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**INSURGENT AND TERRORIST GROUPS
IN LATIN AMERICA**

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CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
TASK ONE	
<u>Historical Background and Typology of Terrorism and Insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere</u>	5
A. Matters of definition	5
Targets	6
Aims	6
Scope	7
Size	7
Level of Organization	8
Public Support	8
Leadership Background	9
Effectiveness	9
B. Background of the Violent Left in the Western Hemisphere	11
C. The Orthodox Communist Parties	13
TASK TWO	
<u>Ideologies of Revolutionary Warfare in Latin America</u>	22
Orthodox Communist parties	23
Cuba's Appeal and Ideological Influence	28
Anarchist-Marxist Influences	34
The Maoists	37
The Trotskyites	41
The Role of the Church	43
TASK THREE	
<u>Violence on the Right</u>	47
The Ideological Roots of the Violent Right in Latin America	48
Terrorism on the Right?	50
The Aims of Right-Wing Terrorism	57
The Methods of the Violent Right and Its Structure	58
Anti-Marxist Guerrillas and Terrorism	63

TASK FOUR

<u>Tactics, Trends, and Assessment of the Guerrillas of the Left</u>	65
Infiltration of the Government Apparatus	67
The Combination of Legal, Para-legal and Military Action	68

TASK FIVE

<u>A Compendium of Terrorist and Insurgent Groups in Latin America</u>	77
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I Leftist Groups

ARGENTINA

Partido Comunista Revolucionario-PCR	97
Movimiento Peronista Montonero-Montoneros	104
Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo-ERP	119

BOLIVIA

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional-ELN	133
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR	146

BRAZIL

Acao Libertadora Nacional-ALN	153
Movimento Revolucionario-8-MR-8	165
Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionario-PCBR	172
Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria-VPR	180

CHILE

Partido Comunista de Chile-PCCh	188
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR	201

COLOMBIA

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional-ELN	218
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC	229
Ejercito Popular de Liberacion-EPL	240
Movimiento de Autodefensas Obrera-MAO	249
Movimiento 19 de April-M-19	261

ECUADOR

Frente Radical Alfarista-FRA	264
------------------------------	-----

EL SALVADOR

Partido Comunista de El Salvador-PCES	267
Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion-FPL	282
Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo-ERP	303
Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional-FARN	325
Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de Centro America-PRTC	341

GUADELOUPE

Groupe d'Organisation Nationale de la Guadeloupe-GONG	351
L'Alliance Revolutionnaire Caraibe-ARC	354

GUATEMALA

Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo-PGT	359
Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre-MR-13	371
Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes-FAR	382
Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas-ORPA	402
Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres-EGP	414
Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo-MRP	432

HAITI

Parti Unifié des Communistes Haitiens-PUCH	435
--	-----

HONDURAS

Partido Comunista de Honduras-PCH	440
Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de Centroamerica-PRTC	445
Frente Morazanista para la Liberacion de Honduras-Frente Morazanista-FMLH	452
Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias Lorenzo Zelaya-Lorenzo Zelaya	457

-	Movimento Popular de Liberacion Cinchoneros-Cinchoneros	461
-	<u>NICARAGUA</u>	
-	Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional-FSLN	467
-	<u>PERU</u>	
-	Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario-FIR	488
-	Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional-ELN	498
-	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR	505
-	Vanguardia Revolucionaria-VR	519
-	Partido Comunista Peruano (Sendero Luminoso)-Sendero Luminoso	524
-	<u>URUGUAY</u>	
-	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional Tupamaros-Tupamaros	540
-	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Orientales-FARO	558
-	<u>VENEZUELA</u>	
-	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR	562
-	Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional-FALN	571
-	Partido Bandera Roja-Bandera Roja-PBR	581

II. Non-Leftist Groups

ARGENTINA

Alianza Anticomunista Argentina-AAA 588

BOLIVIA

Esquadron de la Muerte 591

BRAZIL

Escuadro da Morte 593

CHILE

Patria y Libertad 597

COLOMBIA

Muerte a los Sequestradores-MAS 600

EL SALVADOR

Brigada Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez 603

Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista-ESA 607

Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista-ORDEN 612

Union Guerrerra Blanca-UGB 618

GUATEMALA

Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista-ESA 622

HONDURAS

Ejercito de Lucha Anticomunista-ELA 626

NICARAGUA

Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense-FDN 630

Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica-ARDE 636

Unidad Democratica Nicaraguense-Fuerzas Revolucionarias
de Nicaragua-UDN-FRN 645

Fuerza Revolucionaria Miskito, Sumu, Rama-MISURA 648

INSURGENT AND TERRORIST GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA

Introduction

Compared with Africa or Asia, Latin America has reached a far higher degree of political sophistication and has developed closer ties with West European and North American ideological and intellectual traditions. This has historically been true of ideological currents on both the Right and the Left. Fascism had some imitators in Latin America during and immediately after World War II, and at least two of them, Getulio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Peron in Argentina, were still in power in the 1950s, when European fascism was intellectually and politically in complete decline outside of the Iberian Peninsula. The strength of the Spanish and Portuguese fascists helps to account for the survival of their epigones in South America, considering the linguistic, cultural, and historical ties between the two regions. On the other hand, the fact that fascism took root in South America later than in Europe reflects the common Latin American pattern of importing European ideas only after a few years or even decades of delay. The same pattern can be seen in the case of the ideologies of the Left, with the difference that the latter were older than the former, and therefore appeared in Latin America earlier.

The pattern of assimilation and imitation of European ideas and ideologies in Latin America is a very complex phenomenon, and one which has had a significant impact on the current ideological inclinations of Latin American political and intellectual elites. Latin American states have assimilated, imitated, or accepted European ideologies very unequally and selectively. This lack of uniformity can be explained by the very important differences among the Latin American states and by the variety of their ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and economic or social patterns. Wealthy, ethnically and racially homogeneous by regional standards, with a largely

European population and strong cultural and trade ties with Western Europe, countries like Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina were often among the first to follow European ideological and intellectual fashions, while more PR countries like Bolivia, Honduras, Ecuador, and Paraguay were the last to be influenced, and often through the intermediary role of the first group. The majority of Latin American states fall between these two groups, with extraregional ideological influences coming both through direct contacts and through other Latin intermediaries.

The second aspect to be considered is the question of the specific sources of ideological influences. A majority, particularly the South American countries, were overwhelmingly influenced by West European and to some extent East European political and ideological trends, the latter often transmitted through Jewish immigrants. German, Spanish, Italian, and English communities in Chile, Venezuela, Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, Croatian immigrants in Chile and Peru, and Jewish communities in Argentina and Venezuela all contributed to the variety of types, origins, and strengths of European ideological influence, particularly in light of the fact that these new immigrants of the post-World War II era were and still are far more numerous among the elites than their numbers would suggest. In Central America, and to some extent in the Caribbean, the U.S. cultural influence has been greater than in South America, although in ideological terms it is balanced even there by British or French influences.

Finally, the strength of ideological influences in various countries is directly related to specific characteristics of the social and cultural peculiarities of those countries. Large middle-class groups in the countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) and the relative wealth of those countries explain the relatively large number of politically active citizens and the influence and size of the

intelligentsia. In more backward countries, or in those with sizable Indian communities, which historically have tended to remain outside the cultural and thus ideological influence of the dominant Europeanized groups, foreign ideological influences are minimal, except for small groups of intellectuals and politicians. Until very recently this was the case with countries like Peru and Guatemala, and it is still largely the case in Paraguay and Bolivia. Once again, however, the majority of Latin American states falls somewhere between these two extremes.

At the more detailed level of specific social or occupational groups and institutions, a number of general patterns can be defined that apply to most countries in Latin America, although they have changed considerably over time. From an ideological viewpoint, one must first distinguish between groups, such as intellectuals, military officers, and students or clergymen, that are the representatives and "creators" of ideological and political fashions, and those, such as unionized workers and peasants or the urban middle classes, that are largely the consumers and followers of those fashions. Furthermore, age is such an important factor in Latin American political and ideological opinion that it deserves to be considered separately. Finally, in the past decade and a half, institutional and cultural changes in most of the countries south of the Rio Grande have resulted in a growing political and ideological involvement of women, another important and very Latin American characteristic of insurgent and terrorist groups.

The present study will also examine a number of non-Latin states in the Western Hemisphere, most of them English-speaking countries in the Caribbean, the French-speaking Haiti, and France's territories of Martinique, Gouadeloupe, and Guyana. Although in terms of numbers these states and territories represent about one-third of the total Western Hemispheric countries, their experience with political

violence is both different from and far more limited than that of the Spanish-speaking states and Brazil. The Caribbean countries formerly under British rule have inherited and (with the exceptions of Grenada and Guyana) succeeded in preserving parliamentary democratic systems, which are less vulnerable to political violence than the traditionally authoritarian systems in the former Spanish colonies. The homogeneity of the population of the island states and of Belize is also greater than that of the mainland countries and thus plays a restraining role in the development of deep social cleavages and violence. Finally, the distribution of wealth in the English-speaking countries is generally more equitable than on the mainland states, another factor limiting social tensions. This combination of factors explains the very low incidence of political violence in the English-speaking countries as well as in Surinam, a country with a similar tradition, at least until 1980.

In Haiti, the second oldest independent state in the Americas, terrorism and political violence had little impact during the 1970s and early 1980s, and the government appeared to be able to prevent or, in a few instances, crush attempts to establish guerrilla groups. Moreover, the uniformly low level of politicization of the population and the virtual nonexistence of a middle class or intelligentsia are additional factors that explain the ineffective, sporadic nature of Haitian terrorism and insurgency and that will probably preclude changes in the near future.

Conditions in the French territories are very different from those of English-speaking Caribbean countries and the Spanish-speaking mainland. Their culture, political arrangements, and history have resulted in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guyana becoming parts of France in a way the Caribbean or the mainland states never were in respect to England or Spain. Terrorism in the French territories, therefore, is

far more similar to the separatist type existing in the metropole (Corsica and Brittany) than in the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

These preliminary considerations amply demonstrate the extremely complex and dynamic character of political violence in the Western Hemisphere,* and thus the difficulty of defining stable patterns of steady evolution. On the other hand, certain patterns that have appeared since the Cuban Revolution and particularly in the past decade seem to indicate that the general trend may be toward increased uniformity in the nature and patterns of political violence, and thus that the impact of cultural and historic differences is diminishing.

TASK ONE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Matters of Definition

The most important issue facing any student of contemporary political violence is defining his field, because of the widespread conceptual and philosophical confusion surrounding such terms as "terrorism" and "guerrilla." This confusion is demonstrated in the inability of such international bodies as the United Nations to provide a definition of terrorism, and thus to counter it in any meaningful way. At the national

*For the purpose of this study the Western Hemisphere is defined as all states and territories of the Americas with the exceptions of Canada, the United States, their dependencies (Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands), and Cuba.

level, confusion and absence of a consensus are equally evident and are factors that have prevented the United States from adopting a coherent policy with regard to political violence in the Western Hemisphere, at home, or elsewhere.

The very nature of contemporary political violence precludes any easy definition of terrorism or insurgency, but preliminary definitions can be offered as hypotheses to be verified in the course of this study. The first distinction to be made with regard to terrorism and insurgency in general, and in Latin America in particular, is that while both are forms of violence with a proclaimed political motivation, they differ greatly in terms of their targets, aims, scope, size, level of organization, public support, leadership background, and effectiveness.

Targets. Terrorist groups tend to concentrate almost exclusively on such non-military targets as undefended civilian economic targets, politicians, aliens, and members of the public as a whole. Conversely, they consistently avoid confrontations with security forces and perform very badly when forced by circumstances into such confrontations. Guerrilla or insurgent groups, on the other hand, generally combine attacks against military targets with important, and often well-defended, economic targets and undefended human or material targets. The latter are generally seen as of secondary importance and are used for propaganda purposes alone. For the terrorist, the targets are public opinion and individual representatives of the established government; for the guerrilla, the target is ultimately the government itself, the overall structure of political and economic power in the country.

Aims. For the terrorist the short- and long-term aims are similar -- weakening existing political structures in the hope that their collapse will bring about radical change, even if the forces to take advantage of or to implement such changes may not be the terrorists themselves. The terrorist hopes that his actions will "awaken" the

people and thus ultimately bring the government down. The future shape of the government will be decided at that point; for the time being the terrorist's aim is strictly negative, and his actions are far more symbolic than revolutionary. The terrorist sees his acts as preparing for the revolution to come, not as forging its shape or taking control of its subsequent direction. The guerrilla, on the other hand, even when he engages in what at the first glance may appear to be terrorist acts, never loses sight of the ultimate aim, which is not only to replace the existing government, but also to destroy its popular base and build a new base for revolutionary changes he intends to control and can already define. For the guerrilla, such actions are positive -- he intends to destroy in order to build a specific and well-defined new structure.

Scope. By its very nature, the terrorist group concentrates on a few highly prominent targets with great symbolic value, most often in urban areas. When terrorists operate in rural areas, they are usually seen as indulging in sheer banditry and have no impact at the national level. The guerrilla, on the other hand, seeks targets over an extended area and at least tries to operate in both urban and rural regions. Since he does not seek highly visible or symbolic targets, the guerrilla can spread operations over wider regions and may even avoid spectacular actions for extended periods of time. Perhaps the most prominent example is the Guatemalan Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), which was established in 1973 and only began "armed action" six years later.

Size. The size of terrorist groups and their character are closely related. Because they are small, they can reach only a limited number of targets; because their impact is thus limited, their ability to increase in size is sharply diminished. The guerrilla band's size, on the other hand, depends on completely different factors, the

most prominent of which are their ability to survive, to maintain military pressure on government forces, to indoctrinate and mobilize sectors of the public, and to avoid indiscriminate use of violence.

Level of organization. Terrorist groups are almost always organized around small cells that have very little contact with one another in order to avoid detection and infiltration. This organizational structure, however, also prevents them from coordinating actions or reacting rapidly to shifts in government tactics. Moreover, since the leaders, always very few, are the only ones with a detailed knowledge of the organization as a whole and play the role of the nervous center connecting the autonomous cells, their capture or death may well spell the death of the organization itself. Guerrilla groups, on the other hand, have far more organizational flexibility, often establish double chains of command, and frequently possess alternative leadership groups. The distinction between the two types of organization is perhaps best exemplified by comparing the Guatemalan Party of Labor (PGT), which twice lost almost all of its leadership to anti-insurgency operations by the army but is still in existence, with the Guatemalan MR-13 or the Uruguayan Tupamaros. Neither of the latter two organizations can be strictly defined as terrorist although they are closer to terrorist than to guerrilla organizations in structure and tactics. Both were decisively defeated by security forces when the leader of MR-13, Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, was killed and the founder of the Tupamaros, Raul Sendic, was captured.

Public support. The level and duration of public support for terrorist and guerrilla groups differ as greatly as do their organizations' strength and ability to withstand government hostility. Terrorist groups may enjoy a certain degree of public admiration for specific actions but are almost universally unable to translate that admiration into steady and increasing support. Moreover, they tend to lose whatever

support they may have had following particularly violent acts against persons perceived by the public as innocent. Almost invariably, the terrorist groups' level of public support tends to level off or decline after the initial period of activities. Guerrilla groups, on the other hand, tend to be able to solidify and increase the level of public support they have, provided they survive long enough to do so. The vulnerability of guerrilla groups in terms of their being isolated from the population tends to be far greater in the middle stages of their existence; terrorist groups tend to receive most of their support at the beginning.

Leadership background. This appears to be a far less important factor for distinguishing between terrorist and guerrilla groups in Latin America, since in both cases members of the same social or occupational groups tend to become leaders. These are generally students and university dropouts, young intellectuals, and clergymen. The major distinction between terrorist and guerrilla groups is the general inability of the former to expand their membership or leadership outside these groups, compared with the far greater ability of the guerrillas to attract members from different sectors of society, even when those members may not reach leadership positions.

Effectiveness. The effectiveness of terrorist groups in achieving their aims is uniformly poor, while the success of guerrillas in Latin America has recently increased after the failures of the 1960s. Despite the differences between terrorist and guerrilla groups described above, one should keep in mind that very few purely terrorist groups have ever existed in Latin America, and that no guerrilla group in the region (with the temporary exception of Guevara's ephemeral ELN in Bolivia) has always refrained from using terrorism as at least a secondary method. This fact in turn underscores the importance of defining terrorism as a phenomenon with diverse parallel meanings -- as

action and strategy, as doctrine and opportunity, as a perceived necessity at specific stages and an aim in itself. As a form of action, terror is used by all politically violent groups at some point or another (the ELN itself engaged in it following Guevara's death), even if they reject the definition of their actions as terrorism. Moreover, if one defines terrorism as indiscriminate and persistent violence against non-combatants, one must underline the fact that such violence should be intentional and planned in order to qualify as terrorism. Accidental or unintended casualties among non-combatants may occur even in the activities of those groups least inclined toward terrorism, but they do not justify the definition of such groups as terrorist. On the other hand, even actions that are not directed against non-combatants but against material targets or symbolic ones, when they are the sole means of action of a group, could qualify that group as primarily terrorist. Acts such a kidnapping, bank robbery, assassination of political figures, and bombing public buildings may or may not qualify as terrorism, depending on their context.

One may conclude at this point that the number of terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere is today exceedingly small. If a "purely" terrorist group is defined according to the criteria mentioned above, and if one considers groups like the Baader-Meinhof Gang in West Germany or the Italian Red Brigades as archetypes of terrorism, only minuscule groups like those in Guadeloupe, French Guyana, and Martinique could be included. All other groups, whether ideologically inclined toward the Left, as the overwhelming majority are, or toward extreme forms of nationalism, i.e., the "extreme Right," or even toward democracy in the Western sense (like most Nicaraguan anti-Sandinista groups), are far closer to the definition of guerrilla than terrorist. This diversity indicates that the term "guerrilla" does not have any ideological connotation per se, but implies a number of structural, tactical, and

organizational characteristics related to their basically violent form of political expression. If there are differences between leftist and non-leftist guerrilla groups, they are related not to their structure or aims, but to their targets: the government in the case of the former, and anti-government forces in the case of most of the latter. The leftist guerrilla aims at changing the status quo; the non-leftist attempts either to maintain or return to a previous status quo. The number of non-leftist guerrilla groups is far smaller than that of the leftists, and thus their impact is less important. Moreover, almost all non-leftist guerrilla or quasi-military non-governmental groups have appeared in reaction to the activities of the Left. It is the violent Left in the Western Hemisphere that today represents the most serious and general danger to the established governments and to the security of the States in the region, as well as to the interests of the United States.

Background of the Violent Left in the Western Hemisphere

The Latin American Left in all Spanish-speaking countries and Brazil is characterized by its continental aspirations and an extremely high level of ideological similarity. To the extent the Left claims nationalist beliefs, it are limited to stressing the opposition between the country in question and the United States or some less clearly defined form of "imperialism," rather than the particular attributes of a country vis-a-vis other Latin American countries. Thus the Guatemalan guerrilla groups claim to struggle for the "true" liberation of Guatemala from U.S. exploitation and influence, but consider the truly nationalist and popular aim of annexing Belize a "capitalist plot" and reject it. The "nationalism" of ORPA, EGP, PGT, and FAR begins and ends at the level of anti-Americanism.

These groups, as well as the Salvadoran groups under the FMLN umbrella, are all outspoken in defining their activities as part of a regional and ultimately continental revolution. Many South American groups, particularly the Argentine Montoneros, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, the Bolivian ELN, and the Chilean MIR have regional ambitions and have even established a Revolutionary Coordination Junta (JCR) in Paris to coordinate their actions. They have actually operated in other countries' territories in pursuit of the aims of their colleagues. The Argentine ERP was directly involved in the assassination of Somoza in Asuncion on behalf of the Nicaraguan FSLN. The Salvadoran FSLN groups, together with the Colombian FARC, the Venezuelan PER, and the Chilean MIR have attempted a similar institutionalization at a meeting in Esmeralda, Ecuador, in April 1983. Among the "internationalists" fighting alongside the FSLN against Somoza, and providing financial help as well, were Tupamaros, Montoneros, Guatemalans (mostly from ORPA and EGP), and Salvadorans. At least some Nicaraguan revolutionaries, including Eden Pastora, now the military leader of ARDE, were directly involved in fighting or, at the very least, in providing financial or fund-raising support to the Guatemalan guerrillas. Finally, the operational, logistical, and even tactical involvement of FMLN cadres in subversion, including terrorist activities, in Honduras demonstrates both the very poor level of organization and minimal strength of indigenous guerrillas and the importance of foreign involvement.

Such close collaboration among leftist guerrilla groups in Latin America is both the cause and the result of most of these groups having similar ideological and political roots. It is a cause since foreign groups with particular expertise in certain military or organizational matters often influence indigenous groups. It is known, for example, that Tupamaro and ERP cadres, operating in Chile during the Allende period,

have provided tactical advice to the MIR, and that the latter's operations in Concepcion and Santiago have often imitated methods used previously in Buenos Aires, Tucuman, or Montevideo. On the other hand, foreign groups tend to be most closely involved with ideologically compatible groups in other countries. The same mixture of anarchism and Leninism rooted in Guillén and Mariella dominated the ideology of the Tupamaros and Montoneros, as well as of the Chilean MIR. The closest connections, before 1980, between Nicaraguan and Salvadoran groups were those between the "guerra prolongada" faction of the former, led by Tomás Borge, and the FPL, then led by Salvador Cayetano Carpio, also a supporter of the "guerra prolongada" approach. The most obvious demonstration that ideological compatibility is directly related to international cooperation is provided by the orthodox, pro-Soviet Communist parties. In such cases, however, the military dimension of the cooperation was minimal, and the primary unifying factor was the influence of the Soviet Union, rather than simply shared beliefs.

The fundamental ideological cohesion of Latin America's Left is demonstrated not only by its similarity of aims, but also by the simultaneous appearance of certain trends in different countries, by similar patterns of coalescence or breaking apart of various groups or parties in different countries, and by the continental scope of the influence of a number of major ideologues.

The Orthodox Communist Parties

The oldest leftist groups in most Latin American countries are the orthodox pro-Soviet Communist parties. Most of them were established by the late 1920s or early 1930s under the control and guidance of the Comintern. Until at least the late

1950s the Communist parties' control over the Left in all countries was such that the two were often seen as synonymous. One important result of this fact, and of the parties' total allegiance to Moscow and its global interests, was that their strategies were completely out of step with the changing realities of Latin America. These parties acted on the general Soviet perception of the Cold War period that U.S. "imperialism" was far too strong in the Western Hemisphere, and that U.S. interests in the region were so vital as to condemn to immediate and bloody failure any Communist attempt to take power -- by force or by any other means. The 1954 events in Guatemala only served to strengthen such Soviet perceptions, which dated from the Communist-led insurrection in western El Salvador in February 1932 and its bloody failure.

Most of the Communist leaders were quite bourgeois in their habits and exceedingly reluctant to become involved in actions that might bring them the same fate as that of Farabundo Marti in El Salvador. This limited both their appetite for political violence and their ability to attract a committed following. As a result, the basis of popular support for the Communist parties was, with the exception of the PCCh, minimal. This combination of factors -- Soviet assessments of the willingness and ability of the United States and its regional allies to intervene by force, Soviet awareness of Communist weakness, and the Communist party leaders' lack of enthusiasm for the hard life of the guerrillas -- explains why, between 1932 and the early 1960s, no Latin American Communist party was even rhetorically involved in or associated with acts of overt political violence.

The Cuban Revolution produced the ideological equivalent of an immense earthquake in Latin America. It demonstrated, first, that a leftist guerrilla war could succeed; second, that the United States would not necessarily intervene or do so

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Most of the Communist leaders were quite bourgeois in their habits and exceedingly reluctant to become involved in actions that might bring them the same fate as that of Farabundo Marti in El Salvador. This limited both their appetite for political violence and their ability to attract a committed following. As a result, the basis of popular support for the Communist parties was, with the exception of the PCCh, minimal. This combination of factors -- Soviet assessments of the willingness and ability of the United States and its regional allies to intervene by force, Soviet awareness of Communist weakness, and the Communist party leaders' lack of enthusiasm for the hard life of the guerrillas -- explains why, between 1932 and the early 1960s, no Latin American Communist party was even rhetorically involved in or associated with acts of overt political violence.

The Cuban Revolution produced the ideological equivalent of an immense earthquake in Latin America. It demonstrated, first, that a leftist guerrilla war could succeed; second, that the United States would not necessarily intervene or do so

effectively; and, third, that certain means and methods could be used that were different from and far more effective than those that had been used by the orthodox Communist parties for decades. The Sino-Soviet rift, which occurred almost at the same time as the Cuban Revolution, accelerated the decline of the orthodox Communist parties. Most of the innumerable pro-Chinese splinter groups broke away from the orthodox Communist parties by the mid-1960s, but none of them proved able to capture a larger membership than those parties or, more important in light of the Castroite appeal, to demonstrate an ability to start, lead, and succeed in winning a guerrilla war. Thus, while the Maoist parties further weakened the orthodox Communists' monopoly of the Left, they were unable to establish their own domination. Such splinter groups, therefore, succeeded only in diminishing the orthodox parties' ability to counter the Castroite influence and to retain their traditional control over established radical political sectors. On the other hand, the Cuban Revolution and the Maoist threat to their Marxist-Leninist legitimacy did push a number of orthodox Communist parties toward trying to join the guerrilla wave of Latin America. The most active of those parties, although far from successful, were the PGT, the Venezuelan CP, and, to a far lesser extent, the PCB. The majority of the Communist parties, however, continued their previous position of rejecting guerrilla warfare as an inappropriate revolutionary tactic. By the late 1960s even the three exceptions mentioned had retreated from violence and re-entered the fold.

The reasons for the continued unwillingness of the majority of the CPs to treat Cuba as a model or to try to compete with Castro and Guevara were complex. One was an awareness that they lacked the strength that would ensure success; a second was the failure of the Castroite approach outside Cuba and Guevara's death; a third was the dawn of détente, which reinforced Soviet misgivings about provoking the

United States in an area Moscow still perceived as far too marginal and dangerous to be worth jeopardizing its larger global interests for. Finally, the 1970 election of Salvador Allende in Chile, with the PCCh as a major component of his winning coalition, appeared to vindicate the Soviet and orthodox parties' persistent claim that means other than guerrilla warfare could and would succeed in establishing a "revolutionary" government. In ideological terms, the CPs rejection of violence as the primary instrument for conquering political power was based on analyses purporting to demonstrate that a "revolutionary situation" did not exist in the Western Hemisphere and, therefore, that any violent attempts to conquer power were doomed in advance.

Institutionally, the ideological convulsions of the 1960s followed a complex and varied pattern in Latin America, and only certain aspects were identical in all countries. This pattern involved the breaking apart of the orthodox parties as a result of the departure of either Maoist or Castroite factions. The former accused the CPs of "revisionism," and the latter pursued irregular warfare in the forests or hills. In some cases, the Maoist splinters were the first to be formed, but in most instances the Castroites were the first to leave the orthodox fold. By 1968, after Guevara's inglorious death in the Bolivian lowlands and the Soviet success in bringing Castro into a position of definitive and public dependence, the Castroite-induced process of splintering the Communist parties came to an end in most countries.

The defeat of the Guatemalan, Peruvian, Venezuelan, and Bolivian Castroite guerrilla groups by the late 1960s appeared to justify Soviet and orthodox Communist reluctance to be involved in such attempts, which they variously described as "adventurist," "infantile leftist," or "deviationist." At the same time, however, another type of ideological input resulted in a new division within the Latin American Left

different from the older rivalries between Maoists, Castroites, Trotskyites, and orthodox Communists.

A first line of dissension from the 1960s approach of the Castroites and the orthodox Communists was represented by a mixed group of organizations that, while still rejecting the orthodox Communists' opposition to guerrilla warfare, were also aware of the inadequacy of the romantic, emotional, "foco" theories and practices associated with "Che" Guevara, which had been discredited by his own abysmal failure. Some of these groups were strongly influenced by the ongoing and, even at that time, promising Vietnamese experience with protracted war ("guerra prolongada"). The former PCES secretary general, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, was the most prominent representative, and the "guerra prolongada" faction of the FSLN is another example. Another type of politically violent Latin group was represented by Raul Sendic and his Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Montoneros of Mario Firmenich in Argentina, and the Chilean MIR. Their ideological roots go back to another ideologue whose spectacular failure to apply his own theories could have denied him a place in the history of the region -- the Brazilian CP dissident Carlos Marighella. The influence of Marighella and Guillén, combined with that of Castro, the post-1968 West European student rioters, and anarchism resulted in a contempt for what by 1970 has become the fashionable approach to revolution in Latin America, as exemplified by Chile.

The differences between the two types of supporters of violent political action lay in their personal and particularly in their national background. It is thus significant that the anarchistic current so clear in the declarations and programs of the MIR, Tupamaros, and Montoneros stemmed from countries and leaders very close to Western Europe, ethnically as well as culturally, while the more typical Third

World approach of the Vietnamese found a stronger echo among the far more backward inhabitants of El Salvador and Nicaragua. One of the natural results of the different ideological roots and national circumstances of the two types of guerrillas surviving by the late 1960s and early 1970s was their diametrically opposed approach to obtaining popular support. While Carpio was slowly building an organization by indoctrinating and mobilizing the poor peasants of Chalatenango, Firminich, Hernandez, and Sendic were concentrating on trying to impress, if not to win over the far more sophisticated inhabitants of the large cities of the Southern Cone. In many ways the Montoneros, Tupamaros, and the Chilean MIR were the earliest to be inspired by the same Rudi Dutschke and Daniel Cohn-Bendit who later became heroes for Baader, Meinhof, Feltrinelli, and Negri in Western Europe.

A second approach was represented by the PCCh, which demonstrated, at least temporarily, that neither the orthodox parties, of which it had been, ironically, one of the foremost examples, with their fatally ineffective approach to the conquest of power nor the voluntaristic Castroite believers in the "foco" had a monopoly over revolutionary success. For at least the three-year period of the Allende regime, the "via Chilena" inspired many of the most violence-prone groups and provided some justification for the orthodox parties. No Latin American party other than the PCCh, however, had such a large membership and popular support, and none had a candidate of Allende's stature or had as spokesmen allies with the strength of his Marxist-Leninist Socialists.

Between 1973 and 1976 events developed in such a way as to bring the Latin American violent Left back to where it had been in the late 1960s, when the Castroites seemed to be definitively defeated and thus eliminated as a significant influence over the guerrillas. In 1973 Allende was overthrown by the military and the

Tupamaros were wiped out by the Uruguayan armed forces. In 1976 the coup led by General Jorge Videla in Buenos Aires marked the beginning of the end for the Montoneros and the ERP, the latter being the only Trotskyite guerrilla group in the Western Hemisphere ever to have reached high levels of effectiveness. By the end of the same year, the founder and only significant theoretician of the FSLN, Carlos Fonseca Amador, was killed by the Nicaraguan National Guard. It thus appeared that the violent Left in Latin America had once again been defeated and that its short-term prospects were bleak indeed. Three major developments, two of which represented the beginning of a new global political trend, saved the Left from both oblivion and long-term defeat. These were the Cuban intervention in Angola, the election of Jimmy Carter in United States, and the massive and relatively sudden radicalization of significant sectors of the Catholic Church in Latin America.

Cuba's successful intervention in the Angolan civil war, despite clear initial Soviet reluctance to provide full support for it, dramatically changed both Castro's position vis-à-vis Moscow from that of a dependent with only symbolic value to that of an active and valuable surrogate permitted a high degree of operational autonomy. The election of Jimmy Carter shifted U.S. policy priorities in Latin America from rational and practical national security considerations to vague, moralistic "human rights" issues. Under the guise of departing from an "inordinate fear of communism," the new administration explicitly accepted the legitimacy of "revolution" in the Third World and acted in a manner consistent with that claim in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Iran. Those actions and the "human rights" rhetoric emanating from the White House served to encourage a rather disheartened Latin American Left, by convincing it that, as at the time of the Cuban Revolution, the United States was at least unwilling, if not unable, to use force or strong economic and political pressures to prevent the

Left from conquering power by force. The Carter administration's willingness or even eagerness to accept, if not to actively promote, the isolation of the beleaguered governments of Guatemala and El Salvador, both under potentially decisive military pressure from the guerrillas of the Left, appeared to confirm the perception of U.S. retreat or implicit acceptance of the Left's actions.

Finally, events inspired by the Vatican II Council, confirmed by the Medellin Latin American Episcopal Conference (ELA), and first manifested by Camillo Torres' joining the Colombian ELN, finally reached complete fruition during the second half of the 1970s. Significant elements of the Catholic Church in Latin America, including whole orders such as the Maryknoll and Jesuits, and prominent leaders like Archbishop Romero in El Salvador and Cardinal Arns in Brazil were openly supporting the cause of the Left and provided it with a legitimacy it had lost only a few years before. Since then, Catholic priests have become guerrilla leaders in Colombia, Honduras, and Guatemala; guerrilla ideologues in Nicaragua and El Salvador; willing partners or fellow travelers in Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Chile; and major sources of propaganda and financial support in the United States and Western Europe. The impact of the priests' open support for the Marxist-Leninist Left in Latin America, manifested in the "liberation theology" movement and concretely demonstrated in the cases mentioned above, was tremendous, particularly among those who were least educated and therefore most susceptible to Church influence -- the largely illiterate Latin American peasantry.

Finally, the general decline in U.S.-Soviet relations and the demise of détente demonstrated by the invasion of Afghanistan and the Olympic and grain embargoes, which contributed to the election of President Reagan, eliminated whatever interest Moscow had in restraining Cuba or the orthodox Communists from trying to take

advantage of U.S. indecisiveness or of the vulnerability of incumbent governments denied U.S. military, diplomatic, or economic support.

The results of this were the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in 1979, the Grenadian Marxist-led coup of the same year, and the initially pro-Cuban orientation of the military junta in Suriname. Of these, the FSLN victory was by far the most significant. Not only did their victory appear to repeat that of Cuba in 1979, but it also provided the Latin American Left with its first foothold on the mainland since Allende's downfall, and ideologically it allowed at least three major ideological orientations in recent Latin American Marxist-Leninist history to claim that they had been vindicated. Indeed, the victorious FSLN included a faction whose ideological and tactical approach was close to Cuba's (the "terceristas"), one close to the late 1960s diehards (the "guerra popular prolongada"), and one close to the orthodox Communists, although formally opposed to them (the "proletarian tendency"). The power won by the composite FSLN became both the aim and a potential model for a majority of the Latin American leftist groups and provided evidence of the fact that, once some form of unity is achieved, victory is possible, if not always likely. The old ideological debates, dissensions, and hatreds began to look obsolete and counterproductive, and the feeling that success was close tempted many traditionally hostile leftist groups to try to repeat the FSLN experience, and thus avoid, forget, or minimize their differences. For the first time since the 1950s the Latin American Left was once again in the process of being united -- not under the monopoly of power or influence of the orthodox Communist parties, but because of the promise that unity in action might lead rapidly to the conquest of political power by force.

TASK TWO

IDEOLOGIES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA

Ideology provides internal cohesion, motivation, methods of political action, and may also account for tactical or strategic military behavior. The varying ideological strains in the Latin American Left have resulted in differences among groups in terms of effectiveness and longevity. Moreover, the ideological orientation of a specific group is the most reliable predictor of its behavior. Ideology is the basis for a group's analysis of the social, political, and military situation of the country it operates in, shapes the type and level of intensity of its external contacts, and determines its attitudes toward other political or social actors at the national and international levels.

The ideological approach to the analysis of Latin American guerrilla groups also makes possible an examination of trends and patterns across national boundaries, and perhaps even a degree of extrapolation to other areas of the Third World. The major ideological trends, in Latin America as elsewhere, tend to become more and more complex as adaptations to circumstances impose permanent modifications on the initial set of dogmas. This trend is more pronounced today than it was during the 1960s, but even then it was exceedingly difficult to find "purely" Castroite, anarchist-Marxist, or Maoist groups. In fact, the experience of groups of all ideological persuasions has contributed to changes in the operational and political behavior of all the others. The following analysis of the major ideological strains in Latin America is thus centered on the major contributions each of them has made to the development of the

increasingly uniform modus operandi of leftist guerrillas in the period from 1960 to 1984 and on their role in either weakening or strengthening the unity of the Left.

Orthodox Communist Parties. The ideological orientation of these parties is defined in Moscow, and their aims are, therefore, to further Soviet policy goals and, when possible, to follow Leninist tactics of conquering power as they were employed in Russia at the time of the Bolshevik takeover. When, as was the case before the Cuban Revolution, the two aims were apparently incompatible, Soviet interests prevailed at the expense of the Latin American parties' hopes of conquering power. The major concept determining the orthodox CPs' approach to political violence has been that of the "revolutionary situation." This concept can succinctly be defined as an ideal but exceedingly complex combination of social, political, economic, and international cleavages, circumstances, and conflicts, which at some undefined time could result in the decisive weakening of the existing government structures and thus allow "the people," i.e., the Communist party as the people's "vanguard detachment," to conquer power rapidly. In other words, the orthodox approach to revolution is by definition reactive and opportunistic -- the party acts only when all "objective" conditions for success are present and retains the absolute right of deciding when to act. In practice, however, a number of CPs have chosen to decide that a "revolutionary situation" existed for reasons having nothing to do with a serious, realistic analysis of national realities. The Venezuelan CP is a good example. It denied the existence of a "revolutionary situation" in Venezuela at a time of all but complete collapse of political and social institutions during the late 1950s, but it suddenly "discovered" the existence of favorable conditions for revolution at a time when the democratic Betancourt regime was already establishing its roots and gaining widespread popular legitimacy. The result was the bloody failure of the party's

ill-timed guerrilla campaign and a re-evaluation of tactics few years later, when the PCV was thoroughly discredited, its membership decimated, and its influence nil.

A second characteristic of most Latin American CPs' ideology is its persistent justification of what could be defined as a two-track approach to violence. The first such example was the PCES in 1932. At that time the party, led by Agustin Farabundo Marti, was known to have accepted the usefulness of violent and illegal political action, as witnessed by Marti's own personal involvement in the anti-American and anti-government campaign of Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua, while at the same time following a double-track policy at home. The PCES hailed the December 1931 coup which overthrew President Araujo, a left-of-center reformist, and made a serious attempt at trying to infiltrate the leadership of the new military regime. At the same time, the PCES participated (and performed very poorly, except in San Salvador, where it came out third) in the January 1932 elections, while it was also deeply involved in preparing for an insurrection in the western parts of the country. This pattern of open support for and involvement in violent action outside the country while at the same time operating legally within the country and participating in the legitimate political process while also preparing for unconstitutional violent action has characterized the PCES and a number of other CPs in Latin America ever since. It should also be pointed out that the double-track policy of the PCES in 1932 was not the result of shifts in the dominant group of leaders, but a policy supported by the entire leadership.

A third aspect of the Latin American CPs' approach to revolution is their view of the relationship between political violence and opportunistic or "tactical" alliances with non-Communist groups within the existing legal political framework. Most of the time the CPs have persisted in attempts at forming coalitions with other

left-of-center groups as a means of influencing national political affairs, despite or because of the CPs' generally illegal status. At the same time, in another manifestation of the double-track approach, many CPs have persistently tried to influence or even control guerrilla groups operating outside or even against the established Communist party, while disclaiming any connection with either political violence in general or politically violent groups in particular. In other words, many CPs would go to great lengths, but only covertly, to maintain some degree of influence and decisionmaking power among violent groups, which have often been led or founded by Communist sympathizers, former party members, or even leaders.

The major contribution of the orthodox CPs to guerrilla strategies and tactics in Latin America, however, has been their consistently successful effort at infiltrating non-Communist and even non-leftist institutions and pressure groups, thus reaching a level of influence at critical points and within key institutions out of proportion with the generally small number of party members. The importance of this is underscored by the fact that all guerrilla groups, at least in the initial stages of their developments, have to face the problem of retaining and expanding influence when their numbers are small. The ability to do so promises future expansion of membership, which creates an impression of strength and omnipresence; an inability to do so usually works to the detriment of the guerrillas. In other words, and despite the old slogan that time favors guerrillas as long as they are not perceived as losing, guerrillas have to be seen as making progress if they are to avoid being perceived by the public as nothing more than a deadly nuisance. The CPs' ability to penetrate or co-opt, ally with or join other institutions or political organizations and parties is a result of long practice, significant financial resources, and, perhaps most of all, of ideological flexibility. Communist penetration of or influence with non-Communist

groups and institutions has a double impact upon those groups or institutions. First, it detaches them from the previous anti-Communist national consensus and thus contributes to the fragmentation of anti-leftist opinion; second, it steadily radicalizes the rank-and-file members of those institutions and groups, and thus increases pressure on their leaders to adopt more confrontational attitudes toward the incumbent government to legitimize their own leadership position.

Despite the orthodox CPs' success in penetrating and radicalizing non-Communist institutions and groups, those parties were often unable to control the emerging leadership of those institutions or retain any significant degree of influence over them. A brief examination of specific cases and countries clearly supports this conclusion.

The institutions most frequently targeted by the CPs in Latin America are unions, student organizations, and, at least since the Medellin CELA, important sectors of the Catholic Church. Attempts to penetrate the military are as permanent as they have been generally unsuccessful (Peru, El Salvador, and Guatemala are only partial exceptions). The highly personalistic character of most Latin American institutions, which results in very low levels of institutionalization and high degrees of dependence upon skilled, charismatic, or otherwise famous strong men greatly facilitates penetration. This phenomenon of caudillismo, a major trait of Latin American political culture, is far from being limited to the top national political leadership. It spreads to lower-level institutions, and an acceptance of a strong leader is in the nature of most institutions. While caudillismo does not necessarily mean public acceptance of the legitimacy or program of a specific leader, it does provide the institution or group able to claim such a leader with a high level of popular respect. Whether hated, disliked, or feared, figures such as Carpio in El Salvador,

Sendic in Uruguay, Jaime Bateman in Colombia, and Abimael Guzman in Peru are widely known and respected, although not usually accepted as legitimate contenders for national power. Thus, despite their exceedingly small numbers and the rather colorless nature of their official leaders (figures such as Corvalan of the PCCh, Arismendi of the PCU, Handal of the PCEs, and Fortuny of the PGT), charismatic second-level CP members quite often succeed in mobilizing popular support behind themselves as personalities, rather than as representatives of a specific ideological approach or party. Thus, Luis Turcios Lima and Cesar Montés in Guatemala, and Roque Dalton in El Salvador, all second-echelon leaders of their respective CPs, won national fame and respect despite the ill-repute or unattractiveness of their superiors within the CPs. The CPs' problem, however, is that very often such young and charismatic members, once in a position of influence, may decide to pursue their own aims, which usually contradict the official party position. All three of the personalities mentioned above did precisely that, and there was little their former parties could do about it. The CPs could seldom afford to condemn them, and could not dismiss them as inconsequential.

Finally, and despite their long history of splintering and fragmenting, the orthodox CPs demonstrated an enviable ability to retain their identities despite official repression, public contempt, association with the USSR, and general lack of charismatic leaders. This ability in turn served as an example for the new wave of guerrilla leaders of the 1970s by underscoring the essential importance of organization, tight discipline, and continuity in political tactics. In contrast, older guerrilla groups quite often tend to use violence in order to decide ideological, personal, or tactical debates, probably as a natural extension of their belief in

violence as the major or only solution to all types of conflicts, within or outside a group, country, or coalition.

The orthodox CPs have not contributed important ideas, tactics, or approaches to the actual military content of guerrilla warfare. More often than not, young CP militants left the party to establish or join guerrilla groups, and justified their decisions by portraying the CPs as unimaginative, "bourgeois," and calcified institutions unable to act or to take advantage of obvious opportunities. In light of the unconvincing performance of the anti-insurgency forces of the Soviet bloc in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Angola, it appears likely that, despite the general trend toward a pro-Soviet attitude, Latin American guerrillas will adopt different military tactics, rather than accept direct advice from either Moscow or Havana. Indeed, it seems likely that an army like Cuba's in Angola, steadily losing tactical and strategic initiative to the UNITA guerrillas, would not impress Central or other Latin American guerrillas with its capabilities. On the other hand, Havana's influence has penetrated far more deeply, in ideological terms, than that of the orthodox parties, and even today it is Cuba rather than the USSR that is seen as something of an example for guerrillas in the Western Hemisphere.

Cuba's Appeal and Ideological Influence

Since the victory of Castro's guerrillas in Havana in 1959, Cuba has been perceived as Latin America's redeemer. Until then the historic frustrations of the Latin American intelligentsia and middle classes had been manifested in an anti-Americanism marked by a combination of hatred and envy for the United States. There have been constant attempts to justify the continent's failure to equal the

development level of the United States by blaming the United States for the poverty, inequality, and lack of political maturity that have hindered the establishment of stable democratic systems in Latin America. In addition, due to its Indian and Iberian background and the strong historical influence of the Catholic Church, Latin America has never been able to reach any significant degree of truly capitalist development, if one defines the latter as including expanding private entrepreneurship, a free-market economy, and a strong respect for individual rights and social mobility. While one may fairly say that capitalism has never been tried in Latin America, it has historically been seen as having failed -- by social groups ranging from the far Right to the far Left. In many cases the same situation prevails today. When one compares the socio-economic structures of authoritarian Mexico, democratic Costa Rica, autocratic Paraguay, and quasi-oligarchic Guatemala, a number of characteristics remain constant, including the dominance of the state over the economy, centralization of economic as well as political decisionmaking in the hands of the government, and the ever-increasing size and power of the bureaucracy. These characteristics, combined with anti-Americanism, disdain for private enterprise, traditional or ethnic-racial obstacles to social mobility, the predominance of family over national loyalties, the absence of political or personal discipline, and widespread acceptance of violence as a valid political instrument, all contributed to making Castro a model for many a Latin American intellectual. To this one may also add the historical Latin American (and Iberian) cult of the strong leader, the caudillo, whose authority lies in control of the means of violence, personal following, strong personal and emotional appeal to the people, and revolutionary claims. The fact that so many political upheavals in Latin America were instantly proclaimed to be "revolutions," although quite often they involved only membership changes in the ruling elites and even more often not even

that, also indicates the popular attraction revolutionary claims and promises, however vague, have in Latin America. Finally, courage and personal success are widely respected values and, as Castro's appeal due to his apparent ability to retain power despite the hostility and threats of the United States demonstrates, continue to play an essential role in the personalization of popularity among Latin American intellectuals and youth. Castro's appeal and influence, however, must be analyzed critically and rationally. Castro is in many respects the actual opposite of the image he has established throughout Latin America, which is based on an emotional, rather than rational, approach to reality. In countries where relations with the Soviet bloc and experience with Soviet patterns of control and domination of other countries are minimal, Cuba's total dependence on Moscow is not an acceptable, let alone accepted reality; among intellectuals self-conditioned to believe that aggression against Latin America can come only from north of the Rio Grande, description of Cuba as an aggressor is unacceptable. Finally, the cult of "revolutionary" heroes so predominant in Latin America was further strengthening Cuba's influence when "Che" Guevara died in Bolivia. In many ways, he was bound to become a mythical figure: an Argentine who was involved in the Communist attempt to take over Guatemala, he succeeded in conquering Cuba and was active in Africa before coming back to the South America of his youth to find his death. Guevara is still seen as a truly continental, "Latin American" hero, rather than as a Cuban or as the physically fragile, rather inept, but ambitious adventurer he was. Guevara's myth is strong and can be expected to remain strong because it fits into the continentwide perceptions of the Latin American intelligentsia and the peculiar character of the Latin American nationalism.

It is in light of these facts that Cuba's ideological influence among the Latin American guerrillas should be seen. It is also important to understand that Guevara's

approach to revolution in Latin America, essentially a voluntarist one, attracted so much admiration and emulation because it corresponded to political and cultural values related to caudillismo as well as to all-out anti-Americanism. Thus, the foco theory, a clear and sharp departure from Lenin's theory and practice of revolutionary takeovers, has found many imitators in Latin America since the early 1960s. Basically, this theory, practiced by Guevara and popularized by Debray, reverses the Leninist and orthodox CPs' approach to revolution by claiming that, even in the absence of an objective "revolutionary situation," a handful of committed professional revolutionaries can, by their personal example and spectacular action, stir the "masses" to such an extent as to provoke a "revolutionary situation" when the social, economic, or political preconditions may not exist. In many ways, Guevara's thought served as a rationale, or an excuse, for terrorism, since it justified and enhanced the alleged value of violent action by small but dedicated groups, regardless of their ties with or support from the "masses." In a Latin American context, but also in Western Europe (Italy, Spain, West Germany, and to a certain extent even Northern Ireland), Guevara provided at least a sense of "legitimacy" for those middle-class youths whose aspirations and aims went far beyond their numbers, qualifications, understanding of reality, and representativeness. Lenin's professional revolutionary, expected to take over following a civil conflict due to an existing "revolutionary situation," became the essential element in creating the conditions for his own conquest of power without waiting for the "people" to reach a level of "political self-consciousness" that would enable them to take power. The professional revolutionary, seen by Lenin as trained to infiltrate and "hijack" existing reformist or democratic revolutionary structures, became the cause, rather than the opportunistic winner of a "revolutionary situation."

For the proponent of the foco theory, a small group of well-trained and charismatic revolutionaries, neither of "popular" origin or even of the same nationality as the "masses," can provoke a set of circumstances in which previously fatalistic and obedient "masses" will follow the example of the group and create a revolutionary situation. The foco is only intended to act as the initiating factor. In order to do so, it must perform widely publicized actions against the alleged "enemy." The actions and motivation of a handful of individuals, completely unrepresentative of the majority of the population, are thus considered to be sufficient causes for bringing about a "revolution." Guevara's group, in which non-Bolivians were a majority and the leadership was in Guevara's hands, was intended to be an example. The attempt failed, but it became a myth whose impact was out of all proportion with the modest and short-lived activities the group has undertaken in the field in 1967. This is consistent with the voluntaristic tradition in Latin America, symbolized by caudillismo, and it provided radical youths with ideological and psychological arguments in their favor. By openly and actively encouraging an individual action directed toward making history rather than the Marxist rationalism that allows little freedom of action to the individual, Castroism not only appealed to Latin American psychological traits going as far back as the conquistadores, but also demonstrated that revolution was indeed possible. Finally, the voluntaristic approach to action characteristic of Castroism allowed Latin American revolutionaries to overcome the social and political differences among various countries, because it minimized the necessity of adapting tactics to an overwhelmingly rural or, in a few countries, a predominantly urban population. Since the center of revolutionary activity has decisively shifted from lower-class social groups and protracted mobilizational work among the people to the

actions and example of selected individuals, the pace of revolution quickened and revolution became more widespread.

An additional implication of the Castroite influence on Latin American ideologies of revolution is the sudden stress upon spectacular revolutionary acts rather than revolutionary processes and activities like subversive mobilization and penetration and infiltration of existing institutions. Moreover, considering the continuous social isolation of the growing number of middle-class youths in Latin American universities since the 1960s -- a group with little or no contact with the daily life of the peasantry or even the urban workers -- the difficulties of attracting mass support by ideological indoctrination could be overcome by obtaining such support through the emotional appeal of spectacular acts and, quite often, through sheer terrorism described as revolutionary action. Thus, while Castroism is certainly not terrorism, and it never openly accepted the legitimacy of individual acts of indiscriminate violence with political aims, it certainly encouraged its epigones in Latin America to engage in terrorist acts. Significantly enough, the smaller and more middle-class or student-oriented a group, the more likely it was to engage in activities that were closer to, although not necessarily identical to, West European terrorism for the sake of spectacle. The Uruguayan Tupamaros, Argentine Montoneros, and Chilean MIR are the best examples of this phenomenon. These groups and many others, however, were also strongly influenced by the anarchist-Marxist theories of such ideologues as Guillén and Carlos Mariella.

Anarchist-Marxist Influences

While Castroism and particularly the foco theory combined a Latin American cultural tradition of individualism and violence with Marxist class analysis and the Leninist stress on the decisive role of the professional revolutionary nuclei, Guillèn and Marighella drew their theories largely from the Spanish, Catalan, and, ultimately, from the nineteenth-century Bakunin strand of anarchism. They attempted to combine it with the Latin American, particularly South American, pattern of disdain for government and authority. While Guevara saw his Bolivian foco as the immediate cause of revolution, Marighella saw his group's acts as producing the type of hopeless government impotence that might bring about the downfall of government as such. For the anarchist-Marxist the aim is escape from authority; for the Castroite (and the orthodox CPs as well) it is the replacement of a "bourgeois" government with one that has equal or even greater authority, but is controlled by "the people." In the first case the destruction of social and political structures was the principal aim -- hence the similarity between the practices of the followers of Guillèn and Marighella and the patterns established later in West Germany and Italy by the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Brigades, respectively. In all these cases members of the elites, professional, intellectual, or economic, declare war on their own class, while the Castroites seek the replacement of fathers by sons in the name of "the people."

Furthermore, while the Castroites claimed to fight governments that had failed to raise the standards of living of the people, and promised to do so themselves after the victory of the revolution, the anarchist-Marxists often rose against governments that had succeeded or at least come close to succeeding in establishing quasi-welfare states where absolute poverty and disease were largely eliminated, as in Uruguay,

Chile, and Argentina -- because they had done so. As in the case of Baader-Meinhof, the Tupamaros rose against the democratic quasi-welfare state in Uruguay because they saw it as a perniciously successful attempt to destroy the political soul of "the masses" with economic incentives. All three groups mentioned above, although not purely anarchist-Marxist in ideological complexion, rose against democratic governments because they were democratic, because they have been successful in institutionalizing a national consensus, and because the revolutionaries saw revolution as far more important than democracy and as inherently opposed to it. It is only in light of these considerations that one can understand why the Tupamaros were bent upon destroying the Uruguayan democracy, MIR continued to engage in violence even during the Unidad Popular regime in Santiago, and the Montoneros reached the peak of their violent activities during the (Juan and particularly Isabel) Peron regimes.

It could be argued that the Tupamaros, Montoneros, and the Chilean MIR were more West European in their ideas, activities, and social background than Latin American. However, one could also argue that, particularly since the dramatic economic growth and social change of the 1960s and early 1970s, more and more Latin American countries have moved closer, although not as close as Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina, to West European patterns of middle-class rebellion against middle-class governments. The anarchist-Marxism of the Southern Cone and Brazil, even more than Castroism, is a uniquely Latin American phenomenon insofar as the Third World is concerned, and it underscores the deep similarities between Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States. It could not have thrived in countries without sizable middle classes, influential universities, or large numbers of students, and would have been inconceivable without middle-class support. It failed in all instances because in the end it directly threatened the very middle classes it sprang from with

indiscriminate violence and totalitarian pretensions. As a result, faced with a choice between the violent chaos of the revolutionaries and the order maintained by the violence of the military, the middle classes consistently favored the latter.

The practical contribution of the anarchist-Marxists, most of whom were engaged in urban guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism, was far greater than their ideological contribution. Marighella's "Mini-Manual of Guerrilla Warfare," a how-to treatise on terrorism, is still widely read, although his more pretentious ideas and aims are either unknown today or dismissed as irrelevant. The tightly structured cell organizations of the Tupamaros are still emulated in many other countries where guerrillas are involved in urban operations, but their political program was thoroughly discredited after it failed completely. The Tupamaros' aim was to discredit and delegitimize the democratic system in Uruguay in order to bring upon the country a ruthless military regime whose excesses would cause the people to revolt. They did succeed in bringing down democracy in Uruguay, and a military junta replaced it, but the price was the destruction of the Tupamaros, a lasting dictatorship in Montevideo, but no popular uprising. The political debate today in Uruguay is between democracy of the type the Tupamaros did everything to destroy and a continuation of the military regime. There are, however, no signs of a popular uprising.

As for the Argentine Montoneros, they are at least as discredited in Argentina as the Tupamaros are in Uruguay. Mario Firmenich, their supreme leader, is known or at the very least widely rumored to have used the huge treasury his group amassed from kidnappings and robberies in the mid-1970s to indulge his own rather luxurious tastes. After more than ten years in jail, the Tupamaros' Raul Sendic has become not a continental hero but the object of "human rights" demands for his release, another obscure victim of the violence he helped begin. As the MIR's Andres Pasca! Allende

travels between Havana and Managua, his group is becoming more and more similar to other Cuban-aided and -manipulated groups in the Western Hemisphere, and it has been forced to establish an alliance with the despised PCCh. The Brazilian Left is for the time being reduced to quasi-electoral politics under military supervision, and political violence has at least temporarily ceased to be its preferred method of action.

The Maoists

Very often the ultra-leftist groups that sprang up in the 1960s, usually as splinters of the orthodox CPs, were seen as resulting from the ideological influence of Mao in particular or from the impact of Chinese and, perhaps more significant, Vietnamese guerrilla experience. While the rush of "Maoist" splinter parties in the 1960s was indeed a result of the Sino-Soviet disputes, and most of the Communist/Marxist-Leninist groups were indeed favored and a few even financed by Beijing, their impact, ideological or otherwise, was minimal indeed. Generally even smaller than the orthodox CPs from which they came, the Communist/Marxist-Leninist parties were marginal even within the framework of a rather minuscule Left in Latin America. As institutions, and as Chinese spearheads in the Western Hemisphere, they were uniformly ineffective; as purveyors and catalysts of new inputs for the baroque ideology of Latin American leftist guerrillas, their influence was far more significant, although indirect.

Regardless of their Asian origin, Maoism and the Vietnamese experience, paradoxical as it may seem, shared two important characteristics of obvious applicability to the Latin America: the cult of the leader, which related to caudillismo, and the stress upon the role and mobilization of the peasantry, which

made up the overwhelming majority of the population in both East Asia and most of Latin America. One may also point out that although the Latin American Left's ideological inclinations were complex and quite remote from the "pure" Marxism-Leninism of Eastern Europe, they were quite open to yet another addition to their tactical and practical approach to revolutionary violence, especially after the orthodox CPs had been discredited in the 1960s. Even more important was the success of what was widely believed to be the Vietnamese "revolution" by 1975. It is important to notice in this respect that by then the revolutionary élan of Latin America was largely spent, as a result of the defeat of the guerrillas during the late 1960s and the ultimate failure of the Allende experiment in Chile.

The basic Maoist contributions to guerrilla warfare and Latin political approaches were the accent upon the mobilization of the peasantry and the concept of protracted warfare. The first was finally seen as important after the foco practice and theory of Castroism was perceived as a failure and voluntarism was seen as a liability for the ultimate success of the revolution. Since reliance on spectacular acts and an elite-based small group could lead to total defeat, as in Bolivia and elsewhere, long-term mobilization of rural groups with the ultimate aim of making them permanent sources of support and recruits was seen as a viable alternative by a number of practitioners and theorists of revolution in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, it was clearly understood from the Vietnam War that the United States simply did not have the power and will to oppose effectively a revolutionary thrust against their allies, provided that such a thrust was directed toward the very long term and therefore required maintaining a national consensus in the United States over a long period of time. Like Mao and Giap or Ho Chi Minh, Latin American groups discovered that in an environment of relatively low-level but clearly revolutionary

violence, the volatility of U.S. public opinion is a vital asset. Unlike the tactics of the CPs in 1932 in El Salvador, when the accent was upon deception (the hope that the United States would see the CP-led insurrection to come as a violent form of "araujismo," i.e., populist reformism), or the PGT attempt to hide behind the alleged nationalism of Arbenz in Guatemala between 1950 and 1954, the Maoist/Vietnamese-inspired guerrillas sought to outlast any anti-Communist awareness in the United States with regard to their countries. Thus the FPL in El Salvador in the early 1970s and the "guerra prolongada" faction of the Nicaraguan FSLN led by Tomàs Borge were clearly acting on an "Asian" understanding of the relationship between time and revolution. They saw duration and the power of sheer survival as the main assets of the guerrillas, particularly in light of their perception that the enemy, directly as well as indirectly, was not the national government but the United States. In other words, these groups were fighting, literally, the democratic consensus of the American government rather than the military dictatorship of El Salvador or the dynastic Somoza regime. Considering Latin America's traditionally emotional and voluntaristic approach to political violence, the acceptance of the concept of a long-term time framework for revolution is unusual. It has made these groups a permanent feature of their countries' revolutionary landscapes, but their failure to attain significant successes has tended to reduce their appeal among the youth. They retain the support of the peasants, however, because the peasants' perception of time is different from that of the romantic revolutionaries of the cities.

In tactical terms, the Maoist/Vietnamese-influenced guerrilla groups tend to operate in a "centripetal" rather than "centrifugal" fashion. Their aim is to close in on the cities from rural bases, according to Mao's idea of besieging the cities from the countryside. In contrast, the anarchist-Marxists as well as the CPs adopted the

centrifugal approach of spreading revolution from the nervous centers of the nation, the cities, to the more remote areas of the countryside. As for the Castroites, their approach, as previously noted, was based upon a national rather than a geographical or social source of revolution.

The only Maoist movement to make a genuine contribution to Latin American guerrilla warfare is the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru. Significantly, it looks for support among certain isolated Indian communities and is led by the omnipresent intellectual elites composed of graduates and former faculty members of the Ayacucho University. It hates the post-Mao regime in Beijing, and it dismisses as dangerously irrelevant the Peruvian Left's electoral successes. Despite its spectacular feats and the widespread impact of its terrorist tactics in the Andean Indian communities, Sendero seems condemned to the same fate as the Tupamaros -- a flaming destruction by the concentrated efforts of the government, army, and perhaps the accommodating Left as well.

It is also important to note that Sendero Luminoso, like the Tupamaros and the Montoneros, sprang into spectacular action following the inauguration of democratic government in Peru, counting upon the culturally alien, and politically irrelevant Indians of the Altiplano for its recruits. Sendero Luminoso thus presents the quite paradoxical situation of being organized and led by a well-educated Ph.D. in philosophy who claims to represent "the people," i.e., the illiterate Indians he does not really understand. Thus, the former philosophy professor at Ayacucho, Abimael Guzman, alias "Comrade Gonzalo," describes himself as the mythical survivor of the Incas, the "Fourth Sword of Marxism" (after Marx, Lenin, and Mao), and as a quasi-legendary and thus untouchable and absolute leader. This Mao in the Andes offers himself as the Indians' Messiah and takes advantage of the Quechua and

Aymara naiveté and ignorance in an attempt to stir up, or even invent, Indian "class consciousness."

Despite its Maoist rhetoric, Sendero does not represent merely a transplant of Maoism to South America. Its involvement in drug traffic, its expansion into Columbia and Bolivia, and its alliance with the "unorthodox" MIR of Chile, PBR of Venezuela, and M-19 of Colombia indicate the necessity of adapting Maoism to the realities of a different continent, culture, and reality. The fact that Sendero has, over time, become less rather than more of a Maoist group is another indication of the Latin American Left's trend toward some sort of homogenization of approaches, ideology, and rhetoric, despite the widely different national and ideological origins of its different factions.

The Trotskyites

Despite their long presence in Latin America and their attempts to influence the international Left from bases in Mexico and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, the Trotskyites have been of only marginal importance, except for the Argentine ERP. As is the case with the Maoists, however, the Trotskyite influence is far less related to the impact of any one guerrilla group than to certain ideas and practices that have become widespread in the region. Thus, the Trotskyite idea of permanent revolution, which implies a process that does not begin or end with a single revolutionary victory, and that is based upon as intense a hostility against the bureaucratization of revolution as against institutionalization of democracy, provides a degree of legitimization for regimes like Nicaragua's in their attempts to further radicalize their internal policies in the name of post-revolutionary sharpening of the class struggle.

Even more important, the Trotskyite view of revolution as a universal phenomenon that cannot survive unless it spreads is quite compatible with the Latin American dream of continental unity.

Thus Trotskyism provides a revolutionary and self-proclaimed Marxist justification and legitimacy for the Latin American Left's dreams of continental unity and radicalism. An example is provided by the PRTC, a group whose small membership is out of proportion with its regional Central American ambitions or proclamations. Bowing to realities, however, the PRTC has agreed to act as the Cinderella of the FMLN in El Salvador and to accept the "separation" of its so-called branches in Honduras and Guatemala -- another indication of the recent trend toward homogenization of the Left in Latin America.

The only Trotskyite group to have made a significant contribution to guerrilla practice in Latin America is the Argentine ERP, and its history helps to explain the declining influence of Trotskyism in the Western Hemisphere. Centered on a small group of quasi-intellectuals in the Argentine cities and led by urban-bred Roberto Santucho, the ERP tried to gain the unreachable and to pursue the unimaginable by attempting all-out attacks against military garrisons in Tucuman and Buenos Aires in the mid-1970s. The predictable results were the destruction the ERP and the end of the Trotskyite attempt to play a concrete role in the development of guerrilla warfare in Latin America. The only other significant attempt of the Trotskyites, the temporary flirtation of the Guatemalan MR-13 with the Posada faction of the internationally fragmented Trotskyite movement, died with the decision by the former group to shift, once again, toward a kind of unity with ideologically different factions such as the Castroite FAR.

Ideologically, the appeal of Trotskyism, although it is seldom recognized as such, has been its international ambitions -- its stress on the role of international rather than national revolution. By rejecting the Stalinist concept of revolution in one country -- and by implication of revolutions in the service of that one country -- Trotsky and his fragmented successor groups responded, inadvertently, to the profound aspirations of the Latin American Left and their perception of Latin America as a naturally homogeneous entity in spirit if not in fact.

Regardless of the influence Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism, Castroism, anarchist-Marxism, Trotskyism, or Maoism have upon the Latin American intellectuals, students, and sectors of the middle classes, few of them compare in scope or impact with the radical sectors of the Catholic Church. At the very least, without the implicit or even direct encouragement of those sectors, many teenagers, peasants, and workers would not have joined guerrilla groups they do not control and in which they still have only a marginal influence.

The Role of the Church

Radical elements of the Catholic Church have played an increasingly important ideological and practical role in the formation and activities of the Marxist guerrilla groups in Latin America since the late 1960s. While "liberation theology" alone is seldom more than an inarticulate attempt to combine Marxism with unorthodox Christian teachings, and, as an ideological or intellectual construction, is blatantly adaptive rather than creative, its impact in social and political terms should not be underestimated. The importance of "liberation theology" and of the clergymen acting in its name lies far less in their convincing large numbers of people of the validity of

their interpretation of the Gospels than in their contribution to shifts in popular perceptions of institutional political legitimacy.

By proclaiming their total and exclusive support for "the poor," a social category of vague characteristics that is often defined opportunistically, and by openly accepting the validity of the Marxist-Leninist concepts of class warfare and capitalist exploitation, radical clergymen play an important polarizing role in Latin American society. Polarization, in turn, destroys the already weak premises of democracy, based as they are upon compromise, negotiation, and trade-offs. By openly choosing an alliance, and sometimes an identification with the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas' cause and analysis of political and social realities, and by consistently taking anti-capitalist stands, the radical sectors of the Church are actively working on behalf of revolutionary change, which, in the present context of Latin America, means Marxist-Leninist revolution based upon violence.

By proclaiming, against abundant evidence to the contrary, that upward social mobility cannot be realistically hoped for by the young because of the alleged repression of the ruling classes, radical churchmen reinforce the impact of Marxist promises to the unemployed or unemployable youth that their only hope for personal fulfillment and advancement is the victory of the revolutionaries in their country. The polarization encouraged by the radical clergy forces even conservative sectors of the Catholic Church to move toward the center and against the status quo. Moreover, in a polarized political and social environment, the advocates of reform and gradual change are more often than not seen as irrelevant, even treasonous, by both sides. In addition, radical churchmen are extremely adept at forcing the hand of the Church as a whole. Thus, when priests or nuns openly join guerrillas and are killed by government forces, ecclesiastic solidarity forces reluctant bishops to condemn the

government. When violence becomes the dominant means of political intercourse, the Church tries to take an even-handed stand, which tends to place the legitimate government on the same level as the groups using unconstitutional means to bring about political change.

Radical Church groups, primarily certain religious orders such as Maryknoll and the Jesuits and some members of the Catholic hierarchy, have completely succeeded only in undermining the previously stabilizing role of the Catholic Church in Latin America. Even more important, perhaps, particularly in countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Chile, and Brazil, the prestige of the Catholic Church is used by groups or individuals for their own purposes. Thus, when most of the priests, monks, or nuns in a country are foreigners, or, in the case of orders, under the control of centers outside Latin America, their ability to attract support for the guerrillas from ordinary people is greatly enhanced by their religious affiliation. This acceptance of radical priests or nuns as legitimate members of the Catholic Church and their importance in expanding the influence and membership of guerrilla groups is perhaps best exemplified in cases such as that of Father Poncel, a Belgian priest now acting as the principal propagandist for the Salvadoran ERP, or the Jesuit Luis Pellecer Faena, formerly an important leader of the Guatemalan EGP.

While Poncel and Pellecer can be described as aberrations, it is significant that one of the continental martyrs of the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas is Camillo Torres, another former priest, who took over the leadership of a Colombian group, the ELN, and died in a shoot-out with the army. It is only superficially paradoxical that former Archbishop Romero of San Salvador has been raised to revolutionary sainthood, since his political evolution and impact shifted steadily to the Left toward the end of his life. After attempts to reduce violence by condemning both sides in the civil war,

Romero ended in openly supporting the front organizations of the guerrillas, justifying their violence, and encouraging disobedience in the national armed forces.

The importance of the radical priests and nuns for the guerrilla cause in Latin America is further enhanced by their ability to influence international public opinion in their favor, due to the global presence of the Church. Radical priests and nuns support the use of violence despite Christian teachings, and are well aware that in Latin American political tradition violence has consistently been seen as a legitimate means for pursuing political aims, and that the Church has perhaps been the only factor inhibiting it. Their actions have contributed to the legitimization of leftist guerrilla warfare and at the same time to the delegitimization of self-defense on the part of the established governments, described from many a pulpit as corrupt, brutal, and ultimately illegitimate.

TASK THREE

VIOLENCE ON THE EXTREME RIGHT

The international media and human-rights organizations have given increased attention to the activities of the Latin American far Right, particularly since the April 1976 military coup in Argentina and the intensification of the Salvadoran civil war following the October 1979 coup. This tends to obscure some of the basic patterns of violence from that end of the ideological spectrum. Far too often the activities of extreme nationalist groups and of strongly anti-Communist regimes, particularly military ones, are either lumped together with those of the Marxist-Leninist Left under the general label of terrorism, or included in the badly defined and much-abused notion of state terrorism. This latter trend is in part explained by the existence of close ties between many of the violent groups of the Right and sectors of the armed forces in certain countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, and Brazil), particularly the intelligence branches of the military and police. Notwithstanding these common misperceptions, the Right does play at least an indirect role in the general pattern of politically motivated violence in the region (with the exception of the Caribbean, where there have not been any known anti-Marxist violent groups). The connection between violence on the Left and on the Right is expressed in a number of tactical similarities suggesting a convergence in the methods of the Left and Right, and in the very origins and aims of the Right itself.

This task will also examine those groups which cannot, ideologically or otherwise, be placed on either the Left or the Right extreme of the spectrum of political violence in the Western Hemisphere.

The Ideological Roots of the Violent Right in Latin America

Unlike most of the leftist terrorist or insurgent groups, the Right in Latin America does not trace its ideological roots to any coherent and continentally known ideologue or groups of ideologues. Labeling the Right "fascist," as the Left and many a liberal in the West do, may be emotionally satisfying and useful for public relations purposes, but is historically, ideologically, and politically false. Indeed, the only terrorist groups in Latin America that can be traced to a "fascist" origin, and even then only in a conceptually loose manner, are groups now on the Left: the Colombian M-19, a remote product of the populist and quasi-fascist caudillo Rojas Pinilla's late electoral campaigns, and the Argentine Montoneros, initially the product of the extreme right wing of the quasi-fascist Peronist Movement (Movimiento Peronista Justicialista). Both groups, however, shifted so rapidly and dramatically toward the Left that they are universally seen as Marxist today, and both claim themselves to be Marxist-Leninist.

The tendency to label violent and even non-violent anti-Communist Latin American groups as "fascist" can be traced to the World War II enmity between the populism of the far Right and the internationalism of the Marxist Left. The Right, then as now, claimed that nationalism and communism (the latter label being flexible enough to include all reformist as well as Leninist revolutionary groups) are incompatible, and that it alone had a monopoly over nationalist interests and traditional cultural and moral values. To the extremely limited extent to which today's Right still maintains that position, its ideological roots can be traced to European, particularly Hispano-Lusitanian versions of fascism. Other, perhaps more important

aspects of the violent Right in Latin America today, however, are in outright opposition to the fundamental tenets of European, including South European (Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese) fascism. These include support for free enterprise, for Catholicism, meaning pre-Vatican II dogma and particularly the pre-Medellin clerical role, and a general paternalism, as opposed to the traditional fascist populism, in the approach to the interests of peasants and urban proletarians. The Latin American Right, then, tends to be both nationalist including being (protectionist and biased toward a limited paternalistic role for the state in economy) and internationalist (to the extent it perceives itself as part of a global anti-Communist, anti-Soviet crusade).

It is also important to note that, by comparison with most groups on the violent Left, rightist organizations in Latin America tend to be far less elitist in both leadership and membership. Thus the leaders of Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Argentine, and Brazilian rightist violent groups generally come from the lower middle classes. Despite the financial support they have received from the landed or moneyed oligarchy, they are seldom its obedient tools nor are they ideologically dependent on it. One of the best examples of rightist organizations whose members are involved in violent para-legal activities is the Salvadoran Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) led by former army intelligence major Roberto D'Aubuisson, which has become the second largest Salvadoran political party. Not only did ARENA receive over a quarter of the votes in the constitutional assembly elections of March 1982, but D'Aubuisson was also a particularly strong candidate for the presidency of the country in the March 25, 1984 presidential elections, with about one-third of the total vote in the first and over 45 per cent in the second round.

The most striking fact about ARENA is that it received a large number of peasant votes, particularly in western El Salvador, in elections that everyone, with

the exception of the Salvadoran Left and its Western and U.S. fellow travelers, considered to be fair. This was in addition to support from the well-educated managerial and business classes, large numbers of women, and urban dwellers. Prominent members of ARENA, including D'Aubuisson himself, however, have admitted that the party is merely the political arm of a far deeper and more politically and ideologically committed alliance of anti-leftist forces, although they do not publicly consider violence, including para- or extra-legal violence, a legitimate or effective political instrument. Such admissions are related to the recurrent claims of both the Left in El Salvador and anti-conservative opinion in the United States and Western Europe that ARENA is actually little more than a front for the "death squads" in El Salvador and is consistently engaged in indiscriminate violence against "the people," that is, in terrorism. These claims, not only because they are so widespread and politically important for the fate of El Salvador and the outcome of the civil war in that country, but also because they reiterate similar claims about Argentine, Chilean, and Guatemalan anti-Marxist groups, raise the essential issue of terrorism on the Right.

Terrorism on the Right?

According to the definition of terrorism and the criteria given in Task One, Latin American anti-Marxist groups, despite their violent methods, cannot as a rule be considered terrorist. Their targets, unlike those of typical leftist terrorist groups like the Montoneros or Tupamaros, are not uninvolved civilians (such as foreign businessmen), but nationals perceived to be involved in some way with the guerrillas of the Left. Whether those targets are intellectuals seen as providing the needed

ideological support and political deception methods to the hard core Leninist Left, union organizers seen as close to members of the various leftist front or "popular" organizations, or members of urban or rural underground cells of Leninist groups, they are selected because their elimination will numerically reduce the number of militants on the other side and deter the others. Whether all the victims of the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, or Argentine (between 1976 and 1978) rightist "death squads" can actually be included in any of the above categories is, conceptually if not morally, irrelevant -- they were certainly seen as members of the opposition in an environment described by both the violent Left and the violent Right as a civil war. The term "dirty war" applied to the Argentine military government's anti-insurgency campaign of 1976-78 is particularly appropriate, since confusion and intelligence mistakes often resulted in the deaths of innocent, non-involved civilians. On the other hand, and this is particularly important, anti-Marxist groups operating outside official government seals have neither the intention nor an interest in murdering "civilians" (in such circumstances civilians are defined by their non-involvement and non-participation in the political, mobilization, or military side of the civil war, rather than as those who are not uniformed and claim to be "only" political supporters of the anti-government side).

The main problem of definition, as well as of interpretation: by outside observers, however, lies in the clearly documented and not infrequent instances of "right wing" or anti-Marxist vigilante groups' involvement in the killing of uninvolved citizens, both nationals and foreigners. The primary reasons for these occurrences are the very structure of the intelligence apparatus of these groups and historical perceptions on the nature of certain types of organizations.

Most, although by no means all, Latin American anti-Marxist vigilante groups are connected to some significant extent to their countries' intelligence organizations or at least with former members of those organizations. This means that the "death squads" rely on intelligence sources of known unreliability in many cases for the selection of their targets. Name confusions and murders of close relatives of known terrorists occur frequently, despite the fact that these relatives may never have been involved in or have supported the activities of the terrorists.

A far more important caveat regarding the "death squads" in Latin America concerns their perceptions of important and large institutions, particularly the unions, the Church, and foreign activists. Here the situation is further confused by the roots of those perceptions in the two most important cases: the unions and the clergy. The unions were consistently seen as "communist" in many parts of Latin America, long before some of them were penetrated and manipulated by organizations of the far Left. Moreover, the term "communism" and "communists" has become a loose label for those who in any way challenge the established structure of power in Latin America from the left -- from reformists, to liberal democrats, to genuine Marxist Leninists. Since communism is correctly seen as threatening the most basic values of national culture throughout Latin America, labelling someone a communist makes him a legitimate target for violence. Those in power have often used communism as a label for their opponents of all ideological stripes, and it still serves as a justification for personal vendettas, sheer brutality, or indiscriminate violence against innocent persons in order to deter the "real" communists.

Most often union members are the victims of this indiscriminate labellings, and in circumstances where the Leninists are indeed challenging the status quo the "communist" label ensures one of becoming a "death squad" target. Legitimate unions

are far from widespread in Latin America, and illegal formation of unions try to counter the conservative accusations of communism that are directed to these unions' leaders. But like many other institutions, the Latin American unions have increasingly, if not always, become actual targets of communist infiltration. The right often points to this when labelling all unions, and unionism in general, as nothing but hidden Marxiam Leninism. All of these facts explain the extremely high number of unionists being targeted by "death squads" throughout most of Latin America.

To some extent the clergy's position is the opposite of the unions', insofar as the Church, historically has been seen as an ally of the status quo in some Latin American countries. However, strong traces of the anti-clerical and sometimes anti-Church "liberal" positions of the nineteenth century remain in a number of countries, and today reinforce anti-clerical attitudes on the part of the right (Guatemala, Paraguay, Colombia, Chile, are among the examples). More importantly, in a significant number of Latin American countries members of the clergy, both national and (more frequently still) foreign, support the "liberation theology" doctrines and are actively involved in civil strife on the side of the Left. This reinforced anti-clerical attitudes in some countries and provoked them for the first time in many others. Accusations against Catholic (and Protestant) priests and nuns of being communist abound in countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua (under Somoza), Brazil, Chile, and Peru. The fact that a growing number of clergymen and nuns had been openly and vocally associated with Leninist terrorist groups since Camilo Torres, only strengthened the conservatives' perception of the clergy as a subversive element in their countries. This was further reinforced by the fact that the Vatican, until the reign of John Paul II, never condemned people like Camilo Torres. The overlap between Christian Base Communities (CEBs) and Marxist-Leninist terrorist cells in

some countries, particularly in Central America and in Chile or Peru, provided a "legitimate" reason for "death squad" violence against clergy, and in some cases it took indiscriminate forms. But, it should also be noted that clergymen like Rogelio Ponce (S.J., El Salvador, prominent ERP ideologue) or James Carney (Honduras) actually have become leaders of the Leninist side in Latin American civil wars, and thus cannot claim any immunity from violent reprisals. These facts, however, are not the rule, nor do they contradict the basic nature of anti-communist vigilantism or "death squad" activities, which are manifest in the violent right's selection of targets and general behavior as well as in the left's.

In terms of using targets as examples for the other side, as symbols, the Right has often engaged in spectacular assassinations, but the victims are, once again, actual or perceived members of the opposing side. A very good example is the assassination of the leadership of the Salvadoran Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), including its president, Enrique Alvarez, in the fall of 1980, in San Salvador. Often labeled by the Salvadoran Left and by liberals in the United States and Western Europe as "murder," the liquidation of the FDR leadership should be seen in its Salvadoran context and without irrelevant emotional involvement. The relevant fact is that Alvarez and his comrades in the FDR leadership were openly, publicly, and actively working for and in cooperation with the guerrilla groups' umbrella, the FMLN, and acted as FMLN spokesmen. At that time, as now, the FMLN was openly and actively challenging the government of El Salvador and the social, political, and even cultural status quo by using military force. To consider the FDR leadership "non-combatants" under such circumstances is to invite ridicule, since the distinction between the military and political wings of leftist guerrilla/terrorist groups is nonexistent. Indeed, in El Salvador the five member groups of the FMLN umbrella

define themselves as politico-military groups, thus accepting the unity of purpose of guerrillas in the hills of Morazan, urban terrorists, and political supporters operating in San Salvador, Washington, or Havana and Moscow. To accuse the Right in El Salvador of failing to make a distinction between political leaders of the FDR and guerrilla chiefs, when the latter did not accept the legitimacy of such a distinction, is fallacious and involves a blatant double-standard.

The case of Argentina in 1976 is similarly obvious. When the army took over the weak, incompetent, and ineffective government of President Isabel Peron, the overwhelming majority of Argentians supported the coup led by General Videla. The main reason for that support was the generalized insecurity in the country due to the actions of the leftist guerrillas, mostly the Montoneros and the ERP. The destruction of the Montoneros and ERP by the military, completed by 1978, was generally hailed by the public. The Argentine Anti-Communist Army (AAA) organizationally and methodologically one of the forerunners of the Salvadoran "death squads," included many middle- and lower-class citizens, and, according to the Montonero supreme leader Mario Firmenich, inflicted more losses on the Montoneros than either the military or the Montoneros had expected. Only after the military structure and power of the Left had been eliminated did the social, political, and particularly the emotional impact of the decapitation of the middle- and upper-middle-class youth -- the "cream" of the Montoneros and ERP -- become apparent as the "dirty" aspects of the civil war were revealed.

For understandable but nevertheless purely emotional reasons, the middle-class mothers of the dead leftist terrorists and their supporters, the "Madres del Plaza del Mayo," requested "justice" and information about their dead or "missing" sons and daughters in the name of law, human rights, and sheer decency. This request was a

source of embarrassment to the military regime in Buenos Aires, and it represented the logical conclusion of the usual terrorist claim that he has all the legal rights of an ordinary citizen, despite his open, murderous, and consistent disregard for "bourgeois" law. It also provides a clear demonstration of the fundamental differences between the social and cultural bases of the AAA and those of the leftist terrorists. The former tended to see the post-1978 "human rights" campaign and the anti-military attitude of the middle classes as attempts to revive the influence of the Left and thus saw the Madres del Plaza del Mayo as basically "subversive"; the latter tended to believe that killing their terrorist sons was a crime, despite their acts and contempt for the values of their countrymen, and used the military as a scapegoat for the violence of the civil war, acting as if it had been fought by one side alone. Despite these differences, the AAA did not attack the families of the defeated terrorists because they were not perceived as a threat to the non-Marxist system of Argentina, and because the danger posed by the Left was widely seen as overcome. Violent and active as it was, and may become if the Alfonsín regime is perceived as weak and tolerant toward the violent Left, the AAA is not interested in or ideologically geared toward the elimination of the anti-government opposition as such, unless it uses violent means to impose change on the Argentinian political and economic system. If the AAA had been the mirror image of the Montoneros and ERP, i.e., if it represented terrorism of the Right in reaction to the terrorism of the Left, it would have taken on the post-1978 opponents of the government to stop the continuous decline in the popularity of the military regime, if for no other reason. The fact that it did not do so indicates that it, like the Guatemalan MLN or the Brazilian "esquadras de muerte," only springs into action when the government cannot cope with a violent

challenge from the Leninist Left. Once the threat is seen as receding, the para-military, para-legal vigilante groups of the Right tend to dissolve themselves.

The Aims of Right-Wing Violence

No right-wing group engaged in politically motivated violence has ever made radical political change its aim. On the contrary, almost all such groups support a status-quo based on "historic" or "traditional" values against what they perceive as the onslaught of culturally and morally alien values and political or social aims. Of the few generalizations that can be made about the anti-Marxist violent groups on the Right, therefore, are that they are traditionalist in outlook, conservative in terms of their moral and cultural values, and politically oriented toward maintaining the status-quo. Their values, in other words, are the reverse of the revolutionary utopianism of leftist terrorist and guerrilla groups. The right-wing "death squad" does not purport to implement a revolution, but to prevent one from being imposed by force upon the population and particularly upon its own members and supporters.

Being geared politically and ideologically toward the maintenance of the status quo, the violent Right in Latin America has none of the quasi-messianic appeal of the Left (particularly the sectors of the violent Left supported by elements of the radicalized Catholic Church) and thus appears to be largely "reactionary." If the term "reactionary" is denuded of the ideological connotations ascribed to it by the radical and revolutionary Left, all of which imply an opposition to progress as such, and is interpreted instead as a reaction to developments seen as threatening the cultural and political, as well as economic or religious, values of a particular people, the Latin American violent Right is indeed reactionary. It is also reactionary in the

etymological sense of the word, insofar as it always becomes active in response to a military challenge by the revolutionary Left against the established government (either democratically elected or military) and tends to dismantle its own organization and operations once threat has been overcome.

The Right may model its structure along the organizational lines perfected by the revolutionary Left, which makes it difficult to approach anti-Marxist political violence and its representatives from the same point of view as the revolutionary Left. Similarities of structure and methods tend too often to be interpreted as expressions of similar aims, if not similar motivations.

The Methods of the Violent Right and Its Structure

The historical evolution of such groups as Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN), ESA, ORDEN, the Maximiliano Hernandez Marti 12 Brigade, AAA, and the "escuadrones de muerte" is generally characterized by a trend toward organizational and tactical similarity to their enemies on the Leninist Left. This phenomenon can be traced to external influences. Former French military and intelligence officers who had been impressed by their enemies' organizational success during the Algerian War, for example, later served as advisors in Latin America. And some of the most prominent graduates of the Taiwanese political warfare school were Latin Americans, including D'Aubuisson himself.

Among the examples of the similarity in the tactical and organizational patterns of rightist violent groups and their enemies on the revolutionary Left are the use of political front organizations and the cell structure, which is intended to eliminate the dangers of intelligence leaks, infiltration, and discovery following the capture of

important members. Both are political and military patterns the Right learned from the revolutionary Left.

Another similarity is indicated by the fact that the various Salvadoran "death squads" mentioned above are all reported to be linked to an intelligence center in El Salvador with close financial ties to these émigré circles in Miami and Guatemala. This parallels the FMLN's financial and military ties with the Soviet bloc. Political and diplomatic targets are pursued by the "democratic" FDR members, and part of the near-term aim is the infiltration of the existing legal institutions in El Salvador. Just as leftist groups infiltrated the military and civilian-technocratic groups seen as alternatives to the status quo, and penetrated and perhaps controlled elements of the first junta after the October 1979 coup, the Right has since then penetrated and probably controls significant elements of the army, other security forces, and the government.

The operational methods of the violent Right exhibit many similarities throughout Latin America, particularly due to the fact that the Guatemalan and Argentine groups have served as models for most of the others. The most frequent pattern is the organization of para-military groups by either regional or national politico-economic groups, which usually include their rural and urban clientele. Once these groups are established, they receive some training from the regular military, forge close links with military intelligence institutions or their most prominent members, and attract to their ranks discharged soldiers and retired officers. The triad of elite members, lower-class rank-and-file members, and elements of the military tends to operate along highly secret organizational lines, with members denying any role in actions undertaken by the groups. None of the three segments is unanimously involved,

however, as demonstrated by the efforts of some military sectors to deny support or even to dismantle such violent organizations.

The social, institutional, and military conditions explaining the existence and activities of the extreme Right's violent groups are quite similar in many Latin American countries. The most important of these are the following: (1) an antiquated and inadequate judiciary and judges who are afraid to take harsh measures against captured members of the violent Left, either for fear of reprisals or because of social solidarity with the terrorists or, far more often, with their families; the legal code itself which often remains under the influence of pre-independence Spanish principles, and whose inadequacy is demonstrated by the fact that in practically no Latin American countries does legislation provide either a clear definition or clear penalties for political crimes. (2) Most leftist terrorist leaders are of middle-class origin, and their activities are very often perceived as not only threatening state security, but as doubly treasonous -- for the country and for their own social group. These perceptions explain the ferocity of the violence of the extreme Right against what it perceives to be a group of criminals formed in its own midst. On the other hand, the social and cultural similarities between some of the leaders of the extreme Right and most of those of the extreme Left also explains the selectivity of the Right's targeting of victims. When revolutionary leaders come from the same family or social background as anti-Marxist vigilante group leaders, the danger of alienating a friendly or neutral family by indiscriminately killing its suspected leftist members is too great. The close ties between internal security and intelligence organizations and rightist vigilante groups usually, although by no means always, minimizes the risk of indiscriminate attacks, at the same time that it improves intelligence. To the extent that rightist vigilantes or "death squads" target only revolutionary leaders and their known

supporters, they cannot be defined as terrorists. The definitional problems become far more complicated, however, when the targets are members of social or ethnic groups other than the elites.

The military justification for right-wing violence in Latin America is closely related to the militaries' institutional characteristics insofar as they were not, at least until the 1960s, either trained or organizationally and professionally prepared to battle domestic political violence. The officer corps as a rule has been drawn from social groups that have not generally and traditionally been part of the dominant elites, usually lower-middle-class or peasant groups. This is particularly true in the case of the Central American military forces, in which no members of the economic and social elites have played a meaningful role for decades. On the other hand, the situation is far more complex in countries like Brazil, Peru, or Venezuela, where a professional military group has developed that has pursued the military career for generations and has reached a prominent social position as well. As a result, they were generally not aware of or touched by the ideological divisions produced by universities or private schools that affected the middle and upper classes. The military's widespread lack of knowledge of, preoccupation with, or interest in economic, ideological, or political issues (political in the sense of party politics) left them unprepared to operate effectively in an ideologically loaded and politically polarized atmosphere.

After the first revolutionary wave swept over Latin America in the mid-1960s, it took the military a certain amount of time to adapt to the new type of war it was expected to fight, and the later the threat came, the longer the time required for adaptation. It is thus important to note that the Guatemalan military, one of the first to be faced by a Castroite guerrilla threat, was also the first to adapt to an

ideologically motivated war and the first to coordinate its actions with right-wing anti-Communist vigilantes.

The Guatemalan "model" is perhaps the most widely accepted in Latin America, in terms of providing organizational and operational methods for right-wing vigilantes in an anti-insurgency environment. Following the traumatic events of 1954, when the Arbenz regime, decisively penetrated and controlled by cadres of the Communist party (the Guatemalan Party of Labor, or PGT), was overthrown by the joint action of a group of military officers led by Castillo Armas, the U.S. government, and the middle classes, the ideological awareness of the Guatemalan military and economic elites became quite acute. The same was true of the other side, with polarization along ideological lines becoming acute within the army as well as within Ladino society shortly after the Cuban Revolution. The National Liberation Movement (MLN), a basically middle-class and small-landowner-based political party with strong anti-Marxist credentials, initially established as a political support system for Castillo Armas, was probably among the first such political parties in Latin America to define themselves as both the political and military expression of their constituencies. In line with this definition, the MLN organized its own para-military structures in southeastern Guatemala; directed them against the various Marxist guerrilla groups in the area, and succeeded in eradicating the guerrilla threat there, with only limited official military support. The MLN's leader and founder, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, became a one-man clearinghouse for similar organizations in other Latin American countries, particularly the Southern Cone states and El Salvador. The MLN succeeded in establishing total economic, social, cultural, and political control in southeastern Guatemala, and in competing with the military in anti-insurgency operations. At the time that Mario Sandoval was the Guatemalan vice-president, MLN actions became

quasi-official policies, and this reinforced its influence over the other Latin American parties and vigilante groups with a similar organizational pattern. Perhaps even more important, subsequent military governments attempted to apply some the MLN's operational principles to the national territory as a whole, particularly under the Rios Montt regime of 1982-83, despite acute political (but not necessarily ideological) disagreements between that government and the MLN. The Rios Montt regime's formation of popular militias, mostly Indian, whose principal aims were the maintenance of law and order locally and the elimination of the guerrillas' support system, borrowed from and implemented many MLN tactics. In addition, there are ties between the MLN and the Salvadoran elites in general and the principal conservative Salvadoran party, ARENA, in particular. The MLN also established ties with the Argentine military after the 1976 coup in Buenos Aires, with former French Secret Army Organization (OAS) veterans, and with Cuban émigrés and veterans of the Bay of Pigs. In light of these contacts, the similarities between the far Left and the extreme Right in organizational terms and the similar operational patterns of Guatemalan, Salvadoran, Argentine, and perhaps Chilean para-legal vigilante groups become more clear.

Anti-Marxist Guerrillas and Terrorism

The appearance of anti-Marxist guerrillas or quasi-terrorist groups in Latin America is related to the rise of anti-Castro Cuban organizations, based mostly in the United States (with Guatemala and Nicaragua as secondary or alternative bases), whose tactics were perfected by the Angolan UNITA and further refined by the Mozambican MNR and by the Afghan "mujahedeen." Most of the anti-Marxist guerrillas

in Latin America are in Nicaragua, the only country where such groups operate on a permanent basis. They are composed of a rather puzzling mixture of democrats, unideological peasants, former members of the Nicaraguan power structure, and soldiers with highly professional credentials and primarily personal motivations.

Despite the wild rumors inspired and spread by the Nicaraguan government, the major guerrilla groups -- the National Democratic Front (FDN), the Indian group MISURA, and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) -- neither advocated nor engaged in consistent acts of random violence against civilians. For this reason alone they cannot be considered terrorist organizations. Their goals, while varying in terms of the ultimate aim (autonomy for the Indians in the case of MISURA, and the overthrow of the FSLN regime in Managua in the other two cases), are related and characteristic of insurgent groups in general: the forcible removal of the existing government, support for an alternative ideology or political system, attracting popular support, and eroding the political base of the government while at the same time defeating the government's military in a long-term campaign.

The somewhat peculiar MISURA case aside, the Nicaraguan guerrillas, although trying to apply some of the patterns of operation previously pursued by the Marxist guerrillas, are still far from effective, either militarily or politically. Both FDN and ARDE seem to be unable to penetrate the Nicaraguan regime's institutions effectively, to mobilize large peasant or urban groups behind them, or even to take advantage of the political and economic errors of the FSLN. The coordination between the political and military arms of each of the two groups, as well as between the groups themselves, is still shaky and ineffective, and their political and logistical support bases are highly vulnerable, particularly due to their almost complete reliance on the United States.

