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THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE: A CONTENT ANALYSIS
OF THE EDITORIALS OF FOUR AMERICAN
PRESTIGE NEWSPAPERS FROM 1948 TO 1978

APPROVED:

Wayne A. Sanderson
Ernest A. Sharpe
Carl Linden

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by

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my loving wife and partner in life, Sharon. Without her encouragement, love and support, I could never have completed this research. Her comments and recommendations throughout the writing of this thesis contributed enormously to the scholarship of the final work you read here.

To my parents, Leo and Patricia Warden, of Lubbock, Texas, I also dedicate this work. Their sacrifice and hard work to raise a family and offer to us all those opportunities denied them by fate and fortune are a contribution words can never repay.

To my parents and to my wife, Sharon, I dedicate this work.

M.L.W.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE: A CONTENT ANALYSIS
OF THE EDITORIALS OF FOUR AMERICAN
PRESTIGE NEWSPAPERS FROM 1948 TO 1978

BY

MICHAEL L. WARDEN, B.A.

THESIS

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I am deeply indebted to many people for the opportunities provided me in pursuing an advanced degree at The University of Texas at Austin and, ultimately, in completing this research project and thesis.

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Dr. Wayne Danielson was the Chairman of the School of Mass Communications when I arrived for studies at The University. A nationally acknowledged expert in the technique of content analysis in communication research, Dr. Danielson graciously consented to supervise this research and thesis. He generously provided the time and patience necessary to complete this work several years after my completion of coursework at Texas while thousands of miles away. I will always be deeply indebted to him for his support and supervision.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the contributions made to this work by my wife, Dr. Sharon Parker Warden. Without her encouragement and selfless support, I would never have completed this thesis. Her comments on my drafts were invaluable in keeping this work the academic contribution I hope it to be. More importantly, she was and continues to be my inspiration. To her I have dedicated this work -- I could do no less.

M.L.W.

Arlington, Virginia

March 1984

A B S T R A C T

Unsigned editorials of the New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times were content analyzed to document empirically the editorial treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict by these four prestige newspapers. A random sample of editorials published in these American newspapers from May 14, 1948 (formation of the state of Israel), to September 17, 1978 (conclusion of the Camp David Summit), were coded and content analyzed. Issue treatment and editorial theme toward the Israelis and Arabs were examined over the 31-year period covered by the research. Collected data were compared in the aggregate, between newspapers and over time during both conflict and nonconflict periods to provide long-term insight into press performance in coverage and commentary on the Arab-Israeli Dispute. Ten hypotheses and three research questions were promulgated against which data were analyzed and reported. Major findings of the research showed (1) a solid majority of editorials coded were predominantly "neutral" toward both the Arabs and Israelis, but (2) when the press did take sides these papers consistently favored the Israelis and were critical of the Arabs, and (3) time was a significant variable in the examination of press treatment of the

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Arab-Israeli conflict with pronounced shifts in editorial positions evident among these newspapers in the 31-year history of the dispute, and (4) there were significant differences among the newspapers chosen for study in their editorial treatment of Israel and the Arabs, and (5) on those issues central to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict these prestige papers consistently sided with Israel and were critical of the Arabs. However, this research also showed that the American prestige press has begun seriously to consider favorably the Arab point of view on many of the issues relevant to the resolution of this Middle East conflict. The author concludes that this study clearly demonstrated that long-term trend studies of selected foreign policy issues are possible without sacrificing reliability and replicability. Such trend studies are necessary to provide an essential barometer against which press performance can be measured.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A journalist is the lookout on the bridge of the ship of state. He notes the passing sail, the little things of interest that dot the horizon in fine weather. . . . He peers through fog and storm to give warning of dangers ahead. . . . He is there to watch over the safety and welfare of the people who trust him.

--Joseph Pulitzer (1904)

Pulitzer's view of the role of the press in the conduct of American foreign policy was a lofty one -- the journalist perched high above the ship of state, the welfare of its crew (the American people) entrusted to his sharp eyes ever trained on the horizon. It was the charge of the journalist, in Pulitzer's view, to maintain surveillance of the waters ahead to provide direction for the ship of state in the conduct of the foreign policy of these United States.

