of the USSR . . . is to provide reliable defense of the Socialist Motherland and to be in constant combat readiness, guaranteeing that any aggressor is instantly repulsed.²

How credible is the second objective of leading the world to socialist revolution? Americans and citizens of most other Free World countries are vaguely aware that the Soviets have said they plan to replace capitalism with communism. The subject is raised in grade school and high school when our children read about the Soviet Union and its political system. However, the point is rarely stressed or

explained in detail because very few teachers understand the issue, nor are they fully aware of how serious Soviet leaders are about achieving their stated objective. Occasionally political figures or newspaper columnists remind audiences of this Soviet goal, but they rarely provide contemporary evidence. Therefore, most citizens are apathetic because they believe Marxist-Leninist philosophy to be outdated and they see no immediate threat to our way of life. Besides, the likelihood of such an event occurring is considered so remote that very few people give it serious thought.

In 2084 will our great grandchildren continue to enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by Jeffersonian democracy? If the Soviet Politburo has its way they will not. The basis for the Soviet claim of the ultimate victory of socialism over capitalism is found in The Communist Manifesto which was written in 1848 by Karl Marx, a German social philosopher, and Friedrich Engels, a German economist. They define "bourgeoisie" as the class of modern "capitalists" who own the means of production and employ "wage labour", and "proletariat" as modern "wage-labourers" who own no means of production and "are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live". To Marxists The Communist Manifesto is a sacred book. It is as important and prophetic to them as the Old Testament is to Jews, the Bible is to Christians and the Koran is to Muslims. Key passages applicable to the world socialist revolution include,

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. . . . The essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the

bourgeoisie class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labour. . . . What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all the other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, and conquest of political power by the proletariat.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; . . .

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things. . . . The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling class tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!³

In spring 1920 Lenin wrote,

Now we already have considerable international experience which most definitely shows that certain fundamental features of our revolution have a significance which is not . . . Russian only, but international. I speak here of international significance . . . to mean the international validity or the historical inevitability of a repetition on an international scale of what has taken place in our country . . .

But as matters stand at the present moment in history the Russian model reveals to all countries . . . their near and inevitable future. . . . Herein lies the international 'significance' (in the narrow sense of the term) of Soviet power, and of the fundamentals of Bolshevik theory and tactics . . .⁴

In the event the reader considers the writings of Marx and Lenin be outdated or irrelevant the following examples are offered as evide

that this objective retains very high priority in current Soviet planning and decision-making. From Article 28 of the 1977 Constitution,

The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favorable for building communism in the USSR, safeguarding state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.⁵

In a November 1977 speech to a joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, which generally equates to our executive branch of government, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, roughly comparable to our legislative branch, Leonid Brezhnev opened as follows:

Sixty years ago, . . . the workers and peasants of Russia overthrew the . . . capitalists and land-owners. That was the first victorious socialist revolution in world history.

. . . the epoch of the world's revolutionary rebirth, . . . opened the road along which hundreds of millions of people are marching today and upon which the whole of mankind is destined to embark.

Brezhnev concluded by saying:

We are advancing toward the epoch when socialism . . . will be the prevailing social system on earth. . . . This is no beautiful dream. This is a real prospect. It is daily brought nearer by our work and struggles, comrades. . . . This work is the continuation of the cause begun by the October Revolution.⁶

On 25 April 1984, Constantin Chernenko addressed the Central Committee Commission responsible for drafting a new party program to be presented at the 27th Party Congress scheduled for 1986.

We have no doubt at all that socialism will ultimately win that [socialist vs capitalist] competition. At the same time, while stressing that today's capitalism is doomed by history, it is necessary to bear in mind that under conditions of

its general crisis, too, it still possesses quite substantial and far from exhausted reserves for development.

Chernenko directed that the new program deal with specific domestic and foreign policy issues stressing "peace efforts" since the triumph of the Soviet system depends upon these policies. He further stated that the new program is to eliminate predictions of when socialism will defeat capitalism. The last party program was presented by Nikita Khrushchev in 1961. His predictions have failed to reach fruition resulting in a degree of embarrassment for the Brezhnev and Andropov regimes. Khrushchev asserted that physical labor in the USSR would be eliminated in the 1960s, that by 1970 Soviet workers would enjoy the shortest working day of any industrial country and the USSR would outstrip the US in per capita output, and that by 1990 the USSR would transition from socialism to communism, the ultimate stage in social development.⁷

Today the socialist revolution is being aggressively pursued. There is no secret plan nor is there a specific timetable for the victory. The Soviets are clearly telling us that it is their preordained, historical destiny to eliminate capitalism and replace it with socialism and ultimately communism. They would prefer to do it by peaceful means, but they envision the West opposing what Communists call the "inevitable march of history" and possibly using military force to do so. Thus the Soviet Union must be fully prepared to "defend the gains of socialism" militarily, economically and ideologically.