TASK FOUR

TACTICS, TRENDS, AND ASSESSMENT OF THE GUERRILLAS OF THE LEFT

The history of Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in Latin America is also the history of continuous changes in tactics, methods, and strategies, and of changes in membership and differences in the fates of many groups. It is only in light of these dynamics that one can understand both the present character of most guerrilla groups and the probable direction they will pursue in the near future. In addition, regardless of the "official" ideological current a specific group may claim allegiance to, it does not usually follow that its tactics and methods will always be predictable.

Despite their different and often opposed ideological roots, most of the Latin American guerrilla groups since the early 1960s and all those still surviving today have demonstrated an increasingly surprising adaptability and ability to learn rapidly from the experience of other groups, whether in the same country or elsewhere. Thus the self-proclaimed Castroite, Trotskyite, Maoist, or (orthodox) Marxist-Leninist nature and ideology of a certain group does not, particularly during the past decade, mean that it does not adopt the tactics of groups with different ideological views. Despite widespread misperceptions regarding the alleged Soviet and/or Cuban control and manipulation of Latin American guerrilla groups, most of these groups try to adapt to local circumstances, even if doing so compromises their Marxist-Leninist "purity." This is an indication of the sophistication and complexity of the leftist guerrilla phenomenon in Latin America as a whole and of its growing ability to take advantage of the cultural and historic peculiarities of the region. The adaptability and flexibility of the guerrillas of the Left have become more and more evident over the

past decade, and the increasing national and continental links among these groups help to account for their flexibility.

The first and perhaps most important aspect of the evolution of leftist guerrilla tactics since the "heroic" times of the early 1960s is the almost complete abandonment of the Castroite theory of the revolutionary foco. So general is this reassessment that Castro himself has come to deny that the foco was ever the major premise of Cuban revolutionary theory and practice. He ultimately accused Debray of having misinterpreted his own and Guevara's approach to guerrilla warfare. The problem is not that the theory's psychological and philosophical premise -- the decisive role of the elite, professional revolutionary -- is inadequate, but that it has proved to be dangerously wrong at a tactical level. Without a sophisticated and extensive logistical network, and without large numbers of adherents and fighters, the professional revolutionary cannot hope to win, and this is now clearly being seen as Guevara's most important mistake. Thus, while an elitism rooted in Leninism as well as in the Latin American caudillo tradition remains as dominant as ever, the necessity for expanding the size and reach of the support apparatus of the guerrillas has been reconsidered and reassessed. This reassessment emphasizes the importance of mobilizational and political action, which are out of the reach of the revolutionary elites as long as they reject alliances and the use of front organizations. On the other hand, the previously dogmatic attitude of the Castroites, as well as of the Maoists and Trotskyites, appears to have been re-examined, with the result that the more flexible orthodox CPs are now recognized as the leftist organizations most skilled in establishing alliances, coalitions, and temporary agreements with non-Marxist groups. They are also known to be quite adept at infiltrating other institutions, including

governments, the Church, and the military, and have the (Soviet-provided) financial resources to continue to pursue those tactics.

Leftists guerrilla tactics in Latin America have changed drastically since the mid-1970s, as a result of the new attitudes of the USSR and therefore the CPs, the new importance of Cuba's role, and the ideological convergence of most of the previously divided groups. One of the most important, if not the most important change is the new accent on a combination of political and military tactics, legal and illegal activities, "armed" and traditional propaganda.

The political tactics of the guerrillas have become extremely sophisticated, and what used to be the domain of the CPs has been raided by Castroite and other types of groups. These tactics include the following:

Infiltration of the government apparatus. Previously the only leftist groups that tried to penetrate government institutions were the CPs; now such tactics are pursued by revolutionary groups previously hostile to the orthodox parties. Thus the Guatemalan EGP managed to place one of its activists in the public relations office of the presidency; the FPL in El Salvador had militants in the first junta after the 1979 coup, including at least one minister and so did the FARN and ERP; provincial governors and mayors were secretly or even overtly members or supporters of the Montoneros in the mid-1970s; and the Tupamaros have received covert aid from prominent members of the legal political opposition. Guerrilla penetration of legal political institutions in Latin America is largely the result of the ideological convergence of various Marxist-Leninist currents. This means that the situation of the 1960s, when Maoists, Trotskyites, Castroites, and orthodox CPs competed against each other even to the extent of helping the government against other leftists, has radically changed. The growing unity of the Left and its acceptance of violence as a

legitimate and necessary tool suggest that their capabilities for penetration and infiltration of institutions and the degree of their coordination will continue to increase.

The combination of legal, para-legal, and military action. This is another area where significant change in guerrilla tactics has occurred since the 1960s. At that time the guerrillas themselves saw the main purpose of their attempts to infiltrate the government and the military as gaining useful intelligence and recruits. They tended to separate themselves from the rest of the population in order to avoid detection and infiltration by the security forces, as well as to maintain the cohesion of the core of professional revolutionaries of the foco. The early 1970s changed all this, and groups as different as the Trotskyites, Maoists, Castroites, and even anarchist-Marxists began attempting to take control of legitimate groups and institutions that were different from or even opposed to the incumbent governments. Among the selected targets were the "Christian base-communities" established by radical priests in countries as different as Guatemala and El Salvador, Brazil and Chile, Honduras and Colombia.

This approach was perhaps the most spectacularly successful in Nicaragua, where the FSLN actually controlled the "Group of Twelve" -- intellectuals, priests, and businessmen who claimed to represent the legitimate democratic opposition to Somoza and who won a great deal of credibility in Nicaragua and particularly in the United States, Latin America, and Western Europe. The largest FSLN faction, the "Terceristas," has controlled at least the majority of the members of the group, and most of them have become members of the FSLN-controlled government after the victory over Somoza. In El Salvador the Left, and most particularly FARN and ERP, did manage to penetrate some sectors of the military, and some officers joined them even after the failed January 1981 "final offensive."

Such spectacular examples of penetration and subversion of legitimate institutions are still isolated incidents and are probably not yet decisive, because many of them were far too dependent upon the individual success of one secret agent or another. They do, however, represent a steadily growing trend.

The most important, and, for the long term, the most promising targets of penetration and subversion are such institutions as the Church, the unions, and established (and legal) political parties.

The infiltration of unions has been an aim of the orthodox CPs since their creation in the early 1930s and has been a target for other sectors of the Left since the 1970s. In El Salvador, the teachers' union, ANDES, was brought under FPL control in the early 1970s, under the leadership of the FPL's second in command Melida Anaya Montes (alias "Companera Ana Maria"), and even the government-established peasant union, CUC, was at least partially and temporarily penetrated by the far Left. In addition to the penetration and ultimate "hijacking" of existing unions or other institutions, the guerrillas also established alternative, quasi-legal institutions that were under their control from the beginning. The most typical, and perhaps the most effective, of these were the "popular organizations" in El Salvador, such as the BPR, LP-28, and FAPU, and similar although for smaller and weaker organizations in Guatemala. Most of these were umbrella groups combining various unions penetrated or influenced by a certain guerrilla group, and they were intended to increase tensions in the country by engaging in illegal and violent acts such as embassy takeovers, violent demonstrations, and land takeovers (tomas), thus forcing reprisals from government forces, and conveying an image of the repression and abusive brutality of the regime. Moreover, such groups allowed their guerrilla controllers to manipulate public perceptions by denying any connection with them, by attracting support for the

"popular organizations" from such figures as Archbishop Romero, who either did not want or were unable to understand the modus operandi of these archetypical Leninist front organizations.

Psychologically, the "popular organizations," some of which were initially created with the blessing or under the direct sponsorship of the Catholic Church (the Salvadoran FAPU is an excellent example), were also excellent sources of invaluable revolutionary martyrs, both in Latin America and in the United States or Western Europe. The Left's need for martyrs to reinforce the attraction of its messianic utopianism and to spread it to otherwise non-committed or historically hostile groups, is absolute. For this reason the possibility (increasingly substantiated) that Archbishop Romero himself was killed by the Left should not be dismissed.

The complexity of the guerrilla pattern of mobilization, penetration, infiltration, and manipulation of all sectors of society completely prevented many Latin American governments from adopting a coherent and rational approach to combating it. Somoza's treatment of the Nicaraguan Communists (PSN), a largely irrelevant and exceedingly small group is a good example. The Guardia Nacional searched for Communist party influence and subversion when there was none, since the FSLN had little if anything to do with the PSN. A typical orthodox CP opposed to guerrilla warfare until the beginning of 1979, PSN succeeded only in diverting the Guardia's intelligence resources, of which there were few, and allowed greater freedom for the FSLN's subversive activities and penetration of institutions and society.

The theory of the "united front," developed by Lenin and pursued by the USSR at the international level during the 1930s under the overall direction of the Comintern, has historically involved one or both of two possible tracks: "united front from below," based upon penetration of the rank and file of a different,

non-communist group, pushing its leadership toward de facto acceptance of coordination with the CPs; and "united front from above," based on coalitions of CPs and non-Communist leaders for specific political aims. One of the innovations of the Latin American guerrillas in the late 1970s, with the FSLN playing the role of predecessor, was following both tracks at the same time. Thus, the infiltration of the rank and file -- the nationalist rhetoric of the Terceristas being the main instrument -- was combined with a formal alliance between the FSLN as a whole and the representative of the Wide Opposition Front (FAO), the "Group of Twelve," sectors of the Conservative and Social or Christian Democratic parties, and the anti-Somoza groups of the business community. The end result was that the only realistic alternatives to the FSLN rule were practically demobilized while participating in the anti-Somoza struggle and despite the fact that they have contributed far more than the FSLN itself to the ultimate victory of July 1979. When the first National Reconstruction Junta was established after Somoza's fall, of its five members, two were known to be members of the FSLN (Daniel Ortega and Moises Hassan Morales), one was a weak-willed symbol of anti-Somoza opposition (Violeta Chamorro), one the FAO and business community leader Afonso Robelo. The decisive vote, therefore, was that of a member of the allegedly "independent" but FSLN-controlled "Grupo de los Doce," Ramirez Mercado. The Ortega, Morales, and Mercado group was clearly in the majority, and Robelo was ultimately forced to resign, leaving a clear field for the FSLN. A similar pattern is followed today by the Salvadoran guerrillas, who claim to be allied with the FDR, while the reality is that they completely control it. Thus, of the seven FDR Political-Diplomatic Commission members, the actual "ruling" body and a quasi-government in exile, two are figures who had not openly been associated with Marxism in the past (although they may have changed their attitudes), namely

Guillermo Ungo of the MNR and Ruben Zamora of the PSC. The other five are high-ranking members of the five Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups -- the FPL, ERP, FARN, PRTC, and PCES. Thus, at the very least, Ungo and Zamora are outvoted and thus controlled by the guerrillas' representatives, while allowed to act as the main spokesmen for the FDR. Since the membership of both the MNR and PSC is minuscule, they have no political basis of their own, which also explains their alliance with the guerrillas. As de facto political figureheads, they are useful because of their ability to attract foreign, i.e., West European and American, support and may (and probably will) be discarded as soon as their usefulness has passed.

The major aims of the guerrillas are the fragmentation of the legitimate opposition parties, the separation of well-known personalities from the mainstream group, and thus the isolation of the leaders. This would create confusion among the supporters of the opposition parties and enhance the ability of pro-guerrilla factions to attract partial if not full support for their own goals. The Christian-Democratic and Social-Democratic parties have consistently been targeted for such maneuvers, and in countries like El Salvador or Guatemala, and to a lesser extent Nicaragua and Honduras, these tactics succeeded. In countries like Chile, where the Socialists were themselves Marxist-Leninists, the competition was for power rather than for members, since ideology played only a minimal role. The question of which tactics were to be adopted was the main area of competition, with the PCCh and Allende being on the mobilizational and long-term side, while the PSCh leadership under Carlos Altamirano was closer to the MIR type of insurrectional approach. The Chilean Left under Allende cannot be considered typical of the violent Left in Latin America in the same way that the guerrillas can be, because it was the government, rather than the opposition, that used violence, albeit government-sponsored or at least

government-tolerated, to pursue anti-constitutional aims. The penetration and infiltration went on, with the MIR and the PSCh trying to infiltrate the navy and the Carabineros and to establish para-military forces directed against the remaining opposition parties. The Chilean techniques were imitated by guerrilla and leftist groups preparing for future violence in other countries, because they demonstrated the success of penetration, deception, and infiltration in groups ranging from unions to the military and from opposition parties to government institutions.

The infiltration of the Roman Catholic and, to a lesser extent, other Christian denominations was also favored. From the "comunidades de base" (CEBs) to the offices of the archbishop in Chile and El Salvador, such efforts were largely successful and were therefore imitated throughout the continent. Such penetration resulted in Cardinal Henriquez of Santiago providing support for Allende's anti-constitutional practices, Archbishop Romero of San Salvador supporting the "popular organizations," and the takeover of the CEBs by Marxist-Leninists. For the illiterate peasant, the priest proclaiming the legitimacy of revolution and of Marxism as the engine of revolution has meant that his eternal soul will not be endangered if he participates in a revolutionary action led by atheists. Religion therefore is no longer an obstacle to revolution for the faithful, and this represents a very important success for the guerrillas in light of the strength of Catholicism among the masses of Latin America.

A final aspect of the change in the guerrilla tactics and practices in Latin America is the trend toward unity and operational uniformity obvious in countries as different as Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. In all these cases the late 1970s or early 1980s witnessed the establishment of umbrella organizations, including groups ranging from Maoists to orthodox CPs. The FSLN itself, a rather artificial coalition of the dogmatic Marxist-Leninists of the Jaime

Wheelock faction, the Vietnamese-influenced "guerra prolongada" faction of Tomás Borge, and the opportunistic Leninism of the "Terceristas" served as the model for the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran Left. In all these cases the Cubans played the role of matchmaker. These developments, however, should not be seen as mere Cuban ploys, but as inevitable and natural developments prefigured in the earlier coalition of such ideologically disparate Southern Cone groups as the Tupamaros, Montoneros, ERP, ELN, and MIR of Chile in the late 1970s as the Paris-based Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). The trend toward ideological unity and the growing operational coordination among the guerrillas of the various sectors of the Left is a Latin American development encouraged, financed, and supervised by Havana or Moscow, but not invented by them. Moreover, the April 1983 Esmeralda meeting in Colombia indicated an even more spectacular trend, toward continental unity, perhaps encouraged or made possible by Cuban and Soviet promises, but certainly not ordered by Havana or Moscow. The attitude expressed there by Sendero Luminoso, for long a bete noire for Havana and for almost all the Latin American guerrillas, is another indication of the dramatic change in the tactics, ideology, and methods of the leftist guerrillas. When the Maoist Sendero decided to cooperate with the FMLN, the Colombian ELN, and the Venezuelan PBR at Esmeralda, the decision went far beyond the need for drug money -- it was an implicit acceptance of the regional, even continental character of its struggle, and of the realization of the fact that sectarianism is no longer viable if the guerrilla struggle is to prevail.

The trend toward unity among the various groups of the violent Left became a stampede and began following identical patterns under Cuban sponsorship between 1979 and 1982. In late 1978, the leaders of the three FSLN factions, whose differences, initially tactical, had by then become personal and social more than

anything else, were brought to Havana and practically forced to combine efforts and coordinate operations, as well as to establish a unified leadership on a formally equal numerical basis. Each faction was entitled to nominate three members to the nine-member supreme leadership, the National Directorate, although the unequal strength of the three factions ensured that among the nine allegedly equal "commanders of the revolution" some were far more equal than others. The Havana-enforced unity of the FSLN proved to be successful enough to become the model for a similar attempt on the part of the Salvadoran groups in the Spring of 1980, despite the fact that personality differences as well as ideology and actual strength divided the various contenders. Thus the Castroite, consistently anti-CPES FPL, the quasi-Maoist-cum-Castroite ERP, the Marxist-Christian (at the time) FARN, the Trotskyite PRTC and the CPES itself were brought together under the FMLN umbrella by Havana and Managua, under the informal and inherently unstable leadership of the generally disliked Salvador Cayetano Carpio, FPL's leader. In Guatemala the following year, under similar conditions and pressures, the FAR Castroites, the vacillating PGT (or at least its more violent faction), the Maoist-Castroite EGP, and the "guerra-prolongada" oriented ORPA were similarly brought together under the UNRG umbrella. Finally, in 1982 the aspiring guerrilla groups in Honduras, which were individually and collectively insignificant, tried to follow the example of their far more successful Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan colleagues and formed an umbrella group including such ideologically disparate groups as the FMLH, the PCH, the Cinchoneros, the PRTC, and the Lorenzo Zelaya Commandos. In none of these cases was perfect unity achieved in any meaningful way, since the members of the newly established umbrella organizations continued to operate autonomously, independently, or even at cross purposes with

their nominal allies, to seek financial support independently, and to pursue propaganda policies intended to strengthen their own individual image.

TASK FIVE

A COMPENDIUM OF TERRORIST AND INSURGENT GROUPS
IN LATIN AMERICA

The attached compendium of Latin American and other terrorist and insurgent groups in the Western Hemisphere, despite its size, is not intended to provide an exhaustive analysis of these groups, but rather to offer an easy-to-consult description of these groups. The very nature of insurgent and terrorist groups makes it impossible in many cases to provide an analysis of their development, structure, and ideological background. The compendium cannot be consulted without a degree of familiarity with the definitional clarifications included in the introductory study. In addition, each of the criteria included in the compendium raises a number of questions, which are clarified below, in numerical order.

The name of a specific group (1), in its original language, is translated into English, but the group may be referred to by a different name. The MLN of Uruguay, for example, are universally known as the Tupamaros, and the full name of the Shining Path of Peru is generally reduced to the first two words of its name in Spanish (Sendero Luminoso).

The principal country of operation (2) of any guerrilla group is generally self-evident. However, in addition to such self-proclaimed regional groups as the PRTC in El Salvador and Honduras, there are a significant number of groups operating at least occasionally outside their own country's boundaries. Such operations may include committing terrorist acts in other countries, having training and headquarters

facilities in other countries, and having individual members enrolling in the ranks of foreign groups with the implicit or explicit approval of their group's leadership.

The date of formation (3) of a specific group can be very difficult to determine, since the origin of many of the groups is still unclear. Some were established long before they became known through their actions, and some have their origins in different organizations whose unification resulted in the formation of that specific movement or group.

In terms of their original organization (4), some, but by no means all, terrorist or insurgent groups of the Western Hemisphere came into existence as a result of the splintering of previously existing parties, groups, organizations, and movements. Determining the date of their formation is dependent on determining the timing of such splits, and thus becomes a question of discretion rather than of chronology. Generally, the date chosen was selected on the basis of the first split that led to the establishment of a new group, or on the basis of the group's own statements.

The front organizations (6a) of most leftist guerrilla and terrorist groups are themselves umbrella organizations including various unions, splinter unions, groups posing as unions, professional organizations or political pressure groups, and, in many instances, institutions and groups, such as the Church-sponsored "Christian base-communities," whose leadership was taken over by violent, usually Marxist, revolutionary organizations.

The administrative/auxiliary organizations (6b), unlike the front organizations, are usually established after the formation of the controlling guerrilla or terrorist group and act more or less openly in connection with it and as its vehicles for political or administrative mobilization. The names and structures of front and

auxiliary organizations are subject to the same uncertainties previously mentioned with regard to the primary guerrilla/terrorist groups.

Membership (7), is difficult to determine, since many members of front organizations participate in their activities (strikes, demonstrations, embassy takeovers) without necessarily being either aware or supportive of the strategy and aims of the leadership or of their ties to violent Marxist groups. Moreover, a distinction must be made between the front and auxiliary organizations of the Nicaraguan FSLN, which is now the governing group in the country and tends to see membership in such organizations as a proof of loyalty to the regime, and other such organizations controlled by non-ruling groups, in which membership offers no immediate rewards and may even entail social, political, or legal penalties and personal risks.

The sections on leadership (8) give individualized (although inevitably incomplete) biographical notes for the most prominent founders and leaders. Many details of the lives of such leaders are either unclear or still debated, and many are simply unknown. The entry for character is intended to provide, where possible, an insight in the motivations, level of commitment, and personal biases of particular individuals. The publications of many guerrilla or terrorist leaders are inconsequential in terms of content, and merely indicate that they claim to be theoreticians as well as operational leaders. In other cases, however, a theoretician for a specific group may have played a far more important role than his military activities indicate, as in the case of Roque Dalton and Carlos Fonseca Amador.

The ideological origin (9) of a group is defined on the basis of such factors as the self-definition of the group at the time of its establishment, the known ideological orientation of its first leaders, and subsequent statements of allegiance by members.

The current ideological orientation (10) of a specific group takes into consideration changes in its ideology that have either been detected or proclaimed from the time of establishment to the present.

The original program (11) of a group includes the social, economic, and political aims of the group at the time of its creation.

The section on the current program (12) updates the description of the initial program and includes changes related to ideological shifts or attempts at political adaptation.

Ideologues (13) are those who have had the greatest impact on the theory and political behavior of a specific group. While most are nationals, some are foreigners, and they are described in the section on the specific group adopting their ideas. The impact of certain ideologues may be limited to groups in their own countries, while others have an influence that extends well beyond the borders of their country of origin.

The content (14a) of the propaganda activities of various groups is defined according to its primary intended audience (internal, external, or both) and the major ideological theme. Groups whose audience is intended to be primarily domestic are either isolated internationally or still retain nationalist priorities. An accent on external audiences may indicate a preoccupation with external support and recognition of domestic isolation.

The means (14b) for propaganda distribution often indicate the logistical strength of a particular group. The ability to operate a radio station, for example, usually indicates good organization and a relatively high degree of control over a specific territory. The existence of printed propaganda (papers, weeklies) usually demonstrates the group's ability to operate in the cities, where the literate part of

population generally lives, as well as the existence of a distribution network. In some cases printed propaganda is circulated only externally, due to the inability of a group to operate in the country's cities. Having leaflets and oral slogans as the dominant forms of propaganda tends to demonstrate either the weakness of a group or that it is in the initial stages of organization and political mobilization.

A group's views on political violence (15) often indicate the tactical preferences as well as the ideological inclinations of the group. Castroite groups tend to support the foco theories of Guevara and Debray; Maoist/Vietnamese-influenced groups prefer protracted warfare; while Trotskyites incline toward insurrectional approaches. The pro-Soviet Communist parties generally consider violence an addition, not an alternative to, mobilization and the infiltration of existing institutions. The ideological and operational changes that often occur over the course of a group's history can alter the original preference for certain forms of violence, or can result in combining them, depending on the environment (urban/rural) and tactical considerations (using a mobilizational approach at the time of elections and alternating united front approaches with terrorism at times of tactical or strategic retreat).

Recruitment patterns (16a) tend to vary with the length of a group's existence. Primarily middle-class groups, once they reach the stage of guerrilla warfare, tend to expand their recruiting pool by including lower-class youths and peasants. Although most groups started as violent splinters of existing organizations revolving around young middle-class activists, some have become almost exclusively an expression of violence-prone youth in general. After the expansion of the student population since the late 1960s and of the middle classes since the early 1960s, growing numbers of

women have become attracted by and involved in political violence, and groups such as the Salvadoran ERP have a high proportion of women in their top leadership.

The indoctrination (16b) of cadres and other militants is discussed at the instrumental level only, without an analysis of the content of the process. Militants can be indoctrinated after joining a group, through compulsory sessions on Marxist-Leninist theories; they can be indoctrinated before joining, in universities, high schools, and theological seminaries, by pro-guerrilla educators or by fellow-traveler teachers. One of the most important types of indoctrination is that undertaken in religious institutions by followers of the theories of the "theology of liberation" or by "Christian base-communities" led by radical priests and nuns. Unions that have fallen under the control of revolutionary cadres are often used as an instrument for the indoctrination of regular members, either directly or, more often, by creating conditions fostering government anti-union violence (as the result of illegal or violent strikes), which results in a radicalization of the membership. Finally, foreign cadres can be used for indoctrinating militants or future militants, either in guerrilla-controlled areas or in foreign countries.

The general military structure (17) of Latin American leftist revolutionary groups has become more and more uniform since the mid-1970s. This structure usually includes territorial forces (militias), mobile forces (guerrillas), quasi-regular forces (usually the most heavily armed), and special-mission forces (commandos), in addition to the largely political and sometimes terrorist-oriented urban cells. The large insurgent groups combine these structural characteristics, and many small ones attempt to establish them within the limits of their means.

Political control (17b) of the armed militants is generally separated from the military chain of command in large guerrilla organizations and overlaps it in the small

groups. Some groups can maintain ideological schools for training political cadres, but most depend on external (Cuban, Nicaragua, or Soviet-bloc) training.

The motivation (18) of a guerrilla group's rank and file and cadres may differ greatly. The former are generally motivated by nationalism, a perception of injustice in the present system, and peer pressure; in the case of most teenagers, there is a sense of personal importance, pride in fighting "like a man" (the "macho" complex); or, in the case of women, there is a desire to become or prove to be the equals of men. The motivations of the leadership may be either an idealistic sense of mission or sheer lust for absolute power, or a combination of these.

Performance (18b) in combat depends on a number of variables and tends to vary over time. With the exception of the 1978-79 insurrection in Nicaragua, no insurgent group has ever proved able to defeat regular military forces in direct combat without an overwhelming numerical advantage. The militias and the guerrilla sections tend to be the least combat-effective, while the commandos are able to sustain brief combat encounters. The discipline of the various groups appears to depend on the personal example of the leaders, the degree of political control over the fighters, and the social background of the rank-and-file. Political, ideological, and personal disputes within the political leadership tend to translate rapidly into a weakening of discipline at the rank and file level. The relationship between discipline and endurance in the case of Latin American terrorist and insurgent groups tends to follow a uniform pattern, with discipline and motivation improving steadily after the initial period of uncertainty regarding the group's ability to survive, reaching a plateau for a few years, and tending to decline when the probability of protracted warfare increases. Moreover, the endurance rate of the rank and file tends to be far lower than that of the cadres, with the latter continuing their activities much longer

than rank-and-file members. A particularly good example of this is the Guatemalan FAR, which still maintains a certain level of activity in the remote El Peten due to its cadres' commitment to revolution and despite the almost total destruction of the group during the anti-insurgency campaign of the late 1960s.

The role of leaders in combat is an important factor for assessing the motivation and survivability of a group. Most orthodox Communist-controlled guerrilla or terrorist groups are at a decided disadvantage in this respect, since the leaders of those parties tend to live in relative comfort in foreign countries. On the other hand, Maoist and particularly Castroite groups have a relative advantage since many of their leaders participate directly in operations.

The desertion rate is generally the best indicator of a group's motivation and survivability perceptions. The higher the desertion rate, the higher the likelihood that discipline, motivation, and belief in the possibility of success have been greatly weakened. When the desertion or surrender rate among the cadres is significant, it generally indicates that the group is close to collapse.

The sophistication of the weapons available to the guerrilla and terrorist groups depends on their financial resources in the initial stages, when weapons are bought on the international market, on the weapons available to government forces when the insurgents are strong enough to capture them, and on the level of training and the military skills of the rank and file. Generally speaking, today's Latin American insurgents have weapons comparable to those of their government opponents, with the notable exceptions of aircraft and heavy artillery. Finally, the use of surface-to-air portable rockets is still the exception rather than the rule.

Military training (19) can take place within the country of operation or in friendly countries, such as the Soviet bloc, Cuba, certain Middle Eastern states, and

Nicaragua. The instructors can be locals or, most often, a combination of locals and foreign experts. The presence of foreign experts is generally difficult to ascertain, since they tend to avoid combat, are almost never captured, and carry no identification.

Financial resources (20), while playing an important role in its weapons procurement capabilities, do not necessarily affect the group's chances of ultimate success. On the contrary, in many cases a group's ability to attract or otherwise obtain funds (particularly from external sources) increases after the demonstration of its military and/or political effectiveness. The financial resources of a group can be of almost exclusively domestic origin, of external origin (as is often the case with pro-Soviet Communist parties), or, as in the majority of cases, a combination of the two, with one or the other being more important at different times.

The means (20b) insurgent or terrorist groups employ to finance their operations vary in scope and type both over time and according to the structure and type of the group. Generally speaking, kidnappings and bank robberies are committed frequently in the initial stages of all insurgencies, particularly in the case of those with a predominantly urban focus. In the guerrilla or insurrectional stages, most funds come from prominent supporters and from outside, as well as from levies on the population under the insurgents' control. Some groups, such as the Colombian, Bolivian, and Peruvian ones, gain funds from drug trafficking. For the most part, the amount of money available to various groups cannot even be approximated, although its order of magnitude can be surmised in some particular instances.

The financial resources (21) of a group and its degree of external support are the principal variables determining the quality of its logistical, communications, and other equipment. Although some groups, such as the Salvadoran FPL and ERP, may

have a technological advantage over government military forces in communications gear, the majority are handicapped by unreliable sources, small volume of equipment, and inadequate technology. The ability of insurgent groups to feed, maintain communications with, and renew the supplies of their militants in the field may well determine the final outcome of not only particular operations but also of the group's fight for survival. Most insurgent groups either capture equipment and supplies or, more often, acquire them on the international market or through aid from friendly governments or groups. Logistical matters become more and more essential or even decisive in the case of guerrilla groups, especially during the final, quasi-regular stage of their military operations.

The level of support (22) for most groups is particularly difficult to gauge. All of them claim to represent "the people," just as all the governments they seek to overthrow claim that the insurgents have no popular support whatsoever. An additional difficulty is posed by the very structure of many leftist groups, because front organizations play a significant but usually misleading role as an indicator of popularity. The best examples of this are unions whose leadership was taken over by guerrilla-associated figures. Strikes and demonstrations by such unions are far too often interpreted as proof of popular support for the insurgents, when in most cases they are expressions of non-political, non-ideological grievances insofar as the rank-and-file members are concerned. Depending upon the degree of the guerrillas' control over their fronts, the latter's members can variously be considered as basically indifferent, neutral, or overtly supportive of the militants' aims. A guerrilla support base can be national or, more often than not, local and limited to particular social, professional, or ethnic groups. The electoral performance of many leftist organizations, including guerrilla fronts, is another indicator of the level of popular

support for their aims. To the extent that openly violent groups are able to establish united front structures, or at least temporary coalitions with non-leftist or non-violent leftist organizations or parties, their members may be considered as lost to the government, although not necessarily won by the revolutionaries. Thus, while the leadership of Catholic groups and some Christian Democratic parties or of Socialist and Social-Democratic ones may often be defined as the guerrillas' fellow-travelers, the members of their groups and parties are far less likely to consciously play that role.

The existence, degree, or type of external support (23) available to an insurgent or terrorist group is very often decisive for its chances of survival and victory over the long term. Cuban support, in many cases the only support available during the 1960s, has been important for almost all Latin American and Caribbean revolutionary groups, but in no instance has it proven to be sufficient to ensure success or survival, since Cuba does not have the resources needed for providing the financial and military aid necessary. The combination of Cuban and Soviet-bloc support, on the other hand, can play a decisive role in the success of any given revolutionary group, as demonstrated by the case of the FSLN in Nicaragua. The ability of revolutionary groups to acquire the support of radical Third World regimes, as well as of the Soviet bloc and Cuba, greatly improves their chances of political and diplomatic recognition internationally and may significantly increase their financial resources. It is the support of allegedly non-revolutionary organizations and groups, such as the Socialist International, or radical and liberal organizations, personalities, and institutions in the United States and elsewhere, that, combined with other sources of external support, provides the best opportunity for victory for most Latin American Leninist revolutionary groups. Ostensibly non-revolutionary organizations in the West are used

as a counter to possible U.S. support for the governments targeted by the revolutionaries, by presenting a misleading and false "non-totalitarian" image for the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, and by thus narrowing the level of public political support for actions against them or in support of governments under attack from the Left. Another source of external support for insurgent groups are similar groups, principally those from Latin America, but also such organizations as the PLO and the Basque ETA, which can and often did provide technical, logistical, financial, and manpower support.

The volume (23b) of external support may be decisive, as in the case of the FSLN during the final months of the anti-Somoza insurrection, when an enormous quantity of military supplies arrived from Honduras and Costa Rica and enabled the insurgents to keep fighting at a time when the National Guard ran out of ammunition. For the most part, however, it is less important for a group whether the material support from outside is massive or limited, as long as political and financial support is sufficient. Moreover, after a certain point in the military development of the conflict, when the guerrillas reach the conventional or regular warfare stage, their ability to capture material from the retreating army may increase to such an extent as to make the importance of external supplies marginal. On the other hand, the level of outside military support is never significant during the initial stages of an insurgency, at least not in absolute terms, since the insurgent group's ability to assimilate such aid is very limited.

In terms of the type (23c) of foreign support an insurgent or terrorist group receives, primarily terrorist groups tend to enjoy less Cuban or Soviet-bloc support than guerrilla groups. Among the various forms of such support, direct political aid is the most important and long lasting type; military aid is important during the

intermediary stages (between early actions and the regular warfare stage), while indirect political support is important in all stages. Direct political support occurs when the external actor openly advocates the cause of the guerrilla group, and indirect support is manifested by opposition to, and attempts to diplomatically or otherwise isolate the government targeted by the insurgents without openly supporting them. Thus Venezuelan, Costa Rican, or Socialist International political support for the FSLN was indirect insofar as it was covertly directed at isolating the Somoza government by hampering its ability to obtain military supplies, by foiling its efforts to prevent Costa Rica from channeling supplies to the insurgents, and by preventing it from taking drastic but legitimate measures against groups and institutions openly working for the FSLN within Nicaragua under the guise of the protection of "human rights."

External financial support seldom comes from the same sources as military and direct political support. It tends, instead, to be related to the sources of indirect political support. Thus some "human rights" groups and the Socialist International may financially support insurgent groups under a humanitarian guise, as do many sectors of the Catholic Church or other religious denominations. These sources, however, seldom provide direct military aid or willingly and openly pay for weapons procurement.

Foreign participation (23d) in guerrilla activities in various countries can be either direct or indirect. It is direct when aliens become militants or even leaders of groups in other countries, or insurgents in countries other than their own. Examples of indirect participation are providing training for foreign insurgent and terrorist cadres or serving as a protector for such groups by, for instance, offering safe sanctuaries in border areas and deterring hot-pursuit actions by the target government. This type of support is exemplified by the attitude of Nicaragua vis-à-vis the Salvadoran and

Honduran guerrillas, of Mexico toward the Guatemalan insurgents, of Honduras toward anti-Sandinista guerrillas.

The degree of dependence (24) on various types of foreign support varies according to the type of support and its relation to the group's needs, aims, and tactics. Certain groups can be dependent upon foreign support or participation for their very existence, the most extreme example being the "Bolivian" ELN, a creation of "Che" Guevara, whose few initial members and practically all founders were overwhelmingly foreigners. Tactical (i.e., the availability of foreign-provided supplies, funds, or political support) and strategic dependence on external support is demonstrated by the successful Cuban-sponsored "unification" of the querulous factions of the FSLN in 1978, under the threat of denial of support, or the similar "unification" of the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran insurgent groups as a result of joint Cuban-Nicaraguan-Soviet pressures during 1980-83. When external support is primarily political, the degree of dependence is far lower than when it is military and political. Logistical dependence may mean that a specific government or group in another country facilitates the transfer of supplies to guerrillas in another country from a third country, which is the supplier. A break in the logistical chain can sharply curtail the abilities of a guerrilla group to operate, but alternative routes can generally be found. Logistical dependence may therefore be decisive in a few cases, although it is always important.

The changing attitudes and political limitations of a foreign supporter of a guerrilla group may deal serious blows to the group at difficult times. For example, Cuba's formal withdrawal of support for the Venezuelan guerrillas in the 1960s (although small shipments of Cuban arms still reached them) was the decisive factor in the PCV's decision to cease armed activities. Cuban denials of open support to various

groups during the 1960s and later also imposed some limitations on the extent of covert Cuban support for those groups, since the risk of discovery was deemed by Havana to be too great. Similarly, the present Costa Rican declarations of neutrality in the Nicaraguan civil war mean that the supply lines and movements of the Nicaraguan anti-government guerrillas based in Costa Rica are only periodically and irregularly threatened by actions of the Costa Rican government and its Civil and Rural Guard.

The relations (25) between a particular guerrilla or terrorist group and ideologically similar or compatible groups in the same country or elsewhere are difficult to ascertain, since most of these groups tend to be secretive and to deny or minimize their external ties for public relations and propaganda reasons. At the national level, connections may exist between various groups, with the pattern of current ties being the opposite of what it had been in the first decade and a half after the Cuban Revolution. Until the mid-1970s, the groups on the violent Left in different countries were generally formed as a result of the splintering of existing organizations. Disputes among them were not uncommon and on occasion became violent. After the mid-1970s, however, the trend was reversed in many countries, and leftist cooperation increased at the national level, despite ideological or tactical differences among groups.

At the regional level cross-national cooperation has always been deemed important in theory, although it rarely occurred in practice until the past decade. By and large, Central American guerrilla and terrorist groups tend to exhibit the strongest propensity for cooperation, followed by the groups in the Southern Cone states. Such relations may take the form of joint operations (Salvadoran guerrillas operating in Honduras, for instance) or of personnel support across national

boundaries. Wealthier groups lend financial support or expertise to poorer organizations in foreign countries (as was the case when the Montoneros provided aid to the FSLN in 1978). In some instances it is almost impossible to distinguish between regional and continental cooperation among leftists, since the two may largely overlap.

The extrahemispheric ties (25b) of Latin American groups tend to be principally, although not exclusively with West European and Middle Eastern violent organizations.

The relationship between various extra-continental, non-governmental groups on the Left and Latin American guerrillas and terrorists (25c) take the specific forms of providing training, experts, supplies, funds, and either military or political cadres.

Depending upon its nature (guerrilla or terrorist) and ideological inclinations (Maoist, Trotskyite, Castroite, or orthodox Marxist) a revolutionary group may or may not seek or claim interest in establishing areas under its control (26). Most rural-based groups do seek such areas, while urban-oriented groups usually make no attempt to do so and thus risk being forced to defend fixed positions and a significant number of non-combatants. In most cases, however, guerrilla groups claim control over certain "liberated areas," although few of them are able to demonstrate such control at all times or for prolonged periods.

The extent of the area under any form of guerrilla control (26b) depends upon the nature of the territory and terrain (uninhabited areas, for example, are seldom of concern to the government), the level of development of a group (older ones tend to attract and retain support in specific areas for extended periods) and on the location of an area (most "liberated areas" are remote border regions).

The duration of guerrilla control (26c) over a certain area depends, more often than not, on the government forces' willingness to pay the price of retaking or

challenging guerrilla control over it. Almost invariably, when the government's will to do so exists, the guerrillas are forced to leave the area, sometimes after suffering heavy casualties.

The degree of guerrilla control (26d) over a "liberated area" is seldom, if ever, total. Pockets of pro-government resistance always exist, as do government informers, and population movements can never be completely controlled. Frequently, the level of guerrilla control fluctuates depending upon government military activities, popular attitudes, and guerrilla tactics.

The administration of areas temporarily under the control of violent groups (26e) is dependent on the extent, duration, and type of control. Long periods of control (as in the cases of zones in the Morazan and Chalatenango provinces of El Salvador under the respective control of ERP and FPL) may result in the establishment of embryonic, quasi-government institutions. FPL has established "local assemblies," whose leaders are "elected" from among the candidates nominated by the guerrillas, has eliminated all significant private property, and has transformed the schools into indoctrination centers for the youth. In many cases such steps toward the institutionalization of guerrilla rule provide the most important indication and irrefutable proof of their nature and allow informed predictions about the behavior they will exhibit in the event that they conquer state power.

The degree of unity (27) among the leaders of a guerrilla/terrorist organization is often the best indication as to the survivability of the group in the long term. Disunity and disputes (ideological, tactical, or personal) that become public have consistently resulted in the formation of breakaway splinter groups, subsequently weakening both the original group and the new ones. Factionalism and ideological disputes will not only weaken a specific group, but will also have a lasting impact

upon the public image, support, external acceptance, and long-term credibility of all revolutionary groups in a given country. As an indicator of the potential or actual level of success of a group, factionalism plays a very important role. It may also play a significant role in weakening the independence of a group vis-à-vis its external supporters, since various factions may compete for the same foreign aid source and allow potential foreign suppliers to establish control over the group as a whole.

Weakened central control over peripheral operational groups, vulnerable communication lines, the personal motivations of particular leaders, and ideological or tactical disputes can result in a growing fragmentation of the operational area of a specific group. The most important indicator of such a process is the greater degree of autonomy (28) or de facto independence of regional leaders and groups vis-à-vis the central leadership. From a military standpoint such a development can prove lethal to the guerrillas, since they become unable to concentrate their usually meager resources and thus lose their principal advantage over the military -- the ability to select the place and time of action. Once coordination among regional or local leaders weakens or disappears, the tactical initiative slips from the guerrillas' control and is generally taken up by the army.

Perhaps more so than is the case in other regions of the world, Latin American groups tend to be highly dependent on a few personalities (29), usually their founders and ideologues, for unity, internal cohesion, and operational discipline and planning. This is especially true in light of the fact that most Latin American revolutionary groups were founded and have remained under the control of a small number of middle- or upper-middle-class individuals. The Argentine ERP, for example, practically collapsed following the death of its leader and founder (Roberto Santucho), while the Salvadoran FPL splintered after the loss of its leaders (Carpio and Melida Anaya

Montes). Very few, if any, Latin American revolutionary groups have succeeded in establishing a truly collective leadership, and, therefore, they are all highly vulnerable to the loss of important leaders. The realization of this fact has led some leaders to minimize the risks they take with their lives, but such an approach can result in declining morale among their followers.

Another indication of possible or actual weakness of a specific guerrilla/terrorist group is the length and vulnerability of their supply lines (30), whether financial, logistical, or personnel-related. Thus the absence of a neutral or friendly government in at least one neighboring country may spell serious trouble for a revolutionary group. Under such circumstances the only solution appears to be reliance on alternative, usually long and risky communications and supply lines, including maritime ones (El Salvador, Colombia). Operating as they do in an international environment rather than a strictly national one, the revolutionary groups in Latin America tend to be vulnerable to significant changes in that environment, outside their control.

Although few if any guerrilla/terrorist groups depend on extensive public support (31) for their ability to remain active threats to the government, the level of popular support or acceptance they enjoy is clearly a valuable indicator of whether or not they will grow in the future. The Salvadoran groups under the FMLN umbrella, for instance, did enjoy public acceptance and even active support, through the efforts of their "popular organizations" until the beginning of 1980. After losing most of that support, they succeeded in continuing to fight and in expanding their areas and types of operations for almost four years. However, their inability to win, and the general popular weariness with the war, resulted in declining levels of both support and acceptance of the guerrillas' aims and activities, with the result that by 1984 some of

them found it necessary to use coercion to expand their forces, which led to a loss of both support and effectiveness. Whether the loss of support is local (in areas traditionally well-disposed toward the revolutionaries) or national may be less important than the decline in support itself. Declining support may mean that time has ceased to operate in favor of the revolutionary and that, if the government has the intelligence and means of resisting the threat, it may gain the strategic initiative.

Argentina - Group PCR
- 97 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Partido Comunista Revolucionario
- b) In English : Revolutionary Communist Party
- c) Acronym or known name : PCR

Country of Operation

Argentina

Date of Formation

6 January 1968

Original Organization

The PCR, formed originally as the Communist Party of Revolutionary Recovery, was created by dissidents from the PCA (Partido Comunista de Argentina) and especially its Communist Youth Federation. The creation of the PCR expressed the growing disaffection of young radical cadres of the pro-Soviet PCA with the "gradualist" approach of the leadership. The founders of the PCR criticized the politics of "class conciliation" practiced, according to them, by the orthodox PCA.

Membership

The PCR counted, at its height, several hundred members.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name: César Otto Vargas

Argentina - Group PCR
- 98 -

b) Place of birth : Argentina

c) Political career : Vargas held an important position within the Communist Youth Federation before his expulsion from the PCA in 1967.

Ideological Origin

The creation of the PCR was determined by the development of a Maoist tendency within the orthodox, pro-Soviet PCA. The leaders of the Communist Youth grew increasingly dissatisfied with the parliamentary strategy of the party. They accused the pro-Soviet leaders of opportunism, lack of revolutionary courage, and absence of imagination, reformism, etc. The new PCR embraced the basic Maoist theses (the crucial role of "national-liberation" movements, the criticism of Soviet "hegemonism" in the world communist movement, etc.) as well as some theses promoted by Cuba. In this respect, the PCR was influenced by both Maoist and Castroite ideologies. The PCR is a Maoist party and over the years has received recognition as such from Beijing. However, the party abandoned its pro-Beijing orientation after the Chinese leaders adopted a more moderate political course. The PCR can thus be described as a Marxist-Leninist party of Maoist orientation. It is committed to the ideas of "continental revolution" and opposes "peaceful coexistence" as an international strategy. The PCR considers Soviet "revisionism" a betrayal of Leninist revolutionary principles, especially with regard to relations between the USSR and the USA. Throughout the years, the PCR criticized Castro's tendency of imposing his supremacy in the Latin American revolutionary movement, but it shares with Cuba the same hostility toward the U.S. and commitment to violence and insurgency.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The PCR called for nationalization of "imperialist" enterprises, credits for poor and middle-class farmers, increased wages and, in the long run, the "socialization" of the whole economy.

b) Social program: The PCR advocated violent armed struggle to gain power and opposed the "reformist" approach of the orthodox PCA. The revolutionary struggle should be developed through urban guerrillas. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" is the main objective of the PCR.

c) Foreign policy : The PCR expressed strong anti-American stances, solidarity with Cuba and China, and all the "anti-imperialist" movements.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The PCR advocates the Marxist-Leninist economic program including expropriation of foreign enterprises, state-monopoly of foreign trade, nationalization (confiscation) of major private enterprises.

b) Social program : Although the PCR has officially favored armed insurrection, particularly urban guerrilla activities, there is little evidence of its ever having engaged in them. One objective of the PCR has been to develop the "party of the proletariat," as a precondition for "successful revolutionary struggle."

c) Foreign policy : The PCR manifested solidarity with China (Chinese invitations to the PCR leaders to visit China). The group declared its support for the subversive movements in Latin America. After the change of strategy in Chinese politics, the PCR persevered in its radical Maoist position and interrupted contact with Beijing.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The ultra-radicalist propaganda of the PCR is addressed mainly to working-class youths and university students.

ii) Ideological content: The ideological orientation of the PCR is expressed in appeals for revolutionary struggle. The analyses of the social-political liberation of the country criticized the lack of revolutionary willingness on the part of the PCA. The PCR considers that "socialist revolution," conceived in Marxist-Maoist terms, represents the solution for Argentina's problems.

b) Means

i) Print: Nueva Hora, the organ of the PCR

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The PCR, theoretically favoring an insurrectionary approach, did not participate in recent armed actions. Instead it concentrated on developing a following within the working-class and student groups. PCR conceived this grassroots work as a "prerequisite for organizing and applying revolutionary violence."

Indoctrination

The PCR organized its own student front, the Federation of Leftist University Groups in the early 1970s. Certain analysts have considered this

Argentina - Group PCR
- 101 -

Federation as "the backbone of the party." Approximately 3,000 students were supporting the Federation in the early 1970s.

Military Structure

Force type : In the mid-1970s, the PCR tried, unsuccessfully, to create its own network of urban cells. Unlike the ERP and the Montoneros, the PCR did not have a relatively large basis among university students and middle-class intellectuals.

Financial Resources

a) National origin

Mostly foreign: The PCR received political and financial support mainly from China. After the party's break with China's post-Maoist leadership, Cuba began to support the group's activities.

Level of Popular Support

a) Total group and front organization : During the early 1970s the Federation of Leftist University Groups was considered to be the "backbone" of the PCR. It had hundreds of active members and thousands of supporters.

b) Local support : The party exerted influence among university students in Buenos Aires.

Argentina - Group PCR

- 102 -

External Support

External support, both political and financial, is decisive in the survival of the PCR. The party is isolated and unpopular. It cannot count on major voluntary contributions.

Dependence on External Support

The PCR, at the height of its activity, was strategically and politically dependent on foreign support particularly from China and Cuba.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: During the early 1970s, the PCR developed its links with militant, socialist-oriented Catholic organizations within Argentina, including the "Camilo Torres Command" and the "Third World Priests Movement."

ii) Continental : Relations were developed with Cuba and pro-Cuban leftist groups on the continent.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

After 1972-73 the PCR lost support among the students (a defeat in the FUA elections -- Argentine University Federation). The defeat was attributed not only to a rejection of the pro-guerrilla line advocated by the PCR but also to the PCR student leaders' strong emphasis on revolutionary goals to the detriment of student demands.

Argentina - Group PCR
- 103 -

Remarks

The role and meaning of the PCR can be attributed to its consistent criticism of the "orthodox," pro-Moscow PCA bureaucracy. The PCR was not able to go beyond the rhetoric of violence, but it developed a political support for other groups directly involved in terrorist activities. The modifications in Chinese international strategy left the PCR without major external support since their "good relations" with Beijing were decisively affected by PCR doctrinaire approach. Nevertheless, the group established contacts with Cuba and thus avoided its complete international isolation. For Cuban communists, relations with the PCR offered the opportunity to recuperate a segment of the Latin American Maoist Left.

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 104 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimiento Peronista Montonero
- b) In English : Montonero Peronista Movement
- c) Acronym or known name : MPM (Montoneros)

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Argentina
- b) Others : Chile

Date of Formation

The MPM was founded in the early 1970s, supplanting the Authentic Peronist Party created earlier by old-guard Peronist left-wingers. The original organization was thus represented by the highly heterogeneous Peronist movement (the Justicialist Party). The MPM expressed the most radicalized positions among supporters of left-wing Peronism. The Montoneros belonged to a new political generation which had not experienced the so-called First Era of Peronism. They knew of Peron and his regime only indirectly and had little empirical sense of what Peronism really meant. They supported the return of the exiled leader trusting his "Third World"-ist statements and hoping to persuade the Caudillo that socialism was the complement of his nationalistic stances.

Membership

a) Active members : At its height the group mobilized some 5,000 hard-core guerrillas. In 1978, security forces estimated that no more than 350 survived in Argentina after the decimation of the group by the military.

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 105 -

b) Sympathizers : Approximately 15,000 active sympathizers supported the MPM at the group's height.

c) Cadres : The MPM counted several hundred cadres, particularly affected by the anti-guerrilla operations of the military.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name: Mario Firmenich

b) Place of birth : Argentina

c) Date of birth : 1948

d) Social background: Urban middle-class

e) Education : Buenos Aires University

f) Profession : After abandoning his studies, he became a professional terrorist.

g) Political career : Firmenich began his political career as a neo-fascist student leader. He rapidly changed political color and as an influential MPM figure, contributed to the inauguration of the brutal period of terror and counter-terror (Argentina's "dirty war"). Considered to be the top-ranking leader of the MPM, he sought exile in 1977. He was in Nicaragua during the last phase of that country's civil war. By the end of 1983, reports mentioned his presence in Bolivia. He participated in the 4th meeting of South American "democratic parties" in Sao Paulo, Brazil in November 1983. Arrested in Rio de Janeiro (February 1984), he is in the process of being extradited.

h) Character : Ruthless, self-righteous, and strongly committed to violence, Firmenich organized one of the most active and effective urban guerrilla groups in Latin America. He was one of the strongest advocates of violent struggle and

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 106 -

did not hesitate to engage in very bloody operations. During his exile in Brazil, Firmenich indulged in a luxurious lifestyle, while conveying solidarity messages to his imprisoned terrorist fellows in Argentina. He is a cool practitioner of savage terror rather than a dogmatic revolutionary leader. Firmenich was directly involved in the 1970 assassination of former Argentine President, Pedro Aramburu.

In Decree 157 (December 1983), the Argentine national executive branch established "the need to prosecute in relation with the events perpetrated after 25 May 1973," terrorist leaders Mario Firmenich, Fernando Vaca Narvaja, Ricardo Obregon Cano, Rodolfo Galimberti, and Roberto Perdia of the Montoneros, and Enrique Gorriaran Merlo of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). However, on December 20, 1983, former Buenos Aires Governor Oscar Bidegain announced, at a press conference, the dissolution of the Peronist Montonero Movement, and the revival of the Authentic Party created in 1975. He read a document addressed to the Argentine people and signed by Mario Eduardo Firmenich, Roberto Perdia, Ricardo Obregon Cano, Fernando Vaca Narvaja, and himself. According to certain reports, by the end of 1983 Mario Firmenich was living in Bolivia (Santa Cruz de la Sierra), awaiting the appropriate time to return to his country to engage in the political activity of the Argentine Justicialist Party. Actually, he was seized in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in February 1984. After formal extradition proceedings, the Brazilian authorities are supposed to return him to his country.

Ideological Origin

Ideologically, the Montoneros were more populist than Marxist in their orientation. Their name reflects their attempt to capture certain myths persistent in the Argentine political culture: they adopted this designation to identify with

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)
- 107 -

the Andean pastoral hill-rebels in the 19th century. Their ideology was thus conceived as a combination of left-wing nationalism (leftist Peronism), anarcho-Marxism, and certain Castroite tenets (the pre-eminence of armed minorities over mass organizations, the belief in the continental character of the revolutionary struggle, etc.). The Montonero ideological orientation consists of left-wing Peronist radical ideology mixed with Marxist-Leninist ideas, and anarchist theses (a combination of demagogic populism and sectarian radicalism). The idols of the Montoneros were, from the outset, the exponents of radical leftism, the ideologues and practitioners of the "continental revolution": Fidel Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Camilo Torres, Radl Sendic, and Carlos Marighella.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The Montoneros advocated a program of expropriation of foreign companies and basic changes in the existing system of distribution.

b) Social program: For the Montoneros, the main social-political task consisted of the formation of a "national liberation front with the single objective of defeating the present military junta and restoring democratic institutions." The front was to be an "alliance of classes under the hegemony of the working class so as to move towards socialism."

c) Foreign policy : The group brandished nationalist slogans against "imperialist penetration." They advocated a foreign policy committed to solidarity with Cuba and all the "national liberation movements." The Montoneros developed links with other Latin-American Leftist terrorist organizations.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The Montoneros pretended their struggle was aimed at implementing "state capitalism" through the establishment of a strong centralized government that would plan the economy, monopolize foreign trade and basic industries, and introduce workers co-management ("a transition to socialism").

b) Social program : The Montonero social-political program includes: the takeover of the union movement from its traditional Peronist leaders; the rupture of the National Justicialist Movement; the destruction or at least the weakening of the power of the military. The ultimate goal is to establish a "socialist fatherland."

c) Foreign policy : When the MPM attempted in July 1977 to open an office in Mexico City the military attaché from the Soviet Embassy was present at the ceremony, which indicated certain contacts with the communist states. They have waged an intense campaign for Third World support and military-political relations with the PLO, while consistently manifesting their support for and solidarity with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the left-wing guerrillas in El Salvador.

Ideologues

The movement drew many of its ideologues from the universities: social scientists or teachers of architecture and psychology. Although the movement has not produced any systematic description of its ideology, the ideological positions of the Montoneros can be discerned from their statements and interviews,

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)
- 109 -

particularly, in recent years, those released by Mario Firmenich and Fernando Vaca Narvaja.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience: When the movement was at its height, it focused its attention on trade unions, universities, and the secondary schools. Unlike the ERP, the MPM found considerable support from within the diverse corporate entities of the urban society of the east.

ii) Ideological content: The Montonero developed a revolutionary-nationalist rhetoric requiring the repudiation of the "oligarchical-military dictatorship." After the 1983 elections, the group began to invoke democratic slogans.

b) Means

i) Print: The Montoneros resorted to such propaganda means as: mimeographed communiques, interviews, and articles issued in foreign leftist magazines.

ii) Direct (oral/leaflets) : The Montoneros practiced direct propaganda particularly in the universities and secondary schools.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The Montonero view on violence combines interest in the terrorist approach and the development of specific methods of mobilization. Their strategy aims at eventually destabilizing the system and bringing about a general insurrection. Their strategy envisages domination of grassroots organizations, particularly

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)
- 110 -

unions; formation of militia groups; execution of military operations and agitation of the masses; attainment of political representation either within the Peronist movement or by creating their own party; establishment of a "national liberation front"; conquest of power; and ultimately construction of a "socialist fatherland."

On October 1983 the Montonero group announced the beginning of military actions in the forests of the Tucumán Province (this information was denied by the authorities). The forests of the Tucumán Province were then staging areas for the activities of the guerrilla groups of the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) between 1974 and 1976. However, a mimeographed communique signed by the supreme leader of the Montoneros, Mario Firmenich, stated that the MPM would support the democratic process: "whichever party is elected, the movement will make every effort to ensure that it finishes its constitutional term in a peaceful atmosphere." With regard to the evolution of the Justicialist (Peronist) Party, Firmenich's statement warned that "although this process was not as democratic as all of us had hoped it would be, it must be noted that the degree of democratization reached by the Justicialist Party is a truly significant achievement."

Performance

a) Recruitment

i) Social groups: The Montoneros were influential among students and segments of the working class (a heterogenous amalgam: mostly railwaymen and port workers) as well as among middle-class intellectuals.

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 111 -

ii) Age groups : Many Montonero recruits came from schools or colleges. Recruits also were attracted from among the sons of the upper-classes in areas such as the northern suburbs of Buenos Aires.

iii) Sex targeting: The Montoneros succeeded in attracting a significant number of middle-class women. Despite the secrecy which envelops the Montonero leadership, there are reports of women at the group's highest echelons.

b) Indoctrination

i) Use of unions : The MPM tried to influence the Peronist labor movement but its attempts failed. The unions are dominated by members of Peronist traditional bureaucracy, who are generally not attracted to the feverish rhetoric of leftist radicals.

ii) Use of foreign cadres: Some Tupamaros and Chilean MIR militants were reported as active members of the MPM.

Military Structure

a) Force type

i) Guerrilla : the Montoneros organized paramilitary groups as well as urban strike units. The Montoneros were initially a commando organization, before transforming themselves into a political-military group. The commando organization (Comando Juan José Valle "Montoneros") became one of the most influential groups within the left-wing Peronist movement and was to be the backbone of the MPM. They first gained international attention in 1970 with their abduction and subsequent execution of the anti-Peronist former President Pedro Aramburu.

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 112 -

ii) Militia : The group tried to establish militia units but was unable to achieve this objective. The military were able to get rid of the Montonero underground infrastructure.

iii) Urban cells : According to their ideology of urban guerrilla warfare, the Montoneros established a network of urban cells, which was dismantled by the military in the late 1970s.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The Montoneros foresaw the imminent possibility of taking power, and this attracted ambitious and idealistic young scions of the middle class.

ii) Leadership: The group exhibits the populist-radical willingness to suppress the existing "bourgeois" order as well as Leninist-type temptations of absolute power. The Montonero leaders rejected the politics of compromise with the established order and tried to catalyze a political and economic collapse of the abhorred "system." For many among them, revolution became an end in itself, a chance to overcome all kind of complexes and frustrations, an occasion to experience real dangers and total adventure.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : After 1976, the military carried on a ruthless campaign against the MPM and succeeded in killing, capturing, or driving into exile virtually all members. Montonero resistance capacity and combat ability were weak.

ii) Leadership in combat : Unlike their Uruguayan peers, the Tupamaros, the Montonero leaders have not nourished a mythology of martyrdom, since for the most part they left the country during the anti-guerrilla operations. The Montonero supreme leader, Mario Firmenich, preferred to leave the country and to let other people die for the slogans he was professing from Havana. His case was typical of those leaders.

v) Desertion rate : Many recruits who had joined from school or college became thoroughly disillusioned with the course of events (after 1976) and volunteered information which brought about the complete collapse of the movement inside Argentina.

Training

a) Place

i) Local : The training of the urban guerrilla fighters was accomplished primarily in Argentina before the military destroyed the terrorist networks. The Montoneros cooperated with ERP in training their cadres.

ii) External : Especially in the late 1970s, Nicaragua, Cuba, Libya, and the PLO (South Yemen, Lebanon), provided the necessary conditions for continuation of training and indoctrination of the Montonero militants.

b) Trainers : Both Argentines and foreigners were involved in training guerrillas. Montonero militants were trained in foreign countries, where they were initiated into the techniques of international terrorism.

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 114 -

Financial Resources

a) National origin : The financial resources of the Montoneros were mostly local, though it seems they were also supported by foreign terrorist or pro-terrorist groups.

b) Means : The Montoneros were involved in kidnapping and bank robberies. They benefitted from voluntary contributions and controlled revenues (drugs).

c) Amount : The group's resources are in the range of millions of U.S. dollars.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : The Montoneros made use of rifles, revolvers, home-made explosives, and light machine guns. Outside the country, exiled Montonero leader Horacio Mendizabal claimed that, in recent years, MPM members were abandoning the use of explosives and were developing "warfare with light weapons." Actually, during recent years, the activities of the Montoneros have been reduced to occasional grenade or bomb attacks in Buenos Aires.

b) Origin : The Montoneros employed Soviet-made weapons (RPG-7 rocket launchers).

Level of Popular Support

a) Total group and front organizations : The Montoneros were particularly influential within the Peronist Youth and the National University Confederation.

b) Local support: The group exerted influence among university students in Buenos Aires, Mendoza, Cordoba. The MPM penetrated the Peronist Youth and tried to influence -- unsuccessfully -- the Peronist Workers Youth.

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 115 -

External Support

a) Origin : Cuba and the PLO became close allies of the Montoneros, especially in the late 1970s. MPM militants joined training camps in Cuba and Lebanon.

b) Volume : At the height of their operations, the Montoneros could rely on themselves. External support was needed primarily for political reasons. Material support was therefore marginal.

c) Type : Cuba, Libya, and the PLO provided military, political and, in later years, financial support.

Dependence on External Support

a) Political : During the late 1970s, MPM launched an intense lobbying campaign abroad. Contacts were made in Madrid with the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Communist Party (PCE), and in Sweden with Olof Palme's Social Democratic Party. Contacts were developed in Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania and political-military relations were improved with the PLO and Cuba.

b) Logistical : During their struggle against the military, the Montoneros received only limited logistical support from their foreign associates.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: The Marxist-oriented FAR (the Revolutionary Armed Front) merged with the MPM in late 1973. The MPM maintained relations with the ERP through the FAR and through one of the ERP's splinters -- the "22 August" group -- which rejoined the parent party in 1974. The Montoneros argued with the ERP over the interpretation of left-wing Peronism. Notwithstanding these

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 116 -

differences, the groups cooperated (strategically and tactically) in their terrorist operations (Mario Roberto Santucho was described as a friend of the MPM).

ii) Regional : The Montoneros established close ties with the Chilean MIR and the Tupamaros.

iii) Continental : In March 1979, Fernando Vaca Narvaja, reported to be deputy chief of the Montoneros (MPM), was interviewed in Nicaragua and admitted that the Montoneros had a medical brigade at Masaya and that the MPM gave material support to the Sandinista front, specifically to finance the war in its last stages. Mario Firmenich was in Nicaragua during the last phase of the civil war there.

b) Extrahemispheric: The Montoneros established political-military relations with the PLO, which according to Montonero military leader Horacio Mendizabal, had provided arms. The relations between Firmenich and Yasser Arafat of the PLO are reportedly excellent. The MPM maintains close ties with IRA and ETA in Western Europe.

c) Type : The MPM militants contributed to the training and provided financial support, logistical support, and cadres for foreign terrorist groups.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

In February 1979 two top leaders of the MPM (Montoneros), Adolfo Galimberti and Juan Gelman (who had cultivated international contacts in Europe), announced that they were breaking with the organization so as better to carry on "the revolutionary struggle against the dictatorship and for the liberation of the Argentine people."

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 117 -

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

After 1976-1977, many recruits who had joined from school or college were deeply disappointed by the course of events and volunteered information which led to the almost complete collapse of the MPM inside Argentina. Within the democratic framework in Argentina, the Montoneros are totally isolated and the upcoming trial of their top leaders will confirm their historical defeat. The Montoneros lost their political credibility in the early 1970s, and their association with international terrorism led to further isolation. Another reason for the group's lack of popularity is the grand lifestyle the Montonero leaders were reportedly enjoying abroad, while other people were experiencing the rigors of military dictatorship.

Remarks

The Montoneros symbolized the transformation of a left-wing, radical, and nationalist movement into a rigid Marxist-Leninist terrorist group. The specificity of the Peronist ideology in Argentina, the cult of the charismatic leader, and the pervasiveness of violence as a basic feature of Argentina's political culture contributed to this metamorphosis. The original promises of the group were rapidly forgotten and the Montoneros increasingly indulged in destructive, nihilistic activity.

The Montoneros focused on urban guerrilla operations and consistently practiced "active propaganda." They were interested in attacking the most conspicuous targets and tried to bestow a symbolic value on their actions. They established a rigid hierarchy within the terrorist network and warmly embraced the Leninist principles of organizing a clandestine subversive party, and especially, strict centralism. Their strategy, beyond open terrorism, included such

Argentina - Group MPM (Montoneros)

- 118 -

weapons as blackmail and slander, and they succeeded in penetrating some of the most influential media. Their main objective consisted of "destabilizing" the democratic system and escalating the violence through offensive actions against the police and military. They carried this out eventually, though many Montoneros militants were to pay dearly, most with their lives.

The Montoneros established and developed close contacts with other groups similarly oriented: the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Chilean MIR, the Colombian ELN, the Venezuelan FALN, etc. Though they cannot be considered an "orthodox" Castroite group, the Montoneros have been supported by Cuba and their strategy was largely publicized in the Latin American leftist media.

Argentina - Group ERP
- 119 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo
- b) In English : People's Revolutionary Army
- c) Acronym or known name : ERP

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Argentina
- b) Others : Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay

Date of Formation

29 July 1970

Original Organization

The ERP was founded as the armed branch of the majority faction of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT -- Worker's Revolutionary Party), a nominally Trotskyite party, at the PRT's Fifth Congress (1970). It is possible that the ERP was founded with help from Uruguayan MLN -- Tupamaros. In the mid-1970s, the ERP was considered Argentina's most powerful and best-financed guerrilla organization.

Membership

- a) Active members : There were approximately 3,000 by the mid-1970s.
- b) Sympathizers : Several thousand were members, particularly students and intellectuals. Many of the ERP members and sympathizers were former Peronist

Argentina - Group ERP

- 120 -

guerrillas of the leftist (revolutionary) wing disaffected with the "reactionary" orientation of the Peronist union bureaucrats.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name: Enrique Ricardo Gorriaran Merlo

b) Place of birth : Argentina

c) Date of birth : 1941

d) Social background: He is a descendant of Basques who emigrated to Argentina.

e) Political career : Gorriaran Merlo is considered an experienced guerrilla chief, a fighter in Nicaragua, and the planner and the leader of the guerrilla group that killed Anastasio Somoza Debayle. He was sought for more than a decade by the Argentine security services. One of the founders of the ERP, he is now among its top leaders. The Decree 157, issued after President Alfonsin's victory in the 1983 elections, established the need to prosecute a group of former Montonero leaders, as well as Gorriaran Merlo of the ERP, for events perpetrated after 25 May 1973.

f) Character : Considered by certain Latin American journalists an almost legendary figure, he is the symbol of leftist radicalism in Argentina. In a recent interview (October 1983) he proclaimed his commitment to the democratic process inaugurated by Alfonsin's victory in the 1983 elections.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name: Mario Roberto Santucho

b) Political career : Santucho, the titular leader of the ERP, was the inspirer and the brain of the organization.

c) Character : He had been exemplary in personifying the emotional transformation required by the ERP of its cadres. His wife was killed along with 13 other guerrilla prisoners at the naval base Almirante Far in the Patagonian city of Trelew on 22 August 1972 after Santucho had refused to surrender himself (before escaping to Chile and then to Cuba) in exchange for her life. Santucho was killed in 1976. The name Trelew has since become the subtitle for a number of guerrilla fronts that emerged as "spin-offs" from the ERP and the Montoneros (whose members also died there) and were assigned symbolic functions in Argentine "guerrilla politics."

Ideological Origin

The ERP ideology combined elements of Castroism (the Argentine revolution as a part of the continental revolution), Trotskyism (opposition to "orthodox" Marxist "gradualist reformism"), and "anarcho-Marxism." The latter constituent of the ERP doctrine was rooted in the so-called "philosophy of the urban guerrilla," professed by Abraham Guillén. A veteran of the Spanish Civil War, Guillén -- much like Alberto Bayo, another leftist doctrinaire -- served as a mentor and a theoretician for guerrillas in Latin America. His work, "Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana" -- "Strategy of Urban Guerrilla" (1966, 1969) -- formulated much of the strategy and tactics of urban guerrillas as applied in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the mid-1960s. For Guillén, revolutionary war is total and radical. No compromise is allowed, no negotiations are justified. The purpose of the struggle is to overthrow the established social-political order: "people and (liberation) army

are united everywhere against domestic reaction and foreign invaders in a struggle without quarter which exacts the highest political tension." Such a united front, anchored in the alliance of the workers and peasants, must develop continental fronts of workers, youth, and peasants, as well as a "Latin American Liberation Army." Another influential theoretical source of the ERP doctrine was the ideology of left-wing Peronism.

Current Ideological Orientation

The ERP's ideological orientation is Marxist-Leninist, combined with Guillén's ideology of the urban guerrilla (anarcho-Marxism). It preserves certain Trotskyite tenets in its ideology (the role of the urban elites), but seems less reluctant to preserve the strategy of the rural guerrilla.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The ERP advocated agrarian reform based on extensive expropriation of land, the "socialization of economy."

b) Social program: The ERP insisted on the necessity to develop a broad "democratic and anti-imperialist" program that calls for the establishment of a "revolutionary people's government" led by the working class. According to recent statements, the group is allegedly committed to the development of the democratic process.

c) Foreign policy : The ERP advocates the termination of all political and military pacts with the United States and of all agreements with organizations (such as the IMF) which are allegedly dominated by "imperialist capital." It supported the strategy of a Latin American continental revolution, and issued

Argentina - Group ERP
- 123 -

proclamations of solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran leftist guerrillas.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : Students, intellectuals, and urban middle-class represented the main targets of ERP calls for "revolutionary warfare."

ii) Ideological content: Revolutionary proclamations and manifestoes pointed out the necessity of a violent opposition to the established order.

iii) External intended consumer : Interviews and statements of ERP leaders were published in Cuban and Nicaraguan press.

b) Means : Manifestoes, leaflets, and oral propaganda publicized ERP positions.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The ERP's views on violence and revolution stem from the radical-leftist belief that overthrowing the social order involves a multitude of methods. The group adopted the perspective of protracted warfare, while considering both terrorist and mobilizational approaches indispensable for a successful outcome. The propagandistic terrorist actions were thus instrumental in the development of a mobilizational approach. A member of the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria), ERP supports the idea of the development of a bloody and prolonged "revolutionary war" that would make the Latin American continent "the second or third Vietnam of the world." ERP

Argentina - Group ERP
- 124 -

promotes revolutionary war as a "complex process of mass struggle." Until 1973, the ERP was affiliated with the "United Secretariat" faction of the Trotskyist Fourth International and supported the strategy of continental revolution promoted by Trotskyite doctrinaires. Even after the break with the Fourth International, the group upheld the same "internationalist" outlook, particularly in the Castroist version.

Performance

a) Recruitment

i) Social groups: The ERP militants were students, workers, and middle-class intellectuals. Many had been involved in Peronist left-wing guerrilla activities.

ii) Age groups : The ERP attracted young people under 30, primarily university students and middle-class intellectuals.

iii) Sex targeting: Mario Roberto Santucho's wife became a symbol of the ERP "uncompromising struggle" after she was killed in 1972.

b) Indoctrination

i) Use of schools/universities: The ERP succeeded in influencing significant segments among students and intellectuals.

Military Structure

a) Force type

i) Guerrilla : ERP activities were primarily urban until 1975, then they established a rural front in Tucumán (eradicated 1977).

ii) Commando : Commando units were active in urban areas

Argentina - Group ERP
- 125 -

iii) Regular troops : Paramilitary units were formed in Tucumán

iv) Urban cells : They are in Mendoza, Cordoba, Rosario. The ERP used the Tupamaro-style cell structure, making it difficult for a "soldier" to be forced under torture to divulge the names of more than the members of his immediate cell.

b) Political control of forces

i) Political officers : Each ERP commando unit had a political leader. The ERP's cadres were considered full-time "soldiers." The role of political officers was to prepare the guerrillas for major psychological tests. The ERP militant had to accept the fact that if captured his organization had the right to kill him so that he could not be questioned. The ERP "pedagogy" required guerrillas to break all emotional ties with other humans.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : Many students joined leftist (Peronist and Marxist) groups as a way of challenging parental authority (influence of Marxist-Leninist, Castroist, Maoist, and Trotskyist radical ideologies); they expressed dissatisfaction with Peronism and manifested willingness to take over political power and to carry out a profound social-economic transformation.

ii) Leadership: The ERP leaders have been motivated by revolutionary adventurism and an exacerbated hostility toward the established social order. They have held up Castro's Cuba as a model for Argentina. Absolute power is their basic objective.

b) Performance

Argentina - Group ERP
- 126 -

i) **Combat ability** : The ERP commando units demonstrated dynamism but were successfully eradicated by the military.

ii) **Discipline**: The ERP's cadres were full time "soldiers" and manifested a high degree of discipline.

iii) **Weapon sophistication** : Judging by army descriptions of captured material, the ERP was mostly dependent on small arms, machine guns, dynamite, and mines or bombs.

iv) **Leadership in combat** : In July 1976, Roberto Santucho was killed in a shootout; most leaders head fighters in combat, which explains the high casualty rate among leaders.

Training

The ERP trains in Argentina and Cuba.

Financial Resources

a) **National origin**

Mostly local : From 1970 to 1976, ERP organized terrorist operations (robberies, kidnapping for ransom, etc.). The ERP became one of the richest terrorist organizations in Latin America.

b) **Means**

i) **Kidnapping**: The ERP organized successful kidnappings for ransom of prominent Argentine and foreign figures (particularly businessmen).

ii) **Bank robberies** : The ERP initiated some well-publicized bank robberies in the early 1970s.

Argentina - Group ERP
- 127 -

iii) **Voluntary contributions:** The ERP was supported primarily by leftist intellectuals and other urban middle-class elements.

c) **Amount :** ERP developed a pattern of guerrilla extortion, e.g., on 8 April 1973, the ERP had kidnapped and subsequently freed (following the payment of \$750,000) the president of the Rosario branch of the Bank of Boston. ERP had very large financial resources as a result -- in the tens of millions of U.S. dollars.

Equipment and Supplies

a) **Level of sophistication :** The group employed weapons generally used in urban guerrilla operations: small arms, submachine-guns, home-made explosives

b) **Volume:** Since the group launched successful attacks on military garrisons, it has acquired a large volume of supplies.

c) **Origin :** Equipment was captured from the military and/or supplied by foreign supporters (Cuba); most, however, was bought from international dealers.

Level of Popular Support

a) **Total group and front organizations :** At the height of its activities, the ERP mobilized at least 10,000 fighters and sympathizers.

b) **Local support:** The group was particularly influential in the universities of Buenos Aires, but also received isolated support from young working-class elements

c) **Support from unrelated groups or organizations:** The ERP established various contacts with the armed Peronist movements. ERP belongs to the Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria (JCR) set up in 1974.

External Support

a) Origin

i) Cuba : Despite some significant ideological strategic differences, the ERP was financially, politically, and militarily supported by Cuba.

ii) Others : ERP belongs to the JCR (Revolutionary Coordinating Committee) together with the Uruguayan Tupamaros, the Bolivian ELN, and the Chilean MIR.

b) Volume : External support was marginal; indeed, the group was not only self-reliant but was able to furnish equipment and money to other leftist organizations.

c) Type

i) Military : Certain ERP militants were trained in Cuba.

ii) Political (direct): ERP leaders established close contacts with Cuban leaders and benefitted from direct political support.

iii) Financial : The ERP, especially in recent years, was increasingly subsidized by Cuba. This situation results from their defeat in Argentina and their inability to continue the practice of kidnappings, bank robberies, and assaults.

Dependence on External Support

For both ideological and political reasons, the ERP needs external relations and support. Their concept of revolution is a continental one, and they aimed to coordinate their actions with other Latin American groups. However, the roots of the movement were within the country and the external support was important for a long time mainly from a strategic-political standpoint.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: As Santucho admitted in March 1974, relations with the armed Peronist movements, among them the Montoneros, were irregular. Differences over relations with the Peronist left and the Peronist governments elected in 1973 led to much dissension within the ERP. The ERP was outlawed in 1973 and Santucho attacked Peron as a "counterrevolutionary in the service of capitalism." The contacts became more intense after 1974 when the Peronist guerrilla left moved into active opposition (noteworthy contacts between the Montoneros and an ERP splinter -- the 22 August group).

ii) Regional : In 1978, Argentine ERP elements were reported to have infiltrated the Brazilian Marxist Socialist Convergence Movement (MSC), which enjoyed student support. The ERP developed ties with the Chilean, Uruguayan, and Bolivian guerrillas and belongs to the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (JCR), which announced its formation on 15 February 1974. Other groups in JCR are the Tupamaros (the Uruguayan MLN), the Bolivian ELN, and the Chilean MIR. The principal center abroad for the JCR has been Paris, where there is a large exiled Latin American left-wing community. Contact was established with the Colombian ELN and the Paraguayan Frepalina.

iii) Continental : ERP leaders maintain close contacts with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and with Salvadoran leftist guerrillas, as well as with the International Department of the Cuban Communist Party. The ERP was affiliated with the Trotskyite Fourth International (United Secretariat) until 1973.

b) Type : The relations between ERP and other revolutionary groups include training, financial and logistical support, and exchanges of cadres.

Extent and Structure of Areas under Guerrilla Control

In the mid-1970s, the ERP attempted to establish its control over a "liberated area" in regions of the sparsely populated Tucumán province. The group was not able to impose more than a fleeting control and eventually abandoned its territorial ambitions as a result of decisive army activities.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

After the death of the group's main leader, Mario Roberto Santucho in July 1976, the ERP never recovered, despite the prominent position of Gorriaran Merlo and his tactical skills. The ERP represented a typical case of a violent minority mobilized and inspired by a strong personality whose elimination resulted in its gradual decline.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

The continued guerrilla war waged by the ERP was a major factor in precipitating the March 1976 coup. Thereafter, the armed forces carried out an intensified campaign against ERP guerrillas. There has been no significant urban action recorded since the December 1975 attack on Monte Chingolo barracks. The rural front in Tucumán was eradicated in 1977. The guerrilla paramilitary units were overwhelmingly defeated, the army having succeeding in killing or capturing virtually all of the guerrillas. The urban guerrillas faced many difficulties: (1) it was difficult to cooperate with other revolutionary organizations; (2) it was

Argentina - Group ERP

- 131 -

difficult to work out policies that would lead to the steady growth and development of the guerrilla force; (3) it was hard to prevent the emergence of different views on strategic and tactical issues that in practice led to internal quarreling and even splintering of the organization; (4) the difficulty to win even the passive support of substantial portions of the population, much less the active support of ever increasing numbers of individuals.

Many of these lessons were implicit in the program issued in February 1974 by the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (JCR), an inter-American guerrilla organization founded by four of South America's most important guerrilla forces with extensive rural and urban experience -- the Chilean MIR, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, the Bolivian ELN, and the Argentine ERP. For the most part activities of the JCR centered around propaganda initiatives in an attempt to isolate military governments at home. It published a bulletin, Che Guevara, but also operated through the Centro Argentino de Informacion y Solidaridad (CAIS), set up in Paris.

The ERP attempted to unify a Trotskyite with a Castroite approach to the issues of revolutionary warfare. The impact of Abraham Guillén's thesis on the urban guerrilla was quite significant for the elaboration of a peculiar ERP ideology.

The group consistently developed the strategy of the urban guerrilla and went beyond the strategic framework imagined by Castro and his supporters. The ERP tactics combined urban terrorism with active propaganda, and the group exerted a major influence on exalted youth, particularly of urban middle-class origin.

Highly eclectic, the ERP ideology and practice tried to capitalize on Guillén's and Trotsky's celebration of radical violence. As a combination of Trotskyism, Castroism, and anarcho-Marxism, the ERP ideology presented certain specific

Argentina - Group ERP

- 132 -

features, e.g., the justification of any attack which could undermine the established order. At the beginning, the movement tried to create a "Robin Hood aura" around its operations. Later they succeeded in organizing large-scale coordinated operations (attacks on army bases and other targets in 1975).

The ERP, due particularly to its connections with the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR, was instrumental in the establishment of a Latin American Coordinating Committee in 1974. This was conceived as a coordinating center for various rural and urban guerrilla groups.

Bolivia - Group ELN
- 133 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional
- b) In English : National Liberation Army
- c) Acronym or known name : ELN

Country of Operation

Bolivia

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The ELN was formed in 1966 by Cuban and Bolivian revolutionaries. Its creation was the direct result of the Cuban strategy (after 1965) of support for guerrilla movements in Latin America and direct involvement in their orientation and coordination.

Front Organizations and Auxiliaries

The Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Bolivianos (PTRB -- Bolivian Workers' Revolutionary Party) was set up in 1972 as a political front for the ELN.

Membership

- a) Active members : The ELN reached its maximum size -- 51 persons -- under Guevara in March 1967.
- b) Cadres : The group had perhaps twenty cadres, mostly Cubans and other foreigners.

Bolivia - Group ELN

- 134 -

d) Foreign members : In March 1967, among the ELN members were 18 Cubans, 3 Peruvians, and 1 German. Other foreign members came from Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, and Chile.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name: Osvaldo Peredo ("Chato")

b) Political career : Three Peredo brothers were active in the Bolivian ELN during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Roberto "Coco" Peredo was killed with Guevara in 1967; Inti Peredo died in a shoot-out in La Paz in September 1969. Subsequently the guerrillas were led by "Chato" Peredo. The PTRB is led by "Chato"'s brother Antonio Peredo. All brothers were initially members of the Communist Party of Bolivia.

c) Character : "Chato" Peredo was described as committed to violent actions and as an enthusiastic supporter of Castroism-Guevarism.

Ideological Origin

The ELN was founded according to Ernesto "Che" Guevara's theory of the guerrilla force as a "nucleus of armed insurrection" (the so-called "foco theory"). The creation of the ELN was connected with Guevara's obsession of creating a "second Vietnam," i.e., a revolutionary outburst in Latin America. Ideologically the group faithfully represented the views and the opinions of the Cuban leadership. Despite its complete defeat, the ELN maintained its revolutionary stance and refused to accept the political consequences of Guevara's failure to implement his ideas.

Bolivia - Group ELN

- 135 -

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The ELN adopted the Castroite economic program including land reform, nationalizations, and expropriations. A centrally planned economy was put forward as the economic objective of the "socialist revolution."

b) Social program: The ELN called for the development of rural guerrilla warfare, the destruction of the established social structure, and the "socialist revolution" on a continental scale. For the ELN armed struggle represented the only possible way to achieve social change in Latin America.

c) Foreign policy : The ELN was founded as an "international organization" to promote the revolutionary struggle in Latin America. The group espoused strong anti-American positions, support for Cuba, and solidarity with other guerrilla groups in Latin America.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The ELN calls for basic reforms meant to implement a communist program. The "Socialist revolution," whose model was discovered by the ELN in Cuba's experience, has remained the basic economic-political goal.

b) Social program : The ELN's social program revolves around the development and continuation of the armed struggle ("a prolonged revolutionary war"). The seizure of power would mean the possibility of introducing the Cuban socioeconomic pattern in Bolivia.

c) Foreign policy : In February 1974, the ELN was one of the four guerrilla organizations in Southern Latin America to form the pro-Cuban Revolutionary Coordinating Committee. ELN promotes solidarity with guerrilla groups and

Bolivia - Group ELN
- 136 -

revolutionary movements throughout Latin America. The experience of the ELN was largely publicized by Cuban or pro-Cuban ideologues.

Ideologues

a) Name : Guido "Inti" Peredo

b) Publications: Though undated, "Guerrilla Warfare in Bolivia Is Not Dead: It Has Just Begun," a special supplement to Tricontinental (Havana), was published in 1968. Peredo described himself as the "accidental heir to the last and most valuable teachings of the greatest revolutionary genius in Latin America," (i.e., Ernesto "Che" Guevara).

c) Impact (internal) : Peredo's texts had an impact only among the leftist Castroite militants.

d) Impact (external) : As a survivor of Guevara's group, Peredo was influential among leftist groups in Latin America. (He died in September 1969.)

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The 1967 declaration "To the Miners of Bolivia," actually written by "Che" Guevara, was supposed to radicalize the Bolivian working class.

ii) Ideological content: The ELN resorted to exhortations of mass struggle against the established order and revolutionary slogans

iii) External intended consumer : The Cuban and pro-Castro propaganda strongly capitalized on the ELN experience and succeeded in working out "Che" Guevara's myth.

Bolivia - Group ELN
- 137 -

b) Means

The ELN makes use of the the PTRB clandestine paper, El Proletario and practices oral propaganda.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

For Castro and Guevara, Bolivia was supposed to represent a spark, the first stage of a continental insurrection. In his "necessary introduction" to Guevara's diary, Castro wrote that "Che" did not conceive of the struggle in Bolivia as an isolated fact, but "as part of a revolutionary liberation movement which would not delay in extending to other South American countries." According to a statement published in 1975 the PTRB (the Bolivian Workers' Revolutionary Party) was expected to grow into the vanguard of the Bolivian revolution. The ELN would not disappear, but be the "armed fist" or "military force of the working class and Bolivian people." The ELN reiterated its conviction that revolution must be carried on through armed struggle and be continental in scope.

The ELN tried to combine Guevara's "foci theory" with a mobilizational approach. The group believed in an imminent uprising of Bolivian peasants but there was no basis in reality for their optimistic expectations. They were perceived as "foreigners," undesirable intruders and lacked any appeal among the groups they wanted to mobilize. On the contrary, Bolivian peasants were cooperative with the military and supported the anti-guerrilla operations.

Performance

a) Recruitment

Bolivia - Group ELN

- 138 -

i) **Social groups:** The ELN recruited among middle-class intellectuals, university student leaders, working class (unemployed mine workers, taxi-drivers)

ii) **Age groups :** The group especially attracted young people, but also older militants.

iii) **Sex targetting:** The famous Tamara Bunke (nicknamed "Tania") established and maintained the urban connections of the ELN, until her withdrawal with the guerrillas in the mountains and her 1967 death.

b) **Use of foreign cadres:** The ELN is avowedly an international organization incorporating within its ranks guerrillas from other Latin American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, Peru, Chile). Among the most famous foreign cadres were Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the inspiration of the ELN, and Tamara Bunke ("Tania"), citizen of the GDR and resident of Cuba.

Military Structure

a) Force type

i) **Guerrilla :** The ELN organized its guerrilla units with both military and political functions.

ii) **Urban cells :** The urban network of the ELN was dismantled in 1967, but re-emerged after 1970.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) **Rank and file :** The ELN militants have been motivated by the desire to create a revolutionary situation in Bolivia, establish a basis for further

Bolivia - Group ELN
- 139 -

guerrilla operations, wage a prolonged revolutionary war, and transform the ELN into a "fighting vanguard."

ii) Leadership: The ELN leaders intended to touch off an international guerrilla war. Guevara's 1967 "Message to the Tricontinental" was a call for "true proletarian internationalism, with international proletarian armies."

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : In October 1967 "Che" Guevara and all but five members of the ELN were killed by Bolivian military forces. The ELN re-emerged after 1969, but suffered another defeat in 1970, due to problems among the guerrillas themselves and to clashes with the army.

ii) Discipline: There were a lot of desertions among the guerrillas in 1967 and Guevara himself was disappointed with the attitude of the Bolivian militants (a very low degree of discipline and reliability).

iii) Weapon sophistication : The ELN made use of machine guns, rifles, mortars, and revolvers.

iv) Endurance : Before its defeat in 1967, the ELN was already weakened by internal dissensions, casualties, and isolation, described by Guevara as "total" as early as the end of April.

v) Leadership in combat : The most active members of the ELN during the 1966-1967 episode were the foreign militants (Guevara and the other leading foreign cadres).

vi) Desertion rate : The reliability of the Bolivian combatants in the 1967 episode was undermined by the desertion rate: one-third of them deserted and/or collaborated with the authorities after being taken prisoners.

Bolivia - Group ELN
- 140 -

Training

a) Place : The guerrilla fighters of the ELN were trained both in Bolivia (local training) and in Cuba and Chile (1970-1973) -- external training.

b) Trainers : The ELN militants were trained by Bolivians, Cubans, and other Latin American leftist experts in guerrilla warfare.

Financial Resources

a) National origin : Financial resources came primarily from Cuba and Chile (1970-1973).

b) Means : The group resorted to kidnapping, bank robberies, and voluntary contributions.

Equipment and Supplies

The level of sophistication was not very high: small arms, machine guns, explosives, and rifles. The equipment came primarily from Cuba.

Level of Popular Support

During the 1967 guerrilla struggle, the ELN was not able to attract the support of the local population. The peasants in the area proved entirely unwilling to cooperate with the guerrillas (they disliked and distrusted the "foreigners").

External Support

a) Origin : Cuba has always been a supporter of ELN exploits. The ELN has been one of the few insurgent forces organized entirely on the basis of the Castroite-Guevarist ideology.

Bolivia - Group ELN

- 141 -

b) Volume : Without external (Cuban) support, the ELN would not have been able to survive its catastrophic defeat in 1967. On the other hand, Guevara's action was supposed to validate Cuba's revolutionary strategy, and therefore, Castro was extremely generous with this particular group.

c) Participation : Cubans were directly involved in Guevara's Bolivian adventure. Moreover, some of them were members of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. Castro did not try to make a secret out of his commitment to armed struggle in another Latin American country; on the contrary, he presented the Cuban intervention as a form of "proletarian internationalism."

Dependence on External Support

The ELN has been one of the most dependent groups in Latin America: external support was vital for its survival and it has desperately looked for Cuban help (financial, political, logistical, etc.).

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: After a short, initial period of support for the ELN guerrilla venture, the pro-Soviet Bolivian Communist Party became more and more critical of the whole strategy promoted by the Castroite group (1967). Roberto "Coco" Peredo had been a member of the PCB Central Committee. The PCB continually refused to collaborate with the guerrillas; hence, relations were strained. This was evident in the personal conflict between the PCB General

Bolivia - Group ELN
- 14? -

Secretary and "Che" Guevara as well as Fidel Castro's later attacks against the "reformist" PCB.

ii) Continental : Castro and Guevara thought of the ELN as the vanguard of a Latin American continental revolution. Four ELN militants were members of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. In February 1974, the ELN was one of the four guerrilla organizations in Southern South America to form the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (JCR), a Castroite international organization. In the early 1970s, ELN cooperation with the Uruguayan Tupamaros, indicated Castro's intention to strengthen ties between Cuban-sponsored groups and other leftist movements on the continent (a trend toward convergence).

b) Type : Since the ELN was dramatically deprived of national roots and contacts, its fate was dependent on foreign, i.e., Cuban supplies and moral-political support.

Extent and Structure of Areas under Guerrilla Control

a) Territorial ambitions : The group aimed to establish its control over a territory the Castro-Guevarist used to call "liberated area" (the Southeast section of Bolivia).

b) Extent of area controlled : Under the leadership of "Che" Guevara, the ELN wanted to establish a "liberated" area in the southeast section of Bolivia. That area was supposed to become the foco, i.e., a political-military nucleus of revolutionary action.

c) Degree of control : The ELN established only a relative, short-lived control over the area they were targeting.

Bolivia - Group ELN

.. 143 -

d) Type of administration : The guerrillas were almost completely isolated in the area they chose for the foco. The region was thinly populated and inaccessible. The Indian peasants were hostile to the guerrillas and proved entirely unwilling to cooperate with them. Hence no administration was set up and no "revolutionary institution" was brought into being.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

The Bolivian Communist Party refused to collaborate with the ELN led by Guevara in 1966-1967. On the contrary, the fiasco of Guevara's venture offered an argument to the pro-Soviet PCB and enhanced the dispute between the "orthodox" and the Castroite Latin American militants. Castro accused the PCB of "cowardice" and "opportunism." The PCB did not want to accept Guevara's control over the revolutionary armed forces and rejected the whole strategy worked out by the supporters of the foco theory. The alienation of the PCB was one of the factors leading to the isolation and defeat of the guerrilla force.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

First Guevara's death, then "Chato" Peredo's arrest and then Inti Peredo's death, contributed to the continual weakening of the ELN. One can assume that the pro-Cuban Bolivian far left has never recovered from the blow it was dealt with the eradication of Guevara's insurrectionary foco.

Vulnerability to the Interruption of External Lines of Supply

Despite a strong rhetoric, the ELN grew more and more marginalized and isolated. The very fact that it organized a political-official front indicates a

change of attitude and an increased need to overcome the complete isolation. Loss of communication with Cuba and La Paz was decisive in the 1967 defeat. Their changed strategy in recent years is the confirmation of the subordinate status of the ELN in its relations with Havana: each time Castro changes his mind, the Castroite group enthusiastically approves of his wise decision and embarks on the new line.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

As a segment of the Bolivian violent far-left, the ELN has almost completely lost its influence among the working class and intellectuals. The group, whose sectarianism turned out to be a perennial characteristic, resigned itself to issuing revolutionary statements and proclamations. In a certain way, marginalized and debilitated, the ELN symbolizes the ruin of the Castro-Guevarist project of igniting an "apocalyptic" continental upheaval.

Remarks

The ELN's main characteristic consisted of its original constitution as a practical confirmation of Castro-Guevarist foco theory. Its collapse in 1967, Guevara's death, and subsequent incapacity of recovery clearly demonstrated the political shortsightedness of those who put their faith in the "catalyzing" function of the revolutionary nucleus. The group was dismantled before being able to prove its fighting skills. The ideology of "exported revolution" as conceived by Guevara and elaborated in his Message to the "Tricontinental" Conference (Havana, 1966) could not pass the test of reality. The Guevara episode with the ELN had far-reaching consequences for the rethinking, by Fidel Castro and the Latin

Bolivia - Group ELN

- 145 -

American radical left in general, of the revolutionary strategy. Without completely relinquishing the assumptions which inspired Guevara's action, Castro adopted a more "reasonable" posture and pretended to forget his aspirations of continental subversion. Never dedicated to ideological creation, the ELN totally embraced Castro's suggestions and frantically supported his exhortations. The continental significance of the ELN activity lies primarily in the tactical and strategic reasons which led to its defeat, though the Castroite groups refused to acknowledge the fiasco of their idol. They followed Fidel Castro in the mythmaking operation and helped "Che" Guevara's transfiguration into a symbol of redemptive martyrdom, and, through a typical dialectical artifice, they considered his defeat a "necessary" step toward the "ineluctable" victory.

Bolivia - Group MIR

- 146 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
- b) In English : Movement of the Revolutionary Left
- c) Acronym or known name : MIR

Country of Operation

Bolivia

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The Bolivian MIR was formed in 1971 as a result of a split within the youth section of the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano -- PDC).