How well has Pulitzer's journalist "lookout" -- the personification of the press -- performed in his role as "sentinel" for American foreign policy? Has his performance ensured the safety and welfare of the people, or has their trust been betrayed in the day-to-day conduct of this country's affairs of state?

In this chapter we will examine the role of the press in this country in the foreign policy process.

The Public and American Foreign Policy

A fundamental premise in the examination of foreign policy formulation in the United States is the key role that researchers, scholars and political scientists alike ascribe to the "public" in this policy process.

"The key element in the concept of democracy . . . is the notion that governments must take into account the wishes of the population," wrote Alan Monroe in his examination of Public Opinion in America (1975, p. 4). Monroe observed that:

If one believes the American political system to be at least somewhat democratic, then we would expect the nature of public opinion as an aggregate quantity to have some important implications for those in a position to determine public policy. (1975, p. 242)

Historically the wishes of the population were represented at the ballot box where "the whole people . . . have the right to pass final judgment on important policies" (Gallup, 1939, p. 5). However, with the evolution of modern society into an industrialized, urbanized mass with profound effects not only on lifestyle, but on the manner in which it is governed, as well, the ballot box was insufficient measure of the public's will.

We have a national election every two years only. In a world which moves as rapidly as the modern

world does, it is often desirable to know the people's will on basic policies at more frequent intervals. . . . World events do not wait for elections. We need to know the will of the people at all times. (Gallup, 1939, p. 5)

The will of the people -- public opinion -- provides a framework within which public officials may act and, therefore, has an important effect on the conduct of public policy particularly, for our purpose, on the conduct of American foreign policy (Cohen, 1963; Levering, 1978). Ralph Levering studied the impact of public opinion on the conduct of policy in his work, The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978 (1978). In his examination, he concluded that public opinion, in combination with other political circumstances, has had a profound effect on the conduct of American foreign policy in this century. For example, he notes that public opinion helped prevent America's entry into the League of Nations, deterred the Roosevelt Administration's early efforts to aid the Allied powers before the start of World War II, and shortened American military involvement in both Korea and Vietnam.

If public opinion defines the parameters in which public officials may act, then the wishes of the people are a considerable force to be reckoned with in the policy making process. As Lord Bryce observed in Modern Democracies, public opinion is "the real ruler of America . . . a real force, impalpable as the wind, yet a force which all are

trying to discover and nearly all to obey" (quoted in Gallup, 1939, pp. 8-9).

With the advent of modern, sophisticated polling instruments of this century, public opinion has now become less a force to be discovered as it is a force to be harnessed, for, as Walter Lippman (1945) has observed, "the knowledge of how to create consent will alter every political calculation and modify every political premise" (p. 248).

To hold the reins of public opinion, to harness that great "impalpable force," became the impetus for numerous studies on propaganda and the insidious effects it might have on the unsuspecting public in the wrong hands. Concern also shifted not to just the insidious influences on opinion, but the manner in which this impalpable force, wielded by the modern masses, might be used intelligently. It was this concern that brought together some of the greatest minds of this country to form the Commission on the Freedom of the Press. Their findings were published in A Free and Responsible Press (1947), but the commission's name and the title of their published work are misleading. The commission's central concern was not simply the mass media of communication, as their name implies. Instead, they were concerned with the future development and interplay of what they saw as the three essential actors in the public affairs, public policy arena: the Government, the Press, and the Public. Each of these actors had a role to play

in a modern, democratic society. Each had an impact on the public opinion process within this democratic society.

Markel (1949) observed that the government exerted direct influence on the public and public opinion through official addresses, and indirectly through contact with the press and private groups. The press exerted its influence on public opinion through daily and weekly newspapers delivered to millions of homes; through daily radio broadcasts, motion pictures, magazines, books, and later, television. The public -- a small "attentive" public in the specialized, elite arena of foreign affairs (Almond, 1960; Cohen, 1963) -- were able to exert influence on public opinion through citizens groups such as special interest organizations, study groups, public forums and similar means (Markel, 1949). Each of these actors sought, and continue to seek, influence on public perceptions, choices and attitudes toward foreign policy issues in this country (Markel, 1949; Almond, 1960; Cohen, 1963; Levering, 1978).