Behavior Which Accomplishes Soviet Objectives. Three elements of Soviet national security policy are apparent: war avoidance, war preparation and military doctrine which stresses the achievement of total victory. We in the Free World must understand that Soviet leaders do

not, under any circumstances, want a war between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and North Atlantic Treaty Organization nor between the USSR and China. Except for a reunified Germany with a western orientation, no other state or coalition of states poses a major threat to the Motherland or the Party.

War avoidance is given the highest priority. It is accomplished first by building and constantly upgrading the largest, most modern and highly visible defensive force in the world. Such power in the hands of leaders who have not hesitated to demonstrate resolve by shooting down intruding airliners in 1978 and 1983, or invading neighboring countries to protect the gains of socialism as in 1956, 1968 and 1979, creates a realistic deterrent for those who might seek to challenge Soviet authority.

The Soviet populace is attuned to paying the price of national security through constant reminders of the Great Patriotic War and the current bellicose policies and actions of the US, NATO and China. Propaganda is tailored depending upon the state of relations between Moscow and the potential aggressor. At present US and NATO military budget issues, high visibility weapons programs and President Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric are highlighted and frequently orchestrated by the Soviet media as proof of capitalist plans to place socialism "on the ash heap of history." Soviet rhetoric directed toward the Chinese, popular in the 1960s and 1970s, has been dramatically reduced as Moscow is currently interested in normalizing relations with this neighbor which is recognized as a superpower by virtue of its nuclear weapons capability.

Bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, especially those emphasizing arms control and disarmament, are skillfully negotiated and honored to the legal letter of the law as interpreted by

Soviet lawyers and Party leaders. (The Western concept of the "spirit of law" is alien to Soviet thinking and therefore those who conclude written agreements with the USSR should not be deluded by the belief that they will honor such aspects of a contract or treaty.) While participating in treaty negotiations Soviet leaders reach for the moral highground by widely proclaiming peaceful intent and proposing declarations of "no first use" and the establishment of nuclear-free zones, positions which appeal to significant numbers of peace activists throughout the Free World. However, such proposals have yet to include provisions for realistic on-site verification to prevent cheating, a point never made in Soviet rhetoric.

Prior to the mid-1970s direct military action by Soviet combat units was taken only to protect vital interests close to the Motherland as demonstrated in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in frequent border clashes with the Chinese since the 1961 Sino-Soviet rift. A new technique was introduced in 1976 and 1977 when Cuban troops entered the fighting in Angola and Ethiopia, respectively, as surrogates for Soviet forces. This approach again places the USSR on the moral high ground internationally while demonstrating to the world the resolve of the fraternal socialist community to support the just cause of "wars of national liberation." In 1979 when the Politburo perceived that the fabric of socialism was once again threatened, this time in neighboring Afghanistan, Soviet combat troops were deployed just as they were in Hungary and Czechoslovakia to preserve the socialist revolutions in those countries.

Another technique for avoiding war is to claim one's own actions as righteous and justified while accusing potential enemies of disrupting the peace process and lowering the nuclear threshold. The aggressive

propagandizing of issues such as the deployment of single warhead PERSHING II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) into Europe is an excellent example of keeping competitors off balance by forcing them to defend and justify their policies and actions. The Kremlin's goals appear to have been two-fold. Seizing upon the natural inclination of West German peace activists to resist the NATO decision the Soviets apparently felt they might even achieve their long held goal of splitting the NATO alliance and ultimately weakening this potential adversary. Secondly they sought sympathy for their position by complaining that by deploying missiles which can reach the Motherland in 6-10 minutes the US violated SALT I which deals with strategic systems. By Soviet definition any weapon which can reach the USSR is strategic. However, the fact that SS-20s, each with three MIRVs, launched from inside the Soviet Union can reach London, Paris, Madrid, Rome and Athens is ignored in Kremlin arguments.