Front Organizations and Auxiliaries

The MIR formed part of the UDP (Union Democrática y Popular -- Democratic and Popular Union) during the 1978 and 1979 elections. Other parties belonging to the UDP include the left-wing Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) and the Bolivian Communist Party.

Membership

The MIR has fewer than 1,000 members.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name: Jaime Paz Zamora
- b) Place of birth : Bolivia

Bolivia - Group MIR
- 147 -

c) Social background: Upper middle-class; nephew of former president Victor Paz Estensoro.

d) Political career : One of the main MIR leaders and a lawyer by profession, Zamora became Bolivia's vice president, with Siles Zuazo as president, in 1982.

Ideological Origin

The ideology of the Bolivian MIR was primarily a Christian-radical one. Its basic themes were the promotion of social justice and equality, the defense of human rights and the necessity of struggle against social and political "oppression." In its early stage, the group seemed to favor violent attempts at overthrowing the established order but in recent years it has advocated legal means for effecting social reforms.

During the late 1970s the MIR increasingly turned into a revolutionary party with a Marxist ideology. Though the group proclaims the necessity to do away with the "bourgeois privileges" it did not engage, in recent years, in anti-government operations. Moreover, despite certain polemics by the present Bolivian leaders (Hernan Siles Zuazo), MIR militants continue to cooperate with the government. The MIR leaders identify with leftist and/or anti-American orientations and tend to influence the political options of the government. The MIR is a constituent of the present ruling coalition in Bolivia.

Bolivia - Group MIR

- 148 -

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The MIR belongs to the ruling UDP coalition led by President Hernan Siles Zuazo and supports the leftist course of that administration.

b) Social program : The MIR program includes the idea of a complete social transformation, though for obvious political reasons its leaders do not proclaim the imminence of a "socialist revolution."

c) Foreign policy : At this moment, the MIR plays the democratic game and seems committed to the politics of gradual social and economic reforms. The group expresses support for "national liberation movements" and solidarity with the Third World revolutionary regimes. The Bolivian Government's "non-aligned" and Third World foreign policy was evidenced by the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba and Nicaragua and recognition of the PLO.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The MIR propaganda addresses sectors of the middle class, as well as students and peasants.

ii) Ideological content: The MIR manifested active support for the leftist course of the Siles Suazo government.

b) Means : The MIR propaganda makes use of radio and print, particularly since the group joined the government.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The group engaged in guerrilla activities in the late 1960s. The MIR grew increasingly radical under the influence of Castroism but was never able to launch successful operations. Disastrously defeated, the group decided to return to legal political activity and to abandon terrorist methods. It obtained legal recognition when political parties returned to open activity in 1978. The MIR joined the UDP coalition which supported Hernan Siles Zuazo.

Performance

Recruitment

- i) Social groups: The MIR recruits students, and middle-class intellectuals.
- ii) Age groups : The MIR exerts particular influence among young intellectuals and has penetrated student political organizations.

Military Structure

- a) Force type : The MIR tried to launch guerrilla operations in the late 1960s. It organized urban cells which were rapidly dismantled.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

- i) Rank and file : The MIR exploited feelings of frustration among members of the middle-class and the leftist intellectual tendency of identification with the professed objectives of the Cuban revolution.

Bolivia - Group MIR

- 150 -

ii) Leadership: During the first, violence-oriented stage, the MIR leaders looked to the Cuban revolution for inspiration.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : The MIR guerrilla groups were disastrously defeated after 1971.

ii) Discipline: The group was unable to coordinate actions and discipline was loose.

iii) Weapon sophistication : The MIR made use of small arms, machine guns, mortars, and explosives.

Training

a) Place : The MIR militants were trained both in Bolivia and Cuba.

b) Trainers : The trainers were Bolivian and other Latin American leftists (Cubans, Colombians, etc.).

Financial Resources

The financial resources of the MIR have been primarily of national origin.

Means : The MIR gets its money through voluntary contributions and front organizations.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : It was not very high: small arms, submachine guns, explosives

B) Origin : The group made use of captured weapons (from the Bolivian military) and benefited from Cuban supplies.

Bolivia - Group MIR

- 151 -

External Support

a) Origin: Though Cuba manifested solidarity with the MIR attempt to generate a guerrilla front in Bolivia, the Cuban military support was rather marginal. The Cubans offered primarily political and financial support and contributed to the training of MIR guerrillas.

Dependence on External Support

The MIR needed Cuban support for reasons of legitimacy as a representative group of the radical left in Bolivia. Cuban support was important also from a strategic point of view, since the MIR was attached to Castro's idea of a "continental revolution."

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: In the late 1970s the MIR was closely associated with Siles's faction of the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario -- Nationalist Revolutionary Movement), which became the MNRI (the Left-wing Nationalist Revolutionary Party). The MIR belongs to the UDP coalition. Jaime Paz Zamora, Bolivian vice-president and chairman of the Congress, is one of the MIR leaders. There are persistent rumors concerning the internal disputes within the UDP, particularly those between Paz Zamora and the president, Hernan Siles Zuazo.

ii) Continental : The group established close contacts with Cuba and Nicaragua. It supports leftist groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries.

Bolivia - Group MIR

- 152 -

b) Type

i) **Financial** : The financial support was significant during the guerrilla period.

ii) **Logistical**: The logistical support counted primarily during the guerrilla period, when Cuba got involved in the development of guerrilla struggle in Bolivia and expressed support for the MIR activities.

Extent and Structure of Areas under Guerrilla Control

Territorial ambitions : The MIR aimed at establishing a "liberated area" but was unable to control areas since it was rapidly defeated.

Remarks

As an active member of Siles Zuazo's coalition (UDP), the MIR has been deeply involved in the electoral process during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Apparently the group considers methods of urban revolutionary war, rural guerrilla cells, and social subversion outdated in Bolivia.

The Bolivian MIR illustrates the transformation of certain radical-Catholic groups into guerrilla movements committed to insurgency and terrorism. Unlike other leftist groups, the MIR became aware of its failure to inspire a revolutionary war and decided to revise its strategy. Ideologically, the group evolved from the initial radical-religious rhetoric toward a Marxist social doctrine, emphasizing the class struggle and the historical "necessity" of a fundamental social change.

Brazil - Group ALN
- 153 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Acao Libertadora Nacional
- b) In English : National Liberation Action
- c) Acronym or known name : ALN

Country of Operation

Brazil

Original Organization

The ALN was founded in Sao Paulo (in 1968) by dissidents from the pro-Soviet Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), after a 1967 split in the PCB. The dissidents vehemently condemned the "reformist" course of the PCB and called for guerrilla warfare in Brazil.

Membership

By 1969, the ALN reportedly had branches in 18 of 22 Brazilian states. The group had several hundred active members in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The ALN could also count on several hundred sympathizers.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name: Carlos Marighella
- b) Political career : Marighella had been a prominent member of the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) for several decades prior to his break in the mid-1960s. A founder of the ALN, Marighella was killed on 4 November, 1969.

c) Publications : Marighella was the author of various writings on guerrilla warfare. The most influential was his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla.

d) Character : According to his writings and actions, Marighella was a hardened revolutionary. He was an inflexible enemy of "gradualism" and "reformism" and enthusiastically supported violent means (assaults, ambushes, executions, kidnappings, wars of nerves, and terrorism). He praised "the greatest cold bloodedness, calmness, and decision." After his death, Cuban propaganda converted him into a revolutionary myth.

Marighella deeply distrusted the bureaucratic organization of the PCB-type. He was committed to a more spontaneous vision of revolutionary struggle and rejected the idea of creating another communist party, "for the functioning of big, bulky organizations tolls the death of the revolutionaries . . . and we cannot keep losing time with the Central Committee.

Ideological Origin

A long-time member of the Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party, Carlos Marighella grew increasingly disaffected with what he considered an opportunistic approach to the realities of "class struggle in Brazil." He reproached the communist leadership's lack of understanding for the necessity of organizing armed struggle in Brazil. Marighella and his supporters warmly greeted the decisions of the OLAS Conference in Havana (1967) and insisted on the obligation of the Brazilian left to follow the example of Ernesto "Che" Guevara. In his letter to the Central Committee, explaining his decision to break with what he called a "reactionary line," Carlos Marighella emphasized the "necessity of armed struggle in the Brazilian revolution." In this 1968 letter he pointed out that

Brazil - Group ALN

- 155 -

"seizure of power by the masses will not be achieved by an illusory redemocratization or peaceful action, but by force of arms and unity of popular forces." Marighella's group adopted the OLAS (Latin American Solidarity Organization) stance that armed strife is the only path for launching revolution. The ALN militants were certain that the "Brazilian revolutionary vanguard" would "arise from the guerrillas." They even declared: "For us, Che Guevara's example is what counts." Marighella was committed to the goal of unleashing a continental upheaval, "the establishment of nuclei in all Latin American countries in order to create two, three, and many Vietnams." Documents issued by the group hailed the "victories of Cuban people" and greeted Cuba as the "vanguard of Latin American revolution."

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The ALN called for the expropriation of big foreign and Brazilian capital and agrarian reform. The group upheld the establishment of a centrally planned economy the pattern of which was represented by Cuba.

b) Social program: For the ALN, the crucial point was to overthrow the "bourgeois government" and to set up a "dictatorship of the proletariat" through violent means. All means were recommended by the group as long as they would undermine the established order.

c) Foreign policy : The ALN avowed unconditional support for the Cuban strategy in Latin America. The group expressed support for all pro-Cuban, leftist groups. "North American imperialism" was considered the symbol of injustice and exploitation.

Ideologues

a) Name : Carlos Marighella

b) Publications: His writings included: For the Liberation of Brazil and especially the Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, completed in June 1969. Before his break with the PCB, he contributed to World Marxist Review, the Prague-based journal published by pro-Moscow communist parties.

c) Impact (internal) : The Minimanual became the tactical handbook for guerrillas in Brazil. The book was distributed clandestinely in Brazil.

d) Impact (external) : Tricontinental (Havana) printed Marighella's Minimanual in 1970. The book circulated widely outside Brazil, particularly through the promotion of the Cuban government. Marighella's ideas became a basic component of the leftist creed in Latin America, an essential element in the constitution of the Castro-Guevarist doctrine.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The ALN addressed the potential mass power base for urban guerrillas. The ALN attracted militants of the orthodox communist party (especially communist youth), intellectuals and working-class, militants.

ii) Ideological content: The main theses stressed the meaning and purposes of urban guerrilla warfare.

iii) External intended consumer : Marighella's Minimanual influenced almost all other Latin American urban guerrilla groups.

b) Means

Brazil - Group ALN

- 157 -

i) Radio: Communiques and statements were broadcast from Havana and from Brazil (captured radio stations).

ii) Print: The ALN publicized its views through books and journals (particularly those printed in Cuba: Tricontinental and Tricontinental Bulletin).

iii) Direct (oral/leaflets) : The ALN developed an influential sector dealing with "oral propaganda."

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The basic positions of the ALN were described by Carlos Marighella in his writings. The group favored urban guerrilla as the main strategy leading to triumph over the established order. The ALN supported Guevara's foco theory and tried to justify the recourse to terrorist methods. ALN militants were urged to develop mobilizational tactics and to refuse indulging in "pacifist illusions," allegedly the mortal sin of the orthodox, pro-Moscow PCB. It is important to note that Marighella avoided a unilateral approach to the problem of guerrilla warfare. Early in 1969, not long before his death, he tried to work out a coherent interpretation of the relation between urban and rural guerrilla, considering that the success of each strategy depended on the effectiveness of the other one: "If rural guerrilla war is not launched out of the urban guerrilla movement and with a proper coordination of urban and rural struggle, the rural guerrilla movement will not survive." On the other hand, he wrote at about the same time: "the whole urban struggle, whether on the guerrilla or mass-movement front, must always be seen as tactical struggle . . . the decisive struggle will be in the rural area."

Shortly after Marighella's death, the Cuban press published an article by Joaquim Camara Ferreira, his successor, who claimed that eventually armed

struggle in the countryside would become the foundation of the war for "liberation." For Marighella, terrorism was "an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish."

One has to understand the major impact of Marighella's Minimanual on the inflamed Latin American revolutionary mind. Marighella's ideas seemed to have been inspired by Russian anarchist thought of the 19th century, particularly by Bakunin and Nechaiev. His ideal was the radical hero, a mixture of fanaticism and despair. The revolutionary program, as conceived by Carlos Marighella, consisted of revenge, assassinations, and spoliations: "Within the framework of the class struggle ... the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points toward two essential objectives: a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and of the police; b) the expropriation of government resources and those belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists, and imperialists, with small expropriations used for the maintenance of individual urban guerrillas and large ones for the sustenance of the revolution itself." (Marighella's Minimanual).

Performance

a) Recruitment : The ALN succeeded in recruiting among workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, and priests.

b) Indoctrination : In his Minimanual, Marighella wrote that the central nucleus of the urban guerrilla movement -- the best trained, most experienced, and most dedicated fighters -- would be "indoctrinated and disciplined with a long-range strategic and tactical vision" (an application of Marxism, Leninism and Castro-Guevarism).

Military Structure

Force type

i) Guerrilla units : In secret documents of the ALN, Marighella recommended the creation of "guerrilla nuclei" with the final objective of creating a "revolutionary army."

ii) Urban cells were developed as a network of small units which carried out activities on their own initiative and strategic actions on orders from the general command. Marighella considered that "sabotage groups" should be created in the cities and the ALN attempted to implement its leader's indications.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : For Marighella, urban guerrillas required "a politico-revolutionary motivation," flowing from personal experience and Marxist training. Also necessary was technical-revolutionary preparation.

ii) Leadership: The ALN leaders were motivated by resentment of "peaceful-evolutionary" strategies; they were prisoners of anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois obsessions. Marighella countered that in the struggle "to be an assailant or a terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honorable man."

b) Performance

i) Weapon sophistication : The ALN resorted to revolvers, automatic weapons, shotguns, and light machine guns.

ii) Leadership in combat : Marighella was killed on 4 November 1969. Joaquim Camera Ferreira, his successor, died on 23 October 1970, during a

Brazil - Group ALN
- 160 -

confrontation with police forces. Both of them were active members of the urban guerrilla groups and tried to be living examples of genuine revolutionary behavior.

Training

The ALN militants were trained primarily in Brazil by Brazilian leftist trainers. Some ALN guerrilla fighters were also trained in Cuba.

Financial Resources

The group resorted to kidnappings and bank robberies and benefited from voluntary contributions. Its financial resources were mostly local.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : The ALN made use of revolvers, automatic weapons, shotguns, mortars, bazookas, bombs, Molotov cocktails, and, as the basic weapon, the light machine gun.

b) Origin : The ALN organized assaults, ambushes, and attacks against military units. Some of the equipment was provided by Cuba, who warmly supported the ALN.

Level of Popular Support

a) Local support: Because they promote underground activities, urban guerrillas are condemned to isolation and lack of communication with the broad strata of the population.

b) Electoral performance : Programmatically, the urban guerrilla wholeheartedly attacks the "election farce" and the "so-called political solution."

Brazil - Group ALN
- 161 -

c) Support from unrelated groups or organizations: The kidnapping of the U.S. ambassador to Brazil (4 September 1969) was carried out in cooperation with another terrorist group, MR-8.

External Support

a) Origin : The ALN developed close connections with Cuba (political, financial).

b) Volume : External support was marginal.

c) Type

i) political (direct): Marighella's Minimanual was given publicity almost equal to that given Debray's "Revolution in the Revolution?" (1967).

ii) financial : Cuba provided financial aid to the ALN.

Dependence on External Support

a) Strategic : Marighella conceived his strategy in accordance with the Castroite project of a "continental revolution."

b) Political : The contacts with Castro led to increased political-ideological support by Cuba. Pensamiento Critico, the Cuban ideological journal, devoted 106 of 272 pages in its February 1970 issue to Marighella.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: Shortly before his death, Ferreira stated that unity of all revolutionary groups was possible (meaning the ALN, the VPR, and MR-8.) An example of guerrilla unity was provided by a manifesto on the November 1970

Brazil - Group ALN

- 162 -

elections issued jointly by these groups. The extent of public response to this appeal could not be ascertained.

ii) Continental : The ALN maintained close political and ideological relations with Cuba. Marighella attended the OLAS conference in Havana -- he did it in defiance of PCB instructions -- and then wrote to Fidel Castro (August 1967) expressing his total agreement with the Cuban strategic outlook. Marighella's Minimanual became a central piece of the Castroite system of indoctrination.

b) Type

i) Training : Some ALN militants were trained in Cuba.

ii) Financial : The ALN was financially supported by the Cubans.

Extent and Structure of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

Primarily involved in urban guerrilla operations, the ALN did not seek to establish a "liberated area" under its control. In one of his secret directives (August 1968), Marighella recommended the creation of "guerrilla nuclei" in the west-central section of the interior and the northeast of Brazil. He stated that activity should be avoided on the Atlantic coast, where there was less chance of success.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

Marighella's death in 1969 and Ferreira's death in 1970 decisively weakened the ALN. The group ceased to be the most active and important guerrilla force in the country.

Brazil - Group ALN
- 163 -

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

After 1973, terrorism was almost completely eliminated and the ALN lost its influence on leftist movements in Brazil.

Remarks

It is interesting to note that Luiz Carlos Prestes, the leader of the Brazilian Communist Party, sought in 1979 to rehabilitate Carlos Marighella, the former PCB leader who had broken with the party in the mid-1960s to launch urban guerrilla activities.

After long disputes and mutual accusations, the leftist groups have recently tried to put an end to their factional struggles. The orthodox communists, as always obedient and loyal to Moscow, decided to resurrect Marighella's memory in order to present themselves as the true revolutionary party of Brazil.

The main characteristic of the ALN was its total commitment to the theory of the urban guerrilla. According to Marighella's Minimanual, the objectives of the urban guerrillas are:

- a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs, assistants of the armed forces and the police;
- b) the expropriation of government resources and those belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists, and imperialists, with small expropriations used for the maintenance of individual urban guerrillas and large ones for the sustenance of revolution itself.

Though completely disbanded in the early 1970s, the group exercised its influence through Marighella's ideas. The Minimanual can be considered one of the most systematic expressions of the terrorist mind and remained a privileged source

Brazil - Group ALN

- 164 -

of information (and formation) for subsequent guerrilla generations. The contemporary practitioners of guerrilla struggle in Central America are undoubtedly people who have thoroughly studied the doctrine of the Brazilian prophet of urban terrorism.

Brazil - Group MR-8
- 165 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimento Revolucionario-8
- b) In English : Revolutionary Movement-8
- c) Acronym or known name : MR-8. The group took its name from the date Ernesto "Che" Guevara was captured in Bolivia (8 October 1967).

Country of Operation

Brazil

Date of Formation

The MR-8 was founded in the late 1960s by dissident members of the pro-Soviet Brazilian Communist Party. The main reason for the split was the dissidents' conviction that armed struggle was the main revolutionary method and their criticism of the "reformist" politics of the PCB leadership.

Membership

Active members : The MR-8 was considered to be a small but very active group (probably less than 100 members). The group had approximately 100 sympathizers.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name: Jorge Medeiros do Vale
- b) Social background: Upper middle class
- c) Profession : Banker

Brazil - Group MR-8
- 166 -

d) Political career : Medeiros do Vale was accused in 1969 of having given \$158,000 to the PCB and \$105,000 to the MR-8. He was subsequently described as an MR-8 leader. Sentenced to a ten-year prison term in August 1970, he was released in 1971 for the kidnapped Swiss ambassador.

Ideological Origin

The MR-8 advocated the urban guerrilla theory and cooperated with other terrorist groups in organizing kidnappings. Its ideology was primarily Castroite, though the group did not elaborate cogent theoretical documents. The MR-8 militants were committed to the preparation of a "socialist transformation" of Brazilian society in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist pattern. After 1980, the MR-8 made a radical "self-criticism" of their "extremist," "leftist," "anti-Soviet" positions and decided to dissolve itself and return to the PCB.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The MR-8 called for the Marxist-Leninist economic policy: nationalizations of foreign and big companies, agrarian reform, confiscation of big properties.

b) Social program: The MR-8 called for urban guerrilla and favored the attempt to destabilize the Brazilian social-political system through violence. Urban guerrilla was viewed as the basic method of weakening the institutions of the established political order.

c) Foreign policy : The MR-8 expressed total solidarity with Cuba and the leftist subversive movements in Latin America. The group declared its

Brazil - Group MR-8
- 167 -

commitment to the cause of a "continental revolution" inspired by the Cuban model.

Propaganda

a) Content : The MR-8 developed patterns of "active propaganda," particularly in the cities.

i) Addressed internal audience : The MR-8 propaganda aimed at intellectuals, students, and working-class elements.

ii) Ideological content: The MR-8 shared the basic Castroite ideas concerning the "people's revolutionary war."

b) Means

i) Print: The MR-8 issued statements and manifestos advocating the necessity of "revolutionary struggle."

ii) Direct (oral/leaflets) : The MR-8 developed oral propaganda (agitation) among students.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The MR-8 as an urban guerrilla group, was committed to the ideology of urban terrorism. Inspired by Castro-Guevarism, the group upheld the idea of the foco, but did not engage in rural guerrilla operations.

Performance

They recruited mainly students, middle-class intellectuals, and very few workers.

Brazil - Group MR-8
- 169 -

Military Structure

The MR-8 tried to establish its own network of urban cells. They also tried to develop commando groups and advocated the necessity of guerrilla warfare.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The MR-8 militants were motivated by hostility toward the established social-political order and the impact of the Cuban revolutionary pattern.

ii) Leadership: The MR-8 leaders were motivated by the willingness to destroy the established social system and to impose a socialist one through violent means.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : The MR-8 suffered large losses due to numerous arrests of members in 1969 and was not able to recover during the 1970s.

ii) Weapon sophistication : The group made use of small arms, rifles, and home-made grenades.

Training

The MR-8 guerrillas were trained both in Brazil and Cuba.

Financial Resources

a) National origin : Due to connections with some leftist businessmen, the MR-8 was able to get a significant amount of money from national sources.

Brazil - Group MR-8
- 169 -

b) Means

i) Kidnapping: The MR-8 cooperated with the ALN in the kidnapping of the U.S. ambassador (1969).

ii) Bank robberies : The group was directly involved in bank assaults.

iii) Voluntary contributions: Jorge Medeiros do Vale, the MR-8 leader, was himself a banker.

Level of Popular Support

The MR-8 had its headquarters in Rio Grande do Sul. In March 1979 several MR-8 militants were arrested in Minas Gerais.

External Support

a) Origin : The MR-8, as a Castroite group, received substantial support from Cuba.

b) Volume : The Cuban support, though important, represented a marginal source of money and material supplies for the MR-8. Due to its own connections the group could rely on itself from a financial standpoint.

c) Type : The Cuban support consisted primarily of weapons and money. For the MR-8 Cuba represented the political center of Latin American revolution. The group looked for and received significant political support (direct and indirect) from the Castroite leadership.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

Brazil - Group MR-8

- 170 -

i) National: The MR-8 cooperated with the ALN (the National Liberation Army) in the kidnapping of the U.S. ambassador to Brazil in 1969. The ambassador was released in exchange for 15 "political prisoners," most of whom went to Cuba. Later, some MR-8 members were released, together with militants of other leftist groups, in exchange for the kidnapped West German ambassador (an action organized by the VPR in June 1970).

ii) Continental: The MR-8 developed consistent relations of solidarity with and concrete support for Cuba. The Cubans were considered the political-ideological guides of the activity of the MR-8.

b) Type : The MR-8 maintained political and military contacts with Cuba (Cuba provided a part of the military supplies for the group.). Though financially self-reliant, the group received Cuban material support. Many MR-8 cadres were trained and indoctrinated in Cuba.

Extent and Structure of Areas under Guerrilla Control

Though committed to guerrilla warfare, the MR-8 was unable to establish its control over a so-called "liberated area."

Indications of decline in local or national popular support

The MR-8 suffered large arrests during 1969 and the Brazilian authorities consider that the group has been disbanded.

Remarks

The MR-8 represented an attempt at implementing Carlos Marighella's ideas on urban guerrilla warfare (see ALN). Together with such doctrinaires as Guillén

Brazil - Group MR-8

- 171 -

and Marighella, the MR-8 militants believed that the mass character of the urban guerrilla movement is preferable to the elite foco favored in the rural revolution. The utopian sectarianism was the trademark of these kinds of radical leftist groups. The MR-8 contented itself with adopting the ideological dogmas created by other groups and consistently avoided issuing theoretical documents. The group was eventually dismantled and its survivors, if not in Brazilian jails, left for Cuba. The collapse of the MR-8 was another confirmation of the leftist ideological disarray. The group adopted and practiced a rudimentary version of Marxism, combined with elements of anarchism and rigid Leninism. Castro-Guevarism was the basic ingredient for this simplistic but influential (among leftists) ideological mixture. In the early 1980s the remnants of the MR-8, abiding by Castro's strategy, decided to unify their subversive efforts with those of the "orthodox" PCB. The Central Committee of the MR-8 and a majority of state leaders and members decided at the Fourth Congress in June 1983 to dissolve the group and return to the PCB. Members made a radical "self-criticism" of their leftist "deviation" and chose the "party's manifold" as the "true and only center" of the Brazilian communist movement. The only condition imposed by the PCB is that the dissidents should join the party individually, in keeping with the party statutes. Friction has arisen nonetheless between "orthodox" communists and MR-8 members (mutual accusations and personal confrontations). The MR-8 decision to join the pro-Soviet communist party is in line with the current trend toward convergence among Latin American leftist groups.

Brazil - Group PCBR
- 172 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionario
- b) In English : Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party
- c) Acronym or known name : PCBR

Country of Operation

Brazil

Original Organization

The original organization was the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro-PCB). The PCBR emerged in April 1968 as a reaction to the allegedly "reformist, pacifist" line of the PCB leadership. Among other things, the founders of the PCBR were dissatisfied with the pro-Soviet orientation of the Prestes leadership of the PCB. The new party expressed solidarity with the radical line promoted by Cuba.

Administrative/Auxiliary Organizations

a) Name : The PCBR attempted to create the so-called Independent Mass Organizations -- autonomous groups allegedly active in the labor movement, universities, and high schools.

b) Role : Their basic objective was to foster agitation in the universities, to radicalize the labor movement, and to unleash riots in rural areas.

Brazil - Group PCBR

- 173 -

Membership

a) Active members : During the late 1960s and early 1970s the PCBR succeeded in mobilizing many PCB members who objected to the strategy of the pro-Soviet party.

b) Sympathizers : At the height of its activity, the PCBR could count on several hundred sympathizers.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name: Apolonio Pinto de Carvalho

b) Political career : One of the founders of the PCBR, Pinto de Carvalho, was expelled from the pro-Soviet PCB in 1967. He was among the prisoners exchanged for the German ambassador in 1970, after which he went to Algeria. Later he went to Cuba.

c) Publications : His studies and articles appeared in left-wing publications (Cuba, Chile, etc.).

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name: Mario Alves de Souza Vieira

b) Political career : Together with Apolonio Pinto de Carvalho and Jacob Gorender, he founded the PCBR. All three were expelled from the PCB in 1967. A joint ALN-VPR manifesto in 1970 declared that Alves de Souza Vieira had been killed while in prison. His successor was Apolonio Pinto de Carvalho.

Ideological Origin

The creation of the PCBR was an expression of the popularity of Cuban (Castro-Guevarist) theses among militants of the Brazilian CP. The founders of

Brazil - Group PCBR

- 174 -

the PCBR decided to support the strategy of guerrilla warfare, and they thoroughly condemned the "legalistic" approach of the "orthodox" party. The new party was nevertheless a Marxist-Leninist one, and its ideology was influenced by Guevara's theses concerning the role of small but resolute vanguard minorities.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The group advocated the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary program: agrarian reform, nationalizations, expropriations. The Cuban revolutionary practice was the model for the PCBR program.

b) Social program: The PCBR has been committed to the "seizure of power by the revolutionary forces" and the "destruction of the machinery of the bourgeois-landowner state." This program could be accomplished "only through armed struggle." The guerrilla warfare must be combined with "economic and political strikes."

c) Foreign policy : Reflecting the PCBR's advocacy of "independent" communist parties, the group condemned the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The PCBR criticized the "revisionist theses" of the CPSU and praised the Cuban revolutionary intransigence.

Ideologues

a) Name : Apolonio Pinto de Carvalho

b) Publications: His studies and articles were published by left-wing journals (Punto Final). In his contributions, Pinto de Carvalho, who replaced Alves de Souza Vieira, defined the PCBR as a Marxist-Leninist party which endeavors to assimilate the characteristics of a political-military organization that sees armed struggle as the principal form of class struggle.

Brazil - Group PCBR
- 175 -

c) Impact (internal) : His theses were influential among the followers of the Castroite line within Brazilian leftist groups.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The PCBR issued political statements and other documents addressed primarily to the working-class.

ii) Ideological content: The PCBR statements represent calls for guerrilla warfare and harsh criticism of the "reformist" strategy.

b) Means

i) Radio: PCBR documents were broadcast by Radio-Havana.

ii) Print: The PCBR published, among other documents, the "Political Resolution of the National Conference of the Party" (1968).

iii) Direct (oral/leaflets) : The PCBR insisted on the necessity to mobilize the working class through oral propaganda and other methods of political agitation.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The PCBR rejected the alleged "pragmatic opportunism" of the "orthodox" communist party. The group advocated the strategy of protracted warfare combined with the advantages of a mobilizational approach.

Brazil - Group PCBR
- 176 -

Performance

a) Recruitment

i) Social groups: The PCBR attempted to recruit among workers, students, middle-class intellectuals.

ii) Age groups : The PCBR was influential among university students.

b) Indoctrination

i) Use of schools/universities : Following the dissolution of the Popular Action Student organization and its subsequent alignment with the PCBR, student agitation became a focal point of the party's activities. The PCBR regarded students as "useful-shock-troops" and instructed them to "engineer riots" and provoke confrontation with the police.

iii) Use of unions : The PCBR developed the so-called Independent Mass Organizations-autonomous groups allegedly active in the labor movement, universities and high schools, and sugar refineries.

Military Structure

The PCBR attempted to establish urban cells and was successful in penetrating student circles. Though theoretically committed to guerrilla warfare, the group did not succeed in carrying out its plans of organizing guerrilla units.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The PCBR's influence was linked with the political radicalization of the student organizations in the late 1960s. The militants were motivated by disaffection with the "gradualist-reformist" political strategy of the PCB.

Brazil - Group PCBR
- 177 -

ii) Leadership: The leaders' attitudes and actions were primarily inspired by the influence of the Castroite revolutionary theories. They were mobilized by the willingness to destroy the established political structure and to impose the "proletarian dictatorship" by violent means.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : The PCBR militants participated in the violence of April 1968 that erupted throughout Brazilian universities.

ii) Weapon sophistication : The PCBR resorted to small arms, dynamite, home-made grenades.

Training

The PCBR militants were trained both in Brazil and Cuba.

Financial Resources

a) National origin

Like other Castroite groups, the PCBR was strongly supported by Cuba.

b) Means

i) Kidnapping: A PCBR group attempted to kidnap the U.S. consul for Northeast Brazil in 1970.

ii) Voluntary contributions: The PCBR was funded by middle-class intellectuals and university students coming from well-off families.

Brazil - Group PCBR

- 178 -

Level of Popular Support

Despite its "proletarian" rhetoric, the group did not reach significant influence among the working-class. Its principal support came from radical intellectuals and university students.

External Support

The PCBR was politically and financially supported by Cuba. The Castroite-oriented movement received, from Cuba, decisive military supplies essential for its launching of terrorist actions.

Dependence on External Support

The whole strategy of the PCBR was formulated according to Castroite dogmas and slogans. The group's very existence depended on Castro's political and logistical support.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: The PCBR harshly criticized the "errors and weaknesses" of the PCB. Its main ambition was to unite "all elements of the proletarian class whose revolutionary conscience led them to quit the PCB."

ii) Continental : There is solidarity with Cuba and the Castroite groups in Latin America. According to Diario de Pernambuco (July 26, 1970) the PCBR's main leaders were in Cuba and Cuba had given financial backing to the movement.

b) Type : The PCBR militants were trained in special camps in Cuba.

Brazil - Group PCBR
- 179 -

Extent and Structure of Areas under Guerrilla Control

Territorial ambitions : Primarily interested in urban guerrilla, the PCBR did not aim at "conquering" a territory and establishing an alleged "liberated area."

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

During the late 1970s the PCBR almost completely lost its political influence. In September 1978 an Italian priest, Domenico Corcione Domingo was charged with the attempted reorganization of the party.

Remarks

Though marginal and lacking influence among members of the working-class, the PCBR was instrumental in the radicalization of young intellectuals in the late 1960s. Ideologically, the creation of the group betrayed Castro's intention, at that time, of subverting the "orthodox," pro-Moscow communist parties. The PCBR vanished from the political spectrum for both internal and international reasons. Firstly, it was not able to go beyond a sectarian approach to the problems of Brazilian society and could not have a large appeal in the population. Secondly, with Castro's revision of the relations with Moscow (1968-1969), the PCBR was frustrated with its fundamental foreign support. In the late 1970s, as a new system of alliances emerged among Latin American leftist groups, the PCBR resurfaced and resumed its activities. The presence of a priest in its top leadership clearly indicates connections and cooperation between the Marxist groups and certain sectors of Latin American radical clergy.

Brazil - Group VPR

- 180 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria
- b) In English : Revolutionary People's Vanguard
- c) Acronym or known name : VPR

Country of Operation

Brazil

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The VPR was formed in the late 1960s. The membership of the group derived from a small left-wing organization of former army officers (the National Revolutionary Movement) as well from the pro-Soviet Brazilian Communist Party and the pro-Chinese PCB (the Communist Party of Brazil).

Membership

Active members : The VPR never mobilized more than several hundred militants.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name: Carlos Lamarca
- b) Profession : He was a former army captain
- c) Political career : Unlike Marighella and Ferreira, other prominent Brazilian guerrilla leaders, Lamarca did not have a history of membership in an orthodox communist party. He died on 17 September 1971.

Brazil - Group VPR
- 181 -

d) Character : Lamarca has been described as "more capable and intelligent" than Camara Ferreira and "more cautious and elusive" than Marighella. He was considered a man of action and one unlikely to unite the guerrilla groups since he was very intransigent and totally dedicated to his own strategic purposes.

Ideological Origin

Initially perceived as a left-wing nationalist group, the VPR warmly espoused the main tenets of Castroite ideology: the emphasis put on revolutionary violence, the vanguard mission of small, armed groups, the preeminence of the military element in the clandestine organization, etc. Embracing Castroism signified the transformation of the VPR into an intransigent violent group with determined Marxist convictions.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The economic program of the VPR was inspired by the Cuban revolution and consisted of the basic Marxist-Leninist economic objectives: agrarian reform, expropriations of big companies, nationalization of foreign companies.

b) Social program: The VPR's goals were: to launch a "people's revolutionary war"; to overthrow the dictatorship and replace it with a "popular government."

c) Foreign policy : The VPR called for an "independent foreign policy" and solidarity with Cuba and all the insurgent-revolutionary movements. The group attempted to create in Brazil the basis for a further continental "fulfillment" of "socialist revolution."

Brazil - Group VPR

- 182 -

Ideologues

a) Name : Juarez Guimaraes de Brito

b) Impact (internal) : Considered a top VPR ideologist, Brito was killed in May 1970. He tried to offer theoretical assessments of the social and political situation in Brazil and to justify the strategy of the movement.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The VPR propaganda was addressed primarily to middle-class intellectuals and the military.

ii) Ideologic' content: The VPR propaganda expressed the attempt to justify the "people's revolutionary war" and the guerrilla warfare.

iii) External intended consumer : Certain opinions expressed by Lamarca were published in France and Chile.

b) Means

i) Print: The group issued manifestos and interviews.

ii) Direct (oral/leaflets) : The VPR organized agitation among university students and developed oral propaganda among the military.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The VPR was ideologically attracted to the theory of protracted warfare. Carlos Lamarca and his comrades were convinced that the struggle against the established order would take a long time and would involve recourse to both terrorist and mobilizational approach. The VPR did not hesitate to participate in kidnappings and other terrorist actions and supported other groups practicing similar tactics.

Brazil - Group VPR
- 183 -

Performance

a) Recruitment

The VPR recruited among social groups such as students, former army officers and soldiers, middle-class intellectuals, and peasants.

Military Structure

The force type of the VPR included guerrilla and commando units as well as urban cells.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The VPR militants were motivated by revolt against the established social-political system, particularly among the university students (radicalized under the impact of the Cuban revolution).

ii) Leadership: The VPR leaders were motivated by disaffection with the "conciliatory" politics of the "orthodox" Left and the willingness to impose a communist regime inspired by Castro's experiment.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : The guerrillas were more successful with their terrorist actions in the cities than with rural warfare. After the 1970 anti-guerrilla campaign, the government announced the arrest of numerous guerrilla members and the destruction of three training camps.

ii) Weapon sophistication : The VPR made use of small arms, rifles, and machine guns.

iii) Leadership in combat : Lamarca was directly involved in the guerrilla struggles and died in 1971.

Brazil - Group VPR
- 184 -

Training

The training of the VPR guerrillas took place both in Brazil and Cuba.

Financial Resources

a) National origin : Financial resources were mainly of local origin.

b) Means

i) Kidnapping: The VPR organized three successful kidnappings of diplomatic representatives in 1970.

ii) Bank robberies : The VPR was involved in several bank-robberies defined as "expropriations" and presented by leftist propaganda as examples of "heroism."

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : The VPR made use of small arms, dynamite, and machine guns.

b) Origin : The VPR organized attacks on garrisons and robberies. Cuba supported the VPR guerrillas with military supplies.

Level of Popular Support

In the early 1970s the VPR had its headquarters in the state of Guanabara. The group found some local support among the peasants.

External Support

a) Origin : As a Castroite group, the VPR received recognition and support from Cuba. The group also established Third World connections, particularly with Algeria.

Brazil - Group VPR
- 185 -

b) Volume : The external support was marginal, but important for political reasons.

c) Type : Support is political, logistical, and financial particularly from Cuba. Cuban media presented the VPR as the vanguard of "revolutionary struggle" in Brazil.

Dependence on External Support

The whole strategy of the VPR was a consequence of the Castro-Guevarist conception of armed struggle in Latin America. The VPR was strategically and politically dependent on Cuba and Cuban political initiatives.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: In July 1969 the VPR merged with another group, COLINA, to form a new organization called VAR - Palmares. A split occurred two months later, as Lamarca's faction (the VPR) advocated the formation of rural guerrillas, while the other group (VAR-Palmares) favored political work (mass action).

ii) Continental : The VPR maintained close relations with Cuba and the pro-Castro guerrilla movements throughout Latin America.

b) Type : The VPR militants were trained in Cuba. At the same time, the group received financial and logistical support, as a confirmation of Castro's solidarity with armed rebellion against established order in Latin American countries.

Brazil - Group VPR

- 186 -

Extent and Structure of Areas under Guerrilla Control

Territorial ambitions : Despite its ambitions, the VPR was not able to exert control over an alleged "liberated area."

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

Both the VPR and the splinter group VAR-Palmares were severely weakened during the early 1970s. There were differences of opinions within the VPR on tactical issues (urban vis-a-vis rural guerrilla methods).

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

After Lamarca's death in 1971 the VPR, while still operating in a number of Brazilian states, was considerably reduced in size and importance.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

In the late 1970s the VPR was not able to recover from Lamarca's death. Former VPR militant who were active within the VAR-Palmares were arrested in 1978.

Remarks

It is noteworthy that the VPR gave Castro an opportunity to apply his theory of guerrilla warfare in one of Latin America's largest countries. Moreover, unlike Marighella, Carlos Lamarca was not a communist "old-timer," had not been involved in intensive strife within "orthodox" Marxist-Leninist parties. He joined the revolutionary struggle coming from the army, as Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa did in Guatemala. This indicated to Fidel Castro the possible appeal of his radical viewpoint of a continental upheaval against the established social order and the

Brazil - Group VPR

- 187 -

United States. The evolution of Lamarca's group toward Marxism-Leninism is proof of the inevitable absorption of insurgent leftist groups by the organized subversive opposition. Lamarca had to cooperate with other seditious groups and grew increasingly convinced that Marxism-Leninism was the real solution for what he saw as Brazil's predicament. His death was exploited by Castro's propaganda machine. Cuba propaganda created another mythical figure without making any attempt at understanding the reasons for VPR's fiasco.

CHILE - Group PCCh
- 188 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Partido Comunista de Chile
- b) In English : The Communist Party of Chile
- c) Acronym or known name : PCCh

Country of Operation

Chile

Date of Formation

PCCh formed in 1922. The Communist party was founded by radicalized elements influenced by Leninist ideas and dedicated to the promotion of Comintern strategy in Latin America. It emerged as a direct outgrowth of the Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Obrero Socialista) founded in 1912 by Luis Emilio Recabarren.

Front and Auxiliary Organizations

The PCCh was very active in establishing the National Trade Union Coordinating Committee (CNS), headed by a Christian-Democrat. The Communists founded a front group in 1983, the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), that also included members of the Almeyda faction of the Socialist Party. The Communist Youth Organization promoted activity among students.

Membership

The PCCh claimed 200,000 members in early 1973. Its membership has decreased since the coup in September 1973. The current estimated membership is 20,000. The government claims that there are 50,000 communists, organized into

CHILE - Group PCCh

- 189 -

five-person cells in a hierarchical structure throughout Chile's communes, provinces, and regions up to the Central Committee and secretary general. However, most estimates of the current party strength are much lower.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Luis Corvalán

b) Political career : The PCCh's general secretary, Luis Corvalán, belongs to the "old guard" of pro-Soviet Latin American Communist leaders. He has been in exile since December 1976, when he was released from a Chilean prison. His statements are often broadcast from Moscow.

c) Publications : Corvalán has published articles in the Chilean communist press, Soviet publications, and the Moscow-sponsored "World Marxist Review."

d) Character : Corvalán has always been a disciplined pro-Soviet militant. In several crucial situations, when the unity of his party was menaced by factional activities, he manifested an uncompromising intransigence. A dogmatic Marxist-Leninist from the ideological point of view, he is a pragmatic politician, totally committed to the fulfillment of his objectives. In recent years he seems to have favored a strategy of violent overthrow of the Chilean government. In September 1980, Corvalán endorsed an anti-Pinochet strategy employing "all forms of combat, including acute violence.

Ideological Origin

The Chilean Communist Party totally supports the Soviet international strategy and the Soviet interpretation of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary doctrine. Its alleged "moderate" stances during Allende's years (1970-73) were bound to conceal the real objectives it was pursuing in the long run: the takeover of

CHILE - Group PCCh
- 190 -

power, the destruction of democratic institutions, and the establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The PCCh shared and in some cases originated the basic economic objectives of the Allende regime: nationalizations (the takeover of large sectors of Chile's basic industry and trade), agrarian reform, and other socialist goals.

b) Social program: The party endorsed the strategy of the alleged "peaceful transition to socialism": a general transformation of the Chilean social and political system and the implementation of "socialist" institutions (workers "self-management" through workers' councils).

c) Foreign policy : Chilean communists expressed support for the Cuban revolution and unconditional support for the Soviet foreign policy. The PCCh is one of Moscow's most loyal allies within the world communist movement. The PCCh criticized the strategy of continental guerrilla warfare and, until recently, the use of violence for seizing power. Two attitudes toward Cuba stood out in PCCh statements before Castro's alignment to Soviet foreign policy in 1968: support for the Cuban revolution in general terms and opposition to certain international initiatives launched by the Cuban communists. Castro's support for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 1968) was emphasized as "true internationalism" by PCCh statements.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The PCCh statements call for the expropriation of "monopolies," a new land reform, a wage increase, and adoption of measures

CHILE - Group PCCh
- 191 -

against unemployment, inflation, and corruption. In the long run, the PCCh promotes the Marxist-Leninist economic solutions.

b) Social program : The minimal social-political program of the PCCh includes a "guarantee of full democratic freedoms" (complete freedom of action for the Left); the return of the exiles; housing, education, and health programs; broad participation by workers and all people in the organs of public administration and management of enterprises.

c) Foreign policy : The PCCh promotes international positions akin to those of the USSR. The party praised the Soviet Union for its role in "the struggle against imperialism" and attacked the Chinese leadership. Chilean communists call for solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua and the guerrilla movements in Latin America. The PCCh actively endorses the Soviet and Cuban international strategy.

Ideologues

a) Name : Vladimir (Volodia) Teitelboim

b) Publications: He has published studies and articles in "World Marxist Review" and in leftist publications edited in Cuba, France, and Italy.

c) Impact (internal) : He was one of the doctrinaires of the "Popular Unity" strategy before the 1973 coup.

d) Impact (external) : Teitelboim, together with Orlando Millas, Corvalán, and other communist leaders, tried to work out a theoretical appraisal of the socialist experiment undertaken under Allende. His articles were published by influential Western leftist journals. He specialized in studies and articles dealing with Latin American cultural issues, interpreted according to "orthodox" Marxist-Leninist theses.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The PCCh propaganda aims primarily at working-class people, but also peasants and intellectuals.

ii) Ideological content: PCCh's ideology represents the basic themes of communist propaganda. It calls for a new people's democratic system, anti-Government stances, criticism of the Pinochet government, and violent anti-U.S. rhetoric.

iii) External intended consumer : Publications are sent to the Socialist International and other parties and organizations.

b) Means

i) Radio : Corvalán's speeches and statements are broadcast by Radio-Moscow (Spanish) and other East European stations.

ii) Print: The PCCh publishes irregular clandestine papers and newspapers abroad: Unidad Antifascista and Principios; organ: El Siglo.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

Recent statements of the PCCh underscore the party's orientation toward the strategy of the armed struggle. The new strategy, adopted and developed after 1979, involves the development of military underground networks (what the communists call the "military element") -- the position of the clandestine PCCh leadership, as presented by Radio-Moscow in Spanish to Chile (3 November 1983). In January 1978 security forces discovered a hide-out where the Socialist Party and the Communist Party had collaborated with the MIR. Small-arms and machine-guns were manufactured there, and a clandestine press produced propaganda. Other facts prove that the PCCh became more and more involved

CHILE - Group PCCh
- 193 -

particularly after 1979, in armed actions against the government. Commitment to armed struggle became the official position of the PCCh after 1980. In September 1980, Luis Corvalán, the PCCh secretary general, openly endorsed the employment of violent means for overthrowing the government. The PCCh embarked on the strategy of "popular rebellion" as the way to remove Pinochet. However, it has also called for collaboration with centrist groups, especially the Christian-Democrats. The communists, joined exiled leaders of the leftist MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), the Clodomiro Almeyda faction of the Socialist Party, and former leaders of the Radical Party in an attempt to endorse the strategy of armed struggle (via armada) against the government. Despite past disagreements and harsh polemics, the communists have cooperated with MIR militants in preparing and carrying out violent actions within Chile. The Communists were behind the incidents of violence and vandalism in the shantytowns. The government considered these incidents preludes to the uprisings advocated by the party (1983). It is characteristic of Leninist strategy to combine violent and non-violent tactics. Chilean communists have tried to take advantage of the political openings in the last few years and openly enter the political fray.

Performance

a) Recruitment : PCCh recruits workers, students, peasants, and middle-class professionals. Its political appeal was particularly strong among working-class people and middle-class intellectuals. In the past the PCCh has received 10 to 15 per cent of the vote and it retains considerable influence among organized workers.

b) Indoctrination

CHILE - Group PCCh
- 194 -

i) Use of schools/universities : The Communist Youth (Juventud Comunista de Chile -- JCCh), a powerful force in university and secondary school politics before the overthrow of Allende, is outlawed, although JCCh members won positions in the 1979 elections of student delegates at the University of Chile in Santiago.

ii) Use of unions : The once-powerful communist-dominated Single Center of Chilean Workers (CUT) has been illegal since 1973, but operates underground through unions that the government permits to exist (the activities of the Confederation of Construction Workers). The PCCh operates through the (illegal) National Trade Union Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Nacional Sindical), whose leader is a left-wing oriented Christian-Democrat.

Military Structure

a) Force type

i) Commando : The recently established "Zero Front" seems to be a PCCh commando-type structure. The PCCh militants cooperate with MIR commandos in carrying out violent actions within Chile.

ii) Urban cells : The PCCh benefits from its centralized structure and establishes its network in underground urban cells (five-member cells organized in a hierarchical structure).

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : PCCh militants are primarily motivated by the willingness to overthrow the present regime. The party exploits the discontent among certain strata of the working class affected by the consequences of the

CHILE - Group PCCh
- 195 -

government's economic policy. Combat effectiveness, though untested, is probably low.

ii) Leadership: The PCCh leadership tries to exploit each social tension in order to foster opposition to the government. Its main purpose is to ignite mass rebellion against the regime and provoke a socialist transformation of Chile. The PCCh leadership, however, offered a poor personal example during the 1973 coup.

b) Performance

i) Weapon sophistication : Weapons include home-made explosives, revolvers, and small arms. The PCCh cooperates with other clandestine groups, including the MIR.

ii) Leadership in combat : The majority of PCCh leaders live abroad, exiled to the countries of the Soviet bloc, Western Europe, and Cuba.

Training

PCCh militants are trained in Cuba, the Soviet Union, and countries of the Soviet bloc.

Financial Resources

a) National origin : The PCCh is supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and countries of the Soviet bloc.

b) Means : Besides external support -- which remains decisive -- the PCCh benefits from voluntary contribution and support offered by its front organization (before 1973).

c) Amount : Before 1973 PCCh's financial resources ranged in the tens of millions of U.S. dollars. It is less now, though the PCCh continues to be one of

CHILE - Group PCCh
- 196 -

the richest underground groups in Chile. This is due primarily to its privileged relations with the Soviet Union.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : It is not very high, since the PCCh only recently embarked on the strategy of armed struggle against the government.

b) Origin : Supplies come primarily from the communist countries. The PCCh maintains excellent relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and after 1968-1969, it improved its relations with Cuba.

Level of Popular Support

a) Local support: The PCCh exerts its influence mainly through the student organizations and communist-infiltrated unions.

b) Electoral performance : Before the coup in 1973, the PCCh belonged to the influential "Popular Unity," and was the third or fourth largest party in Chile. The PCCh has been for decades the only truly established and powerful communist party in Latin America.

c) Support from unrelated groups or organizations: The PCCh developed relations of collaboration with the MIR terrorist groups and with other underground movements (left-wing Catholics and Socialists). The endorsement of the armed struggle by PCCh leaders after 1980 opened the possibility of cooperation with the extremist MIR.

External Support

a) Origin : The PCCh, as a traditional exponent of Soviet interests in Latin America, has been consistently supported (politically and materially) by countries

of the Soviet bloc. It attended a meeting of South American revolutionary forces in La Paz, Bolivia, financed by the Argentine terrorist group, Montoneros (1983). Historically it has condemned or at least avoided being linked with guerrilla and terrorist groups. Lately, however, it has adjusted to the imperatives of a "concerted" leftist strategy of destabilizing the Pinochet regime.

b) Volume : A lot of party militants live in exile, and it seems that external financial and material support has become decisive.

c) Type : The external support includes military, political, and financial backing of communist underground activities in Chile. Communist underground networks make use of the supplies of other subversive groups (the MIR, left-wing socialists), mainly of Cuban provision.

Dependence on External Support

a) Strategic : The PCCh completely accepts and advocates the strategic line promoted by the Soviet Union within the world communist movement.

b) Tactical : There is only a minimal degree of autonomy in the PCCh's tactical approaches. Almost to the last detail its tactics are decided by, or follow consultation with, the C.P.S.U. Relations with Soviet bloc and Cuba include political and logistical support for Chilean communists. Chilean communists are considered among the most trustworthy by Soviet leaders.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: The PCCh has been a member of the Popular Unity, an alliance of leftist parties that enabled Allende to win a narrow plurality in the September 1970 presidential elections (other members: the Socialist Party, the

Radical Party, and several leftist Christian splinter groups). After 1979, the members of Popular Unity sought to strengthen the alliance, particularly through closer cooperation with the Christian Democrats (PDC). To this end, they held meetings abroad and organized and attended international conferences. The PCCh maintains close relations with the Socialist Party faction led by Clodomiro Almeyda.

ii) Regional : The PCCh develops permanent contacts with other orthodox communist parties.

iii) Continental : There is strong support for Cuba, Nicaragua and the subversive guerrilla movements throughout Latin America. The PCCh attended a conference in La Paz, sponsored by the Argentine terrorist movement, Montoneros (the meeting was attended by other leftist parties and groups from Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and by the Chilean MIR and Socialist Party).

b) Extrahemispheric: The PCCh expressed solidarity and encouraged cooperation with the Soviet Union and the pro-Moscow communist parties. Many Chilean communists live in exile in the USSR, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia and receive special training. The Chilean communists maintain good relations with certain West European communist parties, particularly with the French CP (i.e., with the pro-Soviet West European communist parties rather than "Euro-communist" ones, like the Italian or Spanish CP).

c) Type : The relations between Chilean communists and their Soviet supporters include training, financial and logistical backing, as well as political formation of the cadres (many Chilean communists were students of Soviet or East European "party schools").

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

One of the most "orthodox," pro-Moscow communist parties in Latin America, the PCCh was faced, after 1962-1963, with the consequences of the Sino-Soviet conflict. During 1963, a small but active pro-Chinese group emerged within the PCCh and later formed the Revolutionary Communist Party of Chile, under the leadership of Jaime Berros. Also the PCCh and the militants of the radical-extremist group MIR were involved in an ongoing dispute. Nevertheless, since the coup in 1973, the PCCh has been the promoter of a broader and more secure leftist front, including the MIR and other organizations once accused of "ultra-leftism." Moreover, the PCCh adopted a harder line concerning the methods of revolutionary struggle and is now supporting "revolutionary violence" or, in Corvalán's terms, "the people's right to rebel against tyranny."

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

Corvalán is more an exponent of the communist bureaucratic apparatus than a charismatic leader. Therefore a change in the leadership would not affect the basic structure of the organization, its existence or its effectiveness.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

The PCCh suffered a terrible defeat with the successful military coup in 1973. Despite its attempts to organize a large "resistance front," the PCCh was not able to establish a strong internal basis for its activities. Nevertheless, the Party did decide to change its tactics after 1979-1980 and organize its own military branch. This change reflects the Communists' growing awareness of their own isolation. The PCCh was not involved in the creation of the Democratic Alliance, which represents the democratic parties opposed to the Pinochet

CHILE - Group PCCh
- 200 -

government. The issue of communist participation was bypassed in December 1983 when the Alliance called for a series of local town-meeting discussions in which any one could participate.

Chile - Group MIR
- 201 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
- b) In English : Movement of the Revolutionary Left
- c) Acronym or known name : MIR

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Chile
- b) Others : Argentina, Bolivia

Date of Formation

1965

Original Organization

The MIR was founded by dissident members of the Chilean Socialist Party (particularly young people from the Concepción region), and some like-minded non-PCCh revolutionaries. The University of Concepcion provided the initial leadership nucleus.

Front Organizations and Auxiliaries

a) Front Organization

i) Name and acronym : In both its early and its later years, the MIR was particularly active among university students and controlled such organizations as: the University Student Federation (FEC) at Concepcion, the University Movement of the Left (MUI), and the Revolutionary Students' Front, based at the University of Chile in Santiago.

ii) Membership: The organization in Concepción was more popular and influential than the front in Santiago, and it included a few hundred militants.

b) Front Organization

i) Name and acronym : The Revolutionary Workers' Front (FIR)

ii) Membership: In 1972, the FIR candidate for CUTCh President (the Single Center of Chilean Workers), received only 10,000 of some 560,000 votes cast. The FIR was particularly influential in the workers' and communal councils in the industrial belts surrounding Santiago. In 1972-1973, Hernán Aquilo was one of FIR's leaders. He was to become Andres Pascal Allende's second-in-command in the underground MIR network (after Allende's fall in September 1973).

c) Front Organization

i) Name and acronym : Movement of the Revolutionary Poor (MPR)

ii) Membership: The MPR organized walled or fenced-in campamentos in various parts of Santiago ("Nueva La Habana" and "Ho Chi Minh"). Such settlements represented a basis for MIR propaganda and subversive actions.

d) Front Organization

i) Name and acronym : Revolutionary Peasant Movement (MCR). The rural equivalent of the urban MPR, the MCR was the most important of several ultra-left groups responsible for organizing hundreds of extralegal land-seizures beginning before Allende's election and continuing into September 1973.

ii) Membership: The MCR was particularly active among the Mapuche Indians in Cautín Province, but led hundreds of farms seizures (tomas) in other provinces as well.

Membership

a) Active members : There were probably 10,000 active members in 1973. An exiled leader estimated in 1978 that some 5,000 members were killed since the coup in 1973, but this figure seems vastly exaggerated.

b) Sympathizers : MIR possesses several thousand sympathizers, perhaps as many as 5,000.

c) Cadres : They are generally recruited among middle-class intellectuals. Victor Toro is one of the few leaders of proletarian origin.

d) Foreign members : There are members of other Latin American subversive groups (Argentina, Uruguay) who are active within the MIR underground network since the Allende period.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name: Miguel Enriquez

b) Social background: Enriquez was a member of the upper-middle class. His father was the former rector of the University of Concepción; he attended the University of Concepción Medical School in Chile, and became a physician.

c) Political career : One of the founders of the movement, Enriquez was its secretary-general during the entire Allende period. A bank robbery in September 1974 resulted in the police discovery of an important MIR hideout and the death of Miguel Enriquez.

d) Publications : Enriquez published articles and statements in various leftist newspapers and magazines, Chilean as well as Mexican.

e) Character : Miguel Enriquez belonged to the so-called "old generation" of the MIR. Committed to violence and deeply hostile to democratic institutions, he was a fervent admirer of Fidel Castro and a supporter of the Cuban strategy

Chile - Group MIR

- 204 -

of subversion in Latin America. He was one of the main instigators of the unrest and anti-democratic actions that led to the military counter-reaction in 1973.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name: Arturo Villavella Aradjo

b) Place of birth : Valparaiso, Chile

c) Social background: Middle class

d) Education : Villavella attended the University of Concepción. He was a Mechanical Engineering student.

e) Profession : Mechanical Engineer

f) Political career : Villavella began his activity in Concepción (the president of the student council). He was a member of the political commission of the MIR since 1970. At the time of the 1973 coup he and Miguel Enriquez fought at the INDUMET factory. Captured in 1974, he was in jail until 1977. After an exile of 4 years, he was sent back to Chile to organize the armed struggle and was killed in September 1983.

g) Publications : Villavella published statements and articles in the official publication of the exiled MIR: "El Rebelde" (The Rebel).

h) Character : A Marxist fanatic, Villavella was a strong advocate and defender of the Cuban revolution. He was an admirer of "Che" Guevara's ideas and practice. At least once he asked the MIR leadership to send him to the country clandestinely, even though he was very ill.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name: Andres Pascal Allende

b) Social background: Upper-middle class

c) Profession : Sociologist

d) Political career : After the death of Miguel Enriquez, Andres Pascal Allende gradually became the main figure of the MIR supreme leadership. In 1970 he was already a member of the leading group of the organization. In 1979 he organized a meeting of the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (an organization of guerrilla groups from Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay). Today he is the foremost leader of MIR.

e) Publications : Allende has granted interviews in Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Nicaraguan papers. While in exile he made statements in El Rebelde (The Rebel), the MIR publication.

f) Character : One of the most influential leaders of the MIR, Allende is the nephew of former leftist President, Salvador Allende Gossens (the son of the latter's sister, Laura Allende). Dedicated to violent actions, intransigent, and astute, he has been an organizer of the clandestine MIR network after the coup in 1973. Associated with the most extremist wing within the MIR, he is supported by Fidel Castro, and he has succeeded in imposing his control over the organization. Exiled to Havana, Cuba, he illegally returned to Chile for small periods of time (1979). Allende organized the violent assaults on banks and supermarkets characteristic of the MIR. Associated in the early 1970s with other MIR leaders (the so-called "old generation"), he is a survivor and represents continuity in the MIR leadership. It seems that Pascal Allende was influential in the decision to orient MIR activities toward industrial sectors (in the early 1970s). His cousin Gaston Salvatore Pascal, who came to Chile from Europe in the early 1970s after participating in the May 1968 events in Paris, France, was instrumental in Allende's radical development.

Ideological Origin

The ideological basis of the MIR is represented by Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Initially attracted by a more "spontaneous" vision of revolution than the one preached by the "orthodox" Chilean Communist Party, the MIR has gradually adopted a rigid Leninist theoretical framework. From the outset, the group was hostile to the strategy of the "parliamentary road to socialism." MIR accused the leaders of other leftist parties of abandoning the basic principles of Marxism and forgetting the importance of "class struggle." An elitist group, primarily supported by students and middle-class intellectuals, the MIR launched various attacks on the democratic institutions (both under the Christian-Democratic government and during Allende's years). Its doctrine combines the concepts of urban guerrilla warfare and the social-political philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. Without openly assuming the commitment to terrorism, the MIR engaged in violent activities that accelerated the break down of Allende's regime in September 1973.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : MIR's policies focus on the overthrow of Chile's economic, political, and social system: extensive nationalizations, workers' management, expropriation of estates over 40 hectares in size, unilateral suspension on payments on the external debt, etc.

b) Social program: Since its inception the MIR argued that elections were "not a road toward the conquest of power," and it became increasingly committed

to violent actions: illegal seizures which were meant to create an "alternative power base" (the 'workers and peasants' councils), and the precondition of "socialist revolution." MIR has been consistently hostile to elections and the democratic process, even during the Allende period.

c) Foreign policy : MIR fosters a harsh anti-American attitude, total solidarity with the Cuban revolution and supports the guerrilla movements throughout Latin America.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The MIR maintained its basic socialist economic goals: nationalizations, forced expropriations, control over distribution, supply of goods, and land "reform" -- defined as collectivization and expropriation of private farms.

b) Social program : After the military coup, the MIR continued to advocate a strictly violent road to socialism. They were engaged in setting up: (a) "a movement of people's resistance"; (b) "the People's Revolutionary Army," defined as the military organization of the resistance." They maintain their program of socialist revolution, as well as their commitment to armed struggle against the "bourgeois order."

c) Foreign policy : MIR shares solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua, and the guerrilla movements throughout Latin America. It was one of the founding organizations of the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee in Paris, February 1974. Since the coup which overthrew Allende's Marxist regime, the group has had good relations with the Soviet bloc, particularly East Germany. Before 1973 it was seen as ultra-leftist by the PCCh*, and thus denied Soviet bloc support.

Ideologues

a) Name : Miguel Enriquez

b) Publications: Enriquez has published articles and essays in leftist magazines and newspapers (El Rebelde, El Punto Final, etc.).

c) Impact (internal) : His articles summarized the general revolutionary outlook of the MIR before the military coup in September 1973. His statements often served as a catalyst for the extremist segments of the left, particularly in 1972-1973.

d) Impact (external) : Published in Castroist newspapers, his writings contributed to the radicalization of other Latin American leftist groups.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The MIR addressed mainly students, workers, and peasants.

ii) Ideological content: The ideological content consists of propaganda for the violent strategy of revolutionary struggle, and criticism of the "reformist" positions.

iii) External intended consumer : After 1975, the MIR tried with little success to win support from the Socialist International and left-wing groups in Europe.

b) Means

i) Radio: After the coup in 1973, MIR statements were broadcast from Cuba.

ii) Print: MIR uses two publications: El Rebelde and Chilean Resistance Courier.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The MIR regards violence as a privileged revolutionary weapon and considers only armed struggle as conducive to the establishment of a "socialist regime." Unlike other leftist groups, the MIR did not proclaim its commitment to legality (during Allende's years: 1970-1973) and repeatedly engaged in violent actions (seizures, attacks on military garrisons, attacks on banks, etc.). In its publications, the MIR advocates the strategy of protracted warfare, without neglecting the insurrectional and mobilizational approaches. The political ideal of the MIR is to destabilize traditional Chilean institutions. The army is one of its main targets. All their denials notwithstanding, the MIR activists did engage in terrorist operations. One of the MIR ideologues, Luciano Cruz, wrote in mid-1969, "We have decided to follow the example of Lenin, Fidel, and Che . . . we are going to proclaim the armed revolution." Since then, the MIR has not abandoned this strategy. Since 1973, the MIR has been the only leftist group able to persist in limited terrorist activity, despite the fact that its forces have been largely decimated. According to Andres Pascal Allende, secretary general of the MIR, "a people's military force is necessary to carry out the struggle against the dictatorship." During a news conference in Havana (June 1982), Allende pointed to the Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Grenadian revolutions as examples of what the people's military forces can achieve. He also mentioned the "national liberation movements" in other Latin American countries.

Performance

a) Recruitment

i) Social groups: MIR includes middle-class individuals with a humanistic training in law, economics, or liberal arts of some form; students; peasants; and workers.

ii) Age groups : Although the movement recruits mainly students, after 1973 the MIR tried to widen its base and to attract people of different age groups.

iii) Sex targetting: A significant number of middle-class women, mostly students, were assigned very influential positions in the MIR clandestine network.

b) Indoctrination

i) Use of schools/universities : The universities have represented the main point of interest for the MIR militants. They succeeded in recruiting both students and professors, particularly at the Universities of Concepcion, Santiago and Valparaiso.

ii) Use of religious institutions : The MIR tried to penetrate some Catholic schools and publicized radical-Catholic stances; a few priests, Chileans, and foreigners, joined MIR as late as 1984.

iii) Use of unions : The MIR tried to infiltrate the Communist dominated labor confederation (CUTCh) but it failed during the May-June 1972 election. The MIR founded the Revolutionary Workers' Front which concentrated first in isolated unions, then in the workers' councils and communal commands in the "industrial belts" of Santiago. None of these groups was significant.

iv) Use of foreign cadres: It seems that an Argentine citizen ("José"), who was in charge of MIR's military arsenal, was the actual mastermind

Chile - Group MIR

- 211 -

of armed actions carried out by extremists since 1978. Many foreigners were members of Salvador Allende's private security guard, the "Grupo de Amigos Personales" (GAP), and officially belonged to the MIR.

Military Structure

a) Force type

i) Commando : Urban commandos

ii) Militia : In its statements, the MIR refers to a "Command of the popular resistance militias."

iii) Urban cells : They are mostly terrorist oriented.

b) Political control of forces : Leaders serve as political officers.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : Members of the group are hostile toward the established social and economic conditions and possess great disaffection for certain categories of intellectuals.

ii) Leadership: Predominant methods of leadership include the overthrow of the present social-political system with violence and armed struggle. Members are attracted to total power.

b) Performance : After Salvador Allende's fall, the MIR was completely dismantled. The group exploited certain measures of liberalization after 1975 and re-emerged as a dangerous network of terrorists.

i) Combat ability : After the military coup in 1973 the MIR attempted to wage a "prolonged popular war" which it lost rapidly. Although it is

Chile - Group MIR
- 212 -

not completely dismantled, the group has never completely recovered. It mounts an occasional terrorist attack, but it has never been able to fight the military.

ii) Discipline: The MIR is a centralized organization led by a central committee. Discipline is strong within the group.

iii) Weapon sophistication : Rifles, light machine guns, and dynamite are generally provided by Cuba.

iv) Leadership in combat : Arturo Villavella Aradjo, one of the main leaders of the MIR, was killed in combat with the Chilean government forces (1983). Despite the fact that many leaders live in exile, the MIR leadership seems very active within the internal subversive groups. (Miguel Enriquez was killed in 1974). Andres Pascal Allende seems to avoid combat consistently, even on the few and brief periods he lives underground in the country.

v) Desertion rate : The MIR practiced, especially in 1974-75, the assassination of deserters in order to prevent other "defections."

Training

a) Place

i) Local : The MIR was able to establish several training schools in Chile (1970-1973).

ii) External : Training also took place in Cuba and Nicaragua, previously Argentina, and the Middle East. The MIR developed political and military contacts with Libya and the PLO.

b) Trainers

i) Local : Chileans

ii) Foreign: Cubans, Uruguayans, Argentines

Chile - Group MIR
- 213 -

Financial Resources

a) National origin : Resources are mostly foreign, with Cuba and the Soviet bloc countries (GDR and Czechoslovakia) the primary supporters.

b) Means : MIR has performed kidnappings and successful bank robberies. Funds are also obtained from limited voluntary contribution.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : MIR weapons are small in volume and include RPGs, Czech machine-guns, and hand grenades.

b) Origin : The Soviet bloc countries, Cuba, Nicaragua, and certain guerrilla organizations from Latin America (e.g., the Argentina's leftist Montonero Movement and the Uruguayan extremists) supply the MIR with equipment.

Level of Popular Support

a) Local support: MIR activities seem particularly intense in urban areas, and are supported by middle-class radical elements (Santiago, Concepcion, Valparaiso).

b) Electoral performance : Despite the vehemence of its proclamations, the MIR has always been a marginal political formation even within the Chilean Left. It never participated in national elections.

c) Support from unrelated groups or organizations: Despite harsh controversies in the past, the MIR found a growing support among the underground networks organized by the Communist and Socialist parties.

Chile - Group MIR
- 214 -

External Support

a) Origin : Cuba and the Soviet bloc provide the major part of MIR financial and military resources. Nicaragua and probably some Arab groups and states (especially Libya) support MIR terrorist activities. The group also benefits from support from leftist organizations in Latin America.

b) Volume : The external support is decisive.

c) Type : Support ranges from military, to political to financial.

d) Participation : Argentine and Uruguayan militants are directly involved in MIR subversive actions.

Dependence on External Support

a) Strategic : MIR has worked together, on a long-term basis, with other Cuban-supported guerrilla movements. The group is dependent on this coordination for political and logistical support.

b) Tactical : MIR retains a high degree of tactical autonomy.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: After a long period of mutual distrust and hostility, the MIR and the Communist party seem to favor a certain level of collaboration in their struggle against the government. Together with the Socialist Party, they were present at a meeting in La Paz (January 1983), financed by the Argentine Montoneros. In 1978 security forces discovered a hideout where the Socialist and Communist Party members collaborated with the MIR.

ii) Regional : MIR fosters relations with the Argentine and Uruguayan extremist organizations, such as Montoneros and Tupamaros, including joint efforts in arms smuggling.

Chile - Group MIR

- 215 -

iii) Continental : In February 1974, the MIR was among the founders of the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (together with the Tupamaros of Uruguay, the ELN of Bolivia, and the ERP of Argentina). At the conference financed by the Montoneros in La Paz, the group met the representatives of leftist groups from Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay. The MIR actively supports the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua as well as the Cuban strategy in Latin America.

b) Extrahemispheric: The MIR improved its relations with the Soviet bloc countries (e.g., Pascal Allende's news conference in Berlin, the GDR capital, October 1982). Allende also visited France, Finland, Italy, where he established contacts with leaders of the Socialist International (late 1970s).

c) Type : Other groups have influenced MIR training, e.g., the so-called "Juan Texeido," Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and P-30 schools in Cuba (courses for guerrillas). Also financial and logistical support for the MIR is provided by Cuba and countries of the Eastern bloc.

Extent and Structure of Areas under Guerrilla Control

a) Territorial ambitions : Though influenced by Castro-Guevarism, the MIR did not promote the objective of establishing "liberated areas," until Allende's fall in 1973.

b) Extent of area controlled : Regions in the Cautin and lakes areas during the summer of 1973 were under MIR de facto control.

c) Degree of control : Guerrilla control was relative. The MIR was completely disbanded by the military in 1973-74.

d) Type of administration : "People's" councils were under loose control by MIR militants. The best known was the area led by "Comandante Pepe" in 1973.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

Some militants of the MIR left their organization and joined another subversive group called Zero Front, a faction of the armed branch of the Communist Party. In the late 1960 and early 1970s the MIR leadership experienced a dramatic power struggle. The leading nucleus was formed at that time of militants like Miquel Enriquez, Andres Pascal Allende, Humberto Sotomayor, and Luciano Cruz. According to Chilean sources, the latter was assassinated by his comrades for "tactical disputes." Cruz was one of the very few MIR leaders of genuine popular origin. The MIR manifested a persistent sectarian proclivity and fascination with scholastic debates on such topics as revolution, violence, and guerrilla warfare. Described as a master manipulator, Andres Pascal Allende succeeded in eliminating many of his rivals, posturing as the uncompromising defender of the movement's original program. In 1979, a sharp criticism of Pascal Allende's indulgence in a "bourgeois, luxurious life-style" was issued by the leadership of the internal organization of the MIR. It was written by the secretary of that faction, Hernán Aguilo. Allende, supposedly the supreme leader of the terrorist movement, was exposed for having neglected some of the basic postulates of the MIR, including revolutionary puritanism. The conflict between the group of exiled militants, enjoying the life in Cuba and Costa Rica, and those who were actually accomplishing the movement's program was far reaching.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

After Miguel Enriquez's death, Andres Pascal Allende became the undisputed leader of the MIR. He built up his image as the charismatic chief with

Chile - Group MIR
- 217 -

some success. There were rumors of discontent among MIR militants concerning Allende's life style, but he seems strong enough to resist criticism.

Vulnerability to the Interruption of External Lines of Supply

For the time being, external support represents a basic condition for the continuation of the MIR terroristic activities.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

The MIR lost many of its prominent leaders and seems to be in continual decline.

Colombia - Group ELN
- 218 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito de Liberación Nacional
- b) In English : National Liberation Army
- c) Acronym or known name : ELN

Country of Operation

Colombia

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The ELN was formed in Santander, northeast Colombia, in 1964, under the inspiration of the Cuban revolution. Its founders were mainly leaders of the student youth, disaffected with the strategy promoted by the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Colombia. The group undertook its first military action in January 1965.

Membership

The ELN had several hundred members in the 1970s. Since then its membership has decreased. According to Colombian intelligence sources, the group has approximately 200 men organized into four fronts.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : Fabio Vásquez Castaño
- b) Political career : One of the main leaders of the ELN, Vásquez started the movement with a nucleus of 18 peasant members, on 4 July 1964. A convinced disciple of Castro, he became the leader of the ELN until his defection in 1976. The present ELN leader appears to be Nicolás Bautista.

c) Publications : Vásquez's interviews and articles were published in the pro-Castrist publications in Colombia.

d) Character : Before his defection in 1976, Vásquez seemed the most intransigent leader of the ELN. In the late 1960s, he was the commander of the José Antonio Galán Front. He even slightly criticized Castro for Castro's change of attitude toward the guerrilla struggle in Latin America (after 1970). Vásquez tried to imitate the image of the revolutionary leader offered by the Cuban revolution. His lack of interest in ideological disputes seemed to be compensated for by his strong commitment to violence and revolution. Vásquez Castaño's rigid leadership was criticized by many ELN militants and provoked intense factional struggles in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Ideological Origin and Orientation

The ELN tries to present itself as a national-patriotic liberation movement. Therefore, it does not emphasize the Marxist origins of its ideology and the communist implications of the program. The ELN leaders prefer to avoid open Marxist-Leninist statements and speak mainly of the necessity of "justice, democracy and equality." Composed primarily of peasants and workers, the ELN refused the tutelage of either faction of the Colombian communists. In March 1967 the Mexican journalist, Mario Menéndez Rodríguez, visited the ELN and published a series of articles that confirmed the group's Castroite orientation. The ELN capitalized (politically and ideologically) on the death of one of its foremost militants: the priest Camilo Torres, who joined the guerrilla movement in 1965 and was killed in February 1966.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The ELN advocates the typical Marxist economic program: nationalizations, expropriations, and agrarian reform.

b) Social program : The ELN's basic social objective is "the conquest of power for the popular classes," i.e., a Castroite program. For the ELN, guerrilla warfare is the indispensable means with which to solve all of Colombia's problems.

c) Foreign policy : The ELN statements indicate a rabid anti-Americanism, and the willingness to promote violence and revolution throughout the whole continent. The group was unhesitating in its support for the Cuban revolution, though Fabio Vásquez reproached Castro for Castro's decreasing support of the guerrillas.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The ELN adopted and strongly supports the economic purposes of the Castroite movement. It has not changed its basic objectives as stated in the 1970s.

b) Social program : The group upholds the idea of a socialist revolution carried out through guerrilla warfare. Its social program mentions as objectives: better health care, a literacy campaign, and improved housing.

c) Foreign policy : In July 1983 the ELN organized three dynamite attacks against American-owned buildings in the city of Bucaramanga. The stated purpose was "to support the struggle of our Central American brothers against Yankee imperialism." It also occupied radio stations and wire service offices in several cities to protest "Yankee imperialism" in Central America and "administrative graft and drug trafficking" among the Colombian political class.

Colombia - Group ELN
- 221 -

Ideologues

- a) Name : Fabio Vásquez Castaño
- b) Publications : His interviews and articles have been published in Latin American leftist magazines and newspapers, e.g., "Sucesos para todos," Mexico City, 1 July 1967.
- c) Impact (internal) : Besides Camilo Torres's writings, the interviews and articles of Fabio Vásquez are the main ideological source of the ELN militants.

Propaganda

- a) Content
 - i) Addressed internal audience : ELN's propaganda is addressed mainly to the peasants, although the group often invokes the revolutionary potential of the student youth.
 - ii) Ideological content : The group's propaganda employs tough language meant to foster anti-American and pro-Cuban feelings and attitudes.
- b) Means
 - i) Print : Interviews and articles of ELN leaders have appeared in various Latin American pro-Cuban publications.
 - ii) Direct (oral/leaflets) : On 7 July 1967 an ELN commando unit occupied the offices of AFP in Bogotá and transmitted a communiqué concerning its objectives. During their urban actions, ELN guerrillas develop oral propaganda campaigns.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

Manuel Vásquez, Fabio's brother argued in 1967 that guerrilla warfare was the means by which to solve Colombia's problems, and that it was the method all

Colombia - Group ELN

- 222 -

other Latin American peoples would have to use to win their liberty. According to Fabio Vásquez, the political-military objectives of the ELN in 1967 and thereafter were: "the conquest of power for the popular classes, taking for its basic form the insurrectional way, because according to our concept of the people's war -- meaning by people's war that which is developed by the immense majority of the exploited against the great minority of exploiters -- we think that when the legal channels of the political struggle are exhausted, the armed vanguard must come forth from the masses to guarantee the continuity of the struggle for political power." The ELN considers a guerrilla organization politically self-sufficient; therefore it does not insist on the leadership of a political party or the Marxist-Leninist ideology. In recent years, the group has increasingly indulged in terrorist activities in urban areas, without giving up its initial commitment to the Castro-Guevarist strategy of the insurrectionary nucleus (foci theory).

Performance

a) Recruitment

i) Social groups : A very high percentage of ELN members are peasants. Nevertheless, workers, students, professionals and priests played an important role in the organization.

ii) Age groups : The group recruits most young people under 30.

b) Indoctrination : The ELN succeeded in capitalizing on the radical feelings of some Colombian priests. The movement received a boost when it was joined by a young priest, Camilo Torres, who had developed a large following among Colombian students and others. Killed in February 1966, Torres became the prototype for some of the "fighting Christian." His writings became "sacred" texts

Colombia - Group ELN
- 223 -

of the guerrilla ideology and contributed to the political radicalization of many Latin American priests and intellectuals. A former Spanish priest, Domingo Lain, was among the top leaders of the ELN in the early 1970s.

Military Structure

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the ELN organized rural guerrilla fronts. Among these fronts were the "Jose Antonio Galán Front" and the "Camilo Torres Front." The group also makes use of urban cells. In May 1983 the police captured the leader of the ELN urban cells in Santander.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : Many ELN members are poor peasants drawn by the promises of the ELN leaders : equality, the suppression of any form of exploitation, etc. Early supporters were especially attracted by the group's pledge to create an "army of the peasants."

ii) Leadership : The ELN leaders are willing to touch off a revolution brought about in the Castroite pattern. Fabio Vásquez developed a Castroite approach to revolutionary leadership when he insisted on the importance of the Cuban experience.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : The group suffered heavy losses during the early 1970s (particularly in 1974) as a result of government counterinsurgency and internal dissension.

ii) Weapon sophistication : The ELN primarily uses rifles, machine guns, and dynamite.

iii) Leadership in combat : In a leaflet sent to news media on 26 April 1979, the ELN admitted that ten of its top leaders have been killed in its 15 years of existence.

iv) Desertion rate : By the beginning of 1975 all the important leaders of the ELN had deserted or were reportedly killed or captured. Fabio Vásquez, ELN's historical leader, defected one year later, contributing to the progressive weakening of the organization. In the late 1960s, Jaime Arenas Reyes, a student guerrilla who surrendered to the army after being sentenced to death, charged that the guerrilla war had become "a useless sacrifice of students and peasants." Despite a high desertion rate, the movement proved its ability to survive and partially recover in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Training

ELN fighters are trained in Colombia and in Cuba. Trainers are experienced guerrillas of Colombian and Cuban origins.

Financial Resources

a) National origin : The ELN has been able to develop its own financial basis, although it also receives support from Cuba.

b) Means : In 1970 the ELN staged the kidnapping of a former minister who was released on payment of \$100,000 ransom. It also organized bank robberies and benefits from significant voluntary contributions. In its most spectacular operation, the ELN kidnapped President Betancu's brother on November 22, 1983. The guerrillas imagined this action as a political gesture and eventually the president's brother was released unharmed on December 7, 1983.

Colombia - Group ELN

- 225 -

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : The ELN uses rifles, machine guns, and explosives.

b) Origin : Until 1969, the ELN received considerable material support from Cuba.

Level of Popular Support

By the end of 1979, the ELN had become more and more isolated and had been reduced to operating in the middle Magdalena region. The group operates mainly in Arauca intendency and the northeastern region of Caquetá. In 1983 the group intensified its urban operation. Bogotá police reported that ELN activists were responsible for violent disturbances at the National University on October 7, in which eleven persons were injured.

External Support

a) Origin : The ELN receives continual and substantial support from Cuba.

b) Volume and type : Cuban support for the ELN was decisive until 1969-1970. In the early 1970s Castro changed his tactical approach and severely reduced his financial investment in small guerrilla groups. ELN's Cuban connections, however, remained effective and instrumental, despite certain divergences between Vásquez Castaño and the Cuban communist. Cuba still offers political, financial, and military support to the ELN.

Dependence on External Support

The ELN has been strategically dependent on Cuban international politics. The group warmly supported the idea of "continental revolution" and its

representatives were active at the OLAS (Latin American Solidarity Organization) Conference in Havana, Cuba (July-August 1967). External support was decisive in the late 1960s and early 1970s (military, financial, political, and logistical).

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National : During the late 1960s, the ELN, inspired by Castro's attacks against some pro-Soviet Latin American communist parties, harshly criticized the FARC and the Colombian Communist party. In March 1979, the M-19 declared that it was operating in conjunction with FARC and the ELN. Later that August the FARC organ, Resistencia, announced an imminent merger with the ELN; however, the arrangement took no account of M-19. Both the FARC and the ELN were also bitterly hostile toward the EPL for its Maoist stances. According to Colombian sources, the ELN presently appears to be working with the Pedro León Arboleda (PLA) group in the Medellin area. A PLA informer revealed that the PLA had begun a "harassment campaign" against the government, taking advantage of its recent "political unity" reached with the ELN.

ii) Regional : The ELN maintains permanent contacts with pro-Cuban groups in the region.

iii) Continental : Fabio Vásquez sent a taped message to the Latin American solidarity organization conference (July-August 1967) that strongly supported the Castroite line.

b) Type : The ELN has cooperated with other Colombian guerrilla groups, particularly the FAR and the M-19. The Cubans, have provided financial and political support for the ELN, and many guerrillas have been trained in Cuba.

Colombia - Group ELN

- 227 -

Extent and Structure of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

The ELN, under Vásquez Castaño, engaged in operations aimed at establishing a "liberated zone." The group was defeated in the early 1970s but later re-emerged and tried to exert control over the northeastern sector of Caquetá. Its operations were unsuccessful, and the ELN has increasingly engaged in urban guerrilla actions e.g., holdups, dynamite attacks, and kidnappings in the Medellín and Bucaramanga areas.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

For several years, the ELN has been torn by internal struggles which have resulted in executions of "traitors" and the defection of many followers. On several occasions, splits within the organization have led to the formation of rival guerrilla forces -- the Simón Bolívar front, established by Juan de Dios Aguilera in 1968. According to a clandestine bulletin distributed in May 1979, 20 ELN militants negotiated with the military for their surrender. The bulletin branded the guerrillas as "traitors" and reaffirmed that the ELN would continue its fighting from the mountains of Santander. In September 1979, the ELN claimed to have achieved reunification with the appointment of a priest, Manuel Pérez Martínez, as its top leader. Other sources indicate Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista as its principal leader.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

The ELN has never recovered from the toll exacted on its leadership in recent years by government forces, including the defection in 1976 of its principal founder and main leader, Fabio Vásquez Castaño.

Colombia - Group ELN

- 228 -

Vulnerability to the Interruption of External Lines of Supply

The group was largely supported by Cuba until 1969. Since then it has financed itself primarily by extortion.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

By late 1979 the ELN had been reduced to operating in the middle of the Magdalena region. Military authorities reported that the movement had been practically destroyed. Nevertheless, the movement continues to launch attacks and to provoke unrest in the Magdalena region.

Remarks

The ELN represents a Colombian version of the Castroite guerrilla organization. Even so, the group constantly denies its Marxist-Leninist orientation and stresses its commitment to a "peasant revolution" and "anti-imperialist struggle." The failure to develop a mass movement and the refusal of the peasants to embrace its ideals brought about the group's progressive isolation and marginalization. Like Douglas Bravo in Venezuela, Vásquez Castaño was among the few Castroite leaders who challenged Castro's political reorientation in the early 1970s and called for the prolongation of the struggle, with or without Cuban support. Though initially reluctant to join the truce talks with the government, the movement eventually decided to participate in negotiations (early 1984) which could put an end, at least temporarily, to guerrilla activities.

Columbia - Group FARC

- 229 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
- b) In English : Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
- c) Acronym or known name : FARC

Country of Operation

Colombia

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The FARC acts as the armed branch of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). It was formed in May 1966 when a number of "bandit" groups, operating under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda Vélez ("Tirofijo"), came under PCC control. (Some sources cite 1964 as the debut of FARC operations.) FARC leadership mechanisms and general policy are decided by PCC's bylaws and political resolutions.

Membership

Estimates of FARC's current membership range from 700 to 1,000 armed men, with approximately a third of them scattered throughout the Magdalena basin. According to the group's principal leader, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, the movement consists of 5,000 combatants operating on 25 fronts (1983). The central staff oversees the operations of a 22-member high command.

Leadership

- a) Name : Pedro Antonio Marin. When Marin became a guerrilla, he took the name Manuel Marulanda Vélez, in tribute to a trade-unionist who died while

opposing the dispatch of Colombia troops to the Korean War. In 1984, he announced his intention to legalize the name of Marulanda Vélez. The nickname "Tirofijo" was given to him while he was a shooting instructor.

b) Date of birth : 1930

c) Social background : He was born into a peasant family.

d) Education : He had 4 years of elementary school.

e) Political career : Marulanda Vélez is known as one of Latin America's veteran guerrillas, with more than 30 years in guerrilla struggle. He has been officially pronounced dead several times in Army communiques, but he always reappears in guerrilla actions. Reportedly, Marulanda Vélez is a member of the Central Committee of the PCC (the Communist Party of Columbia). In 1984 he accepted the truce proposed by President Belisario Betancur's government. He then announced his intention of entering politics and his wish to join Parliament.

f) Character : Marulanda Vélez is a professional survivor, an experienced tactician, and a determined commander. He makes use of democratic rhetoric and posture in his support of justice and freedom. He was personally involved in combat and proved a good marksman. For nearly 20 years he exerted control over the FARC and eliminated all potential rivals.

Ideological Origin

On 20 July 1964, at the height of confrontations between subversive groups and the government, a guerrilla assembly was held that called for victory in an "agrarian anti-imperialist revolution." On 30 September 1964, the "first conference of guerrillas and self-detachments of the south" established the Southern Bloc, whose driving force was the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC). In less than a year the Southern Bloc evolved into FARC. FARC symbolized PCC's direct

Colombia - Group FARC

- 231 -

commitment to and support for guerrilla warfare. It became the leader of the guerrilla movement in the Communist party.

PCC has always viewed guerrilla struggle as the development of the "people's armed self-defense." Guerrilla insurgency, therefore, is supposed to carry out the objectives of the Communist-led peasant "self-defense" movements. Throughout 20 years of activity, the FARC has been oriented toward the rural guerrilla, without neglecting urban operations.

Although FARC tried to deny its direct subordination and its affiliation with the PCC, its leader (Marulanda Vélez) faithfully followed PCC line and the decisions of the PCC governing bodies. As one PCC leader said, "The Party and the guerrilla detachments are as one, they interweave and are interdependent." FARC has also expressed solidarity with the Cuban revolution and has managed to avoid polemics with the Castroite groups.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The FARC demands a 50 per cent reduction in land and property taxes and a 40 per cent reduction in public utility rates. It feels that the nationalization of foreign enterprises, beginning with the banks and financial organizations is a necessity. The group shares the main economic objectives of the Colombian Communists.

b) Social program : In October 1983 FARC sent a peace plan to President Belisario Betancur proposing a truce. The group asked that a "reform of the political customs of the country" take place between 20 July 1983 and 20 July 1985. It accepted a truce with the government and pledged to struggle for the "enhancement of democracy" in April 1984. FARC also supports the decision of the 13th Congress of the PCC which reaffirmed the party's commitment to the

creation of a "broad anti-monopoly and anti-imperialist front." It proposes complete free education in schools and universities, as well.

c) Foreign policy : The FARC advocates active solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua and all the leftist insurgent movements in Latin America. It supports Soviet strategy and expresses strong anti-U.S. stances.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : FARC's propaganda aims to radicalize Colombian peasants.

ii) Ideological content : The group calls for revolutionary warfare and supports the ideological positions of the PCC.

b) Means : Resistencia, the FARC organ, appears irregularly.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

PCC leaders have maintained an ambivalent attitude in recent years toward armed struggle. According to the PCC's secretary-general, Gilberto Vieira, "We communists want to advance by democratic means, by what we call action and the mass struggle, and not only by means of election, which are only one part of the process." Although FARC's intimate connection with PCC leadership is a matter of historical evidence, confirmed by many statements of PCC or FARC leaders along the years. Vieira contends, for tactical purposes, that the PCC "has never regarded the FARC as its armed branch." The PCC has adopted this strategy to improve its political profile as an element of the democratic process. From the outset, the PCC has oriented FARC's activities toward rural areas. FARC's operations have reduced the effectiveness of other guerrilla groups such as the

Colombia - Group FARC

- 233 -

ELN and forced the rival Maoist EPL to limit its operations to urban areas. FARC has been unequivocally committed to violence and has manifested notorious ruthlessness in dealing with "uncooperative" peasants. In recent years, FARC units have systematically killed peasants for "collaborating" with military forces. This practice and the group's radicalism were extolled in Soviet-sponsored journals ("World Marxist Review") and praised by Cuban media. Throughout its 20 years of activity, the FARC (and the PCC) has unified the strategy of protracted warfare with the terrorist approach.

Performance

a) Recruitment : The FARC has been particularly successful in mobilizing peasants in areas such as: Caquetá, Meta, Santander, and Arauca. The group has also organized peasant "self-defense" detachments in the central Magdalena region. Through the PCC, the FARC received support from other social strata (workers, students, and radical priests).

b) Indoctrination : The FARC carries on its indoctrination in areas where military action is considered unpopular. The group avoids areas where the peasants are armed in support of the army.

Military Structure

a) Force type : According to Colombian sources, the FARC's general headquarters is located somewhere in the border zone between Caquetá and Huila (1983). Each FARC unit (or squad) consists of a minimum of twelve members. Two units constitute a guerrilla cell. Four units, with an equal number

of replacements, make up a column. Each of the FARC's rural fronts is composed of two columns numbering about 200 men. In essence, each FARC unit is a communist cell.

b) Political control of forces : Political control of the forces has been directed by PCC militants. Manuel Marulanda Vélez is a member of the PCC Central Committee and he has been instrumental in the transmission of party-decisions to the fronts.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The FARC emerged as the result of a communist decision to exploit the discontent among certain strata of Colombian peasantry.

ii) Leadership: Unlike many grass roots militants, the FARC leadership has a clear picture of the basic objectives of the guerrilla struggle. It aims to maintain political and social unrest and thereby to prepare conditions for a communist-led national anti-government action. The FARC leaders are hardened communists and their unique purpose is to strengthen communist positions in the country.

b) Performance : FARC guerrilla were able to organize attacks on military and civilian targets in 1983. In its first 1983 operation, a 120-man column from the group's 7th front attacked the town of Toribio in the Cauca valley. FARC operations in Caquetá, Meta, and Santander, prompted the military high command to commit additional helicopters and special counter-insurgency forces to combat the resurgence of violence. Weapons are used generally by rural guerrillas (rifles, submachine guns, dynamite). FARC guerrillas are described as remarkable marksmen.

Colombia - Group FARC

- 235 -

The group's 20-year history indicates its ability to evolve and adjust. Nevertheless, though Marulanda Vélez maintains that the acceptance of the truce represents a victory for leftist forces, the FARC cannot conceal its increasing disenchantment and fears of imminent disintegration.

FARC leaders have been directly involved in combat. Ciro Trujillo, a FARC founder and member of the PCC Central Committee, was killed in action in the Boyaca department in 1968. Throughout the years, the FARC has lost many militants who decided to desert. Guerrillas react to this alleged "treason" by killing "traitors" and even those suspected of treason.

Training

FARC guerrillas are trained primarily in Colombia. During counter-insurgency operations in March and April 1983, troops discovered several FARC training camps in the Huila. FARC guerrillas also receive training in Cuba and Soviet-bloc countries.

Financial Resources

a) National origin : On certain occasions, guerrillas have expressed their disapproval of terrorist methods of financial extortion. Nevertheless, in practical activities, they have succeeded in ensuring their own financial basis. External financial support, though not negligible, is secondary.

b) Means : The FARC has been associated with other guerrilla groups in drug traffic operations. It has also organized successful kidnappings and bank robberies.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : The FARC employs R-12 rifles, .30 caliber carbines, sub-machine guns, shotguns, automatic pistols, and revolvers.

b) Origin : The group's equipment comes primarily from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. Arms reportedly are sent from the city of Balboa in Panama -- mentioned on various occasions as a "free port" of the Colombian guerrillas.

Level of Popular Support

a) Total group and front organizations : A major source of the PCC's influence lies in its control of the Trade Union Confederation (CSTC) which claims a membership of 300,000. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, the PCC has 12,000 members.

b) Local support : The FARC enjoys local support primarily in the departments of Huila, Caquetá, Tolima, Cauca, Boyacá, Santander, and Antioquia.

c) Electoral performance : The PCC, and implicitly the FARC, continues to exercise only marginal influence in national affairs.