The process by which public opinion is formed on foreign policy issues and transmitted to decision makers is central to any discussion of the role of public opinion in a democracy. As Levering (1978) has observed:

Ideally, public opinion in a democracy should be enlightened by governmental leaders and the media; the wishes of this enlightened public should be conveyed clearly to the leaders; and the leaders, as they fashion specific policies, should keep in mind the broad outlines of public sentiment. (p. 31)

As Levering has implied, public opinion requires an information base upon which "enlightened" opinions can be formed. This information base is known as "political" or "public affairs knowledge" and was defined by Oskamp (1977) as "the facts on which public opinion and political attitudes should be based" (p. 99). Cliff Zukin, in his chapter on "Mass Communication and Public Opinion" (in Nimmo and Sanders, 1981), echoed the need for political knowledge in the formulation of public opinion because "the central role accorded the public in a liberal democracy requires at bare minimum information on which judgments about leadership may be made" (p. 359).

In the broad policy arena of foreign affairs, this "political knowledge" is derived from secondary sources -- government, foreign policy organizations, the education system, and the mass media (Levering, 1978) -- because "few of us learn of these [foreign policy] issues by personal experience" (Nimmo and Sanders, 1981, p. 371). Of these secondary sources, "the primary source of information about foreign policy issues continues to be the mass media" (Levering, 1978, p. 35).

Americans get their information (and misinformation) from a variety of sources . . . most important of all . . . is the press -- the organized, commercial channels of mass communication. (Markel, 1949, p. 59)

The link between mass media and public opinion is clear, according to Zukin (in Nimmo and Sanders, 1981):

The mass media and public opinion are inextricably wed. . . . It is primarily through media that citizens monitor their political process, gaining information and insights on the functioning of government, its leaders, and the problems confronting the nation in both international and domestic spheres. (p. 359)

But the use of mass media is not limited to the citizenry alone. The media serve as an important linkage mechanism between the public and government as well. According to Zukin:

Officials monitor the media as a microcosm or sampling of public concerns, searching for the elusive "mood" of the country and seeking the limits to which their actions shall be constrained by the scrutiny and parameters of public opinion. (Nimmo and Sanders, 1981, p. 359)

Thus, the mass media of communication serve a central role in the foreign policy process: first, as an important link in the acquisition of political knowledge upon which the public bases its opinions of policy issues; and second, as both a reflector of the public "mood" to policy-making officials as well as a transmitter of that policy to the public (Cohen, 1963; Rosenau, 1961; Reston, 1966; Hynds, 1975).

Therefore, the mass media represent a vital "opinion-to-policy linkage mechanism" in the conduct of American foreign policy worthy of closer examination (Markel, 1949; Levering, 1978; Paletz and Entman, 1981; Nimmo and Sanders, 1981; Bledsoe et al., 1982).

The Press and Foreign Policy

Of the presses' historical role in the conduct of American foreign policy, James Reston, noted columnist for the New York Times, wrote:

The United States had a press before it had a foreign policy. . . . The American press was telling the country and the world where to get off before there was a State Department. (1967, p. 5)

Reston's observation vividly illustrates the long-standing debate over the role of the press in foreign policy making -- a debate that "reverberates through modern American history" (Cohen, 1963). At the center of the debate are the two competing needs in this policy process: the need of diplomacy for privacy, and the need of democracy for publicity and information upon which the public can make informed decisions (Cohen, 1963). The balancing of these two fundamental yet mutually exclusive needs is critical in the democratic policy process.

Few people are privy to direct observation of and participation in the foreign policy-making process. Yet, "public debate of issues . . . in advance of governmental decisions is essential to the operation of a democratic foreign policy process," according to Rosi (1964).

The mass media perform several critical functions in the policy process. The media bring to the attention of the public a knowledge of remote events in the form of

foreign news. The press also circulates facts and opinions about these events through its news and commentary. These functions contribute to the structuring of the public's ideas and attitudes on specific foreign affairs issues and on the foreign policy process in general (Rosi, 1964).

Cobb and Elder, in their work "Communication and Public Policy" (in Nimmo and Sanders, 1981), observed that the mass media of communication perform three vital functions in the policy process: input, internal, and output functions.