The Soviets respect American, NATO and Chinese military power. Therefore, of greatest importance in war avoidance is to refrain from encroaching upon vital US-NATO and Chinese interests, and to avoid initiating hostilities unless vital Soviet interests are at stake. US vital interests are defined through instruments such as mutual defense treaties with key allies including NATO, Japan and South Korea, presidential statements of our moral commitment to Israel and the 1962 Kennedy Doctrine and 1980 Carter Doctrine stating US resolve to fight in defense of our vital interests in the Caribbean and Persian Gulf, respectively. Recognizing that lines have been clearly drawn Kremlin leaders are highly unlikely to directly challenge our resolve in these regions. Soviet ideological and economic support to wars of national

liberation in these regions will continue to be waged, however, but military confrontation directly involving Soviet armed forces will be strictly avoided. Since the economic survival of the US largely depends upon strategic sea lines of communication it is equally unlikely that Moscow would hold at risk choke points such as the Suez and Panama Canals, the Cape of Good Hope and Straits of Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb and Malacca.

As for vital Kremlin interests, the only circumstances under which it is envisioned that Soviet troops would initiate hostilities would be to preempt imminent threats to Soviet or Bloc territory as in border disputes, or where Moscow-oriented communist parties in neighboring socialist states lose control of their own "socialist revolution" as occurred in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. It is very likely that had the Polish Communist Party not taken a firm stand to crush Solidarity Soviet troops conducting large scale maneuvers on the Soviet side of the border would have intervened. The threat of a reunified East and West Germany having a western orientation also could result in the Soviets initiating hostilities.

Finally, war avoidance also involves establishing an international reputation for predictability and resolve. Since the end of WW II the Soviets have in fact militarily intervened three times to preserve the viability and solidarity of the socialist camp. They have shot down at least two American reconnaissance aircraft and two Korean airliners, and when opportunities have opened for them to export influence and support wars of national liberation, they have predictably stepped forward to assist. Such predictability sensitizes the international community to Soviet resolve and most governments refrain from behavior which could possibly lead to military confrontation with the USSR.

The second element of national security policy is war preparation. While actively seeking to avoid war Kremlin leaders concurrently are preparing to defend the Motherland. Key highway and railroad bridges are guarded round-the-clock to prevent their destruction by saboteurs. As noted earlier, Article 31 of the 1977 states that the Soviet armed forces are maintained in "constant combat readiness" to repel aggressors.

Recognizing the superiority of Western technology the Soviets give the highest economic priority to developing new strategic and general purpose weapons systems to prevent the US and NATO from achieving an overwhelming lead. This is one reason why Moscow builds and maintains in Europe significantly larger numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery. What the Soviets lack in quality they make up in quantity. The second reason for maintaining large inventories of weapons such as ICBMs is to deter combined attacks from the four other countries possessing such weapons, the US, United Kingdom, France and China.

Soviet society is highly militarized. The Young Pioneers, the communist party organization for 10-14 year old boys and girls, conduct "zarnitsa" ("lightning") exercises during summer camp. The campers are formed into squads and companys and they use military organization and tactics to achieve territorial objectives. During the last two years of high school all students, male and female alike, receive 140 hours of compulsory military instruction. The boys stress squad tactics, small arms and hand grenades while the girls receive more first aid and civil defense training. Between the ages of 17 and 27 all males, except those exempt for physical reasons or deferred because they are in medical or agricultural studies, are drafted for military service. After two years

in the Army or Air Force, or three years in the Navy they return to civilian life and remain in the reserve until age 55. Such militarization of the male cohort provides a pool of manpower, trained in at least basic military skills, which can be mobilized during times of crisis to flesh out the Category II and III units which are organized throughout the USSR.

The 1972 SALT I Treaty between the US and USSR included the ABM Treaty which permits signatories to defend either the national capital or its ICBM fields with a maximum of 100 ABM launches. The US abandoned plans for the "SAFEGUARD" system. The Soviets, however, exercised their prerogative and are completing a 100 launcher system to protect Moscow and its environs. They also have established a nationwide civil defense organization and have adequate shelters to ensure survival of at least key party and government leaders as well as industrial and agricultural personnel essential to reconstituting the economy after a nuclear war. The Soviets do not, however, conduct mass evacuation drills and, like their American counterparts, the majority of Soviet citizens fatalistically view the results of a nuclear exchange.