External Support

a) Origin : PCC, whose military branch is FARC, is one of Moscow's most loyal Latin American "orthodox" communist parties. In the mid-1960s the PCC and the FARC took care not to offend Castro and to maintain good relations with Cuba. Cuba and the Soviet bloc are the main foreign supporters of the FARC.

b) Volume : The volume of external support became decisive after 1980, when FARC was dealt some very severe blows.

c) Type : Its foreign support includes military, political, and financial aid.

Dependence on External Support

a) Strategic : The PCC, and subsequently the FARC, adopted the strategy of guerrilla warfare while taking into account the experience of Cuba and the Soviet tactic of manipulating the so-called "national-liberation movements." The PCC is strategically dependent on Soviet international politics.

b) Impact of dissimulation or proclaimed noninvolvement by supplier : As the armed branch of the Communist Party, the FARC has to take into account the various turnings of the Soviet line -- alternating hard guerrilla activities and nonviolent propaganda campaigns. PCC's entire strategy has been dovetailed with the strategic interests of the Soviet Union and, after 1970, of Cuba.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National : In 1978 the FARC took a step toward the unification of guerrilla movements in Colombia: an editorial in Resistencia, the FARC organ, announced a merger with the ELN. On the other hand, the FARC was criticized by the ELN and the M-19 for "splitting the masses of other revolutionary movements by intimidation through the sacrifice of hundreds of peasants." Despite continual tensions and collisions with other guerrilla groups, the FARC has cooperated with them, particularly with the M-19 group.

ii) Continental : Cuba provides both training and material support to the FARC guerrillas.

b) Extrahemispheric : In 1979 intelligence services reported that 30 FARC guerrillas had returned secretly to Colombia after taking a four-month course on weapons and military tactics in specialized camps in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

Extent and Structure of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

By the end of 1979, the FARC had expanded its areas of influence to include portions of El Valle, Meta, Cundinamarca, and the territory of Arauca. The general headquarters appears to be located between Caquetá and Huila.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

Various PCC leaders from the Valle region, including former Central Committee member, José Cardona Hoyos, were expelled from the PCC in 1983 after open disagreement over the party's "permanent support" for FARC. Cardona, who joined the PCC in 1946, charged that the Central Committee is the "main promoter of guerrilla warfare in the country."

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

Manuel Marulanda Vélez was the type of charismatic guerrilla chieftain who inspired unlimited confidence among his followers.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

FARC's practice of killing "traitors and collaborators," has provoked criticism even from other guerrilla groups, and it has emphasized the group's growing lack of popularity (continual attacks on small towns, the assassinations of public officials, other acts of despair). FARC groups often take peasants as hostages and later kill them.

Remarks

According to the Colombian Army's Report on 1982 guerrilla activity, the FARC, considered the organization with the broadest "support," killed 13 soldiers

Colombia - Group FARC
- 239 -

and 10 policemen in ambushes, armed contacts and clashes, assaults, and harrassments during the year. FARC also killed 162 civilians, most of them members of peasant families in areas of mid-Magdalena, Caquetá Department, and the Eastern Plains.

In 1983 the group signed a document bound to put an end to the guerrilla war in Colombia. The FARC High Command members praised President Betancur's effort to establish conditions for amnesty and it declared its support for the amnesty law. In October 1983, FARC leadership sent Betancur a peace plan. The document, signed by Marulanda Vélez, notes that the points that would permit consolidation of the agreement would also include a reform of the amnesty law approved by the parliament to include the terms "pardon and forgetting the past." A formal agreement between FARC and the Colombian government was signed in April 1984. This decision put at least a temporary end to the exhausting drama of the FARC's guerrilla warfare.

The movement has not elaborated on its original ideological documents, and it has avoided involvement in the polemics that marked the history of the Latin American violent Left in the 1960s. However, the FARC has been quite a peculiar military-political experiment. It was one of the few guerrilla organizations established by a pro-Soviet communist party in the mid-1960s. And its very existence has been a clear indication of the ambivalence of the Soviet international strategy: while proclaiming the politics of "peaceful coexistence," the Soviet leaders were encouraging and supporting one of the most radical guerrilla movements in Latin America. The FARC's current statements and its alleged commitment to democracy cannot, therefore, mislead any one. This tactic is only the result of defeat, the bitter confession of powerlessness and overwhelming isolation.

Colombia - Group EPL
- 240 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito Popular de Liberación
- b) In English : People's Liberation Army
- c) Acronym or known name : EPL

Country of Operation

Colombia

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The EPL was formed by the Communist Party of Colombia, Marxist-Leninist (PCC-ML) in late 1967 as its guerrilla arm. The PCC-ML is firmly pro-Chinese. It originated from a schism within the PCC (the Colombian Communist Party) and dates from 1965. Its present leadership hierarchy is obscure. Unlike the PCC (the Colombian Communist Party), the PCC-ML has not attempted recently to obtain legal status.

Front Organizations and Auxiliaries

a) Front Organization : In the late 1960 and early 1970s the PCC-ML exerted control over the Bloque Independente (the Independent Bloc), a trade union organization which originated in Cali with a membership of 20,000.

b) Administrative/Auxiliary Organizations : The PCC-ML's youth group, the Colombian Communist Youth (Juventud Comunista Colombiana) was formed in 1964 (a year before the PCC-ML) by young persons expelled from the pro-Soviet Juventud Comunista de Colombia (Communist Youth of Colombia).

Colombia - Group EPL

- 241 -

Membership

a) Active members : The PCC-ML has an estimated membership of 1,000. The EPL has approximately 250 members involved in guerrilla activities.

b) Sympathizers : The PCC-ML has attracted a few thousand sympathizers at most.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Rafael Vergara Navarro

b) Political career : Rafael Vergara Navarro was considered one of EPL's principal leaders by Colombian intelligence services. He sought asylum in the Mexican embassy in September 1979. Apparently, EPL's new leader (since 1980) is Francisco Caraballo.

Ideological Origin and Orientation

The EPL was the first pro-Chinese group in Latin America to employ the Maoist strategy of revolutionary war. The group is totally committed to the principles of a "people's war" in Latin America. The ideological origin of the PCC-ML, and subsequently of the EPL, stems from the conflicts between pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing elements in various communist parties during the early and mid-1960s. A document, issued jointly by the PC-ML, the EPL, and the "Regional Patriotic Committee of Alto Sinu and Alto San Jorge," declared in 1968: "The People's Liberation Army, the armed branch of our party [the PCC-ML], has emerged and has been growing stronger daily. Today it has become the brain and spine of the armed struggle of the people." Unlike other pro-Chinese

Colombia - Group EPL

- 242 -

Latin American groups, the PCC-ML continues to maintain good relations with Beijing even after Mao's death and the decision of the post-Maoist leadership to embark on a more moderate national and international political line.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The EPL advocates total nationalization and confiscation of all significant industrial and agricultural firms, companies, and property.

b) Social program : The EPL promotes the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary program: nationalizations, social, and economic reforms. It claims to carry out "a war against a system of economic exploitation . . . which can end only with the destruction of that brutal . . . system."

c) Foreign policy : The EPL proclaims imperative the struggle against "imperialism, social-imperialism, and the oligarchy and all its lackeys." It has regularly followed the Chinese line on international issues. While condemning "U.S. imperialism," it also voices the general positions of the PCC-ML and devotes great attention to attacking the Soviet Union's "return to capitalism" and their policy of "peaceful coexistence." According to the PCC-ML, the activities of the EPL represent the creative application of Mao's thought to Colombia.

Current Program :

a) Social program : The EPL upholds the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary program, combined with the Maoist insistence on the progressive role of the peasantry (agrarian reform, nationalization, expropriation, reform of the education system, etc.).

Colombia - Group EPL

- 243 -

b) Foreign policy : A recent attack on the Chilean Consulate in Medellin and the slogans concerning "Operation Free Central America" indicate the radicalization of the EPL's international stances (the struggle against "imperialism and dictatorships"). The group calls for active, "militant" solidarity with Latin American leftist movements, in spite of political-ideological divergences.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The EPL propaganda is addressed primarily to peasants, but insists on the fundamental role of the working class in the "revolutionary struggle."

ii) Ideological content : The Marxist-Leninist and Maoist revolutionary ideas represent the ideological basis of the EPL propaganda.

b) Means

i) Radio : The EPL organized the occupation of several radio stations to broadcast revolutionary statements.

ii) Print : The EPL issued manifestoes and communiqués. The official news organ of the PCC-ML is Revolución.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The basic forms of struggle adopted and approved by the EPL are rural guerrilla warfare, peasant indoctrination, and the development of the "popular army." Despite its ideological orientation, the EPL has limited its operations primarily to urban areas since 1975; however, the group undertook several rural attacks and kidnappings in later years. The EPL insists on the necessity of waging

Colombia - Group EPL

- 244 -

a prolonged war against "domestic and external enemies." According to EPL statements, the three principal activities of the guerrilla group are: "fighting the enemy, undertaking and developing production, and mobilizing, educating, organizing, and arming the broad masses of the people." EPL militants combine the strategy of protracted warfare with the terrorist approach.

Performance

According to EPL statements and to Colombian intelligence sources, the EPL is composed of peasants, workers, and students. In the late 1960s, the EPL announced the establishment of the "Maria Cano" detachment made up of women. There are certain women among the EPL top leaders (Amanda Ramirez).

Military Structure

In the late 1960s, the EPL claimed to have set up eight detachments. Since 1975 it has conducted only limited operations. However, according to Colombian intelligence, it still has an estimated 250 guerrillas organized into four fronts. The group is also involved in urban terrorism: in 1983, Colombian authorities arrested five members of an EPL urban commando involved in a payroll robbery.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The EPL succeeded, in the early 1960s, in mobilizing the discontent of certain segments of the Colombian peasantry. Many joined the EPL believing it was waging a real peasant revolt. They soon grew increasingly disappointed with the group's sectarian orientation.

ii) Leadership : The first generation of EPL leaders were motivated by their desire to offer Colombia an alternative to the political orientation of the orthodox (pro-Soviet) PCC. They embraced Maoism and tried to implement Maoist postulates in Colombia.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : Throughout 1979-1980 the EPL seemed weakened and isolated. It was inactive for some months in 1980 and re-emerged in 1981.

ii) Weapon sophistication : The EPL uses the G-3 rifle, the M-2 carbine, MK-2 grenades, .38 revolvers, and dynamite.

iii) Leadership in combat : In the late 1960s, the EPL lost many leaders, among which was Bernardo Ferreira Grandet, who was killed in August 1968. The leader of the "Ernesto Che Guevara" front was killed during an attack organized by the group in May 1978.

Training

EPL guerrillas are trained in Colombia.

Financial Resources

a) National origin : Although the EPL established some contacts with Cuba and maintained good relations with China, its financial resources are primarily local.

b) Means : The group organizes payroll robberies, and it has staged kidnappings in Antioquia (September and October 1983). EPL guerrillas also extort money from the landowners.

Colombia - Group EPL

- 246 -

Equipment and Supplies

The EPL has launched many attacks on military garrisons for supplies. Guerrillas' equipment includes the G-3 rifle, the M-2 carbine, MK-2 grenades, .38 revolvers, and dynamite.

Level of Popular Support

a) Total group and front organizations : The PCC-ML, a firmly pro-Chinese party, has an estimated membership of 1,000.

b) Electoral performance : The impact of PCC-ML in terms of national political life is insignificant.

c) Support from unrelated groups or organizations : The EPL is supported by another pro-Chinese group called the Marxist-Leninist League of Colombia.

External Support

a) Origin and volume : The EPL received some financial and material support from Castro in the late 1960s. Castro's support primarily aided in the coordination of pro-Chinese and Castroite guerrillas in Colombia. The volume of Cuban support, however, was marginal. Presently, the group does not rely on foreign aid; although it does receive continued financial and political support from China.

b) Type : Statements and inferences from the PCC-ML and the EPL are sometimes found in Chinese publications and those of pro-Chinese parties in Europe and Latin America.

Colombia - Group EPL

- 247 -

Dependence on External Support

The EPL's political profile and raison d'etre stem from the Moscow-Beijing split. Consequently, EPL and PCC-ML are dependent on the evolution of Chinese international strategy.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere : The EPL had been increasingly isolated even among the Colombian guerrilla groups. After 1979 it softened its rigid attitude and began accepting negotiations for "unity of action."

b) Extrahemispheric : The EPL maintains contacts with the Chinese Communist Party and other pro-Chinese groups in Latin America.

Extent and Structure of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the EPL was active primarily in the Alto Sinú and Alto San Jorge regions of northern Colombia, between Medellín and Cartagena. The Colombian Defense Ministry reported in August 1983 that the army had captured the leader of an EPL front operating in the Caquetá area. Despite its ambitions, the EPL has not been able to control its areas, let alone establish a specific type of administration. It operates mostly in the departments of Antioquia and Córdoba, with urban support networks in Bogotá, Medellín, Montería, Bucaramanga, Barrancabermeja, Cali, and Florencia.

Remarks

In June 1983, the EPL denounced the government's amnesty law and those FARC and M-19 members who accepted it, "despite orders from Moscow to seek

Colombia - Group EPL

- 248 -

the unification of all guerrilla groups in the country." Later, the group announced its decision to comply with the prevailing tendency toward national reconciliation.

The EPL began as a political-military organization committed to the implementation of Maoist ideological precepts. The group was dealt severe blows in the late 1960s and early 1970s and has never completely recovered. Its significant contribution to the practice of subversion in Latin America has been its emphasis on the role of the peasantry in the "revolutionary process." Its growing sectarianism is matched only by its fanatical dedication to abstract principles and lack of interest in Colombian reality.

Colombia - Group M-19

- 249 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimiento-19 de Abril
- b) In English : Movement-19 of April
- c) Acronym or known name : M-19

Country of Operation

- a) Colombia
- b) Others : Ecuador, Bolivia

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The M-19 first appeared in January 1974. It initially claimed to be the armed hand of the ANAPO (Alianza Nacional Popular -- National Popular Alliance). ANAPO leaders have long since disavowed any connection with the group. The group takes its name from the contested presidential election of 19 April 1970, when Rojas Pinilla was defeated.

Membership

a) Active members : Estimates of the movement's size range from 800 to 5,000. The largest concentration of M-19 guerrillas, an estimated 2,500, is found in Caquetá and in the Putumayo intendency area in Southern Colombia. By mid-November 1979, some 200 alleged M-19 guerrilla were brought to Bogotá for trial.

b) Foreign members : Some southern cone and Central American guerrillas, are involved in M-19 operations.

Colombia - Group M-19
- 250 -

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Jaime Bateman Cayón

b) Date of birth : 1936

c) Social background and education : Bateman Cayón came from a middle-class family. He studied law at the University of Bogota and was an attorney before becoming a professional guerrilla leader.

d) Political career : The "supreme leader" of the 19 April Movement (M-19), Bateman Cayón was killed in an alleged airplane accident in the northeast of the country, probably on 28 April 1983. He was travelling to meet the leaders of the EPL (People's Liberation Army) as part of an effort to unify the Colombian guerrillas. Conrado Marin, former head of the M-19's southern front also died in the accident.

e) Publications : "M-19 Leader Speaks with NACLA," a general statement about M-19, came out in NACLA, May-June 1983.

f) Character : Bateman founded and inspired M-19. According to intelligence sources, he was originally a member of the FARC, but he became disillusioned with that movement's failures. His statements indicated a strong character, oriented toward violent anarchic action. A revolutionary fanatic, Bateman Cayón was motivated by strong beliefs in his own "historical role."

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Ivan Marino Ospina

b) Place of Birth : Roldanillo, Colombia

c) Date of Birth : 1945

d) Social background and education : Born to a middle-class family (his parents currently live in a middle-class neighborhood in Pereira), Marino Ospina graduated from the Deogracias High School in Pereira, Colombia.

e) Political career : In 1971 Ivan Marino joined the guerrilla movement and received special training in Cuba and Eastern Europe. He was active in the theft of Army weapons; he later led the guerrilla offensive along the Mira River. Ivan Marino was captured in March 1981 and was in prison 2 years. After the amnesty granted in December 1982, he went underground and travelled abroad (Cuba). He rejoined the M-19 as leader of the front operating in Caquetá.

Ideological Origin

The M-19 combines Rojas Pinilla's quasi-fascist populism with a peculiar socialist (Marxist) outlook. Its early statements were imbued with calls for social justice, equality, and economic democracy. Castroism exerted a significant influence on M-19 leaders and became an intrinsic component of the group's ideology. The M-19 pretends to be a "patriotic," left-wing oriented movement, but it has increasingly become one of the most consistent Marxist subversive groups in Colombia.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : M-19 advocates protection of national resources, control of monopolies, and encouragement of small and mid-sized enterprises as well as a sweeping agrarian reform that includes expropriation of private medium and large farms.

b) Social program : M-19 insists on the creation of social services bound "to protect both workers and the population as a whole." They do not conceal their

purpose, "to pursue a popular revolution of national liberation aimed toward socialism."

c) Foreign policy : M-19 captured the Dominican Republic's Embassy, replete with 14 ambassadors -- including the top U.S. diplomat -- in February 1980. In its official platform, the group speaks of an international policy respecting self-determination, peaceful coexistence and non-alignment. In fact, M-19 is fanatically anti-U.S., pro-Cuban, and a supporter of continental revolution.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : M-19 indicates, as its economic objectives, the nationalization of the banking system and public transportation. It speaks of a mixed economy and the necessity of stimulating private industry, while attacking private enterprise principles, foreign corporations, and the "bourgeoisie."

b) Social program : M-19 makes general promises about "political democracy" (broadening legal and political rights for all, freedom of expression, the re-organization of the armed forces, i.e., their complete purge to eliminate both professional and constitutionalist officers).

c) Foreign policy : M-19 proclaims self-determination, peaceful coexistence, and non-alignment as well as solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua, and the leftist guerrilla groups in Central America as major foreign policy objectives. The group has consistently indulged in rabid anti-American stances.

Ideologues

a) Name : Jaime Bateman Cayón

b) Publications : Bateman published interviews and statements in which he emphasized M-19's conception of guerrilla warfare in Colombia. He underscored the necessity of going beyond the political struggle and of building a military force, acting both in urban and rural areas.

c) Impact (internal) : Bateman's ideas contributed to the reshaping of M-19, in the early 1980s, into an increasingly Marxist-Leninist group.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : M-19 tries to reach a larger audience by using the symbols of the National Popular Alliance.

ii) Ideological content : M-19 issues calls for revolutionary warfare against the "bourgeois-oligarchic" government.

b) Means : M-19 propaganda includes oral and printed materials.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

Bateman Cayón was always skeptical about the chances of any legal movement. However, he considered mass mobilization necessary "to push the struggle for economic demands as long as these mobilization form part of a larger strategic program." The movement has intensely professed its commitment to revolutionary armed struggle. The M-19 has organized several spectacular terrorist actions among which was the occupation of the Dominican Embassy in Bogotá. The group held 18 diplomats prisoner for more than 61 days. The internal organization of M-19 (fronts, columns) as well as certain statements of its leaders indicate that it is committed to the strategy of protracted warfare.

Performance

a) Recruitment : M-19 recruited primarily among the middle-class intellectuals, students (under 30), and less among workers and peasants.

b) Indoctrination

i) Forced study : M-19 organizes disguised recruitment for so-called "foreign universities," mostly in Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

ii) Use of schools/universities : M-19 has infiltrated student organizations and found supporters among leftist intellectuals.

iii) Use of religious institutions : The group receives some support from so-called "liberation theology" adherents within the Catholic priesthood.

Military Structure

According to an alleged M-19 defector, the group operates in columns of 70 men and has 22 combat fronts located in over a dozen departments.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : M-19 emerged as a result of disaffection with the FARC failures and opposition to the prevalent line of the ANAPO. Its militants were initially committed to the populist ideology and values.

ii) Leadership : M-19 leaders have demonstrated radical willingness to destabilize the political system of the country and to impose a socialist model of society of Marxist inspiration.

b) Performance

Colombia - Group M-19
- 255 -

i) **Combat ability** : The performance of M-19 commandos and the establishment of the permanent Caquetá base indicate a certain level of military training.

ii) **Weapon sophistication** : The M-19 employs weapons used by government forces and captured by the guerrilla units.

Training

M-19 guerrillas have been trained in Colombia and Cuba. Some leaders, including Marino Ospina, were trained in Cuba and Eastern Europe.

Financial Resources

a) **National origin** : The M-19 is one leftist group which, using terrorist methods, has acquired its own impressive financial base.

b) **Means** : The M-19 has organized kidnappings and bank robberies. Moreover, the group is heavily involved in cocaine traffic, which is now its main source of revenue.

Equipment and Supplies

a) **Level of sophistication** : The M-19 uses rifles, bazookas, and mortars.

b) **Origin** : The group has organized robberies and spectacular attacks, as well as secret shipments from outside the country. On 2 January 1979, M-19 acquired 5700 firearms by tunnelling under the Military Institute Building in Bogotá.

External Support

a) Origin : Cuban support is very significant in terms of training and arms. The group maintains relations with countries of the Soviet bloc (training) and Third World radical regimes (Libya). The M-19 also cooperates with other Latin American extremist groups.

b) Volume : Taking into account M-19's excellent financial state, what the movement needs the most is political support from other leftist parties and groups. Material support, though real, is secondary.

c) Type : The M-19 receives political, military, and logistical support from abroad.

Relations With Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National : In an April 1979 communiqué, the M-19 and the ELN announced their decision to unite for the purpose of "gaining power for the people." This announcement provoked a violent critical reaction from FARC. In 1983 Jaime Bateman, the foremost leader of the M-19, died in an airplane accident while travelling to meet the leaders of the EPL as part of an effort to unify the Colombian guerrillas. The M-19 is believed to act as a coordinator to increase unity among the country's various subversive groups.

ii) Regional : The M-19 has established contacts in Panama. (In October 1981 Colombia claimed that an airplane, found in southeast Colombia, was used by guerrillas of the M-19 movement to transport weapons from Panama.) June 1983 reports from Bogotá indicate that a guerrilla group of the M-19 had been created in Ecuador. The group gave itself the name "M-20." M-19 seems to promote "an international guerrilla front."

iii) Continental : Ivan Marino Ospina and other militants of the M-19 received special training in Cuba. In a May 1983 communiqué, the M-19 acknowledged its presence in the Central American leftist movements. It claims to have deployed "brigades" in the past few months. The claim is both unrealistic and improbable on any significant scale.

b) Extrahemispheric : Ivan Marino Ospina received special training in Eastern Europe. In May 1983, M-19 issued a communiqué admitting that several of its members were receiving training in Cuba, Libya, and the U.S.S.R. There were suggestions that the Libyan planes caught carrying weapons in Brazil were connected with the activities of the M-19 group.

Extent and Structure of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

a) Territorial ambitions : The group has attempted to establish a so-called "liberation area," in the Caquetá region.

b) Extent of area controlled : Caquetá is a remote and inaccessible region formerly part of a government-sponsored colonization project located some 1,000 kilometers south from Bogotá.

c) Duration of control : The M-19 operation aimed at creating the "liberated area" began in the early 1980s.

d) Degree of control : Large numbers of government informers indicate shaky control.

e) Type of administration : The M-19 militants have not created alternative state structures in Caquetá that could serve as a model. The group remains dedicated to nationwide military struggle, and it postpones the elaboration of a definite political program, except the August 1982 platform.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

In February 1981 deep division emerged within the M-19, due to differences of opinion among its top leaders regarding past urban actions and future plans. A clandestine communiqué sent to the international news agencies in Bogotá reported that such a division had arisen between the rank and file coordinator, who was not identified, and Jaime Bateman, then top leader of the organization. The M-19 began to decline in 1979 following the theft of weapons from a military arsenal, when the army arrested more than 100 of its members.

Indications of Growing Autonomy of the Local Leaders from the Central Leadership

The confusing documents issued after Bateman's death support the hypothesis of an internal struggle that opposes executive leadership of the M-19 and the local commanders (1983).

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

Bateman was by far the most influential leader of the group. His succession provoked some disputes and confusions, among which were the persistent denials of his death and the different attitudes toward the amnesty law.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

Such indications result from the claimed readiness for negotiations with the government and the desire to launch a dialogue bound to promote "the unity of all the guerrilla forces."

Colombia - Group M-19
- 259 -

Remarks

Citing Colombian military sources, the Colombian news agency (Colprensa) reported that "representatives of Peru's "Shining Path," Venezuela's "Red Flag," EL Salvador's "FMLN," Guatemala's "Poor People's Guerrilla Army" ("EGP"), and Colombia's ("M-19") attended a meeting of five Latin American guerrilla groups. Colombian guerrilla leader Rosemberg Pabon -- known as "Commander Uno" during the M-19's occupation of the Dominican Embassy in Bogotá in 1980 -- was asked to coordinate a secretariat for guerrilla unity. Colprensa also reported that "to comply with the guidelines of this unity, those who attended the meeting chose, through an election, the (members of) three secretariats for this unity." The three secretariats function in Ecuador, Mexico, and Panama.

In December 1983 the leaders of the M-19 movement announced for the first time in their history the immediate holding of a summit to bring peace to Colombia. Ivan Marino Ospina, the national commander of the M-19, and Alvaro Fayad, second commander of the guerrilla group, granted an interview to two Colombian newsmen and reiterated the M-19's "desire for peace." These were the first public remarks by the M-19 since it met with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Madrid with President Belisario Betancour (October 1983). "The Madrid meeting has opened a historic period, since for the first time, a president has met with a guerrilla organization," Alvaro Fayad said in the interview. The M-19 and the FARC announced their intention to force a political-military alliance (a common political-military front) bound to foster their positions during the talks with the government. Manuel Marulanda Vélez and Jacobo Arenas, representing the FARC, and Ivan Marino Ospina and Alvaro Fayad Delgado, have been charged to carry out this agreement between the two guerrilla movements. In a January 1984 statement, the General Command of the M-19 group

Colombia - Group M-19

- 240 -

announced that the organization had established a "Western Front" which is already operating in the Valle, Cauca, and Nariño Departments.

The M-19 represents the transformation of an initially leftist, populist, and allegedly nationalist group into a Marxist revolutionary movement. It is important to note that M-19, under the leadership of Bateman Cayón, organized the assassination of José Raquel Mercedo, the president of the Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CTC) in 1980. Though originally opposed to the communist-led FARC, the M-19 cooperated with FARC leaders and staged common operations. The group has been instrumental also in the international coordination of certain radical Latin American guerrilla movements. One can conclude that the M-19 is one of the most dynamic and innovative subversive groups in Latin America. Its very existence suggests the new strategic directions that are being pursued by old and new leftists.

Colombia - Group MAO
- 261 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : **Movimento de Autodefensa Obrera**
- b) In English : **Movement for Worker's Self-Defense**
- c) Acronym or known name : **MAO**

Country of Operation

Colombia

Date of Formation Original Organization

The MAO emerged in September 1978 as the urban branch of the EPL (the guerrilla arm of the PCC-ML, the pro-Chinese Colombian Communist Party-Marxist-Leninist).

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : **Armando López Suárez**
- b) Political career : **López Suárez was arrested in May 1980 together with another MAO leader, Oscar Mateus Puerto ("Julián"). López Suárez was the founder of the MAO. His nom de guerre is "Coleta."**

Ideological Origin

The MAO initially claimed to be the urban branch of the EPL. The group is highly conspiratorial and seldom issues elaborate statements. Ideologically it is committed to Maoism, Castroism, and Trotskyism. Colombian authorities tend to consider it Trotskyist and to associate it with the political orientation of the Fourth International. Lately, the MAO has indicated certain signs of autonomy, particularly its violent rejection of any negotiations with the Government.

Colombia - Group MAO
- 262 -

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The MAO considers urban guerrilla struggle the basic strategy in the takeover of the established institutions. The group surfaced in September 1978 when it claimed credit for the assassination of former Government Minister Rafael Pardo Buelvas. Specializing in urban kidnappings and assassinations, MAO is primarily oriented toward the terrorist approach. It rejects the conciliatory tactic adopted by other leftist groups and refuses to join the FARC and other guerrilla movements in signing the truce with the Government. MAO considers violence the sole genuine revolutionary weapon, with urban guerrilla the most appropriate weapon with respect to current Colombian conditions.

Military Structure

The group organizes commando units and urban cells specializing in kidnappings, robberies, and assassinations.

Financial Resources

MAO has succeeded in organizing several successful kidnappings and has extorted important amount of money. The group seems to have been instrumental in establishing its own network of "voluntary contributors."

Level of Popular Support

MAO is among the most isolated leftist groups in Colombia. It is committed primarily to terrorism, and it distrusts the mobilizational approach.

External Support

Some sources report that MAO has links with the Fourth International and, subsequently, with Latin American Trotskyist groups. However, since it emerged as an urban guerrilla arms of the EPL, the MAO has had contacts with pro-Chinese groups and parties. It is difficult to estimate the real extent and implications of MAO's foreign support. The Cuban press has commented positively on MAO actions, which suggests political support from Fidel Castro.

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : In August 1981, the MAO was one of the guerrilla groups that decided to coordinate their activities. The other groups were: FARC, ELN and M-19. This agreement was bound to put an end to previous polemics and inaugurate a new offensive stage of guerrilla struggle in Colombia.

b) Continental : The MAO maintains relations -- financial, and possibly training -- with Cuba and Nicaragua. The group also supports other Latin American guerrilla movements.

Remarks

MAO seems to symbolize only the fringe of Colombian leftist insurgent movement. Nevertheless, it has organized some spectacular and widely publicized terrorist actions. It is noteworthy that among the group's leaders are intellectuals. (Mario Camelo Franco, a poet and writer, was involved in the assassination of a former Minister on 12 September 1978.) Without making any significant contribution to the ideology of Colombian leftist violence, the MAO has widened the spectrum of violent practice, particularly through its urban guerrilla exploits.

Ecuador - Group FAR
- 264 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Frente Radical Alfarista
- b) In English : Alfarist Radical Front
- c) Acronym or known name : FRA

Country of Operation

Ecuador

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The FRA formed sometime in the early 1980s. Since it avoids issuing programmatic statements, it is difficult to indicate the exact date of formation. The group emerged as an active violent minority and has not claimed continuity or affinities with other Ecuadoran leftist movements.

Membership

Membership can be estimated at several dozen members.

Ideological Origin

FRA indicates an effort on the part of Castroite elements in Ecuador to create their own movement. The group tries to make use of historical symbols to get publicity for its activities. Ideologically the FRA is inspired by Castro's revolutionary doctrine. It has not produced ideological statements but the group's positions can be inferred from its association with other leftist Latin-American groups.

Ecuador - Group FAR

- 265 -

Propaganda

The FRA practices "active propaganda" methods such as, organizing spectacular actions with symbolic value.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The FRA combines terrorist and mobilizational approaches. Though the group has not succeeded in provoking social unrest, it can be considered a potential threat to established institutions in Ecuador.

Military Structure

The FRA military structure consists of commando units and urban cells.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation : The FRA's actions are motivated by the willingness to weaken the established institutions and bring about a "revolutionary situation."

b) Performance : The FRA has been unable to go beyond certain spectacular propagandistic actions.

External Support

The FRA has been invited to attend certain international meetings of Latin American leftists. This indicates Cuban endorsement of the group's activities; however, it is difficult to assess the extent of Cuban support for the group.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere : The FRA attended the meeting of South American political forces, which was held in Bogota (February 1983). The meeting was

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- Ecuador - Group FAR

- 266 -

- attended by the Argentine Montoneros (who financed the conference), the MNRI,
- the Bolivian Socialist Party One, the Bolivian Communist Party, the Brazilian
- Workers' Democratic Party, the MIR (Chile), the Chilean Socialist Party, the
- Chilean Communist Party, and Uruguay's Democratic Convergence.

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- **Remarks**

- Little information concerning the FRA is available. However, the group did
- manage to steal two swords from Municipal Museum in Guayaquil that belonged to
- General Eloy Alfaro. The thieves left some pamphlets in which a so-called
- Alfarist Montonero Organization claims responsibility for the action (FBIS, 19
- August 1983). The proclamation said in conclusion: "Now the Alfarists draw these
- swords to rescue and safeguard the people's lengthy struggle for a free and
- sovereign Ecuador."

El Salvador - Group PCES, PCS

- 267 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Partido Comunista de El Salvador
- b) In English : Communist Part of El Salvador
- c) Acronym or known name : PCES, PCS

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : El Salvador
- b) Others : Most of the party's leadership is now in Cuba, Nicaragua, the U.S.S.R., and Eastern Europe. It operated throughout Central America in 1930-1931, in Guatemala between 1944-1954, and it has maintained cadres in Costa Rica and Mexico.

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The PCES was formed as the Salvadoran section of the Comintern on 28 March 1930. It operated legally between 1930 and the unsuccessful party-led insurrection of 22 January 1932. Since 1932 it has never regained its legal status but it has operated under quasi-legal conditions, varying between mild repression and official acceptance of front organizations, since 1944.

Front Organization

The PCES was adept at establishing front parties and organizations, so that it could continue to pursue its strategy of peaceful conquest of power in a manner from which it was legally banned. Most of the front organizations were ephemeral and, if banned, were rapidly replaced with identical ones that had different names but mostly the same cadres.

El Salvador - Group PCES, PCS

- 268 -

Partido Accion Renovadora (Renovating Action Party -- PAR), was one of the PCES's most important front organization. It was initially established by non-communist elements, but it was infiltrated and by 1966 the PCES had taken control. PAR participated in the 1967 elections and finished third, after the ruling party and the Christian Democratic party, with 14.4 per cent of the vote. In San Salvador the PAR won 29 per cent of the vote and finished first. Fabio Castillo Figueroa was PAR's presidential candidate. After the elections PAR was banned, and its cadres were transferred to a new front, the Union Democratica Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Union -- UDN).

UDN was established in 1965. Two years later it took over PAR's cadres and became the main PCES front until 1980. UDN, in coalition with the Christian Democrats and the minuscule Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement -- MNR) formed the National Opposition Union (Union Nacional Opositora -- UNO) for the 1972 and 1977 presidential elections. In 1972 the UNO candidate, Christian Democrat Napoleon Duarte, won a majority but was denied victory through fraud; in 1977 the UNO candidate, independent General Ernesto Claramount probably won a small plurality but was again the victim of fraud. It is impossible to establish only UDN's electoral strength, because of the common UNO ticket. However, UDN can be considered much smaller than PCO, but much larger than MNR.

Following the coup d'etat on 15 October 1979, UDN members participated in the October-December junta in cabinet-level positions. After the resignation of the civilian members of the junta the UDN became involved in illegal and often violent actions against the new governments, e.g., attacks against embassies and takeovers of churches and public institutions. Today the UDN is a member of the CRM and has a representative in the FDR Politico-Diplomatic Commission. Mario

El Salvador - Group PCES, PCS
- 269 -

Aguinada has been the leader of the UDN since the late 1970s. Until his death in 1980, Manuel Franco was the general secretary.

Membership

PCES's membership has always been very small, and even today it probably totals under 1,000. According to Shafik Handal, the PCES does not even have a majority of members in its own armed branch, the FAL (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion -- Armed Forces of Liberation), despite the fact that the FAL's membership totals only about 500.

During the 1960s most PCES members were students and urban workers. Following the repeated splits in the party, most of the younger members left for FARN or ERP. By the late 1970s the PCES consisted primarily of middle-class elements and cadres of some workers' organizations. Since 1932 it has been unsuccessful in attracting any significant number of peasants into its ranks.

Leadership

Shafik Jorge Handal has been the general secretary of the PCES since 1970. Throughout the 1960s he was a Political Commission member. Handal was born in San Salvador to a wealthy family of Christian Palestinian immigrants. As a law student in San Salvador in 1949 he became active in student politics, and the following year joined the PCES. Handal was arrested and exiled to Honduras in the early 1950s, and traveled extensively to Chile (where he tried unsuccessfully to continue his studies), Guatemala, Cuba, and the Soviet bloc. His ethnic background probably facilitated his close ties with PLO chief, Yasser Arafat.

Handal has always been a completely loyal follower of the orthodox line established by Moscow. In the late 1960s he led the majority faction of the

Central Committee and Political Commission against the pro-guerrilla proclivities of then-PCES leader, Salvador Cayetano Carpio. Handal has been Moscow's favorite Salvadoran communist; therefore, he was consistently supported by the U.S.S.R. during the PCES's repeated crises over the choice between violence and electoral politics or institutional subversion and infiltration. Moreover, his articles were often published in the World Marxist Review.

As a theoretician, Handal lacks any originality, and his newly proclaimed military expertise appears to be limited to imitating or following the example of more competent leaders of other FMLN groups. Since 1980 Handal appears to have succeeded, with Soviet support, in establishing good relations with the Cuban leadership.

Handal is a member of the FMLN's top leadership, and since Carpio's death in 1983, he has become that group's main political force. This is mostly the result of his ability to obtain funds and weapons from the U.S.S.R. or through the auspices of Moscow. His only rival and competitor for supreme leadership of the FMLN is Joaquin Villalobos. Lacking personal charisma and courage, Handal is the perfect example of a communist apparatchik and an able manipulator and party infighter.

Ideology

The PCES has never had an original ideology or made an original contribution to Salvadoran revolutionary thought. Its only (relatively) original thinkers were Carpio and Roque Dalton. But, both men left the party after acrimonious debates. Almost without exception, the PCES has followed the Soviet line since its creation by U.S. Comintern agents working through Augustin Farabundo Marti. However, despite its long-held official line of pursuing power

El Salvador - Group PCES, PCS
- 271 -

through non-violent means, the PCES has also consistently followed a double-track approach to power taking strategy -- legal or quasi-legal activities (infiltration of unions, use of legal fronts, participation by those fronts in elections) combined with preparedness or active participation in violent acts when they seemed rewarding.

At the end of 1931, when democratically elected and progressive President Araujo was overthrown in December, the PCES not only applauded the coup d'etat of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez, but actively sought a meeting with him and participated in the January 1932 elections -- which it lost badly. At the same time, most likely before the coup, the PCES was preparing for insurrection in the western regions, for the insurrection began immediately after the elections.

In April 1979, according to Handal, the VIIth PCES Congress decided to take the path of violence toward the conquest of power; nevertheless, the party openly participated in the post-October 1979 junta. Moreover, while a member of the government, the PCES was also involved in negotiations with the guerrilla groups, and it joined them a few months after leaving the government. In other words, the PCES never locked itself into a single strategy; it has consistently pursued a double approach, combining formal claims of non-violence and attempts to take over through force.

The program of the PCES was always that of most pro-Soviet communist parties throughout the world -- total state control over all activities of the society, including the economy, culture, political expression, and the destruction of private property. In foreign policy terms, it followed Soviet interests, supporting detente when Moscow did, and advocating violence and conflict when the Soviets decided that it would serve their purposes in Central America. The party supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, condemned the Polish free

unions, and supported Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Moreover, since 1944 the PCES has been a major factor in expanding Soviet influence in Central America, as demonstrated by the prominent role of Salvadoran communists in Guatemala during the Arbenz regime. This was merely a continuation of previous PCES behavior. In the late 1920s, Farabundo Marti attempted to infiltrate and co-opt the nationalist movement of Augusto Cesar Sandino in Nicaragua.

Propaganda

PCES propaganda is centered around justifying the party's many ideological, political, and tactical shifts, explaining the current policy toward other groups, and trying to attract workers' support. Peasants are almost totally disregarded, but a heavy concentration of resources is manifest in the centers of education, both the universities and high schools. Externally, PCES propaganda repeats and justifies Soviet actions and policies.

Before engaging openly in violence, the PCES and UDN published "Voz Popular," and the theoretical journal Fundamentos y Perspectivas. In addition, leaflets and posters are and were distributed by party militants. Since January 1981 the PCES has had access to Radio Venceremos, the main guerrilla station, and has broadcast a number of statements during takeovers of legitimate radio stations.

El Salvador - Group PCES, PCS

- 273 -

Views on Violence

As previously mentioned, the PCES has historically oscillated between the use of violence and legal quasi-legal means for attaining power. (Sometimes it has combined them.) In 1960, when Fabio Castillo was a member of the junta, the party was close to power, but the junta collapsed. Thereafter, for a brief period, the PCES flirted with the notion of guerrilla warfare. Once again, however, it returned to the electoral option with Castillo through PAR. By 1969 a strong minority faction led by then-secretary-general Salvador Cayetano Carpio advocated the use of revolutionary violence. It was defeated by the Handal-led majority faction which supported participation in elections and the subversion of existing parties and institutions. As a result, Carpio left the PCES in 1969. In April the following year he founded the FPL. However, the debate over the question of guerrilla warfare did not cease when Handal took over party leadership. In 1971 another group, including some Central Committee members, e.g., Roque Dalton, left the party and founded ERP. By 1975 another small group, that included Fabio Castillo, did the same for similar reasons and greatly contributed to the formation of the PRTC.

According to Handal, in April 1979 the VIIth Congress of the PCES decided to adopt armed struggle as its main strategic option. However, Handal also stated that the FAL was only established in 1981, toward the end of that year, and the party had to train most of its cadres in military matters, for two and a half years.

Less than half a year after the decision to engage in violence, the PCES became part of the government of El Salvador, while continuing to prepare for guerrilla and terrorist activities.

With regard to the two major Salvadoran forms of military strategy -- the protracted popular war advocated by FPL and the insurreccional approach advocated by ERP -- Handal tried to keep his distance from both. On the one hand he revealed that the Vllth Congress had embraced the insurreccional approach; on the other he admitted that three years later the insurrection did not materialize, and therefore, in 1983, he tried to come out with a "dialectical combination" of the two. In fact, everything in the PCES's background and history, including the middle-class urban nature of its leadership and its lack of any rural following, indicates that its favored option is the insurreccional approach, preferably in combination with elements of the military infiltrated by the party.

Performance

Most PCES recruitment occurs through the urban middle classes and unionized workers at National University, Jesuit University of Central America -- "Jose Simeon Canas" UCA and the unions under party control or influence.

Most members are relatively older than those of the other revolutionary groups in El Salvador, except for PRTC. The average age is probably around 30 for full-fledged members. Members are mostly men, especially in the Central Committee and Political Commission.

Cadres are indoctrinated abroad, mostly in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. There are a few ordinary militants, although PCES is mostly a cadre organization. Like FAL elements, they are trained in El Salvador. According to captured FAL members, some were trained in Moscow and Odessa (in ideological, historical, and political matters) and Vologda (in military tactics).

El Salvador - Group PCES, PCS

- 275 -

The PCES was instrumental in transforming the National University in San Salvador, a small institution with some 3,000 students in the early 1960s, into a burgeoning center for revolutionary indoctrination and training, with over 30,000 students by late 1970s. Then-party member Fabio Castillo, rector of the university between 1963-1967, helped implement PCES strategy at the university, and students formed the bulk of the often rebellious youth branch of the PCES.

Among the unions, the United Federation of Salvadoran Trade Unions (Federacion Unida de Sindicatos Salvadoreno -- FUSS) was a PCES front from the start as well as a fertile recruiting ground.

Paradoxically, the PCES probably has a smaller proportion of foreigners among its cadres than all other Salvadoran guerrilla groups. Most likely the party wishes to avoid exposing the U.S.S.R., for the PCES is known to be Moscow's closest tool in El Salvador.

Military Structure

PCES's military apparatus is recent and relatively small. Party control over the fighters (most of whom by Handal's own admission are not PCES members) is complicated.

According to Handal, the VIIth Congress decided not only to engage the party in revolutionary violence, but also the specific organizational forms violence the party should take. PCES's violent network primarily consists of the Revolutionary Action Groups (Grupos de Accion Revolucionaria -- GARs), which in some instances overlap with party cells. The GARs are mostly urban and because they primarily include workers who must show up at their jobs, they are only part-time guerrillas. The GARs engage primarily in urban terrorist activities, and are always party members.

El Salvador - Group PCES, PCS
- 276 -

The "rural" FAL is led by Rigoberto Lopez. (Rural is not very accurate because FAL is in charge of all PCES violent actions, including the GARs'.) FAL operates in the southeastern, eastern, and Morazan fronts, generally in conjunction with ERP, FARN, and PRTC, and always under the overall command of members of the former two groups. By Handal's own admission, most of the FAL members are not PCES members; however, the party has steadily and successfully transformed them into loyal followers. This was accomplished by the use of party cells, most of which were completely transplanted from San Salvador and Santa Ana. These cells play the leading role in indoctrinating other FAL recruits. Moreover, political commissars (all PCES cadres) operate among non-party FAL members and in close conjunction with the existing cells, and they subject all FAL fighters to indoctrination sessions.

Most likely, FAL members and particularly FAL cadres also try to indoctrinate rank and file militants of other groups into the PCES line. They are known to have made enormous progress in assuming control over the PRTC guerrillas in the rural areas. Following the Soviet pattern, the political commissar at platoon, canton, or higher level, is also second-in-command of the military operations. This is less a means of securing replacements for lost commanders than an instrument for controlling them and providing the party cadre (the commissar) with a formal rank. According to Handal, the FAL is not the party, and the political cells and commissars are not subject to the PCES. However, he also made it clear that the FAL leaders are all PCES leaders and that "democratic centralism," imposed by the party, is the rule among commissars.

Performance

The PCES, i.e., FAL leaders seldom if ever direct field operations. Handel has stayed away from El Salvador for the most part since 1980. Middle-level cadres, particularly in San Salvador, are left to follow military and political instructions decided in Managua, Havana, and Moscow. They often avoid direct participation in combat and terrorism as well, leaving the dirty work to the rank and file elements. However, most of the remaining cadres of the PCES still in the country are in or are close to San Salvador. Also, because, PCES had quasi-legal status until 1979, its membership is more well known than that of other guerrilla groups. This makes PCES far more vulnerable to loss of cadres through capture or assassination by vigilante groups of the right ("Death squads") than other FMLN members. Proportionally speaking, more FAL and GAR elements were captured or killed by the authorities than any other guerrilla group.

Tactically, FAL elements seem more adept at taking civilians with them when on the move than other FMLN groups. (This is a pattern demonstrated by communist parties in their guerrilla incarnation since Greece in the late 1940s.) As a result, civilian casualties during anti-guerrilla operations in which the FAL are a target are far higher than when those operations occur against FPL or ERP elements.

Finally, the PCES's ineptness in military matters, combined with the traditional party members reluctance and fear of engaging in direct terrorist acts have resulted in a relatively higher desertion rate for FAL than for any other FMLN member group. For decades the group was the target of the joke that only lovers of vodka and caviar joined the PCES. Now the party finds itself with members who did not want, envision, or prepare for terrorism, or for the demanding guerrilla operations of the countryside. Consequently, they are easily

El Salvador - Group PCES, PCS
- 278 -

captured or vulnerable to the temptation of amnesties and to government-intelligence infiltration.

Training

High-level cadres are trained abroad. In addition, FUAR (Frente Unido de Accion Revolucionaria -- United Front of Revolutionary Action), a front consisting of GARs and FAL elements, apparently oversees local, i.e., low and middle level cadres' training. Abroad, PCES cadres are militarily trained in Vologda, as well as in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Nicaragua (El Paraiso camp), Cuba, and perhaps still in Lebanon (by both Al Fatah and FPLP). Members of the quasi-regular "Rafael Aguinada Carranza Battalion," the FAL elite formation, may have been trained in Cuba and Nicaragua, with the commanders specializing in the Soviet Bloc states.

Most trainers are nationals of the camps' location, except for the South Yemenis, West Germans, East Germans, and some Irish in the PLO Lebanese camps and the Soviets in the Cuban and Bulgarian or Czechoslovakian camps.

Equipment and Supplies

Because of its insignificant size, the FAL cannot take advantage of the fact that the PCES and, Handal specifically, are the main providers and buyers of weapons for the entire FMLN. But areas with FAL units are supplied with Vietnamese-provided M-16 rifles, Galil rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, M-60 and HK-21 machine guns, as well as with TRC radios, 81-mm mortars and 90mm cannons. Handal's position does ensure that the FAL is at least as well armed as any FMLN group, if not better; although, FAL probably does not receive the same quantities as the larger ERP, FPL, and FARN.

Level of Popular Support

PCES has never had any significant level of popular support outside the universities, some unions, and alienated middle- or even upper-middle-class individuals. Also, most of that support was lost following its numerous splits between 1970 and 1976. Support was stabilized by 1976 at the lowest level -- older cadres, some controlled unions (mostly minor) and a few middle-class elements. Most students and urban workers deserted the party between 1970-1975 to join FPL, and particularly the ERP and FARN, as well as PRTC. Since 1980 even more have deserted to join the Christian-Democratic-controlled unions.

External Support

Far more than any other FMLN member, the PCES is dependent upon external support (financial, political, military) for its very survival. Without such support, primarily the aid from the Warsaw Pact states, the PCES would be forced back into its traditional "legalistic" approach, and without incentives and pressures from abroad it would have never openly joined the FMLN.

Financially the party has historically relied upon Soviet bloc funds, for without them the PCES could not maintain even its small membership. The newly discovered importance of military training would have been impossible to realize without Soviet bloc aid and training, and the political preparation for infiltration, subversion, and penetration of legitimate institutions also would have been impossible without protracted education for cadres in the Soviet bloc. Without Soviet bloc support, it is unlikely that the PCES would be able or willing to continue its involvement in the FMLN, or that Handal would be the most prominent political figure in the FMLN and the second most powerful character in the guerrilla camp.

Relation with Other Groups

a) National : The PCES's relations with almost all other Salvadoran revolutionary groups have been difficult since these groups started as PCES splinters. The FPL, under Carpio's leadership, was seen as an "adventurist" group by Handal and his supporters, as was the ERP; however, it seems Roque Dalton was considered a loyal, although less than relevant member, despite his participation in the ERP establishment. FARN was seen as "deviationist" and "adventurist." It took the PCES a lot of "criticism and self-criticism" at the April 1979 Vllth Congress to accept cooperation, in some cases as a minor partner, with these groups.

Nevertheless, the PCES, faithful to its history of attempting to infiltrate the military, was ambiguous toward the October 1979 coup d'etat, participated in the government, and, together with FARN, tried to convince other FMLN (or soon to be FMLN) groups to penetrate, rather than to oppose the post-October 1979 junta. Most of them believed that it was an obstacle in the way of the Salvadoran revolution as they saw it, and that the PCES' total dependency on Moscow is more of an obstacle than an advantage. Moreover, most consider Handal a colorless appartchik, and distrust his motives, claims, and role.

b) Regional: The PCES had good ties with most central American communist parties, including those of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. However, in 1969 it supported the Salvadoran government in its war against Honduras with the same steadfastness as the PCH supported its own government. The relations between the two parties remained strained until 1979. Relations with the FSLN remain very close. As a result the PCES, like other FMLN groups, is able to use Nicaragua as a rear base for its own violent operations.

El Salvador - Group PCES, PCS
- 281 -

Impact of Factionalism

The PCES has been the major source of all guerrilla movements, groups, and organizations in El Salvador since 1969. All of them started, at least in part, as spinoffs of the PCES, and they have retained a strong dislike for the party and its leaders -- particularly Shafik Jorge Handal. Moreover, with the possible exception of the PRTC, all of the splinters have become larger than the PCES, and thus they dismiss it even more.

With each splinter the PCES became smaller and weaker; however, it retained its main asset, the support of the U.S.S.R. Today this support makes the PCES and particularly Shafik Handal more important within the FMLN than the party's numerical strength would warrant. It also forces the larger groups to accept Handal's newly acquired prominence.

El Salvador - Group FPL
- 282 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion Farabundo Marti
- b) In English : Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces
- c) Acronym or known name : FPL

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : El Salvador
- b) Others : The FPL has consistently used Honduran territory for logistics, R&R, as a safe rearguard area, and has actively participated in terrorist acts against the Honduran government, directly or through the use of local radicals. The headquarters of the FPL, at least since 1980, are located in a suburb of Managua, and many cadres operate propaganda outlets in Costa Rica.

Original Organization and Date of Formation

Internal disputes within the PCES (concerning the use of violence versus legal and electoral processes and the position to be adopted in regard to the Honduras-El Salvador conflict) resulted in a split, with the minority faction being led by then-secretary-general Salvador Cayetano Carpio. By the end of 1969, Carpio and his group began organizing their own revolutionary force, which, on April 1, 1970, was publicly made known as the FPL.

Front Organization

The People's Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque Revolucionario del Pueblo -- BPR) was established on July 20, 1975, as an umbrella organization including a number of urban and rural unions controlled by the FPL and intended to operate on its

El Salvador - Group FPL

- 283 -

behalf as a violent, para-legal instrument. Juan Chacon Vazquez, the BPR secretary general until November 1980, described the organization's aims, nature and ties with the FPL as follows: "The BPR ... was the answer to an urgent necessity which manifested itself as the logical consequence of the deepening of class struggle, the necessity that the people find an organization which fights consistently for its immediate and fundamental interests and for a democratic and revolutionary government. . . . the BPR considers that all forms of struggle -- legal and illegal, peaceful and violent -- are important and necessary but that the fundamental one on which it places stress is the organized and combative [struggle] . . . This fundamental form of class struggle falls within the scope of our strategy of protracted popular war, decided in 1970 by the FPL."

Among the constituent groups of the BPR the following were the most significant and active: Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants (Federacion Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadorenos -- FECCAS); Union of Rural Workers (Union de Trabajadores del Campo -- UTC); National Association of Salvadoran Educators (Asociacion Nacional de Educadores Salvadorenos -- ANDES); Revolutionary Movement of Secondary School Students (Movimiento Estudiantil Revolucionario de Secundaria -- MERS); University Revolutionary Forces 30th of July (Fuerzas Universitarias Revolucionarias 30 de Julio -- FUR-30).

The BPR was intended from the start to destabilize the entire society, to paralyze or force into irrational acts of violence the military, the government, or conservative and business sectors. Occupations of churches, foreign embassies, ministries were all intended to attract attention, polarize the country, and force the authorities into "repression" of the mobs involved. Control of the BPR was established through parallel chains of leadership: ANDES leader Melida Anaya Montes was also second in command of the FPL; Facundo Guardado and before

El Salvador - Group FPL
- 284 -

him Juan Chacon were among the members of the FPL national leadership, represented the BPR in the CRM and the FDR, and answered to the supreme leadership of the guerrilla group. Guerrilla elements mixed among the BPR demonstrators and on repeated occasions opened fire against the security forces or fired back when the latter started the shooting. The BPR objectives, defined by Juan Chacon in 1980 as "The conquest of power and the establishment of a democratic government," were precisely those of the FPL, and Chacon himself defined the BPR as a Marxist organization following the strategy of the FPL.

Among the so-called "popular organizations" (i.e., fronts of the five guerrilla groups in El Salvador) the BPR was by far the largest. In 1980 Chacon claimed that the BPR had over 100,000 members, clearly an exaggerated figure; at its height at the end of 1979 and first part of 1980 the BPR may have been able to bring as many as 20,000 members into the streets. Some of those were middle class elements, particularly students and teachers; some were elements of the lumpenproletariat and rural poor; some were individuals simply interested in violence and looting.

By the Spring of 1980 the BPR's activities were increasingly countered by violence from the far right, and the risks involved for many rank and file members became too high. As a result, many simply dropped out from the group, and the most committed of the cadres left for the hills of Chalatenango, to join the FPL guerrilla elements. As a result, both the membership and the effectiveness of the BPR declined dramatically, and by January 1981 the organization played a very ineffective role in the attempted insurrection.

Membership

Until the end of 1983 the FPL was the largest FMLN member group, representing as many as one-third of the total active guerrillas of the five groups. Since then, however, due to splits in the ranks and desertions, as well as to the growing number of fighters and cadres joining ERP, the FPL has become second to ERP in size, with fewer than 2,000 guerrillas.

The number of sympathizers, in rural zones in Chalatenango and Cabanas may still be as high as 10,000 or more, but it is also declining. The cadres may number as many as a few hundred, increasingly divided and losing control over the organization, particularly over its urban structure.

The number of foreign cadres in FPL ranks and in areas under its influence or control is difficult to assess, but it appears to be in the dozens. Most are non-combat elements, such as trainers, doctors, priests, teachers, etc. The presence of Nicaraguans, Italians, West Europeans (Spaniards, Italians, Belgians, Dutch) and some Latin Americans (Colombians, Ecuadorans, Costa Ricans and Venezuelans) has generally been established with a fair degree of reliability. The existence of Cuban advisers was widely rumored and claimed but not proved.

Leadership

a) Name and background: Salvador Cayetano Carpio, alias "Marcial," was the founder, supreme leader, and most powerful personality of the FPL. Carpio was born in 1920 in San Salvador, the son of a shoemaker. At age 13 he dropped out of the Catholic seminary, and never acquired a formal education. In 1943 he joined the Bakers' Union, quickly becoming one of its leaders. Indeed, he was the main organizer of its strikes in 1944 and 1945, trying to take advantage of the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez regime.

El Salvador - Group FPL
- 286 -

First arrested in 1946, Carpio joined the PCES the following year. Exiled to Guatemala, he traveled to Mexico and Cuba as well. Upon returning to El Salvador in 1952, he was again arrested and, according to his testimony in Kidnapping and Hood (Sequestro y Capucha, San Salvador 1954), tortured. In 1954 he was sent by the party to "study" in the U.S.S.R.; he also visited Cuba, where he established close ties with Blas Roca, then a communist party leader and now an important figure in the Castro regime. Back in 1959, Carpio established FUAR, intended as a training group for guerrilla warfare on the Cuban model. The FUAR's plans for guerrilla warfare never got off the ground, however. Following a coup in 1960, the PCES succeeded in infiltrating the post-coup junta and underwent a change of attitude in respect to violence. In 1964 Salvador Cayetano Carpio was elected secretary general of the PCES and retained that position until 1969, when the Handel faction assumed a predominant role in the Central Committee and Political Commission. Carpio held a minority position in respect to the "Soccer War" with Honduras and the role of violence, opposed the PCES's "nationalistic" support for the Salvadoran cause during the 1969 war and advocated strongly the beginning of guerrilla warfare. With a few followers, including Melida Anaya Montes (for a long time apparently his mistress and, since its establishment, the leader of ANDES), he established the FPL on April 1, 1970. In the Fall of 1972 the FPL started its first terrorist actions, including attacks against the Argentine embassy in "solidarity" with the Montoneros and ERP terrorists who were killed while trying to escape from the Trelew prison in Patagonia.

Throughout his career as FPL leader Carpio took advantage of his training as a model communist apparatchik and was very effective in infiltrating existing groups and institutions, in creating front organizations, and in cultivating close

El Salvador - Group FPL
- 287 -

ties with Castro and a number of similarly minded Central American guerrilla leaders. The most prominent of the latter, and the one Carpio was closest to, was the Nicaraguan GPP leader and now Nicaragua's Interior Minister, Tomas Borge Martinez.

Carpio has consistently combined total revolutionary dedication and ruthlessness with infinite patience and cautiousness. A theoretician and practitioner of the guerra popular prolongada ("popular protracted war"), Carpio never refused to use para-legal means such as the BPR, or terrorism, for the achievement of his goals. On the other hand, he did not believe in the Salvadoran guerrillas' ability to successfully organize a general insurrection on the pattern of Nicaragua in 1979, and in this his views clearly clashed with those of ERP and its leader, Joaquin Villalobos.

Supreme leader of his movement, unchallenged and unwilling to accept any dissent from rank and file or other leaders, Carpio considered himself the natural leader of the entire Salvadoran guerrilla organizations under the FMLN. Described as the "Ho Chi Minh of Central America," Carpio was a fanatical and patient pursuer of his own ideas and aims, allowing no deviation. In addition, he had a very high opinion of his own historic role, which only made him more inflexible and authoritarian. Secretive (he only allowed his first photo without a mask in January 1981), Carpio was never a guerrilla tactician or commander -- his last incursion into El Salvador, in Chalatenango in 1981, almost ended in his capture and death. He thus lost contact with some of his field commanders -- and often disregarded their opinions, from his safe residence in the Managua suburbs. Moreover, he never trained, accepted, or encouraged any potential successor, despite his age and frail health.

El Salvador - Group FPL
- 288 -

To a decisive extent Salvador Carpio's end was a watershed in the history and of the FPL, of the FMLN, and of Marxism-Leninism in El Salvador in general. Carpio's successful cultivation of his own "legend" resulted in his persona being regarded internationally as the symbol of the Salvadoran violent Left. The ignominious destruction of that image in 1983 resulted in confusion, radical shifts in the intra-FMLN balance of forces, and may have affected the FMLN's ability to take power by force of arms.

In 1980 the FPL and its front, the BPR, were in the forefront of trying to unify the revolutionary left in El Salvador. Initially, for the January-May period, the only groups joining the CRM and DRU (Direccion Revolucionaria Unificada or Unified Revolutionary Directorate) were FARN and the PCES. By May the ERP and its front, the LP-28, also joined as did the PRTC and the MLP a few weeks later. Carpio was accepted as the main leader and spokesman for the DRU, which appears to have been his precondition for assisting in the unification of the left. Toward the end of the year, however, Carpio was confronted with the ERP advocacy of general insurrection, supported by the Nicaraguan and Cuban governments. The FPL rejected the insurrectional line in CRM and FMLN councils (i.e., the "final offensive"). In January 1981 Carpio was in Libya seeking funds and weapons, an indication of his lack of confidence in the success of the operation. Despite the failure of the "final offensive," Villalobos managed to blame FPL's half-hearted involvement for the defeat, and by Spring 1981 Carpio was eased out from his position as a primum inter pares in the DRU, mostly by a coalition of Handal and Villalobos.

Following that setback, Carpio apparently became even more disenchanted with the FMLN tactics, and his group began playing the role of a consistent opposition, blocking common decisions and preventing joint operations unless under

El Salvador - Group FPL

- 289 -

FPL command. Moreover, ever since 1980 he used his control over weapons and funds for the FMLN (from Cuba, Nicaragua, the Middle East and the Soviet bloc) to strengthen his group, punish others, and deny supplies to particular units of other groups. After his loss of supremacy in the DRU, and Handal's becoming the main intermediary between the FMLN and their suppliers, the FPL began losing its undisputed military superiority over the other FMLN groups. The failure of Carpio to bring victory closer, and of the 1981 "final offensive" to bring about an insurrection, combined with the attitude of the Reagan Administration, growing pressures on Nicaragua, and clear Soviet reluctance to openly bankroll the FMLN -- all resulted in growing pressures upon and within that organization for the adoption of negotiations as another tactical alternative. Carpio apparently refused to pay more than lip service to the notion of negotiations, and this, added to his handling of the "final offensive," futile attempts to take control of the FMLN, and his reluctance to speed up the pace of the war resulted in his losing control over the FPL itself to a faction led by "Ana Maria" (Melida Anaya Montes). Stepping up the pace of the war while simultaneously proclaiming a desire to negotiate is no paradox nor is it unique to the FMLN, for it was previously done in Vietnam, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. In January-February 1983 Carpio's line became a minority position within the FPL leadership, repeating his 1969 experience in PCES. Violent, disappointed, and bitter, Carpio either encouraged or accepted the use of violence to re-establish control over his organization, which is as he saw the FPL. On April 6, 1983, an internal coup took place within the FPL. "Ana Maria" was killed by Carpio's main lieutenant, Rogelio Bazzaglia, and a selected commando, in a Managua suburb. At the time Carpio was in Libya, and upon his return three days later he led the funeral for "Ana Maria," in the hope that her murder, like so many others in the history of the Salvadoran Left, would

El Salvador - Group FPL
- 290 -

be soon forgotten in a mist of martyrdom. Carpio apparently misunderstood and underestimated the degree to which the "Ana Maria" faction was linked to the ERP, PCES, and, most importantly, to Cuba and Nicaragua. The result was that all those forces (most importantly, the suppliers of havens and weapons to the FMLN -- Cuba and Nicaragua) decided that the preservation of the FMLN and of their control over it under a divided leadership (Villalobos and Handal) was far more important than Carpio's control over the FPL. The funerals of "Ana Maria" were immediately followed by a visit to Carpio from his old friend and ideological twin, Tomas Borge, the person responsible, as Interior Minister, for the protection of all FMLN leaders in Nicaragua. Very likely Carpio was told that his usefulness to "the cause" was past, promised that revolutionary martyrdom would surround his disappearance, and told in no uncertain terms that he had to choose between suicide or "official" suicide. What he chose is still a mystery, but since a final letter from him was allowed to reach his followers, it appears that Carpio was able to obtain some concessions before dying. According to the highly unreliable official Nicaraguan statement, Carpio committed suicide on April 12, 1983, at 9:30 p.m., in his house in Managua, in the presence of his wife and other FPL cadres. It is important to note, however, that Carpio's death was first announced ten days later. It is therefore clear that Carpio died sometime between April 9, the date of his last public appearance at "Ana Maria's" funeral and April 22, the date of the official Nicaraguan statement on his death.

For a few months after his death, Carpio was treated as a martyr, and a campaign by FMLN forces was named "Commander Ana Maria, We Swear to Win! Commander Cayetano Carpio, until victory forever!" By September 1983, however, it appeared that the internal disputes sparked by Carpio's death were coming to a head. Despite prior claims that Carpio had committed suicide as a result of his

El Salvador - Group FPL

- 291 -

being heart-broken by Melida Montes' death, a new FPL leadership, elected in August, portrayed Carpio as nothing more than a traitor to the cause, obsessed with power, a deviationist, and as the major obstacle to FPL and FMLN unity. With the post-mortem purge of Carpio and his ideas and followers, "Ana Maria" became the official martyr of the FPL. The name of the cadres school of the FPL, until then that of Carpio's daughter, was changed to that of "Ana Maria's", and attempts were made to erase the memory as well as the following of Carpio within the FPL. By December 1983 the internecine conflicts between the followers of Carpio and those of "Ana Maria" and the new leadership became so violent that ERP units penetrated FPL-controlled areas in order to impose order on dissident, pro-Carpio cadres and militants, and on behalf of the newly proclaimed leaders. Neither of the two new "leaders," -- Leonel Gonzalez as political leader or Valentin Martinez as military leader -- was strong enough to survive, let alone to keep a position without ERP help. Seven FPL leaders were "sentenced to death" by the FPL's new leaders; they were placed on an elimination list by ERP commandos, as was done by ERP in 1975 to kill Roque Dalton and to attempt the murder of Ernesto Jovel. The urban units of the FPL were the most pro-Carpio elements, and it appears that they led the dissenting group against the new leaders. To a very large extent, the FPL, now apparently having Salvador Guerra as the de facto leader, has completely collapsed after Carpio's death, and its remnants have become either independent operators (i.e., the "Clara Elizabeth Ramirez" Metropolitan Front -- CERF), or instruments of ERP.

b) Name and background: Melida Anaya Montes, alias "Commander Ana Maria," was born in 1929. Melida Anaya came from a middle class background and finished her training as a teacher at the University of San Salvador. In the early

El Salvador - Group FPL
- 292 -

1960s she was exiled as a result of revolutionary activities among the students, and traveled extensively in Eastern and Western Europe, and in Egypt. In 1965 she joined ANDES and soon became its secretary general. In 1978 she became the de facto leader of the BPR, and later a member of the CRM and the FDR Politico-Diplomatic Commission, and since 1970 was the FPL second-in-command. After her death (stabbed more than 80 times with an ice pick) in April 1983 in Managua, she became the official heroine and martyr of FPL and the most prominent FMLN revolutionary "martyr." A teacher by profession, she was highly instrumental in recruiting for the FPL, and in trying (against Carpio's wishes) to establish a working relationship within the FMLN.

c) Name and background: Leonel Gonzalez, born in the late 1940s, and Valentin Dimas Rodriguez, of similar age, were both "elected" leaders of the FPL on September 13, 1983, and both appear to be little more than ERP tools.

Ideological Origin and Views on Violence

Despite its close ties to Cuba, the FPL initially rejected the foco approach, as well as the urban terrorism of the Southern Cone groups (again, despite actions in support of the Montoneros and ERP). The most obvious influence upon the FPL and on Carpio was the perception of the Vietnamese war, as a popular, protracted, and total conflict, combining all means of action toward one single aim -- total control over the country, regardless of the time needed. This combination of quasi-Maoist tactics and understanding of the link between time and revolutionary victory, was combined with more orthodox communist practices of establishing front organizations and manipulating them, of using quasi-legal means of political expression, and of infiltrating unions, church organizations, and peasant groups. In its complex understanding and practice of revolutionary war,

the FPL and Carpio in particular were to a very large extent the predecessors of those conducting the present revolutionary wars in Guatemala and El Salvador. The establishment and use of "popular organizations," as well as the patient build-up of local structures of alternative power in remote rural areas were, for Latin America at least, original contributions of the FPL, and were imitated by most FMLN groups as well as by Guatemalan guerrilla organizations.

The most interesting, and for Latin America at least, the most original aspect of the FPL ideology and tactics is the total reversion of the relationship between time and revolutionary victory. From the triumfalismo ("triumphalism") of Guevara and the Castroite practice, Carpio shifted radically toward an "Asian sense" of the limited importance of time and the need for cautious, expanded, and time-consuming infiltration of all sectors of society, and of building up solid, deep-rooted alternatives to the existing political, cultural, and socioeconomic habits and structures. While not without importance, time is far less important than steadiness and depth of subversive penetration. It is worth noting that the three most significant Latin American guerrilla groups pursuing the protracted war strategy -- the Guatemalan ORPA and EGP, and the Peruvian Shining Path were all established after the FPL was founded. The FPL's main problem was that Carpio's patience and ability to lead were not enough, and were largely limited to his own ability to retain supreme leadership of the group. Once Carpio was gone, the FPL adapted the largely opportunistic and ever changing tactics of the rest of FMLN.

Program

The original FPL program was based upon the group's protracted popular war strategy. Since the long-term aim was the total destruction of the existing

El Salvador - Group FPL
- 294 -

society, in its political, cultural, and social or economic manifestations, a policy of broad coalitions and united fronts was largely shunned as unnecessary. By rejecting serious negotiations (or more probably the danger of tactical use of negotiations "trapping" the Left into actual concessions), Carpio was only being ideologically consistent. His central belief was that total power will be conquered at the end of a long war. Thus, the FPL had a maximalist program under the leadership of Salvador Carpio -- total destruction of the existing "bourgeois" institutions (military, parties, unions, educational system), total destruction of private property, and total "socialization" (i.e., estatization, of the economy, trade, industry, agriculture, and culture). In other words, the initial FPL program was clearly and openly a totalitarian one. The present program of the FPL is that of the FMLN-FDR in general, that is, a minimalist and tactical collection of vaguely worded democratic-sounding promises. (See FARN.)

Propaganda

The FPL propaganda apparatus is centered around its radio station, Radio Farabundo Marti, itself an example of Carpio's unwillingness to associate with FLMN and its Radio Venceremos station (controlled by ERP). Radio Farabundo Marti, claiming to broadcast from Chalatenango, actually at least temporarily broadcasting from Nicaragua, broadcast daily at 1230 and 1900PM, on 6.9 mhz, the 40 meter band, shortwave. Its broadcasts are even less reliable and continuous than those of Radio Venceremos, and since late 1983 have been limited to isolated repetitions of the latter's claims.

In addition to the Radio Farabundo Marti, the FPL and its BPR front have published (and sporadically still do so) the newspaper El Rebelde and, for external propaganda targets, the "Farabundo Marti Weekly Informative," often quoted by

El Salvador - Group FPL

- 295 -

U.S. and West European fellow travelers and leftist publications. The BPR produces the "Weekly Popular Combat," also mostly for external audiences, and since the beginning of 1981 the "Juan Angel Chacon Bulletin," for similar audiences. Leaflets (particularly for the BPR), posters, and graffiti are widespread propaganda means for the FPL.

Performance

a) Recruitment: The main recruiting tools for the FPL were ANDES (mostly for future cadres from the university), FECCAS, and UTC (mostly for rank and file elements). Students, particularly university dropouts, and unemployed teenagers (some recruited through MERS) played a very important role in FPL, while some prominent members of the middle and upper middle classes provided important propaganda successes when they joined the FPL. The prominence of "Ana Maria" notwithstanding, most policymakers in the FPL leadership were and still are men, but women play a significant role at the middle and lower rank levels of leadership.

b) Indoctrination

i) Use of schools: Most of the indoctrination of the rank and file takes place at roving schools in Chalatenango, the most important and best known being that which now bears the name of "Ana Maria." Many recruits, mostly peasants, are forced to attend indoctrination sessions regularly and some become dissatisfied with the FPL for this very reason. Deserters claim that recently recruited youths are treated harshly in FPL camps and executions are quite frequent, even for non-political "errors."

ii) Use of universities: By 1979 the National University of El Salvador in San Salvador has largely become the largest urban center for training,

indoctrination, and recruitment of the guerrilla and terrorist groups. The FPL and particularly the BPR had established their own sectors and camps on the campus, and were actively training and recruiting students. ANDES, under the leadership of Anaya Montres, played a decisive role in radicalizing and recruiting would-be cadres for the FPL.

iii) Use of Clergy: The Clergy played a significant role in legitimizing, recruiting for, and helping the FPL and its fronts, although to a lesser extent than was the case with ERP and FARN. FPL penetration of internal refugee camps in El Salvador and its use of the camps for resupplying its forces with food and medicine was facilitated by the CARITAS organization, as was the similar use of refugee camps in Honduras.

In addition to such recruiting and legitimizing factors, the FPL was active in using the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission for its propaganda purposes, in conjunction and often in competition with ERP and FARN.

iv) Use of Unions: Unions, particularly FECCAS and UTC, were the largest recruiting ground for FPL rank and file, and served as the BPR main support and legal front systems.

v) Use of Foreign cadres: FPL uses more foreigners in its camps and "controlled areas" than most other FMLN groups. Those include citizens of the U.S., Mexico, Nicaragua, Colombia, Venezuela, Spain, Italy, West Germany, and France. Most are medics, priests, nurses, propaganda and communications experts, but at least some are engaged in combat.

Military Structure

a) Force type: The FPL has one of the most complex, though not most combat-effective, military structures among Latin American guerrilla groups. The official military arm of the organization is the Popular Army of Liberation (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion -- EPL), which is virtually indistinguishable from the FPL itself, at least until Carpio's death. The EPL is divided into columns, which are restricted to specific areas of operations, mostly in northern Chalatenango. The "vanguard units" are commando-type groups far more mobile than the columns and mostly used for offensive and specialized operations. Militia-type forces are strictly territorial and in charge of protecting rear areas against minor attacks. They are lightly or poorly armed and only the cadres have any training of significance. Militias are divided into "base combat units" of 4-6 members, brigades (up to 26) and columns, including 2-3 brigades and up to 80 militiamen. Urban operations are undertaken by cell-type terrorist units operating under the strictest secrecy and characterized by a high level of command redundancy, limited ties between cells, and often loose contacts with rural headquarters. The coordinated command of the urban terrorist cells is centered around the "urban front," which has a status relatively similar to that of the FPL forces in the five rural "fronts."

b) Political control: Political of the FPL forces is in the hands of political cadres, some trained in the group's own ideological school (formerly "Emma Guadalupe Carpio," named after Carpio's daughter, now renamed "Anaya Montes").

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file: Rank and file motivation of FPL members was, until the relatively sudden expansion of ranks in 1979-1980 extremely high. Since then, however, the group appears to have difficulties in absorbing new recruits and properly training and indoctrinating them, difficulties further heightened by internecine conflicts at the leadership level, culminating in Carpio's death and a series of splits.

Desertions among FPL members appear to be significant and growing, mostly caused by fatigue, complaints of bad treatment, lack of pay in some cases, discontent with tensions within the group and between it and other FMLN elements.

ii) Leadership: It appears that Carpio's failure to groom a political successor and his fear of competition from subordinates extended to the military field, with the FPL having few competent field commanders, and even those in relatively powerless positions. Internecine conflicts have negatively influenced both the quality and motivation of commanders. As late as December 1983, seven commanders were "sentenced to death" by the shaky post-Carpio leadership, and probably targeted for assassination. In such circumstances it is likely that an increasing number of FPL units and operations are led by non-members, either foreigners (Nicaraguans in particular) or ERP cadres.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability: Between the end of 1979 and 1984 the FPL succeeded to a large extent in maintaining a high degree of control over sparsely populated rural areas in northern Chalatenango, but only against sporadic and generally brief and weak military incursions by government forces. The latest

El Salvador - Group FPL

- 299 -

successful attack in FPL areas, the destruction of the El Paraiso military headquarters on January 1, 1984, may have been a combined operation with other FMLN elements. In the urban areas FPL terrorist cells have consistently been engaged in kidnappings, some successful and spectacular, and in the killing of an U.S. military adviser in 1983, but in most cases those attacks were directed against unprotected or unsuspectful individuals and did not involve significant combat.

ii) Discipline: So long as Carpio lived, the FPL retained a high degree of internal discipline, which was almost completely, if temporarily, lost toward the end of 1983. Against consistent FMLN policy of releasing captured army members, the FPL in 1983 has engaged in a number of killings of prisoners, and the discipline in Chalatenango's FPL areas had apparently broken down completely by December 1983, when ERP units were rumored to have imposed "martial law" on FPL units. In addition, the urban "front" of FPL, the "Clara Elisabeth Ramirez Metropolitan Front" (CERF) apparently broke away from the FPL and engaged in a series of terrorist acts, some which were promptly condemned by the FPL leadership. Deserters from FPL ranks in 1984 mentioned frequent public "executions" in the group's camps -- another indication of weakening of discipline.

Training

Most FPL cadres were trained abroad, mostly in Cuba, Nicaragua, Lebanon, Libya, and probably North Korea. Middle level cadres and rank and file elements were trained in remote camps near the Honduras border or even within Honduras. In all cases the instructors were a mixture of foreigners and some Salvadorans. Foreign trainers, including U.S., Mexican, South American, and Nicaraguan nationals are in FPL camps at all times.

Financial Resources

Before 1979, when Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, and the Soviet block began channelling large amounts of funds and supplies to the FPL (and the FMLN in general), a large part of the group's fund came from terrorist activities, mostly bank robberies and ransoms from kidnappings. Peasants in FPL-controlled areas, as well as travelers on the roads in those areas are consistently forced to pay "revolutionary taxes," and some funds come from wealthy families whose members are involved in FPL activities, and from radical elements of the Church.

The EPR, through its use of union dues, also contributed to the FPL war effort until its loss of membership and resources in 1980. Altogether, even before external aid started in earnest by the end of 1980, the FPL probably had a "budget" on the order of tens of millions of U.S. dollars.

Equipment and Supplies

Until the first half of 1981 the FPL was the best armed FMLN group, mostly due to Carpio's relative control over the distribution of external supplies.

Among frequent items used are G-3 and M-16 rifles, as well as Galil rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, HR-21 and M-60 machine guns, 81mm mortars, 90mm cannons, and excellent communications equipment.

Since the end of 1983 it appears that food and medicine supplies in FPL areas have declined in volume to the level of a quasi-permanent crisis.

Most of the FPL weapons were provided by Cuba, the Soviet bloc, Vietnam, and Libya.

Dependence on External Support

Until 1979 the FPL was largely independent of external pressures, since it was able to more or less satisfy its still limited needs. Since then, however, dependence on help from abroad increased to the extent that Nicaragua and Cuba were able to pressure Carpio into policies he did not normally agree with, and finally to remove him from his position in DRU and FPL. The loss of autonomy and of the historical leader may have resulted in the FPL's now being unable to continue significant operations, or even to survive without foreign help.

Relations with Other Groups

During the 1970s the FPL was not only the largest but also the most influential group within the Salvadoran violent Left. In May 1975, following the violent conflicts within ERP and then between that group and the FARN, FPL intervened to force the two to accept a truce (i.e., to cease trying to liquidate each other's leadership). The balance of power within the Left changed after 1979, but Carpio was unable to accept that fact, and his organization has consistently disrupted the FMLN's attempts at increased unity. Tactically, FPL formed shifting coalitions with various other groups, intended to increase its own influence. Thus it joined with the PCES and FARN in the DRU, trying to minimize the impact of ERP's membership by postponing it. It supported the PRTC against opposition from FARN when the former tried to join the FMLN, and at the end of 1980 it reached an agreement with ERP and the PCES regarding decisionmaking within the FMLN (democratic centralism rather than consensus), thus prompting FARN's temporary departure from the FMLN.

Today, following the destruction of the leadership, it appears that FPL is increasingly under the influence and perhaps even control of ERP. This has

El Salvador - Group FPL
- 302 -

prompted a dissent faction to leave the FPL and to reject the FMLT, forming the Movimiento Obrero Revolucionario Cayetano Carpio (MOR), centered around the CERF, and involved in terrorist actions in San Salvador and Santa Tecla.

Extent and Structure of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

The areas of FPL influence are described by Leonel Gonzalez as "zones of control." They are located in the Chalatenango, Cuscatlan, and San Vicente departments, and the FPL claimed to have established local administrative bodies there, the so-called "people's governments." These areas are divided into cantons, comprising 700-800 families, and BPR retains its existence. Local "elections" were staged in 1982 and 1983, for a "people's assembly," claiming to also include non-FPL elements. The assembly is said to elect a local administrative body (junta), which controls the community, and is composed of a president, a secretary for "legal affairs," and officials in charge of production, education, and "social affairs." The guerrillas control schools, used for indoctrination of children as well as illiterate adults, have rudimentary clinics, and control the production of staples and distribution of land.

About eight such juntas are said to have formed a "people's government" led by "the most responsible and combative companeros, those with acknowledged moral standing, conscientious militancy, and a high revolutionary spirit." To the extent that such local and regional bodies exist, and represent FPL's attitude toward the future structure of the country as a whole, they appear to be run along typical communist lines. On the other hand, the size of the FPL areas is fluctuating continuously, and appears to be shrinking since the end of 1983.

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 303 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo
- b) In English : People's Revolutionary Army
- c) Acronym or known name : ERP

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : El Salvador
- b) Others : ERP is the most active Salvadoran guerrilla group in Honduras, where it controlled Cinchonero operations and probably played the main role in establishing that group. Headquarters are in Managua, with significant propaganda activities carried out of Mexico.

Original Organization and Date of Formation

ERP was established in a number of stages beginning in 1970, by dissident elements of PCES's youth organization (Juventud Comunista) and radicalized members of the Christian Democratic youth branch and Accion Cristiana group. It was initially known as "The Group" (El Grupo), and it was involved in some of the first major terrorist acts in El Salvador (such as the kidnapping of Ernesto Regalado in 1971). By 1974-1975 it had evolved into the ERP. In May 1975 the ERP suffered a serious split which resulted in the creation of FARN by a dissident faction. In 1977 a major purge occurred at the first Congress of the Partido de la Revolucion Salvadorena (Party of the Salvadoran Revolution -- PRS) when the founder and main leader of ERP, Sebastian Urquilla, was eliminated, together with Carlos Humberto Portillo (alias Mario Vladimir Rogel).

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 304 -

Front Organizations

The Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero (28th of February Popular Leagues -- LP-28) was established in 1977 as ERP's reply to the BPR and FAPU. LP-28 took its name from the 1977 violent clashes between frustrated supporters of UNO's presidential candidate, Colonel Ernesto Claramount, and the authorities. Unlike the BPR, the LP-28 had no extensive means to create chaos and civil violence on its own, and it was not as autonomous as FAPU or the BPR. The membership of the LP-28, which only included minor unions and student organizations, was about a few thousands at most, toward the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, the height of the group's activities. Most members were revolutionary students (including high school students) and middle-class elements, with a particularly high representation of women.

Auxiliary Organization

In 1977, the PRS was established to: (a) provide a pretext for the already dominant Villalobos clique to take complete control from the Sebastian Urquilla faction of ERP founders; (b) counter FARN, FPL, and PCES accusations that the ERP was a strictly "militarist" group that disregarded "political work"; (c) make the ERP legitimate in the eyes of Cuba and other communist countries whose help ERP sought; and (d) demonstrate ERP's Marxist Leninist character.

For the most part, the PRS is symbolic. It is led and controlled by Villalobos and has no importance insofar as ERP operations are concerned, except that its leaders are also ERP's leaders. Attempts to put some flesh on the PRS are still under way. Villalobos announced a Central Committee Plenum in October 1981, the first in at least two years. More importantly, the Plenum was announced three months after the fact (July 1981). Villalobos claimed that the "top body

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 305 -

[had] not met for two years to evaluate the development and role of the organization in the process because of the revolutionary war." In 1984 another PRS meeting was mentioned, and Villalobos was "elected" secretary-general of the party. In October 1981, Villalobos announced the members of PRS's political commission: Villalobos, Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Ana Sonia Medina Arriola ("Mariana"), Mercedes del Carmen Letona ("Luisa"), Claudio Rabindranath Armijo ("Francisco"), Juan Ramon Medrano ("Balta"), and Jorge Melendez ("Jonas"). In his 24 October 1981 speech at the ERP "Rafael Antonio Arce Zavala" military school, Villalobos mentioned the following as ERP leaders: Ana Guadalupe Martinez, "Mariana," "Luisa," "Francisco," "Balta," "Jonas," and Villalobos.

Membership

ERP has more fighters than any FMLN member (about 3,000), including defectors from FPL and de facto controlled formations from PRTC and PCES. Traditional analytical wisdom in the U.S. and elsewhere in the West considers ERP the second largest, "but most military effective" FMLN element. However, since Carpio's death and the subsequent collapse of the FPL, and perhaps since the strange death of FARN's Ernesto Jovel in September 1980, the ERP has controlled a few FMLN elements so tightly they could be considered incorporated by it.

At the end of 1984, the ERP could conceivably control 50 per cent of the total FMLN guerrilla forces in rural areas, and have a membership close to 40 per cent of that total. That would place the ERP at about 3,000 members with perhaps as many as 2,000 more operating under its field commanders or following its general strategy.

El Salvador - Group ERP

- 306 -

Cadres

There are between 500-800 ERP cadres. They are extremely well motivated and have a coherent ideology. Many are foreigners, including some in quite prominent positions. Belgian Jesuit priest, Rogelio Ponceel is often described as the "ideologue" of ERP but Villalobos would never allow anyone define his group's orientation but himself. Nationals of the U.S., Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador are known to have joined ERP groups in Morazan. Some are combatants, but most are administrative, logistical, and medical cadres.

Leadership

Contrary to most external impressions, very little is known about ERP's leadership. It was only in 1976 that Sebastian Urquilla was revealed as ERP's leader, but he was formally removed from that position one year later. Very few have realized the importance of Joaquin Villalobos. Moreover, some analysts as well as the Left have given far too much importance to Roque Dalton Garcia.

a) Name and background: Joaquin Villalobos Hueso, alias "Rene Cruz," has been ERP's leader since 1977. Born in 1953 in San Salvador to a middle-class family with devote Christian inclinations, he enrolled in the National University in San Salvador to study economics. Villalobos eventually dropped out of school, but remained politically active at the university. By 1971 he began organizing would-be guerrilla groups among students. He was one of the initial members of the ERP (and of "El Grupo" before it). In 1973 Villalobos went underground. He became a member of ERP's "military staff," and according to the 1980 testimony of Ernesto Jovel, he was directly involved in the murder of Roque Dalton. Villalobos also may have killed Dalton's fellow "revisionist, CIA and Cuban

intelligence agent" Armando Arteaga, alias "Pancho." He seems to be the most violently inclined leader of the Salvadoran Left. In 1978 he murdered a prominent PCES union boss in order to force the communists into violent actions. Villalobos also may have been involved in Carpio's "suicide", although to what extent is unclear. Most likely the Nicaraguan and Cuban regimes had more to do with it, but he and Jorge Shafik Handal were the main beneficiaries of it.

Unlike most of his fellow FMLN leaders, Villalobos has military interests, talent, and training; consequently, he is the main strategic and tactical brain of the entire Salvadoran Left. In regard to the October 15-17, 1979 and the January 1981 attempted insurrections, Villalobos succeeded in "justifying" the October 1979 attempt and blaming others (mostly Carpio) for the January 1981 failure. He is the only one of the five official FMLN top leaders to live more than sporadically in El Salvador, although, even he spends most his his time in Nicaragua rather than in Morazan.

Villalobos, more than any other major Salvadoran leader, lacks any scruples, consistency, or personal credibility. He "justified" killing Roque Dalton by blaming Sebastian Urquilla, and he justifies ERP's historic "militarist" approach to revolutionary action by blaming it on Urquilla, Portillo, and everyone but himself. Daring takeovers of other groups' leadership, such as the failed attempt to murder all FARN leaders in May 1975, and his placing weak puppets at the top of FPL after Carpio's death, are his trademarks. Villalobos combines personal courage and risk taking with a particularly pronounced inclination toward violence against fellow leftist rivals.

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 308 -

More a terrorist than a theoretician, Villalobos's only publications are interviews, a foreword to the propagandistic work of his second-in-command, Ana Guadalupe Martinez (El Salvador's Clandestine Prisons, laureate of Cuba's Casa de Las Americas publishing house). He has also published a few pieces in Granma and leftist Mexican journals, such as Punto Final.

b) Name and background: Ana Guadalupe Martinez was born the same year as Villalobos (1953), and was a dropout of the University of San Salvador Medical School. In 1973 she joined ERP and two years later became the main field commander of the (then irrelevant) "eastern front." She was arrested in 1976 and released (according to Martinez, after having been raped and tortured) in exchange for a kidnapped victim who was killed by ERP before the final arrangements were reached, but after Ana Guadalupe Martinez was safe. She then spent almost three years in Algeria, contacting radicals and terrorists from almost all over the world. These contacts have served her well, as she is currently one of the main FDR spokespersons on international affairs. Her book was published and awarded a prize in Cuba. It is a propaganda piece, widely received by many non-Marxists as an accurate description of the El Salvador regime in the mid-1970s.

c) Name and background: Roque Dalton Garcia, alias "Julio Delfos Marin," was not an important ERP leader or a significant Salvadoran revolutionary theoretician. However, since his death he has become a hero to many revolutionary leftists in El Salvador and the cause of many disputes, sub rosa, between ERP and all other FMLN groups.

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 309 -

Dalton was born to a prominent land-holding family on 14 May 1935. He studied at the exclusive Jesuit-run San Jose Day School. Upon graduation, he claimed an interest in law, and enrolled in the Law School of the National University, only to drop out soon after. By 1956 he was a PCES member and involved in anti-government activities. By 1960 he had "escaped" from jail, apparently with the discreet help of the authorities. He spent the next thirteen years in Cuba and Czechoslovakia, a hero of Latin America's revolution who drank Pilsen in Prague and wrote about revolution in Havana. In December 1973 he secretly returned to El Salvador, apparently still a member of the PCES Central Committee, as well as a potential infiltrator for the party into the newly established ERP.

According to the FPL statement regarding Dalton's death and the impact it had on the ERP and FARN, Dalton only participated in one action, the takeover of a radio station. He was adept at the combination approach: he mixed terrorism with political mobilization, and thus dissented from the foguismo cum urban terrorism of the military group, e.g., the ERP faction led by Urquilla and Villalobos. According to the FPL and with respect to Carpio's idea of a true revolutionary, "Dalton's career in the organization (ERP) was that of a cadre member handicapped by excessive liberalism and indiscipline, the product of his low ideological character and of his pragmatic bourgeois tendencies." Moreover, the FPL and the ERP believed that Dalton was sent to El Salvador as a Castroite agent, in order to establish Cuban influence within ERP.

By April 1975 the conflict between Dalton and his group, which included Ernesto Jovel, and the military leaders of ERP came to a head. Dalton and Arteaga were captured and after a "trial" were shot on 10 May 1975. Jovel and two other members of FARN, then on its last stages of formation as an

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 310 -

independent group, were the victims of an unsuccessful assassination attempt by the ERP.

Today the Salvadoran and most of Latin American Marxist-Leninist Left have made Dalton a martyr of the revolution. They claim that his "poems" (actually little more than political leaflets in verse) make him one of the most prominent poets of his country. His straightforward political works include an extensive critique of Debray's Revolution in the Revolution?, National Reality, Fascist Dictatorship, and The National Army and Counter Revolution in El Salvador. The latter two had a significant impact upon FARN's analysis of the Armando Molina and Romero regimes.

Ideology

Until 1979, the ERP combined the Castroite foquismo with the theories of Carlos Mariella and Abraham Guillen. This was especially the case with its strongmen in the military faction and with Villalobos. In many ways the ERP also acted similarly to the Tupamaros and Montoneros. The cult of violence (its main revolutionary value) and the practice of raising "revolutionary consciousness in the masses" were combined with some tenets of the Cultural Revolution in China and North Korea, as well as with Maoism in general -- i.e., hostility toward the U.S.S.R. because of its "revisionism" and toward Cuba because it was seen as Moscow's puppet. Since 1979, however, and particularly during 1980, the ERP has been influenced increasingly by Nicaragua and Cuba. Differences between ERP and other FMLN umbrella groups still exist, but they are on tactical matters rather than ideological ones.

The PRS's first Congress in 1977 noted "the absence of a party structure and of a greater solidity in the political analysis" and that "it was toward the end of 1974 when [the party] started to develop a more serious analysis of the Salvadoran society." However, the "more serious" political analysis centered exclusively on the conquest of power, not on the policies that were to be pursued beyond that point. By admitting that a "correct" analysis of the Salvadoran society, classes, and history, was necessary, the PRS, i.e., the ERP, also was admitting the lack of a theoretical and philosophical basis for its violent undertakings.

In 1977 the ERP-PRS also discovered that "the Latin American revolution [had] suffered much from having badly assimilated its own and foreign revolutionary experiences, [and it would have to consider] Lenin's teachings on the necessity of the Party, of the analysis and revolutionary theory as essential instruments of the working classes in the revolutionary struggle." PRS also decided that "there [was] a necessity to establish, together with the Marxist-Leninist forces, a continental strategy related to the anti-imperialist aspect of the revolution. "This was in line with ERP's belief that the main enemy of the Salvadoran (and Latin American) revolution is U.S. "imperialism," rather than local and national regimes.

The PRS also decided that the Salvadoran society "[lived] in a revolutionary situation, rooted in its own contradictions." The logical corollary of such an analysis, within a Leninist context, is that insurrection was possible.

However, in 1977 the PRS also declared that "the continental strategy (or revolution) does not mean tying the revolution to the seesaw of the struggle for world hegemony between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., converting the revolutions in fields for disputes of that hegemony." Such claims have misleadingly led some

analysts to define the ERP as "Maoist," when in fact it only tried, briefly and half-heartedly to maintain autonomy from the embrace of Cuba and the U.S.S.R.

By 1979-1980, the ERP, as a member of the DRU, FMLN, and CRM, became openly supportive of all Soviet international positions, and it has ceased describing the U.S.S.R. as only one of the two superpowers. ERP's road toward Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy ended when it subscribed to the FMLN, DRU, and FDR declarations, as well as to those of the PCES, the party it had long accused of petty bourgeois tendencies and of being a tool of "hegemonism," i.e., Moscow.

Program

Insofar as a coherent program existed, it was centered on the conquest of power in the name of the "masses" in order to establish a strict communist system. Its main aims were the destruction of "large" industrial and agricultural firms and enterprises, the elimination of the presence of most foreign companies in El Salvador, an undefined "land reform" that claimed it would give the land to the peasants, and the introduction of universal education, health services, etc.