In the input function, the media serve as conduits for demands and active agents in stimulating, filtering and structuring the inputs of the policy process. The media serve a role in this input process by defining both the systematic agenda of public concerns and the formal agenda of government.

In their internal function, the media provide important channels for communication among policy makers and act as sources of readily usable, policy-relevant information.

The media serve an output function as both purveyors and interpreters of the public record. Of the vast amounts of information that is generated by government, that which is truly public tends to be limited to only that information which is distilled by the media and presented by them to the mass public (Nimmo and Sanders, 1981).

In performing these functions the press plays a critical role in establishing the necessary links between the policy makers and the public throughout the policy-making process. Therefore, in a democratic policy process "popular reactions to policy actions and actors are . . . likely to hinge on what the media choose to report and how" (Nimmo and Sanders, 1981).

In this country the press occupy a strategic location as intermediaries in the policy process (Nimmo and Sanders, 1981). This strategic location is crucial because, as Gabriel Almond wrote in his work, The American People and Foreign Policy (1950):

American foreign policy acquires strength to the extent that it is derived from competitive discussion in front of a critical audience capable of judgment and discrimination. (pp. 145-146)

The competitive discussion of foreign policy is influenced markedly by the media. The American media represent not only the essential linkage mechanism between the relevant groups involved in the discussion of foreign policy, but they also air that discussion before the mass and attentive publics and participate in the discussion themselves through their reporting and commentary. The media help to shape this competitive discussion in other ways: through their coverage of foreign events, their selective focus on foreign policy issues, and in their role as contributory agents in the developing of domestic

images of foreign nations. Each of these has an important impact on the shape of American foreign policy.

Foreign events coverage. Press accounts of world events, classified typically as "foreign news," contribute to public and government understanding of the international community. More importantly, for most people these foreign news accounts represent the only foreign contact, acquaintance and knowledge of many areas of the world (Reigordski and Anderson, 1960). It is on the basis of this information and other non-media variables that many people form their opinions and develop their "relevant maps of reality" of much of the world (Lippmann, 1945; Cohen, 1963).

In his examination of foreign news in United States media, Frank L. Kaplan (1979) wrote:

To serve the public fully it should be recognized that responsible overseas reporting must be truthful, comprehensive, and well balanced, representative of the entire international scene and not merely a few events and occurrences chosen essentially according to the same criteria used to select domestic news. (p. 233)

Instead of finding foreign news in U.S. media that was truthful, comprehensive and well balanced, Kaplan found "neglect [by the press] in comprehensively informing the American population about the global scene" (1979, p. 234). Of his findings he wrote:

If it were possible to convert news content into calories, today's foreign news diet served by most U.S. newspapers and broadcast outlets would waver on the borderline between undernourishment and starvation. (p. 233)

Studies have consistently shown that United States media carry a disproportionately smaller amount of foreign news than do their European, Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin counterparts (Markham, 1961; Abu-Lughod, 1962; Hart, 1963; Hart, 1966; Dajani and Donohue, 1973; Lent, 1977). What news is carried in the press does not, as Kaplan (1979) recommended, represent the entire international scene.

Instead of balance, the U.S. media portrays a "distorted world picture," with emphasis on only some nations with little or no exposure of others (Hester, 1973; Gerbner and Marvanyi, 1977; Rimmer, 1981). When the press does report foreign news it tends to report the superficial, the trivial, focusing largely on violence, disasters and conflict. This type of foreign news coverage results in a substantive and chronological discontinuity of foreign affairs in the American press (Cohen, 1960; Cohen, 1963; Lent, 1977; Rosenblum, 1977; Pinch, 1978; Lent and Rao, 1979; Kaplan, 1979; Rimmer, 1981).

Of this coverage of foreign events, Kaplan (1979) concluded:

The press continues to play up the spot and sensational news perpetuated by crisis reporting and hit-and-run journalism, practices fire engine and deadline-every-minute reporting even in foreign affairs. (p. 243)

Foreign issues. The media's influence is not limited to the transmission of factual information on world events. The American reading, listening and viewing publics

learn how much importance to attach to a foreign policy issue or event from the emphasis placed on that issue or event by the mass media. Shaw and McCombs (1977) contend that the media, to a considerable degree, determine the "important" issues in their selection and presentation of the news. In this way, the media set the "agenda" of public and, increasingly, private discussion.