The third and final element of security policy is war winning. The Soviet populace and all military personnel are psychologically attuned to preserving the Motherland at all costs as demonstrated in the 1977 Constitution and the Soviet Military Oath. From Article 62, "Defense of the Socialist Motherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR.", and Article 63, "Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honorable duty of Soviet citizens."⁸ The Military Oath, sworn individually by every officer and enlisted man in the armed forces, is even more explicit. "I swear to defend it [my

homeland] bravely and wisely with all my strength and in honor, without regard for my life to achieve a complete victory over the enemy."⁹

A summary of the basic tenets of military doctrine is as follows. Make every effort to avoid war. If war begins keep the conflict at the conventional level. The Soviet armed forces and people, however, must be prepared for the eventuality of nuclear war. Employ deception, surprise and mobility to overwhelm the enemy with massive firepower. The Soviet Union will not use nuclear weapons first. At the commencement of hostilities use conventional weapons and specially trained forces to destroy enemy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, storage facilities and C³ associated with nuclear warfare to prevent escalation to a nuclear exchange. The use of a small number of nuclear weapons to demonstrate resolve is unacceptable. Once the enemy launches its first tactical nuclear weapons the USSR will respond with all nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic. Be constantly ready to launch nuclear weapons on tactical warning or retaliate after absorbing a counterforce strike. (Note that the SS-17 and SS-18 are "cold-launch" systems which provide a rapid re-load capability.) Retain a strategic nuclear reserve for use after the enemy has nearly exhausted his entire inventory to force the war to be terminated on terms favorable to the USSR.¹⁰ In recent years, while continuing to stress "non-first use", several Kremlin leaders have made it clear that if their intelligence reveals enemy preparations to use nuclear weapons they will preempt. One such assertion was made in July 1982 by Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Ustinov Minister of Defense, who stated, "The Soviet Union would preempt a strategic nuclear attack on the USSR even in the preparatory stages."¹¹

The second principal objective of the CPSU is to lead the world socialist revolution. To accomplish this goal the Soviets must demonstrate the superiority of socialism, achieve recognition as a world power and exploit social, economic, political and military weakness in target countries.

The superiority of socialism is highlighted by stressing the fairness and morality of Soviet policies and objectives. Underpaid workers laboring long hours in unhealthy conditions and living in squalor with their wives and underfed, sick children, as well as campesinos (peasants) engaged in back breaking work in the mud or baking sun for an absentee landlord who pays meager wages and overcharges them for rent and facilities, are easily attracted by persuasive moral arguments and the promise of a better life.

Since socialism is a socioeconomic system it is essential for the USSR to develop their own strong, diverse and viable economy to attract potential client governments or left leaning opposition political parties. The Soviet economy today, however, is relatively poor and unproductive compared to the industrialized capitalist nations. In fact, the low standard of living for most Soviet families in the rural sector and many in urban areas approximate that of citizens of many Third World countries. For example, very few collective and state farm families have indoor plumbing. This requires them to draw water from the village well and carry it in buckets to their log cabin (or adobe house with thatched roof which is the customary domicile in the arid regions of Soviet Central Asia). Laundry is washed by hand in streams and ponds. In cities and towns some 20% of the people still live in communal apartments where two to five families share one kitchen and bathroom. Soviet women complain that they must spend two to three hours

daily standing in line to buy food and other consumer goods to support their families. And the chronic shortage of meat, which has existed since before WW II, continues to plague Soviet consumers.

Except for military hardware, farm machinery and machine tools the USSR has very few goods to offer the Free World in international trade. As for consumer goods, many items continue to be shoddily manufactured and therefore rejected by the people. In his 26 December 1983 address to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Yuri Andropov said,

. . . of recreational and household goods intended for sale in 1984, trade organizations refused to purchase 500 thousand TV sets, 115 thousand radio sets, almost 250 thousand photographic cameras, one and a half million watches and clocks, 160 thousand domestic refrigerators and a number of other products because of the disparity between the quality and assortment of these goods and the demands made by the buyers.

He also admonished party and ministry leaders for weaknesses in planning and management and for not eliminating waste and inefficiency which is commonplace throughout the Soviet economy.¹²

Soon after assuming power as Party General Secretary Andropov initiated an aggressive campaign against rampant corruption which he perceived as bleeding the economy. In January 1984 the Kremlin executed the highest level party members convicted to date for major economic crimes.¹³

In March 1984 a Pravda article noted that, as in years past the economy is behind schedule in meeting five-year plan goals in industry, construction, agriculture and transportation. The article stated, "It is necessary to take any steps to uproot idleness, bribe-taking, speculation, theft and drunkenness--in other words, everything alien to our outlook and way of life as well as our morals."¹⁴

The "workers' paradise" promised by Marxism-Leninism has not become a reality for the 270 million citizens living in the USSR, nor does it appear that it will become so in the foreseeable future. Outside observers must question the validity of socialist claims that theirs is a superior economic system, for of the some 15 countries following the socialist path to socioeconomic development today, not one has a standard of living comparable to any of the major capitalist countries such as Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Britain, Canada or the US.