Since its inception, ERP had been hostile to elections and the electoral process. During the first days of the post-October 1979 junta, it tried to start an insurrection. This was consistent with ERP's historical hostility toward incremental change and reform.

When the DRU, FMLN, and FDR were created, the ERP began to support their domestic and foreign programs publicly. ERP had been generally independent from and sometimes publicly dissatisfied with Havana, but since 1980 it has changed its approach radically. Villalobos is now close to Castro and receives significant aid and political support from Cuba.

Propaganda

Technically and in terms of scope, ERP's propaganda network is the most sophisticated of all Salvadoran guerrilla groups. Its importance is underscored by the fact that Radio Venceremos is controlled by Mercedes del Carmen Letona "Luisa," a member of the national ERP-PRS leadership. Also, second-in-command, Ana Guadalupe Martinez is involved exclusively in propaganda abroad for the FDR.

ERP's main instrument of propaganda is Radio Venceremos, which broadcasts on a 40-meter band, three hours a day, seven days a week, AM and FM. Its location is difficult to assess, since ERP claims it is in Morazan, while El Salvador's government claims it is in Nicaragua. It appears that most of Radio Venceremos is in El Salvador, with some relay stations in San Salvador. It has an extensive staff and its own armed guard which also operates as a military unit.

Officially, Radio Venceremos is the station of FMLN. FPL has its own station, Radio Farabundo Marti. PCES, FARN, and PRTC also use Venceremos, although they do not control it. Radio Guazapa is an ERP station, but it has a limited range and broadcasts infrequently.

As for printed propaganda, ERP publishes periodic bulletins and LP-28 publishes an irregular information bulletin as well as the more regular "Ligas Populares."

ERP has other propaganda outlets in addition to its well-known ones. Until 1983, it had successfully penetrated and controlled the self-appointed El Salvador Commission for Human Rights, whose leader was Marianella Garcia Diaz. Although she was apparently a FARN member, she was killed while in action with an ERP unit. There had been strong competition for control of the commission from the FPL. ERP controlled most of the human rights commission's propaganda work

El Salvador - Group ERP

- 314 -

abroad. Marianella Garcia appeared to have cooperated mostly, but not exclusively, with ERP, according to Salvadoran military sources.

Views on Violence

ERP has been by far the most consistently violence-oriented group in El Salvador. In addition, it appears less concerned with casualties, its own as well as civilians, than the other FMLN members. The main characteristic of ERP's approach to revolutionary violence is the "triumfalismo": the perception that victory is within immediate reach, and that only a last effort, regardless of the cost, is needed to reach it.

When "El Grupo" was formed, ERP engaged in urban terrorism based on the Southern Cone model, in the hope that it would ultimately serve to radicalize the "masses." After the October 1979 coup d'etat, ERP believed that the "masses" were radicalized enough to support an insurrection based on the Nicaraguan model. It tried to create an insurrection in San Salvador's slums, which failed. This has resulted in mostly civilian casualties, but also in the loss of at least one prominent ERP commander.

In January 1981, days before the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan, ERP managed to attract Cuban and Nicaraguan support for a new bid at insurrection. The group was in the forefront of the "final offensive," but failed once again. Two years later, Villalobos attempted to explain the failure by saying the ERP had followed the notion of "rebellion of the masses." The aim was "not to annihilate the army but to incite the masses to rebellion, and, based on this rebellion, to go on to other tactics. . . the key thing was to incite the masses to rebel, which would create a problem for the military." Most importantly, however, (and more plausibly as well) Villalobos defined the failed offensive as "the

Salvadoran revolutionary movement's letter of introduction at the international level." Once the offensive failed, ERP adopted a war of positions, to protect its rear areas. It admitted that it had to separate its units from each other due to its inability in establishing a single controlled area. Once again in March 1982, on the occasion of the elections, ERP reverted to insurrectionary tactics, described as follows by Villalobos: "We had to fight a strategic battle so that we could at least weaken the electoral results. . . By obtaining a military victory somewhere in the country, in order to unleash the masses' insurrectional movement there." The ERP chose the town of Usulután, and despite using (according to Villalobos) more than 500 fighters, failed to occupy the whole town or the military headquarters. Since then, Villalobos has defined ERP's aims as "to defeat the army. . . . It was necessary to become more effective in the military area: to go from the defense of positions to a war of motion, to go from the dispersion to the concentration of forces."

In December 1982, Villalobos claimed that "certain forces within the Salvadoran revolutionary movement followed the mistaken policy of physically annihilating the enemy." However, he justified annihilation by stating that "the need to strike at the henchman or execute a traitor arose logically within the framework of the original insurrectional spirit."

ERP has been consistently accused by other Salvadoran guerrilla groups of "militarism" and a total reliance on force in the reaching of its goal. By 1981-1982, the group claimed to have taken a self-critical position and eradicated the problem. Villalobos stated that "militarism," which he blamed solely on Urquilla and the pre-1977 PRS Congress leadership, was eliminated; that it was Urquilla, and his "hegemonic ambitions" that had prevented ERP from reaching internal democracy. Instead Urquilla had encouraged factionalism, "sectarism," and

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 316 -

"adventurism," (Carlos Humberto Portillo, alias "Mario Vladimir Rogel" was "adventurism's" foremost spokesman) as well as summary executions in seeking to solve political disputes. Because of Urquilla's urgings, prestigious members of ERP were assassinated, among them the poet Roque Dalton. It is a well-known fact that Villalobos was involved in Dalton's killing, and that ERP was opposed to any combination of military and non-military tactics as late as 1981; therefore, Villalobos' claims are less than convincing. However, they did indicate a reassessment of ERP tactics in the past three years.

Performance

a) Recruitment: Most ERP cadres are of middle-class background or are university dropouts and professionals. Some are from radicalized Christian backgrounds. Recruitment continues among the same groups, through threats and blackmail as well as promises for future power. Rank and file elements are generally workers. In some rural areas, particularly northern Morazan, they are mostly peasants. The cadres, as well as the rank and file are young. The average age is in the mid-twenties. Some rank and file members, particularly since 1983, were forcibly recruited from the population. These were mostly peasants in the areas under ERP control (temporarily).

ERP has the highest proportion of women in important positions of all guerrilla group in El Salvador: three out of seven ERP-PRS main leaders are women. This fact is balanced, however, by the fact that absolute power is concentrated in Joaquin Villalobos's hands.

b) Indoctrination

i) More than any other FMLN group, with the exception of the PCES, ERP insists on extended and deep indoctrination of its cadres and most rank and file. Indoctrination takes place with the active and widespread support of revolutionary Catholic priests, who combine the religious peasants' respect for the cassock with their own dedication to Villalobos's aims and strategy. Because it had larger areas under control for a longer time than all FMLN groups, except for FPL, ERP was able to establish quasi-permanent indoctrination centers ("schools"), in Morazan. The most prominent is the "Rafael Arce Zablah" Military School in Morazan, which actually prepares political cadres as well as field commanders. Thus, addressing the Rafael Arce School "graduates" in October 1981, Villalobos was able to claim that "this school is part of a great structure. . . there are students, instructors, a principal; there are personnel for services, logistics, and carriers; and this structure exists throughout the territories where we have established political and military control."

ii) Use of schools and universities: The LP-28 includes members of such groups as the Ligas Populares Obreras de Estudiantes de Secundaria (Popular Working League of Secondary School Students) and Ligas Populares Universitarias (University Popular Leagues). ERP has even established "vocational" schools in areas under its control, mostly with the aim of training would-be recruits militarily as well as politically.

iii) Use of religious institutions: ERP is less closely linked to radical elements of the Catholic Church than FARN. But, ERP has a large number of individual priests in its ranks, who play important propaganda, indoctrination, and possibly financial roles.

iv) Use of unions: ERP had only a shaky connection with most important unions. However, the LP-28 had a few minor unions as members, that included students (university as well as high school).

v) Use of foreign cadres: ERP has many foreigners in its ranks, mostly as cadres. Extensive, consistent but unconfirmed rumors of the presence of blacks in ERP ranks may indicate the presence of Cubans or South Americans. Known members of ERP include Belgians, Dutchmen, Mexicans, Ecuadorans, Nicaraguans, Italians, U.S. citizens, and Spaniards. A few engage in combat, but most are propaganda and indoctrination cadres, doctors, "teachers," and technical experts (mostly on the Radio Veneceremos staff).

Military Structure

The ERP forces are divided into guerrilla groups which are mobile and could be geographically shifted, militias (which are local), specialized units or commandos, urban terrorist cells, and the quasi-regular, elite, Rafael Antonio Arce Zablah Brigade -- BRAZ. BRAZ operates mostly in the departments of Morazan, La Union, Usulután and San Vicente. Some terrorist cells, safe houses, and ERP installations were found in San Salvador as late as 1984. In most cases the political and military command tasks overlap, with front or large-unit commanders in charge of political work as well.

Motivation and Performance

The rank and file's motivation rests in a desire to share in ERP's well-established military prowess. For leaders absolute power appears to be the essential motivating factor. The link between the two, and an important factor in raising ERP morale, is that, unlike other FMLN groups, ERP still keeps many of

its prominent leaders in the field. Even Villalobos, although living in Nicaragua most of the time since 1981, appears often in the field, particularly in Morazan. "Jonas," "Claudio," and "Luisa," are also mostly in the field, despite their high ranks.

However in 1982, "Alejandro Montenegro," the alias of Arquimedes Canadas and ERP's main commander in the Guazapa area defected from the group. This indicates that even commanders are vulnerable to personal and ideological disaffection and discouragement in the face of some realities. It may also indicate declining popular support for FMLN and for ERP. Yet, despite such a high ranking and probably painful disaffection and some very serious conflicts between Villalobos and some of his main field commanders, ERP general discipline remains higher than that of most FMLN elements. Also, its combat performance did not decline significantly after the political and military setbacks of 1982-1984.

Weapons Sophistication

Since 1981 (and particularly since 1983), the ERP has been better equipped than most FMLN groups. This is due mostly to its own proved military abilities and Villalobos's ability to prove to Cuba and the U.S.S.R. his group's usefulness. Moreover, as today's dominant FMLN group, ERP is able to retain most of the umbrella organization's best weapons.

Financial Resources

For the 1971-1980 period, most of ERP's resources derived from kidnappings, bank robberies, and theft -- i.e., "war taxes" extracted on the roads and highways, in addition to funds provided by sympathetic clergymen and some external supporters. Since 1980 most of the funds or weapons have come directly

from Cuba and the Soviet bloc and its Third World allies and satellites (Vietnam, North Korea, Ethiopia, the PLO, Libya, South Yemen, etc.), as well as from foreign terrorist groups. The Basque ETA openly claimed that it provided ERP with \$250,000 in 1982. From kidnappings alone in (1977 Poma provided \$2 million, in 1979 Hill provided \$5 million) ERP was able to finance most of its operations before its expansion in 1979-1980.

The Red Cross and Caritas (particularly the latter) provide significant aid to ERP through help to Salvadoran "refugees" in Honduras. Most of these "refugees" camps are penetrated, if not controlled by ERP as well as the FPL. In addition, ERP local units extract payments from coffee planters in exchange for allowing them to harvest and transport the products in areas like Usulután and San Vicente.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication: ERP's equipment and supplies are on a par with the Salvadoran army, with the prominent exception of combat aircraft. They include G-3, M-16, and Galil rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, HR-21 and M-60 machine guns, 81-mm mortars, 90-mm canons, and TRC-7 radios captured from government armed forces or purchased abroad.

b) Volume: All indications are that sufficient equipment is now provided by disloyal, fleeing, or captured army troops and by external suppliers. Necessary supplies of food, clothing, and medicine remain problematical.

c) Reliability: The group's equipment and weapon supplies are fairly reliable. It has easier logistics than other groups, given its areas of operations proximity to Nicaragua and the sea.

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 321 -

d) Origin: Cuba has acted as broker for arms supplies to all FMLN groups, from Vietnam, Soviet bloc, and radical Arab countries. It ships these supplies to El Salvador through Nicaragua. The Salvadoran army also supplies, willingly or unwillingly, a large portion of ERP arms.

External Support

According to a number of sources, including Alejandro Montenegro and other deserters from ERP, by 1980 Cuban advisers had become essential in preparing ERP for operations, down to the tactical level. The eight-man team that destroyed a large number of aircraft at the Illopango Air Base in 1982 had been trained in Cuba and infiltrated through Nicaragua and Honduras. Weapons come from Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., East Germany, North Korea, and Vietnam. Additional training is provided by individuals from South American, West European, and even Asian countries, as well as from the U.S. Like other Salvadoran groups, the ERP seems to be able to sustain a lower level of operational effectiveness for an extended period without external support. But without this support it could not increase the effectiveness of its military forces.

Cuban and Nicaraguan support has expanded up to the planning of tactical operations, and includes political and recruitment assessments usually done in Managua by Cuban experts.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: ERP has historically accused the PCES of being a docile and submissive tool of Moscow, while at the same time using some of its dissatisfied cadres as its own. The FPL was regarded, at least until 1979 as the

main leftist force in El Salvador. In 1975 the ERP was prepared to accept at least formally FPL's intervention in the ERP-FARN conflict. FARN is considered the treasonous splinter of ERP, and the ERP was involved in killing FARN cadres and at least one PCES union leader. It is not impossible that ERP was involved in the death of Ernesto Jovel in September 1980.

ii) Regional: ERP not only considers the Salvadoran civil war a small part of the more general Central American "revolution," but it also actively participated on FSLN's side in the Nicaraguan civil war and engaged in terrorist acts on its behalf in El Salvador. Similarly, ERP is deeply involved in Honduran revolutionary politics. In fact, the Cinchoneros performed their most spectacular terrorist act, the kidnapping at the San Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce, in order to secure the release of some ERP cadres, including Alejandro Montenegro.

iii) Continental: ERP has ties with radical South American groups, including the Tupamaros (Uruguay), MIR (Chile), and the Montoneros (Argentina). Literature includes early references to the "Latin American Revolution."

b) Extrahemispheric: ERP had brief relations with Communist China. It has declared solidarity with the Palestinian people, and has demanded that the Salvadoran government recognize the PLO. It also has relations with George Habash's FPLP and with other radical Arab states, or groups, as well as with the Soviet bloc nations and Vietnam. The group known ties with ETA and probably with the Red Brigades, and the German Red Army Faction. In addition, ERP cadres were trained in Lebanon in Al Fatah and PFLP camps, and the group has received financial help from the ETA, PLO, and perhaps some West European groups such as the IRA.

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 323 -

Areas under Guerrilla Control

ERP has controlled areas in the most remote parts of Morazan, La Union, San Vicente, and Usulután departments since 1980. It does not claim to have established "people's government" structure there; however, it has established control over administration, education, health, and particularly production -- i.e., collectivization of villages, harvesting and marketing of coffee for financing the group, etc.

Considering ERP's continuous indoctrination and use of children some as young as eight years of age, it is clear that the group seeks permanent control and a long-term influence in some areas.

In some villages and small towns ERP allows local authorities to continue in office, provided they cooperate with its forces. In others it has established direct control, including extensive training camps, military camps, "schools," and economic control instruments. Local "committees" are often established to control existing officials or to run the communities.

Dependence on a Charismatic Leader

Despite ERP's high level of organization, the group's coherence is highly dependent upon Joaquin Villalobos. His removal would most likely result in internal conflicts, particularly between the mostly internally based field commanders, like Melendez ("Jonas") and external propaganda-oriented figures, like Ana Guadalupe Martinez.

Remarks

Today ERP is the largest, most powerful, and influential group within the FMLN-FDR structure. It controls most of the FPL, has field control over PCES

El Salvador - Group ERP
- 324 -

and PRTC units, and outnumbers FARN as well. In addition, it controls Radio Venceremos and appears to established itself successfully as the main receiver of Cuban, Soviet bloc, and Nicaraguan help. How long ERP will retain these advantages remains to be seen, but for now it is the main center of revolutionary violence in El Salvador.

El Salvador - Group FARN
- 325 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional
- b) In English : Armed Forces of National Resistance
- c) Acronym or known name : FARN

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : El Salvador
- b) Others : FARN is active in Honduras and Mexico, and it has close ties with at least one Guatemalan guerrilla group; some of its headquarters are located in Nicaragua. The group operates from Panama on financial matters.

Original Organization and Date of Formation

FARN and its political auxiliary Partido de la Resistencia Nacional (Party of National Resistance -- RN) began coalescing early in the Spring of 1975 as a faction within the ERP. In April 1975 ERP had an internal crisis that resulted in the deaths of Roque Dalton and Armando Arteaga, and the attempted assassination of Ernesto Jovel by the majority faction of Urquille and Villalobos. This finalized FARN's break with ERP and immediately led to its formation as an independent guerrilla group.

Front Organizations

The United People's Action Front (Frente de Accion Popular Unido --FAPU) was initially created under the direct auspices of radicalized Jesuits, such as Rutilio Grande and Jose Alas. They put together an ad hoc coalition of peasants, radical teachers, students, and teenagers, as FAPU to stop the construction of the Cerron Grande Dam. Their pretext was that the dam would result in the eviction

El Salvador - Group FARN

- 326 -

of as many as 15,000 peasants from their land, despite the fact that the project would also provide jobs and energy, as well as encourage development throughout the country. Shunned by the PCES, FAPU fell into organizational disrepair until 1976 when it was reorganized and strengthened as a front for FARN. FAPU's constituent groups include of, FENASTRAS, some smaller teachers' unions, and most importantly the Church-created, directed, and indoctrinated Church Base Communities (Comunidades Eclesiales de Base -- CEBs). The main stronghold of FAPU before its concentration on urban activities in 1979-1980 was the Suchitoto area.

During 1979-1980 FAPU was actively involved in terrorist actions: the occupation of churches and embassies, violent demonstrations, and other activities similar to those of BPR, LP-28, UDN, and MLP. It was led by Augusto Coto, a Protestant minister, until his death in a (most likely staged) plane "accident" on 17 September 1980 (Ernesto Jovel Funes was also killed). Saul Villalta, Eduardo Calles, a public figure more than an actual leader, and Jose Napoleon Rodriguez Ruiz, a former deputy rector of the National University of El Salvador helped lead FAPU, and had significant, though not essential roles in the RN as well as formal but irrelevant roles in FARN.

In May 1980 FARN claimed it had as many as 100,000 supporters (presumably mostly FAPU members). Nevertheless, FAPU only had 20,000 sympathizers and/or members at most at its height, which made it second only to the BPR among the "popular organizations" in El Salvador.

Most FAPU members and sympathizers include middle-class elements, radical students, some urban workers, and peasants who were radicalized in rural areas by their priests.

El Salvador - Group FARN

- 327 -

FAPU often demonstrated tactical differences vis a vis FARN. Both groups had close ties with elements in the military. These apparently included some of the organizers of the October 1979 coup, and perhaps junta member Colonel Adolfo Majano.

FAPU is a member of the CRM, and has a representative (Saul Villalta) in the FDR Politico-Diplomatic Commission. Its membership has declined drastically, like that of all other "popular organizations," as cadres have fled to the hills, ordinary members have renounced violence or joined legitimate unions, and the urban infrastructure has collapsed since May 1980. Past estimates seem to indicate that as many as 16 per cent of the FARN guerrillas in the field in 1981 were initially FAPU cadres or activists.

Auxiliary Organizations

The RN is supposedly the controlling element in the FARN-FAPU-RN structure, but in fact it is little more than a political facade for FARN, and an example of lip service to the Leninist principle of party control over the military (i.e., FARN). Officially, the RN is under the leadership of a seven-member group. They are the same people in the National Leadership of FARN. The RN equivalent of orthodox Leninist parties' the Central Committee is "the extended leadership," or the top and middle-level cadres. Extended leadership meetings are convened and decided by the top seven, and they generally follow FARN's line.

Leadership

a) Name and background: Ernesto Jovel Funes was FARN's historic founder. He was a lawyer still engaged in private practice in 1975, when ERP leaders tried unsuccessfully to assassinate him. He went underground immediately after.

El Salvador - Group FARN

- 328 -

Probably born in the late 1940s, Jovel was a member of ERP's "political" faction until it was eradicated by the military wing under Urquilla and Villalobos. He seems to have retained a very strong personal animosity against Roque Dalton's killer, Joaquin Villalobos, while at the same time accepting the revolutionary demand for "unity" within the FMLN, DRU, and FDR. In an interview published posthumously, Jovel admitted that it was "very difficult" for him to work with Villalobos, and reiterated his accusation that the latter was indeed the person who killed Dalton with his own hand.

Despite his background, Jovel encouraged rumors that he was a textile worker, probably to polish his "proletarian" credentials. As long as he was the supreme FARN leader, the group retained its traditional distrust toward the FPL and particularly ERP. Just before his death Jovel actually took FARN out of the DRU. The decision was taken, according to FARN, in July and following a meeting of the "expanded leadership." Interestingly enough, the decision to return to DRU, announced on 23 October 1980, a few weeks after Jovel's death, appears to have been made by Jovel's successor, Ferman Cienfuegos on his own. Public polemics started between FARN and FPL and ERP during the last month of Jovel's life. Therefore, his death in a plane "accident" on 17 September 1980, was extremely convenient for FPL and its leader, Cayetano Carpio, who was then trying to take over the DRU leadership, as well as for Villalobos, Jovel's long-time personal enemy.

b) Name and background: Ferman Cienfuegos, the alias of Eduardo Sancho Castaneda, was born in Costa Rica in 1947. After graduating from the National University of El Salvador, he became a professor of art history and architecture, as well as an employee of the Ministry of Education. In 1970, he participated in

El Salvador - Group FARN
- 329 -

the formation of "El Grupo." Concurrently, he was a member of the PCES youth branch.

One of the FARN founders in 1975, he became second-in-command to Jovel and immediately succeeded the latter after his 1980 death. Cienfuegos personally appears to have close ties to the Cuban DGI and Soviet KGB, particularly in Mexico, and with the violent splinters of the Guatemalan PGT and the FAR. Such connections may explain why he, among the five top FMLN leaders, appears to be mostly involved in foreign affairs. Less personally hostile to ERP and to Villalobos than Jovel was, he seems to have been involved in preventing Carpio from completely taking over the DRU, and in May 1981, in removing Carpio from the top leadership position of the umbrella group altogether.

Ideology

FARN's origins, a combination of radical religious elements and disaffected PCES and ERP revolutionaries, have had a lasting impact on the group's ideology. Regarding the Church, Jovel stated that "Our policy toward the Church is clear, precise and well defined -- we respect freedom of religion, freedom of worship. . . . In particular we consider that the Church of the poor, the Church represented by the Archbishop of San Salvador, Monsenor Oscar Arnulfo Romero, plays a progressive, valiant role in the struggle of the people, and has its place in the Salvadoran Democratic Revolution." It is also significant to note that Augusto Coto, FARN's representative in the FDR Politico-Diplomatic Commission and an important leader of the group, was a Protestant Minister and the "chaplain of FARN," until his death with Ernesto Jovel.

Regarding the military, Jovel claimed that "Within the Armed Forces there is a sector of young officers, honorable and patriotic whom. . .we exhort to immediately abandon the fascist leaders. . . ." "Immediately after the 1979 coup, FARN and FAPU, together with the PCES, were in the forefront of an attempt to infiltrate or at least ally themselves with the new military leaders, particularly the group represented by Colonel Adolfo Majano. Defining the Salvadoran "revolution," FARN leader Julia Rodriguez claimed that "Our revolution is Salvadoran, very much ours; nobody would decide what we have to do or how we should do it. . . . Of course, this does not mean that we will reject the experience of other peoples which today are masters of their destiny, but on the contrary; we try to understand their experiences".

Despite claiming that it is Leninist in character, FARN withdrew temporarily from the DRU because it did not accept the FPL-PCES-ERP attempt to impose "democratic centralism" as the decision-making principle within that umbrella organization.

The FARN policy on front organizations and its analysis of the pre-October 1979 coup period distinguished it from all other FMLN groups. Unlike the PCES, FARN has always considered violence as necessary; however, unlike ERP it has considered a policy of wide alliances with the middle class, the Church, and even military elements as equally necessary. Unlike the FPL it did not consider that the Marxist Leninists could, or should try to conquer power in El Salvador by themselves; unlike the PRTC it did not adopt a directly and openly regionalist approach.

El Salvador - Group FARN
- 331 -

Like other FMLN elements however, FARN's ideology has since 1981 moved toward increased homogeneity with that of the other guerrilla groups, and toward a more orthodox Marxist Leninist approach.

Program

Today FARN's program is the same as FDR-FMLN's. Moreover, Jose Napoleon Rodriguez Ruiz, former deputy rector of National University, FAPU leader, and FARN member, was the principal writer of FDR's first declaration. This was little more than another version of FAPU's own statements and program.

According to FPR's analysis of the El Salvador situation, the country is in a crisis characteristic of the "dependent capitalist model" and the level of "repression" in 1980 has reached levels unseen since 1932. From this analysis, the FDR derives the following aims: to mobilize and incorporate in the "liberation" process all "honest and genuinely representative sectors of the people"; to create the awareness that only "the people" can lead its revolution; to increase the awareness of peoples and "democratic governments" throughout the world of the righteousness of the struggle of the Salvadoran people; to mobilize and channel the solidarity of those peoples and governments with the struggle of the Salvadoran people; and to denounce U.S. support for the Salvadoran government and U.S. "preparations to invade El Salvador."

Slightly more concrete in nature was the April 1980 Program Platform of the Revolutionary Democratic Government, once again a document to which FARN-FAPU had a large contribution. The aims of the Salvadoran "revolution" are to overthrow the "military reactionary dictatorship"; to bring an end to the political, economic, and social domination of the big owners of land and capital; to liquidate once and for all the economic, political, and military dependence of

the country on the "yanqui imperialism"; to ensure democratic rights and liberties for all the people, particularly for the working masses; to give to the people "through nationalization and the creation of collective and associative enterprises" the main means of production; to raise the material and cultural of living of the population; to create a new army, based on the revolutionary forces, that could include some elements ("sound, dignified and patriotic") of the present army; and to orient the country's foreign policy toward a new direction, based on the principles of independence, self-determination, solidarity, peaceful coexistence, equality in rights, and mutual respect among states.

Propaganda

FARN uses Radio Guazapa (together with ERF) and Radio Venceremos to disperse propaganda. FAPU publishes "Pueblo Internacional," while FARN issues regularly its bulletin "Parte de Guerra." Generally, FARN propaganda is less ideologically strident than that of ERP or FPL, and it seems to be directed toward urban groups more than the peasantry.

Views of Violence

FARN's public disagreement with ERP over the latter's "militarism" was the main reason for the 1975 break between the two groups. Despite its claims of pursuing a strategy of revolutionary violence combined with political mobilization, FARN specialized in urban terrorism patterned on the Tupamaros' and Montoneros' model. This strategy made FARN the richest Salvadoran terrorist group, with coffers including almost \$75 millions by 1980. Unlike some ERP and FPL kidnappings, FARN's seemed almost exclusively directed toward large ransoms rather than political impact. For this reason many of the victims were foreign

El Salvador - Group FARN
- 333 -

industrialists, such as the Japanese businessman, Fujio Matsumoto (who was killed by FARN before negotiations for his release were even completed). Urban terrorism during the late 1970s was combined with "executions" of government sympathizers and members of the paramilitary groups, e.g., ORDEN. While all FMLN groups are involved in such murders, FARN appears far more active than the others. FARN militants were accused of wearing military and paramilitary or security force uniforms while engaged in ransom murders, with the intention of having them blamed on the "death squads" or the government.

By 1980 FARN's strategy moved closer to ERP's insurreccional approach, and even took the character of ERP's "Triunfalismo." Just before his death, Ernesto Jovel claimed that "the fundamental objective (of FARN as well as the FMLN as a whole) [was] to prepare the masses for their incorporation in the insurreccional process." At the same time, Ferman Cienfuegos claimed that "at [that] moment a call from the CRM for general insurrection would represent the immediate incorporation of one hundred thousand Salvadorans in the armed struggle and the figure would triple in the following days." Such figures, to the extent that Cienfuegos or Jovel took them seriously -- and it appears that they did -- explain FARN's support for Villalobos's call to insurrection in January 1981. They are also a blatant example of "triunfalismo" and explain the collapse of the "final offensive" of January 1981.

Performance

a) Recruitment: Most FARN cadres are from the middle-class although some of them have tried to become associated with the proletariat or to reinvent their own biographies. The predominance of middle-class elements in FARN leadership is related directly to the group's origins at the National University, and from students and PCES youth members. Their association with the FARN from the beginning have made them prominent among its present leaders. Jovel, Cienfuegos, Coto, Rodriguez, and Anabel Ramos, are typical in this respect.

FARN's membership is relatively young, as are its cadres, with a probable average age around 25 years. Women play a significant role in FARN, although not as important a role as in ERP, despite the fact that at least one (Julia Rodriguez) is a member of the top leadership.

Indoctrination

FARN's indoctrination practices are centered around a few, fairly recent, political schools in the rural areas -- far less effective or extensive than those of FPL or ERP -- and the use of union or association frameworks for preparation of would-be cadres. Most prominent among those were the high school, university, and the CEBs "lay preachers" (the latter trained by Jesuits and Maryknollers sympathetic to FARN aims) in rural areas. The CEBs provided a large number of FARN cadres, as did radical Protestant elements.

Foreign Cadres

Proportionally FARN probably has fewer foreigners in its ranks than other Salvadoran revolutionary groups other than the PCES. However, there are well

El Salvador - Group FARN
- 335 -

confirmed data that Mexicans, Italians, Spaniards, Americans, and South Americans are active within FARN.

Military Structure

FARN's military structure must be viewed in conjunction with RN's structure for they overlap to a large extent and are mutually supportive.

RN is run officially by the "Council of Delegates," a body similar to the Congress in most Leninist parties. It, thus, meets infrequently and then only at the decision of the permanent leadership. The Council is presided over by the secretary-general and the "second responsible." Together they also form FARN's general military command. In addition, there are a flexible number of persons in charge of organizational work, mass work, propoganda, military problems, international aspects, and financial problems. The "amplified" leadership or directorate, which includes the formal leaders and selected cadres, serves as a consultative body on infrequent occasions. The only decision-making body is the seven-member National Executive Directorate. Regional directorates are generally centered on a three-member structure that includes a peasant, a worker, and a member of the "middle class." RN cells at the same time link the party and the terrorist units, the latter themselves organized around the cells.

FARN is structured along the following lines: the General Command, led by the general-secretary of RN and the second-in-command, heads the General Staff at the national and regional levels. The general staffs at both levels are divided into operational and military divisions, each in charge of both guerrilla and militia forces: The militias are divided into columns of about 50 members, which are divided into squads. There are five squads for each column; The "masses," that is the FARN sympathizers, are divided into brigades of "armed self-defense. These

were mostly used for introducing an armed element into FAPU demonstrations in the name of "self-defense," or as a means for engaging into military clashes with the authorities. The basic operational unit is the guerrilla unit, which is divided into sections of about 25 members. These sections may be combined for larger operations that involve as many as 150-200 fighters.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file: Most FARN elements are urban, with the guerrilla units fighting only in limited areas and then under joint command with ERP, PCES, or FPL. Members, mostly professionals, radicalized peasants following their priests' advice, and some members of the youth and lumpenproletariat, seem more shaky in their convictions and motivation than members of groups such as ERP and PCES. While FARN desertions are not higher than those of ERP or PRTC, it seems that captured FARN cadres and fighters are generally have prepared to provide damaging information about their group under interrogation.

ii) Leadership: The FARN leadership presence in field operations occurs less frequently than in ERP. However, Cienfuegos' leadership presence is of high quality, and he is regarded as FMLN's second best military strategist.

b) Performance

i) Discipline: FARN discipline during the late 1970s, when the group was mostly involved in urban terrorist operations, was relatively tight. With the expansion of membership, following the absorption of FAPU cadres from the cities, it appears that discipline has weakened the rural areas. Moreover, FARN is not particularly adapted to such areas, given its mostly urban roots.

El Salvador - Group FARN

- 337 -

ii) **Weapons sophistication:** During the late 1970s, before massive Cuban, Soviet, and Nicaraguan supplies were brought into El Salvador, FARN was the most sophisticated guerrilla group in the country. This was because it was the richest and had the best connections with the U.S. Mafia (according to Cienfuegos himself); thus it could buy qualitatively superior weapons. The supplies of other FMLN groups have since been brought to parity.

iii) **Endurance:** With most of its treasury exhausted for the sake of FMLN unity, and with its growing dependence upon Nicaraguan and Cuban support, it is unlikely that FARN and its urban terrorist operations could survive a total cut-off of external supplies for long; certainly not as long as the more deeply rooted ERP and FPL or the more sophisticated PCES could.

Training

a) **Rank and file:** Most of the training of FARN rank and file, to the extent it exists, takes place in El Salvador and in San Salvador in particular for the urban terrorist cadres. The middle- and upper-level cadres are trained, like other FMLN cadres, in Cuba, Nicaragua, and sometimes in the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact countries.

b) **Trainers:** With very few exceptions (most of which pertain to South American urban terrorist experts), FARN cadres trained at home or abroad are under the control of nationals of the countries of training.

Financial Resources

At least until 1981, FARN was largely self-sufficient in terms of funds, because of the money it received from kidnapping ransoms. By 1979 FARN probably had more funds available for weapons' acquisition than the government

El Salvador - Group FARN

- 338 -

of El Salvador. Most of the funds were and some still are invested in Panamanian banks. Almost all came from ransoms and, to a lesser extent, bank robberies.

FAPU, which is smaller than the BPR, probably provided some additional funds, but those funds may have been sufficient only for covering its own expenses.

In addition, FARN has operated a few legitimate businesses in El Salvador (from shoe repair shops to small factories) under the formal control of businessmen who are members of or are blackmailed by FARN. At least one of those businesses was a private air cargo company, that was actually involved in illicit transfer of weapons to FARN and other FMLN groups.

Level of Popular Support

Unlike ERP or FPL, FARN still has a significant level of popular support among non-Marxist elements in El Salvador, and it is seen as a more "moderate," and therefore relatively legitimate, opposition group. FARN's opportunistic approach to the October 1979 coup, and its continuous accent on alliances with non-Marxist groups has helped it maintain a certain level of popular sympathy among Salvadorans, even if it did not actually attract new members. However, FARN's emphasis on unity within the FMLN damaged its ability to attract members and its image as a "different" type of guerrilla movement.

FARN has succeeded, to a limited extent, in replacing lost urban support with growing peasant support in some areas, mostly the Guazapa Volcano. But FAPU and general FARN popular support, like that of other FMLN-FDR elements, has declined since 1980.

El Salvador - Group FARN
- 340 -

c) Continental: FARN's ties were directed mostly toward the Southern Cone terrorist groups, the Montoneros, Tupamaros, and the Argentine ERP.

Areas under Guerrilla Control

FARN, unlike ERP or FPL, does not have its own controlled areas. It follows the pattern of the other groups, however, in trying to establish its own administration in San Vicente, Usulután, and San Miguel. In addition, FARN has tried to establish its own area of control on the Guazapa Volcano, at least since 1981, but it has always had to cope with ERP's military supremacy there.

External Support

Most of FARN's external support, other than that of the FMLN as a whole, originates in Cuba, Nicaragua, and even Guatemala. Some liberal and leftist groups in the U.S. and Western Europe also play a significant support role for FARN. Among liberal U.S. circles, the FARN in general, and Ferman Cienfuegos's statements in particular, are often interpreted as indications of "dissensions" or "moderation" within FMLN ranks.

Relations with Other Groups

a) National: FARN and Jovel particularly, harbored deeply felt hostility toward ERP and to some extent toward FPL. The attitude toward ERP was linked to FARN's own origin, as a threatened splinter; those toward FPL were linked to FPL's claim that it was the dean of all the Salvadoran guerrilla groups.

By 1980 FARN was prepared to cooperate with the DRU umbrella, against the personal feelings of such leaders as Jovel, but it found itself faced with Carpio's claims to absolute leadership of DRU and FMLN. Jovel opposed that attempt to a large extent for personal reasons. Cienfuegos, after joining DRU again, played a significant role in easing Carpio out of his position as the main DRU leader.

While FAPU helped delay the MLP from joining the CRM, FARN itself appeared as supportive of PRTC's dislike of "democratic centralism" as the decision-making method of DRU.

b) Regional: Most of FARN's ties are with the Guatemalan PGT and FAR. Historically it is also close to Cuba (through Roque Dalton) and Nicaragua, particularly to the "tercerista" faction of the FSLN.

Front Organizations

During the last few months of 1979 the PRTC, following the example of the other four guerrilla groups in El Salvador, established the Movimiento de Liberacion Popular (Popular Liberation Movement -- MLP). The MLP was so small, however, that its attempt to join the CRM was blocked by FAPU for some months, despite support from the EPR. In May 1980 the MLP succeeded. It was involved in the general disruptive and violent activities of the "popular organizations," until the end of 1980, when it, like the others, were reduced to general inactivity.

The membership of the MLP is extremely small, particularly in comparison to similar organizations of the other guerrilla forces. Members total under a thousand and include students, some intellectuals, and a number of workers.

MLP's known leader is Dr. Fabio Castillo Figueroa, probably the oldest active leftist politician in El Salvador. A pharmacologist by profession, he was a known sympathizer of Castro and most likely a prominent member of the PCES, as well as a member of the communist-infiltrated junta of 1960. In 1963 he became rector of the National University in San Salvador and contributed to, encouraged, and openly facilitated the transformation of the university into a revolutionary stronghold. As head of the PCES-infiltrated and-controlled PAR (Partido de Accion Renovadora -- Renovation Action Party), he ran for the presidency in 1967, and came in third, with 14.4 per cent of the vote. (PAR received 29% of the vote in San Salvador.) In 1972 Castillo was involved in the failed coup following the presidential election and exiled. By 1976 he had become thoroughly disenchanted with the PCES and moved toward the young militants who had established the PRTC. (Some of them were his former students.)

El Salvador - Group PRTC

- 343 -

As MLP leader and thus a member of the FDR and the CRM, Castillo participates to some degree in revolutionary affairs. However, he does not appear influential within the FDR or, more importantly, within the PRTC.

Membership

The PRTC's membership is probably less than one-tenth of the total FMLN forces, or 600 to 800 at most. The number of sympathizers is roughly the same. This includes permanent MLP members.

Foreign Members

Until 1980 the PRTC openly claimed to be a regional organization, making no distinction between its Honduran, Salvadoran, or Costa Rican and Guatemalan members. Despite formally becoming a strictly Salvadoran party, PRTC operations in Costa Rica, for instance, were made possible by direct cooperation from Costa Ricans.

Leadership

PRTC's leadership is perhaps the most secretive of all Salvadoran guerrilla groups. In fact, the only well-known member is Fabio Castillo Figueroa, a relatively minor figure in the party.

Roberto Roca, very likely an alias, is PRTC's main leader. He was probably born in San Salvador around 1948. Roca was a prominent student activist at the National University who, beginning in 1971 organized student strikes. It appears that he was originally attracted to the ERP, but soon grew to oppose the group's military-oriented position. He was probably also associated with FARN, but left in disagreement over that group's definition of the Molina regime (1972-1977) as "fascist."

A "companera Arlen" is also a known member of the PRTC leadership, and Jaime Miranda represents the party in Mexico. Most likely he oversees all international propaganda as well. Luis Adalberto Diaz and Humberto Mendoza, both killed in combat, were among the top members of the PRTC. Today they are the group's most cherished martyrs.

Ideology

The founders of the PRTC turned to revolutionary violence because they were dissatisfied with the orientation of existing guerrilla groups in El Salvador and the lack of such groups in Honduras. However, with regard to other groups throughout Central America, PRTC is a relative newcomer to revolutionary violence.

Although the party never joined the remnants of the Fourth International, it was initially heavily influenced by Trotskyist ideas. These included, the concepts of international i.e., regional revolution and the working class's ability to stage successful revolutions that would lead to socialism, i.e., communism. These ideas were reconsidered in 1979 for a number of reasons: the five Central American countries were too different to allow a uniform revolutionary strategy; the PRTC's influence in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica proved nonexistent; and the party's claims of exclusive working-class membership was contradicted by the overwhelming number of middle-class and university dropout elements that led in Honduras and El Salvador. As a result the PRTC rapidly moved toward Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, as defined by larger guerrilla groups and Cuba and the U.S.S.R. as well. Today no traces of Trotskyist elements remain in the party.

By late 1979 the PRTC wished to join the Salvadoran guerrilla umbrella -- the FMLN for the politico-military groups, the CRM for the military groups and the guerrilla fronts, i.e., "popular organizations," and the FDR, the

El Salvador - Group PRTC
- 345 -

guerrilla-controlled political umbrella. The PRTC's main slogan remains "For Central American and the liberation and socialism!" However, the group's regional claims have been muted since 1980. On May Day 1983, the PRTC made a statement that was characterized by unreserved commitment for the FMLN, to the extent that the PRTC as a distinct organization seems to fade away. Also the party's analysis of Salvadoran and international events is indistinguishable from the majority elements of FMLN. Thus it appears that the PRTC is well on its way to self-accepted disappearance, as a result of its belief in revolutionary "unity."

Propaganda

PRTC spreads its propaganda through radio station takeovers in El Salvador and newspaper statements that are part of ransom demands from kidnappings. In addition, the party uses its membership in the FMLN to broadcast its statements on the ERP-controlled Radio Venceremos. Since at least 1980, the group's propaganda has primarily encouraged enrollment in any or all FMLN groups, for the sake of revolutionary unity.

Views on Violence

Until it joined the FMLN, the PRTC's views on violence and revolutionary warfare were a combination of the "protracted war" strategy embraced by the FPL, and the flexible coalition approach practiced by FARN. As late as 1982 the PRTC was involved in urban terrorist acts (in San Jose, Costa Rica) that were clearly patterned after the Tupamaros, Montoneros, and Brazilian urban terrorists' acts of the 1960s. Moreover, PRTC is still active in San Salvador, more so than its size would indicate. It is also active in the rural areas, with at least one party Political Commission member, Pablo Uribe, a prominent commander on the south-eastern ("Francisco Sanchez") front. This flexibility indicates that the PRTC

in El Salvador has successfully adapted its military tactics to changing circumstances, and that terrorism, particularly urban terrorism, is no longer its main approach.

Rural guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism at home and abroad, are combined with attempts at penetrating unions -- or were combined until 1979-1980. Most national activities are combined with regional ones in much the same way, such as the failed attempt to kidnap Japanese businessman, Tetsui Kosuga, in Costa Rica in November 1982.

Performance

PRTC's recruitment grounds have always been the National University in San Salvador and the labor unions. Both Roberto Roca and Fabio Castillo had prolonged and extensive university links. While some members and leaders came from the ranks of the PCES, some were also lost to that party throughout the last few years.

Most, but not all PRTC cadres are middle-class elements with some university education. There are prominent women in the middle-class cadres, but not at the higher levels. The PRTC's small armed wing, like the PCES's, does not include many teenagers, the average age of known members being around 30 years. (This is not so for the FPL, ERP, and FARN.) Most members were recruited by individuals through student associations and unions.

Military Structure

The armed wing of the PRTC is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Popular Liberation (FARLP), which operates in conjunction with the rest of FMLN forces, and is active mostly in the rural areas. Urban operations are carried out by commando units, usually an ad hoc (i.e., for specific operations) combination of

El Salvador - Group PRTC
- 347 -

underground cells linked by courriers who do not know the source of orders as well as more than one cell member. The leadership of cells and of larger operations is unknown, to the rank and file as well as to outsiders.

Motivation and Performance

Captured rank and file members claimed that they were taught to obey orders from unknown leaders brought to them by unknown messengers with no exceptions. Despite such training, many captured members provided the Salvadoran (and Costa Rican) authorities with information on the PRTC. Because the PRTC is so intertwined with the FMLN, its combat performance is difficult to assess separately. The party seems to undertake some specialized operations, such as bridge bombings, and it is highly mobile. Its small number of members and cadres ensures that each is rotated into different roles and areas, e.g., in a period of five years, Pablo Uribe was a labor organizer, urban terrorist leader, guerrilla fighter in the central front, and commander on the southeastern front. This extensive experience may make PRTC cadres more skillful and imaginative than those of other FMLN groups. With regard to PRTC leadership, it is far less involved in combat, particularly in urban operations, than the leadership of other FMLN groups.

Training

Since 1981, some PRTC members have been trained in Cuba and Nicaragua. Others were trained in El Salvador, mostly in camps controlled by other FMLN groups. In addition, some urban cell members appear to have been trained in terrorist tactics by Southern Cone terrorists.

El Salvador - Group PRTC
- 348 -

Financial Resources

The smallest and most internationally isolated of all FMLN groups, PRTC is also financially the weakest. The desperation of the PRTC in this regard was demonstrated by its November 1982 attempted kidnapping of Tetsui Kosuga in Costa Rica. It occurred after the FMLN had renounced kidnappings as a source of funds and no longer considered such operations abroad as politically acceptable.

Equipment and Supplies

The PRTC was denied significant support from abroad until about 1982, and any support it did have was channelled by other groups; consequently, the PRTC was very limited in its supplies. A small ammunition factory was discovered in San Salvador, but this is more an indication of PRTC's inability to obtain ammunition from outside, than proof of its extensive logistical support system.

Foreign Support

Until 1980, most of PRTC's foreign support came from the group's other Central American branches or from some terrorist groups in South America. After the FMLN was formed and the PRTC became a member, some of FMLN's massive foreign support was channelled to PRTC. The party's former colleagues in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, also continued to provide some help. In fact, Hondurans, Costa Ricans, Guatemalans, and South Americans are found in the ranks of PRTC's cadres and fighters. About one fifth of the PRTC network in Costa Rica is non-Salvadoran (mostly local).

Relations with Other Groups

To a large extent the PRTC was a dissenting group of former PCES and FARN elements. Despite the Trotskyist beginnings, its differences with the PCES

El Salvador - Group PRTC

- 349 -

were mostly tactical and centered around the communist's reluctance to engage in violence. Once the PCES began to engage in violence, PRTC-PCES relations once again became close. In fact, it appears that the PCES is beginning to annex the PRTC in FMLN councils. Also many PRTC members and cadres are PCES-connected, and the PRTC is thoroughly penetrated, if not totally controlled, by the PCES.

Presently, PRTC-FARN relations are solid enough that both groups have cooperated in urban operations and logistics, including production of some explosive devices. There is also cooperation in the rural areas, particularly in the southeast, where both concentrate their forces. However, the PRTC front, MLP, was dismissed by FAPU, the FARN front organization, and PRTC's acceptance into the CRM was postponed in 1980 for that reason.

Within the FMLN the PRTC is the group most inclined toward the total unification of member groups. Thus, in February 1981, following the spectacular failure of the previous month's "final offensive," Roberto Roca stated, "I am a representative of the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers in the FMLN General Command, the supreme leadership body in the front's structure and also the guiding body in the people's struggle in El Salvador. This struggle, I repeat, is guided by the FMLN. We fully belong to the FMLN structure since November and before that we were working in close coordination with the front's structure. This is the basic thing." (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the PRTC still engages in operations in urban areas that are against the apparent wishes of other FMLN groups and are in conflict with its 1983 declaration that it would limit its urban activities to "political work."

El Salvador - Group PRTC
- 350 -

Because of its initial regional orientation, the PRTC still maintains close ties with terrorist groups in Honduras and Guatemala. Also, Fabio Castillo is apparently in charge with regional political operations for the FDR Politico-Diplomatic Commission.

Continental

PRTC urban terrorist operations in El Salvador as well as in Costa Rica are too closely patterned after those of the Tupamaros and Montoneros for this to be a coincidence. Most likely, cadres of the latter two groups are closely cooperating with the PRTC and are providing it with technical and organizational expertise.

In the steady process of consolidation and homogenization of FMLN members, the PRTC appears to be the first candidate for dissolution. It will probably join forces with the PCES. Not only has the PRTC renounced its Trotskyist and regionalist ambitions, but it has also moved steadily toward full operational integration with other groups in the rural areas.



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IN LATIN AMERICA**

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CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
TASK ONE	
<u>Historical Background and Typology of Terrorism and Insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere</u>	5
A. Matters of definition	5
Targets	6
Aims	6
Scope	7
Size	7
Level of Organization	8
Public Support	8
Leadership Background	9
Effectiveness	9
B. Background of the Violent Left in the Western Hemisphere	11
C. The Orthodox Communist Parties	13
TASK TWO	
<u>Ideologies of Revolutionary Warfare in Latin America</u>	22
Orthodox Communist parties	23
Cuba's Appeal and Ideological Influence	28
Anarchist-Marxist Influences	34
The Maoists	37
The Trotskyites	41
The Role of the Church	43
TASK THREE	
<u>Violence on the Right</u>	47
The Ideological Roots of the Violent Right in Latin America	48
Terrorism on the Right?	50
The Aims of Right-Wing Terrorism	57
The Methods of the Violent Right and Its Structure	58
Anti-Marxist Guerrillas and Terrorism	63

TASK FOUR

<u>Tactics, Trends, and Assessment of the Guerrillas of the Left</u>	65
Infiltration of the Government Apparatus	67
The Combination of Legal, Para-legal and Military Action	68

TASK FIVE

<u>A Compendium of Terrorist and Insurgent Groups in Latin America</u>	77
---	-----------

I. Leftist Groups

ARGENTINA

Partido Comunista Revolucionario-PCR	97
Movimiento Peronista Montonero-Montoneros	104
Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo-ERP	119

BOLIVIA

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional-ELN	133
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR	146

BRAZIL

Acso Libertadora Nacional-ALN	153
Movimento Revolucionario-8-MR-8	165
Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionario-PCBR	172
Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria-VPR	180

CHILE

Partido Comunista de Chile-PCCh	188
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR	201

COLOMBIA

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional-ELN	218
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC	229
Ejercito Popular de Liberacion-EPL	240
Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera-MAO	249
Movimiento 19 de April-M-19	261

ECUADOR

Frente Radical Alfarista-FRA	264
------------------------------	-----

EL SALVADOR

Partido Comunista de El Salvador-PCES	267
Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion-FPL	282
Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo-ERP	303
Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional-FARN	325
Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de Centro America-PRTC	341

GUADELOUPE

Groupe d'Organisation Nationale de la Guadeloupe-GONG 351

L'Alliance Revolutionnaire Caraibe-ARC 354

GUATEMALA

Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo-PGT 359

Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre-MR-13 371

Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes-FAR 382

Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas-ORPA 402

Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres-EGP 414

Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo-MRP 432

HAITI

Parti Unifié des Communistes Haitiens-PUCH 435

HONDURAS

Partido Comunista de Honduras-PCH 440

Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores
de Centroamerica-PRTC 445

Frente Morazanista para la Liberacion de
Honduras-Frente Morazanista-FMLH 452

Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias Lorenzo
Zelaya-Lorenzo Zelaya 457

Movimiento Popular de Liberacion Cinchoneros-Cinchoneros 461

NICARAGUA

Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional-FSLN 467

PERU

Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario-FIR 488

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional-ELN 498

Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR 505

Vanguardia Revolucionaria-VR 519

Partido Comunista Peruano (Sendero
Luminoso)-Sendero Luminoso 524

URUGUAY

Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional Tupamaros-Tupamaros 545

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Orientales-FARO 558

VENEZUELA

Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR 562

Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional-FALN 571

Partido Bandera Roja-Bandera Roja-PBR 581

II. Non-Leftist Groups

ARGENTINA

Alianza Anticomunista Argentina-AAA 500

BOLIVIA

Equadron de la Muerte 591

BRAZIL

Escuadro de Morte 593

CHILE

Patria y Libertad 597

COLOMBIA

Muerte a los Sequestradores-MAS 600

EL SALVADOR

Brigada Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez 603

Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista-ESA 607

Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista-ORDEN 612

Union Guerrerra Blanca-UGB 618

GUATEMALA

Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista-ESA 622

HONDURAS

Ejercito de Lucha Anticomunista-ELA 626

NICARAGUA

Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense-FDN 630

Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica-ARDE 636

Unidad Democratica Nicaraguense-Fuerzas Revolucionarias
de Nicaragua-UDN-FRN 645

Fuerza Revolucionaria Miskito, Sumu, Rama-MISURA 648

Guadeloupe - Group Gong
- 351 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Groupe d'Organisation Nationale de la Guadeloupe
- b) In English : The Guadeloupe National Organization Group
- c) Acronym or known name : GONG

Country of Operation

Guadeloupe

Date of Formation and Original Organization

GONG was formed in 1963 by former members of the Guadeloupe Communist Party (PCG).

Membership

- a) Active members : The group consists of approximately 100 militants.
- b) Sympathizers : Sympathizers are estimated at several hundred.

Ideological Origin

GONG espoused, in the mid-1960s, a pro-Chinese stand, accusing the Guadeloupan Communist Party of "revisionism." The group's initial platform called for Guadeloupan independence by means of armed struggle. Later GONG embraced certain Castroite theses.

Propaganda

GONG propaganda primarily addresses an internal audience; however, it also tried to reach an audience in France by issuing articles and booklets there. In addition to oral propaganda and leaflets, the group edits The Monthly GONG.

Guadeloupe - Group Gong

- 352 -

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

Inspired by Marxism-Leninism and Mao's theory of "popular war," GONG has tried to prepare the country for a confrontation. Although it is committed to terrorism, GONG does not overlook the advantages of mobilization.

Performance

The GONG recruits are primarily students and middle-class intellectuals.

Military Structure

GONG has created its own network of commando units and urban cells.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

GONG militants are motivated by nationalist feelings and the desire for Guadeloupan independence. The group's leaders possess a strong nationalism combined with a Maoist outlook of revolutionary struggle.

Financial Resources

GONG relies primarily on local resources (voluntary contributions).

Equipment and Supplies

GONG employs small arms, and home-made explosives.

Level of Popular Support

GONG was not able to acquire a large following. It has remained a small militant group.

Guadeloupe - Group Gong
- 353 -

External Support

There is not much information available concerning external support of GONG. Cuba and Grenada (until 1983) were involved in support for leftist groups in Guadeloupe. That support was military, political, and financial.

Relations with Other Groups

GONG receives some support from French leftist groups and individuals. It has also established ties with the Grenadian NJM and other English-speaking Caribbean groups, as well as with Martinique groups. Cuba has also offered GONG both financial support and training.

Remarks

In 1968 a number of GONG militants were brought to trial, but most of them were acquitted. There is very little reliable information on the leadership or organizational structure of GONG. It seems that the group was headquartered in Paris in the early 1970s. In the early 1980s terrorist activities were resumed in Guadeloupe by a group with the same orientation as the GONG: the Armed Liberation Group (GLP), a leftist pro-independence movement inspired by the Corsican National Liberation Front. An off-shoot of this terrorist group is the Armed Liberation Group of Martinique. The Guadeloupan leftist separatists seem to represent the same ideology and use the same methods as GONG: kidnappings, bomb explosions, etc.

Guadeloupe - Group A.R.C.
- 354 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : L'Alliance Révolutionnaire Caraïbe
- b) In English : The Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance
- c) Acronym or known name : A.R.C.

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Guadeloupe
- b) Others : Martinique, French Guiana

Date of Formation

The group was formed in May 1982.

Front Organizations and Auxiliaries

The front organization's name is Movement Populaire pour une Guadeloupe Indépendante -- M.P.G.L. (the Popular Movement for an Independent Guadeloupe). The M.P.G.L. has a few hundred sympathizers at most.

Membership

According to French sources, the group has approximately 100 militants. Other sources believe no more than 20 militants are active within the A.R.C.

Ideological Origin

The A.R.C. holds a nationalist-separatist position, combined with Marxist-Leninist revolutionary objectives. The group shares Castro's image of the "revolutionary struggle" in Latin America and considers French Overseas Departments to be "colonies" of "French capitalism."

Guadeloupe - Group A.R.C.

- 355 -

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The A.R.C. proclaims "economic independence" its main aim. This will be achieved presumably by cutting most of Guadeloupe's present dependence on French subsidies.

b) Social program : The A.R.C.'s basic objectives are: "To harrass and to strike the French colonialism" and its local "collaborators." Violence is considered an absolutely necessary means for getting rid of the "colonial yoke."

c) Foreign policy : The A.R.C. denounces the "French colonialism" and seeks independence for the three French Overseas Departments.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The ultra-nationalist proclamations of the A.R.C. are intended mostly for black youth.

ii) Ideological content: The group's propaganda consists of calls for independence and rebellion against "French colonialism."

b) Means : Through the M.P.G.L, the A.R.C. was able to make use of radio to publicize its views. Other means employed by the A.R.C. are manifestoes and leaflets.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The A.R.C. is inspired by Castroism and fanatically committed to separation from France. It combines terrorism with mobilization. Though the group has no official contacts with the French Communist Party, there are rumors that the A.R.C. maintains contacts with the Soviet Union and other countries of the Eastern bloc.

Guadeloupe - Group A.R.C.

- 356 -

Military Structure

According to French sources, the A.R.C. has established its own network of commando units and urban cells.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

The militants of the A.R.C. nourish strongly nationalist and anti-French feelings. Its leaders are motivated by the Cuban-inspired program of organizing "national-liberation movements" in French overseas territories as well as by the attraction of power and revolutionary beliefs.

Training

A.R.C. militants are trained both in Guadeloupe and in Cuba.

Financial Resources

Besides certain local voluntary contributions, the A.R.C. receives external financial support from Cuba and probably from radical Arab states. The group has organized kidnappings and it benefits from the financial support of its front organizations.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : The A.R.C. resorts primarily to dynamite and other explosive materials.

b) Origin : The supplies come from Cuba or through illegal shipments from Caribbean states.

Guadeloupe - Group A.R.C.
- 357 -

Level of Popular Support

During the regional elections, at the beginning of 1983, the supporters of Guadeloupan independence suffered total defeat.

External Support

a) Origin : The A.R.C. enjoys support from Cuba and certain radical Third World regimes (Libya, Iran).

b) Volume : Taking into account the group's lack of popular support and its marginal influence, the A.R.C. cannot survive without external support.

c) Type : The A.R.C. receives financial, political, and military support from abroad.

Dependence on External Support

Isolated within the local community, the A.R.C. is strategically, politically, and logistically dependent on foreign support.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National: It seems that A.R.C. actions are coordinated from Paris and are supported by the most politicized wing (the radical wing) of the Antillean community.

ii) Regional : According to French sources, the A.R.C. is supported by Cuba.

b) Extrahemispheric: The group has established contacts with the Soviet Union. A French left-wing magazine, with good government connections, described the A.R.C. as "being in liaison with Moscow."

Guadeloupe - Group A.R.C.
- 358 -

Remarks

The A.R.C. supports Castro's strategy of promoting subversive activities in the area. The group is violence-oriented and its operations (explosions, kidnappings) are extremely harmful to the proper functioning of democratic institutions in Guadeloupe. Its ultra-nationalist slogans were criticized by spokesmen of other leftist groups among which was the PCG (Communist Party of Guadeloupe).

Guatemala - Group PGT

- 359 -

Group of Organization Name

a) In language of country : Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo

b) In English : The Guatemalan Party of Labor

c) Acronym or known name : PGT

Country of Operation

Most of the PGT's violent actions took place in Guatemala City. Political activities, however, have been historically undertaken outside the country as much as in Guatemala. The few members of the first Guatemalan Communist Party of the 1920s operated mostly in Mexico, El Salvador, the U.S., and even in the Soviet Union. After the 1954 fall of the Arbenz regime, most of the PGT leaders took residence in Mexico, Eastern Europe (mostly Czechoslovakia), the Soviet Union, Cuba (after Castro's victory), Chile, Costa Rica, and a few other Latin American countries. Today, the top leaders live throughout Eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R., Cuba, Nicaragua, and Mexico.

Origins

The origins of the PGT are relatively obscure and no certain date of formation can be ascertained. As long-time PGT leader Manuel Fortuny described it, "The first Guatemalan Communist Party was founded in the twenties [1922], but it was crushed by the blood-stained Ubico dictatorship (1931-1944) [in 1932] . . . The Communist Party was reborn . . . in September 1949, . . . At its Second Congress in 1952, it was renamed the Guatemalan Party of Labor." However, known communists, most likely members of existing well-coordinated cells, known as the Guatemala Democratic Vanguard (VDG), had individually penetrated most of the important political parties and other institutions during the Arevalo regime

Guatemala - Group PGT
- 360 -

(1945-1950). Also the formal foundation of the PGT was merely the public admission of the existence of structures at least five years old. 28 September 1949 was the First (secret) Congress of the Communist Party of Guatemala and 11 December 1952 was the first (public) Congress that adopted the name PGT. On 18 December 1952 the PGT was declared a legal party.

Front Organizations

The heyday of the PGT front organizations was during the Arbenz period, when the PGT directly controlled most, if not all major unions in the country, particularly the Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CTG), the teacher's union (STEG), the National Labor Unity Committee (CNUS), and the National Peasants' Confederation of Guatemala (CNCG).

There was a prolonged period (1956-1975) in which PGT's attempts to penetrate the unions of Guatemala were decisively blocked by government hostility to all union activities, the memories of PGT manipulation of unions during the 1944-1954 period, the party's small size and weaknesses, and competition from FAR and EGP. But since the mid-1970s, the PGT has again succeeded in penetrating unions (particularly some of the CNUS members), in direct competition with the FAR. This has applied to electrical, railroad, and municipal workers' unions.

Since 1954, the PGT has not made any inroads in the political fronts. Mostly this is the result of its historically poor relations with the guerrilla groups, which distrusted PGT's opportunistic and slavishly pro-Soviet ways, and its political irrelevance in Guatemala, which made alliances with it unattractive for any legal party.

Guatemala - Group PGT
- 361 -

Membership

Any assessment of PGT's present total membership is meaningless for the following reasons:

(a) The deep factionalism within the PGT makes assessments of membership unreliable since it is impossible to know how many members are part of which of the three factions. Considering that the "camarilla" faction is the largest, a very approximate estimation of its strength would be close to 300. The second largest group, the Nucleo de Direccion Nacional (National Leadership Nucleus) may have as many as 200 members, while the hard-line violent "Comission Militar" (Military Commission) has only a few dozen members.

(b) In addition to its cadres and actual members, the PGT has, through its (mostly union) front organizations perhaps a few hundred more followers. Most of these are under "camarilla" control.

(c) At the time of its inception, as well as during the period of its maximum influence in Guatemala, the PGT was heavily Central American, as opposed to Guatemalan, in its complexion. Among the most prominent of its foreign leaders were: Miguel Marmol, a veteran Salvadoran communist, Virginia Letelier, a Chilean communist, Antonio Ardor, a Honduran who became a member of the Political Commission (the equivalent of the Politburo), the Cuenca brothers, Abel and Max, both Salvadorans and both extremely influential in PGT affairs, and particularly Virgilio Cuerva Mendez, a Salvadoran who became CGTG's secretary for organization. Since 1954 it appears that the PGT has eliminated most foreigners from its higher ranks.

Guatemala - Group PGT
- 362 -

Leadership

At the general-secretary level, the leadership of the PGT has always fluctuated, due to internecine conflicts, government repression, and age attrition. Jose Manuel Fortuny was the first general-secretary until 1954, when he was replaced by Bernardo Alvarado Monzon. Fortuny briefly became general-secretary again in 1960, only to be replaced once again by Monzon. Following Monzon's killing by the military in 1966, Miguel Rodriguez became secretary-general. He was followed by two others, the present one being Carlos Gonzales, the head of the "camarilla" faction.

Practically nothing is known about Gonzales, except that he has been a Central Committee member since the 1960s. He is following the traditional PGT orthodox line, as demonstrated by publications in the World Marxist Review and renowned Castroite journals and Nicaraguan official media.

Central Committee member Daniel Rios appears to be the most prominent leader of the Nucleo de Direccion Nacional (NDN) faction, or at least the main spokesman of that faction.

Ideology

The PGT, a consistent and openly pro-Soviet group, has always followed the Moscow-decided line of action, concerning Guatemala as well as other international and ideological matters. A Stalinist party under Stalin (the Guatemalan Parliament, controlled or influenced by the PGT, was the only such institution outside the Soviet bloc to observe a moment of silence following Stalin's death in 1953.), it eventually became Khrushchevian and embraced détente while the U.S.S.R. promoted it internationally. Today, when Moscow is more interested in supporting violence in Central America than at any previous time,

the PGT's position presents a serious problem for the U.S.S.R. The majority "camarilla" still maintains an ambiguous position toward total acceptance of armed struggle as the main revolutionary strategy. Not only is the "camarilla" faction in majority among PGT cadres; it also represents the traditional blind subjection of the PGT to Moscow, and thus it is difficult to repudiate. The "camarilla's" cautious approach to armed struggle complicates the Soviet Union's plans and aims at supporting and controlling guerrilla movements in Guatemala.

As a purely Leninist party, the PGT traditionally has sought support for its strategy among the small "proletariat" of the urban areas. It has dismissed the role of the Indians with the argument that their backwardness prevents them to play any significant role in the coming revolution. To some extent this attitude was also extended to most of the peasantry. However, following the 1969 Fourth Congress, the PGT recognized that Guatemala was indeed an agrarian country. Thus the PGT program at that time declared that the first phase of the revolution should be the "agrarian anti-imperialist people's revolution," to be followed by a "socialist" revolution. With regard to the "camarilla" faction, this analysis, reiterated at various times during the 1970s, remains the dominant justification for current PGT activities.

Program

PGT public programs have shifted with the fortunes of the party. During its heyday, under the Jacobo Arbenz regime, the party's primary aim was the nationalization of the "main means of production," i.e., railroads, United Fruit Company assets, mines, and agrarian reform. (Agrarian reform involved the establishment of collective villages and cooperatives.)

After 1954 the party was forced underground and, in order to strengthen its united front policies, its policies became much more vague. Clear platform points were avoided, and a minimum common denominator, with legal parties and groups on the left or center-left, was sought. Considering the PGT's unwavering loyalty to the U.S.S.R. and to the Leninist model, the party will certainly follow a path identical to PCUS's if it ever takes power.

In July 1963, the PGT's Central Committee Resolution claimed that "our views on the problems of the international Communist movement coincide with the views of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and, consequently, our attitude to these problems is identical. This resolution still applies, with respect to other foreign policy issues as well. The consistent stream of PGT leaders publishing articles in the World Marxist Review since 1950 further indicates the identical views of the party and Moscow in all issues.

Ideologues

The PGT's complete identification with Soviet views prevented it from producing an original thinker. Jose Manuel Fortuny, until the mid-1960s, and Bernardo Alvarado Monzon, until his violent death in 1972, generally stated PGT's ideas, opinions, and interpretations of Guatemalan events in Soviet-dominated journals.

Propaganda

a) Addressed internal audience : PGT's propaganda contains the party's general attitudes. Its internal audience is centered around university students, unionized workers, and some wage laborers in the countryside. Guatemala's high illiteracy rate limits the party's audience.

Guatemala - Group PGT

- 365 -

b) Means : The PGT has published, irregularly, its own newspaper, Verdad (Truth). In 1977 Otto Sanchez, a party leadership member, claimed that almost 200 issues of Verdad had been published since 1955. The PGT claims that it also publishes Revolucion Popular (Popular Revolution) in the center of the country, Trinchera (Trench) in the western highlands, and Juventud (Youth), the publication of the PGT youth organization. All of these publications have only a minimal impact, due to their restricted circulation, Guatemala's prevailing illiteracy, and the party's illegal status.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The issue of the role and importance of armed action in the revolutionary process in Guatemala has plagued the PGT since the early 1960s. Many of its leaders, including members of the Political Commission and the Central Committee, left the party after the PGT-FAR split in 1967. These included Camilo Sanchez, Cesar Montes, and almost 40 per cent of the full and candidate members of the Central Committee who were admitted in 1966. As Political Commission member, Silva Jonama described it, "Their original plan has been to seize the Party leadership and clear the way for applying their military-political ideas. When this fell through, they decided to smash the Party." (WMR, March 1969) But the fact remains that the PGT has never concentrated exclusively on guerrilla warfare, and this has been its main source of dispute and recrimination with other guerrilla movements. PGT believes that armed struggle can be only one of the many forms of anti-government activities. Political action and infiltration of existing legal institutions (union, parties) through united front tactics remain its most important strategies.

Guatemala - Group PGT
- 366 -

The PGT has never successfully adopted a coherent approach to armed struggle or convincingly applied its views on the topic in practice. The party rarely seems to initiate armed actions; rather, they respond with it. In 1962, following student uprisings, there was a good chance of a national insurrection. The PGT responded to the situation by forming its own guerrilla group. The military destroyed it in one single action, at Conces (Baja Verapaz Department). According to the party, "Because of the haste, mistakes of a political and military nature were committed." (Monzon, WMR October 1966)

Following the split between the PGT and Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) in late 1967 and early 1968, the PGT proclaimed the formation of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces -- FAR). (The party purposely used the same initials as Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes'.) Due to lack of action, credibility, and significance, the new guerrilla force rapidly fell into oblivion.

This half-hearted approach to revolutionary violence has made the PGT vulnerable to factionalism and splits: in 1967 it lost control over the FAR, and during 1981-1982 its cautious approach to insurrection and/or guerrilla warfare was openly rejected by the guerrilla-oriented National Nucleus and the quasi-anarchist National Directorate factions.

Performance

a) Recruitment : Most PGT members are recruited through universities, high schools, and unions. Many joined because of their personal convictions. Leaders tend to be over 40 years old. Some have been in the party since the Arbenz era. As a rule, the average age of PGT members and leaders is close to that of FAR's. Unlike most Latin and Central American guerrilla groups, the PGT has no

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Guatemala - Group PGT
- 365 -

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Guatemala - Group PGT
- 366 -

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Guatemala - Group PGT

- 367 -

prominent female members in its leadership. The party is not known to use any foreign cadres, activists, or militants in its leadership at the present time.

b) Indoctrination

i) Cadres : During the Arbenz era, the PGT had its own political cadres' school, the Escuela Claridad. It was run by mostly foreign cadres, the majority being Salvadorans. By 1962 the PGT claimed to have established another school for cadres, with courses to be taught for 18 months.

ii) Youth : The PGT youth organization (JPT) was and to some extent still is autonomous from the party. During the 1960s it was very assertive. Today it still remains more radical than the PGT. Unhappy with the older and more cautious PGT leadership, it strongly supports armed struggle.

iii) Religion : Openly atheistic, the PGT, unlike the other violent groups in Guatemala, has little if any direct, open support from radical elements within the Catholic Church.

iv) Unions : PGT's influence is limited to elements of CNUS. It also controls the (underground) CAUS (Federation of Autonomous Trade Unions).

Military Structure

It was only on 1 May 1981 that Secretary-General Carlos Gonzalez "informed the public of [the PGT's] decision to contribute to the struggle of the revolutionary movement in order to pave the way for a revolutionary war." This lack of experience in guerrilla warfare, as well as the PGT's limited and strictly urban base of support, explains why the party's military structure is limited to armed urban cells, mostly in Guatemala City. These small groups concentrate on kidnappings and assassinations, and they consistently avoid direct clashes with security forces, unless cornered and forced to fight.

The cells' structure centers on older cadres commanding members of the party youth organization or other disparate elements. Few cadres and almost none of the rank and file have any military training. Ideological training, on the other hand, appears better organized. According to PGT spokesmen, there is still a functioning party school.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

Available official sources indicate that PGT armed elements are the least effective among those of the leftist insurgents in Guatemala. The disproportionately high number of PGT activists killed or captured by police and army units supports this assessment. Even the fact that most top PGT leaders live outside the country could indicate that the party possesses poor leadership motivation and military performance.

Despite the PGT's long history of underground activities, it has never been able to establish a secret structure able to withstand government penetration and infiltration. Consequently, PGT has an extremely high incidence of government arrests and killings of its leaders during secret meetings. Since 1972 the party has lost many Central Committee members as well as two general-secretaries due to successful government infiltration of party ranks.

Training

Although little is known of PGT training practices, it is very likely that almost all military training takes place outside the country, i.e., the Soviet bloc and probably Cuba, with trainers coming from those countries as well.

Financial Resources

The PGT claims that its funds come from members' dues, voluntary contributions from sympathizers, and party-controlled shops in Guatemala. It is more likely that most, if not all its limited funds, come directly from outside, i.e., the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and perhaps other Latin American communist parties and groups. During the past three years, the PGT has attempted to raise some funds through kidnappings. Also, some unions under PGT control may provide limited financial support.

Equipment and Supplies

PGT's minuscule armed apparatus is clearly unable to undertake military actions resulting in the capture of weapons. Therefore most of its supplies come from outside. These include primarily light weapons, which are supplemented by locally manufactured explosive devices.

Level of Popular Support

a) Local support : Since 1953-1954, the level of PGT popular support, as well as that of its members has steadily declined. It is unlikely that the PGT today has much more than one tenth of its 4000 members at the time of Arbenz's fall. Unable to develop a significant rural base and handicapped by the competition for urban support from the larger EGP, ORPA, and FAR, the PGT, including all its three factions, has only minimal support in Guatemala today.

Guatemala - Group PGT
- 370 -

b) Electoral performance : The last election the PGT participated in was during the last two years of the Arbenz regime. The party did poorly; only one open party member, Jose Manuel Pellecer, was elected to the national congress. (He later defected.) Even then-Secretary-General Fortuny was defeated in his election attempt.

External Support

PGT's external support is decisive, for without it the party would probably be defunct. However, the party's ineffectiveness, particularly its military weaknesses, has always limited the amount of support it receives. Presently it may receive less than any of the other three large guerrilla groups. Most support comes from the U.S.S.R. and such East European countries as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary. Most of the external support received by the PGT consists of funds and limited training, as well as propaganda support.

Dependence on External Support

PGT's heavy dependence on external support is manifested in its slavish parroting of the PCUS line, even in the smallest details. Since the FSLN victory in Nicaragua, the Soviet Union has forced the PGT to support armed struggle publicly, despite the party's historical reluctance to pay more than lip service to it. More recently, Soviet pressure has resulted in PGT expressing a willingness to join the URNG, even though one of its minority factions, the National Leadership Nucleus, has already joined.

Guatemala - Group PGT

- 371 -

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : The PGT's relations with other revolutionary and violent groups in Guatemala have been uneasy since the early 1960s. The party attempted to control the FAR small groups loyal to the PGT into FAR, despite the overwhelming superiority in numbers, effectiveness, and leadership of MR-13 and FGEL. It also tried to eliminate FAR from any position in the political leadership of the revolutionary forces during the 1960s by excluding FAR from the umbrella organization. Because some of PGT's most prominent leaders were also among the FAR leadership (such as Cesar Montes and Pablo Monsanto), the party hoped to manipulate the guerrillas. When all this failed, the PGT was left without an armed branch. (The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias were never taken seriously.) They also earned the reputation of being unreliable and treacherous, which still persists today.

Despite the party's inability to establish even a significant military force, it has consistently proclaimed itself the only legitimate vanguard of the Guatemalan revolution for the past twenty years. Such claims, still pursued by the "camarilla" majority faction, alienated the party from the larger guerrilla groups. Also the fact that PGT leadership is still "supporting," not joining, the URNG only underscores the party's isolation and ineffectiveness. In August 1981 the "camarilla" publicly dissociated itself from the URNG. This may have been a direct result of the National Leadership Nucleus faction joining the URNG.

b) Regional : Historically, the PGT has been skeptical of Cuba. It considers the FSLN victory in Managua a fine example of revolution, but the party is wary of the Nicaraguan victory's impact on Guatemala. As Politburo member Antonio Castro Mayen stated in a 1983 interview with the Hungarian Communist Party newspaper Nepszabadsag "Our struggle has been made more difficult by the fact

that, following the victory of the Nicaraguan Revolution, the false illusion of the possibility of a rapid victory became predominant without a foundation among the revolutionary groups. And, when we had to acknowledge the realities dictated by internal and external conditions, many of them became disheartened, lost their faith, and harmed the unity of the movement." In April 1983, PGT leaders Raul Solorzano and Mario Lopez declared in Mexico that the URNG had suffered "enormous casualties" from the Rios Montt regime's anti-insurgency campaign of 1982. This may have been a reason why the PGT leadership did not join the URNG.

The PGT has little if any ties with revolutionary groups in Latin America, except for other orthodox communist parties, such as those of Chile and Uruguay. Its closest relations have always been with the Soviet bloc ruling parties.

Factionalism

By 1980 the PGT began losing control over some of its leaders and many of its members. Some of the reasons for this disintegration were the hopes raised by the FSLN victory in Nicaragua, the then-promising chances of a similar victory by the FMLN in El Salvador, and the rising prominence of groups like EGP and ORPA in Guatemala. In March 1983 PGT elements murdered retired Colonel Maximo Zepeda (a former anti-insurgency leader during the late 1960s), San Carlos University professor Diemick, and popular industrialist Alberto Habie. On May 26 the party issued a statement denying any link to those actions, and claiming that "our party's name is being usurped by those who are trying to survive in the shadow of our banners." This was a clear reference to what later became the breakaway group, PGT "Military Commission." This group, in turn, denounced the PGT leadership for rejecting those actions. The "Military Commission" faction

Guatemala - Group PGT
- 373 -

(Comision Militar -- CM), a small minority within the PGT, went further and further left. It eventually joined the "rejectionist" People's Revolutionary Movement -- DIM (MRP-DIM).

In 1980 the URNG was formed. Immediately internal debates began within the PGT over whether or not to join it. These debates led to another faction taking a separate position from the majority of the Politburo. The National Leadership Nucleus, later joined the URNG. The relationship between the majority "Political Commission," (the "camarilla") and the National Leadership Nucleus is one of mutual recrimination but not rejection. Therefore, both groups are allowed to make their positions known in Cuban and Soviet bloc publications. Although Cuba and Nicaragua support the Leadership Nucleus, Moscow still considers the "camarilla" faction the legitimate PGT spokesman.

While the CM group was the only one to perform acts of terrorism in 1983, the Leadership Nucleus soon undertook similar actions to establish its "military credentials" with its new partners in the URNG (ORPA, EGP, and FAR). As usual the "camarilla" faction has been more preoccupied with political arrangements than with establishing an armed branch. Any violent acts by the "PGT" are more likely to be those of the dissident factions than of the Political Commission. This may explain the publicly expressed willingness of the Mejia Victores government to allow the PGT -- presumably the "Political Commission" -- under Carlos Gonzalez, to participate in the 1985 presidential elections.

Remarks

The PGT is splintered, limited to strictly terrorist activities, and without any significant base of popular support. Regardless of the role one or another of its factions may play, the party as a whole seems condemned to play a minimal role in the outcome of Guatemalan insurgency and revolutionary war.

Guatemala - Group MR-13
- 374 -

Group of Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre
- b) In English : The 13 of November Revolutionary Movement
- c) Acronym or known name : MR-13

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Guatemala
- b) Others : MR-13 made periodic incursions into Mexico for R&R, supplies, and maneuvers around army concentrations on the Guatemalan side.

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The MR-13 took its name from the date of the abortive 1960 coup against the Ydigoras Fuentes government. Initially it had the name of Alejandro de Leon-MR13 and was divided into two main fronts -- the Alejandro de Leon in Sierra de las Minas, and the FGEL, led respectively by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and Luis Turcios Lima. In 1964, following the disputes with the PGT that led to the formation of FAR and its incorporation of the FGEL, the Yon Sosa faction became an independent group with the name MR-13.

In 1967, as a result of Yon Sosa's disenchantment with the Trotskyites and FAR's separation from the PGT, the MR-13 and FAR rejoined once again as FAR, with Yon Sosa as the nominal commander and Cesar Montes of the FGEL as his second-in-command. Since then the MR-13 has permanently ceased to exist as a separate organization.

Membership

The MR-13 never had more than a few hundred members, including sympathizers. By 1970, at the time of Yon Sosa's death, it had as few as a dozen fighters. Between 1964-1966 a number of cadres, particularly political ones, were foreign Trotskyites, mostly Mexicans and South Americans.

Leadership

Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, the founder and main leader of MR-13, was born in 1938 to a Chinese father and a Guatemalan mother. After completing the military academy in Guatemala City (The Polytechnical School), he underwent a brief period of training at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. Actively involved in the 1960 coup, he fled to Honduras after its failure. The following year Yon Sosa returned to start a guerrilla movement.

Despite bitter ideological disputes with the PGT, FAR, and Cuba, Yon Sosa was widely respected by all his opponents for his military skills and for his unflagging revolutionary commitment.

Yon Sosa was always an activist more than a theoretician, which may explain his ideological shifts. He formed an alliance with the PGT, then switched to the Trotskyites of the Fourth International, and ended finally with the Castroite elements of FAR. Yon Sosa was killed in a shootout with the Mexican border forces, on Mexican territory, in June 1970.

Ideology

MR-13 favored a military approach to revolution, and it was around the needs of such an approach that the group centered its ideological positions. When the PGT was perceived as lukewarm in its support for guerrilla warfare, Yon Sosa

broke with it. Between 1964-1966 a group of Mexican and Argentine Trotskyists infiltrated the MR-13 and took a leading position in its ideological orientation. The "First Declaration from the Sierra de las Minas," of 1964 was clearly conceived by Trotskyist elements, and it included many of the typical Trotskyist points. It rejected the PGT's thesis that revolutionary struggle can take place only by stages, and instead adopted the claim that a general insurrection can and should be organized, to result outrightly in a socialist state. Only direct "popular action," expressed through guerrilla warfare, violent strikes, and use of all legal and quasi-legal means was considered adequate for the success of the revolution. Moreover, immediately after victory the capitalist and/or "quasi-feudal" system in Guatemala would be erased and replaced by a truly socialist economic, social, and political one.

Program

The major programmatic statement of the MR-13 was the "First Declaration from the Sierra de las Minas," which included a vague program of expropriations of local and foreign large commercial, agricultural and industrial enterprises. It also stressed the collectivization of agriculture and considered the state the main controlling factor in society.

In light of MR-13's opposition to reformism, detente, and "peaceful coexistence" with the U.S. (the main "enemy" of Guatemala's revolution), the group took a number of positions that were seen at the time as pro-Chinese and, even more so, anti-Soviet.

Guatemala - Group MR-13
- 377 -

Propaganda

Most of the MR-13 propaganda was directed against the PGT and the relatively modern labor force of the southeast. The group was a little reluctant in attacking FAR. Externally, between 1964-1966, the Posada faction of the Fourth International played a significant role in popularizing the impact and aims of the MR-13, often exaggerating both out of proportion. Trotskyist journalist, Adolfo Gilly, also played a prominent role in MR-13 propaganda throughout Latin America, mostly through his "Letters from the Guatemalan Front."

Both Internally, and particularly in Mexico, MR-13's main propaganda instrument was Revolucion Socialista, an irregularly published theoretical journal, that ceased publication by 1969.

Views on Violence

MR-13 never reached a permanent position regarding revolutionary violence. The military background of most of its leaders, particularly Yon Sosa and Loarca, resulted in an emphasis on action, and a relative lack of interest on ideology and propaganda. But MR-13's brief flirtation with the Fourth International seems to have represented Yon Sosa's own inclination toward a brief and massive civil war that would be stirred up by the example of the guerrillas in the Sierra de las Minas and would spread throughout the region. These views were in line with the Trotskyite dreams of a regional or continental evolution in Latin America, and the foco insurreccional approach. In fact MR-13's choice of the Izabal and Zacapa departments for its actions, and its half-hearted attempt to establish a rural front among the Indians of Huehuetenango indicated that the group was seeking a rapid and rapidly expanding civil war solution to what was perceived as the Guatemalan revolutionary situation.

Guatemala - Group MR-13

- 378 -

Performance

Most of the MR-13 members were former military officers and lower-rank soldiers. Some students and peasants joined in small numbers. Almost all members were adult men.

Military Structure

Throughout its existence the MR-13 operated only as a guerrilla group in a limited area in the Izabal Department. The Trotskyites of foreign origin who joined the group played a limited political role in indoctrination matters. As far as Yon Sosa was concerned, they existed only to help establish external connections.

Motivation and Performance

Operating in small units, and generally avoiding head-on clashes with the military, the MR-13 never demonstrated a particularly high combat effectiveness. However, Yon Sosa's own training and background explains the group's ability to survive as long as it did. A number of defections occurred, but they were generally in the lower ranks. Throughout its existence, the group's core was extremely well motivated.

Training

Until 1964 and probably after 1967, some cadres were trained in Cuba. But during those periods and between 1964-1966, most of the training was local or unnecessary due to the previous military background of some cadres.

Guatemala - Group MR-13

- 379 -

Financial Resources

Most of the MR-13's limited funds were of local origin -- armed robberies, kidnappings, and "revolutionary expropriations." Yet even though the group's financial state was precarious, the Fourth International had such limited means, it was forced to divert M-13 funds for itself.

Popular Support

Despite its continental fame, the MR-13 never enjoyed extensive popular support in Guatemala, or even in the limited areas it operated in. This is evident in the support the population has given the military since 1967, and in the effectiveness of the paramilitary, civilian, and local vigilante groups in eliminating the guerrillas.

External Support

Until 1964, when it split with FAR, the MR-13 received limited Cuban support. Between 1964-1966 such support stopped as a result of Castro's dissatisfaction with the role of the Trotskyists in MR-13. The Fourth International also offered Yon Sosa support, which included aid in spreading MR-13's propaganda and Mexican Trotskyist help in purchasing weapons. However, the Fourth International's means became so limited that it eventually was forced to divert MR-13's funds for itself.

Relations with Other Groups

The "First Declaration from the Sierra de las Minas" clarified the nature of the disputes between MR-13 and the PGT. For the most part they were centered around the former's rejection of the incremental approach to revolution adopted

by the communists. Relations with FAR were influenced by FAR's ties with the PGT. Once those ties were interrupted in 1967, and once MR-13 cut its own ties with the Fourth International, the FAR and MR-13 found it easy to unite once again.

Between 1964 and April 1966, MR-13 established close ties with the Buenos Aires-based Posada faction of the Fourth International. (A Mexican Trotskyist, Galvan, played a prominent role in smuggling weapons for Yon Sosa.) But the ties between Posada's group and MR-13 were never very deep. All it took was the diversion of a small amount of MR-13 funds into Posada's coffer to have the Trotskyist representatives "tried" by Yon Sosa and expelled.

Areas under Guerrilla Control

For a brief period in 1964 MR-13 established a certain level of control over remote areas in the Sierra de las Minas, only to lose them once the military anti-insurgency campaign went underway in earnest. The population under guerrilla control was required to provide food and other help, and was "encouraged" to form organizations (unions, and cooperatives) according to MR-13's prescriptions and under its direct leadership.

Dependence on a Charismatic Leader

From the start MR-13 was the creation of Yon Sosa, and he maintained strict control over it until his death. The combination of Yon Sosa's death and the devastating effects of the anti-insurgency resulted in the permanent and total collapse of the MR-13.

Guatemala - Group MR-13

- 381 -

Remarks

MR-13 was the first Latin American guerrilla group to adopt openly a socialist program. Most Castroite groups at the time had programs that were, publicly at least, nationalist, reformist, or simply vague.

Guatemala - Group FAR
- 382 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes
- b) In English : Rebel Armed Forces
- c) Acronym or known name : FAR

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Guatemala
- b) Others : Mexico was consistently used by FAR as a supply route for weapons and as an R&R area. Today the group operates on the El Peten-Mexico border, as well as in Belize border. FAR has also been directly involved in terrorist activities in El Salvador.

Origins

On 13 November 1960, a group of Guatemalan army officers, led by Colonel Rafael Sessan Pereira supported discreetly by important civilian politicians, staged a coup. They centered on garrisons near the capital, in Puerto Barrios and Zacapa. Following the coup's defeat, most of the leaders fled the country, among them Lieutenants Augusto Luis Turcios Lima, Alejandro de Leon, and Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. All three secretly returned to Guatemala in early spring of 1961. There they contacted various opposition parties, with the aim of organizing a military uprising with wide popular civilian support, and established their first links with the communist party (PGT). Alejandro de Leon was captured and killed by the police in July 1961, the same month Turcios and Yon Sosa reached an agreement with the PGT.

Guatemala - Group FAR
- 385 -

On 24 January 1962, the police chief responsible for Alejandro de Leon's death, Ranulfo Gonzalez, was shot down, and on 6 February 1962 a large group of armed men attacked the United Fruit Co. properties in the southeastern department of Izabal. That same month the Movimiento Guerrillero Alejandro de Leon-13 de Noviembre (The Alejandro de Leon Guerrilla Movement-November 13) made its first public statement.

In March 1962, Colonel Paz Tejada (ret.), President Arevalo's former defense minister, and then a PGT associate, announced the formation of the "Frente 20 de Octubre" (October 20th Front). The group's name commemorated the date of the 1944 coup that started the revolutionary process in Guatemala which ended in 1954. Later that month, violent student demonstrations broke out, but were rapidly suppressed. This resulted in the formation of the "April 12 Revolutionary Movement" by the leaders of the attempted insurrection. Most of the leaders were associated with the youth branch of the PGT, the JPT (Juventud Patriotico de Trabajo-Patriotic Workers' Youth). In December 1962, the three groups and the PGT established a common organization -- Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes -- FAR. The MR-13, led by Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima was practically FAR's only armed element. Yet the political body that controlled the FAR, the United Front of the Resistance (Frente Unido de Resistencia-FUR), included no MR-13 members and was under PGT control.

From its inception, the MR-13 was divided into two separate areas of operations: one led by Yon Sosa in the Sierra de las Minas that retained the name of Alejandro de Leon, and the other, led by Turcios Lima in the lowlands of Izabal and Zacapa, named the Edgar Ibarra Guerrilla Front-FGEL. The two groups remained operationally separate within FAR as well.

Guatemala - Group FAR

- 384 -

FAR's first operation on 30 June 1964, was an attack against a small military unit on Rio Hondo. However, conflicts between Yon Sosa and FUR grew, and by the end of 1964 the Alejandro de Leon guerrilla front became the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre -- MR-13 -- and broke with both the PGT and the FGEI. The FGEI under Turcios retained its links with the PGT, despite growing disenchantment with it. At the beginning of 1968, FGEI cut all ties with PGT. At that point FAR, which was nothing more than the FGEI, was led by Cesar Montes. In March 1968 it reunited with Yon Sosa's MR-13, under the name FAR. Yon Sosa was its main leader and Cesar Montes was second in command.

By the end of 1968, the military had almost completely eliminated FAR. Its few survivors withdrew to the Mexican border. The Third Conference of FAR in 1971 reassessed the movement's approach to revolutionary action, and began a period of retrenchment and quiet mobilization. In 1978 FAR renewed its violent activities to a significant extent, but by then very few of the initial leaders were alive or active.

Front Organizations

FAR was the main force behind the activities of the National Committee of Trade Union Unity (CNUS) (established in March 1976, and including mostly industrial and urban groups). After reaching a peak in 1978, CNUS was able to organize effective strikes in the mines of Izabal and at various enterprises in Guatemala City. However, many of the unions participating in CNUS were under PGT control or had originated from leftist fringes of the Christian Democratic union federation -- the Confederacion Nacional de Trabajo (CNT). Moreover, CNUS has always had only minimal influence in the rural areas. After the deaths of 27

Guatemala - Group FAR
- 385 -

of its leaders during a secret meeting in the capital, on 21 June 1980, CNUS's influence declined sharply. Today the group is part of the Democratic Front Against Repression (Frente Democratico contra la Represion -- FDCR), the (mostly international and in exile) front of the URNG guerrilla umbrella.

Members

FAR probably has less than 200 cadres and twice that number of ordinary fighters. In addition there is a fluctuating mass of followers in CNUS and other minor fronts that number into the thousands. Less than one quarter of the effective fighting force may be in the jungles of El Peten, half in the urban areas (mostly Guatemala City), and the rest in the northwestern highlands, particularly in Chimaltenango and the Pacific Department of Escuintla.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Luis Augusto Turcios Lima

i) Place of birth : Guatemala City

ii) Date of birth : November 23, 1941.

iii) Social background : Turcios said he was from the middle class. He hated his mother, claiming that she was a "reactionary" because she supported the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz. His father was a watch repairman.

iv) Education : Turcios Lima was educated at a private Catholic school in Guatemala City. From there he went on to the Polytechnical School (the military Academy). In 1959 he graduated and underwent a brief period of training at the Ranger Training School, Fort Benning, Georgia (1959-1960). Upon completion of the course Turcios was commissioned as second lieutenant at the beginning of 1960.

- Guatemala - Group FAR
- 386 -

- v) Political Career : Despite his age and junior rank, Turcios Lima
- was one of the most active participants in the failed 13 November 1960 coup.
- After the defeat, he fled to El Salvador, but returned to Guatemala in the Spring
- of 1961.

- Following his return, Turcios Lima became the commander of the FGEI
- (then part of the MR-13, and later of FAR after the break with Yon Sosa). He
- was Castro's favorite Central American revolutionary, as well as a prominent
- spokesman for guerrillas throughout Latin America. Turcios represented Guatemala
- at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1967, and was one of the few
- guerrillas to have a high position there. Ideologically, he was initially a
- nationalist who confused Castro's victory in Cuba with a success for Latin
- American nationalism against the U.S. By 1962 he had become a Castroite,
- although he did not break with the "reformist" PGT. Upon his return from the
- Tricontinental, he belatedly became a member of the PGT, despite numerous and
- often public disagreements with party positions. Most of his lieutenants, however,
- were high-ranking PGT members, and Turcios worked well with them. On 2
- October 1966 Turcios Lima was killed in an auto accident outside Guatemala City.

- b) Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia, alias Pablo Monsanto, alias "Manzana" : Very
- little is known about FAR's present leader. He was born around 1947-49 with a
- Ladino background. During the 1960s, he was the third-ranking FAR leader
- ("captain"). As "captain," he signed the January 1968 declaration that announced
- FAR's break with the PGT, although at the time he was also a member of the
- PGT's Central Committee. Monsanto has published interviews with a few leftist
- publications, e.g., Granma and Punto Final Internacional. As FAR's present
- supreme leader he is a top leader of the umbrella organization, URNG (Unidad
- Revolucionario Nacional de Guatemala -- Guatemalan National Revolutionary

Unity). URNG also includes EGP and ORPA, both initially FAR splinter groups, and a faction of the PGT.

c) Name or assumed name : César Montes

i) Place of birth : Guatemala City (?)

ii) Date of birth : 1942

iii) Social background : Middle-class, Ladino

iv) Education : Montes was expelled from a Catholic school at age 13 for expressing a hostile attitude toward the coup that overthrew President Arbenz. Soon after, he was leading student demonstrations and riots against the government. He attended Law school, but eventually dropped out to join the guerrilla movement. In the university one of his teachers was future president Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro.

v) Publications : Montes has published articles in Cuban and Chilean leftist magazines (Tricontinental, Punto Final, etc.).

vi) Character : Montes was one of the toughest Guatemalan guerrilla leaders. Fiercely independent, he refused the control of the PGT and rejected the transformation of the FAR into an "armed branch" of the communist party. His small stature and baby face earned him the nickname "the kid" (El Chiris). In 1968 Montes was "demoted to private" by his colleagues, and he broke with the group. He is now with the EGP.