The media, in this agenda-setting role, help to convey to the public the range of foreign policy priorities under consideration by policy-making officials. They also convey to the public the support and opposition for specific policies and help to focus public attention. In this role the press provides a guide to the public on what foreign policy issues they should be thinking about (Cohen, 1963; Levering, 1978).

In their agenda setting, the press are active participants in the governmental process. They precipitate action by focusing attention on an issue or issues. They influence policy in the way they present the facts regarding policies under consideration. And, according to Paletz and Entman (1981), the press:

Have the power to decide which issues will be brought before the public, the terms in which they will be presented, and who will participate, under what conditions, in the presentation. (pp. 5-6)

In addition to their coverage of world events and the structuring of the public agenda in foreign affairs,

the press play a role with long-term impact on the conduct of American foreign policy -- a role in developing images of nations held by the public.

Foreign images. The images of nations are received at least partially through the foreign affairs coverage of the mass media (Merrill, 1962; Lee, 1979). These images have an effect on the international relations between countries and the policies we formulate toward those countries.

Historian Melvin Small (1974) studied the media's role in portraying national images in international affairs and published his findings in an article entitled "How we learned to love the Russians: American media and the Soviet Union during World War II." Small's effort was intended to determine "how the mass media transformed the enemy of yesterday (Russia) into the friend of tomorrow." He found improved public opinion of the Soviets throughout the war "closely paralleling or reflecting the positive, more balanced image of Russia presented in the mass media."

While no direct causal relationship could be definitively established in his limited study, Small nevertheless contended that:

What they [the American public] read and heard should explain more about their attitudes, images and perceptions -- the nine-tenths of the iceberg which lay below their opinions as expressed in the polls. (1974, p. 457)

The susceptibility to change of international images demonstrated by Small is because these images are typically

gross, poorly organized, and ill-articulated attitude structures that have been developed without first-hand contact with the image object (Janis and Smith, 1965; Smith, 1973). The sources of information used in the formulation of these images are usually only those channels provided in society, such as mass media channels. Because of this, Smith (1973) observed, these international images "provide a potentially unique susceptibility to change."

Images that citizens hold of other nations and people affect public opinion of those nations and peoples. In turn, those opinions held by the public have influence over the government's political, economic and social relationships with those other nations (Smith, 1973). Thus, international images and a nation's foreign policies are reciprocal and inseparably linked (Lee, 1979). The mass media's role in the maintenance or changing of those international images is crucial because, according to Lee (1979), "the press has the potential to create the image either way: good or bad."

The Problem

This examination of the American foreign policy process has shown that a preeminent role is ascribed to the public in defining the limits in which foreign affairs may be conducted in a democratic society. The Government,

the Press, and the Public are the three key actors in this policy process with the press serving as a central linkage mechanism in transmitting public demands to government and, in turn, articulating government policy to the public.

In foreign affairs the media play a particularly significant role in the policy process through their transmission of foreign news to the government and public, their shaping of the foreign policy issue agenda, and in developing (or changing) the international images held by the public of foreign nations or peoples.

Levering (1978) and others have noted that the amount of space allocated to the coverage of foreign news in the American press is meager. Only 10 to 15 percent of news space is devoted to foreign affairs in the mass media (Levering, 1978). The media must, therefore, be highly selective in the choice and emphasis of those issues and events that will be afforded presentation to the mass public. This journalistic reality has significant influence on the foreign policy process. According to Cohen (1961):

[T]he severe limitation of space allocated to foreign policy news, permitting the publication of only a handful of stories each day, lends especial importance to those few items that are printed. They become the chief elements in the portrayal of the foreign policy world, and thus build up for their readers a comparably limited picture of the scope and character of international political relations. (p. 118)

Concern, then, turns to what information is being presented to the public by the mass media and how it is

being presented. Is the daily diet of foreign affairs in the press sufficient to develop informed opinions on important foreign policy issues, or, as Levering (1978) has claimed, is it often based on "insufficient knowledge and tainted by partisan motives"?

Media research to date has focused not on specific foreign policy issues, but instead has examined foreign policy events. These event analyses provide little insight into the long-term mass media communications on continuing foreign policy issues and can provide only fleeting glimpses into the presses' record on important foreign policy issues.