In view of the foregoing how do the Soviets hold up their economy as a showpiece of socialist achievement? Simply by showing visitors only the best side of their way of life. This might best be referred to as the "Potemkin village deception". (In 1787, four years after annexing the Crimea, Catherine the Great hosted Emperor Joseph II of Austria, the King of Poland and the French and English ambassadors accredited to St. Petersburg on a tour of the region. She wanted to impress her foreign guests with the progress Russia was making for political reasons and to encourage foreign economic investment.¹⁵ Her Viceroy, Grigori A. Potemkin, built "movie-set" villages, assembled well-dressed "peasants" and successfully created the illusion that the land was heavily populated and the people were prosperous.)¹⁶

Tourists and officials visiting the USSR today follow very busy schedules. They stay in the very best hotels (most of which have been designed and built by either Finnish or Swedish contractors) and their meals include meat, salads and other items not found in either state stores or the farmers markets. They are moved about in air conditioned buses and cars past store windows exhibiting a variety of modern products. These items usually are not to be found inside the store. If

official foreign visitors are shown an apartment it is either a "typical workers apartment" (maintained for show purposes) or one inhabited by their host who is a member of the communist party elite and therefore definitely does not live in a "typical" apartment. Though tourists are not prevented from leaving their tour groups during the day very few of them speak or read Russian and they are uncomfortable venturing forth on their own in a society in which only Russian is spoken. Besides, the itinerary includes all of the sights tourists wish to see in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Samarkand and the other cities visited and they are thrilled with the prospect of seeing the historical attractions they have always read about. They are not exposed to the realities of Soviet life such as farmers markets, secondhand furniture and clothing stores, barren grocery shelves and 300 people standing in line to buy rubber boots from the shipment just arrived from Romania. Visitors are moved from city to city by rail or Aeroflot aircraft and therefore do not experience old women and young children carrying buckets of water to their log cabin, women washing the family laundry in the pond, or men plowing fields or pulling farm wagons with draft animals instead of tractors. Thus the spirit of Potemkin villages lives on and the communist party leaders and bureaucrats from Nicaragua, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam and other Latin American, African or Asian countries are impressed with the economy of Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, just as the royal visitors and diplomats were impressed by Catherine's economy 200 years ago.

Another means of demonstrating the superiority of socialism is through portraying the "good life" enjoyed by Soviet citizens. The foregoing describes one method of showing-off Soviet achievements.

Soviet leaders, escort personnel for foreign delegations and Intour tour guides proudly point out how the 1977 Constitution guarantees right to full employment as well as rest and leisure, free medical and maintenance in old age, sickness and disability, the right to low cost housing and utilities, free education, freedom of scientific, technical and artistic work and human rights including freedom of the press, speech, assembly and the right to profess any religion.¹⁷ When challenged as to why religious believers who teach religion to children under the age of 18 are frequently sentenced to three years in forced labor camps, or why Andrei Sakharov is in exile in the city of Gorky they respond by citing Article 39 of the 1977 Constitution which states "Enjoyment by citizens of their rights and freedoms must not be to the detriment of the interests of society or the state, or infringe upon the rights of other citizens."¹⁸

Performing artists and athletes who win gold medals in international competition also demonstrate the superiority of the socialist system. For this reason the Soviets identify 8-10 year old children exhibit potential in their art form or athletic event and place them in special schools where, in addition to usual school work, they are taught, coached and molded by former prima ballerinas or olympic gold medalists. Eventually only the very best emerge to represent the ideals of Marxism-Leninism in competition with artists and athletes who are products of the capitalist system.

Technological "firsts" are essential to impressing developing nations with socialist superiority. Sputnik, followed by Yuri Gagarin's orbital mission, brought tremendous credit to Soviet science and technology. The Kremlin was so eager to be the first to place men on the moon that the day before Apollo 11 lifted off the Soviets launched

lunar mission with three cosmonauts. The rocket exploded killing all three men. No information about this attempt and failure was ever released to either the Soviet people or the international community. (A Soviet dissident related the incident to the author and intelligence officials have confirmed the report.)