Ideological Orientation

During the 1960s, FAR was a Castroite organization whose ideology and tactics were faithfully modelled after Castro's and Guevara's experience. The foco insurreccional was the main instrument of FAR armed struggle. FAR foci, however, were located in the Ladino, small-landholder, and fundamentally

Guatemala - Group FAR

- 388 -

conservative areas of the Izabal and Zacapa departments. In November 1962 FAR half-heartedly attempted to establish a foco in the Indian highlands of Huehuetenango. The attempt was unsuccessful. Despite its Castroite bent, FAR cooperated with the orthodox and pro-Soviet PGT throughout most of its initial period (1962-1967). Many of its leaders were also PGT Central Committee members, e.g., Cesar Montes, Pablo Monsanto, Nestor Valle. As a result, throughout the 1960s, FAR was dependent on the PGT for political support, political fronts for recruiting, supplies, funds, and contacts with the party cells in Guatemala City.

In 1971 the Third Conference adopted a double-edged approach to armed struggle: the continuation of the foco approach in the remote and largely uninhabited El Peten Department and the creation of a strong network of cells in Guatemala City and the industrial and agro-industrial areas of the Pacific Coast. Despite this strategic shift, a large number of cadres left FAR the following year, accusing the group of neglecting the "revolutionary potential" of the unassimilated Indians of the highlands. They formed the original nucleus of ORPA. Another group of 1960's FAR survivors established an independent movement in the Indian highlands at the beginning of 1972, after completing training in Cuba. This group eventually became the EGP. FAR continued to move closer to its former mentor and ally, the PGT, by concentrating in the urban and industrial areas. Nevertheless, in August 1982, it also attempted to establish a foothold in the highlands with the creation of the "Tecun Uman" front in the Chimaltenango and El Quiche departments.

Guatemala - Group FAR
- 389 -

Original Program

FAR's original program was largely that of the PGT, which controlled the guerrillas' ideology, platform, and alliance policies. Only perfunctory attention was given to the Indian problem, and to the development of FAR's own social, economic, and political program.

The "old" (pre-1970) FAR's economic, political, and social program included: the industrialization and development of Guatemala within a "patriotic-capitalist" framework; measures against "imperialism," i.e., multinational corporations, while preserving the property of the "national bourgeoisie;" a "national democratic revolution" that would bring to power a bloc of four classes: workers, peasants, national bourgeoisie, and petty bourgeoisie; strong nationalist, patriotic and anti - "imperialist," i.e., anti-U.S., stances; and solidarity with Castro's Cuba and all "national liberation" movements throughout Latin America and the world.

Present Program

FAR's current domestic program closely resembles that of the URNG umbrella organization. On 8 March 1982, Intercontinental Press published URNG's founding statement, which included a domestic program open to various interpretations. URNG calls for an end to repression, but it defines repression as all government actions against terrorism and insurgency. It advocates the confiscation of all "large" properties, without defining "large", and it guarantees the existence of small and medium agrarian holdings without further specifying what these holdings are.

This ambiguity is also found in URNG's economic policies, which are centered on the principles of a control economy, particularly price controls and "adequate wages." But it is the new regime that will decide what "adequate" means and who will receive these wages. Also the economic program makes no mention of the creation of wealth. (Perhaps this can be explained by FAR's propaganda, which inexplicably claims that Guatemala and Central America are "rich.") However, URNG does consider foreign investments "necessary for poor countries," as long as these investments are made with "respect for the needs of the nation," i.e., with respect for government economic policies and a "reasonable rate of profits". But again, it is the new regime that will decide what is a "reasonable" rate of profit.

In its social program the URNG promises equality between Indians and Ladinos and freedom of expression, association, and religion. It also claims that "all patriotic, democratic, and popular sectors will be represented in the government." This implies that the division of power will be decided on the basis of certain political attributes of various groups, rather than on elections and choices. URNG also threatens that "recalcitrant repressive enemies and the clique of top military chiefs" will be "severely judged" once the guerrillas take over, while concurrently stating that certain elements of the army will have a place in the "new revolutionary people's army." Interestingly, the Nicaraguan FSLN made a similar claim and subsequently, completely destroyed the existing military.

Regarding religion, the URNG says "it recognizes Christians as one of the pillars of the new society," even though URNG members are extremely hostile toward traditionalist Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants. Perhaps the "Christians" it accepts are those "progressives" already cooperating with the revolutionaries.

Guatemala - Group FAR
- 391 -

On 19 October 1983, FAR published a foreign policy statement in Guatemalan newspapers and on television stations in return for the release of former president Rios Montt's and current president, Mejia Victores's sisters. The statement attacked U.S. policies in Central America and throughout the world, thus expressing FAR's view of the world. The two basic premises of this view are that "It is useless to attempt to recover the already lost U.S. hegemony in the world," and that "In response to the increasing U.S. intervention in Central America the Guatemalan revolutionaries will increase the struggle to achieve our true national independence."

The statement blamed all of Guatemala's problems, since the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz, on the U.S., and it expressed a clear regionalistic approach to revolution in Central America. This latter aspect was demonstrated by repeated expressions of solidarity with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador. FAR also called for support of "peaceful" solutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador, on the terms proposed by the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas, and it expressed support for the Contadora group, as well as solidarity with Cuba.

Ideologues

FAR has never developed a coherent and original ideology, not even in the 1960s when its foco approach was identical to Guevara's theories and practices. Turcios Lima, Cesar Montes, and more recently, Pablo Monsanto limited their theoretical analyses to brief interviews and repetitions of previous theories and revolutionary experiences in Guatemala or elsewhere.

Guatemala - Group FAR

- 392 -

Propaganda

a) Addressed internal audience : FAR propaganda is directed particularly to the literate, i.e., Ladino and urban or industrial groups, some of which are unionized.

b) Ideological content : During the last few years, FAR propaganda has called for a large coalition that includes, in addition to the guerrilla groups, "nationalist," "democratic," and "progressive" sectors of the bourgeoisie, military, Church, and legal political parties.

c) Means : FAR's most frequently used propaganda medium are temporarily seized radio stations forced to air guerrilla statements. Statements have also been aired by the Salvadoran rebels' Radio Venceremos and Nicaragua's Radio Sandino. FAR also demands publication of propaganda in newspapers in exchange for kidnapped hostages. The group irregularly publishes an information bulletin, Guerrillero, mostly outside Guatemala. In addition, Cuban, Soviet bloc, and Latin American leftist media outlets are often used to propagate FAR's aims. FAR propaganda leaflets have been confiscated repeatedly by the Guatemalan military, in Guatemala City, the Department of Escuintla, and in Chimaltenango. They were apparently printed locally or mimeographed.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

From its inception (and even throughout the MR-13 Alejandro de Leon period in the early 1960s) FAR has viewed armed struggle as the major instrument for a revolutionary takeover. This attitude can be traced back to the military background of the group's two founders, Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and Luis Augusto Turcios Lima. Both men admired and emulated Castro and Guevara. It was FAR's "militaristic" position (and that of its related groups, MR-13 and FGEI)

Guatemala - Group FAR

- 373 -

that caused the many conflicts between it and the opportunistic PGT. During the 1966 election of civilian president Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, Valle and Montes were among the minority of PGT leaders and followers who rejected the party decision to support Mendez. In accusing the communists of betraying the guerrillas, FAR claimed that "The PGT provided the ideas, while FAR provided the dead." FAR broke with the PGT a year later.

FAR's foco experience during the 1960s ended in disaster, with the movement practically destroyed. The 1971 conference reassessed the group's strategy and decided to continue the foco approach in El Peten, but also to move toward a strategy of prolonged mobilization and use of fronts and urban terrorist cells. In October 1983 FAR claimed that "if it is necessary to struggle 10, 20, 30, or more years to expel the imperialist intervention from Central America territory, we will do it . . . we will follow the example of the heroic people of Vietnam." This statement as well as the group's present slogan, "To win or die for Guatemala, the revolution, and socialism," reflects its commitment to armed struggle and the "guerra popular prolongada" (popular protracted war) theory of Latin American Marxist revolution.

Performance

a) Social Group : In El Peten, the FAR groups are led by Ladino urban types and consist of peasants as ordinary members. In the urban and developed areas most members and cadres are from the urban strata, including workers, lumpenproletarians, and middle-class elements, with the latter in the predominant role.

Guatemala - Group FAR

- 394 -

b) Age Groups : During the 1960s many FAR fighters and leaders were university dropouts. Even today some university professors and students, in the provinces as well as at the San Carlos University in Guatemala City, are FAR members or collaborators. However, the majority of members are from petty bourgeois and middle-class backgrounds. Far is the Guatemalan guerrilla group with the oldest membership (with the exception of the PGT, which is not a guerrilla group in the ordinary sense). Monsanto is probably less than 40 years old, but that is still older than the average age of members of either the EGP or ORPA.

c) Sex targeting : FAR has never had large numbers of women among its important leaders, or among cadres.

Indoctrination

a) Very often members are indoctrinated before they are recruited. Additional ideological training is slight, consequently members possess a low level of identification with the group. This results in FAR members frequently joining other groups.

b) Use of universities : Universities and high schools are sometimes used as indoctrination and recruitment grounds for FAR but, as with the use of religious groups (Jesuits, Maryknollers, etc.), this occurs less frequently than in the cases of ORPA and particularly the EGP.

c) Use of unions : Given FAR's initial role in CNUS, unions are considered important indoctrination and recruiting grounds. However, many CNUS members ultimately joined EGP, ORPA, or even PGT unions and fronts.

d) Use of foreign cadres : Although reliable evidence does not exist, it appears that Cubans, Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans, as well as some

Guatemala - Group FAR
- 395 -

Nicaraguans were and may still be involved with FAR as trainers, fighters, or members of its national and/or international support network. Their role, however, appears to be limited.

Military Structure

FAR has been militarily divided by areas, types of forces, and operational specialization. Thus, the group's overall forces are divided into fronts, the most important of which are the "Turcios Lima" and "Tecun Uman."

Urban commandos are always used for spectacular sabotage actions and kidnappings. FAR's claims that it has a militia structure in various rural areas should be dismissed as exaggerated, given the group's small size and extremely limited rural support, presence, and activities.

Political Control of Forces

In light of FAR's small size, it appears that field commanders -- who have renounced their 1960s habit of assuming army-type ranks -- are also in charge of political affairs for their units.

Fighting Performance

a) Motivation : Regarding the "old" FAR, Monsanto's own recollections reveal that many temporary recruits were later involved in lynchings of FAR members, an indication of the shallow loyalty new members and the rank and file had toward the leadership. Today, FAR's small size is largely explainable by the large number of its members deserting, accepting amnesties, or joining government-sponsored civilian self-defense patrols.

Guatemala - Group FAR

- 396 -

FAR leaders, on the other hand, have always been committed to their cause, even when they left the movement to join competing ones. And they have frequently participated directly in combat, hence the extremely high casualty rate among the FAR founders and initial cadres core during the 1960s.

b) Performance : The "old" FAR's ability to threaten the Guatemalan government was never more than a figment of the imagination of the Latin American Left. By 1968, according to Monsanto, only five out of the initial 25 FAR founders were still alive; the group had succeeded in recruiting two new members that year -- one deserted and the other died. In no important confrontation with the military did FAR manage to do more than escape with serious damages to itself. The post-1978 FAR, with its concentration of efforts in the deserted El Peten and on terrorist activities in urban areas, avoids hard targets and direct clashes with the military and concentrates instead on kidnappings of civilians and assassinations.

Training

Most of FAR's training for rank and file and lower-level cadres takes place in Guatemala, with some rudimentary training facilities in El Peten. Important cadres are trained in Cuba, Nicaragua, and probably acquire additional experience in El Salvador. The trainers are mostly Guatemalans, with temporary visits by foreigners, mostly Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Mexicans trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba.

Financial Resources

The overwhelming portion of the "old" FAR's resources came from Cuba, as supplies, training, weapons, and propaganda expenses. The "new" FAR appears to

Guatemala - Group FAR

- 397 -

rely far more on ransom incomes from their numerous kidnappings; although a significant portion of revenues still comes from outside -- Cuba, radical Third World regimes, Nicaragua, Mexican citizens, Western leftists and fellow travelers, and some Catholic and even Protestant church elements. CNUS, when dominated by FAR, also served as an important source of revenues, through the union dues paid by the members.

Equipment and Supplies

The "old" FAR used weapons captured from the military and acquired on the international black market. The group distinguished itself by its obsolete equipment. The "new" FAR uses mines (including some homemade devices) more extensively, as well as weapons similar to those of the Guatemalan military (mostly Galil rifles), albeit often bought outside rather than, as FAR claims, captured from the "enemy." No heavy weapons are yet used by FAR guerrillas. Light machine guns, however, seem to exist in the FAR inventory. This is implied in the group's claims of shooting down government helicopters.

Level of Popular Support

The "old" FAR had a very limited level of support among the population, a fact accepted by its present leaders themselves, particularly by Monsanto. The effectiveness of the civilian vigilante groups (a.k.a. the "death squads") in the late 1960s indicates the shallow support the guerrillas received. Because it has never reached a significant number of fighters, the "new" FAR has the same problem. The fact that CNUS has lost so many members to the EGP-controlled Committee of Peasant Unity (Comite de Unidad Campesina-CUC) and that FAR, once the most resolute opponent of united front tactics is now the most active

promoter of URNG, indicates that FAR has never reached a significant level of popular support in the cities and in the rural areas.

External Support

The "old" FAR was a creation of the Castroite wave of revolutionary high expectations during the 1960s. When Guevara died in Bolivia and Castro became an open Soviet satellite in 1968, these hopes died and FAR collapsed. Propaganda, weapons, training, all were the result of Castro's support for Turcios Lima. Moreover, at that time FAR was the only Guatemalan guerrilla group.

Today, the "new" FAR has to cope with competition from larger and stronger groups (mostly ORPA and EGP) and wealthier groups (PGT). It can only offer its tradition and the names of Turcios Lima and Yon Soes to would-be external supporters. FAR's traditional clashes with the pro-Soviet PGT and its inability to compete with the EGP or ORPA among the Indians, have diminished its chances of receiving preferential Soviet bloc or Cuban help.

Since FAR was extensively dependent upon external aid, the loss of most of this aid may explain the group's present weakness. Indeed, the group's enthusiastic embrace of the URNG may have occurred in the hope that it would receive external aid from the URNG umbrella at a level comparable to that of the 1960s. Nevertheless, the change in international, regional, and global conditions, as well as the absence of another Turcios Lima, may doom FAR to only a marginal role in the present Guatemalan struggle for power.

Relations with Other Groups

FAR is the only Guatemalan Marxist group, other than the PGT, that has served as the initial core of a number of competitive guerrilla groups. Remnants

Guatemala - Group FAR

- 399 -

of the "old" FAR, who discreetly disagreed with the group's approach to the Indian problem and the location of the armed struggle, established the EGP in February 1972. Dissidents who objected to FAR's adoption of an urban-based foco strategy shortly before and after the 1971 conference, left to establish the ORPA. FAR's relations with both groups have always been plagued by resentment, open or implied accusations of treason on both sides, and sheer envy on FAR's part when ORPA and particularly the EGP grew larger and more effective than the group claiming the inheritance of Turcios Lima, the great hero of the Guatemalan Marxists. As for FAR's relations with the PGT, they have always been plagued by distrust, at times open, e.g., in 1967 FAR accused the PGT of collaboration with "the enemy;" in the late 1970s there was competition for control of union fronts, and more recently there has been competition for a prominent role in the URNG. Monsanto may be proud of his role as one of the four URNG supreme leaders, but the "democratic centralism" principle that the URNG employs in decision making may place him in a minority. The ORPA-EGP ties are far stronger than those between either FAR or PGT and the other two groups, or between FAR and PGT.

FAR's relations with non-Guatemalan groups are close and old. FAR proudly assumed responsibility for the kidnapping of a wealthy Salvadoran in 1971 by both FPL and FAR members, and it has consistently supported the FPL-Carpio tendency within the FMLN. Carpio's death by "suicide" in Managua in April 1983 probably weakened some of the old FAR-FPL ties.

As relatively recent converts to the "guerra prolongada" practice and theory, FAR have close ties with Tomas Borge, the Sandinista Interior Minister. This may be another Faux-pas in light of the Ortega brothers' growing domination

Guatemala - Group FAR
- 400 -

of Nicaraguan politics and Borge's declining fortunes. Outside the Central or Latin American universe, FAR's present connections are very limited.

Extent of Areas under Guerrilla Control

FAR has always claimed areas under its absolute control as "liberated areas." But these areas were either inaccessible and uninhabited, as in some El Peten regions, or products of propaganda. Even the Sierra de las Minas of Izabal, the location of the MR-13 main foco during the 1960s, was actually a collection of isolated islands of chaos rather than the beginnings of a "new" regime. In the wake of FAR's shift toward the urban and developed regions during the past decade, the use of the term "liberated areas" has been infrequent.

Impact of Factionalism

FAR has been plagued by factionalism throughout its history. Whether centered around strategic disputes (like the FAR-PGT debates of 1964-1967), or ideological ones (like the FAR-MR-13 1964-1967 arguments), or on the different approaches to the Indians' role and potential (like during the early 1970s), FAR internecine disputes had a way of resulting in the creation of new groups, factions, or regional units. With such leaders as Turcios Lima, Yon Sosa, and Cesar Montes, personality also played an important role, and served as an additional source of factionalism and institutional breakdowns. Overall, these factional disputes have resulted in the decline of one of the oldest continuing guerrilla movements in Latin America.

Guatemala - Group FAR
- 401 -

Remarks

FAR is the oldest Central American guerrilla group, with a history dating back to 1960. It has undergone strategic shifts, ranging from an imitation of the foco insurreccional of Guevara to its present embrace of the "protracted popular war" strategy, but it still remains marginal in Guatemala and, ultimately, as a model for Latin American revolution. Today FAR -- known during the late 1960s for its unorthodox approaches to revolution and its opposition to the pro-Soviet PGT -- practically embraces PGT tactics and ideas. This may reflect the larger trends in Latin America's revolution. In fact, without the history of FAR no understanding of Latin and Central America's revolutionary history and trends would be complete.

Guatemala - Group ORPA
- 402 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Organización del Pueblo en Armas
- b) In English : Armed People's Organization
- c) Acronym or known name : ORPA

Country of Operation

Guatemala. In addition, ORPA uses the Mexican territory extensively for supplies and for R&R purposes.

Origins

According to available information (most of which is provided by ORPA) the group first appeared in 1971. It was a dissident faction of the "old" FAR that included survivors of FAR's western front. In June 1971 ORPA began its first efforts to establish a rural base of support by indoctrinating the Indians. By September the dissidents formally broke with the almost defunct FAR. At the end of 1972 the group established an urban network, mostly among university and high school elements. On 18 September 1979 ORPA attacked and occupied a coffee farm in Quetzaltenango, thus making public its existence. It since began extensive terrorist activities in Guatemala City and the northwestern departments.

Front Organizations

Unlike the EGP, PGT, or FAR, ORPA is oriented more toward the militaristic approach to revolution. Thus it pays less attention to the establishment of significant front organizations. Although some elements of CNU5 and CUC -- the latter at the local level -- were and may still be ORPA cadres as well, ORPA has never controlled these two groups.

Guatemala - Group ORPA
- 403 -

Membership

Since 1979 ORPA has been considered the second largest Guatemalan guerrilla group. (The EGP is larger.) At its peak in 1981-1982, the EGP had about 4,000 fighters. The PGT and FAR had only a few hundred combined. Therefore, ORPA may have had as many as 2,000 full-time fighters at most. Since 1982, however, large losses -- through defections, deaths, and capture -- have been incurred by all groups, most particularly by EGP and ORPA. Today ORPA may have as many as 1,000 fighters at most, and it may be almost as strong as EGP, particularly in Guatemala City.

In addition to the full-time fighters, ORPA's strength includes local para military forces of peasants, which are poorly armed and of widely fluctuating size. Their numbers ranged between five and six thousand in 1981. Since then they have sharply declined.

Leadership

Very little is known about the main ORPA leaders, particularly in light of the organization's secrecy and experience in underground activities.

The foremost leader is Rodrigo Asturias Amado, alias "Gaspar Ilom" (or Ilon). He is of Ladino origin and has adopted an Indian nomme de guerre in line with ORPA's attempts to attract Indians into its ranks and to claim to speak for them. Ilom represented ORPA at the 1980 talks that resulted in the creation of the URNG.

The group's main spokesman in Havana appears to be Joaquin Cristobal. Some prominent clergymen, mostly Spanish Jesuits, are among ORPA's field commanders, e.g., "Juan Carlos," and "Pedro," and Irish priest, Donald McKena. A number of women are also known to be or to have been important commanders.

Guatemala - Group ORPA
- 404 -

"Commander Ines," the alias of Dr. Julia Solorzano Foppa, was the niece of the Guatemalan economy minister in 1981, Valentin Solorzano. She was killed in action in December 1981.

Ideology

ORPA's ideology is a combination of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and the nativistic and racist-romantic ideas of Franz Fanon and Carlos Mariategui. In many ways ORPA's approach to revolutionary violence is similar to that of the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso.

ORPA believes that the Indians, provided with the right political, theoretical, and social indoctrination, are the main source of revolutionary militancy. Areas considered most backward and still manifesting significant pre-modern or even pre-colonial traditions, are seen as the most favorable to ORPA activities. Despite the fact that almost all its important leaders are Ladino or foreigners, and of middle-or-upper-class background, ORPA tries to take advantage of and to exacerbate racial tensions between Indians and Ladinos. In accordance with Fanon's theories, native violence and the rejection of "alien European" customs, economic patterns, and social behavior, are fundamental elements in ORPA's revolutionary strategy. Violence is seen not only as necessary for the conquest of power, but also as a purifying factor in producing devoted cadres and building new patterns of behavior.

The Maoist influence in ORPA's revolutionary practice is reflected in the group's emphasis on rural warfare. This is demonstrated by the fact that cadres initially belonged to a rural structure. The urban structure was established later.

ORPA rejected the foco theory. In fact it was that rejection and the group's emphasis on rural warfare that caused the split with FAR. Once FAR was defeated in the Sierra de las Minas it turned toward urban terrorism, the creation of front organizations, and the infiltration of unions. The dissidents who formed the initial nucleus of ORPA rejected this approach.

Program

ORPA's minimal program can be found in the URNG program. (See FAR.) The party shares URNG's goals in the social, economic, and political realms. With regard to foreign developments, ORPA believes that FSLN's victory in Nicaragua "confirms that through the revolutionary process a people can overthrow tyrannical regimes . . . and defeat armies trained to repress and murder their own people." The party also considers the U.S. and Israel the main "enemies" of the "Guatemalan revolution." It has consistently demonstrated "anti-Zionist" attitudes, and expressed "solidarity" with the Salvadoran FMLN.

Ideologues

Long periods of secret organization and its recent militaristic approach has made ORPA decreasingly interested in political analysis and increasingly oriented toward action. No prominent ideologues of the group exists; although many ideological statements are published in Erupcion, the party's publication.

Propaganda

During the underground period (1971-1979), ORPA directed its propaganda toward the illiterate, non-Spanish speaking Indians, mostly through secret indoctrination. Since 1979, however, the group has targeted urban elements

(students), as well as alienated middle-class youth and women. Unlike groups such as the EGP, which consider the Guatemalan army beyond revolutionary "redemption," ORPA has made consistent attempts to attract supposedly dissatisfied soldiers and officers. The group has attempted to infiltrate the military and appealed to the men to desert.

ORPA's means of propaganda include its publication, Erupcion, and the radio. No Latin American group is as proficient as ORPA is in the use of radio. It has overtaken many radio stations and broadcasted its propaganda. More importantly, in a number of cases mobile ORPA transmitters are more powerful than legitimate stations; thus the group can overpower these legitimate wave lengths and use them to broadcast its own statements. ORPA's capabilities also enable it to interfere with and intercept Guatemalan military communications.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

ORPA may be the most consistently military-oriented revolutionary group in Guatemala. It firmly believes that "Only through the triumph of the people's revolutionary war will we be able to live in peace and brotherhood." The group has been extremely vocal in its rejection of all amnesties offered by the government, including the one offered by Rios Montt in 1982. It claims that they are only "maneuvers by which new massacres can be perpetrated."

According to one of its members, ORPA is "a political and military people's organization whose immediate objective is to take power through people's revolutionary guerrilla warfare . . . Nor do we claim to be the vanguard of the armed movement in Guatemala." This last sentence indicates ORPA's more military approach to revolution and power. It does not favor the typical Marxist-Leninist approach based upon the claim that it is the elite force of the

Guatemala - Group ORPA
- 407 -

people. Thus it appears the ORPA's aim is the destruction of the present government, with the question of political control after victory left deliberately open.

In June 1981 ORPA guerrillas operating in groups up to two hundred men occupied towns in San Marcos, Retalhuleu, and Huehuetenango and conducted propaganda rallies and seized arms from the local police stations. Recently, ORPA guerrilla operations have intensified in these regions. During the 1983 "Victorious January" campaign the group claimed that its forces had inflicted 65 casualties to the army and captured approximately 4000 rounds of ammunition. Besides activities in the northern and western departments of San Marcos, Quetzaltenango, Solola, Totonicapan, Huehuetenango, ORPA has launched urban guerrilla operations in Guatemala City. (1981-1982) These have included attacks on police garrisons.

Performance and Recruitment

ORPA recruits its rank and file members mainly from the rural areas of the north-western departments. Universities and alienated middle-class elements provide a solid number of middle-level cadres. Many middle-level cadres and a few major ones are women. They are, for the most part, from middle-class or upper-class background, e.g., Julia Solorzano. ORPA claims to represent Indian interests as well as those of the "poor." These claims may explain why a large number of Catholic priests, almost all foreigners, have joined the group in important positions.

Indoctrination

Most rank and file indoctrination occurs in remote villages, often through "armed propaganda," i.e., at gunpoint. In other cases, indoctrination is centered around local low-level cadres commanding the Fuerzas Irregulares Locales -- FIL (Irregular Local Forces), who are actually poorly armed and trained militias.

One of ORPA's primary aims is the formation of a racially centered "Indian consciousness." The group justifies this aim by pointing to the Indians' inferior political and economic position, which it claims is the result of "capitalism" as well as the Spanish conquista. For the sake of "Indian authenticity," Indians are discouraged from adopting modern economic and social patterns of behavior. And, despite ORPA's claims to the contrary, they are encouraged to distrust and hate Ladinos.

Use of Foreign Cadres

Despite its nativist and Indian-oriented claims, ORPA seems to have a higher proportion of foreign cadres in its higher echelons than almost any Guatemalan or Central American guerrilla group. Government claims that Cuban "commanders" have been killed in action while leading ORPA groups are too frequent and too well-established to be dismissed. The impressive number of Catholic clergymen of foreign origin among ORPA's prominent leaders is another substantiated fact.

Military Structure

ORPA's military structure is centered around three types of forces. Full-time guerrilla units in the rural areas generally are active in ambushes, political murders of informers and pro-government elements, and control of the

Guatemala - Group ORPA
- 409 -

population. The FIL, is the largest element, but it is also the least effective. It is very vulnerable to government attacks and amnesties, rewards for captured weapons, and threats of starvation of themselves and their families. Urban commandos, stationed mostly in Guatemala City, are the most recent and best trained. They specialize in bombings, spectacular terrorist attacks -- the January 1984 artillery attack on the Presidential Palace, kidnappings, and political murders. Also, as "Commander Pedro," an ORPA leader in Solola described it in 1980, the ORPA "urban front has been supplying the guerrillas in the mountains with arms, medicines, clothing and so forth."

Following the impressive government anti-insurgency campaigns of 1981-1983, most of ORPA's rural structure has been destroyed or forced into an ineffective retreat to the pre-1979 underground activities. The urban network, which bore the most serious fighting, has survived; however, many of their top leaders were killed.

The political control of the ORPA forces is undertaken by the field commanders, FIL leaders, and in rural areas by both guerrilla and FIL leaders. Small and usually mobile "schools" for indoctrination and military training of lower level cadres exist in remote villages and in some safe houses in Guatemala City and Chimaltenango. Higher cadres are trained in Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet bloc countries. According to captured cadres, most are sent to Panama with false passports and from there to Cuba, and return the same way.

Motivation and Performance

ORPA militants are skillful in communications, rural ambushes, and harassment operations. However, on a few occasions they have let large units be surrounded or largely eliminated and consequently have lost some of their major

Guatemala - Group ORPA
- 410 -

commanders. For example, in July 1981 prominent leaders of the urban network, including at least three commanders, were killed in a shootout with the army. Later that year (December) "Commander Ines" was also killed.

Most rank and file members perform creditably in ambushes and harassment operations. But when major offensives by the military force them to fight against highly trained regular forces, they collapse or withdraw hastily.

ORPA commanders, perhaps more than those of any other Guatemalan group, are at least occasionally involved in field operations. In December 1981, "Gaspar Ilom" led the failed offensive in the highlands of San Marcos and Huehuetenango.

Desertion Rate

Since the advent of the Rios Montt regime the rate of ORPA rank and file desertions has steadily increased. There are many reasons for this: potential conflicts between the predominantly non-Indian leadership and its pro-Indian pretensions; the Indians' belief that the protection of their villages, families, and traditions is more important than revolutionary hopes and aims; and a general disappointment among Indians with ORPA's inability to fulfill its highly optimistic promises. This is especially relevant in light of the exaggerate hopes that followed the Sandinistas' 1979 triumph in Nicaragua.

Weapons

On various occasions, including the attack against the Presidential Palace, ORPA has used light artillery pieces, including mortars of Chinese making. Generally, however, ORPA's armory includes weapons captured from the police and army (Galil rifles and pistols) and mines. The group's experts seem quite

Guatemala - Group ORPA
- 411 -

proficient at manufacturing explosive devices and using sophisticated ones obtained from abroad.

Financing

According to ORPA, most of its financing is the result of voluntary contributions from peasants, the middle-class, and even alienated members of the Guatemalan upper-classes. The group claims to have an "international front," which indicates a major source of financing and the importance ORPA places on foreign support. At its peak in 1981, ORPA probably operated funds in the range of millions of quetzales per month, just to keep its forces in the field. A large part of these resources were in quetzales, the result of "voluntary" contributions in ORPA-penetrated and influenced areas. But most came in hard currency, the result of ransom payments and contributions from Cuba, Mexican leftists, and Western sympathizers.

External Support

ORPA's external support (financial, training, and propaganda) is quite extensive. Nevertheless, the group could operate in its absence, although at a much lower level of intensity and effectiveness.

Relations with Other Groups

ORPA seems to have been the major catalyst in the creation of the URNG and it was the first group to announce the "unification" of the guerrilla groups. By June 1980 ORPA spokesmen had already underlined the fact that leaflets describing the program of a new, united, revolutionary regime had been distributed on May 1. They called this proof of the "possibility of revolutionary

Guatemala - Group ORPA

- 412 -

unity." However, by July 1981 ORPA statements began to criticize the EGP for "trying to take over control and leadership of Guatemala's revolutionary movement." They also accused EGP of an excessive aggressiveness that led to such serious losses as the death of "Commander Manolo." Then in January 1984, ORPA's Silvia Gutierrez declared that "The process of unity is advancing. This year we carried out joint political-military activities, which mark a qualitative jump between the unitarian process and the expansion of this process, which is advancing." Also, despite tactical disagreements with the EGP, ORPA committed a number of terrorist acts in Guatemala City in 1982, as revenge for the arrest, trial, and execution of three EGP members involved in a kidnapping.

ORPA seem particularly close to the FSLN, as demonstrated by its involvement with Eden Pastora in 1980 and by its willingness to disavow him once he broke with Cuba and Managua.

Since 1979 ORPA has had close ties with Cuba. ORPA cadres train there, and there have been many Cubans involved in ORPA activities.

Areas under Guerrilla Control

Although ORPA has never proclaimed any specific area a "liberated area," some regions in San Marcos, Chimaltenango, and Solola, were under extended control of its cadres. It appears that those regions were militarized thoroughly, with social and behavioral changes only a secondary aim. The creation of FILs was its most important aim.

Factionalism

In 1979 ORPA dissidents, dissatisfied with its rural warfare orientation and convinced that an insurrection was possible, left the group. They first

Guatemala - Group ORPA
- 413 -

established the dissident "Our Movement" (Nuestro Movimiento) group, and in 1982, they established the MRP-IXIM. Their leader, a former ORPA cadre, Raul Rodriguez alias "Commander Efrain" was killed in action in January 1984. However, this did not prevent the group from expanding marginally by including maximalist dissidents from the EGP, FAR, and PGT, who were united in their insurrectional approach and hostility toward the URNG.

Guatemala - Group EGP
- 414 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres
- b) In English : Guerrilla Army of the Poor
- c) Acronym or known name : EGP

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Guatemala
- b) Others : Many EGP R&R places are known to exist in Mexico, mostly disguised as "refugee camps." Nicaragua is one of the group's main rear areas for leadership meetings. Also, El Salvador and Honduras are conduits for supplies, cadres, and friendly local groups.

Origins

At the end of 1971 a handful of surviving cadres from the FGEI met on the Mexican side of the EL Quiche-Mexico border. They were retrained in Cuba and maintained a small, inactive urban underground structure in Guatemala City. On 19 January 1972 they crossed the Chiapas-El Quiche border, in the Ixan area. Their last act in Mexico was to blow up two light planes that belonged to local landowners accused of having helped the Mexican police detect and kill Yon Sosa less than two years previously. This act was symbolic in two ways: it underscored the continuity of guerrilla activities between the "old" FAR elements of the 1960s and the soon-to-be-named EGP, and it initiated a pattern of freely using the territory of Mexico. In the Spring of 1975 the new group undertook its first violent action -- the murder of a prominent local agriculturalist, Luis Arenas. During its first conference of cadres, in Spring 1975, the name EGP was adopted formally.

Front Organizations

Of all present Guatemalan guerrilla groups, the EGP is the most successful at establishing significant front organizations. The largest is the Committee of Peasant Unity (Comite de Unidad Campesina -- CUC), which first acted publicly on 1 May 1978. It was initially a loose collection of peasant leagues, some of which were formed previously, under the initiative of Jesuits and Maryknollers, on the Salvadoran model established by Father Rutilio Grande at Aguilares. It then became a quasi-military organization uninterested in legal status, and widely used by the EGP (in a few scattered areas also by ORPA) as an instrument of mobilization, indoctrination, and recruitment of Indian peasants. According to leftist analysts, "CUC work merged with that of the guerrilla organizations in sabotage and harassment of the Army, preparation in armed self-defense and political education." CUC's slogans, including "VIVA GPR!" (Long Live the Popular Protracted War), are the same as those of the EGP, as are its leaders.

Following the Salvadoran pattern, CUC rapidly spawned other organizations. All were nominally separate, although ultimately they fell under CUC-EGP control. The most important of these groups, for propaganda purposes, were the January 31 Popular Front (FP-31) and the Revolutionary Christians "Vicente Menchu." The first name refers to the 31 January 1980 EGP-CUC takeover of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City, which ended in bloodshed and the death of the terrorists, including Indian activists Vicente Menchu.

Despite the essential EGP-CUC-FP-31 chain of control, formally it is the FP-31 that includes the CUC, the "Vicente Menchu" front, and others, such as the "Robin Garcia Revolutionary Student Front" (FERG). The FP-31, in turn, is the main element of the guerrilla fronts' umbrella, the Guatemalan Patriotic Unity Committee (Comite Guatemalteco de Unidad Patriotica -- CGUP). The CGUP also

Guatemala - Group EGP
- 416 -

includes the main international front of all Guatemalan revolutionary, Marxist, and Leninist groups, the Democratic Front against Repression (Frente Democrático contra la Represión -- FDCR), founded in 1979.

Although CUC attracted thousands of members during 1980, its membership was and still is impossible to assess, particularly in light of the organization's secrecy. Following the established EGP pattern of secrecy and strict underground activities, CUC's leaders remained anonymous until 1980.

Membership

EGP's membership is impossible to estimate with any accuracy, due to lack of reliable sources, wide fluctuations, and the group's own secrecy. By far the largest guerrilla group in Guatemala, the EGP may have had as many as 1,200 fighters in 1981 and up to 2,000 the following year. It has declined steadily ever since. Sources mentioning as many as 8,000 EGP guerrillas are most certainly exaggerated, and they include part-time, mostly forcibly recruited and untrained peasant followers. However, the recent strength of the EGP, which started in 1972 with about two dozen guerrillas and urban cadres, clearly indicates its relative success.

Cadres

The number of important EGP cadres runs into the hundreds. This is due to the geographical diversity of the fighting units and the large area in which they operate. While most cadres are Guatemalan, some are foreigners, i.e., Hondurans, Mexicans, and some Nicaraguans. Despite EGP's emphasis on the revolutionary role of the Indians, the overwhelming majority of the cadres are Ladino. Indians are better represented in the fronts and in propaganda apparatus, particularly abroad.

Guatemala - Group EGP

- 417 -

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, alias "Rolando Moran"

b) Date of birth : mid 1930s

c) Political career : Because the EGP is such a secretive organization, little is known about Moran, its main leader, and almost nothing is known about its other prominent leaders. Moran is a former student and FAR member. He was as associate of Cesar Montes, and like Montes, he was a PGT cadre. During 1954, Moran was a prominent leader of the unsuccessful PGT attempt to keep Arbenz in power. After the fall he left Guatemala for Argentina and was briefly jailed there. He claims to have met Ernesto "Che" Guevara during their common assylum at the Argentine Embassy.

Moran appears to be one of the first FAR leaders to come from Cuba to the Izabal department in 1964. Following the defeat of the "old" FAR in the late 1960s, he went abroad, probably to Cuba and Mexico. In 1976, Moran became the main leader of the EGP. He has retained this position ever since. In 1980 he represented the group at the unification talks that led to the formation of URNG.

d) Publications : Moran has never been a writer or ideologue. He limits his theoretical activities to interviews in leftist and Cuban journals and newspapers. The latest was in Granma, 1 January 1984.

Ideology

At its inception the EGP made a clear break with the guerrilla experience and theories of the 1960s. Also, the presence of experienced former PGT cadres, who specialized in subversion of existing legal institutions, unions, and student groups, has provided the group with the experts and patience necessary for its purposes.

The EGP's first penetration of Guatemalan territory, in the "Ixil Triangle," centered around the towns of Chajul and Nebaj. This selection is indicative of the group's approach to revolution. Unlike the "old" FAR's selection in the 1960s (Izabal-Zacapa), the "Ixil Triangle" was remote, contained large numbers of uprooted settlers and Ixil Indians, and lacked the presence of the government administration.

The group has also rejected any approach to revolutionary change other than force. As described in its own journal, Companero, the attempt of the PGT (and implicitly, albeit reluctantly, of FAR) to operate within the institutional framework during the 1966 election of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, was an "illusion," and high price was paid for that illusion.

The EGP believes that Guatemala's high levels of economic growth during the 1960s and early 1970s have resulted in greater poverty for the poor and increased violence and repression. Its answer to these problems lies in the following statement from Companero (1981): The defeat of the FAR in the late 1960s demonstrated "the need to incorporate all the people in a process of popular revolutionary war, with armed struggle as the center of the process. . . . The coming together of the armed struggle with other forms of mass struggle implies that more and more, the struggles of the popular organizations assume paramilitary forms and underground organizational methods, while the armed

struggle assumes more of a mass character." These statements imply that violence is the primary recourse. All fronts ("popular organizations") must be able and prepared to follow both legitimate means (strikes and demonstrations) and violent actions, with violence dominant. Revolutionary change in Guatemala must focus on total civil war, rather than on the foco or the opportunism of the PGT and FAR during the 1960s.

Another equally important aspect of the EGP's ideology and revolutionary approach is the group's position toward the Indians. The EGP, despite its overwhelmingly Ladino leadership claims that, "The revolutionary popular war, and the ethnic affirmation of the Indians in the process of this war, today offer the only alternative and future solution to the ethno-cultural complexity of our country. . . . The descendants of the Maya-Quiche . . . are rising up today in a struggle for clearly defined revolutionary objectives. This is the most fundamental fact in the present history of Guatemala." The group views the Indian peoples of Guatemala as minorities, that together form a majority. Since only a popular, protracted war can bring success to the revolution, the Indians' participation is essential.

This approach to the Indian question and the view that war is total, protracted, and "popular," place the EGP ideology somewhere between the basic tenets of Maoism and the Latin American Marxist-oriented theory of nativism (Mariategui's "indigenismo"). Not surprisingly, the EGP and to an even larger extent ORPA are very similar to the Indian-centered and Mariategui-influenced Shining Path of Peru. However, even though EGP retains most of the Leninist revolutionary dictates, including the importance of fronts, subversion, infiltration, and dictatorial power for the "people," its position on the Indian problem and the peasant-proletariat issue, is much closer to Mao. These ideological traits make the

Guatemala - Group EGP

- 420 -

EGP one of the least dogmatic and most flexible and original Latin American guerrilla groups. Moreover, the EGP is the Central American leftist group least influenced by Cuba, ideologically. This does not indicate, however, an absence of Cuban influence or Cuban aid.

Program

Other than the URNG program (see FAR), in which it had the major input, the EGP has no publicly stated economic, political, or social program for a revolutionary Guatemala. However, EGP claims concerning the guerrillas' attitudes in the areas they control or influence indicate that collective farming is seen as necessary and compatible with Indian traditions. Also, an "important task is production and contribution of everything to the guerrillas need . . . To feed the guerrillas they [the villagers] contribute a portion of their harvest. There is an increasing expansion of collective forms of production for the organization (the EGP) that is, production on lands lent by their owners to plant and harvest for the guerrillas and where the work is voluntary and collective, for the revolution." This massive and compulsory mobilization of peasant production and resources for the guerrillas, the harvest quotas, and the "voluntary" work involved are significant indications of the EGP'S approach to the rural economy when or if it obtains power.

Similarly, EGP attacks against the assets of multinational companies in Guatemala (including oil companies) and its disregard for their impact on the workers, reflects the group's position on foreign investment. CUC's violent strikes in Guatemala City (for exaggerated wages and openly political reasons) also indicate the EGP's strictly political and power-oriented approach to the economy.

In October 1979, the EGP kidnapped Jorge Garcia Granados, the son of an influential Guatemalan industrialist and politician. In return for his release the group published a statement in a number of foreign and Guatemalan newspapers. This statement included EGP's position on foreign affairs. (It can also be found in Moran's Granma interview of January 1, 1984.)

EGP's analysis of the present international situation centers on the following premises:

(a) The U.S. is in retreat in the Third World as well as in the world in general, as demonstrated by defeats in Vietnam, Angola, and Cuba and by disputes with France and West Germany.

(b) As a result of Cuba's and Nicaragua's victory, Latin America is no longer a dominant, status-quo oriented "dependency" of the U.S.

(c) There is a conflict between the social democratic forces and the "imperialists" in the U.S. and in the Western European states. Moreover, an "objective convergence on issues" between the former and the revolutionary forces is possible.

(d) "Central America is the weakest link in the continental imperialist chain." Therefore, revolutionary actions in that region are less likely to be countered successfully by the U.S. The Nicaraguan victory has shifted the "balance of forces" in Central America decisively to the Left.

Although Cuba and Nicaragua are often mentioned by the EGP as forerunners, the U.S.S.R. and the "socialist community" are not. However, the EGP's foreign policy attitudes are consistently and radically anti-U.S.

Propaganda

a) content : EGP propaganda, depending upon circumstances, immediate needs, or external demands, is centered around: (a) literate Guatemalans, mostly from the middle class, as a means to exacerbate their anti-government sentiments; (b) "armed" propaganda, which consists of military takeovers of remote villages and forcible indoctrination of illiterate inhabitants; (c) the use of prominent cadres, mostly Catholic clergymen, as a tool to attract new followers; (d) external appeals, not by actual guerrilla leaders; but by cadres such as the Indian woman, Rigoberta Menchu or old-timers of the Arbenz regime e.g., Luiz Cardoso y Aragon, the nominal leader of FDCR; (e) appeals to the Guatemalan people during elections, coups, or other important political events, to denounce the government, the electoral process, or the democratic process as a whole.

b) Ideological content : The ideological content of EGP propaganda varies depending upon the above-mentioned audiences. When addressing an internal audience it calls for a "popular protracted war" against the government. It also focuses attention upon the government's response to guerrilla activities, describing it as a "terror." Of course the EGP makes no mention of its own "executions" of civilians, murder of politicians and businessmen, or non-combat assassinations of military officers.

EGP propaganda also tries to reach foreigners, including socialists, social-democrats, liberals, and religious groups. The group's focus then shifts to the government's "repression," i.e., anti-insurgency operations and the poverty of Guatemala's population -- "proof" of the government's unpopular measures and exploitation.

Guatemala - Group EGP
- 423 -

c) Means : Most of the EGP propaganda is directed through international front spokesmen. (Rigoberta Menchu, Cardoso y Aragon, etc.) during their trips abroad and occasionally through captured radio stations. Its journal, Companero, is an international information bulletin, i.e., it addresses external audiences, rather than Guatemalans, and it has no significant circulation inside the country. Locally printed booklets, leaflets, and short texts are regularly distributed and regularly confiscated by the military and the police.

View on Violence

The EGP considers revolutionary violence long-term and all-inclusive, i.e., it should even include groups that may also participate in legal opposition activities. This constitutes the group's strategy of a "protracted popular war." (GPP)

According to Moran and various EGP statements, in the context of the GPP, guerrilla warfare occurs in specific phases. First a popular base of support should be built, mostly by armed propaganda including temporary takeovers of small towns and villages "to transmit the revolutionary message to the population, avoiding direct combat with the army." Second, increasing direct combat should take place. This stage began at the end of 1979 in Guatemala and continues today. The expansion of such activities has given the EGP a more military character, in contrast to its pre-1979 mostly secret and politically oriented character. At that time the EGP used force only when under immediate attack.

Guatemala - Group EGP

- 424 -

EGP's approach to guerrilla warfare conflicts with the opposite of Castroism and its foco theories: the group builds popular support, then engages in military activities. However, unlike Maoists, the EGP does not consider the existence of a communist party necessary for either of the two phases of war.

According to existing sources, there are seven EGP "fronts" -- largely autonomous units that are designated a specific area of operation. The most active are in Guatemala City and in the departments of El Quiche, Alta and Baja Verapaz, Solola, Chimaltenango, and Huehuetenango. The Huehuetenango front, named after Ernesto Guevara, was "made public" in August 1980. In 1981 a special front was established in the areas of Alta and Baja Verapaz, specializing on attacks against oil installations. EGP units also operate in the departments of Suchitepequez and Escuintla, thus making the group the most active in Guatemala.

However, despite the claims of its leftist sympathizers abroad, the EGP is still far from being a "national" guerrilla movement. In 1982, the EGP announced the creation of the "13 November Front," operating in Izabal, Chiquimula and Zacapa departments, but that should be interpreted as a purely propagandistic claim intended to show the strength of the group at a time of retreat. By its own admission the EGP has little or no influence in the departments near the Salvadoran and Honduran borders, including Zacapa and Izabal, or in El Peten.

Performance and Recruitment

Some of EGP's top cadres are experienced former communist party or FAR members. Its more recent elements are intellectuals, university dropouts, a small number of Indian notables in rural areas, and a few workers and poor farmers.

Guatemala - Group. EGP
- 425 -

Since most EGP members, particularly among the rank and file, are recruited through the front organizations, e.g., CUC and FERG, their social origin, age and sex vary and generally reflect those fronts' memberships. Despite the organization's claims of equality between the sexes and its attempts to recruit women, no women are among its important leaders. Some front members are women, such as Rigoberta Menchu, but their decision-making role is minimal or nil. Clearly the limited number of women in the EGP cadres is for propaganda purposes, particularly abroad.

Indoctrination

The EGP frequently uses schools to attract recruits. (The establishment of the FERG is an example of times.) The University of San Carlos in Guatemala City has long been a center of Marxist indoctrination in many departments, and many of its students have later joined various guerrilla groups -- including the EGP -- while faculty members have on many occasions joined the CGUP or the FDCR. In many villages and Indian towns even temporarily under EGP control, forced indoctrination and even recruitment have occurred with increased frequency.

Among the top EGP Guatemalan City leaders was Jesuit priest, Luis Eduardo Pellecer Faena, who defected in 1983. It appears that at least 15-20 Catholic priests, mostly foreigners, are directly involved with the Marxist guerrillas in Guatemala, and with the EGP in particular. In fact, the entire diocese of El Quiche was deserted following harsh military actions against clergymen and nuns involved in a variety of EGP activities.

As previously mentioned EGP's use of unions -- CUC in particular -- provides the group with a useful propaganda and economic-political tool and a large pool of recruits.

Military Structure

The EGP is divided into quasi-autonomous fronts which operate in specific areas of departments. The fronts are divided into units and, in the cities, into cells. The cells are centered around safe houses that also serve as arsenals. These hideouts, as well as some in the Escuintla and El Quiche departments were not safe against army infiltration and discovery. This indicates that the cell structure is larger and less hierarchically organized than it was during the EGP's first years of activity when infiltration was extremely limited.

Commando units of less than ten members are used for specific purposes in urban areas, e.g., kidnappings, political murders, and "executions" of defectors and government informers.

The political control of the EGP rank and file is found generally with the unit and commando leaders, who also serve as political "commissars," and with the political cadres at the front. EGP-controlled "mass" organizations often combine both centers of political control and add to them an extensive network of informers (often small children in the villages).

Fighting Performance and Motivation

Until 1979 the EGP undertook only isolated military operations against remote outposts of the paramilitary and security services rather than the army itself; therefore, it was difficult to assess the group's military performance. Between the second half of 1979 and the March 1982 coup, the EGP appeared

Guatemala - Group EGP
- 427 -

able to withstand competent -- albeit sometimes brutal enough to be counterproductive -- attacks from the military. Since then the movement has suffered serious blows, mostly due to intelligence defeats and subsequent discovery of cadres and safe houses, and arrests of militants. In light of the growing number of defections among leaders and rank and file, it appears that motivation has suffered considerably.

The EGP combat ability is limited insofar as the group generally avoids direct contacts with army units. It prefers instead ambushes of police and security forces units. Military anti-insurgency tactics since 1982, improved public relations, civic and political actions, and extensive patrolling have dealt serious blows to the EGP in most areas.

The defection or confessions of such important leaders as Father Pellecer or CUC leader, Emeterio Toc Medrano (who later recanted his confessions), as well as the increasing number of EGP cadres killed in combat, indicate a serious decline in morale. Also a number rank and file and cadres have taken advantage of the repeated amnesties or have joined anti-guerrilla civilian defense units. There has also been a number of EGP murders of former militants as reprisals for defections and cooperation with the government.

Training

Most EGP training, except for top political and military cadres, takes place in Guatemala. Leaders are trained in Cuba, the Soviet bloc, and Nicaragua. Trainers are local or foreign depending on where training occurs. A limited number of foreigners are involved directly with the EGP in Guatemala. Groups like the Tupamaros and Montoneros may also provide additional specialized training, particularly urban warfare training.

Financial Resources

EGP's funding grew more diversified and less limited to outside sources when it began to demonstrate its military and political ability. Today most EGP financing comes from local sources: union dues from unions under EGP control, compulsory levies from peasants in areas under EGP control or with strong EGP influence; contributions from middle-class sympathizers and clergymen sympathetic to the guerrillas, kidnappings, robberies, and theft. Outside contributions come directly from Cuba, Nicaragua, radical Third World regimes such as Libya, and the Soviet bloc; indirectly they come from the West through international front organizations controlled to some extent by the EGP, e.g., the FDCR. These fronts receive significant cash contributions, free propaganda, and media exposure, all ultimately channelled to or used for the purposes of the guerrillas.

Equipment and Supplies

Judging by the captured material provided by the Guatemalan army, most of the EGP weapons are similar to those used by the army -- such as Galil rifles -- made in Soviet bloc countries -- Bulgarian and North Korean rifles -- or obtained from communist or revolutionary Third World regimes -- French-made, Algerian vintage rifles, American M-16 rifles captured in Vietnam and still bearing U.S. registration numbers, and a number of antiquated firearms. According to (probably exaggerated) Guatemalan government data, as many as 10,000 weapons of all types were estimated to be in EGP possession by 1981. Weapons supplies are known to come from abroad either via Mexico's overland routes, or through Mexico and then by sea to the Pacific Coast. Smaller amounts arrive through Belize and Honduras, from Cuba and Nicaragua respectively.

Level of Popular Support

Although difficult to assess, it appears that by 1981 the EGP and particularly its front organizations were able to bring as many as 30,000 demonstrators in the streets, and perhaps had as many followers, sympathizers, or collaborators throughout the country. Most of those, however, proved unreliable since they defected, joined the government-organized civil defense forces, or withdrew from political activities following the fall of the Lucas Garcia regime in the Spring of 1982. The fluctuating nature of EGP support indicates that its supporters, or at least most of them, are less pro-Marxist than they are anti-Lucas Garcia, inhibited, scared, or in some areas simply following the prevailing mood.

External Support

Most of EGP's external support comes from Third World revolutionary regimes, e.g., Libya and Nicaragua, from Soviet bloc countries and Cuba, and from assorted leftist and liberal sectors in the United States and Western Europe, as well as from Mexico and Latin America in general. With or without this external support, the EGP seems strong enough to sustain a significant level of activity in the present and in the foreseeable future. (There would, however, be less activity than there was during 1980-1982.) Yet without any support from abroad the EGP has little chance of winning the war or expanding it dramatically.

Guatemala - Group EGP

- 430 -

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : The EGP maintains relations with some elements of the PGT, particularly the "National Leadership Nucleus" in Guatemala City and Havana. The EGP is a (dominant) member of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity -- URNG (together with FAR, ORPA and the "National Leadership Nucleus" of the PGT). However, there are important differences in strategy between the EGP and the ORPA: according to a former EGP leader, his former group "is aware of the need to rely on the support of the masses before taking power while the ORPA believes that it is more important to take power militarily and then integrate the masses."

b) Regional : The EGP has extensive contacts with and active support from Cuba and Nicaragua. Moreover, Moran has repeatedly stressed the regional nature of revolutionary war in Central America and has expressed solidarity with the Honduran and Salvadoran guerrilla groups. He often boasts of the EGP's role in preventing Guatemalan aid from reaching the Salvadoran government.

Sandinista commanders were extremely active during the negotiations that led to the creation of the URNG; the document stipulating the creation of the URNG was signed in Managua. In addition, Eden Pastora, now an opponent of the Managua regime, was actively seeking funds and arms for the EGP in 1980.

Extent and Areas Under Guerrilla Control

The EGP has never claimed any "liberated areas," but it has repeatedly boasted of its ability to deny government administrators and the army access to extensive regions in the Indian-inhabited highlands of the northwest. In such regions the EGP has established a parallel, or even exclusive administration, centered on collective villages, compulsory quotas on production for the

Guatemala - Group EGP
- 431 -

guerrillas, the dismantling of small and middle-level individual farms and "voluntary" financial contributions to the guerrillas. In addition, the EGP has consistently attempted to change age-old patterns of labor division between men and women, marriage patterns, and children's education. Most of EGP's control and influence in these areas (Huehuetenango, El Quiche, Chimaltenango, Alta and Baja Verapaz) have been reduced drastically. Also civilian participation in civilian defense patrols may in part indicate dissatisfaction with the ideas and practices of the EGP in social, economic, and ethnic terms.

Impact of Factionalism

The EGP enjoyed a surprising unity and ideological solidarity among its leaders until 1979. Then the Nicaraguan Revolution and the resulting high expectations and pressures upon the leadership to adopt a more aggressive and insurrection-oriented approach resulted in serious debates and disputes among EGP leaders. Growing Urban interferences in the movement's affairs. Also contributed to the group's instability. As a result of these conflicts a dissident group, bent on immediate insurrection and opposition to any alliance with other guerrilla or political groups split from the EGP. The group joined similarly dissatisfied elements of ORPA and FAR, as well as the PGT "Military Commission."

Guatemala - Group MRP-DXIM
- 432 -

Group of Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo-DXIM
- b) In English : People's Revolutionary Movement-DXIM
- c) Acronym or known name : MRP-DXIM

Country of Operation

Guatemala

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The MRP-DXIM is the most recent and least known revolutionary movement in Guatemala. Its origin was the now defunct Our Movement (Nuestro Movimiento), a splinter of ORPA, formed toward the end of 1981. Led by Edgar Talmanau, Our Movement was opposed to cooperation with PGT, EGP, and FAR, and to the unity talks between ORPA and those groups, which finally resulted in the formation of the URNG in 1982. Following Talmanau's death in a clash with the army, his comrades formed the MRP at the beginning of 1982. At the same time, other dissidents from EGP, FAR, and the PGT Military Commission faction opposed to the increasingly political turn of the four major guerrilla groups, also joined the MRP.

Leadership

The known leaders of the group, killed in Guatemala City in January 1984, were Raul Rodriguez Agreda, alias "Commander Efrain," and Jose Ernesto Lopez Cruz, alias "Pancho," the group's intelligence chief.

Ideology

The MRP is a strictly urban terrorist group based in Guatemala City and specializing in kidnappings. Its most spectacular kidnapping was that of Dr. Xiomara Suazo Estrada, the daughter of the Honduran president Roberto Suazo Cordoba, in Guatemala City in December 1982. Four former EGP members, in all likelihood associated with MRP were captured, tried, and sentenced to death in 1983 for their involvement in a kidnapping and a failed kidnapping of the same person. In December 1982 the MRP-IXIM published the "Manifesto of the People's Revolutionary Movement" as a condition for the release of Xiomara Suazo. It is the only extensive statement from the group to date.

In MRP's opinion Honduras has become an "imperialist headquarters" for Central America, as a result of U.S. military aid and support from "the criminal state of Israel." Costa Rica is described as a "pawned democracy," while "combative solidarity" is expressed with the FSLN in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador. The Guatemalan situation is seen as hopelessly mired in a continuing economic and social crisis, that cannot be solved except "through the organization of, education in and promotion of the popular war, which is just and necessary in Guatemala."

Regarding other groups on the violent Left, the statement claims only that "We cannot allow tiny incapable groups to play at war, thus propitiating victories of the "security" forces and sacrificing humble people." As for the MRP itself, (it has) emerged as a revolutionary organization because the historic and political conditions have so determined, but we emerge as a unity movement and in the context of the people's revolutionary war. In this context, the MRP-IXIM is basing its military and political tactics on the assumption that the war will be

prolonged, united, and progressive . . ." Finally, and somewhat anachronistically, the MRP statement claims that "The Cuban revolution marked the beginning revolutionary processes in Latin America, showing the true and definitive path by which to expel the gringo imperialists and to destroy the very rich and their genocidal armies."

This last point seems to indicate that the MRP, despite its unwillingness to participate in the Havana-sponsored URNG, still considers the Castroite approach as relevant after a quarter of a century of consistent failures in Latin America. However, it appears that ideology plays a relatively minor role in MRP's attitudes, since the group praises Cuba and the Sandinistas, as well as widely disparate and ideologically incompatible groups like the FMLN, the Peruvian Shining Path, and the Colombian guerrillas.

Level of Support

MRP has, at most, a few dozens militants and a few hundred sympathizers. The fact that "Efrain" had to use his own house as a hideout indicates the absence of an extensive support network. Presumed disagreements with Cuba and the other possible sources of external support most likely explain MRP's stress on kidnappings as its only means of acquiring funds and propaganda outlets.

Haiti - Group PUCH
- 435 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Parti unifié des communistes Haitiens
- b) In English : The United Party of Haitian Communists
- c) Acronym or known name : PUCH

Country of Operation

Haiti

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The PUCH was founded in 1934 by intellectuals, particularly writers and poets, such as Jacques Roumain. Banned in 1949, PUCH was reorganized when several smaller leftist parties, e.g., the Haitian Castroite group and the pro-Soviet PEP (People's Entente Party), merged.

Membership

PUCH has less than 300 members, most of whom are underground, in jail, or in exile.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : René Théodore
- b) Political career : Théodore was promoted to General Secretary of the PUCH after 1979.
- c) Publications : He is the author of "When Words and Deeds Do Not Tally," a PUCH open letter (December 20, 1979).

Haiti - Group PUCH

- 436 -

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : Jacques Dorcilien
- b) Political career : Dorcilien was General Secretary of PUCH until 1979.

Ideological Origin

PUCH is a Marxist-Leninist party, completely aligned with Soviet and Cuban international strategy. Its main objective is to overthrow the present regime and to create conditions that will promote a "socialist transformation" of Haitian society.

Original Program

a) Social program : PUCH has proclaimed the necessity to overthrow the "Duvalier dictatorship and the yoke of the U.S. monopolies." According to the PUCH, "peaceful . . . methods of struggle cannot be applied under the conditions of Duvalier's tyranny." The group wishes to build "a new political and social system in Haiti."

b) Foreign policy : PUCH has expressed solidarity with Cuba, the Soviet bloc, and the revolutionary movements in Latin America.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : PUCH advocates the Marxist-Leninist economic program: nationalizations, expropriations, agrarian reform, the struggle against the "big bourgeoisie" and the "bureaucratic elite."

b) Social program : The "Final Declaration" of the First Congress (late 1978 or early 1979) demanded the overthrow of the dictatorship; abrogation of the 1969

Haiti - Group PUCH
- 437 -

anticommunist law; and a general amnesty. The objective is to set up a regime inspired by the Cuban and Soviet patterns.

c) Foreign policy : Party leaders hail international support for their efforts, praise the policies of the Soviet Union, and condemn the United States.

Ideologues

a) Name : Gesner Briard

b) Publications : Briard's articles were published by the Soviet-sponsored World Marxist Review.

Propaganda

a) Content : The group has called for the union of the opposition (1983).

b) Means :

i) Radio: PUCH statements are broadcast from Havana and Moscow (Radio "Peace and Progress").

ii) Print: Articles and studies expressing PUCH views have appeared in the Cuban and Soviet Press. The irregularly and externally published clandestine newspaper, Boukan (Torch), expresses the underlying ideology of the organization.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The PUCH "Charter of Unity" (1969) states that "guerrilla war" is essential in the struggle and that the formation of urban and rural guerrilla units is the "chief task" of the party. Later PUCH documents have emphasized party work rather than armed activities. The group is committed to insurrectional and mobilizational approaches.

Haiti - Group PUCH

- 438 -

Performance

PUCH recruits mainly among small urban elements in and around the capital city (Port-au-Prince), peasants, exiled intellectuals and workers. Writers, poets, and teachers are particularly active within the group.

Military Structure

PUCH has tried to establish its own underground network of urban cells; however, these attempts have failed.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation : PUCH militants oppose the excesses of Duvalier's regime and strongly support its defeat.

b) Leadership in combat : Most Central Committee members are engaged in party work from abroad. In April and June 1969 the party was seriously damaged when most of its leading militants were killed in confrontations with police forces. The PUCH claims to have held a congress within the borders of Haiti in 1978. Most likely the more important meetings take place in Havana, Montreal, and Paris.

Training

PUCH militants are trained in Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Financial Resources

PUCH receives support from Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Haiti - Group PUCH
- 439 -

Level of Popular Support

a) Total group and front organizations : The communist movement in Haiti is weak. There are at most a few hundred internal militants.

b) Local support: Most PUCH activities have been carried on outside Haiti among exiles in Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cuba.

External Support

Even if PUCH's isolation within Haitian oppositional forces is taken into account, the group lacks significant internal support. Therefore, Cuban and Soviet support is mandatory for its survival.

Dependence on External Support

Cuban political support is needed for PUCH's "legitimacy" as a revolutionary force. Mainly an exiled collective, the group relies on external support for its very existence.

Relations with Other Groups

The PUCH has not been able to unify all segments of the anti-Duvalier opposition. Its calls for a unified front of opposition go unheeded. Tensions developed between PUCH and the French Socialist government in 1983. René Théodore wrote the French prime minister, Pierre Mauroy, in protest over the French government's decision to return the ashes of the revolutionary leader Toussaint L'Ouverture to Port-au-Prince.

Honduras - Group PCH

- 440 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Partido Comunista de Honduras
- b) In English. : The Communist Party of Honduras
- c) Acronym or known name : PCH

Country of Operation

Honduras

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The PCH was initially established in 1927, with strong involvement on the part of Salvadoran and Mexican communists. By 1932, during the dictatorship of Tiburcio Carias Andino, it was practically destroyed. It was reorganized in 1954.

Front Groups

The PCH has no significant front organization of its own, although it has consistently used unions in San Pedro Sula and La Ceiba, as well as some student organization at the National Autonomous University of Honduras -- UNAH -- for the promotion of its influence. The party also has been active in recruitment and organizational work among secondary and university students. The PCH-sponsored FESE (Federation of Secondary Students) organized several strikes (1979) but was unable to obtain large support for those actions. The party spent a lot of effort trying to influence the elections for the Federation of Workers of the Capital District (FECESITLIH), the most important union federation in Tegucigalpa and the central regions of the country.

Honduras - Group PCH
- 441 -

Membership

By 1982 the PCH probably had as many as 650 members, including "candidate" members, whose role and participation in decision making is minimal. There are also at least as many sympathizers, mostly unionized workers and middle-class elements.

Leadership

PCH has only had three general secretaries: Mario Morales, Dionisios Ramos Bejarano, and its current general secretary, Rigoberto Padilla Rush.

Publications

Patria is PCH's main publication; however most of its important statements are spread through the World Marxist Review.

Ideology

The PCH has been one of the most staunchly pro-Soviet parties in Latin America. Despite its talk of armed struggle and prolonged revolutionary war at the 1969 Fifth Plenary, the group has been shy of engaging in violence. Yet in 1977 Padilla described the Melgar Castro regime as "liberal reformist," and called for elections claiming that "We reject terrorism . . . because it hampers organized mass action and because it creates conditions that are unfavorable for those who are conducting a struggle."

Changes in PCH's position appeared by 1980, when Padilla noticed that "Honduras [had] a privileged geographical position. It [was] surrounded by people who [had] been victorious and who [had] rebelled against the traditional

Honduras - Group PCH

- 442 -

oppressors." However, in an interview with the San Pedro Sula Tiempo in September 1981, the three main leaders of the PCH, Padilla, Mario Sosa Navarro, and Longino Becerra claimed that "The Honduran communists are opposed to violence. At this time we believe the best way to achieve positive solutions to the problems of an electoral fraud, the economic crisis and to the repression unleashed against the Honduran people, is through a dialogue in which all national sectors participate."

In July 1982 Padilla fled Honduras, barely escaping arrest. By May 1983 he had declared to the Czechoslovakian CP newspaper Rude Pravo that the PCH was going underground because "the communists and their allies in other revolutionary democratic and patriotic organizations now [had] no other choice but to prepare for armed struggle." By then the PCH had already formed a coalition with groups known to be terrorist and engaged in violent operations against the government of Honduras. Established in April 1983, the National Leadership for the Unity of the Revolutionary Movement in Honduras included the PCH, the PRTC, the FMLH, the Cinchoneros, and the FPR "Lorenzo Zelaya."

Rigoberto Padilla Rush's position of supporting and participating in violent actions, or at least openly cooperating with other leftist groups doing so, was not shared by all leaders of the PCH. In May 1984 Mario Sosa Navarro, a member of the national political commission of the PCH and perhaps the actual leader of the party's organization inside Honduras, claimed that "he is opposed to violence and that the PCH is struggling to obtain power peacefully, not through violence."

Relations with other groups

- a) Western hemisphere

Honduras - Group PCH
- 443 -

i) National : At the end of April 1983, the Central American press announced the establishment of a "national leadership for the unity of the revolutionary movement in Honduras." It included the PCH, the Revolutionary Party of Central American Working People (Honduras), the Revolutionary Movement for Liberation (Cinchoneros), the "Lorenzo Zelaya" Revolutionary People's Forces, and the Francisco Morazan Movement.

ii) Regional : The PCH supports the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerrilla groups. It expresses solidarity with Cuba and the leftist insurgent movements in Central America and has a permanent mission in Havana.

b) Extrahemispheric : The PCH maintains close relations with the ruling parties in the Soviet bloc. Rigoberto Padilla has visited the Soviet Union and the East European countries several times. Of a 27 July 1979 meeting in Moscow with Boris Ponomarev, Tass noted that "The representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the PCH warmly welcomed the victory of the Nicaraguan people over the forces of internal reaction and imperialism."

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

A major dispute over tactics and strategy arose within the PCH in 1967. Two groups emerged calling themselves the PCH: the PCH (Traditional) and the PCH (Revolutionary). The former advocated the use of peaceful means of struggle; whereas the latter was Castroite in ideology and advocated the armed struggle as the road to power in Honduras. Dionisio Ramos Bejarano, the leader of the "Revolutionary" faction became secretary general of the PCH. After a reorganization of the party's top leadership in late 1978, Rigoberto Padilla Rush

Honduras - Group PCH

- 444 -

emerged as the new secretary general, replacing Ramos Bejarano. At the PCH's Third Congress, held in 1978, there was no hint of an impending leadership change.

Presently, Sosa Navarro is influential in the national apparatus, while Padilla is important with external aid. However, there are disputes between the Padilla Rush line of violence and the Mario Sosa Navarro advocacy of peaceful activities. They may well indicate another serious break in the PCH.

Honduras - Group PRTC
- 445 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de Centroamerica-Honduras
- b) In English : The Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party-Honduras
- c) Acronym or known name : PRTC

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Honduras
- b) Others : El Salvador and particularly Nicaragua

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The PRTC in Honduras is little more than the combined creation of the PRTC in El Salvador and the Nicaraguan government. PRTC was established to some extent as a Trotskyite regional answer to the majority of Castroite or radical Catholic guerrilla groups in the mid-1970s. The party was formally established in February 1976, but it did not begin any significant violent actions before 1980 in El Salvador. By April 1980 it was banned in Honduras.

Front Organizations

The PRTC in Honduras was largely the creation of radical elements at UNAH. Most PRTC members and leaders, including Reyes Matta and Wilfredo Gallardo, were connected to the UNAH. Gallardo was a FEUH and FUR leader, as

well as PASOH activist. PASOH (Partido de Accion Socialista de Honduras -- Honduras Socialist Action Party) was formed in 1979 and is led by Virgilio Carias. Carias, nephew of former dictator Tiburcio Carias Andino and scion of a wealthy and prominent family, lives in exile in Nicaragua. He was vice-rector of UNAH and director of its Institute of Economic and Social Research.

PASOH, FEUH, and FUR act mostly as a recruitment ground for PRTC. And until the left lost control over the UNAH and FEUH in 1982, they provided sheltered training and indoctrination bases. It is not clear whether or not the PRTC controlled the three organizations, or if it does so today. Most likely it shared control and influence over FUR and FEUH with the PCH and other revolutionary organizations.

Ideology

PRTC's name implies that it is a regional, rather than a national, movement. However, this is an empty claim, for the Guatemalan "branch" of the PRTC never really took roots. PRTC was initially Trotskyite, but by 1980 it lost any distinction it may have had from the other guerrilla groups in Honduras or EL Salvador. Both the Honduran and Salvadoran PRTC groups have joined umbrella organizations that include historically anti-Trotskyite parties and groups, such as the communists and Castroites. This reflects the dilution of Trotskyite elements in PRTC ideology. In fact, the Honduran and Salvadoran PRTC presently lacks any distinctive ideology or prominent ideologues.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Jose Maria Reyes Mata, alias "Commander Pablo
Mendoza"

i) Date of birth : Late 1930s

ii) Political career : Reyes Mata was active in Honduran leftist politics for a very long time. He was repeatedly arrested; the last time was in April 1980 when his group was banned for planning the disruption of the forthcoming elections.

Trained at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, Reyes Mata claimed to have been one of Ernesto "Che" Guevara's companions in Bolivia. This was probably not true. He was killed in the Summer of 1983 while leading a first guerrilla nucleus of 97 members, in the Olancho Department.

b) Name or assumed name : Father James Carney, "Padre Guadalupe"

i) Background : Father Carney was a Canadian national and a U.S.-trained priest.

ii) Education : Father Carney was educated at Marquette University.

iii) Political career : Accused of actively recruiting for would-be guerrilla groups, Carney was expelled from Honduras in 1979. He died of starvation during the same operation Reyes Mata was killed in.

c) Name or assumed name : Wilfredo Gallardo Museli

i) Education : Gallardo was a medical student at UNAH.

ii) Political career : Gallardo was a prominent UNAH student activist and former president of the Honduran University Student Federation (FEUH) and the far leftist University Reform Front (FUR). Based in Nicaragua, he appears to

Honduras - Group PRTC
- 448 -

be the most prominent PRTC leader today. At the time of the Reyes Matta-Carney incursion into Olancho, Gallardo was preparing another group of about 150 guerrillas in Nicaraguan camps. That group never crossed the border. Gallardo is a prominent Honduran Socialist Party (PSH) activist.

Propaganda

Except for leaflets and small brochures, PRTC propaganda has been distributed through Havana and Managua outlets since 1980. The propaganda attempts to influence the peasants by taking advantage of their religious beliefs; hence the combination of Marxism and Christian terminology. Priests also play an essential role in this endeavour. Most are foreigners, and they are active in PRTC ranks.

Views on Violence

Based on PRTC's August-October 1983 Olancho operation, the group's approach to guerrilla warfare appears to be founded on premises close to those of the Salvadoran FPL and the Guatemalan ORPA and EGP. Only after the following preconditions are met, will guerrilla warfare take precedence: (a) the establishment of safe rear bases in sparsely populated areas; (b) the avoidance of contacts with the military until a strong and well supplied force is established and popular support built; and (c) concurrent attempts to establish urban contacts and a supply and propaganda network.

Performance

The two-month Olancho expedition failed miserably, with 94 out of 97 guerrillas killed, captured, or defecting. All but two leaders were killed or died of starvation. Moreover, the fact that one member was shot by his own comrades and that 17 defected indicates poor morale; the fact that 11 members died of starvation indicates poor planning. The poor selection of the foco site indicates an even greater problem: the leaders were ignorant of conditions in their own country.

Recruitment

PRTC cadres were recruited from UNAH and through student organizations. The rank and file (mostly peasants in the Olancho group) were recruited by peasant organizer, Teofilo Martinez and a few priests. Martinez (who died in Olancho) promised the peasants literacy and the priests provided a degree of credibility to his promise.

Most PRTC members are men. Their indoctrination, although poor, was provided forcibly in Cuba and Nicaragua. It took advantage of the recruits' feelings of hopelessness in a foreign country and in isolated training camps.

Clergymen were very important in PRTC's operations in Honduras. With regard to the Olancho group, three of the six leaders were foreign priests: Carney, a "Mario," and Bernardo Gulian, a French priest from the Celebrators of the Word organization. The priests added a legitimacy to the PRTC, e.g., Carney's expulsion in 1979 provoked sharp protests in the United States and among the generally conservative Honduran hierarchy. Also unsuccessful attempts

Honduras - Group PRTC
- 450 -

were made to describe his death as a "violation of human rights" or a "crime" in the U.S.

Training

All PRTC training for the Olancho group took place in Cuba, and appears to have been technically advanced, particularly in terms of weapons handling. According to defectors from the PRTC or prisoners taken in Olancho, all trainers were Cuban.

Financial Resources

Most likely Cuba provided all the funds needed to train, transport, and arm the PRTC guerrillas. In addition some Catholic groups' from the U.S. and Canada probably channeled money through Carney. Nicaragua also provided help with accommodations and food, as well as transportation to the border and at least one helicopter resupply operation afterwards.

Level of Popular Support

In light of the peasants' cooperation with the military in locating the Olancho group, and their refusal to help the guerrillas in any way, it appears that the locals perceived the guerrillas as dangerous interlopers.

External Support

The Olancho operation would never have occurred without the direct and active support of Cuba and Nicaragua. To a decisive extent the PRTC acts as a

Honduras - Group PRTC
- 451 -

Nicaraguan-Cuban pressure instrument against Honduras and the country's support for or acceptance of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas.

Relations with Other Groups

Since the creation of the DNU-MRH umbrella in 1983, PRT has been a member. It also appears to play a far more significant role in the umbrella than its Salvadoran counterpart plays in the FMLN.

Honduras - Group FMLH
- 452 -

Group or Organization Name

a) In language of country : Frente Morazanista para la Liberacion de Honduras

b) In English : Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras

c) Acronym or known name : FMLH

Country of Operation

a) Principal : Honduras

b) Others : Nicaragua

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The precise date of FMLH's formation is impossible to establish. The group seems to have been the result of ad hoc reactions to the Sandinista victory and the resulting high revolutionary hopes throughout Central America, and an analysis of Honduran realities colored by wishful thinking and unjustified hopes related to the 1980 elections. Before the elections the FMLH announced its existence and its intention of beginning struggle once the "electoral farce" was over, but it was still limited to threatening announcements in August 1980.

Despite these facts, Octavio Perez (probably an alias) claims that the FMLH was created on 16 September 1969. While a Francisco Morazan Movement (Movimiento Francisco Morazan) briefly existed at that time, it was almost forgotten and completely inactive until 1980.

Honduras - Group FMLH
- 453 -

If FMLH is the same group as the MFM of the late 1960s, its origins could be a dissident, Castroite group within the PCH that was dissatisfied with the party's "reformist" and "revisionist" policies and particularly with the PCH's reluctance to engage in guerrilla warfare.

Membership

According to FMLH leaders, the group has no more than a few hundred members, but even this is most certainly an exaggerated figure.

Leadership

Octavio Perez is often quoted as a member of the national leadership, and described as a "mature" man who has "experienced the repression" in Honduras. Little is known about Perez or any other FMLH leaders.

Ideology and Program

According to a Perez interview in 1980, the FMLH "conceives the people's revolutionary war as the basic instrument for liberating people from their current bounds." He also regards inflation as the main problem facing Honduras.

As for the FMLH program, Perez was extremely vague, saying only that "the front's main objectives are to give land to the peasants, eliminate the social and economic problems plaguing the masses, and establish a people's government capable of carrying out such a program."

FMLH's most prominent and often mentioned aim is solidarity with Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerrillas, i.e., preventing Honduras from helping the Nicaraguan "contras" or hindering the free movement of FMLN groups throughout the Honduran national territory. FMLH also believes that the main

Honduras - Group FMLH

- 454 -

cause of Honduras' underdevelopment, and the revolutionary movements' main enemy is the U.S.

Propaganda

Most of the Morazanista propaganda is found on radio stations in Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran insurgent station, Radio Venceremos, as well as in leftist newspapers in Cuba and Nicaragua.

Views on Violence

Despite its repeated expressions of support for a "people's war" and professions of faith in armed struggle as the only alternative to the status quo, the FMLH has stressed that it will start military action only when the necessary mobilization and indoctrination work is completed. This view places the group in the company of such long-preparing and patient guerrilla movements as ORPA in Guatemala and the FPL in El Salvador.

Recruitment and Performance

Presently it is impossible to assess the FMLH morale, performance, or methods of recruitment. However, it is known that the group operates with some degree of support from the peasants and their organizations in the western areas of Honduras. But FMLH is not a rural guerrilla movement. Most of its cadres belong to the middle class or are students. Only the small group of rank and file are mostly peasants.

Honduras - Group FMLH
- 455 -

Structure

The National Leadership Directorate of the FMLH includes four members, and it is replicated at the regional, departmental, and municipal levels in the western and northern areas. The cell structure below these command groups is transformed ad hoc into Morazanista Squads, platoons, and "companies," most of which have only a few members -- about ten in the rural areas and as few as three in the cities.

The FMLH also appears to operate on the basis of commandos. Most likely this indicates its small number of qualified cadres, and the need to use the same cadres for successive operations. Many of the commandos have specific names which further complicates the task of distinguishing between FMLH operations and those of other groups.

Training

The training of the FMLH cadres takes place in Nicaragua, with perhaps a few higher ranking elements trained in Cuba and the Soviet bloc states.

Financial Resources

Although FMLH elements have repeatedly tried to obtain funds from kidnappings, it appears that the group is far too inept to succeed. Consequently it relies exclusively on the Nicaraguan and Cuban largesse, with some Libyan help as well. Both logistically and financially, as well as in terms of training and weapons, the FMLH is decisively dependent upon non-national sources.

Honduras - Group FMLH
- 456 -

Relations with Other Groups

Since 1980, Octavio Perez has stated that "the FMLH pursues a policy of unity with all the country's revolutionary forces bent on building a better future for the fatherland." Eventually, these forces joined with the FMLH to form the National Unity Directorate of the Revolutionary Movement of Honduras (Direccion Nacional Unitaria -- DNU de Movimiento Revolucionario de Honduras -- MRH). The movement includes the Cinchoneros, the Lorenzo Zelaya group, the PRTC, and the PCH, as well as the FMLH.

Honduras - Group FPR-Lorenzo Zelaya
- 457 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias "Lorenzo Zelaya."
- b) In English : "Lorenzo Zelaya" Popular Revolutionary Forces
- c) Acronym or known name : FPR-Lorenzo Zelaya

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Honduras
- b) Other : Nicaragua, El Salvador

Origins

According to media information, the FPR appears to have started as a part -- and subsequently as a splinter -- of the FMLH. Its first significant actions were the bombings of the Chilean and U.S. embassies on 31 October 1980.

Membership

THE FPR membership, including sympathizers among students and some urban groups, is probably less than 100 active members.

Leadership

The principal founder of the FPR was Efraim Duarte Salgado, a lawyer trained at UNAH. Salgado was born to a middle-class family from the Atlantic Coast in the 1950s. He was captured by the Honduran authorities in the Spring of 1982 and, in exchange for cooperation with the government, was allowed to emigrate to Guatemala, where he still lives.

Honduras - Group FPR-Lorenzo Zelaya
- 458 -

Ideology

According to all existing evidence, the FPR was a creation of the Nicaraguan FSLN to pursue Nicaraguan aims in Honduras. The group's ideology is centered around unreserved solidarity with the FSLN and a fierce hatred for the United States.

Propaganda

Most FPR propaganda is transmitted through Managua or, following terrorist attacks, through the Honduras-based national and international media. The majority of communiques are directed against Honduran ties to the U.S., operation of U.S. multinational companies in Honduras, and the "anti-Sandinista" position of Tegucigalpa. FPR created a Lorenzo Zelaya news bulletin in Mexico in December 1982.

Views on Revolutionary Violence

The FPR claims to be involved in a "popular" war, but its actions are more indicative of urban terrorism. Due to its small size and lack of popular support, the group is limited to symbolic bombings against high visibility targets -- embassies and foreign companies -- with no reluctance at hurting civilian passers-by.

Recruitment and Performance

Almost all leaders and cadres, as well as most activists are former students, UNAH dropouts, graduates, and student activists, between 20 and 30 years of age, and mostly men.

Honduras - Group FPR-Lorenzo Zelaya
- 459 -

Foreign Cadres

Some of FPR's closest advisers are also members of the Nicaraguan armed forces and intelligence services. It appears that a number of ORPA members from Guatemala also are involved in training of FPR cadres in Nicaragua as well as Cuba.

Military Structure

The FPR activities are carried out exclusively by commando-type groups, many of which may be formed of the same militants. The commandos are the military expression of the cells operating in the two major cities of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula.

Training

The training of most FPR cadres takes place in Nicaragua, with a limited number also trained in Cuba.

Equipment

All FPR actions have involved bombings, some relatively sophisticated. The use of light personal weapons was also noticed.

External Support

Initially started as a local expression of the high hopes for revolutionary success stirred by the Sandinista victory in 1979, the FPR soon was forced to become a subservient instrument of its only significant outside supporter, the FSLN regime. The group could not survive for any significant period of time without the support it receives from Managua.

Honduras - Group FPR-Lorenzo Zelaya
- 460 -

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : The FPR has been a member of the DNU-MRH umbrella since that coalition's inception in 1983.

b) Regional : The FPR's closest external links, other than those with the FSLN regime, are with the Guatemalan ORPA and radical Mexican groups, both of which help FPR with supplies and weapons procurement.

Honduras - Group MPL, Cinchoneros
- 461 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimiento Popular de Liberacion
"Cinchoneros."
- b) In English : The "Cinchoneros" Popular Liberation
Movement
- c) Acronym or known name : MPL, Cinchoneros

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Honduras
- b) Others : Nicaragua and El Salvador are used as areas for training and
obtaining supplies.

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The origins of the Cinchoneros are as unclear as their date of formation. The group's first spectacular action took place in September 1982, but it had already been in existence for at least a year.

From the limited evidence available, it appears that the Cinchoneros are either a front for or the creation of Salvadoran guerrilla groups (particularly the FPL and ERP) that wish to pursue their own aims in Honduras. The Cinchoneros may be the immediate successor of the FPL-created People's Revolutionary Union (Union Revolucionaria del Pueblo -- URP) which was involved in a series of kidnappings in 1980 on behalf of the FPL. The first known Cinchoneros operation took place on 4 February 1981 and involved the explosion of a home-made leaflet bomb in front of the Metropolitan Cathedral in Tegucigalpa, which is very close to UNAH. The belief that the Cinchoneros are a creation of Salvadoran groups is also supported by the prominence in its statements of support for the FMLN, and

Honduras - Group MPL, Cinchoneros

- 462 -

the synchronization of its actions with Honduran measures against FMLN operations in Honduras. According to the first known Cinchonero manifesto (which was spread by the Metropolitan Cathedral bomb of 1981), "The MPL proclaims its international (sic) solidarity with the heroic struggle being waged by the FMLN, the vanguard of the Salvadoran people. At the same time, it alerts all the members of the MPL to begin active defense of the Salvadoran revolution whenever necessary." Thus, it appears that the Cinchoneros were established as a nucleus for future FMLN violence planned for the end of 1980. This violence was most likely connected with the 1979 coup in El Salvador and the FMLN's "final offensive" scheduled for January 1981.

Membership

The Cinchoneros have probably less than a hundred active Honduran members. Interestingly, of the 67 "political prisoners," i.e., captured terrorists, that the Cinchoneros asked for release of during the San Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce takeover of September 1982, 36 were Salvadorans and only 28 were Hondurans. The rest were Guatemalans, Venezuelans, and Ecuadorans.

Leadership

A "Commander One," reportedly was the main leader of the 1982 San Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce operation. He probably was the same man who previously engineered a kidnapping in Tegucigalpa. "Commander One" may belong to the Toribio family, but this is not certain. The actual names of the Cinchonero leaders, providing they are Hondurans and not Salvadorans, remain unknown. Based on the limited information provided by the Honduran negotiators during the 1982 kidnapping, it appears that "Commander One," is an intellectual or at least a

Honduras - Group MPL, Cinchoneros
- 463 -

former student. This confirms the general assessment that the Cinchoneros are mostly UNAH students, professors, or graduates.

Ideology

Except for complaints about Honduras' high inflation (which does not exist) and the slow pace in implementing land reforms, most of the Cinchoneros' important positions do not concern Honduran realities. However, "Pedro," a representative of the Cinchoneros in Havana, did object to "human rights violations" in Honduras.

Program

To the extent that the Cinchoneros have a program, and that is slightly different from that of its sponsors in El Salvador, the program includes expropriations of foreign companies, i.e., U.S., and the destruction of the (non-existent) Honduran wealthy class. According to a Cinchonero leader, the group took its name from "a historical event that took place in 1986 when a Honduran began a struggle to defend our national resources, specifically our mining resources."

Propaganda

Cinchoneros propaganda is directed toward a vaguely defined Honduran "people." Its main means include "armed propaganda," i.e., terrorist operations such as bombings and kidnappings, leaflets, and the services of Radio Havana. According to "Jose," in an October 1982 Radio Havana statement, the Cinchoneros firmly believe that the Honduran army is led by "criminals," and the only "terrorists" in the country are the military senior officers. Cinchonero propaganda

Honduras - Group MPL, Cinchoneros
- 464 -

also stresses the violation of human rights by the authorities following the arrests of Cinchonero terrorists and sympathizers, e.g., in the cases of students Osiris Villalobos and Cesar Amilcar Castellanos and lawyer Ali Espino Sequeira, who were arrested and subsequently confessed participation in bombing attempts against the Salvadoran Embassy and the Supreme Court of Justice in the first half of 1984.

Views on Violence

The Cinchoneros' views on revolutionary violence are distinct from their practices. The group claims that it and other similar groups in Honduras, are forced to "defend" themselves against the "real" terrorism of the military, and it also claims that its actions are more propagandistic than violent. Yet, the Cinchoneros' actions to date reflect those of a small terrorist group with a very limited, middle-class and professional membership involved exclusively in urban terrorism.

Performance

The little information available on Cinchoneros' membership indicates that most of its cadres are professionals and students, particularly university dropouts from UNAH. This conflicts with the group's claim that it includes peasants, workers, and students, and that it represents a cross section of the majority Honduran population.

Honduras - Group MPL, Cinchoneros

- 465 -

According to the government negotiators during the San Pedro Sula occupation of the Chamber of Commerce in 1982, only the main leader, "Commander Uno," was an adult. The rest of the 18-member group were teenagers. This same characteristic seems to apply to other operations and, by extension, to the membership of the group.

Under the rectorship of Carlos Alberto Reina (before 1982), UNAH was a fertile ground for recruitment by all Honduran terrorist groups, particularly the Cinchoneros, the Lorenzo Zelaya group, and the PRTC.

Military Structure

As a terrorist group operating exclusively in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and La Ceiba, the Cinchonero organization is based on cells which also operate as commandos. These commandos take different names; hence, it is difficult at times to establish which "major" guerrilla group they are a part of. A "Froylan Turcios Revolutionary Command" circulated communiques in Honduras and through the Salvadoran guerrillas' Radio Venceremos in July 1982; they were probably a commando of the Cinchoneros. A "Juan Rafo" commando planted a bomb in San Pedro Sula on January 1982. They, too, may have been a Cinchoneros units, but it is also possible that they were a FMLH or Lorenzo Zelaya command.

Equipment, Supplies, and Training

Equipment, supplies, and training most likely reflect the Salvadoran and, to a lesser extent, the Nicaraguan desire to support and promote the Cinchoneros. To a decisive extent, the Cinchoneros are only a spillover of the regional conflict that pits Honduras against the revolutionary forces on its borders -- Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

Honduras - Group MPL, Cinchoneros
- 466 -

Relations with Other Groups

The Cinchoneros belong to the DNU-MLH. During its takeover of the San Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce it was openly supported by the PCH.

Nicaragua - Group FSLN
- 467 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In Language of country : Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*
- b) In English : The Sandinist National Liberation Front
- c) Acronym of known name : FSLN

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Nicaragua
- b) Others : Honduras, Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, were all used by the FSLN for staging areas, rear bases, propaganda bases, fundraising, and R&R locations.

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The FSLN was created by a small group of radical students and former communist party members (Partido Socialista Nicaraguense -- PSN) who were under the influence of the Cuban Revolution. Their first attempt to organize an insurrection centered around the Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth organization, which had been infiltrated and manipulated by the former PSN cadres Tomas Borge Martinez, Carlos Fonseca Amador, and Silvio Mayorga since 1960. Following the failure of this attempt, the same trio founded the FSLN in 1961. According to their own testimony, the FSLN had less than twenty members in 1961, and less than 800 by the fall of 1978. Most members and all the leaders came from middle-or upper-middle class backgrounds, primarily from Matagalpa, Leon, and Granada.

*This study only examines the FSLN as a guerrilla group, i.e., until July 1979 when it became Nicaragua's ruling group.

Nicaragua - Group FSLN
- 468 -

Following Carlos Fonseca's death in combat on 7 November 1976, the FSLN split into three competing groups. All three accepted membership in the FSLN, as well as each others' claim to the FSLN label. On 7 March 1979 the three "tendencies" proclaimed their reunification. Although they still maintain a degree of separateness they have cooperated closely with each other ever since.

Front Organization

Each of the three factions established its own front organizations between 1976-1979. These were:

a) Proletarian Tendency (Tendencia Proletaria -- TP): Comites Obreros Revolucionarios (Revolutionary Workers' Committees -- COR); Comandos Revolucionarios del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Commands -- CRP); Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario -- FER-Marxista Leninista (Students' Revolutionary Front) Movimiento Cristiano Revolucionario (Christian Revolutionary Movement -- MCR); Movimiento Estudiantil de Secundarios (Secondary School Student Movement -- MES); Federacion de Movimientos Juveniles de Barrios de Managua (Federation of Managua Slum Youth -- FMJBM); Comité Universitario de Solidaridad con el Pueblo (University Committee for Solidarity with the People -- CUSOP).

b) For the Protracted Popular War Tendency (Tendencia Guerra Popular Prolongada -- GPP): Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (Revolutionary Students' Front -- FER), from which the TP-controlled FER-Marxista Leninista split.

c) Tercerista faction (or Tendencia Insurreccional -- TI or Insurreccional Tendency faction): Juventud Revolucionaria Sandinista (Sandinista Revolutionary Youth -- JRS); Grupo de los Doce (the Group of Twelve), which was also a front for the entire FSLN in 1979, probably the most effective since none of its

Nicaragua - Group FSLN

- 469 -

prominent members admitted open ties to the FSLN or the TI almost until the last moments of the civil war; Movimiento Pueblo Unido (United People Movement -- MPU), by far the largest FSLN front organization, with members connected to all three tendencies. (The majority were tied to the TI)

Similarly, the Frente Amplio Opositora (The Large Opposition Front -- FAO), while including distinctly non-Marxist or even conservative and democratic groups, also included the Grupo de los Doce, and thus to some extent at least, operated under some TI influence.

Leadership

The relevant leadership of the FSLN could be divided into two categories: historical leaders and leaders of the three factions, some of whom are clearly more important than others. For reasons of space only a few will be mentioned.

a) Name and background : Carlos Fonseca Amador, founder of the FSLN, is now one of Nicaragua's national heroes. He is second in importance only to General Augusto Sandino. Fonseca was born in Matagalpa in 1935, the son of a domestic servant and an employee of Somoza's firms. He was reared in a middle-class environment. After finishing high school in Matagalpa, a feat possible only for very intelligent or relatively well-off youths, he went to the Managua National University. There he immediately fell under the influence of Tomas Borge, who claimed to be a law student but was actually a student activist and PSN cadre.

Fonseca had been politically active since his early youth. In high school he joined the PSN, and when he reached Managua he became the editor of the leftist journal, El Universitario. He was arrested and jailed for a month in 1956, but was released without a trial. In 1957 the PSN rewarded his precocious militancy and

Nicaragua - Group FSLN
- 470 -

party membership by sending him to the U.S.S.R. He returned overwhelmed and more radical than ever. In 1958 he was once again briefly arrested and then deported to Guatemala. From Guatemala he found his way to Castro's Cuba. There Fonseca established ties with Castro and even received promises of some support. From that time on he traveled incessantly between Costa Rica, Mexico, Cuba, and periodically Nicaragua.