This study endeavors to document the long-term content of mass media communications through the examination of a single foreign policy issue over time. That issue chosen for systematic study is the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

In the murky waters of foreign policy, where has Pulitzer's journalist "lookout" guided the American ship of state? Has this "sentinel" of American foreign policy ensured the safety and welfare of the people, or has he failed to warn of pending dangers because, as Bledsoe et al. (1982) have claimed: "In the world as presented by mass media, the foam on the sea is often more important than the sea" (p. 474).

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The Middle East

The Arab oil embargo in November 1973 brought the Middle East and particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict to the front doorstep of most Americans (Daugherty and Warden, 1979). Americans were suddenly made aware of the strategic military, political and economic importance of this distant corner of the world. The threat of Soviet intervention in this regional conflict, the worldwide alert of United States military forces, and the spectre of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear confrontation dramatically highlighted the importance of this volatile region to American security, prosperity and continued existence.

But American interests in the Middle East spanned many years prior to those momentous events of 1973. In his book America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter, Robert W. Stookey, noted foreign service officer and an authority on U.S.-Arab relations, wrote:

[T]he United States had experienced diplomatic and commercial contact with the Arab world for nearly two centuries, engaging in an inconclusive war with the Barbary pirates, sending out a dedicated band of missionaries and educators to Arab lands, and entering a little belatedly into the

scramble for Middle Eastern petroleum. (1975, p. v)

The United States was, in fact, instrumental in supporting the League of Nations' system of mandates in the region after World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. These new states, "Mandates" distributed among the victorious Allies, gave rise to the nations of the area we now know as the contemporary Middle East. With one notable exception -- the Jewish State of Israel -- those boundaries and nations are largely the countries of the Middle East as we know them today.

However, it has been the United States' role in the establishment and support of a Jewish homeland in this region that has entangled this country in the central issue that dominates relations between the U.S. and the states of the Middle East -- the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Because the establishment of the Jewish State did not take place until 1948, American foreign policy in the contemporary Middle East has had a relatively brief history. Though brief, the history of relations between the United States and the Middle East is important because, as Bill and Leiden observed in their book Politics in the Middle

East:

Today the center of the world's power structure is visibly and inexorably shifting toward the direction of the Middle East. . . . [I]t is catapulting the area into a position as the world's new heartland. The ancient lands of pyramids,

pharaohs, prophets, and poets is in the midst of a remarkable renaissance. The area's blinding transformations carry an international impact. (1979, pp. v-vi)

The Roots of Conflict

Establishment of the British Mandate over Palestine by the League of Nations in September 1923 provided the seeds from which a "national home" for the Jews would blossom. That mandate included a preamble which incorporated the Balfour Declaration -- a letter from then British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild, leader of the British Zionist movement. This "Balfour Declaration" had promised that Great Britain would support the creation of a Jewish homeland. Its incorporation in the preamble of the British Mandate over Palestine after World War I assured the implementation of Zionist dreams for a home in historic Eretz Israel, the Biblical land of Israel.

Under the British Mandate, Zionists moved into Palestine, increasing the numbers of Jews inhabiting those ancient lands. As the Jewish population rose, so did tension between them and Palestinian Arabs. Conflicting claims by Jews and Arabs over the right to occupy portions of Palestine led to political maneuvering, terrorism, and bitter strife. The conflict became bloody with civil disorder erupting over the right of more European Jews to enter and make a home in Palestine, "displacing"

Palestinian Arabs. As a result of the violent civil disorder Great Britain clamped down on immigration, setting a quota on the number of Jews who would be allowed to immigrate to Palestine. The restriction coincided with the outbreak of World War II and Nazi persecution and extermination campaigns against Jews throughout Nazi-occupied Europe (Sachar, 1976; Jwaideh, 1977).

This "Holocaust" created an outpouring of support within Western nations who, led by the United States, pressured Great Britain to lift restrictions on Jewish immigration to its mandate Palestine. President Truman pushed for free settlement of Palestine by Jews, and the U.S. Congress supported his efforts.