The supersonic transport (SST) is another example of Soviet efforts to claim technological superiority. In 1975, some six months before Air France and British Airways inaugurated regular Concorde service to the US the companies engaged in a media blitz which included schedules, fares and other information for customers. The Soviets were known to be testing their own SST, the TU-144. About ten days before the initial Concorde flight Moscow announced that the TU-144 would enter regularly scheduled service three days later, one week before the Concorde. Amid great fanfare a TU-144 flew from Moscow to Alma Ata, the only other Soviet city with a runway long enough for this new aircraft, and the Kremlin claimed credit for this significant technological "first." The world was never told, however, that the aircraft carried no passengers, only mail and cargo, and it was unable to return to Moscow until about two months later. In fact, even today, in 1984 the SST carries no passengers. Every Wednesday there is a mail and cargo flight to Alma Ata and return. Thus we find another application for the "Potemkin village deception".

Finally, people wishing to favorably impress others usually stress the positive and ignore the negative. The Soviets have developed this technique into a fine art. They manage their news very carefully to ensure that negative events are rarely revealed or officially acknowledged. When Aeroflot aircraft crash or ships sink, unless foreigners are involved the media and people are not informed. Thus in 1973 when a

passenger liner caught on fire and sank near Odessa with loss of life, and in September 1974 when a Soviet Navy KASHIN class destroyer sank near Sevastopol with a loss of nearly two hundred men, the events remained secret even though Western media carried the stories. Not until February 1983, more than three years after the invasion did the Soviet Press acknowledge that Soviet troops have been engaged in combat. The initial report noted that three Soviets had been killed by counter-revolutionaries. Western sources estimate that at least 5,000 Soviet troops died in the first three years.

Earlier in this paper it was noted that throughout history the dominant world players have combined raw military power, the resolve of leaders to use that power and a strong viable economy to achieve recognition of their position. Since the end of WW II Kremlin leaders have been attempting to bring these factors together so that they too might finally be recognized as a leader in the world community. After Moscow tested its atomic and hydrogen bombs, in 1949 and 1953, respectively, and demonstrated in 1954 that it possessed bombers to deliver the weapons, the world began to regard the USSR as a world power. In 1957 the launch of Sputnik started the race to develop ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles for deterrence. As noted previously the Soviet economy has many weaknesses and it does not even begin to equate to the economies of the major capitalist countries. However, since the mid-1960s the USSR has indeed been recognized as a superpower because of its armed forces and the military threat which many governments and people perceive the Kremlin to pose.

Moscow also seeks recognition as an economic giant. However, as stated earlier, the application of Marxist-Leninist theory to practical

economic problems in the USSR and other socialist countries has not been successful to date. The principal causes appear to be a lack of motivation and enthusiasm among workers and farmers, and a general suffocation of factors which stimulate economies. Of considerable importance to the future is the economic potential which lies untapped in the USSR. Physically it is the largest country in the world. Vast reserves of most natural resources abound, and the population of some 270 million people creates a significant manpower pool. The existence of these assets suggest that someday, if the communist party significantly modifies its inflexible control over the economy, the USSR could in fact become the economic example to which Kremlin leaders aspire.

Negotiations and agreements and treaties with other major countries, especially the greatest superpower of all, the US, greatly enhance the standing of the USSR among Third World people and governments. They are impressed that even the US must respect the positions of the socialist superpower and that in many areas of the world major decisions are not made, nor problems solved without input from Moscow.

Finally, highly publicized official visits to and from the USSR by national leaders contribute greatly to Soviet recognition as a world power. Of particular importance have been Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the US for the Camp David summit meeting and subsequent, "we will bury you" speech in the UN, and President Nixon's 1974 tour to the USSR. The recent funerals of Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov have again focused upon the important position of the USSR in world affairs as a steady stream of presidents and prime ministers have passed through the Kremlin to pay homage to the fallen leaders.

Another important instrument used by the leaders of the world socialist revolution is the exploitation of social, economic, political

and military weakness in target countries. Many nations in Latin America, Africa and Asia are ripe for planting the seeds of socialism. El Salvador is a classic example. It is a country about the size of Connecticut with a population of some 5 million. According to Colonel John Waghelstein, USA, commander of the 55 man US Military Group in San Salvador, April 1982 until July 1983, 35% of the land is owned by some 1,000 families while 185,000 families control less than 17% of the land.¹⁹ The peasant farmers work hard for their landlords but they and their families live in abject poverty. Disease claims the lives of many children and medical care for those surviving childhood is rudimentary. The large towns and cities are crammed with unemployed workers seeking any job to support their families whose squalid living conditions in run down apartments or shantytowns are often worse than those in the rural sector. The elected government is on the verge of bankruptcy and unable to attract foreign investors. They have borrowed the maximum from international lending institutions. The people want three regular meals per day, adequate shelter, medical care, educational opportunities for their children, and some prospects for upward mobility during their lifetime. Obviously the capitalists who control the government and the economy are unable or unwilling to meet the people's needs. In fact they continue to exploit the peasants and workers while the wealthy jet to Miami Beach to visit friends and family and pursue business transactions which make them wealthier. This exploiting class has no real loyalty to the Salvadoran people. As long as their ranches, farms and light industries produce a profit they are satisfied.