In June 1959 Fonseca participated, as a minor member, in the attempted invasion of Nicaragua at El Chaparral. This was his first open break with what he believed was an overly cautious PSN approach to violence. Following that failed attempt, but still convinced of the virtues of guerrilla warfare, Fonseca became the main force in the 1961 creation of the FSLN and its historic founder and leader until his death in a clash with the Nicaraguan National Guard in 1976. Never a guerrilla expert, Fonseca spent most of his life between 1961 and 1976 in exile in Cuba, Costa Rica, and Mexico. Toward the end he reconsidered his initial commitment to all out civil war and turned to a more complex policy of combining military actions, terrorism, and coalition building. In this regard he is rightly considered the founder of the TI, and only his unchallenged leadership of the FSLN prevented the latter from breaking down into competing factions before his death.

b) Name and background : Daniel Ortega Saavedra was born in Managua in 1943, to a very prominent family that claimed ties to Sandino. He studied law at the University of Nicaragua in Managua, but never completed his studies. By the late 1960s he was a professional revolutionary. Sentenced to prison for bank robbery, he spent seven years in jail, until he was freed in exchange for a terrorist attack against the U.S. embassy. He became a prominent leader of the TI after Fonseca's death and played a significant, although not a decisive, role in

the military operations of the 1978-1979 period. Today he is the most prominent, albeit not the most powerful, member of the nine-member FSLN National Directorate. Ortega also claims to be a poet, but his "poems" are for the most part political tracts.

c) Name and background : Humberto Ortega Saavedra, Daniel's brother, is Nicaragua's defense minister and probably the most powerful individual in the country. He was born in 1948. Like his brother, he studied law at the University of Nicaragua in Managua, but never completed his studies. Humberto played a far more important role in the civil war than Daniel, and appears to be the FSLN, or at least the TI, main spokesman.

d) Name and background : Jaime Wheelock Roman, the main leader of the TP faction, was born in Managua in 1943 to a well-to-do family of English descent. A graduate in Political Science, he was a law professor at the University of Nicaragua. In 1972 Wheelock was accused of killing a National Guard officer, and as a result, fled to Chile. There he studied agricultural law at the University of Chile. After the 1973 coup that overthrew the Allende government, Wheelock returned to Nicaragua and went underground. He emerged as one of the top Sandinista guerrilla commanders. Eventually he became the head of the "proletarian faction." Presently he is one of the nine members of the Sandinista Directorate as well as minister of agrarian reform. Wheelock has written a number of scholarly articles and two monographs on Marxist themes that were published in Mexico in 1975 and 1976.

e) Name and background : Tomas Borge Martinez, the main leader of the GP faction, is the only surviving member of the trio that founded the FSLN in 1961. Borge was probably born in 1929 in Matagalpa. He studied law at the University of Nicaragua in Managua but dropped out to become a full-time activist. A member of the PSN since the 1940s, he became disenchanted with the party's "reformist" and "bourgeois" ways. Following Castro's victory, he founded the FSLN in 1961 in Tegucigalpa, together with Fonseca and Mayorga. Although he was leader of the second largest "tendency" of the FSLN, Borge had only a small role in the FSLN guerrilla activities, because he spent most of the 1960s and 1970s (until 1978) in jail.

Ideologically Borge and his fellow GPP leader Henry Ruiz ("Modesto" during the guerrilla war) are the most dedicated and consistent Marxist-Leninists of the entire FSLN leadership. However, since coming into power as Nicaragua's interior minister, he has reportedly indulged in corruption and a life of luxury. Borge is also an excellent orator.

Ideology and Views on Revolutionary Warfare

Despite its prominence after the 1979 victory, the FSLN never had a coherent ideology; nor did it provide much original thinking on guerrilla warfare. Moreover, even among the top leaders the degree of commitment to Marxism, and particularly to Marxism-Leninism varied: there were hard-core Leninists like Borge, Fonseca, and Ruiz and more flexible, action-inclined leaders of the Insurreccional Tendency.

In the beginning the FSLN intended to follow Castro's example. (Fonseca's acquaintance with Castro and Guevara as well as his protracted stays in Cuba were in accord with this intent.) As a result, guerrilla foci were established on

Nicaragua - Group FSLN

- 473 -

the Nicaragua-Honduras border, in the Bocay and Rio Coco areas. By 1963 these groups were wiped out by the National Guard. Attempts to establish another foco in the Matagalpa region, around Pancasan, with more careful organization and mobilization of local peasants also failed miserably in 1967 and resulted in Mayorga's death. Similarly, attempts to establish urban networks for terrorist actions resulted in further losses among the leadership, particularly in Managua. By 1970 the FSLN practically ceased to operate.

The failure of these different approaches resulted in a serious ideological split within the FSLN, which in 1975 culminated with the expulsion of the TP faction from the movement. Each of the three factions then adopted its own method or strategy of revolutionary warfare.

The TP faction (Wheelock Roman, Carlos Nunez, and Luis Carrion) professed a dogmatic, class-centered approach to revolutionary war and concentrated all its efforts in the cities and among the lumpenproletarians of the slums, the dissatisfied and unemployed (or unemployable) youth, and university students.

Despite its "proletarian" claims, it was a group led by intellectuals from the middle classes with some marginal support from the poorest urban strata. Consequently, the TP was limited to isolated terrorist actions in the cities of Managua, Leon, Matagalpa, and Esteli.

The GPP, FSLN's second largest faction, adopted a quasi-Maoist strategy of protracted warfare, mostly in the rural areas. Its aim was to drain Somoza's resources in a long-term but illusive military campaign. However, the GPP units became isolated from each other and from the towns and the populated areas, and thus played a relatively unimportant role in the final military victory.

The Terceristas, or the Insurreccional Tendency were the largest FSLN faction, and had the major role in bringing the FSLN into power. As stated in a 1978 communique, "The armed insurrection of the masses is a means to achieve the revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza dynasty and open up a process of popular democracy, which will allow our people to enjoy democratic liberties, a more favorable framework in which to accumulate the revolutionary energies required for the march towards full national liberation and socialism."

Significantly the Terceristas, while openly advocating "socialism" and "popular democracy" -- a term defined by the regimes of Eastern Europe after the World War II -- also established extensive alliances and coalitions with groups on all sides of the Nicaraguan political spectrum, e.g., dissident Liberals and Conservatives, elements of the Church, radical middle-class groups, businessmen, and the PSN. Like Castro the FSLN employed a wide coalition to take power; however, unlike Castro, the Terceristas never hid their Marxism-Leninism.

Current Ideological Orientation

The FSLN's current and fairly uniform Marxist-Leninist ideology can be attributed to the following circumstances: all three faction leaders share fundamentally similar Marxist-Leninist beliefs, and their tactical and military strategy differences, no matter how acute in 1977, were temporary. The group's policies -- economic, foreign, social, and cultural -- are very similar to those of the Eastern European countries in the late 1940s. They seem to encourage a steady and irreversible transformation of Nicaragua into a communist state.

Original Program

FSLN's original program was more or less a copy of the Castroite programs throughout Latin America, and it concentrated on nationalistic as well as reformist goals. Also, because it played an essential role in attracting support for the 1979 insurrection, it was the program of MPU, a largely Sandinista (and particularly tercerista) front. Politically, it stressed unity so as "to develop a flexible policy of alliances with other sectors opposed to somocismo, unless [they did] not tolerate the historical objectives of [the FSLN's] popular coalition." With regard to government participation, the MPU program offered participation to all "political and social forces which have consequently fought for the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship." As far as political liberties were concerned, the MPU program demanded freedom of the press and thought; freedom of political union, and popular organization for the working class, the peasants, the workers in general, the youth, the students, progressive women, popular masses in the slums, etc." The MPU program also promised the trial of any member of the military guilty of "genocide, assassination, or any other crime against the workers and the people."

In terms of foreign policy the MPU program claimed that the revolutionary regime would establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with all countries of the world, regardless of their ideology, race, culture, or form of political organization. Of course this meant relations with all communist and leftist governments. Indeed, the first action the FSLN took on foreign affairs was to break ties with Israel and open diplomatic relations with the PLO.

Economically, the MPU program provided for the confiscation of all "monopolist assets of the Somozas and their relatives and accomplices, national and foreign, as well as the wealth of the Somocista camarilla amassed by theft

Nicaragua - Group FSLN
- 476 -

during the dictatorship; nationalization of all "national resources" and maritime, air, and public transportation means; the creation of a minimum, subsidized, price for main food staples; and integration of the Atlantic Coast into the national economic and social structure. (This became a perfect excuse for the anti-Indian policies of the FSLN in power, policies bordering on genocide in many cases.) With respect to agriculture the MPU program provided for confiscation of Somocista property and "limitation" of land property (in a country which is largely underpopulated). The program also called for an Industrial Development Plan with the participation of all active forces : Government, unions, and managers. When the social and work provisions are added it becomes apparent that the MPU program represented a program of Marxist "development." Not surprisingly it has been faithfully pursued by the FSLN since it came into power in Nicaragua.

Ideologues

Prior to 1979, the main FSLN tendencies had their own ideologues: the TP's Jaime Wheelock, the TI's Carlos Fonseca and Humberto Ortega, and the GPP's Tomas Borge. All of them have published extensively before 1979. However, until the FSLN came into power, none were considered original thinkers or relevant examples for other Latin American groups involved in guerrilla warfare. Jaime Wheelock attempted a number of social and economic analyses of the Nicaraguan society in an orthodox Marxist vein, particularly in his Imperialismo y Dictadura (Imperialism and Dictatorship). Carlos Fonseca also published a number of brief essays and pamphlets on revolutionary war. Most prominent FSLN leaders aspire to have their works published, especially since the 1979 victory. (Some, e.g., Daniel Ortega, Humberto Ortega, Sergio Ramirez, felt this way even before the victory).

Propaganda

In the mid-1970s, the FSLN began to use primarily armed propaganda to attract attention and popular support. The Christmas 1974 kidnapping of prominent Somoza supporters and relatives and the takeover of the National Palace in 1978 were spectacular and highly effective examples of this.

The group's access to Costa Rican, Mexican, and Cuban media outlets was extensive and extremely effective in making the guerrillas' aims known to the Nicaraguan population, as was the Nicaraguan newspaper, La Prensa, and a number of independent, anti-Somoza radio stations.

During the last stages of the civil war most FSLN propaganda was controlled by the TI faction. It centered on calls for national unity against Somoza rather than on doctrinaire statements.

Performance

The initial cadres of the FSLN were almost exclusively middle-class elements previously associated with the PSN. Until the latter half of 1978 the total number of FSLN guerrillas, in all three tendencies, was under 1,000. That autumn FSLN ranks swelled with enthusiastic and hopeful youths, some of them as young as 12, some peasants and workers, and many students. For the most part the FSLN did not have to recruit actively; growing numbers joined the guerrilla spontaneously. But for a time there were so few guerrillas that in some instances there were no cadres to lead the new followers.

Nicaragua - Group FSLN

- 478 -

FSLN's initial cadres included a significant proportion of middle- and upper-middle-class women. Most were student activists, and some even reached second-level leadership positions, e.g., Dora Tellez, Doris Tijerino, and Monica Baltodano.

The Church has played an important role in indoctrination and recruitment for the FSLN. The anti-Somoza stand of the Catholic hierarchy in Nicaragua helped delegitimize the regime, and thus, at least indirectly, encourage elements of the population to join the movement. More directly, however, a number of clergymen actively recruited for and even fought with the FSLN, operated in FSLN front organizations, and acted as propagandists for the guerrillas. The most active clergymen on behalf of the guerrillas were members of the Jesuit and Maryknoll orders.

Since 1967, when the FER took control over the student organizations, universities, especially the University of Managua, have been FSLN's most important recruiting grounds. Some of the most prominent Sandinista leaders, such as Daniel Ortega and Doris Tijerino, were initially FER leaders, and most of the cadres, particularly those in the TI and TP factions, were associated with the university.

Use of Foreign Cadres

Throughout its history the FSLN has received extensive and direct foreign help with cadres. The first guerrilla foco of Bocay and Rio Coco included a fair number of Cubans, most of whom were killed in combat. By the end of 1977 the FSLN units included Panamanians (Hugo Spadafora was a combat leader), Guatemalans (particulary ORPA and EGP fighters), many Salvadorans (mostly from the ERP and FARN, but also from the FPL), Hondurans, Cubans, and members of

Nicaragua - Group FSLN

- 479 -

the defeated terrorist groups of the Southern Cone: MIR from Chile, Tupamaros, Montoneros, ERP from Argentina, as well as Venezuelans, Colombians, and Dominicans. Some of the foreign cadres were in leadership positions, such as Costa Rican Plutarco Hernandez, a major leader of the GPP faction, or Mexican Victor Tirado Lopez, one of the three major TI leaders.

Military Structure

Toward the end of the civil war the FSLN forces were divided into seven fronts (Some included forces from all three factions, and all but one was named after a revolutionary hero.): Northern ("Carlos Fonseca Amador"); Southern ("Benjamin Zeledon"); Northwestern ("Rigoberto Lopez Perez" -- the assassin of Anastasio Somoza in 1956); Central ("Camilo Ortega Saavedra"); Northeastern ("Pablo Ubeda"); Eastern ("Roberto Huembes"); and Nueva Guinea. In urban areas forces employed tactical combat brigades and commando units. Commando units were used for specific missions as well.

All of these forces formed another front -- the Frente Interno (Internal Front), which also included the Popular Action Commandos, the People's Brigades, and the Sandinista Militias. This latter group was connected with the Civil Defense Committees (CDS) in Managua.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Leadership : The FSLN leadership, which at the late stages of the civil war included all of the cadres, were the die-hard's of the group. In light of their generally privileged economic, social, and educational status, their main motivation was clearly political power.

ii) Rank and file : The main motivations for FSLN fighters (most of whom only joined during the last year of war and did not have a coherent ideology) were a better life and for some the hope for rapid financial gain in the event of victory; for the many teenagers fighting under the FSLN banner, the war represented the once in a lifetime chance of proving their "manhood." For many women, particularly middle-class ones, the FSLN enabled them to fulfill ambitions that their social and educational status made attractive but that the traditionally male-dominated Nicaraguan society frowned upon.

b) Performance

i) Combat Ability : Despite FSLN mythology, its units have never won a direct confrontation with regular National Guard units. Even its Southern front, which was well armed and had the best leaders, was unable to dislodge the National Guard until the total collapse of the regime in Managua.

ii) Discipline : Before 1978, when there were few guerrillas, discipline was strict and accepted. However, once spontaneous uprisings started to occur (Masaya, Esteli, Managua) and the number of FSLN guerrillas grew, discipline weakened rapidly. Lootings, murders, and violence against civilians occurred frequently. Moreover, the discrepancy between poorly armed militias -- the bulk of the insurrectionary forces -- and the "regular" forces resulted in serious discontent and acts of indiscipline on the part of the former.

iii) Weapons sophistication : Until the last two years of the civil war, the FSLN relied mostly on second-rate weaponry purchased from the international black market and/or supplied by Cuba and the Soviet bloc countries. The group also used weapons captured from the police and irregular forces. (Despite their claims to the contrary, the Sandinistas never depended on weapons captured from the National Guard.) By 1978 the stream of weapons from Latin America, Western

Nicaragua - Group FSLN

- 481 -

Europe, Cuba, the Middle East and the Soviet bloc, which came mostly through Costa Rica and Honduras, had become a flood. At the end of the civil war the FSLN probably had more plentiful supplies of medium and light weapons, as well as ammunition, than the National Guard.

iv) Endurance : At least twice in its history the FSLN came close to extinction: after the failure of the Bocay and Rio Coco foci in 1963, and after the Pancasan defeats of 1967. In both instances the leadership withdrew abroad and reorganized the group. Moreover, without Somoza's international isolation, the FSLN would have remained at best a marginal nuisance until as late as 1977.

v) Leadership in combat : Throughout FSLN's history, its leaders have played an active role in combat. However, their performances have seldom matched their undeniable courage, as demonstrated by the high casualty rate among top FSLN leaders. Most people forget that the majority of present-day Sandinista leaders did not participate in actual combat for any extended period of time. Either they spent most of the civil war period in jail (Borge, Daniel Ortega) or abroad, or they played only a small role. (The most prominent exception among today's members of the nine-man National Directorate is Henry Ruiz.) Those who did participate in direct operations often lost their lives, e.g., Carlos Fonseca and Silvio Mayorga, two of the three founders, German Pomares, Camilo Ortega and Sergio Buitrago.

Training

All FSLN training took place abroad, mostly in Cuba, the Middle East, and in Soviet bloc countries, under the direction of foreign trainers. The trainers included Soviet bloc personnel, Cubans, South American terrorists, and Palestinians.

Financial Resources

Before 1977 most FSLN funds came from bank robberies and from Cuba. Between 1977-1979 they came from Latin American, West European, the U.S., the Soviet bloc, and radical Middle East regimes, as well as from defeated, but wealthy terrorist groups like the Montoneros. Business groups in Nicaragua have provided extensive financing since 1977. The Catholic Church also aids the FSLN.

Level of Popular Support

Despite post-July 1979 mythology, all available evidence, including evidence from FSLN members and foreign sympathizers, indicates that popular support for the FSLN was significantly lower than support for other anti-Somoza groups. An overwhelming majority of the fighters against Somoza, even when operating under real (but more often nominal) FSLN leadership, were not truly Sandinistas in the FSLN definition of the term. Also the small size of the FSLN as late as 1978 demonstrates that the group's success was more the result of it riding the tide of popular hatred for Somoza than of it enlarging its ranks with well-motivated and indoctrinated elements.

In addition, the front organizations of the FSLN in general, and those of the TI faction in particular (which were by far the largest) were overwhelmingly composed from non-Marxist elements. Moreover, there were clear differences in

the type of support received by the FSLN from various social groups and various regions. The youth and middle-class elements were far more sympathetic to the guerrillas than other age and social groups, as were many women. The FSLN received practically no popular support in the department of Zelaya and in the areas on the Honduran border and around the city of Granada. Also some FSLN support was due to the personal charisma of certain leaders, such as Eden Pastora Gomez, rather than to the FSLN ideology.

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : The FSLN relations with the other communist groups and parties in Nicaragua were always difficult and characterized by mutual dislike and distrust, often manifested through acrimonious debates and public accusations. Despite the PSN background of its founders, Carlos Fonseca Amador and Tomas Borge Martinez, the FSLN consistently accused the party of "reformism," "petty bourgeois character," and cowardice. The Stalinist splinter of the PSN, the Nicaraguan Communist Party (Partido Comunista Nicaraguense -- PCN), consistently accused the FSLN of "adventurism," and "left-wing infantilism." It, in turn, was accused of irrelevance, dogmatism, and ineffectiveness by the FSLN.

The FSLN, and particularly the TI faction, also had extensive and close ties to pro-Marxist elements in the Catholic Church. They were mainly with practitioners of "liberation theology," particularly the Jesuits and Maryknollers, as well as with radical intellectuals like Sergio Ramirez, Moises Hassan Morales (a member of the FSLN in the end), and Carlos Tunnerman Bernheim (the rector of the University of Managua).

b) Regional : A few individual members of the FSLN and fellow travelers had extensive ties to important personalities and ruling parties in Western Europe

Nicaragua - Group FSLN

- 484 -

and Latin America. Eden Pastora, a naturalized Costa Rican, had his own Fonseca and Latin America. Eden Pastora, a naturalized Costa Rican, had his own Fonseca to Tomas Borge and the Ortega brothers (Daniel and Humberto), had personal ties to Fidel Castro, and the organization as a whole had durable and extensive ties to Havana and many Latin American terrorist groups.

c) Extrahemispheric : Some FSLN leaders, particularly Henry Ruiz, had long standing ties to the U.S.S.R. while others (Moises Hasan Morales) had ties to the Middle East, and still others connected the FSLN to organizations such as the Socialist International and the Catholic Church. Finally, a number of FSLN cadres were trained in the Middle East and had ties to Libya.

Extent of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

It is a significant, though rarely noted fact that throughout the FSLN's history, it never managed to establish a "liberated zone," in the rural or urban areas. Except in periods of insurrectional activities in Managua, Masaya, and Esteli, during the final stages of the civil war, the FSLN could never deny the National Guard access to any region.

The FSLN was thus never able to apply its political and socio-economic ideas before taking national power; therefore, many Nicaraguans, particularly the peasants and the middle-class, most likely did not fully understand the nature of the group's ideology and strategic goals. As a result, the guerrillas enjoyed much popular support during the last stages of the civil war.

Impact of Factionalism

Following its crushing defeat at Pancasan in 1967, the FSLN suffered a period of inactivity that began in 1970 and ended in 1974 with the Christmas attack on "Chema" Castillo's house. The group's dormancy resulted in a clear division of its ranks. In 1975 the Proletarian Tendency was expelled from the FSLN because it disagreed with the other tendencies over the appropriate tactics for revolutionary violence. Even Carlos Fonseca Amador sanctioned the expulsion from his Cuban exile. Concurrently, conflicts had arisen between the supporters of the traditional line, (i.e., since Pancasan) of "protracted popular war," and the younger and more flexible elements, who were convinced that insurrection, and thus a rapid end to the war, was possible and desirable. This latter group apparently succeeded in obtaining Carlos Fonseca's support just before his death in 1976, and used it when it claimed to represent the "National Directorate." However, these disputes, including expulsion of the TP from the FSLN, should not be exaggerated, for the three factions tried to avoid direct competition with each other and the overlapping of territorial operations. Also they were able to reunite in 1979, without any major purge or remaining bad blood. Of course, Cuba enforced the "shotgun marriage" of the three factions, but the reunification appeared to take place smoothly, and whatever differences remain between them today seem based on personal, rather than ideological grounds.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader

The FSLN's only charismatic leader was Carlos Fonseca Amador, the true founder of the movement and the one Nicaraguan revolutionary still accepted as legitimate, even by non- and anti-Marxist elements. However, Fonseca's prolonged absence from the country and his death in 1976 (in circumstances far less clear

than the official Sandinista mythology claims) left the movement without an evident leader and ideological authority. Also, it allowed, even prior to 1976, the formation of the cliques that eventually became the three factions. The attrition of leadership through combat casualties eliminated most of the prominent cadres, some of whom could have taken Fonseca's place, and left instead a number of important, but historically less significant, elements to lead each faction. Consequently, there is a fuzzy division of power among the three factions, as well as a jockeying for authority among and within them.

Tomas Borge, who has the advantage of being the only surviving founder of the FSLN, also has the disadvantage of having been in jail for most of the FSLN's activities. Jaime Wheelock Roman, the leader of the smallest faction, and one of those "expelled" in 1975, was popular enough among Sandinista cadres to exchange his lack of effective revolutionary military credentials for an important position in the present leadership. He is the balancing element between Borge and the TI leaders, including the Ortega brothers, particularly Humberto. As for the Ortega brothers, who clearly control their own faction -- the Mexican Victor Tirado Lopez is little more than a token of revolutionary internationalism and has no power of his own -- they must cope with ambitious members of the GPP faction, e.g., Bayardo Arce, in order to elbow Tomas Borge out of the picture. (They appear to be succeeding.)

Remarks

To date the FSLN is the only successful guerrilla movement in Latin America other than Castro's. As such it has become a model for aspiring guerrillas, as well as a source of support for them. The importance of FSLN ties with Latin American guerrillas in general is demonstrated by the group's ability to

Nicaragua - Group FSLN

- 487 -

strike effectively in Honduras (the murder of Pablo Salazar, alias "Commandante Bravo," and Somoza's most competent commander in 1980) and in Paraguay (the murder of Somoza by a terrorist group led by a former Argentine ERP cadre and a Nicaraguan civil war fighter). Moreover, the FSLN's prestige, strengthened by Nicaragua's resources explains the group's ability to establish or simply "invent" guerrilla groups in Honduras (the FMLH and to a decisive extent the PRTC), and to influence greatly groups in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Peru - Group FIR

- 488 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario
- b) In English : The Revolutionary Front of the Left
- c) Acronym or known name : FIR

Country of Operation

Peru

Original Organization

The FIR was founded in December 1961 as a Trotskyist party belonging to the United Secretariat faction of the Fourth International. The group was the result of the unification of the POR (Partido Obrero Revolucionario -- Revolutionary Workers's Party) and other segments of the Peruvian Trotskyist far left.

Front Organizations and Auxiliaries

FIR's front organization is the Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores (PRT). In 1978 the FIR joined the Popular Front (FOCEP), a thirteen-group coalition that contained various Trotskyist organizations. By mid-1979 the FOCEP expelled the PRT for promoting Hugo Blanco's presidential candidacy. In November 1983, Blanco announced his intention of joining the coalition of the "Unified Left." However, Alfonso Barrantes Linegán, the Marxist mayor of Lima and one of the leaders of the leftist coalition (which includes the Peruvian Communist Party) declared: "I cannot realize an alliance with those who have always tried to divide us."

Peru - Group FIR
- 489 -

Membership

The group has approximately 100 members.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Hugo Blanco

b) Place of birth : Cuzco, Peru

c) Education : Blanco graduated from the University of La Plata, in Argentina, where he studied under the Trotskyite Hugo Bressano.

d) Political career : In 1962 Hugo Blanco a Trotskyist militant, sought to radicalize peasant unions in the department of Cuzco. Throughout 1959-1963 he mobilized an estimated 300,000 peasants in the Lares and La Convención valleys (located 90 miles north of Cuzco) in land invasions that overran nearly 300 haciendas. After 7 years in prison, Blanco was released in 1970 under the political amnesty. His presidential candidacy was supported by the PST (Socialist Workers' Party) in 1978. His objective was to create a single party from the various Trotskyist groups.

e) Publications : Blanco has published various articles in many Latin American and European liberal-leftist publications.

f) Character : According to knowledgeable analysts, Blanco possesses all the psychological features of a charismatic personality. He has been described as a natural leader, able to arouse enthusiasm among peasants (He is fluent in Quechuan).

Ideological Origin

Hugo Blanco was the disciple of the Argentine Trotskyist social thinker,

Peru - Group FIR
- 490 -

Nahuel Moreno (Hugo Bressano). In the early 1960s Blanco was a member of the Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Workers' Party -- POR). This party became international with the Moreno's creation of the Frente de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Front of the Revolutionary Left -- FIR), a broad union of leftist organizations in solidarity with peasant federations in Brazil and Guatemala that advocated land seizures and tried to indoctrinate the peasantry. Moreno was very influential among Peruvian Trotskyites in the early 1960s. In fact he was head of the Argentine section of the Trotskyite "International Committee" (associated with the "International Secretariat of the Fourth International"). Moreno felt that there was a tendency to exaggerate the relevance of the Cuban strategic model: "Guerrilla warfare is not synonymous with insurrection. The latter is the art of bringing the masses to power and the former is one form of struggle which may permit the insurrection in its final stages, but in no sense should it be suggested at its commencement." At first, Hugo Blanco seems to have supported the idea of a guerrilla war. However, his actions in La Convención Valley indicated that he eventually decided to endorse the strategy outlined by Nahuel Moreno. The FIR was founded to reflect Moreno's political imperative: "Without party there is no revolution; the party is everything, the masses are the tools in its hands."

Current Ideological Orientation

FIR's ideological orientation is Trotskyite with shifts toward "democratic" radicalism.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The FIR advocates a socialist land reform (i.e., nationalization, collectivization), and nationalizations and expropriations of industry and foreign companies.

b) Social program : The FIR's objectives are mentioned in their statements: the creation of a new labor union federation opposed to "reformism" and the creation of a "workers' revolutionary party" able to promote the goals of a "socialist revolution."

c) Foreign policy : The FIR expressed support for the Cuban revolution, despite Castro's harsh criticism of Trotskyism. The group shares the main positions of the United Secretariat: criticism of the Soviet bureaucracy, neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict, strong anti-U.S. stances, and calls for world revolution.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The FIR promotes the Marxist-Leninist program as conceived and formulated by Trotsky and by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International: agrarian reform, nationalizations, and the establishment of a "socialist" economy.

b) Social program : The FIR seeks the establishment of a socialist system, but it considers the guerrilla struggle a tactic and not a strategy.

c) Foreign policy : The FIR expresses criticism of the USSR (both foreign and domestic policy) as well as of China's positions. The group calls for support for the Cuban revolution and the insurgent movements in Latin America.

Ideologues

The Peruvian Trotskyites affiliated with the United Secretariat faction of the Fourth International developed an ideological position with certain peculiarities. The main spokesman of this orientation was Hugo Blanco, who in spite of having been deprived of his leadership position in 1962, was after his capture acknowledged as the main exponent of the FIR. Blanco's views were extensively developed in a pamphlet entitled, El Camino de Nuestra Revolución (The Road of Our Revolution), which appeared in July 1964. In this pamphlet, Blanco notes the importance of the peasants in the development of the Peruvian revolution. He emphasizes the role of the peasant unions as the incipient "dual power," comparable to the Soviets in the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. According to Blanco, primary attention should be placed upon the development of the peasant union (conceived as a very broad-gauged organization). It should become the nucleus of the new society. Blanco admitted that there were some weaknesses in the model inspired by La Convención struggle. But he argued, the fundamental shortcoming of his own efforts in the early 1960s was the lack of a sufficiently well-organized and revolutionary political party. Blanco acknowledged profound disagreements with the "foco" theory embraced by the disciples of Castro and "Che" Guevara. His theses were widely publicized by Trotskyite propaganda and discussed by Latin American leftists.

Propaganda

a) Addressed internal audience : During the activity among the peasant unions, the FIR propaganda primarily addressed the Peruvian peasantry.

Peru - Group FIR
- 493 -

b) Ideological content : The FIR indulges in polemics with other leftist groups and calls for proletarian revolution and peasant uprisings.

c) Print : During the 1960s, the FIR's clandestine publication was Revolución Peruana.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

Blanco disagreed with the idea that revolutionary centers were capable of carrying out a revolution. Therefore, the FIR has shared the Trotskyist views on revolutionary violence and stressed the idea of the "workers-peasants alliance." Blanco's assumption in 1962 was that political agitation would encourage the peasants to claim the land, and this would eventually lead to the major goal of armed struggle. Blanco criticized Guevara's foco theory and indicated main weaknesses of Castroism as: the underestimation of the importance of the party; the underestimation of the importance of mass movements; and the over-estimation and glorification of "isolated heroic acts."

Performance

a) Recruitment

i) Social groups : The FIR recruits among middle-class intellectuals, students, workers, and militants of the peasant unions. During the late 1970s the group retained influence in student circles.

b) Indoctrination

i) Forced study : During the peasant unions' movement, Blanco organized "Revolutionary Workers Schools" as bases for indoctrination.

Peru - Group FIR

- 494 -

ii) Use of schools/universities : The FIR has been particularly active and influential among university students.

iii) Use of religious institutions : Radical Catholic priests supported Blanco's movement.

iv) Use of unions : The FIR has attempted to control unions, particularly peasants' unions.

Military Structure

Guerrilla units were formed during the attempt to radicalize the peasants in 1962, and Union militias were created to support Blanco's rebellion.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The peasants who supported Hugo Blanco's movement were motivated by profound social and economic frustrations. In the late 1950s, Peru possessed many volatile economic discrepancies, particularly in rural areas.

ii) Leadership : The FIR leaders were motivated by their desire to overthrow the established social order and to impose a socialist regime.

b) Performance : On 13 November 1962, Blanco and some of his peasant followers attacked a small police station and killed the only Guardia Civil policeman at the post. Blanco became a fugitive from the law. He found refuge, together with a few followers, among the peasantry of La Convención Valley. By the time he was captured in May 1963, most of his partisans had also been arrested by the police. He spent seven years in prison.

Peru - Group FIR
- 495 -

Training

FIR militants were trained in Peru by Peruvian and foreign trainers (members of the Trotskyist Fourth International).

Financial Resources

The POR, the forerunner of the FIR, specialized in "expropriations" of funds from banks. In April 1962, the FIR organized an attack on a bank in Lima. As a result, almost 3 million soles were stolen, though subsequently the police captured a truck with 1,115,000 soles. The group received support from unions, leftist Catholic circles, and other Latin American Trotskyite movements.

Level of Popular Support

a) Total group and front organizations : As a result of the 1962 defeat, the FIR could not recover and reach a large political audience.

b) Local support: According to Blanco's own statements, his movement was not able to persuade the peasants of the necessity of a "socialist revolution." The FIR was active especially in the department of Cuzco.

c) Electoral performance : As a non-violent but radical candidate, Hugo Blanco received moderate electoral support in 1979.

External Support

The main external support for the FIR came from the United Secretariat faction of the Fourth International. The international campaign in defense of Hugo Blanco mobilized famous leftist intellectuals and certain communist parties (Italian and Mexican).

Peru - Group FIR

- 496 -

Dependence on External Support

Considering the international character of Trotskyism, the FIR counted on external connections for both strategical and political reasons.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

In the late 1970s the FIR joined the ultra-left-wing alliance, FOCEP for a short time. In March 1979 significant divergences surfaced between the FIR leader, Hugo Blanco, and "independent" Genaro Ledesma.

b) Extrahemispheric : The FIR was founded as a Trotskyist party associated with the United Secretariat faction of the Fourth International, based in Western Europe. The group's ties with the United Secretariat have been primarily political.

Extent and Structure of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

The FIR organized rural guerrilla actions in the department of Cuzco in 1962. The group was unable to establish a "liberated area" and the movement was rapidly defeated.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

Factionalism plagued the FOCEP in 1979, due to differences between FIR leader, Hugo Blanco and "independent," Genaro Ledesma. By midyear the FOCEP had expelled the PST (Socialist Workers' Party) for promoting Blanco's presidential candidacy. In the 1978 elections for the National Assembly, Blanco, considered by many observers the left's most compelling electoral figure, obtained 286,000 votes.

Peru - Group FIR
- 497 -

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

Hugo Blanco represents the most prominent figure of the Peruvian far left and his personality is still dominating the Trotskyist movement. Despite the collapse of his venture in the Cuzco region, he has maintained an overwhelming influence among the most radical sectors of the Peruvian left.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

After total defeat in 1962, the FIR became a marginal and isolated segment of the Peruvian left. Its survival is due mostly to Hugo Blanco's influence. It has retained a small basis among university students.

Remarks

The FIR experiment of developing a rural insurrection is one of the most interesting attempts by Latin American leftists to apply the Leninist strategy of "dual power." The movement's history is worth studying because it epitomizes one of the few cases of a Trotskyist sect successfully creating a mass movement. Moreover, despite Blanco's intransigence and frantic radicalism, he remains one of the few consistent and articulate Latin American leftist ideologues. He presently pretends to profess democratic values, but this turnabout should be interpreted as an indication of both his manipulative skills and his desire to remain an influential actor on the Peruvian political scene.

Peru - Group ELN
- 498 -

Group or Organization name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito de Liberación Nacional
- b) In English : National Liberation Army
- c) Acronym or known name : ELN

Country of Operation

Peru

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The ELN was founded in 1962 by former members of the Peruvian Communist Party, who were inspired by Castroite ideology and influenced by Hugo Blanco's rural guerrilla warfare. The founders of the ELN conceived their organization as a "revolutionary party in embryo," and imagined it as an alternative to the "reformist" Peruvian Communist Party.

Membership

After the defeat of the peasants, the ELN had several hundred members.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : Héctor Béjar Rivera
- b) Political career : Béjar, the main leader of the ELN, was held in prison from late 1965 until the military government's general political amnesty in December 1970. Upon his release from prison, Béjar declared that he believed change within the system could be achieved peacefully. In 1982, he began working in the government-controlled National System of Support for Social Mobilization (SINAMOS), even though the ELN continued to reject the military government.

Peru - Group ELN
- 499 -

c) Publication : He is the author of Peru 1975: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience (English translation in 1970).

Ideological Origin

The ELN represented a major split within the Peruvian Communist Party. Disaffected with the bureaucratic style of their original organization, the dissidents who created the ELN considered that only the dynamics of revolutionary struggle would bring about the new party. They adhered to Castro's continental perspective on Latin American revolution and shared the basic tenets of Castro-Guevarism.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The ELN advocated agrarian reform, nationalization, and socialization of the whole economy.

b) Social program: The objective of the ELN, as stated in 1967, was to "develop a popular, anti-imperialist, and anti-feudal revolution to bring about socialism."

c) Foreign policy : The ELN expressed solidarity with other Latin-American guerrilla movements. The group issued strong anti-U.S. statements and manifested total support for Castro and the Castroite revolutionary strategy.

Ideologues

a) Name : Héctor Béjar Rivera

b) Publications: Béjar is the author of Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience. The book won the Cuban Casa de las Américas essay prize in 1969. It was published in English by the Monthly Review Press in 1970.

Peru - Group ELN
- 500 -

c) Impact (internal) : Béjar's book influenced the re-orientation of guerrilla strategy in Peru. His ideas were analyzed by other leftist groups such as the MIR and the FIR.

d) Impact (external) : Béjar's book was specifically published in Cuba to influence the revolutionary outlook of other guerrilla leaders in Latin America.

Propaganda

ELN propaganda frequently called for armed struggle and socialist revolution. Béjar's publications exerted a certain impact on Latin American leftist groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The ELN and the MIR agreed that rural guerrilla warfare was necessary in Peru. The ELN embraced Ernesto "Che" Guevara's theory of the insurreccional foco and attempted to create such nuclei in an area near La Mar (Ayacucho, midway between the two fronts then being manned by the MIR). Its leaders also emphasized the necessity of underground activities in the cities and the advantages of a tactical mobilizational approach. Nonetheless, the Peruvian guerrilla movement of 1965 never progressed past the first or strategic defense stage defined by "Che" Guevara. Béjar analyzed the reasons for this failure in his own Peruvian guerrilla experience. In a 1969 interview, he reiterated his conviction that "the armed way continues to be the only way to bring about a real revolution in Peru."

Peru - Group ELN
- 501 -

Performance

The ELN recruited mainly among students and middle-class intellectuals. Despite demagogic promises to peasants, the guerrillas never succeeded in gaining popular support in rural areas, and this isolation accounts for their 1965 defeat.

Military Structure

The ELN aimed to create foci, military-political nuclei who were supposed to represent bases for the future organization of revolutionary movement.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The ELN militants were mobilized by revolutionary fanaticism, fascination with the Cuban revolution, and intellectual and economic discontent.

ii) Leadership : The leaders of the ELN were determined to create a revolutionary situation, a "revolutionary army," and eventually a "revolutionary party." The group exploited the peasants' desire to own the land on which they worked.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : The ELN was almost completely dismantled after the military defeat in 1965.

ii) Weapon sophistication : The ELN made use of small arms, rifles, and machine guns.

Peru - Group ELN
- 502 -

iii) Leadership in combat : Béjar, was captured in December 1965, bringing the "Year of the Guerrilla" in Peru to a close.

Training

The ELN guerrillas were trained in Peru and Cuba.

Financial Resources

a) National origin : Until 1967-68, Cuba provided the decisive financial support to the ELN. After 1970 the group was almost completely self-reliant, which perhaps accounts for its progressive extinction.

b) Means : At least one spectacular robbery (December 1967) was organized by the ELN. The group also received voluntary contributions from members of the so-called "progressive bourgeoisie" and some radical sectors of the Catholic Church.

Equipment and Supplies

The ELN used small arms, dynamite, and machine guns captured from the army or received from Cuba.

Level of Popular Support

In the late 1970s the ELN lost its influence even in leftist circles. It has since almost vanished from the political scene. Even at the height of its activities, in 1965, the ELN was not able to find wide support in the population.

External Support

Cuba was the main source of supplies and financial resources for the ELN guerrillas. It offered political and material support especially during the 1965 guerrilla ventures. In 1968 the Peruvian military regime took control of the country, and Castro became interested in supporting its leftist course. Consequently, he reduced his aid to Peruvian guerrillas.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National : In 1967, Béjar stated that despite certain differences, the ELN and the MIR agreed on the strategy of using guerrilla struggle to initiate the revolution. Both groups relied on the peasant masses and, given their fundamental agreement on strategy their "coordination . . . and even their fusion [was] only a matter of time." In fact the Castroite ELN almost vanished in the late 1970s, and the MIR is now the main pro-Cuban group in Peru, although it no longer openly advocates violence.

ii) Continental : The ELN established close contacts with Cuba and other Castroite revolutionary groups in Latin America.

b) Type : Cuba provided training and financial and logistical support for the guerrilla undertakings in 1965.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

After the defeat of the peasant guerrilla movement in 1965 and the military takeover in 1968, the ELN lost its influence and became only a marginal segment of the far left.

Peru - Group ELN

- 504 -

Remarks

There were many reasons for the rapid defeat of the Peruvian guerrillas in 1965:

a) The Peruvian left experienced an ideological crisis following World War II, that was exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet conflict. This split prevented the Peruvian guerrillas from acquiring critical support from the organized (institutional) left and from liberal-oriented sectors of the urban middle-class.

b) The guerrillas lacked cogent and appropriate planning, resulting in their failure to secure the support of the peasantry. They also remained separated from the peasantry by an immense cultural and linguistic gap.

c) The guerrillas were so enthralled with their foreign models (Castroite, Maoist, etc.), that they did not properly approach the actual problems of Peruvian society. Moreover, Peruvian peasants identified with the agrarian politics of President Belaunde's government. The Peruvian military capitalized on these conditions to defeat the guerrilla bands in 1965. In 1968 the army took over, and in 1970 the passage of a major agrarian reform bill, which expropriated large coastal sugar properties as well as lands in the sierra, diminished the chances for successful resumption of guerrilla warfare in rural Peru.

Peru - Group MIR
- 505 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
- b) In English : Movement of the Revolutionary Left
- c) Acronym or known name : MIR

Country of Operation

Peru

Original Organization

The MIR, created in June 1962, was originally a splinter group of the APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) party, initially called APRA Rebelde. The APRA was founded in Mexico in 1924 by Victor Haya de la Torre. It underwent dramatic internal struggles in the 1950s. Some of the APRA dissidents organized into parties and advocated guerrilla warfare. An important group of young militants, led by Luis de la Puente, defected from the APRA in the wake of the Cuban revolution, which exerted a strong influence over the MIR. MIR was almost completely dismantled after the defeat of the guerrilla struggle in 1965, but it re-emerged in the early 1970s and was officially "reformed" in 1977.

Membership

The MIR has approximately 100 active members and a few hundred supporters.

Leadership

De La Puente was born in Trujillo, Peru, and was a relative of Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, APRA's most prominent personality. He had been exiled from

Peru - Group MIR
- 506 -

Peru by dictator Manuel de Odría in 1948 for his involvement in the abortive attack by APRA reform elements on the Callao garrison. It is difficult to assess completely de la Puente's contacts with Bolivian and Cuban groups during his exile in Mexico.

The Bolivian Revolution made a great impact on de la Puente, who was jailed by Odría in 1954 for attempting to launch a similar revolution in Peru. Following his release from jail, de la Puente returned to Trujillo and took a law degree. His doctoral thesis on the subject of agrarian reform was later published as La reforma del agro peruano (1966). In his thesis de la Puente described Peru as a semi-feudal area where effective land reform was indispensable. There was no indication at that time that he considered mass mobilization of the peasantry or rural guerrilla warfare as the most appropriate means of securing such reforms.

The Cuban Revolution exerted another tremendous impact on de la Puente and catalyzed his discontent with traditional Aprista politics. In 1960, four months after the Cuban Revolution's triumph, he represented the Peruvian Left at the First National Agrarian Reform Forum in Havana. There he argued in favor of summary expropriation and socialism. Although he purported to represent APRA, by the following year, de la Puente had led a group of dissidents out of the party and had formed APRA Rebelde. Initially, APRA Rebelde sought to implement agrarian reform through legal channels. However, considerable harassment, including an unrelated jail sentence, led de la Puente in June 1962, to abandon the Aprista affiliation and to create the MIR, in line with actions taken earlier by dissidents from Venezuela's Acción Democrática Party (AD). After June 1962, the MIR became committed to armed struggle against the established order and adopted the strategy of guerrilla warfare as the primary means to achieve its goals. Another factor that led de la Puente's to embrace the guerrilla strategy was the influence of Hugo Blanco, the leader of the FIR.

Peru - Group MIR
- 507 -

In October 1962, de la Puente travelled to Quillsbamba to meet with Blanco. This meeting became a landmark in the history of Peru's violent Left. According to some analysts their meeting contains as many unresolved questions as the one held more than a century earlier between Simón Bolívar and Juan de San Martín. Whether it was because of their ideological clash (Marxist vs. Trotskyist), or Blanco's distrust of guerrilla cadres outside of his control, no agreement was reached between the two groups. In fact, Blanco had many reasons to be skeptical about the MIR's capacity to aid his movement.

On 7 February 1964, in Lima's Plaza San Martín, Luis de la Puente delivered a vehement speech that redefined the orientation of the MIR from an urban, middle-class party to one modeled largely on the Cuban example. The MIR was thereafter decisively oriented toward "an awakened peasantry and elements of the progressive bourgeoisie." De la Puente's speech, which was the collaborative work of several MIR ideologists, chastised the APRA politicians for indulging in a counter-productive electoral game. APRA was blamed for its failure to make the basic changes in the agrarian structure of Peru set out in the Manifesto of Chiclayo (the "second Declaration of Havana"). Subsequently, "a new form of struggle" was considered legitimate, one capable of effecting these changes. According to de la Puente, subjective conditions for a guerrilla war in Peru were superior to those that had existed earlier in Cuba. In July 1964, the MIR established a series of fronts in the departments of Cuzo and Junín, while another was planned for Piura, in the north. De la Puente set up his headquarters on the remote Mesa Pelada, a high plateau overlooking the Urubamba River north of the ancient Inca citadel of Machu Picchu. In the armed struggle that began in mid-1965, some 125 guerrillas were killed, among them MIR's two foremost leaders, Luis de la Puente and Guillermo Lobatón.

Peru - Group MIR
- 508 -

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Ricardo Gadea

b) Date of birth : 1942

c) Political career : A journalist by profession, Ricardo Gadea assumed the leadership of the MIR after the 1965 deaths of the two most important leaders of the group, Luis de la Puente Uceda, its founder, and Guillermo Lobatón. He is the brother of "Che" Guevara's first wife. Arrested after the uprising in 1965, he was set free in 1970.

d) Publications : Gadea was co-author of the "MIR Manifesto on the Peruvian Revolution" (April 1965).

e) Character : Committed to revolutionary violence and active as a militant and a theoretician, Gadea attempted to reorganize the MIR after the traumatic 1965 defeat. A hard-line Castroite, he maintained a critical attitude toward the established institutions and refused to cooperate with even the leftist military government.

Ideological Origin

Ideologically, the MIR shared some of APRA's ideas, particularly the specificity of the Peruvian historical development. Luis de la Puente, the group's main ideologue, insisted on the necessity of a revolutionary upheaval bound to emancipate the peasantry and inaugurate a socialist transformation of society. The group was influenced by Marxist ideas, including the Peruvian Marxist doctrine of Mariátegui. Castro-Guevarism was the basic ideological source that influenced MIR's decision to embrace the strategy of guerrilla warfare. The group rejected the assumption that an urban party organization should guide the activities of the guerrilla units. On the contrary, de la Puente clearly asserted

that " . . . starting from certain minimum levels of party organization and prestige among the masses, we must devote ourselves to the work of insurrection convinced that during the preparatory stage in the guerrilla zones, and more intensively after the beginning of the action, it will be possible to build the party and mobilize, organize, give consciousness to, and incorporate the masses into armed struggle." There were certain Maoist aspects in MIR's original program, particularly with regard to the pre-eminent role of the peasantry in the revolution.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The MIR adopted the main objectives of the Marxist-Leninist program: nationalization, agrarian reform, and expropriation of the foreign companies.

b) Social program: All points of MIR's social program were subordinated to its main objectives. The fulfillment of the "socialist revolution" through armed struggle and violence, represented the fundamental social objective of the group.

c) Foreign policy : The MIR expressed a consistent pro-Cuban attitude. It conceived the Peruvian revolution "as a part of the continental and world process, which demands progressive forms of integration in every aspect and stage."

Current Program

a) Social program : The MIR maintained its strong "Castroite" position during the late 1970s. The group was committed to the establishment of a socialist society through a revolution based on armed struggle.

Peru - Group MIR
- 510 -

b) Foreign policy : The MIR indulged in strong anti-American stances. Solidarity with Cuba and the leftist insurgent movements in Latin America, was the basic postulate of MIR's international policy.

Ideologues

a) Name : Luis de la Puente Uceda

b) Publications: De la Puente, originally a young leader of the Peruvian Aprista party, wrote several essays that presented and analyzed the basic concepts of the Peruvian revolution ("The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives") as well as statements and interviews. He was co-author, with Ricardo Gadea and Guillermo Lobatón of the "MIR Manifesto on the Peruvian Revolution" (April 1965).

c) Impact (internal) : Luis de la Puente became one of the main ideologues of the guerilla war in Peru. His opinions on armed struggle were adopted by the MIR as a whole in the mid-1960s. For de la Puente, armed struggle was a precondition for building a "true revolutionary party."

d) Impact (external) : The MIR ideological stances were essential for the polemics between Régis Debray and the orthodox Marxists.

Ideologues

a) Name : Ricardo Gadea

b) Publications: He was co-author of the "MIR Manifesto on the Peruvian Revolution" (together with Luis de la Puente and Guillermo Lobatón). During the late 1960s Gadea exerted ideological leadership in the MIR despite his imprisonment. After his release from prison, Gadea continued to profess the same intransigent ideas in interviews and statements published by the leftist press.

Peru - Group MIR
- 511 -

c) Impact : Gadea's publications appeared in the Cuban and pro-Cuban press, particularly the Tri-continental. They were used by Debray and, through him, influenced other Latin American guerrillas.

Propaganda

a) Content : The MIR propaganda addressed mainly peasants. But these attempts were unsuccessful. Most MIR members were unable to overcome the cultural and linguistic barriers that separated them from the peasantry.

b) Means : MIR published Voz Rebelde, and during the guerrilla struggle in 1965, it also issued a mimeographed publication, El Guerrillero.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The MIR favored rural guerrilla warfare and tried to organize several guerrilla centers to initiate and develop the struggle. According to Luis de la Puente, the movement's ideologue, "given our condition as a mainly peasant country, and our geographic features, insurrection must start in the Sierra or in the Eastern Andean escarpments." In a July 26 declaration, the MIR stated that "revolutionary violence," that is, "armed power in the hands of the people," was an "implicit necessity of the revolutionary process in moving to socialism."

Performance

a) Recruitment

i) Social groups : The MIR was particularly appealing to young intellectuals, students, and some peasants.

ii) Age groups : Young people were recruited especially from the universities.

Peru - Group MIR
- 512 -

b) Indoctrination : The MIR managed to become influential among radical student groups.

Military Structure

In 1964-65, the MIR established a series of fronts in the departments of Cuzco and Junin, while another was planned for Piura, in the north. Rather than employing the mobile, flexible focos advocated by "Che" Guevara as staging bases for surprise attacks, the group then settled into a series of immobile security zones. However, without large and consistent peasant support, the guerrillas fell prey to well-equipped counter-insurgency forces. The Peruvian Army was able to penetrate the allegedly "liberated zones" which became death traps.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The members of the initial MIR were motivated by a combination of adventurism and radicalism; the conviction that the armed struggle was a magic remedy that could solve all of Peru's economic and social difficulties.

ii) Leadership : De la Puente and his comrades were motivated by disaffection with the politics of the APRA leadership and the impact of the Cuban revolution. The desire to overthrow the socio-political order in Peru, and to create another Cuba in the Andes was the strongest source of political motivation for MIR leaders.

b) Performance

i) **Combat ability** : The MIR reached national prominence through an active peasant guerrilla movement during 1965. This phase ended with most leaders either killed in action or imprisoned.

ii) **Weapon sophistication** : During the guerrilla episode, the MIR made use of small arms, submachine guns, mortars, and bombs.

iii) **Leadership in combat** : In the armed struggle that began in mid-1965, some 125 guerrillas were killed, among them the two most important MIR leaders, Luis de la Puente and Guillermo Lobatón.

Training

MIR militants were trained in Peru and in foreign countries (Cuba and Mexico).

Financial Resources

Little evidence is available concerning MIR's financial sources. Cuba was not only the guerrilla's theoretical guide but also their main financial supporter.

Level of Popular Support

a) **Total group and front organizations** : During the guerrilla period, the MIR had some influence among the peasant unions. The group's impact rapidly decreased after its defeat in 1965.

b) **Support from unrelated groups or organizations** : The MIR established contacts and common actions with other leftist Peruvian groups, particularly those of Maoist orientation.

Peru - Group MIR
- 514 -

External Support

It is a fact that Fidel Castro masterminded the guerrilla insurgency in Peru in 1965. Both the MIR and the ELN were inspired by the Cuban strategic framework and benefited from substantial Cuban logistical and financial support. Cuban support for Peruvian guerrilla ventures declined after 1967 for a variety of reasons, one of them being Castro's interest in the newly established leftist military government. Cuban aid to Peru in the wake of the 1970 earthquake reflected this reorientation as did Castro's favorable pronouncements about the Peruvian military government.

Dependence on External Support

a) Strategic : MIR's entire strategy was inspired and influenced by the Cuban revolution.

b) Tactical : Despite some tensions in its relations with Cuba (1969-1970), the MIR has represented the main pro-Castro group in Peru and has acted according to Castro's indications and suggestions.

c) Impact of dissimulation or proclaimed noninvolvement by supplier : The MIR lost a lot of its force and influence after 1969, when Castro decided to encourage the military government in Peru. Moreover, Castro's change of mind with regard to armed struggle in Peru (apparent or real) brought about a factional struggle within the MIR.

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : In 1979 a spokesman for the MIR announced that talks had been held with the Peruvian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), the Revolutionary Communist Party-Working Class, the VR-Proletarian Communist,

Peru - Group MIR
- 515 -

and the Bandera Roja (Red Flag) to form the Single Revolutionary Leftist Front. The MIR engaged in strategic and tactical disputes with the pro-Soviet Communist Party, especially in 1964-1965.

Some points should be noted with regard to relations between the MIR and the ELN. The hasty and ill-planned character of the guerrilla field operations of 1964-65 indicated that the groups' activities were completely uncoordinated, even though the two groups were no more than a ten-day march from each other. In his account of ELN activities, ELN leader Béjar alluded to the fundamental split within the Peruvian Left after 1962. According to Béjar these divergences prevented any agreements between the two major organizations. Since both guerrilla groups emerged from traditionally opposed parties (APRA and the Peruvian Communist Party), the differences between them were difficult to surmount. Organizational and ideological distinctions between the groups persisted. The well-established MIR wanted to lead the revolution, but the less organized ELN insisted that the party be created out of the "internal dynamics of revolution." Neither group wished to subordinate itself to the other's leadership. Béjar, in his self-serving essay, criticized the MIR leadership for their intransigence and lack of cooperation, which he claimed led to the guerrillas' abysmal defeat in 1965. Similar sectarian obsessions precluded any significant cooperation, prior to 1964-65, with Hugo Blanco's FIR. In January 1980, the MIR joined a Bloc of Peruvian Left Political Parties (Left Unity), founded by some leftist parties including the pro-Soviet Communist party.

b) Continental : The MIR established and developed strong relations with Cuba and with the pro-Cuban groups and movements in Latin America. The MIR has consistently demonstrated its solidarity and unconditional loyalty to Cuba. The guerrilla warfare of the mid-1960s was intended to represent an extension of the

Peru - Group MIR
- 516 -

Cuban revolution and, Castro was perfectly aware of the feelings he was inducing among his Peruvian admirers. As one analyst of the guerrilla struggle once observed, "the sign of Fidelismo presided over the Peruvian guerrilla struggle from the very outset." It is noteworthy that Castro continued to support the Peruvian MIR despite the latter's public statements on behalf of the Chinese theses during the polemic with Moscow (1963-64). Cuban assistance to the MIR for the preparation of the guerrilla struggle, was decisive both in nature and extent.

Extent and Structure of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

The MIR attempted to create a simulacrum of "liberated area" in the Departments of Cuzco and Junia. The group tried to set up a series of immobile "security zones" which became easy targets for the military counter-insurgency forces (1965).

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

In contrast with MIR's critical position toward the military government, a MIR faction -- the Revolutionary Socialist Leagues (LSR) -- resolutely supported the junta. Imael Frias, the LSR leader accused the "smaller groups" of the Peruvian Left of misunderstanding the "meaning of the national revolution." The MIR "Castroite" opposition to the military government continued into 1976 despite the fact that Fidel Castro and the Cuban government, adopted a friendly attitude toward the Velasco government.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

The MIR was never able to recover from the death of Luis de la Puente, its

Peru - Group MIR
- 517 -

founder and foremost ideologue. Despite Gadea's prestige among Peruvian Leftists, the MIR lost both its original impetus and ideological originality.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

After the failure of the guerrilla struggle in 1965, the MIR became more and more marginal in the Peruvian political life. In recent years the group has manifested itself only as a segment of the far left, without attempting to launch terrorist activities as it did in the 1960s.

Remarks

Although its guerrilla actions ended in failure and most of its leaders were either killed or put in prison, the MIR was considered -- during the early 1970s -- the strongest leftist group outside the pro-Soviet Communist Party. Moreover, at that time the MIR seemed to enjoy "a great moral prestige" among other leftist groups, particularly the Castroite and Trotskyite sectors.

The Peruvian MIR experience, with its initial exaltation and subsequent breakdown, represents one of the main chapters in the history of Castroite guerrilla movements in Latin America. Historically, the group was the offspring of a radical tendency within APRA, Haya de la Torre's quite unconventional socialist-liberal party. Luis de la Puente, the MIR's doctrinaire and political strategist, was an enthusiastic supporter of Castro's revolution. He grew increasingly convinced that socialism, which he perceived as a combination of agrarian populism with strong political centralization, could not be attained without recourse to violence.

The evolution of the MIR from the left-of-center ideology of the APRA to radical Marxist stances more than suggests certain political-intellectual directions

Peru - Group MIR
- 518 -

in contemporary Latin America. Fidel Castro turned out to be a masterful manipulator of leftist extremists, many of whom sincerely believed they were fighting for the improvement of social conditions in their own countries. However, the fate of the Peruvian guerrillas illustrates that irony of history called victory in defeat. More than one scholar has noticed that those who annihilated the insurgents were the same who were instrumental in the establishment and leftist orientation of the Peruvian military regime. For example, General Jorge Fernández Maldonado, who was commander of the Peruvian Fourth Army, that defeated the guerrillas, later became a Minister in Velasco's government.

The mind of the guerrillero, also played a part in the MIR's defeat. Luis de la Puente possessed an eclectic interest in the most diverse and sometimes incompatible intellectual sources. He borrowed ideas from Mao, Castro, Haya de la Torre, and "Che" Guevara. This breed of ideologue does not seem intimidated by what he considers outdated controversies or deterred by the challenges of traditional orthodoxies. According to de la Puente, "the subjective and objective conditions are present, and the latter, even if they are not fully ripe, will mature in the process of struggle." To quote one of Trotsky's most sarcastic aphorisms, such revolutionaries are guilty of confusing the second month of pregnancy for the ninth. In other words, the Peruvian Castroite guerrillas, despite their populist rhetoric, were doomed to experience the bitter taste of defeat.

Peru - Group VR
- 519 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Vanguardia Revolucionaria
- b) In English : Revolutionary Vanguard
- c) Acronym or known name : VR

Country of Operation

Peru

Original Organization

The VR was formed in 1965 by dissident leftist members of the Aprista party. From the outset, the VR was less influential -- even within radical Aprista youth -- than other leftist groups (particularly the MIR). The members of the VR were influenced primarily by Trotskyist ideology.

Membership

The VR is reportedly a very small group composed mainly of intellectuals.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : Ricardo Letts Colmenares
- b) Political career : Letts Colmenares, the VR secretary-general was arrested in September 1970 on charges of anarchism and subversion. He was deported to Mexico but was allowed to return to Peru early in February 1971. He has since resumed his political activity.

Ideological Origin

An organization of Trotskyite orientation, the VR was established after the defeat of Hugo Blanco's peasant movement and the defeat of the guerrilla groups formed by the Fidelista MIR and the pro-Chinese communists. An article in the periodical of the Ligue Communiste (the French member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International) attributed to the VR the vision of "polarizing the radicalized sectors." The same article noted the VR's "eclectic and conciliatory" tendency and expressed regret that the group refused to discuss "the ideological struggle within the international communist movement." Throughout the past few years the VR has become more interested in Castroite and Maoist ideology and has been criticized by Trotskyist leaders.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The VR advocated massive confiscations and nationalizations of industries, land, and foreign assets.

b) Social program: While favoring a strategy of insurrectional struggle, the VR stressed the role of ideology and the "revolutionary party" in establishing the "socialist society."

c) Foreign policy : The group expressed solidarity with Cuba and the leftist insurgent movements in Latin America.

Propaganda

The VR's propaganda was particularly influential in Peruvian universities where the group largely displaced the Maoists and the Fidelistas from the leadership of student federations. In the early 1970s, the VR published a monthly periodical, Revolución.

Peru - Group VR

- 521 -

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The VR favored the insurrectional approach, and considered the revolutionary party as a precondition of any successful confrontation with government forces. The group criticized the guerrilla actions of 1963-65 for their docile subordination to Castro's strategy. The VR insists on the necessity of large mobilizational activity. In the late 1960s the group was influential among the fishery unions.

Performance

a) Recruitment : The VR recruited primarily among students and middle-class intellectuals. During the 1970s, the VR included some workers but apparently no peasants.

b) Indoctrination : During the early 1970s the VR had a significant following among university students. In elections held at the Student Federation of the Catholic University at Lima (1970), VR students won leadership positions.

Training

The VR militants were trained in Peru. The group denied any involvement in guerrilla and/or terrorist operations.

Financial Resources

The modest financial resources of the VR were mostly local. The group had no significant international connections and was forced to be self-reliant.

Peru - Group VR
- 522 -

Level of Popular Support

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the VR was influential among the students of the University of Trujillo and the Catholic University in Lima. The VR exerted some influence -- in the late 1960s -- among members of fishery unions.

External Support

Despite its consistent pro-Cuban statements, the VR did not win Castro's confidence. The group lacked significant external links, particularly after abandoning "orthodox" Trotskyism and adopting certain Maoist theses. An indication of relations with Cuba can be found in several Granma reports on VR activities.

Relations with Other Groups

The VR backed the MIR revolutionary attempts of 1965, but expressed reservations regarding the MIR tactics.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

By 1971, the heterogenous nature of VR's membership provoked a split into three rival factions, each using the name Vanguardia Revolucionaria. One of these splinters openly proclaimed itself to be Trotskyite, and the two others declared Maoist inclinations.

Peru - Group VR
- 523 -

Remarks

In the late 1970s, the VR grew increasingly isolated and almost vanished from the political scene. Its sole contribution consisted of an unsuccessful attempt to revive leftist radicalism among university students.

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : El Partido Comunista de Peru por el Sendero Luminoso del Pensamiento de José Carlos Mariátegui
- b) In English : The Communist party of Peru on the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui's Thought
- c) Acronym or known name : Sendero Luminoso, "Shining Path"

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Peru
- b) Others : Groups with the same name but whose direct links with Sendero are still in doubt have surfaced in Bolivia and Colombia. Sendero appears to have used, at least occasionally, Bolivian territory for training and supply routes.

Origins

In October 1971 a split occurred within the Maoist "Red Flag" Party of Peru (Partido Bandera Roja), particularly within its student group, the Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (FER). The new splinter, the FER-Sendero Luminoso, led by Abimael Guzman (then-personnel director of the Huamanga University) took control over the university and became the Partido Comunista de Peru. In 1974-1977 the most radical leaders of the peasant unions of the Andahuaylas province joined the party, and in 1977 a decision was taken to pursue armed struggle at the next opportunity. By 1977 another small ultra-revolutionary faction of the minuscule Bandera Roja Party (now legal and represented in Parliament), the Puka Llacta, also joined the Sendero. Thus the party is the combination of the FER-Sendero, Puka Llacta, and Andahuaylas militant union leaders. In May 1980, a few days after Peru's first

Peru - Group Sendero
- 525 -

elections, following twelve years of military dictatorship, Sendero opened its violent campaign.

Front and Allied Organizations

Sendero Luminoso does not have political fronts as such, but since 1980 it has closely cooperated with and probably controls other groups, including: Partido Comunista Peruano-Puka Llacta (Peruvian Communist Party-Puka Llacta), active in the La Oroya area; the Tupac Amaru faction of MIR, operating in the areas of Andahuaylas, Apurimac, Chuchi, and Cuzco; Vanguardia Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Vanguard) -- Politico Militar, active in Lima; and MIR/Peru, active in the regions of Otuzco, Huamachuco, Cajabamba.

By 1977 Sendero Luminoso was manipulating a significant number of organizations in the Ayacucho area, including the Front for the Defense of the People of Ayacucho -- FDPA, Women's Popular Movement -- MFPE, Movement of Poor Peasants -- MCP, and the Youth Movement -- MJ. All these groups were used extensively for recruitment and indoctrination.

Membership

a) Active Members : By March 1983 the total active membership of Sendero (i.e., armed militants), was plausibly estimated at 2-3,000, and it has probably increased slightly since. This number includes the steady and permanent cadres, and it has remained stable despite large loses -- which by September 1983 included, according to the government of Peru, 2,119 captured and 1,033 killed.

b) Sympathizers : The number of sympathizers is impossible to estimate, since some may cooperate only under fear of reprisals, and thus cannot be properly defined as "sympathizers," while others remain deeply underground.

c) Cadres : The number of cadres may be as small as a few dozen, all of whom are either among the group's founders or more recent additions following a thorough, protracted, and often brutal process of selection. While at least one case, that of Hernan Victor Tineo Suasnabar captured on August 1982, indicates that even a new recruit (one and a half years) was able to meet Guzman, that was clearly the exception and not the rule. Tineo Suasnabar was an executioner for Sendero rather than a politico-ideological cadre, which may explain his unusual access to Guzman.

d) Foreign Members : Sendero's own xenophobia and ideological dogmatism appear to exclude, for the time being at least, the presence of any foreigners within its ranks and even more so among its cadres. On the other hand, some foreigners are among its sympathizers, as demonstrated by the arrests of Danish and French nationals accused of cooperating with Sendero.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Abimael Guzman Reynoso, "Comrade Gonzalo."

i) Background : Born in 1934 in Arequipa, from a middle-class background, Guzman completed his Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Arequipa. He wrote his dissertation on Immanuel Kant's concept of space. By 1962 Guzman became a professor of philosophy at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho. The following year he was involved in the activities of the first generation of Peruvian guerrillas, through the MIR. In the 1950s, Guzman became a member of the then-pro-Soviet Communist Party of Peru. In 1964 he left in favor of the Maoist splinter, Bandera Roja. Arrested in 1970 for a brief period, he went underground in 1978, never to surface again. His main power base in the 1960s, and the recruiting ground for his group ever since, was the Huamanga University. He became personnel director by 1971, and thus was able to hire only ideologically

Peru - Group Sendero
- 527 -

close faculty members and to indoctrinate whole generations of students. With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that Guzman's entire career as a teacher and administrator was used for recruitment and indoctrination of youths, mostly "cholos" (i.e., Indian-speaking upwardly mobile inhabitants of the Peruvian highlands). To a decisive extent this was made possible by leftist military dictator, Juan Velasco Alvarado's "no enemies on the Left" attitude.

From the start, Guzman built up his "personality cult" -- a natural characteristic of his megalomania and in line with his pro-Mao ideological line. Always secretive, since going underground in 1978, he has transformed his unchallenged control over Sendero into a God-like, mythical omnipresence. At the same time he remains isolated from the mass of militants and fighters. Neither the overwhelming majority of Sendero's members, nor the Peruvian government know of Guzman's whereabouts since 1978. Rumors, some of which appear reliable, maintain that he is terminally ill with a skin disease (cancer?) or even dead, but they cannot be confirmed.

Guzman has never published any coherent, lengthy text on his own or his movement's ideology. He has total contempt for ideological or political statements, believing instead in the value of action as a statement. Physically, Guzman seems plump, withdrawn, and obsessed by secrecy. Fanatical, ruthless, and imbued with a sense of his own historical importance, he plays the role of an Inca-like Sun-God, requiring a quasi-religious obedience. He has never consented to an interview. However, he has encouraged, even required, his followers to consider him the "Fourth Sword of Marxism," the first three being Marx, Lenin, and Mao Zedong.

b) Name or assumed name : Julio Cesar Mezich Izaguirre

i) Background : Born in Lima in 1951, Mezich is the second in command of Sendero, and if the reports that Guzman is dead or terminally ill are

Peru - Group Sendero
- 528 -

true, the actual leader of the group. Mezich comes from a middle-to upper-middle class family, has studied at an exclusive Catholic High School in Lima, and went on to study medicine at the University of Lima. Married to an Indian woman (daughter of an Indian leader in Apurimac), he is fluent in Quechua and by 1974 became one of the three most prominent leaders of the quasi-anarchist peasant unions' leadership in the Andahuaylas Province.

Leader of Sendero's operations in Apurimac, Huancavelica, and Ayacucho departments, Mezich is described by the Peruvian authorities as "mestizo, oval-shaped face, spaced eyebrows, brown hair, small mouth, straight nose, 1.69 m. tall, and weighing 70 kg."

Like Guzman, Mezich has never published theoretical articles, books or statements.

c) Others : Among the top leaders of Sendero are the following: Elisabeth Cardenas, "Betty"; Julio Casanova, an engineer known to have traveled to China in 1975, and a former teacher of Spanish at Ayacucho; Carlota Tello; Onidina Gonzalez; Nelly Cardenas; Jose Kulich; Victor Quintanilla; Augusta de la Torre de Guzman, Abimael's wife since 1953 and one of his first disciples.

Ideological Origin and Characteristic

Although a purist Maoist group, Sendero implicitly accepts some Castroite rural warfare premises, including the guerrilla nucleus as a replacement for the "vanguard" party. On the other hand, this is not, nor should it be construed, as an indication of Sendero's willingness to mitigate what it considers "true" Maoist theory and practice.

Since Sendero did not make any public statement on its aims or intentions until 1983, the only source for its ideology are the actions it takes and statements made by captured members.

To a large extent Sendero's ideology is similar to Mao Zedong's throughout the Cultural Revolution and Khmer Rouge's during their stay in power in Kampuchea between 1975-1978. The main tenets are total destruction of the market economy -- hence Sendero's "punishment," i.e., killing of peasants involved in trade and its destruction of money -- and the creation of an exclusively rural and collectivist economy of small cooperative and collective villages, all of which are expected to be completely self-sufficient.

It is significant, in terms of strategic and ultimate aims, that Sendero's first public statement of any length (on the fourth anniversary of the beginning of "armed struggle," May 19, 1980) ended with the claim that "everything is an illusion but power." That power is to be used to establish, exclusively through armed force, "the fourth stage of socialism." This implies the rejection of the traditional Soviet view that communism could only be established following a number of preparatory stages, including "bourgeois," "national-democratic," and "socialist" revolutions.

As the self-proclaimed Communist Party of Peru, Sendero implies that it (a) rejects the authenticity of other communist parties in the country, and (b) considers the existence of a party essential for success. With regard to its proclaimed social base of support, Sendero claims to represent the working class, the poor peasants, and the masses. But in fact it concentrates its recruiting, mobilization, and indoctrination efforts in the ranks of illiterate, non-Spanish speaking Indian peasants, and the (mostly Indian) slum dwellers of Lima and Callao, while its cadres are almost exclusively students, graduates, and teachers of the universities of Huamanga, Ayacucho, and Arequipa.

Peru - Group Sendero

- 530 -

The most obvious ideological characteristic of Sendero is its unique dogmatism. While it considers the Khmer Rouge, Maoism in its purest form (i.e., the Cultural Revolution period), and most likely the Stalinist Soviet Union of the early 1930s as acceptable models, it rejects all present-day Marxist regimes as reformist and treasonous, reserving its most vituperative attacks for Deng Hsiaoping's China. (Sendero did have ties with Albania from 1975 through 1977.) Although the party is led officially by "Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology and the guiding thoughts of President (sic) Gonzalo," it is clearly the latter that dominates its actions.

Program

a) Economic policies: Sendero's economic aims are the establishment of a totally collective national economy, based upon self-sufficient villages and the elimination of currency, banks, and financial services; reversion to barter; destruction of the industrial sector; and elimination of both normal internal and external trade. In areas under its control, there are known instances in which peasants were killed for using money or for cultivating areas larger than two hectares.

b) Social program : Claiming support by and speaking on behalf of the poor peasants, slum dwellers, and lumpenproletariat, Sendero advocates the complete destruction of the bourgeoisie, including the petty bourgeoisie, as a class. Literacy, in Spanish or Quechua, appears unnecessary, despite heavy Sendero use of teachers as cadres. Ideally, Sendero intends to return to pre-Colombian forms of social welfare based upon self-assistance at the community level.

c) Foreign policies : Sendero's known xenophobia and dogmatism indicate their desire for international isolation of Peru. Since accusing Enver Hoxha of "revisionism" and breaking ties with Albania in 1977, Sendero has not had any known ties with foreign governments.

Ideologues

Abimael Guzman appears to be Sendero's only source of ideological guidance, and his ideas were and still are transmitted mostly by verbal means to a small number of trusted lieutenants. Thus, the Peruvian government's claim that it has captured "the ideologist" of Sendero, Engineer Amillio Antonio Diaz Martinez, alias "Comrade Alonso," in December 1983 is excessive. At best, Diaz and other members of the National Directorate and Central Committee may explain and expand upon Guzman's directives and ideological decisions. The most important of those is Luis Kawata Guzman's colleague in the faculty of San Cristobal de Huamanga.

The main theoretical texts of Sendero were the two documents published by the Central Committee of Sendero in 1978 and 1979; Against the constitutionalist illusions and for the state of the new democracy, and Let's develop the growing popular protest!

The impact of Guzman's ideology is limited to his own group by the very dogmatism it manifests, and to Peruvians insofar as it draws from the unique Peruvian pre-Colombian experience. Despite these factors, small groups in other Andean countries, particularly Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador, are receptive to at least some of Sendero's ideas.

Propaganda

a) Content :

i) Addressed internal audience : Sendero's propaganda, "armed" or verbal, written or transmitted through captured radio stations, is directed toward the peasantry and the poorest urban elements. In the Andean departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurimac, most of it is in Quechua.

ii) Ideological content : The main objectives of Sendero's propaganda are: to encourage the peasants to take over land, to establish collective farms, to eliminate government representatives, and to reject any modernization of agriculture in its areas. Significantly, one of the "armed propaganda" actions involved the destruction of a model farm and the killing of expensive, improved, pure-bred cattle.

b) Means : The primary means of Sendero's propaganda is armed occupation of villages, forcible indoctrination of peasants, and the establishment of "revolutionary order" by killing reluctant civilians and government officials. Sendero has no regular publications, and its written propaganda is limited to small pamphlets and leaflets. From time to time radio stations are occupied and messages are transmitted calling for support for Sendero and praising Guzman. This has occurred both in the Andean Departments and in Lima (the case of Radio Melodia).

Views on Violence

Armed struggle, in Sendero's view, is the only path to communism, and it must be conducted as ruthlessly and widely as possible. As a Maoist group, Sendero supports the theory of protracted rural (and urban) warfare, or, as stated in its fourth anniversary statement, "It does not matter how long it takes. Those dressed in ragged clothes and without arms will win over the well armed . . . the path has begun, it will be long and difficult but victory will be decisive."

Peru - Group Sendero

- 533 -

Terrorism is used extensively to eliminate symbols of authority, such as local (mostly elected) officials, military officers, defectors, and unsympathetic peasants. As a method, terrorism is used both in the rural and remote areas and in the cities, including Lima.

The main premise of Sendero's approach to violence, as expressed in the Against the constitutionalist illusions . . . (April 1978) is that "The Peruvian State, as State, sustains itself, defends itself and develop itself by using violence; against this the people need revolutionary violence following the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside."

In Sendero's opinion, Peru lives in a "revolutionary situation," as the concept was defined by Lenin. Moreover, it is a "revolutionary situation in movement," which can and should be sharpened by violent means, following Mao's strategy.

The final decision to engage in revolutionary warfare was taken on April 19, 1980, at the Expanded Plenum of the Sendero Party.

Performance

a) Recruitment :

i) Recruitment of Sendero's initial core was done by or under the supervision of Guzman. It took place mostly at the University of Huamanga. Those cadres, in turn, became fluent in Quechua and recruited from among the illiterate Indians of the Andean communities. Teachers, large numbers of whom are Sendero cadres, were by far the most effective recruiting force. Most if not all cadres are Spanish-speaking, while a large number of ordinary members are Quechua-speaking peasants and slum dwellers.

ii) Most of Sendero's cadres, educated at Huamanga in the late 1960s and 1970s, are in their thirties or older. Ordinary members span all age groups, from teenagers to adults of over forty or even fifty years of age.

iii) Apparently some women have reached high positions within Sendero's leadership. Carlota Tello ("Camarada Carla") became one of Guzman's closest disciples. Maria Concepcion Urquiza Sanchez ("Elena") was a member of the Central Committee's Military Command.

b) Indoctrination :

i) Forced Study : Sendero practices forced indoctrination of peasants in the villages it takes over. Most of the cadres, judging by their ferocity and total commitment to the party and to "Gonzalo," are brainwashed effectively, e.g., a Tineo Suasnabar became an executioner after less than two years of membership and, even when captured, proclaimed that he was not a murderer but a follower of the party's orders. Most members are periodically and repeatedly submitted to reindoctrination lessons, most often in "popular schools."

Use of Schools/Universities

Sendero is the product of the University of Huamanga, as well as of university extremism in general. The use of educational institutions was essential for its very existence. Even today large numbers of students at the universities in the Andean regions are recruited by Sendero cadres still teaching there. Highly influential leaders such as Maria Concepcion Urquiza Sanchez, appear in charge of university recruitment and indoctrination. This is another indication of the importance Sendero gives to the role of higher education institutions as a recruiting ground. Some foreign nationals, teaching at Ayacucho and Huamanga, were accused by the Peruvian authorities of contributing to Sendero's recruiting efforts.

Use of Religious Institutions

As a group, Sendero uses no religious institutions for recruiting or indoctrination purposes. However, many (overwhelmingly foreign) priests and nuns were accused by the government of Peru of actively using their institutions for recruiting and training on behalf of Sendero, and many were expelled for this very reason. Among those involved were West European (Belgian, Spanish, Italian, and French) and North American members of the clergy, some of whom were former collaborators of the Marxist-Leninist Allende regime in Chile and who took refuge in Peru after September 1973.

Use of Foreign Cadres or Supporters

While Sendero has no known foreign member among its top leaders, there are instances where West European radicals are used to promote the party's aims. The extent to which these sympathizers are allowed to meet important leaders is limited, but they are clearly allowed to help, mostly in recruiting and infiltrating legitimate institutions, as well as for intelligence purposes.

Military Structure

a) Force type : Sendero divides its forces into discrete types with distinct tasks. The actual cadres and verified militants are used for specialized attacks against economic (roads, railroads, hotels, electric plants) and military targets. Urban commandos are used for attacks in Lima, Callao, Arequipa, Cuzco, and Ayacucho, terrorist in nature (such as against party headquarters). Local sympathizers are used for maintaining control over villages. In addition, highly motivated small groups with special training are used for the murder of prominent government or opposition members and for the "execution" of alleged "traitors" to

Sendero (Two defenseless nurses were murdered in Ayacucho in 1983). Various combinations of these types of force are also used to protect the few "liberated areas."

b) Political control : In addition to the careful and lengthy process of recruiting its cadres, Sendero maintains control over its militants mostly by secrecy, a highly centralized decision-making process (even at the level of field operations), and a relatively effective system of internal intelligence. Thus, planners of urban operations are watched by "ordinary" agents (i.e., disguised and directly linked to the leadership). At the same time, operational and political leaders tend to coincide in terms of personality, tasks, and links to the supreme leadership.

Indoctrination schools are known to exist, and their graduates tend to receive larger responsibilities than ordinary members or even older cadres without such qualifications.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation :

i) Rank and file : Most ordinary Senderistas appear to be either brainwashed students or fanaticized peasants, mostly from the Andean areas. The former seem aware that, with poor professional qualifications, (one reason for this is the politicized environment) and a background from Ayacucho or Huamanga, they have no hope for a job fitting their expectations. The latter, conditioned by traditional blind obedience to community life, fight vengefully against the modern, Spanish-speaking society they cannot understand and enviously against the Indians or non-Indians who succeeded in adapting to that society. At least some Indian groups joined Sendero because of historical hatreds against their anti-Sendero neighboring communities.

ii) Leadership : Since in Sendero's view "all is illusion but power," the leaders of the group are motivated by the desire for absolute power, whether for personal reasons or, more likely, for reasons having to do with a fanatical belief in their mission and their right to change the Peruvian society.

b) Performance-Combat ability :

i) In direct clashes with the Peruvian military or the specialized anti-insurgency "Sinchis," Sendero has about the same lopsided number of casualties as most guerrilla groups. Against police forces or in the urban environment, the group often shows extremely high levels of professionalism, excellent intelligence, and high motivation.

ii) Discipline : Sendero's ability to maintain internal discipline is among the highest in the world's guerrilla spectrum. This is largely explained by the strong indoctrination of all members and by the ability of the group to kill wavering or unreliable members and cadres. Thus, commitment and fear contribute to the high levels of discipline manifested throughout Sendero's violent campaigns.

iii) Weapons sophistication : Since Sendero is not known to receive any significant support from the outside, and its connections with the drug traffic network appear in their initial stages, the group's weapons are limited to what can be captured from the Peruvian police and military forces. Particular importance is given to the use of dynamite, the easiest weapon to come by in the mining-oriented country of Peru. As their drug connections develop the trend moves toward more and more sophisticated weapons. Thus, the ability of buying weapons on the international markets expands.

iv) Endurance : Despite relative successes by the Peruvian government's military and the use of the emergency laws in the Andean departments, Sendero has been able to expand its operations. On the other hand,

Peru - Group Sendero

- 538 -

growing disaffection with Sendero's heavy-handed treatment of peasant communities may, and apparently has begun to, result in intelligence leaks to the military, desertions, and ultimately loss of valuable cadres.

v) Leadership in combat : The highest ranking leaders of the group are not directly involved in operations that may risk their being killed or captured. Neither Guzman nor Mezich are known to have been directly involved in field operations, but other relatively high ranking leaders were and some were captured.

vi) Desertion rate : Sendero's loss of militants and cadres through desertion is extremely low, nevertheless many militants and even important cadres were not only captured but also cooperating with the authorities, particularly since 1983. Among the peasant sympathizers or villages controlled by Sendero, the rate of desertion has grown dramatically, particularly with the increased lynchings of Sendero militants since the beginning of 1983. Reprisals against the villagers only resulted in more disaffection and growing intelligence help to the military against the guerrillas.

Training

a) Place : Almost all of Sendero's training takes place in the Andean departments of Peru; however, in 1983 a training camp was discovered in Bolivia's Luribay region. It was led by a Sendero member but included Bolivian nationals. The discovery and dismantling of the camp apparently led to reprisals against Bolivia, manifested by a number of bombings in La Paz.

Sendero has a number of "military schools" in the Andes, the first being opened by Guzman himself on 19 April 1980, the day the final decision to start the revolutionary war was taken. The school was named ILA'80 (Inicio la Lucha Armada en el ano 80 -- the beginning of the armed struggle in the year 1980).

b) Trainers : Most trainers are Peruvian; although there are rumors that foreigners, including at different times Chinese, Albanians, and Latin Americans, were involved.

Financial Resources

a) National origin : Probably all or at least the overwhelming majority of Sendero's money comes from the peasant communities it controls, terrorizes, or threatens. Connections between Sendero and the Peruvian "narcotraficantes" were dismissed until the latter part of 1983, but it now appears that they are a reality. Arms are bought from outside and transmitted through Chilean ports (under Bolivian authority) and Bolivian territory, a link possible only with extensive ties with drug and arms smugglers.

b) Means : Sendero never kidnapped for ransom. It did, however, kidnap members of the media in order to have its statements aired. Bank robberies are also rare, due to the group's ideological hostility to ward money transactions. Most of Sendero's money comes from "voluntary" donations, i.e., extracted by force from peasants.

During the past two years Sendero has increasingly used "taxes" and drug revenues to replenish its coffers, although it is unlikely that it has become directly involved in drug trafficking. The amounts involved are still relatively modest, judging by the group's modest and limited level of weapons.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : It is clear that Sendero's ability to arm itself at this time is completely dependent upon its ability to capture weapons and other military supplies from the military and police. This, in turn, limits the volume of weapons Sendero has at its disposal and makes the supply issue an unreliable one.

Peru - Group Sendero
- 540 -

b) Origin : Most of Sendero's weapons, at least until 1983 when drug ties and therefore higher amounts were available for international arms market purchases, were obtained from attacks against police and army garrisons, individuals, and mining warehouses (for dynamite).

Level of Popular Support

Sendero's support comes from a number of distinct groups -- social, ethnic, professional. None are large but most are important. The most supportive are the teachers, particularly those of Indian origin and with poor fluency in Spanish. In addition many intellectuals, some from the coastal areas but most from the Andean highlands, and even more students threw their lot with Guzman. A number of unemployed and fundamentally unemployable graduates of Ayacucho, Huamanga, and Arequipa universities also became cadres of Sendero. Desperate peasants in the Andes, some or most of whom have no ideological conviction but have a vague hope for a better future, were also attracted to Sendero. Also many middle- and upper-middle-class women forced themselves to believe that Sendero's ideal world would provide them with the influence, importance, and decision-making power they felt should be theirs. Altogether, Sendero is the representative and result of social elements or groups that feel, rightly or erroneously, that they were pushed toward the fringes of the modern Peruvian society. The most important were the cholos. These upwardly mobile Quechua-speakers, generally young, considered themselves discriminated against by the Spanish-speakers, of the coastal areas, even after receiving a university degree. (The degree, however, was clearly of inferior value.)

The electoral support Sendero may receive is purely a matter of speculation. The Bandera Roja Maoist party, from which Sendero largely originated, is a negligible force in Peruvian politics.

Peru - Group Sendero
- 541 -

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : The movement seems to have no ties with other leftist groups. Sendero's uncompromising Maoist radicalism, combined with Pol Pot-ism and Andean mysticism, contribute to a growing exclusiveness and isolation. Certain sympathizers of the group publish articles in the leftist newspapers, El Diario de Marka (Lima).

b) Regional : In October 1983 the Bolivian government arrested a number of Bolivians and Peruvians in the area of Luribay. A few weeks later, bombs claimed indirectly (through flags and emblems) by Sendero exploded in La Paz. In November 1983 a Colombian group claiming the name of Sendero Luminoso attacked Puerto Chavez, two months after an individual carrying Sendero propaganda and symbols was arrested by the Colombian authorities in the Cauca province, close to the Ecuadoran and Peruvian borders.

c) Continental : Despite Castro's denials (December 1982) and those of all other known Marxist leaders in Peru, Cuba, and in Latin America, the Colombian military claimed that in 1983 Sendero established a high degree of coordination with Salvadoran, Colombian, and Venezuelan Marxist guerrilla groups, during a meeting in Esmeralda, Ecuador. In addition, Sendero's followers have appeared under the same name in Venezuela, Colombia, and Bolivia.

Extent and Area Under Guerrilla Control

The only known area Sendero has declared a "Liberated area" is the Chacapunco (Huancavelica Dept) zone of the eastern valley of the Andes, a densely forested region. It is the same area known to Peruvians as a zone of heavy "narcotraficante." It is poorly inhabited and economically irrelevant. Even there, however, Sendero was unable to protect its controlled population against army attacks during 1983. A number of villages in various parts of the Apurimac,

Huancavelica, and Ayacucho departments were under Sendero control for extended periods, but nowhere could Sendero establish a permanent structure of militants able to survive military and police activities.

The Senderistas claim to practice a policy of "economic self-sufficiency" and controlled production in the "liberated zones." The communities they temporarily control were ordered to plant only enough for their own needs, to avoid surpluses, and to stop all trade with the cities. Each community must be self-sufficient, so that the money economy will disappear. Sendero Luminoso imposed this policy by violent means and provoked discontent among the peasants. Indications of collapse are clearly manifest in Sendero's immediate history. Because of their secretive nature and highly centralized structure, local leaders ("Gonzalo's" representatives) have growing power. The Sendero losses, through death or capture, may result in the collapse of whole cell networks. Moreover, public manifestations of Sendero's offer of a two-year truce in December 1983 in Ayacucho, followed by denials and renewed "offensive" indicate at least serious communications problems, if not major dissension within the group. Moreover, Guzman's role in the party is impossible to replace, and rumors of his death or illness can only weaken discipline, morale, and unity within the group.

Indications of Loss of Support

The increasing number of peasant lynchings of Sendero collaborators, and the killing of Indian peasants by Sendero for "treason" or an unwillingness to support the group, indicate that the level of support among Indian peasant communities has peaked and is declining. Moreover, because the legal Left in Peru has won municipal elections (including Lima and Ayacucho) in 1984, they are much less interested in using anti-Sendero operations as pretexts to attack President Belaunde Terry.

Peru - Group Sendero

- 543 -

Sendero's killing of successful leftist candidates during the elections and its practice of mutilating peasant voters, only alienated them from the Peruvian Left, including the Marxist one.

Remarks

According to certain reports published by the end of 1983, four towns of Tayacaja Province, in the southern department of Huancavelica, have been seized and declared "liberated areas" by groups of the Sendero Luminoso movement, and here the Senderistas continued their practices of "punishing the traitors." Three peasant leaders were murdered in December 1983 (Huacamocha, 520 km northeast of Lima) after a brief "summary trial." The group seems to be the source of the attack on the PRC Embassy in Lima -- it is known that Shining Path has always claimed to be Maoist and opposed to the current PRC government, which the terrorist organization regards as "traitorous and revisionist." Another element in the strategy of Sendero Luminoso is the alternation of violent attacks, with apparent moments of silence and even readiness for a truce: in December 1983 the guerrillas draped white flags embroidered with hammers and sickles in Andean villages in an apparent call for a truce with the government following the capture of one of their top leaders (Antonio Diaz Martinez, one of the three top leaders of the group). In December 1983 two armed men belonging to the Sendero movement attacked the home of a retired Army Colonel in Bogota (Colombia) and stole several weapons from his collection. Some time before this attack, the newspaper El Comercio of Lima, Peru, had warned in an editorial that the guerrilla group had expanded into several South American countries, including Colombia. A new Colombian subversive group, called Sendero Luminoso Party, attacked the town of Puerto Claver (November 1983). The possibility that the group may be a faction of the Peruvian main Senderista

Peru - Group Sendero
- 544 -

organization was not discarded. The Shining Path's presence in Colombia confirms that the Latin American guerrillas have advanced toward "internationalization."

Uruguay - Group MLN
- 545 -

Group or Organization Name

a) In language of country : Movimiento de Liberación Nacional

b) In English : National Liberation Movement

c) Acronym or known name : MLN, the Tupamaros. The name Tupamaros is derived from the Incan prince, Tupac Amaru, who led a revolt against the Spanish government in the late 18th century.

Country of Operation

a) Principal : Uruguay

b) Others : The Tupamaros began to cooperate with the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN) in 1970. Militants of the MLN have been involved in other Latin American guerrilla and terrorist operations, e.g., with Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The Tupamaros first signed their name to a manifesto in 1965, when they tried to justify the bombing of the Bayer plant in Montevideo as a protest against American involvement in Vietnam. Actually, the movement was founded in 1962 by militants of mixed background. Some were radical cane cutters (former unionists of the northern department of Artigas); others were political leftist who joined the movement following a schism within the Uruguayan Socialist Party and the humiliating defeat of the left-wing parties in the 1962 elections. These dissidents were converted to the theory of armed struggle against the democratic institutions of the country.

Uruguay - Group MLN

- 546 -

Front Organizations and Auxiliaries

During the national election of November 1971, the Tupamaros were represented in the Broad Front by the 26 March Movement of Independents.

Membership

a) Active members : Estimates of MLN membership (in 1971) ranged from 200-400 "clandestine combatants", to 1500.

b) Sympathizers : By the end of 1972 several thousand suspects had been arrested. According to a French source, there were about 4,000 sympathizers.

c) Foreign members : Argentine, Bolivian, and Brazilian, militants were involved in Tupamaro operations.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Raul Sendic

b) Place of birth : Flores Province, Uruguay

c) Date of birth : 1925

d) Education : Raul Sendic abandoned his law studies in 1960 and went to work as a cane cutter among the impoverished sugar beet laborers of the northern department of Artigas.

e) Political career : As a student Sendic joined the Socialist Party of Uruguay (PSU). In 1958 he represented the Uruguayan Socialists at the Congress of the Socialist International in Paris. For some months he was in Cuba; then in 1960 he moved to the northern region of Uruguay to organize the sugar plantation workers. In 1962 Sendic gave the MLN its first organizational form (among the rural sugar cane workers) and led the first march of the sugar cane workers from Artigas to Montevideo. His first guerrilla operation was a raid on the Swiss Rifle

Uruguay - Group MLN

- 547 -

Club in July 1963. The police identified him as the ring leader and he fled to Argentina. In 1964 he joined in a second march of sugar cane workers. Arrested in 1970, Sendic escaped in 1971. He was arrested again in 1973, and is presently in jail.

f) Character : Sendic is an intransigent militant, apparently modest and able to establish warm personal relations with other members of the organization. He has been extremely influential among the cane workers from Artigas. Sendic was personally involved in some dangerous guerrilla actions and showed daring and organizational ability. He has been described as a leader who is more pragmatic than ideological or doctrinaire.

Ideological Origin

Although the MLN pretended to be Marxist-Leninist in political ideology, the movement was heavily influenced by Castroism and anarcho-Marxism (Abraham Guillén's philosophy of urban guerrilla). Like other urban guerrilla groups, the Tupamaros were influenced by Carlos Marighella's glorification of violence as the basic means of confronting and/or changing the established political structure. One of the basic tenets of Marighella's doctrine was the role of the urban guerrilla as a destabilizing (disintegrating) factor: "The urban guerrilla is an implacable enemy of the government and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and the men who dominate the country and exercise power. The principal task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear out, to demoralize the militarists, the military dictatorship and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the North Americans, the foreign managers and the . . . upper class." The Tupamaros' reluctance to articulate cogent, systematic political programs stemmed from the group's lack of interest in

theoretical elaborations. For the Tupamaros, the Cuban revolutionary pattern offered the guidelines for all further leftist groups in Latin America. As one guerrilla spokesman said in 1968, "It is not by carefully elaborating political programs that one makes the revolution. The basic principles of a socialist revolution have been established and are carried further in Cuba. It is sufficient to accept these and to follow the way of armed struggle that will make it possible to put them into practice."