The eruption of civil violence between Arabs and Jews in Palestine and British inability to resolve the problem resulted in an appeal to the United Nations to settle the "Palestine question." With strong support and endorsement of the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the U.N. ratified a plan to divide Palestine into two separate states -- one Jewish, the other Arab -- with the Holy City of Jerusalem placed under a permanent U.N. trusteeship and preserved as an "international zone."

With ratification of the plan, Britain set May 15, 1948, as the termination date of its mandate over

Palestine. The deadline for establishment of a Jewish homeland was now set, and the rivalry between Arab and Jew over the partitioned lands led to fierce intercommunal clashes, riots, terrorism and, for all intents and purposes, civil war (Sachar, 1976; Khouri, 1976; Wormser, 1981).

Arab states planned on military intervention to prevent the partitioning of Palestine, a move they had decried. Jews in Palestine put in place the necessary quasi-governmental institutions to operate and defend a fledgling state threatened by attack from Arab states. Both Arab and Jew alike were waiting for the fateful day when the British mandate would end. On that last day, the British lowered the Union Jack, and on May 14 at 4:06 p.m., Ben-Gurion read the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel -- independence that would take place at midnight that night. Troops from the Transjordanian "Arab League" were already converging on Jerusalem. Britain's high commissioner boarded a vessel for Cyprus at the port of Haifa and the British mandate came to an end. In the political and military vacuum left behind by the British departure, war erupted between the new state of Israel and her Arab neighbors, and thus was born the "Arab-Israeli Conflict."

The Arab-Israeli Wars

Since that declaration of independence in May 1948,

Israel and her Arab neighbors have been embroiled in four full-scale wars: the first in 1948, known as the Palestine War or the War of Independence; the Suez War of 1956; the Six Day War of 1967; and the October or Yom Kippur War of 1973.

The Palestine War of 1948. The Palestine War was remarkable in that the new state of Israel had no organized, trained, or equipped professional army. In contrast, the Arab Legion of Transjordan was well equipped, British trained and well led (Bill and Leiden, 1979). The Arab Legion was joined by elements of the Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian and Iraqi armies as well as Palestinian Arab freedom fighters and contingents from the Saudi Arabian Army attached to Egyptian units. With Israel's declaration of independence, these armies quickly advanced to take control of those areas of Palestine inhabited by Arabs. A swift victory was expected, as evidenced in this quote attributed to an Arab Legion officer:

How beautiful was this day, May 14 [1948] when the whole world held its breath anticipating the entry of seven Arab armies into Palestine to redeem it from the Zionists and the West. On this day Arab forces broke forth from all sides and stood as one man to demand justice and to please God, conscience and the sense of duty. (in Sachar, 1976, p. 315)

These Arab forces were regular military organizations equipped with modern military weapons of that time. Facing them was a civilian militia of Israel composed of

the loosely tied units of Haganah (means "defense"), the Irgun (a commando-type Jewish anti-British terrorist organization), and the Lehi, or Stern Group (a small extremist group). According to Chaim Herzog's account of those times:

The avowed and openly proclaimed purpose of the Arab forces was to drive the Jewish population into the sea: the new Jewish state found itself fighting a war for its very existence -- a war that was to become its War of Independence. (1982, p. 24)

The infant Israel defense force did not fare well in the beginning against the Arab armies which quickly occupied areas that had been, generally, assigned to the Palestinian Arabs under the U.N. partition resolution. The Israelis were put on the defensive and turned to the United Nations Security Council for help. However, after a series of U.N.-arranged cease-fires in which the Israelis were able to take advantage of the respite to rearm, retrain and reorganize, the shooting war had decidedly shifted to Israel's favor, and fighting stopped on January 7, 1949. A series of armistice agreements were signed by the individual Arab states over the following months, and, finally, Israel's independence had been secured.

Israel now occupied almost one-third more territory than had been envisioned under the ill-fated U.N. partition plan of 1947. The Palestinian Arabs were left homeless and absorbed into greater Transjordan and Egypt. A Palestinian state, also envisioned by the U.N. under its

1947 partition plan, never emerged from the Palestine War of 1948 to 1949.