Given conditions such as these it is easy to understand why the peasants and unemployed workers are attracted to the Marxist principle

of, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." and to the promise of guaranteed full employment, and collective and state farms in which everyone shares equally.

El Salvador also offers an example of exploitable political and military weakness. The extreme right indiscriminately murders those believed to be aligned to the left, and those in the political center are perceived by the people as responsible for the deterioration of the economy and perpetuation of the feudal social system. The military is small and poorly led, equipped and trained. It frequently demonstrates a lack of initiative, enthusiasm and courage in providing security for the populace. Many senior officers and officials are from the wealthy upper class and abuse their positions for personal gain. Thus there is little respect for, and confidence in either the political or military systems. These conditions, coupled with economic and social deterioration, make the country a prime target for a "war of national liberation" which will allow the oppressed to overthrow their masters and organize their government and economy in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles. Moscow is fully prepared to not only provide moral support and ideological guidelines, but to lend financial assistance, organizational talent, weapons and military equipment for conducting an aggressive revolution. In the case of El Salvador, Soviet advisors are not assigned an active in-country role. Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutionaries are on-scene instead. Wars of national liberation in Nicaragua, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Kampuchea and Laos, to name a few, include direct involvement by Soviet military and civilian advisors.

Conclusions. In order to understand Soviet behavior it is essential to know what Kremlin leaders respect, fear and have identified as their national objectives. They respect military power, resolve to use

that power whenever it suits their purpose and a strong, healthy economy. Their fears reflect the possibility of attack from one country or a combination of countries which encircle the Motherland either territorially or with military bases and mobile strategic forces. Their objectives are to ensure the survival of the Motherland and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to lead the world on the path to socialism.

To accomplish their objectives the Soviets require armed forces so large and well-equipped that they command the respect of all potential enemies. Their accomplishments in all endeavors must demonstrate the superiority of socialism over capitalism, and they must be prepared to exploit any weakness detected in countries which they perceive as potential converts to their Marxist-Leninist cause.

How should the Free World deal with Moscow? By creating stability, remaining militarily strong, demonstrating resolve to use military force to defend vital national interests, promoting greater mutual understanding between Free World and Kremlin leaders, restoring health to our economies and aggressively competing with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of the Third World.

The first step toward creating stability is to deal with Moscow in an adult relationship rather than with rhetoric and childish name calling.

As the only country capable of totally destroying the USSR we in the US must continue to clearly demonstrate through our actions that neither we, nor our allies, will ever attack the Soviet Union or her allies. It is essential, however, that we remain so strong militarily that the Kremlin will always respect our strength and resolve and conclude that they cannot initiate hostilities and win. We do not even

require parity with the USSR in weapons systems to accomplish this objective. We should inform Moscow and the entire world that we are no longer interested in maintaining parity, only sufficient force to cause irreparable damage to their country, economy and population in the event they attack first.

Assuming the validity of the earlier discussion of war avoidance, and that Soviet leaders are no more interested in a nuclear war with NATO than we with them, now is the time for us to accept some small risk and demonstrate our goodwill in hopes that Moscow will follow suit. Since walking out of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations and refusing to return to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in late 1983 Kremlin leaders have been saying that only concrete actions by the US will bring them back to the negotiating table. Today the USSR possesses more strategic launchers while we have more warheads. However, because of our technological edge in targetting, MIRV accuracy and the present invulnerability of our ballistic missile submarines, we currently enjoy overall strategic equality with them. For the past two years the Soviets have pointed out this general equality as they have complained about US plans for new strategic weapons. They have been willing to negotiate dramatic reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles as long as we do not upgrade our present systems.

The US, therefore, should take advantage of this Soviet perception of equality. We should unilaterally freeze, for eighteen months, all activity related to the development, testing and deployment of the MX and TRIDENT D-5 missiles, the B-1 and STEALTH bombers and the submarine launched TOMAHAWK land attack missile. (We also should consider an on-site inspection program which would encourage the Soviets to visit

select facilities, taking care not to reveal so much about our missile projects that they would benefit technologically from what they see.) Our decision should be announced publicly. It should be explained that this is a dramatic, concrete action taken to clearly demonstrate to Moscow our sincerity in moving forward on arms control issues. It also should be made clear that this is a unilateral action, that we are hopeful Soviet leaders will also suspend all similar development, testing and deployment activity, and that if they do not, at the end of eighteen months we will assume they were in fact not serious about reversing the arms race, and we will resume our programs with the goal of upgrading and modernizing our systems to ensure the USSR never achieves overwhelming superiority.