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The Tupamaros advocated agrarian reform, the "socialization" of foreign trade and the domestic economy, and the expropriation of foreign capital.

b) Social program : Their fundamental objective was to establish a socialist society, actually an authoritarian system modeled on Castro's regime. They also spoke about the necessity of redistributing national wealth. Their purpose was "to dethrone those who are determined to remain in power" and they tried to radicalize trade unions. The group was quick to fraternize with all those who considered themselves injured by the regime.

c) Foreign policy : In 1968 the MLN stated one of its chief objectives: "to establish connections with other revolutionary movements in Latin America for continental action." The Tupamaros strongly supported the Cuban regime, and temporarily expressed sympathy for Chinese politics and ideology at the time of the Cultural Revolution.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : In March 1971, the Tupamaros issued their "Program of the MLN Revolutionary Government" mentioning very briefly the basic points of its revolutionary strategy: agrarian reform, nationalizations, and expropriations.

b) Social program : The Tupamaros called for the building of a socialist society in Uruguay, the end of the "bourgeois capitalist regime", and "the suppression of exploitation, poverty and injustice."

c) Foreign policy : In early 1974, two years after it had been crippled domestically, the MLN joined the Bolivian ELN, the Argentine ERP, and the Chilean MIR and formed the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (JCR). The Tupamaros support the idea of a Latin American continental revolution. Some Tupamaro militants fought on the FSLN side in Nicaragua in 1978-1979.

Propaganda

The Tupamaros launched not only a guerrilla war against the established government, but also a propaganda war. The main targets of their propaganda, particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, were certain sectors of the working class (the cane cutters), middle-class intellectuals, and university students. Ideologically, the Tupamaro propaganda consisted of simplistic slogans calling for the destruction of the "bourgeois capitalist order." The Tupamaros relied on two basic techniques: armed propaganda and the construction of "countermedia." To broadcast their own version of events, the Tupamaros used a mobile radio transmitter. They also interrupted regular radio transmissions and took over cinemas, workers' canteens, and other public meeting places to deliver revolutionary speeches to a captive audience. "Armed propaganda" is essentially the attempt to demonstrate the strength of the subversive group and the weakness

Uruguay - Group MLN
- 550 -

of the government. According to Régis Debray, Guevara's friend and disciple, "the destruction of a troop transport truck or the public execution of a police torturer is more effective propaganda than a hundred speeches." One of the most dramatic instances of armed propaganda staged by the Tupamaros was the occupation of the town of Pando on the occasion of the second anniversary of "Che" Guevara's death. Statements of the Tupamaros were issued in leftist newspapers and magazines -- Al Rojo Vivo, Montevideo; Tricontinental, Havana, etc.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The Tupamaros criticized the orthodox Uruguayan Communist Party for "reformism" and bourgeois proclivities. They favored the theory of urban guerrilla, and were convinced that an armed revolutionary group has greater possibilities for converting itself into a powerful army than "a group that limits itself to issuing revolutionary 'positions'." They aimed at creating "a revolutionary consciousness in the population," through spectacular acts of violence.

Performance

a) Recruitment

i) Social groups : In a "manifesto" published in 1970, the group described itself as "an armed organization of students, workers, employees, and intellectuals" but students were the real basis for the MLN. Police dossiers on arrested Tupamaros revealed the bourgeois origin of a majority of the guerrillas, and the fact that many of them had led double lives as highly regarded professional men. Captured Tupamaros included prominent professors, engineers, architects, and scions of wealthy families.

ii) Age groups : The members of the MLN were mainly young people, between 18 and 30.

iii) Sex targeting : Numerous women were involved in Tupamaros operations.

b) Indoctrination

i) Use of schools/universities : The Tupamaros were extremely active among university students in Montevideo.

ii) Use of religious institutions : The Tupamaros received some support from the lower ranks of the clergy, although not on the same scale as in Brazil or Argentina. A priest was killed in fighting with the police in November 1969.

iii) Use of unions : The sugar industry, where Sendic was active, was a basic target for MLN propaganda and actions.

Military Structure

Interlocking cell structure enabled the guerrillas to survive many police raids. At the height of guerrilla operations, the movement was composed of "firing groups" of four or five men, including a group leader who maintained contact with the man above him in the guerrilla hierarchy. This simple organization meant that the capture of one cell -- or the presence of a police agent in one group -- could only do limited damage to the movement as a whole. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Tupamaros organized so-called "support committees" and mobilized large numbers of men for a single operation (the occupation of the town of Pando in 1969).

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The MLN was able to project a Robin Hood image, combining brazen robbery with tactics to isolate the government.

ii) Leadership : The leaders of the MLN aimed to create a revolutionary "consciousness" in the population through actions of the armed groups or other means. Their objective was to produce material bases for a violent revolutionary uprising.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : Three kinds of actions were carried out by the Tupamaros (and acknowledged by them): "tactical actions," aimed at obtaining supplies, "population actions," and "actions against the regime," especially against "the forces of repression". For several years the MLN was the most effective guerrilla group in Latin America.

ii) Discipline : The structure of the MLN was conceived according to the rules of military discipline.

iii) Weapon sophistication : The Tupamaros resorted to small arms, home-made grenades, and weapons captured from government forces.

iv) Leadership in combat : Raul Sendic was involved in some of the most spectacular actions. He was one of the 106 persons who fled through a tunnel on 6 September 1971.

v) Desertion rate : In August 1973 the MLN acknowledged a "temporary defeat," blaming it on an underestimation of the enemy, too little reliance on "the people," and betrayals. Numerous arrests between 1969 and 1973 contributed to the continual weakening of the MLN. (Sendic was arrested in 1970.)

Training

The Tupamaros were trained both in Uruguay and in foreign countries (Argentina, Cuba). There is evidence that the Tupamaros provided training for guerrillas from neighboring countries; the Argentine terrorists in particular have been following their example.

Financial Resources

Political kidnappings were used by the Tupamaros for both financial and propagandistic purposes. Among the most spectacular kidnappings organized by them was that of the Brazilian consul and an American political adviser (Dan Mitrione) in July 1970. The outcome of that affair was the murder of Dan Mitrione and the release of the Brazilian diplomat for a ransom of more than \$250,000. The Tupamaros financed themselves by the method of expropriations inspired by the Bolshevik pattern before 1917. When the Tupamaros raided the lending institution Financera Monty early in 1969, they seized not only cash and securities but some secret account books that provided evidence of the misuse of public funds. The scandal that ensued led to the resignation of their Minister of Agriculture.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : The equipment of the Tupamaros was adjusted to the requirements of urban guerrilla. The group organized assaults on army training barracks. They made use of rifles, machine guns, and explosives.

Level of Popular Support

a) Total group and front organizations : The Tupamaros supported the Broad Front in the November 1971 national elections despite their conviction that revolution could be achieved only through armed struggle.

b) Local support : The Tupamaros found support among the students, intellectuals, and "radical" middle-class groups (particularly in Montevideo).

External Support

The MLN established close ties with other Latin American guerrilla movements, especially those which founded the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (JCR) in early 1974. The MLN exploits were widely publicized by Cuban media. The group maintained political and financial relations with other urban guerrilla movements (the Argentine ERP) and radical-leftist parties (Chilean MIR).

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National : The Tupamaros criticized the "legalist" views of the "traditionalist" political parties. They rejected the strategy of the Socialist Party and denounced the "reformism" and the "petit-bourgeois character" of the political line promoted by the pro-Moscow Communist Party. Without accusing the Communist Party of being "anti-revolutionary," the MLN refused to share the "gradualist" position. In December 1970, the MLN announced its support for the Broad Front, while expressing reservations concerning an electoral strategy.

ii) Regional : The Bolivian guerrilla Oswaldo "Chato" Peredo acknowledged in 1970 that he had both cooperated with and received support from

the MLN. In a statement confirmed by the Tupamaros in August 1970, he stressed the necessity of developing "an internationally integrated struggle" reaching across "artificial borders". He invoked a new kind of solidarity which entailed an interchange of militant members. The Tupamaros also established close contacts with Argentine terrorist groups. The members of the Argentine ERP have even imitated the Tupamaros in using a five-pointed red star as their emblem.

iii) Continental : In early 1974, two years after it had been crippled domestically, the MLN joined the Bolivian ELN, the Chilean MIR, and the Argentine ERP in forming the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee (JCR). As early as 1968 the MLN stated that one of its chief objectives was "to establish connections with other revolutionary movements of Latin America for continental action.

b) Type

i) Training : Tupamaros reportedly trained students in Costa Rica.

ii) Financial : The MLN offered financial assistance to other Latin American extremist groups.

iii) Logistical : The strategy developed by the Tupamaros functioned as a catalyst for other guerrilla groups (Bolivia, Argentina, and Venezuela).

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

The Tupamaros generally sought to avoid the verbal conflicts that divided leftists in many other countries.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

According to one MLN leader ("Urbano"), the arrests during and after the July-August kidnappings (1970), particularly Raul Sendic's capture, dealt the

Uruguay - Group MLN
- 556 -

organization "a hard blow". Sendic had been the intellect, organizer, and inspirer of the MLN.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

By the end of 1972 several thousand suspects had been arrested, more than 200 hideouts and storehouses had been raided, and the Tupamaros themselves acknowledged that they had suffered a serious setback in terms of personnel, supplies, and morale. In August 1973 the MLN expressed a need to reorganize after a "temporary defeat". Although some individual Tupamaros and the character of the MLN experience continued to exert an influence on groups in other countries in the years that followed, the guerrillas ceased to play an important role in Uruguay by early 1976. The Tupamaros had been effectively dismantled as an organization.

Remarks

The strategic views of the Tupamaros, crucial to any understanding of the urban guerrilla in Latin America, were summarized in an interview published by the Chilean Castroite journal Punto Final (2 July 1968, supplement) entitled 30 Questions to a Tupamaro (30 Preguntas a un Tupamaro). The Tupamaros argued that armed struggle accelerates and precipitates mass movement, citing as examples the Chinese and Cuban experiences: "At this point in history no one can argue against the premise that an armed group, no matter how small, has greater possibilities of successfully converting itself into a great, powerful army than a group which limits itself to proclaiming revolutionary 'positions'." Implicit in this statement is the guerrilla's belief that armed struggle is the most effective revolutionary way to overturn "bourgeois order" and to found a "socialist society."

Uruguay - Group MLN
- 557 -

This explained the reluctance of the MLN to indulge in the "legalist" approach promoted by the "institutional" Left, i.e., the Socialist and the Communist parties. The MLN tried to become the armed vanguard of the "Uruguayan revolution." While the group revered Che Guevara's personality, it did not share his opinions regarding rural guerrilla activity. The whole strategy of the MLN turned out to be the result of a terrible misinterpretation of Uruguayan reality. Instead of bringing about the long-expected "radicalization of the masses," it eventually forced the military to take over and put an end to the political chaos of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Tupamaros were indeed the main and the most successful enemies of political democracy in Uruguay.

Uruguay - Group FARO
- 558 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Orientales
- b) In English : The Uruguayan Revolutionary Armed Forces
- c) Acronym or known name : FARO

Country of Operation

Uruguay

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The FARO was formed in 1969 by militants of small pro-Chinese and Castroite groups.

Membership

The FARO had less than 100 members.

Ideological Origin

The FARO was founded by leftist militants disappointed with the "reformist" approach of the pro-Soviet Uruguayan Communist party. The ideology of the group was mainly influenced by Castroite and Maoist theses and was committed to the ideology of urban guerrilla warfare. The group was totally dismantled in the mid-1970s.

Original Program

a) Social program : FARO attacked the "reformism" of the pro-Soviet Communist Party. It advocated the strategy of urban guerrilla and insisted on the necessity of the transformation of the armed struggle "into a people's war."

Uruguay - Group FARO

- 559 -

b) Foreign policy : In its foreign policy stances, the FARO expressed strong anti-U.S. attitudes and voiced total support for the Castroite revolutionary strategy.

Propaganda

In its calls for popular insurrection, the FARO insisted that students and middle-class intellectuals participate in the guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrilla was described as the catalyst of a larger "popular revolt." The group's official organ in the early 1970s was El Guerrillero Oriental.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The group's program stated (July 1970), "Two forms of struggle coexist in Uruguay today: the inferior forms of traditional peaceful struggle and the superior forms of increasing armed firepower. Neither should be underestimated, but it must be made clear which will predominate increasingly in the future: the armed struggle transformed into a people's war." The FARO adopted the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare and was committed to both terrorist and mobilizational approaches.

Performance

The FARO recruited mainly among middle-class intellectuals, students, and young workers. The group was particularly influential within student federations.

Military Structure

The FARO established its own network of urban guerrilla commands and was organized in urban cells. The political-military structure of the group was

Uruguay - Group FARO
- 560 -

dismantled during the anti-terrorist campaign in the mid-1970s. In their actions, the FARO members made use of small arms and home-made explosives.

Training

The FARO militants were trained in Uruguay and in Cuba.

Financial Resources

The group benefited from substantial Cuban financial support. As a terrorist organization, the FARO organized kidnappings and bank robberies. It also received various voluntary contributions.

Equipment and Supplies

The FARO received equipment and supplies from Cuba and other leftist groups in Uruguay and Latin America. The group organized armed assaults on military garrisons as well.

Level of Popular Support

FARO was a relatively small leftist group, without significant influence. It exerted some influence among young leftist intellectuals, but it was not able to mobilize wide popular support.

External Support

The FARO received consistent political, logistical, and financial support from Cuba. Other Latin American guerrilla movements gave political and financial assistance, e.g., the Argentine Montoneros.

Uruguay - Group FARO
- 561 -

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National : The FARO developed contacts and cooperated with the Tupamaros.

ii) Regional : The group had connections with the Bolivian ELN and the Argentine Montoneros.

iii) Continental : The FARO maintained close relations with Cuba.

b) Extrahemispheric : The group had connections with China, though it is difficult to assess their extent and precise nature.

Remarks

The FARO experience in Uruguay is indicative of the fate of certain small Castroite organizations in the mid-1970s. Involved in bloody urban guerrilla operations, the group became a target for a military anti-terrorist campaign and was completely annihilated. Far from being able to engender an "era of social turmoil," the FARO actions betrayed the alienation and despair of a small group of middle-class intellectuals.

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
- b) In English : The Movement of the Revolutionary Left
- c) Acronym or known name : MIR

Country of Operation

Venezuela

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The MIR was founded in April 1960 as a result of a split within the Democratic Action Party (Acción Democrática-AD). The origin of this conflict was the growing discontent of some left-wing leaders with the orientation promoted by Rómulo Betancourt. The founders of the MIR accused Betancourt of "betrayal of revolutionary ideals" and complicity with "U.S. imperialism." Indeed, the effect of the Cuban revolution among Venezuelan left-wing oriented members of the political elite resulted in the creation of the MIR.

Membership

The MIR had approximately 8,000 militants in 1978. There were also several thousands sympathizers.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : Moisés Moleiro
- b) Date of birth : 1937
- c) Political career : Born to a middle-class family, Moisés Moleiro became acting Secretary-General of the MIR in 1968 (while Simón Mérida and Américo

Venezuela - Group MIR
- 563 -

Martin were in jail). He later joined the Antonio José de Sucre Front, where Carlos Betancourt remained the military commander. After 1969 he returned to legality. He is currently the leader of the MIR-Moleiro faction.

d) Publications : Moleiro is the author of La Izquierda y su proceso (The Left and its Trial) 1977 and El Partido del Pueblo (The People's Party), 1978.

e) Character : Moleiro was initially fascinated by the Cuban revolution and the Marxist outlook. Later, he grew increasingly disappointed with Castro's adventurism and pro-Soviet line.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Américo Martin

b) Political career : Born to a middle-class family, Martin was acting Secretary-General of the MIR during the 1960s. He was arrested in 1968. Together with Moleiro, he returned to legality after 1969 and abandoned the guerrilla struggle. After the split in 1979, he became the leader of the MIR-Américo faction of the movement.

c) Publications : Américo Martin is author of Conversaciones con Alfredo Peña, Editorial Ateneo, Caracas, 1978.

d) Character : Ambitious and extremely active, he refused to share power with Moleiro, preferring the division of the movement.

Ideological Origin

Initially a liberal democratic group, the MIR became increasingly committed to violence and revolutionary struggle. The group embraced Castroite ideals and began to profess the postulates of Marxism-Leninism.

Venezuela - Group MIR
- 564 -

Current Ideological Orientation

By the mid-1960s the MIR was an avowedly Marxist-Leninist organization. After the 1980 split, the court awarded the party name to the Moleiro faction. It felt that Moleiro's faction better represented the orthodox Marxist-Leninist position of the MIR, which advocated "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The MIR advocates the Marxist-Leninist economic program: agrarian reform, nationalizations, and a policy of extensive industrialization.

b) Social program : The MIR program describes the "revolutionary war" as a "war for national liberation from imperialism."

c) Foreign policy : The MIR expresses solidarity with the Cuban revolution and support for the foreign policy of the Soviet bloc, although it condemned the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moleiro was critical of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The MIR shares the economic program of the Marxist-Leninist Left: agrarian reform, industrialization, and nationalizations.

b) Social program : By the mid-1970s the MIR had regained its legality and was represented in the national legislature. It currently supports a social program less dogmatic than its program in the 1960s.

c) Foreign policy : The group expresses solidarity with Cuba, the Soviet bloc and "national liberation movements." It supports the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the leftist rebels in El Salvador.

Ideologues

a) Name : Moisés Moleiro

b) Publications: He published two books : La Izquierda y su proceso (The Left and its Trial), Ed. Centauro; Caracas, 1977, and "El Partido del Pueblo," (The People's Party), Vadell Hermanos Editores, Caracas, 1978.

c) Impact (internal) : Moleiro's ideas were particularly influential among the members of the left-wing radical groups in the universities.

Propaganda

During the 1960s, the MIR propaganda consisted of calls for armed struggle and revolutionary warfare. Its official organ was Izquierda (The Left). The group also issued leaflets, especially on student campuses (Caracas, Maracaibo, Merida).

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The MIR began as a Castroite political group, deeply committed to guerrilla warfare. By the mid-1970s it had abandoned the guerrilla strategy and regained its legality. A segment of the "official" Venezuelan left, the MIR is not at the present time involved in insurgent or terrorist activities. During the 1960s, the group tried to organize a Cuban-Venezuelan guerrilla force and supported the creation of the eastern guerrilla front, led by Carlos Betancourt.

Performance

a) Recruitment

i) Social groups : During the guerrilla years, the peasants, the students, and the intellectuals were the main groups of recruitment.

Venezuela - Group MIR

- 566 -

ii) Age groups : During the guerrilla years, the average age of the MIR combatants was between twenty and twenty-five years.

b) Indoctrination : The MIR devoted considerable attention to winning the support of the Venezuelan students (Caracas, Mérida). It organized the so-called First Latin American Student Conference (1968). During the 1970s, it managed to control the FCU (the Venezuelan Federation of University Centers).

Military Structure

The MIR attempted to create its own guerrilla front. It also organized a network of underground urban cells (Caracas, Mérida).

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : MIR militants were motivated by dissatisfaction with the policies promoted by the Democratic Action Party; the Cuban success; and an atmosphere of leftist contamination in Latin America after the Cuban revolution.

ii) Leadership: The MIR leaders were inspired and energized by the willingness to establish a socialist society through violent-revolutionary means; the solidarity with Castro's Cuba and fascination with the guerrilla revolutionary strategy.

b) Performance

i) Weapon sophistication : Weapons (rifles, machine guns, dynamite) were captured from military garrisons and supplied by Cuba.

ii) Leadership in combat : MIR leaders abandoned the guerrilla fronts after the defeat in the late 1960s-early 1970s.

Training

MIR militants were trained in Cuba.

Financial Resources

During the years of guerrilla struggle the MIR received material support from Cuba. Financial resources also came from voluntary contributions and certain front organizations.

Equipment and Supplies

The MIR used rifles, machine guns, and dynamite.

Level of Popular Support

a) Local support : The MIR was influential especially among the university students. In 1978 the MIR had begun to make some in-roads in the labor movement.

b) Electoral performance : The MIR's 1978 presidential candidate, Américo Marin, won 98 per cent of the vote.

External Support

During the guerrilla struggle, MIR militants were trained in Cuba. Cuba provided decisive financial and logistical assistance.

Dependence on External Support

The MIR guerrilla strategy was inspired by Castro. During its commitment to guerrilla warfare, it was politically and logistically dependent on Cuba. In May

1967, Moisé Moleiro landed on the Venezuelan coast as part of a Cuban-Venezuelan guerrilla force.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National : For much of the 1960s, the MIR was the main Castroite group in Venezuela, sometimes competing and sometimes cooperating with the FALN (National Liberation Armed Forces), led by Douglas Bravo. (He later broke with the pro-Soviet Communist Party after 1966.) The MIR supported the urban terroristic actions organized in the early 1960s by the Venezuelan Communist Party. By January 1970 a Committee for Revolutionary Integration was formed, in order to coordinate MIR and FALN activities.

ii) Continental : The Cuban government gave moral and material support to the MIR throughout the 1960s. In May 1967, Moisés Moleiro landed on the Venezuelan coast as part of a Cuban-Venezuelan guerrilla force. The MIR maintained close relations with Cuba after the defeat of the guerrilla struggle. It sent at least four delegates to the conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) in Havana, Cuba, in August 1967.

b) Type : Moisés Moleiro, openly acknowledged Cuban assistance to the MIR and other guerrillas. Cuban assistance included money, weapons, and training of the MIR guerrillas.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

Domingo Alberto Rangel, the founder of the MIR, withdrew his support for the armed struggle in 1963-1964. By 1968, a definite "soft-line" favoring the suspension of armed struggle, had begun to appear, in opposition to the "hard line"

Venezuela - Group MIR
- 569 -

which favored the continuation of the guerrilla warfare. In mid-1970, Julio Escalona, another leader of the MIR, broke completely with the group and announced the formation of the Organization of Revolutionaries (OR), evidently pro-Chinese in outlook. Another conflict pitted Américo Martín against Moisés Moleiro and led to the formation of two parallel groups, MIR-Moleiro (once again divided in 1980 through the separation of the MIR-Proletario) and MIR-Américo. Other factions within the MIR included, MIR-Nini, led by Rómulo Henríquez and Tendencia Marxista, led by Rigoberto Lanz. The MIR-Proletario is headed by Alberto Franceschi and Julio Castillo.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

The growing factionalism and the continual internecine struggle provoked a state of disaffection among the supporters of the MIR. The group led by Rigoberto Lanz (Tendencia Marxista), especially influential among the students, demanded the resignation of the National Directorate in 1978.

Remarks

In the early 1960s the Venezuelan MIR represented certain radical sectors among the intellectuals and the university students. When the group abandoned the armed struggle in 1969, only a handful of members remained. By 1978, it had become the country's fourth largest party but its influence diminished again due to factional struggle that led to the split between the MIR-Moleiro and MIR-Martín. The MIR opposes the strategy of "broad unity" with nonsocialist sectors. According to national organizer Segundo Meléndez, elections involving the overwhelming majority of the nation are important for expanding the Left's area of influence and establishing contacts with the masses. This, in turn, will

Venezuela - Group MIR
- 570 -

accelerate the transformation of its revolutionary potential into a force capable
of effecting basic changes.

Venezuela - Group FALN
- 571 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional
- b) In English : Armed Forces of National Liberation
- c) Acronym or known name : FALN

Country of Operation

Venezuela

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The FALN was founded in 1962 by militants of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) and the MIR (the Movement of Revolutionary Left). In April 1966 the FALN chiefs reorganized their ranks without the approval of the PCV Politburo, which in retaliation expelled them from the party.

Front Organizations and Auxiliaries

The National Liberation Front (FLN) and its military arm, FALN, were charged respectively with directing and carrying out the campaign of violence.

Membership

a) Active members : Some claim that FALN strength, including guerrillas and logistic support groups, ran to over 2,000 men at the peak of its activity. The group had approximately 200 militant supporters by 1966-1967.

b) Sympathizers : The FALN enjoyed a certain popularity among university students and middle-class intellectuals. In the late 1960s the group claimed several hundred sympathizers.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Douglas Bravo

b) Political career : Douglas Bravo is a former member of the PCV Politburo. After 1965, he became the leader of the FALN, and rejected the Party control over the guerrilla movement. Bravo was removed from the PCV Politburo in May 1966 and expelled from the party in May 1967. After 1970, Bravo began to support the Maoist strategy. Currently, he is a militant of the Venezuelan far Left.

c) Character : During the 1960s, Bravo succeeded in maintaining his leadership position in spite of charges of incompetence and an apparent challenge from the second-in-command, Luben Petkoff. Once a close ally of Castro, he became during the 1970s an exponent of the most radical revolutionary positions and criticized Havana's reluctance to support guerrilla groups in Venezuela. Bravo combines the communist pragmatism with a certain ultra-leftist adventurism.

Ideological Origin

Initially organized as an armed branch of the Venezuelan communist party, the FALN moved from orthodox Marxism-Leninism toward Castro-Guevarism. Régis Debray, Castro's admirer and Guevara's disciple, spent some time with the FALN guerrillas in 1964. The FALN leadership was ideologically split. Pompeyo Márquez and Teodoro Petkoff were partisans of the insurrectional approach. Douglas Bravo espoused Castro's rural guerrilla strategy and received strong support from Fidel Castro during the 1967 OLAS Conference in Havana. Bravo continued to insist on the necessity of a "strong revolutionary party."

Current Ideological Orientation

After 1970, Bravo criticized Castro and sided with the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The FALN advocated the Marxist-Leninist economic program: agrarian reform, expropriations, and nationalizations. It claimed "Yankee imperialism's companies" as Venezuela's economic enemy.

b) Social program : The FALN's declared objective was to build a "powerful people's army and an alliance of classes" to carry out the aims of a socialist revolution. It designated as the "political enemy" the whole governmental structure "that supports the exploiting classes."

c) Foreign policy : The group expressed hostility toward the U.S.A. and strong support for Cuba and Cuban-inspired guerrilla movements. It also expressed sympathy for Vietnam and North Korea.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The group maintained its commitment to the Marxist-Leninist economic program: nationalizations, expropriations, and agrarian reform. All these points were to be integrated in the program of the PRV (Party of the Venezuelan Revolution).

b) Social program : The group promoted the Marxist-Leninist strategy of establishing a "proletarian dictatorship." It rejected the electoral process and denounced it as "the election farce." After it was converted into the PRV, the group abandoned the guerrilla strategy.

c) Foreign policy : After 1970, Bravo became increasingly critical of Castro for abandoning his international "revolutionary obligations." He openly sided with the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute. During the late 1970s he organized and led several small pro-Chinese guerrilla organizations.

Ideologues

a) Name : Douglas Bravo

b) Publications: Bravo's interviews and articles were published in Latin American leftist magazines and newspapers.

c) Impact (internal) : Bravo's ideas influenced other leftist groups in Venezuela, particularly the MIR.

d) Impact (external) : Bravo was considered for many years Latin America's most prominent Castroite. Fidel Castro personally singled out Bravo as an example of revolutionary behavior during the 1967 OLAS Conference in Havana. He supported Bravo over many other Venezuelan leftist leaders, e.g., Pompeyo Márquez, Jesus Faria, and Teodoro Petkoff.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Ideological content : The FALN published calls for "revolutionary guerrilla warfare" and expressed strong anti-American stances.

ii) External intended consumer : Bravo's critique of Debray's theses (the 1970 critique of "Revolution in the Revolution?") was intended to reach all Latin American revolutionary leaders and leftist intellectuals. This critique was an indication of Bravo's split with "orthodox" Castro-Guevarism.

Venezuela - Group FALN
- 575 -

b) Means : The FALN national organ was El Combatiente. The group published books and the leaders expressed their views in articles and interviews.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

Douglas Bravo criticized Régis Debray's theory of the revolutionary foco. A former militant of the PCV, he continued to support the concept of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party as the main condition for the triumph of the "liberation struggle." He stressed the role of both the "revolutionary party" and the "revolutionary front of liberation." Rejecting the Guevara-Debray foco concept, one of the FALN leaders, Commander Francisco Prada, endorsed the strategy of "combined insurrection." This strategy consisted of coordinated urban, suburban, and rural insurgent operations.

Performance

a) Recruitment : The leaders of the FALN were of middle-class origin. Most fighters were students and peasants. The group recruited especially among young people under 30.

b) Indoctrination : The FALN was influential among university students (Central University in Caracas). It conceived the struggle in Latin America as continental in scope and acknowledged that men from Chile and other countries were fighting in its ranks. Militants of the FALN were trained and indoctrinated in Cuba.

Military Structure

Bravo indicated that the FALN was composed of rural and urban guerrilla forces and what he called patriotic officers in the garrisons.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The FALN guerrillas were motivated by the conviction that political, economic, and social conditions could not be changed gradually; the complete and sudden (violent) uprooting of the existing order was essential.

ii) Leadership : Bravo grew more and more disaffected with the politics of the pro-Soviet PCV. He and his supporters were fascinated with the Cuban experience and tried to develop a similar revolutionary strategy in Venezuela. Bravo was accused by his former comrades from the PCV of trying to mechanically import the Cuban revolutionary model.

b) Performance : The FALN was not able to survive the internecine struggles of the late 1960s. Despite foreign assistance, the group was isolated and did not show impressive discipline and endurance. Bravo was the actual leader of the FALN during the active guerrilla years. The FALN guerrillas made use of rifles, machine guns, and explosives.

Training

In the early and mid-1960s, FALN guerrillas were trained in Cuba.

Financial Resources

Beside the financial resources of the pro-Moscow Venezuelan communist party (PCV), the FALN received very substantial support from Cuba. The group also organized successful bank robberies and mobilized voluntary contributions.

Venezuela - Group FALN
- 577 -

Equipment and Supplies

Cuba, and later North Korea and North Vietnam, supplied weapons to the FALN.

Level of Popular Support

In a 1967 interview Bravo emphasized that FALN's program was "vast and not sectarian" and remarked that the organization included men from a wide variety of parties. The group was influential in Coro.

External Support

For Cuba, the guerrilla warfare in Venezuela in early 1960 was of utmost significance. The Castroite leadership tried to radicalize the Venezuelan leftist group and spared no effort in strengthening the Douglas Bravo faction of the FALN. Besides the plan to send "Che" Guevara to Venezuela -- a plan which seems to have failed because of PCV opposition -- the Cubans organized "international solidarity" with the Venezuelan guerrillas. This included the direct participation of foreign militants in the FALN operations (the presence of the Chilean guerrillas). The FALN also established relations with North Vietnam, North Korea, and some Third World countries (Algeria).

Dependence on External Support

The FALN was not able to develop its own internal base and was indebted to Cuba for political and logistical reasons. Even financially, the group was not self-reliant.

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National : The FALN was involved in continual disputes with the pro-Soviet Venezuelan Communist Party. It established temporary alliances with the Castroite MIR insurgents. During the late 1970s, Douglas Bravo joined and developed the Maoist Party of the Venezuelan Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Venezolana -- PRV).

ii) Regional : In the late 1960s, the group developed contacts and attempted to coordinate actions with the National Liberation Army (ELN) of Colombia.

iii) Continental : During the 1960s, the FALN was openly and strongly supported by Castro. Francisco Prada, a prominent FALN guerrilla leader, served as one of the four vice presidents of the OLAS conference in Havana in August 1967. Contacts were established with the Revolutionary Movement of June 14 of the Dominican Republic, the ELN of Colombia, during a 1969 conference organized on the Venezuela-Colombia border by Colonel Francisco Caamaño.

b) Extrahemispheric : According to FALN leader, Francisco Prada, during the 1960s the group had only three certain allies: Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea. The FALN reportedly had permanent missions in Havana, Hanoi, Pyongyang, Shanghai, Moscow, and Algiers. Although most of the Venezuelan guerrillas who received training abroad went to Cuba, many were reported to have gone to Algeria, China, North Korea and, above, all, North and South Vietnam.

Extent and Structure of Areas Under Guerrilla Control

Guerrilla warfare was centered in the states of Lara, Yaracuy, and Falcón. It was not very difficult for the military to get rid of the guerrillas and eradicate the FALN from the so-called "liberated area."

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

Between 1968 and 1970, some of the best known FALN guerrillas broke with Bravo, either because they had lost faith in armed struggle or because they disagreed with his tactics. (Among them was Luben Petkoff, the brother of the PCV -- later MAS -- leader, Teodoro Petkoff.) The FLN-FALN vanished during the late 1970s as a result of continual factious struggles. Douglas Bravo joined the PRV (Party of the Venezuelan Revolution), a Maoist group founded in 1970. (Among the PRV leaders, Francisco Prada also had a FALN guerrilla background.) Subsequent conflicts and splits pitted the PRV -- Ruptura against the "Tendencia Revolucionaria" (TR), founded in 1979.

Indications of Growing Autonomy of the Local Leaders from the Central Leadership

A splinter group of FALN called Punto Cero (Hill Point) was formed. Its leaders apparently received some training in Cuba in the late 1960s and conducted an active program of terrorism in Caracas in 1971-1972.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

Douglas Bravo was the inspirer and the most active leader of the FALN. Endowed with Castro's support in 1966-67, Bravo became the charismatic leader of the FALN guerrilla fighters.

Vulnerability to the Interruption of External Lines of Supply

Bravo became increasingly critical of Castro's apparent change of strategy during the 1970s. Losing Cuba's support, the FALN adopted Maoist views and began to criticize the Soviet bloc "reformism."

Venezuela - Group FALN
- 580 -

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

After 1970, the FALN grew increasingly isolated. Douglas Bravo ended eighteen years of hiding on 24 November 1979 in Coro where his insurrection began. Bravo became one of the leaders of the Party of the Venezuelan Revolution (PRV) which was founded after the defeat of the FALN. The PRV is active mainly in the western regions of the country (Aragua, Guayana, and Sucre). The PRV publishes "Ruptura" and "Ruptura Continental."

Remarks

The FALN owed its existence to Castro's decision to export his revolutionary model to Venezuela. Though Douglas Bravo criticized Debray's ideas and insisted on the necessity of a "revolutionary party," the group generally observed the precepts dictated by Castro. The break with Castro was the result of Castro's change of tactics after 1968-69 and Bravo's subsequent feelings of abandonment. The very existence of the FALN clearly indicated Castro's expansionist and subversive intentions.

Venezuela - Group PBR
- 581 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Partido Bandera Roja
- b) In English : The Red Flag Party
- c) Acronym or known name : PBR

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : Venezuela
- b) Others : Colombia

Date of Formation Original Organization

The PBR was formed in 1969 when the MIR split over the question of abandoning armed resistance. The group expresses the views of the most radical MIR militants: consistent commitment to armed struggle.

Membership

The PBR has approximately 100 militants.

Leadership

a) Political career : Gabriel Puerta Aponte was responsible for the guerrilla activities organized by the PBR and the Colombian Castroite group, the ELN. After the two guerrilla groups adopted a common strategy in 1981, he was appointed coordinator of all the attacks. He was captured in April 1982 in a Caracas suburb. His putative successor is Asdrúbal Cordero.

Ideological Origin

The PBR embraces the basic tenets of Castro-Guevarism. It considers armed struggle the only way to overthrow the established institutions in Venezuela. The leaders of the PBR harshly criticize the "reformist" politics of other leftist parties, and refuse to abandon guerrilla struggle. In its statements, the PBR advocates a "continental revolution" in Latin America.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The PBR advocates the Marxist-Leninist economic program: agrarian collectivist reform, nationalizations, expropriations, and opposition to the politics of the democratic parties and democracy as a system.

b) Social program : The revolutionary people's war is considered the cornerstone of PBR strategy. The group aims to establish a "socialist society," including subsidized or free housing, education, and health.

c) Foreign policy : The PBR expresses solidarity with Cuba and with the Latin American leftist insurgent movements.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The PBR manifests strong opposition to the economic policies of the government.

b) Social program : The group is committed to the establishment of a "socialist society" in Venezuela. It supports the thesis of the guerra prolongada ("prolonged struggle"), in which the armed element has a strategic value, but the emphasis is on ties with "sectors of the masses: workers, peasants, and students."

c) Foreign policy : The PBR proclaims total support for Cuba, Nicaragua and the leftist subversive movements throughout Latin America.

Propaganda

The PBR propaganda consists mainly of calls for violent revolutionary struggle and criticism of other left-wing parties. Beside leaflets printed in Venezuela, the group published a magazine ("Causa Marxista-Leninista") in Paris.

Performance

The PBR recruits primarily among students, middle-class intellectuals, and very few peasants. In a highly publicized security operation in 1983, thirteen "international terrorists" associated with the PBR were arrested by Venezuelan police and charged with a series of spectacular bank robberies and holdups using machine guns and hand grenades. Uruguayan Tupamaros were among them.

Military Structure

The Americo Silva Front (FAS) of the PBR was created in 1977. It is actually a small guerrilla group. In 1983, Venezuelan security forces made large-scale arrests in the PBR political cells of Puerto Ordaz and Caracas.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The PBR militants are motivated by their refusal to accept the values of a democratic society. Other possible sources of motivation are feelings of frustration and uncertainty among middle-class intellectuals and students.

ii) Leadership : The leaders of the PBR are driven by a fascination with the Cuban revolutionary pattern. They reject the democratic political mechanism and are committed to acquiring absolute power.

b) Performance : In the early 1970s, the PBR posed a threat in the cities, but later in the decade it became more and more isolated, and possessed no coherent political program. After 1977 the guerrillas tried unsuccessfully to organize a new "front" Puerta Aponte; the PBR leader, has been in prison since 1981. His successor, Asdrúbal Cordero, was arrested in Maracaibo in 1983. Cordero was reportedly carrying plans for combined PBR-ELN operations in the frontier region between Venezuela and Colombia.

Training

PBR militants are trained both in Venezuela and Cuba.

Financial Resources

The PBR was instrumental in organizing continual and highly profitable kidnappings of Venezuelan ranchers in the border region between Venezuela and Colombia. It has also been involved in some spectacular bank robberies. The PBR propaganda calls these operations "expropriations." According to Colombian military sources, the PBR also cooperates with the Colombian ELN in the "protection" of the narcotics route to Venezuela.

Equipment and Supplies

The PBR uses rifles, machine guns, and explosives. Some supplies come from Cuba. Others are furnished by guerrilla groups from Colombia.

Level of Popular Support

The PBR has grown increasingly isolated and has become a marginal-extremist segment of the Venezuelan far left. Therefore, it lacks significant mass-support, although it could emerge as a factor of subversion.

External Support

a) Origin : Besides Cuban political and logistical support, the PBR benefits from assistance granted by other Latin American leftist groups: the Colombian ELN, the Peruvian "Shining Path," and the Salvadoran FMLN. The group is primarily interested in political cooperation with these guerrilla organizations.

b) Type : The PBR has organized common operations with the Colombian ELN. It also has significant political ties, illustrated by the presence of PBR delegates at the international terrorist meeting in Esmeraldas, Ecuador.

c) Participation : International terrorists, including Uruguayan Tupamaros, were arrested in 1983 for having been involved in PBR operations (bank robberies and hold ups).

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : The PBR harshly criticizes the "revisionist" pro-Soviet Venezuelan Communist Party. Its leaders admit that they had provided technical aid and funds to the Argimiro Gabaldón Front (1979). The PBR also denounces the "failures" of other leftist groups. It maintains contacts the OR, a guerrilla group formed in 1969 (Organization of Revolutionaries) and closely identified with the Socialist League (LS). The LS is a Trotskyist movement associated with the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

Venezuela - Group PBR
- 586 -

b) Regional : Venezuelan PBR guerrillas joined the Colombian Army of National Liberation (Castroite-ELN) two years ago, according to a Defense Ministry source in Bogota. The unification was the result of joint operations staged by the two groups on the Colombian-Venezuelan border, and by the decision of their leaders, Gabriel Puerta Aponte and the Father Manuel Perez.

c) Continental : The PBR was the sole Venezuelan leftist group to attend the conference organized in Esmeraldas in 1983. Other groups that sent delegates to that guerrilla "summit" were: the Peruvian "Shining Path" (Sendero Luminoso), the Salvadoran FMLN, the 19 April Movement (M-19) of Colombia, and the "EGP" movement from Guatemala.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

The Americo Silva Front (FAS) of the PBR was created in 1977, one year after the division of the Antonio José de Sucre Front. The split was caused by the expulsion of Carlos Betancourt, who decided to form the PBR-Marxista Leninista. In a 1979 interview, Carlos Betancourt announced his return to legality and withdrew from political activity in 1980. His brother, Argenis Betancourt, also an ex-guerrilla, was killed by police. Pablo Hernandez Parra, a supporter of Betancourt, decided to found a movement called M-28 (Movimiento de 28 de Octubre).

Remarks

Although the PBR announced its decision to wage a revolutionary guerrilla war against the government, it has not been able to carry out its objective. The group lacks popular support in the countryside, and therefore it cannot develop the rural guerrilla strategy proclaimed by its leaders. Politically and ideologically,

Venezuela - Group PBR
- 587 -

the PBR remains a marginal segment of the Venezuelan Left. The group lacks significant appeal even among young radical intellectuals and students. Rather, it is a vestige of the 1960 defeated guerrillas, and its recent operations indicate a growing despair and powerlessness.

Argentina - Group AAA
- 588 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Alianza Anticomunista Argentina
- b) In English : Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance
- c) Acronym or known name : AAA

Country of Operation

Argentina

Date of Formation

The AAA was formed in January 1974 as a reaction against intensified terrorist attacks by leftist guerrilla groups.

Membership

In the late 1970s the AAA had approximately 100 members.

Ideological Origin

An anti-communist organization, the AAA was inspired by an ultra-nationalist ideology. It was committed to violent methods for eliminating leftist personalities and guerrillas. The group's ideology draws on anti-Marxism, a rigid concept of fatherland and nation, and fervent Catholicism.

Performance

The AAA recruited primarily among policemen and former policemen, businessmen, officers, and soldiers (active and retired).

Argentina - Group AAA
- 589 -

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The AAA rank and file was motivated by anti-communism and perceived self-defense.

ii) Leadership : The leaders were strongly motivated by a desire to end leftist terrorist activities that were seen as a threat to their own values, interests, and personal safety.

b) Performance : The group made use of sophisticated methods and supplies. The AAA was instrumental in eradicating the leftist terrorist network and confronting urban guerrilla units.

Training

The AAA members were trained during the anti-guerrilla period, by army and police officers.

Financial Resources

Like many anti-communist groups, the AAA received substantial financial support from individuals committed to the same cause.

Level of Popular Support

The AAA found support among the police forces, the military, and certain sectors of the business community.

Argentina - Group AAA
- 590 -

Relations with Other Groups

The AAA established contacts with other anti-communist groups in Brazil, Uruguay, and in Central America (the Honduran ELA, Guatemalan MLN).

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

A prominent group after 1974, the AAA grew increasingly marginal after 1980. It is no longer a significant factor in the country. The AAA activities were primarily a response to the wave of violence and terror launched by leftist guerrillas in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The resumption of the democratic process under President Alfonsín and the annihilation of the guerrillas in previous years, under the military regime, diminished the role and the influence of anti-communist groups like the AAA.

Bolivia - Group Death Squad
- 591 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Escuadrón de la Muerte
- b) In English : Death Squad
- c) Acronym or known name : Death Squad

Country of Operation

Bolivia

Date of Formation

The Bolivian Death Squad was created in the late 1970s as a reaction against leftist unrest in the country.

Membership

At its height, the Bolivian Death Squad had less than 100 members.

Ideological Origin

The Death Squad lacked a consistent ideology and avoided public statements concerning their ideological perspective. The group was committed to anti-communist struggle and rejected Marxist and socialist movements and doctrines. The real ideological basis of the Death Squad consisted of ultranationalistic beliefs.

Performance

The Death Squad recruited primarily among policemen and ex-policemen and the urban low-middle class. It also established connections with right-wing military groups.

Military Structure

The Death Squad organized their commandos to eliminate leftist terrorist groups.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

The Bolivian Death Squad was essentially motivated by anti-communism. The members of the group resented any leftist orientation and advocated the establishment of a strong government, rooted in traditional values of order and property.

Training

Bolivian Death Squad members were trained in Bolivia and Argentina.

Financial Resources

The basic financial source for Bolivian Death Squad consisted of voluntary contributions from right-wing parties and members of the business community.

Equipment and Supplies

The Death Squad made use of revolvers, rifles, and submachine guns, provided by police forces and military supporters of the group. It probably received aid from the Phalange party.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

Although the activity of the group increased in 1980 and 1981, the Death Squad is not a real challenge to Bolivian internal security. In fact, the group grew increasingly isolated after 1982. However, growing anarchy in the country may result in a revival of the anti-communist vigilante groups.

Brazil - Group Death Squad
- 593 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Escuadro da Morte
- b) In English : Death Squads
- b) Acronym or known name : Death Squads

Country of Operation

Brazil

Date of Formation

The Brazilian Death Squads were founded in the late 1960s.

Membership

At its height, the group had several hundred members.

Ideological Origin

The Death Squads groups represent a violent manifestation of the right-wing, anti-Marxist, and anti-Socialist political movements. Nationalism is a basic ingredient of the group's ideology.

Propaganda

The Death Squad's propaganda is aimed at intimidating radical intellectuals and leftist political groups. It is based on nationalism and emphasizes the principles of law and order.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The most famous Brazilian Death Squads groups are Commando for Hunting Communists (CCC), Commando Herzog, and Commando Delta. They have been involved in kidnappings and executions, ignoring the legal framework. The Death Squads were most active in the 1970s. They remained active in the early 1980s and organized kidnappings, executions of leftists or presumed leftists, bomb explosions, and attacks on newspaper offices.

Performance

The Death Squads recruit among those associated with the police forces, former military, and urban low-middle class.

Military Structure

The Death Squads operate as commandos. They have a fluctuating membership and members change their names frequently.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The members of the Death Squads share strong anti-communist motivation, as well as a belief in law and order.

ii) Leadership : The leaders are motivated by anti-Marxism, anti-Communism, commitment to the preservation of the traditional social-political order, and anti-crime.

b) Performance

Brazil - Group Death Squad

- 595 -

i) **Combat ability** : The Death Squads have been among the most feared right-wing terrorist groups in Latin America.

ii) **Discipline**: The commandos belonging to the Death Squads seem very disciplined, strictly obeying the orders of superior authorities.

iii) **Weapon sophistication** : Generally the level of sophistication required by the type of terrorist activities practiced by the Death Squads (urban terrorism) involves the use of revolvers, rifles, submachine guns, and bombs (home made and military issue).

Financial Resources

The Death Squads' financial resources have been mainly provided by rich voluntary contributions.

Equipment and Supplies

Small arms, bombs, and automatic weapons were generally provided by the Brazilian army and police.

Level of Popular Support

The group found some support in upper-middle class and the slums in large cities. Indirect support (through inaction) has been provided by the military governments since 1964.

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

Initially perceived as an ephemeral "cleansing operation," the activity of the Death Squads grew increasingly unpopular outside the country. The brutality

Brazil - Group Death Squad
- 596 -

and ruthlessness of the Death Squads were denounced both by Brazilian politicians and by foreign groups and organizations (Amnesty International). The Death Squads appear still to have significant support from large sectors of the urban population.

Chile - Group Patria y Libertad
- 597 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Patria y Libertad
- b) In English : Fatherland and Liberty
- c) Acronym or known name : Patria y Libertad

Country of Operation

Chile

Date of Formation

The group was founded in early 1973, before the fall of Salvador Allende's Marxist government.

Original Organization

The founders of the group belonged to the extreme right, the youth wing of the Chilean Nationalist Party in particular. Patria y Libertad emerged as a symptom of the political crisis under Salvador Allende's socialist government.

Leadership

The leader of the group in the 1970s was an attorney, Pablo H. Rodriguez Grez.

Ideological Origin

The group emerged as a paramilitary organization of the extreme right in opposition to Allende's regime. It is anti-Marxist and anti-Communist, and is committed to the traditional values of order, family, religion, and property.

Original Program

The group called for the strengthening of the traditional institution and strongly opposed the socialist program professed by Allende's government. Patria y Libertad embraced many complaints of the Chilean middle-class and consistently criticized the socialist's failure to manage the economy. The group advocates free enterprise and supports measures bound to eliminate leftist subversion.

Propaganda

Patria y Libertad consistently voiced opposition to the anti-democratic initiatives of Allende's government (illegal seizures and expropriations). The group's proclamations were influential among middle-class sectors of the population. Statements of the group were broadcast by radio stations of the opposition under Allende's regime.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

During the last months of the Allende regime, the extreme left possessed a plethora of paramilitary formations. In turn, the extreme right-wing of the opposition decided to arm itself. Together with the "Rolando Matos" Brigade, the Patria y Libertad movement lent valuable support to the unarmed but angry opposition mass movements of the women, students, and workers.

Performance

The group recruited among the urban middle class, intellectuals, and businessmen.

Military Structure

Patria y Libertad organized its own commando units.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation : The group was motivated by anti-communism, hostility to the totalitarian orientation promoted by Chilean left-wing parties, and commitment to the basic values of traditional Chilean society.

b) Leadership in combat : The movement organized certain noteworthy actions before Allende's fall (clashes with leftist demonstrators). Mario Aguilar of the "Patria y Libertad" died from a bullet fired by a leftist in May 1973.

Training

The group's militants were trained in Chile.

Financial Resources

The basic financial source of Patria y Libertad consisted of voluntary contributions, particularly from the Chilean business community.

Level of Popular Support

The group found support among women, especially in Santiago, students, and workers disaffected with the politics of the Allende regime.

Relations with Other Groups

The group cooperated, before Allende's fall, with "Rolando Matus" Brigade, named in the memory of a young farmer murdered by the leftists. Contacts were established with certain sectors within the Army.

Colombia - Group MAS
- 600 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Muerte a los Secuestradores
- b) In English : Death to Kidnappers
- c) Acronym or known name : MAS

Country of Operation

Colombia

Date of Formation

The group was founded in December 1981.

Membership

The MAS is a small and highly secretive group whose membership is unknown.

Ideological Origin

The MAS was formed to bring reprisals against guerrilla kidnappers. It is a right-wing anti-communist group, claiming to be committed to the defense of traditional values of order and free economy. It is possible, however, that its origins can also be found in the major Colombian drug traffickers' attempts to discourage guerrilla kidnappings of themselves and their families in order to replenish revolutionary coffers.

Propaganda

MAS propaganda tries to intimidate the leftist guerrillas and their supporters. The group expresses its views by sending letters to newspapers.

Colombia - Group MAS
- 601 -

Performance

The MAS recruits among policemen, the military, and the middle class.

Military Structure

The MAS organizes its own commando units.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Rank and file : The MAS members advocate strong anti-communism, and active resistance against the wave of terrorism launched by left-wing guerrillas.

b) Leadership : The leaders' motivation stems from a commitment to the defence of the established order, opposition to the leftist guerrillas-terrorist groups, and a desire for self-protection.

Training

The MAS members are trained in Colombia.

Financial Resources

Voluntary contributions are the group's main financial resources.

Equipment and Supplies

The MAS makes use of small arms and submachine guns, generally provided by police, military forces, and private sources.

Colombia - Group MAS
- 602 -

Level of Popular Support

The MAS enjoys support particularly in areas menaced by guerrilla operations. Certain segments of the military and police seem to support MAS anti-terrorist activities.

Relations with Other Groups

The MAS has established contacts with other right-wing groups like the paramilitary "Escuadrón de la Muerte" (Death Squad).

El Salvador - Group Brigada Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
- 603 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Brigada Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
- b) In English : Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade
- c) Acronym or known name : Brigada Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez

Country of Operation

El Salvador

Date of Formation

The group was founded in 1980, probably by members of ORDEN, who were determined to neutralize and eliminate leftist subversion.

Membership

The group recruits among ex-members or "moon-lighters," of Salvadoran military and police. It has reportedly made use of foreign mercenaries, mostly French, Cubans, Guatemalans, Chileans, and Argentineans.

Ideological Origin

Strongly anti-communist, and anti-guerrilla, Brigada Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez was responsible for the November 1980 assassinations of six members of the FDR leadership. Ideologically, the group is ultra-nationalist and xenophobic.

Original Program

- a) Economic policies : The group advocates a Laissez-faire economy. It supports capitalism and proclaims inviolability of private property.

El Salvador - Group Brigada Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
- 604 -

b) Social program : The group insists on the conservation of the status-quo in social class relations.

c) Foreign policy : The group calls for a close alliance with conservative administrations in the U.S. and international business and finance groups, anti-U.S. liberal opinions. Anti-Soviet views were voiced by people with supposed affinities with the group.

Ideologues

a) Name : General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez.

b) Impact (internal) : Hernandez Martinez was the military leader who successfully defeated a communist-led peasant uprising in 1932 by allegedly killing some 10,000 - 20,000 rural inhabitants in western El Salvador. His ideas expressed the political convictions of the Salvadoran farright.

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The group aims to influence the general public, by claiming that guerrillas, members of radicalized clergy, professors, and labor leaders who promote the Marxist revolutionary cause, are anti-national and puppets of foreign (Cuba, U.S.S.R.) countries.

ii) Ideological content : Pro-family, pro-Christian, nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-communist attitudes, represent the core ideology of the group.

b) Means

i) Radio : Radio Sovereignty began short-wave broadcasting four times daily in September 1983. It was also used by ESA.

El Salvador - Group Brigada Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
- 605 -

ii) Print : The group's statements were issued in Salvadoran newspapers.

iii) Direct (oral/leaflets) : Leaflets warning guerrilla members and/or sympathizers are often left on bodies of victims.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The "Brigade" is deeply committed to the terrorist approach. Its targets range from prominent leftists to ordinary citizens suspected of leftist sympathies and their families.

Performance

The group recruits among ex-members of the military, many of whom work as body-guards for wealthy land-owners, businessmen, and financiers. The members are mostly peasants.

Military Structure

The group organizes commando units, loosely structured for each operation.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

Anti-communism and revolt against terrorist excesses of leftist guerrillas seem to generate strong motivation both at the rank and file and leadership level.

Training

The members of the "Brigade" are trained in El Salvador.

El Salvador - Group Brigade Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
- 606 -

Financial Resources

The "Brigade" gets financial support from right-wing extremists; and also from some wealthy Salvadorans now living in Miami and Guatemala.

Equipment and Supplies

The group's equipment is similar to that of the police.

Relations with Other Groups

The "Brigade" is believed to have links to National Guard and Intelligence units of the branches of armed forces. It may also have contacts with the "Mano Blanco" group in Guatemala.

Remarks

The General Maximilian Hernandez Martinez Brigade is a very small right-wing paramilitary extremist organization probably made up of ex-military and security forces, some ex-ORDEN members, and some upper-class land-owners and industrialists. Financing undoubtedly comes primarily from wealthy members of the far right. Its purpose is to eliminate prominent guerrilla and leftist leaders, a task that government forces cannot or will not do. The group can apparently act at will, with little governmental control. Degree of control by National Guard or military high-command is unknown. The ultimate goal is the destruction of the FMLN popular, intelligence, and logistical support network.

El Salvador - Group ESA
- 607 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista
- b) In English : Secret Anti-communist army
- c) Acronym or known name : ESA

Country of Operation

El Salvador

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The ESA was formed in June 1980 as a coalition of six right-wing extremist groups: UGB, ORDEN/FDN, Mano Blanco, Escuadron de La Muerte, Organizacion para La Liberacion del Comunismo, and Brigada Anti-Comunista Salvadorena.

Front Organization

The National Liberation Party (Partido de Liberacion Nacional-PLN) was formed in November 1983. Its leader is Adolfo Torres. Military leaders are "commanders" Aquiles Baires and Jorge Palomo.

Membership

a) Active members : The ESA militants are members of six local right-wing extremist groups. They are primarily ex-members of various military and security forces, especially the National Guard, Treasury Police, and the National Police. Alleged participation of current officers has been mentioned with regard to ESA activities.

b) Sympathizers : Some wealthy land-owners, agriculturists, and financiers are reported to be among ESA consistent supporters.

El Salvador - Group ESA
- 608 -

c) **Cadres** : They are recruited primarily among ex-members of National Guard and work as bodyguards to wealthy civilians.

Leadership

General José Alberto (Chele) Medrano is the leader of the ESA. (See ORDEN.)

Ideological Origin

The ESA represents an extreme right, anti-communist political-military coalition, that uses terrorist tactics against Marxists and their sympathizers. The group advocates "Peace and Democracy" and views FMLN guerrillas as the "main enemy to our national sovereignty."

Original Program

a) **Economic policies** : The ESA advocates the laissez-faire economic system, with no state intervention.

b) **Social program** : The ESA calls for the maintenance of the status-quo and "peace and democracy."

c) **Foreign policy** : The group expresses sympathies for other strong anti-communist regimes that actively repress insurgent activities, including Guatemala, Chile, Taiwan, and Israel. Since reemerging in fall 1983, the ESA has been increasingly critical of U.S. intervention in Salvadoran affairs. The group considers U.S. pressures on "human rights" issues threats to Salvadoran independence and pride.

El Salvador - Group ESA
- 609 -

Propaganda

a) Content

i) Addressed internal audience : The ESA propaganda addresses poor peasants and workers. It aims to prevent them from supporting the Left.

ii) Ideological content : The group's statements convey a strong anti-communist message, imbued with pro-Christian, nationalist, and xenophobic stances.

b) Means

i) Radio : The group makes use of radio Sovereignty, set up in late 1983. The radio station broadcasts on short-wave band, four times daily.

ii) Print : ESA communiques are printed in local newspapers. Usually they include lists of intended targets.

iii) Direct (oral/leaflets) : Leaflets of the ESA are left near bodies of victims or bombing sites. They often contain warnings to communists and supporters who are addressed as "traitors."

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The ESA violently tortures and kills suspected guerrillas and supporters and bombs pro-guerrilla activity sites. It also conducts secret court martials and passes death sentences.

Performance

The ESA recruits primarily among ex-members of armed forces. Some leadership comes from among the oligarchy. Generally ESA members are between the ages of 30 and 40. The group may use foreign mercenaries on a sporadic basis, mostly French, Guatemalans, Chileans, and Cubans.

Military Structure

The ESA set up the "Jorge Alvarez Command." Urban command units are active in the capital city of San Salvador.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The ESA members possess a strong ideological motivation. The group has had no deserters, which explains the almost total lack of confirmed information on the group.

ii) Leadership : Most of the leadership is secret and identified by number. The top leader was unknown until November 1983.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : Commando operations carried out effectively, although ESA is never involved in direct combat. Discipline is excellent and operations are carried out effectively and secretly.

ii) Weapon sophistication : The ESA uses small arms and explosives.

Training

ESA members train in El Salvador.

Financial Resources

Right-wing political forces and some wealthy oligarchs are allegedly ESA's financial suppliers.

Level of Popular Support

The ESA is reportedly a very small organization, but it may be growing

El Salvador - Group ESA
- 611 -

since the establishment of a political arm in late 1983. The group is probably linked to certain elements of ARENA, El Salvador's second largest party.

External Support

The ESA received minimal military support from some governments in Central and South America (Guatemala, Paraguay, and Chile).

Dependence on External Support

The need to keep support for ESA secret, prevents such support from being far greater, and thus limits the group's effectiveness.

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : ESA allegedly has close ties with the National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police, although it has been officially condemned by the Salvadoran Armed Forces high command (COPEFA and the Defense Minister). The group, however, denies any connection with security forces or with the oligarchy.

b) Regional : ESA member groups include two transnational groups, Legion del Caribe (Caribbean Legion) and Frente Anti-comunista Centro-Americano (Central American Anti-communist Front). Both are small and active only in Guatemala and Honduras.

c) Continental : The ESA has established contacts with ultra-conservative military elements in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

El Salvador - Group ORDEN
- 612 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Organización Democrática Nacionalista
- b) In English : National Democratic Organization
- c) Acronym or known name : ORDEN

Country of Operation

- a) Principal : El Salvador
- b) Others : Honduras (1981)

Date of Formation

ORDEN was founded in 1968 and officially disbanded in October 1979; its members now belong to ESA.

Membership

a) Active members : ORDEN organized rural-based paramilitary groups and mobilized some armed peasants. At one time membership totalled a 100,000 and ORDEN was the largest of the peasant organizations favoring the government. Membership has probably declined since ORDEN was officially disbanded.

b) Sympathizers : They include some right-wing large landowners, especially in the Ahuachapan area of western El Salvador, as well as many small independent farmers, former soldiers, their families, and some petit-bourgeois elements.

c) Cadres : Cadres were recruited among retired security officers and army reservists. They were at one time estimated at 2,000.

El Salvador - Group ORDEN
- 613 -

d) Foreign members : There are unconfirmed reports of foreign mercenaries called in at various times and for specific missions. Most of those were probably Cuban, French, and Guatemalan.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : General Jose Alberto ("Chele") Medrano.

b) Profession : Born in the 1920s, Medrano was a career military officer and the hero of the 1969 war with Honduras.

c) Political career : Medrano was the former director of the National Guard and founder of ORDEN. He was allegedly involved in various coup attempts. In the 1972 Presidential elections he was as a candidate for FUDI, a small right-wing party of landed oligarchy. He founded the FDN along with Roberto D'Aubuisson, and is an alleged co-founder of the ESA.

d) Character : Medrano is a hard-line anti-communist, a typical "caudillo" type with a certain charisma. He was closely aligned with landowners of the extreme-right in Ahuachapan area. According to some reports, he could be personally involved in executions and the torture of Leftists. Medrano is known to have called three of his more capable junior officers "my three assassins." Apparently he saved Napoleon Duarte from being forced out of power and the ruling junta in late 1981.

Ideological Origin

The group was probably influenced by the Guatemalan MLN. (Medrano is known to have relations with Mario Sandoval Alarcon.)

ORDEN is strongly anti-communist. It was originally created to counterbalance the growth of FECCAS (a Catholic-sponsored union) in rural areas.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : ORDEN supported free enterprise, laissez faire economics, and the inviolability of private property. It also supported a strong agricultural commodity export-orientation for El Salvador.

b) Social program : ORDEN called for government control of population through the establishment of pro-government peasant organizations. It also advocated maintenance of the socio-economic status-quo and accepted present division of social classes.

c) Foreign policy : ORDEN called for close alliance with conservative administrations or forces in the U.S., as well as with international business and finance groups.

Ideologues

Mario Sandoval Alarcon exerts his influence primarily through informal channels. He is considered the most consistent spokesmen of Central American ultra-nationalist, anti-communist ideology.

Propaganda

ORDEN propaganda was intended to reach poor peasants and the military. Ideologically, it emphasized Christian, anti-collectivist and anti-socialist themes. Externally the group addressed conservative U.S. circles and similarly oriented Latin American organizations and governments.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

ORDEN reportedly terrorized, assassinated, and intimidated rural inhabitants. The group was allegedly involved in several massacres, along with

El Salvador - Group ORDEN
- 615 -

other government security forces, during the early 1980s. Intimidating tactics were used at voting places during 1970s and during the land-reform implementation in 1980.

Performance

The group recruited primarily among the urban lower class and peasants. Leadership and cadres often came from army reservists and retired security officers. There is some indication that membership in ORDEN was a form of self-protection. Non-card-carrying individuals might be arrested and tortured if stopped by security forces.

Military Structure

ORDEN established its own network of commando units.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : While some members no doubt felt forced into membership as a means of self-protection, many were proud to be associated with ORDEN as a sign of prestige and social status.

ii) Leadership : ORDEN leaders were strongly motivated by anti-communist convictions as well as a desire to preserve an advantageous status-quo.

b) Performance

i) Combat ability : ORDEN units rarely engaged in combat. They performed mostly vigilante and intelligence gathering tasks.

El Salvador - Group ORDEN
- 616 -

ii) Discipline : Discipline was loose and abuses by individual members were widespread.

iii) Weapon sophistication : Machetes and some small arms were used during the 1960s and 1970s. Members were later armed with government weapons.

Financial Resources

The Ministry of Defense and some private land-owners provided basic financial supplies. Some wealthy land-owners, businessmen, and financiers made voluntary contributions.

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : ORDEN cooperated with the National Guard, and National Police in rural areas in 1976. It also worked with PCN in 1977 elections to guard polls. In February 1977, ORDEN participated with National Police and army in repressing a UNO demonstration. More than 200 people were reported killed. ORDEN has been reportedly involved in continuous military operations with the army, especially in large sweeps of guerrilla areas where extra troops are needed (even though ORDEN has been officially disbanded). Some ORDEN activity was reported in Honduras in 1981, presumably in conjunction with local military or paramilitary groups in that country.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

Although Medrano is a strong charismatic leader, there is every indication that ORDEN would function well with any strong hard-line anti-communist military leader.

El Salvador - Group ORDEN
- 617 -

Indications of Decline in Local or National Popular Support

ORDEN has suffered an obvious decline in support since the organization was disbanded in late 1979. But apparently many members are still active and openly involved in anti-guerrilla operations in conjunction with government security forces.

Remarks

ORDEN was by far the largest right-wing mass organization during the 1970s, that functioned as an anti-guerrilla, anti-communist, anti-leftist terrorist and intelligence gathering organization. Though officially disbanded in late 1979, ORDEN is reportedly still active in rural areas as an informal network of militants. Strongly supported by hard-line, anti-communist ex-military and far-right extremists, it retains a certain prestige among former members, and large peasant sectors.

El Salvador - Group UGB
- 618 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Union Guerrera Blanca
- b) In English : White Warrior Union
- c) Acronym or known name : UGB

Country of Operation

El Salvador

Date of Formation

The UGB was founded in the early 1970s.

Membership

a) Active members : The members of the UGB are reportedly National Police "moonlighters" and members of Army's G-2 intelligence section (especially during the Molina regime). The group also attracted retired soldiers and officers.

b) Sympathizers : Members of the extreme right-wing oligarchy support the operations of the UGB.

c) Cadres : The most active members of the UGB are current and retired members of the Salvadoran armed-forces, many of whom also work as body guards for wealthy businessmen and farmers.

Ideological Origin

The UGB's ideology is strongly anti-Marxist and anti-Communist. The group has been especially active against radicalized Jesuit priests and missionaries, who are known or suspected of supporting the violent Left. Unlike leftist groups, the UGB avoids issuing ideological statements.

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The UGB supports the pre-1979 status-quo, which included laissez-faire economics, no state intervention, respect for private property, and opposition to unions. The group defends low wages for agricultural workers, to maintain "competitiveness" on world markets and to guarantee sufficient revenues for the country.

b) Foreign policy: The UGB is generally pro-U.S., but hostile to particular U.S. administrations and liberal circles.

Propaganda

Leaflets and notes, as well as a painted white hand, are often left with victims' bodies. The UGB combines threatening symbols with active measures of intimidation.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

Father Rutilio Grande, a Jesuit working with FECCAS (BPR), was killed in March 1977; Father Alfonso Navarro was killed in May 1977. Between 1977-79 five more priests were killed by UGB. The deaths of Archbishops Oscar Romero and Galdamez were attributed to UGB, but unconfirmed and probably untrue. All victims were open sympathizers of the violent Left. The UGB is committed to violence as the basic means of ending leftist subversion and terrorism.

Performance

The UGB recruits primarily among ex-military personnel. The majority of its members are of peasant origin. Important figures of the Salvadoran oligarchy are connected with the UGB, at least as sympathizers, though it is difficult to

El Salvador - Group UGB
- 620 -

confirm direct links. The group probably uses some foreign mercenaries, mostly Guatemalans, Cubans, and Chileans.

Military Structure

The UGB has established commando units that carry out the anti-leftist operations.

Financial Resources

Right-wing land-owners, some now in emigration, and conservative peasants in the western regions make voluntary contributions to the UGB.

Equipment and Supplies

Their level of sophistication is similar to that of the regular military and police.

Level of Popular Support

The UGB has reportedly worked closely with Policia Nacional and Colonel Rene Chacon, Chief of Army Intelligence under Molina.

External Support

According to some reports, the UGB probably receives some support from right-wing, Guatemalan, non-government groups.

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : The UGB is closely allied with security forces, especially with

El Salvador - Group UGB
- 621 -

Policia Nacional. The group had contacts with Colonel Rene Chacon, Chief of Army Intelligence under President Molina (early mid-1970s).

b) Regional : The UGB probably established a connection with the Mano Blanco anti-guerrilla group in Guatemala.

Remarks

The UGB is a small right-wing paramilitary "revenge squad." It has been extremely active in recent years. Its victims were primarily priests, but also have included teachers and union organizers. The group can apparently act at will, with little government control. The UGB sees itself as the self-appointed executioner of tasks that it feels the government forces neither can nor want to perform. The UGB has not operated in late 1983 to the same extent as ESA or the Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade, which suggests that members have been incorporated into one or the other of these stronger organizations.

Guatemala - Group ESA
- 622 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista
- b) In English : Secret Anti-Communist Army
- c) Acronym or known name : ESA

Country of Operation

Guatemala

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The ESA was founded in 1977 by former members of the right-wing groups "Ojo por Ojo," and "Mano Blanco."

Membership

The group has a few hundred members at most. It has about a few thousand sympathizers. Cadres are recruited among landowners, retired military personnel, and policemen.

Ideological Origin

The Guatemalan ESA is a deeply motivated anti-communist group. Its members are committed to traditional values of order, family, and property. The ESA is a nationalist organization that regards socialism and leftist subversion as the primary danger for Guatemalan institutions.

Original Program

Unlike leftist groups, who indulge in issuing ideological platforms, the ESA prefers to avoid such statements. The group supports free enterprise as the basic

Guatemala - Group ESA
- 623 -

element of the economy and advocates a determined anti-communist policy on the part of the government.

Propaganda

The propaganda of the ESA is addressed to peasants, intellectuals, and the urban proletariat. Its primary purpose is to intimidate leftists. Its ideological content consists of nationalist slogans, support for "Christian values," and advocacy of free enterprise and strong anti-communism. ESA's ideological positions have been adopted by other Latin American right-wing groups.

Performance

The group recruits mostly among policemen, military, and elements of the urban middle class. There are certain unreliable reports of contacts with anti-Castro Cubans and former French OAS veterans.

Military Structure

The ESA operations are carried out by commando units organized in temporary formations.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The members are strongly motivated by anti-communism and opposition to the terrorist activities of the leftist insurgent groups.

ii) Leadership : The ESA leaders are committed to the preservation of the existing order against the threats represented by the leftist guerrilla groups. The leaders are not involved directly in actions.

b) Performance : The ESA has been increasingly active after 1980 and its actions have been successful. Some members fought the leftist guerrillas in the departments of Isabal and Zacapa with convincing success. The group uses mostly light machine guns and rifles that are furnished by the military.

Training

The ESA trains its members in Guatemala. The trainers are members of the Guatemalan military as well as Argentinians, French, and anti-Castro Cubans.

Financial Resources

The group is strongly supported by voluntary contributions from businessmen and land owners.

Level of Popular Support

The ESA benefits from indirect support from the MLN, Guatemala's largest party. This support was direct in the past. The group exerts its main influence in the southeastern regions.

Relations with Other Groups

a) National: The ESA maintains contacts with other right-wing terrorist groups: the Death Squads, "Mano Blanco" (White Hand), "Orden de la Muerte" (Order of Death), and "Ojo por Ojo" (an Eye for an Eye).

Guatemala - Group ESA
- 625 -

b) Regional : The ESA has connections with right-wing groups in Honduras and El Salvador.

c) Continental : The ESA belongs to the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation (based in Mexico), which represents a center of coordination for right-wing groups.

Honduras - Group ELA
- 626 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Ejercito de Lucha Anti Comunista
- b) In English : Anti-Communist Combat Army
- c) Acronym or known name : ELA

Country of Operation

Honduras

Date of Formation

The ELA, founded in 1979, operates primarily in Honduras.

Membership

- a) Active members : According to an ELA militant, the group began with 85 members. It now has approximately 400 members.
- b) Sympathizers : The group has sympathizers among the military.

Ideological Origin

The group professes ultra-nationalist and uncompromising anti-communist positions.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

Concerning the methods of the Honduran death squads, an ELA leader said: "First we investigate and follow a suspect who has come to our attention. Then we decide if the case merits further action, we either kidnap the victim, or leave him an anonymous warning. If the suspect heeds our warning, and we confirm his rehabilitation, we leave him alone. If he doesn't, we machine-gun him."

Honduras - Group ELA
- 627 -

Recruitment

People from the military, police, and security agencies (FUSEP) are probably members.

Military Structure

The ELA has established a network of commando units.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

The ELA members are motivated by strong anti-communist convictions. The basic aim of the ELA leader is to intimidate suspected leftists and deter movements that threaten the status quo.

Training

The training of the ELA members takes place in Honduras.

Financial Resources

Voluntary contributions from land-owners and businessmen represent a basic financial resource for the ELA.

Equipment and Supplies

An ELA leader stated in a recent interview that his group gets "unofficial help" from the Honduran military. Weapons are on par with those used by the Honduran military.

Honduras - Group ELA

- 628 -

Level of Popular Support

The group is influential among the military and police forces. It receives support from conservative businessmen and land-owners.

External Support

The ELA activities are loosely controlled and coordinated by the international organization CAL (Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation).

Relations with Other Groups

a) Western hemisphere

i) National : The ELA has connections in the Honduran armed forces and among the policemen. The group cooperates with the Movimiento Anticomunista Hondureno (MACHO), the Honduran Anti-communist Movement.

ii) Regional : ELA representatives maintain that the group is affiliated with similar organizations in other countries. The ELA seems to have close ties with the Maximiliano Hernandez Brigade in El Salvador.

iii) Continental : The ELA attends annual international conferences of right-wing terrorist groups, e.g., the 1982 conference in Buenos Aires, organized by the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance. The overall umbrella group for the "death squad" network is the Mexican-based CAL (Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation), also called "La Mano Blanco" (The White Hand). This network with international ramifications was set up in Guatemala in the 1950s.

b) Extrahemispheric : Belonging to the FAL, the ELA is affiliated to the World Anti-Communist League, a right-wing organization linked to ultra-conservative groups in Asia, Europe, and the United States. Mexican

Honduras - Group ELA
- 629 -

intelligence sources claimed that CAL was founded by a Neo-Nazi group after World War II. CAL is also called The White Hand, The White Force, and The White Brigade.

Nicaragua - Group FDN
- 630 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense
- b) In English : The Democratic Nicaraguan Force
- c) Acronym or known name : FDN

Country of Operation

Nicaragua

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The Nicaraguan Democratic Conservative Party represents the main political component of this political-military organization. The FDN was founded in 1981 as a coalition of center and right-of-center politicians and about 300 former national guardsmen. The front was reorganized by the end of 1982 in an effort to cast off its image as "remnants of the Somoza era."

Membership

The FDN counts at least 8,000 active members. It has several thousand sympathizers, mostly in the northern part of Nicaragua and in refugee camps in Honduras.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : Adolfo Calero Portocarrero
- b) Political career : The former manager of a Coca Cola plant, Calero was secretary-general of Nicaragua's Conservative Party for three years. He participated in a 1954 failed effort to capture the elder Somoza and ship him out

Nicaragua - Group FDN
- 631 -

of the country. After FDN's reorganization in December 1982, Calero became its main leader.

Current Ideological Orientation

The FDN promotes a right-of-center liberal democratic ideology. The ideological democratic thought of the FDN is formulated in the Blue and White Book (El Libro Azul y Blanco).

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The group advocates the development of business and free enterprise in Nicaragua. It expresses opposition to the socialist measures taken by the Sandinista government, but supports agrarian reform and the "conquests of the workers."

b) Social program : The FDN aims to overthrow the Sandinista dictatorship and to develop a pluralist democracy in Nicaragua. It calls for the formation of a Provisional government and free elections for a National Assembly with the participation of all political parties.

c) Foreign policy : The FDN wishes to restore the independence of the country and to establish normal relations with the U.S. The FDN harshly criticized the Sandinista policy of solidarity with Castro's Cuba and the pro-Soviet movements in Latin America.

Current Program

a) Social program : The FDN is committed to the armed struggle against the

Nicaragua - Group FDN
- 632 -

Sandinista regime. The group has three objectives: to keep the Sandinistas "in check"; to force the Sandinistas to hold free elections; and to establish a democratic regime in Nicaragua.

c) Foreign policy : The FDN wants to force the Organization of American States to assume responsibility for an OAS resolution in 1979 that called for an immediate replacement of the Somoza regime and the installation of a democratic government, respect f

c) Impact (internal) :

d) Imp soon as possible.

Propaganda

The FDN propaganda calls for the overthrow of the Sandinista government. Articles, interviews, and statements of FDN spokesmen are issued in other Latin American countries. The group has its clandestine radio station ("Radio 15 September") and publishes a regular bulletin in Honduras.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The anti-Sandinista FDN guerrillas are aware of the military superiority of the government's forces. Their basic goal is to force the regime to accept free elections as soon as possible.

Recruitment

The FDN recruits among peasants, small independent farmers, and professionals. No more than three per cent of the FDN forces were members of Somoza's National Guard. The FDN is also influential among Indians.

Nicaragua - Group FDN
- 633 -

Military Structure

The FDN commandos have been engaged in fighting in the northern Zelaya department and on the Pacific coast in the area of Jalapa. The group organized autonomous units operating especially in the northern areas of the country.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : The primary motivation of the anti-Sandinista guerrilla is the increasing awareness of the totalitarian orientation of the regime, the loss of property and the attack on traditional values.

ii) Leadership : The basic motivation of the FDN leaders consists of disaffection with the despotic regime imposed by the Sandinistas; the feeling that the "commandantes" have betrayed the promises of the anti-Somoza revolution; frustration at the inability to play a role in the political process; and loss of property or close relatives.

b) Performance : The FDN is led by a directorate of seven men and one woman. Besides Calero, other important members of the directorate are Lucia Cardenal, Marco Zeledon, Alfonso Callejas, and Enrique Bermudez, a former colonel in the national guard who heads the FDN military high command in Honduras. Mike Lima is the foremost FDN military commanders. The group has a low desertion rate.

Training

FDN guerrillas are trained in Honduras. The trainers are Nicaraguans, as well as U.S., Argentine, Chilean, and Guatemalan experts.

Nicaragua - Group FDN
- 634 -

Financial Resources

The FDN receives substantial financial support from the U.S. government and exiled countrymen in the U.S.

Equipment and Supplies

The FDN employs AK, Galil and FAL rifles, ROK-7 grenade launchers, RPG-7 rocket launchers, M-79 grenade launchers, M-60 machine guns, 60 and 80-mm mortars, claymore mines, and C-4 explosives. The supplies come mainly from Honduras and the U.S.

Level of Popular Support

The FDN is popular among conservative farmers, Indians, and middle-class elements disillusioned with the Sandinista methods of government. The group is particularly popular in the northern regions of the country, around Matagalpa.

External Support

The FDN receives material, political, and financial support from the U.S., Honduras, Guatemala, and Chile.

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : Despite several differences in the appraisal of the Nicaraguan revolution, the FDN collaborates with ARDE in the anti-Sandinista struggle. The group maintains contacts with the Misurasata people (the organization led by Stedman Fagoth). Edén Pastora, the military chief of ARDE, insisted on the presence of former Somoza officers among the FDN guerrillas and criticized the U.S. for favoring the FDN with regard to military and financial assistance.

Nicaragua - Group FDN
- 635 -

b) Regional : The FDN maintains contacts with political forces in Honduras, and Guatemala.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

A reorganization of the supreme leadership of the FDN put an end to the distorted image of this organization as a group of former Somozan guardsmen and politicians. According to certain sources, the FDN directorate would have decided at the same time to shift colonel Enrique Bermudez from the military to the political side (December 1982). The leaders of ARDE, Edén Pastora and Alfonso Robelo, have pointed to Bermudez's leadership of the front's forces as the key reason for postponing negotiations for an alliance with the FDN.

Indications of Growing Autonomy of the Local Leaders from the Central Leadership

The FDN experiences periodic disciplinary problems; some with prominent field commanders, like "Suicida."

Nicaragua - Group ARDE
- 636 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática
- b) In English : Revolutionary Democratic Alliance
- c) Acronym or known name : ARDE

Country of Operation

Nicaragua (in the southern areas)

Date of Formation and Original Organization

ARDE was formed in 1981. One of its main groups forming ARDE is the MDN ("Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense" -- Democratic Nicaraguan Movement); another group includes supporters of Eden Pastora, the "Sandinista Revolutionary Front." There is also a minor Indian component of the movement (the Miskitos, Sumus, and Ramas -- Rivera faction of Misurasata).

Membership

- a) Active members : According to ARDE spokesmen, the movement has thousands of armed men; according to Pastora's statement in July 1983, the ARDE forces had 2,600 armed peasants. Membership today is under 3,000.
- b) Sympathizers : ARDE has many sympathizers among disillusioned Sandinistas, including the military and militias.
- c) Cadres : Most cadres are Nicaraguans. Some Costa Ricans and Panamanians are also active in ARDE.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : Edén Pastora Gómez

Nicaragua - Group ARDE

- 637 -

b) Place of birth : Leon

c) Political career : Pastora (Commander "Cero"), comes from a middle-class family. He was the leader of the Sandinista group that seized the National Palace (August 1978), a master stroke that crippled the prestige of the Somozas. After the revolution he was unhappy with the secondary roles assigned to him in the government. He left the country mysteriously at the end of July 1981 along with a number of other commanders. He went first to Costa Rica, then to Panama, to get support for his struggle against the Sandinista leaders. Pastora Gómez is now commander-in-chief of the ARDE Armed Forces. He was injured during a terrorist operation organized against him by Sandinista agents (1984). Pastora strongly opposes unification with other forces of the opposition, particularly the FDN, whom he considers infiltrated by former supporters of Somoza.

d) Character : One of the foremost Nicaraguan guerrilleros, Pastora refused the Marxist-Leninist direction adopted by his fellow Sandinistas. He is committed to what he sees as the "true values" of the Sandinista revolution, and refuses to collaborate with people suspected of a Somozist background. In 1981, while deputy minister of defense, Pastora announced his intention to join the left-wing guerrillas who were fighting in El Salvador and Guatemala. He grew increasingly disappointed with the leftist Marxist inclinations of the Sandinistas.

Leadership

a) Name or assumed name : Alfonso Robelo Callejas

b) Political career : Robelo was born to an upper-middle-class family. He is an engineer and a businessman. Robelo was the head of COSEP (Higher Council of Private Enterprise) and was active in the anti-Somoza struggle. He is one of the founders of the MDN (Democratic Nicaraguan Movement). Arrested by Somoza, he

Nicaragua - Group ARDE

- 635 -

was released and went into exile. After Somoza was overthrown, he was one of the five members of the original revolutionary junta. In July 1980, Robelo retired from the junta. He left Nicaragua in March 1982 and joined forces with former Sandinista Commander Eden Pastora.

c) Character : Robelo represents the moderate-democratic group among Nicaraguan businessmen. He is strongly opposed to the totalitarian drift of the Sandinista government and is deeply committed to the democratic promises of the anti-Somoza revolution. Less intransigent than Pastora, he represents the political component of the ARDE that is ready to negotiate with other forces of the anti-Sandinista opposition.

Ideological Origin

The ARDE supports the values of a liberal democracy. The group rejects the totalitarian model imposed by the Sandinistas. It fights for "the democratic rescue of Nicaraguan revolution." The group wants "to put the revolution back on its original track."

Original Program

a) Economic policies : The ARDE upholds the original program of the revolution: the development of a modern economy, agrarian reform, support for small business, and the development of a mixed economy.

b) Social program : The ARDE aims to restore democracy in Nicaragua, by political and military means. ARDE insist that the group was forced to adopt the difficult path of armed insurrection because it was the only alternative that the FSLN had left open to the Nicaraguan majority.

Nicaragua - Group ARDE
- 639 -

c) Foreign policy : The group advocates an independent foreign policy; according to ARDE spokesmen, Nicaragua is now an "occupied country." The crucial decisions "are not in the hands of Nicaraguans, but in the hands of Cubans." Pastora is known to be anti-U.S.

Current Program

a) Economic policies : The platform for a "Government of National Unity," released by ARDE in San José in June 1983, speaks of the necessity to develop a mixed economy.

b) Social program : The ARDE calls for separation of the Army from the FSLN as a party, unrestricted press freedom, and the full exercise of fundamental freedoms. With regard to the elections, the ARDE insists on the participation of all national democratic sectors.

c) Foreign policy : The basic purpose of the ARDE in foreign policy is to restore the independence of Nicaragua, threatened by continual Cuban and Soviet intervention in the country's internal affairs. ARDE denounces foreign interference in Nicaragua's internal affairs and has announced that "Cubans, Germans, Libyans, Salvadorans, Bulgarians, Vietnamese, and other foreigners, will not be treated as fighters, but as war criminals."

Ideologues

Alfonso Robelo writes pamphlets published irregularly in San José.

Propaganda

The ARDE's propaganda calls for democracy and the return to the true "Sandinista values." The group's leaders have published interviews, statements, and

Nicaragua - Group ARDE
- 640 -

articles in other Latin American countries. Radio "Voice of Sandino" broadcasts in Spanish and English (for the Mosquito Indians).

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

The ARDE promotes armed struggle as the indispensable way of overthrowing the Sandinista regime. ARDE leaders recognize that they do not have the military strength to defeat the Sandinistas, who have the most powerful armed forces in Central America. The best way of eliminating the Sandinistas is by free elections. In 1983, ARDE forces were active on the so-called "Atlantic Front" (the ARDE fighting columns). The July 1983 offensives were carried out in the central and northern regions of Zelaya.

Recruitment

ARDE recruits primarily among professionals, former Sandinista fighters, and the Indians (a splinter group of Misurasata, whose leader is the national coordinator of Misurasata, Brooklyn Rivera).

Military Structure

The group has established guerrilla and commando units.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Motivation

i) Rank and file : ARDE members are motivated by disaffection with the Marxist line of the Sandinista leaders.

Nicaragua - Group ARDE
- 641 -

ii) Leadership : Both Pastora and Robelo claim to carry on the ideals of the Nicaraguan revolution and accuse the Sandinistas of indulging in totalitarian practices inspired by Castro and Marxism-Leninism.

b) Performance

i) Weapon sophistication : Pastora complained several times of the poor level of sophistication of his guerrillas' weapons.

ii) Leadership in combat : Pastora regularly participates in combat.

Training

Training takes place both in the southern regions of Nicaragua and in Costa Rica.

Financial Resources

ARDE has received several significant financial contributions. One totaled \$600,000 from Francisco Fiallo, former Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States. Other individual contributions came from personalities like Alexis Argüello, former world boxing champion.

Equipment and Supplies

a) Level of sophistication : The group uses AK and FAL rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, light planes and mines, both sea and land types.

b) Origin : In July 1983, Edén Pastora partially confirmed the report that the Israelis were supplying arms to the anti-Sandinista rebels. Other sources are Honduras, Costa Rica (The ARDE radio station is located in Costa Rica and has been authorized to operate by the Costa Rican Interior Ministry.) and El Salvador.

Nicaragua - Group ARDE
- 642 -

Level of Popular Support

a) Total group and front organizations : The ARDE has initiated military operations against the Sandinistas in the south of Nicaragua. The group claims to have contacts within the militia and the army and enjoys a certain support among Indians.

b) Local support : Local support is significant especially in the southern region of Nicaragua, e.g., clashes with the Sandinista army in Rio San Juan Department (July 1983). In July 1983, ARDE announced the formation of a northern front.

External Support

ARDE receives support from Costa Rica and other Latin American countries like Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, and Venezuela. However, Edén Pastora has referred to the lack of support from democratic countries. The ARDE headquarters are situated in Costa Rica, although the group claims to observe the country's neutrality. Presently, external support is decisive and ranges from political solidarity to military and financial assistance.

Dependence on External Support

ARDE's main problem is its lack of arms. The alliance reproaches the United States for its lack of confidence and consistent support for the FDN. Pastora's recent statements indicate his growing despair over the lack of consistent economic and military support from the U.S.A.. Yet, the absence of Costa Rican support seriously complicates ARDE's ability to acquire supplies.

Nicaragua - Group ARDE
- 643 -

Relations with Other Groups

a) National : Concerning the possibility of unification or at least cooperation with the FDN (the Democratic Nicaraguan Force), the ARDE spokesmen recognize that the FDN has several thousand people inside Nicaragua already effectively fighting against the regime. There are differences between the two groups: the ARDE totally identifies with the Nicaraguan revolution, whereas the FDN would not share the same position. There is a line of communication between the two groups, but ARDE has until recently refused to join the FDN.

b) Regional : Costa Rica granted asylum to many ARDE leaders and militants. ARDE leaders have contacts in Panama and Venezuela.

Extent and Structure of Areas under Guerrilla Control

According to ARDE, the anti-Sandinista forces are now in control of about 2,100 square miles of territory in a trapezoidal area from just inland of San Juan del Norte on the Caribbean coast west along the San Juan River to El Castillo, then northwest to within about 20 miles of Lake Nicaragua, and east along the Maiz river to the Bay of San Juan del Norte. The area controlled is jungle and therefore ideal for guerrilla warfare. ARDE organized a successful operation which culminated with the occupation, for a short period of time, of San Juan del Norte (Spring 1984). The area controlled has no real population; hence, it is "ideal for guerrilla warfare."

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

Commander Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro was an original member of ARDE. He separated from the group because of certain differences when he was expelled from Costa Rica.

Nicaragua - Group ARDE
- 644 -

The Indian Misurasata people are split into two groups. One, led by Steadman Fagoth, is in the northern sector of Nicaragua; another is led by Brooklyn Rivera.

Degree of Dependence on a Charismatic Leader for Existence or Effectiveness

Many fighters joined the ARDE as a sign of loyalty toward former Sandinista Commander Edén Pastora Gómez, the famous "Comandante Cero" who took over Managua's National Palace in August 1978. Without Pastora the group as such is a probalby not viable.

Nicaragua - Group UDN-FRN
- 645 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Unidad Democrática Nicaragüense-Fuerzas
Revolutionarias de Nicaragua.
- b) In English : Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Nicaragua.
- c) Acronym or known name : UDN-FRN

Country of Operation

Nicaragua

Membership

The group has several hundred members.

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name: Fernando Chamorro Rapaccioli
- b) Political career : Fernando Chamorro is the leader of the armed force that invaded Nicaragua in March 1983. He applied for political asylum in Costa Rica in July 1981. Nicknamed "Negro Chamorro," he is the brother of Edmundo Chamorro. Both were active in the anti-Somoza struggle. Fernando Chamorro was one of the leaders of the Nicaraguan Social Democratic Party, and he fought with the Sandinistas.

Ideological Origin

The group professes a liberal-democratic ideology. It rejects the demagogic statements of the Sandinistas and advocates free elections.

Nicaragua - Group UDN-FRN
- 646 -

Original Program

The UDN-FRN shares the fundamental goals of ARDE's program: the overthrow of the Sandinista dictatorship and the development of true democratic institutions.

Performance

The UDN-FRN recruits among disillusioned Sandinistas (peasants and intellectuals). The group has organized guerrilla units which closely cooperate with ARDE forces.

Fighting Motivation

a) Rank and file : These members are people who have experienced disappointment with the Marxist-Leninist course imposed by the Sandinistas.

b) Leadership : Chamorro Rapaccioli fought beside Edén Pastora in 1978-1979 against the Somozist army. Later, disillusioned by the "commanders' betrayal," he joined the struggle against the Sandinista government.

External Support

The UDN-FRN receives indirect support from Costa Rica and some other Latin American governments. External, financial, and logistical support is now decisive for the survival of the group.

Relations with Other Groups

The UDN-FRN maintained close links to and military coordination with the ARDE guerrilla forces. After one year the group separated itself from ARDE.

Nicaragua - Group UDN-FRN
- 647 -

However, ARDE spokesman said in March 1983 that "there are no real differences between the two groups."

Nicaragua - Group Misura
- 648 -

Group or Organization Name

- a) In language of country : Fuerza Revolucionaria Miskito, Sumu, Rama
- b) In English : Miskito, Sumu, Rama Revolutionary Force
- c) Acronym or known name : MISURA

Country of Operation

Nicaragua (the Atlantic coast)

Date of Formation and Original Organization

The group was founded in 1983, by members of the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama Sandinist Unity (Misurasata).

Membership

MISURA claims approximately 15,000 members (a likely over-estimate).

Leadership

- a) Name or assumed name : Steadman Fagoth Muller
- b) Political career : Accused by the Sandinistas of having collaborated with Somoza's security corps, Fagoth left Nicaragua in 1981 and organized the Miskito Indians who had fled their country to several camps on Honduras' Atlantic coast. He founded the Misura Revolutionary Force and was in charge with several attacks on the Sandinista army, including a successful one in May 1983.

Ideological Origin

The group promotes an ethnic-racial ideology that aims at cultural and political autonomy for the Indians in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua - Group Misura
- 649 -

Current Program

The basic objectives of MISURA are the armed struggle against the Sandinista government; the establishment of a democratic régime in Nicaragua; and cultural and political rights for Indian minorities.

Propaganda

Comminiques of MISURA are broadcast by Radio "15 September." The group's propaganda aims to develop the basis of the anti-Sandinista struggle among the oppressed Indian population.

Views on Violence and Revolutionary Warfare

In September 1981, "Misurasata" announced that its forces killed two Cuban alleged "internationalist teachers." The group became more and more active in its struggle against the Sandinista government and its Cuban protectors. In May 1983, Fagoth's "Misura" claimed credit, for the death of "over 1000 Sandinista soldiers" -- a widely exaggerated claim -- and the destruction of seven Soviet-made T-55 tanks.

Military Structure

MISURA guerrilla units are active especially on the Atlantic coast, near the Honduran border, in northern Zelaya Department.

Fighting Motivation and Performance

a) Rank and file : The Indian communities in Nicaragua were humiliated and offended by the brutal campaigns of indoctrination disguised as literacy drives and "socialization" launched by the Sandinistas.

Nicaragua - Group Misura
- 650 -

b) Leadership : The leaders of MISURA refuse to allow a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in Nicaragua.

Training

MISURA guerrillas are trained in Honduras.

Financial Resources

The group is strongly supported by the Indian communities on the Atlantic coast.

Equipment and Supplies

At first, the Miskito Indians fought with hunting rifles, machetes, and bows and arrows. Now they benefit from Honduran and U.S. support (rifles and machine guns).

External Support

As the Sandinistas intensified their repressive campaigns against the Sudans, external aid for the resistance forces became decisive. MISURA receives political, military, and financial support from Honduras.

Relations with Other Groups

a) According to FDN statements the Misurata forces have collaborated with the FDN commandos (the northern Zelaya Department). After Misura Revolutionary Force was founded, the collaboration between the FDN and Fagoth's group was further developed.

Nicaragua - Group Misura

- 651 -

b) Regional : MISURA guerrillas maintain close contacts with the Honduran army. Beside training, they receive financial and logistical support.

Extent and Structure of Areas under Guerrilla Control

The MISURA guerrillas control some northern pockets of swamps and forests.

Impact of Factionalism and Strategic or Tactical Disputes

An official communiqué to "all members of the Misurasata organization" released by the FDN in September 1982 criticized the "dissociative activities" of Brooklyn Rivera in the U.S.A., Costa Rica, Venezuela and other countries. The supreme authorities of the Misurasata decided to exclude Rivera from the organization. Rivera's Indian faction belongs now to the ARDE political-military organization. In 1983, Fagoth founded the Misura Revolutionary Force.