Concomitant with this modified freeze we must encourage resumption of arms control negotiations in all areas, both nuclear and conventional. Our positions must be imaginative and we must accept some risk such as publicly conceding to the Soviets a degree of superiority so they can comfortably deal with what they perceive as simultaneous threats from both east and west. Negotiations should be conducted privately, not publicly where participants are prone to showmanship and grandstanding.

Economically our first priority must be to begin reducing our budget deficit with the goal of eliminating it in five years, regardless of how painful it is to do so. A strong economy is absolutely essential for successfully competing with Marxism-Leninism.

The Soviets need economic cooperation with the West. As the third most populous country behind China and India they represent tremendous potential as a market for consumer goods. We must imaginatively explore

this area and should expand scientific cooperation to include medicine, agriculture and more space projects.

At the earliest opportunity President Reagan, or his successor should meet with Konstantin Chernenko or his successor. Not in a summit meeting where major agreements are usually signed, rather in a "getting-to-know-you" atmosphere similar to the president's April 1984 visit to China. Such familiarization visits to each other's country would clearly demonstrate a degree of stability, enhance the leaders' understanding of one another and each other's perspectives, and begin the long and tortuous process of kindling a spark of mutual trust.

Building upon contact between our leaders we should encourage expanded people-to-people contact. In the past, and at present it is a one-way street for Westerners to visit the USSR. Only select, reliable Soviet citizens are permitted foreign travel. One of our long-range objectives should be to urge a relaxation of Soviet restrictions.

In the event of a severe crisis between the US and USSR which appears to be heading toward a possible nuclear confrontation, American leaders must be prepared to make a dramatic gesture to demonstrate that we will not order the release of nuclear weapons. Non-stop contact via the upgraded Washington-Moscow hotline is essential. However, our resolve to prevent a nuclear war would be more clearly stated if, under such circumstances, the President, the Speaker of the House and the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate, and their entire families, to include all children and grandchildren, were to fly to Moscow where our leaders could confer face-to-face with Kremlin leaders to defuse the crisis. Such a simple act of good faith could very well ensure the survival of mankind.

The creation of stability and promotion of mutual understanding will not dissuade Kremlin leaders from their long range objective of successfully converting the entire world to socialism and ultimately to the highest stage of socioeconomic development, communism. These improvements should, in fact, result in an atmosphere more conducive to Soviet achievement of that goal.

Herein lies the challenge to the Free World. Recognizing the nature, the strategy and the tactics of our rival, we can compete. Military competition is out of the question. It is too expensive and potentially too dangerous. Ideology and economics are the strength of the Free World. Western ideology is founded upon the Judeo-Christian ethic, the rule of law and the value of each man, woman and child in society. Our economies are based upon the principles of free enterprise, competition and innovation.

We are at war with the USSR and have been since the late 1950s when colonies began to seek independence, some peacefully, many through violence. It is an ideological and economic war which is gradually expanding in scope and spreading throughout the continents of Africa, Asia, North (Central) and South America and even Europe. The objective of this competition is the future social, economic and political alignment of the Third World and ultimately the industrial world. If our way of life, our ideals, freedoms and property are to be the legacy we pass to future generations, we must launch our own economic and ideological offensive now. The US, in close cooperation with other leaders such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Italy and Brazil, must innovatively pool economic and ideological resources and our technological and organizational talent. We must concentrate upon eliminating the social, economic and political weaknesses in the Third World which

provide fertile ground in which the seeds of socialism have been, and will continue to be planted and nurtured by the USSR.

The ultimate goal of the USSR is to lead the world socialist revolution.

The Communists . . . openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. . . . They have a world to win.²⁰
Karl Marx, 1848

. . . socialism . . . will be the prevailing social system on earth. . . . This is no beautiful dream. This is a real prospect. It is daily brought nearer by our work and struggles, comrades.²¹
Leonid Brezhnev, 1977

We have no doubt at all that socialism will ultimately win that [socialist vs capitalist] competition. . . . Today's capitalism is doomed by history.²²
Constantin Chernenko, 1984

Soviet behavior supports their claims. We have the ideological and economic power. But do we have the collective resolve to deny them their ultimate victory?

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