Suez War of 1956. No peace treaties were ever signed between the new state of Israel and her Arab neighbors. Thus, prospects for continued strife remained. Of this, Azzam Pasha, the first secretary of the Arab League, remarked:

As long as we do not make peace with the Zionists, the war is not over; and as long as the war is not over there is neither victor nor vanquished. As soon as we recognize the existence of the state of Israel, we admit by this act that we are vanquished. (Quoted in Safran, 1969)

In addition to refusing to accept Israel's existence, denying recognition and exchange of ambassadors, the Arabs instituted boycotts of Israeli goods; blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's lifeline to the East; and disallowed the transit of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal.

The aftermath of the defeat of the Arab armies also brought fundamental changes to many of those Arab states which went to war against Israel. As a result of defeat, Arab popular anger focused on their political leadership. The results were several major changes in the governments of those states which had failed in war against the Jewish state. Syria's government was overthrown in the first of several army coups in 1949. King Abdullah of Transjordan was assassinated in 1951 by a Palestinian Arab refugee. King Farouk of Egypt was overthrown by military officers in a coup in 1952.

As Stookey (1975) observed, "Arab honor and dignity lost by military defeat could be recovered only through future military victory." Revolutionary changes were taking place throughout the Arab world, and a sense of unity of purpose became evident. The Arab "national purpose," the rallying cry around which Arab nationalism focused in these times, was the call for the destruction of Israel. In April 1956, Egypt's new President Nasser, along with the leaders of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, formed a joint military command against Israel. In October 1956 another joint command was formed between Egypt, Syria and Jordan, "the principal concern of which is the war of destruction against Israel" (Spanier and Elowitz, 1975).

Egypt, now aligned with the Soviet Union in the supply of arms, economic and technical assistance, and alienated from the West by the rejection of support to build the Aswan High Dam, moved to nationalize the Suez Canal. The conflict between Britain and Egypt over the nationalization of the British-owned canal company precipitated a "preemptive strike" by Israel against Egypt in collaboration with the British and French (Spanier and Elowitz, 1975; Bill and Leiden, 1979).

In a surprise move, the Israelis seized the Sinai and the strategic coastal town of Sharm el-Sheikh overlooking the Strait of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel's access to the Gulf was now assured with control

of the Sinai and Sharm el-Sheikh. But the gains were short-lived. Under pressure from the United States, Israel was forced to withdraw from the Sinai and return Sharm el-Sheikh. British and French troops were also forced to depart, leaving the Suez Canal in the hands of the Egyptians. U.N. troops were introduced in the Sinai along the border between Israel and Egypt and at Sharm el-Sheikh. The Gulf of Aqaba was open to Israeli shipping once again.

The Israeli, British and French withdrawal bolstered the image of Nasser in the Arab world and forged stronger, deeper ties between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Arab unity, promoted by Nasser, would now be dedicated to the "restoration of the Arab rights in Palestine" or the "liquidation of the Zionist aggression in Palestine" (Wormser, 1981). What followed the war over the Suez was nearly eleven years of relative "peace" in the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Six Day War of 1967. While the Soviets had rearmed the Egyptians with more modern weaponry after the 1956 war, the early 1960s saw the introduction of U.S. arms to Israel as part of official American military assistance for the first time. Previously, the U.S. had been supplying arms only to pro-Western Arab governments, and Israel had depended primarily on the French for the supply of modern arms and aircraft. However, with limited American arms sales to Israel beginning in 1962 and the French decision in 1967 to cut off arms sales to Israel, the United States

became the Jewish state's chief arms supplier (Wormser, 1981).

The war of 1967 was instigated, in part, by two grave decisions made by Egyptian President Nasser. The first was that he demanded the evacuation of United Nations forces from the Sinai and Sharm el-Sheikh on May 18, 1967. With Egyptian troops close to Israel's border once again and in control of Sharm el-Sheikh, Nasser announced his second fateful decision -- to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba. Egypt was now in a position to deny passage of Israeli ships or vessels of any nation carrying strategic materials to the Israeli port of Elath. Israel had repeatedly stated since 1957 that interference with shipping through the Straits of Tiran into the Gulf of Aqaba would be considered "an act of war" (Stookey, 1975; Wormser, 1981; Herzog, 1982).

After the failure of both the U.S. and the U.N. to abrogate tensions, a third war between the Arabs and Israelis began in the early hours of June 5, 1967. An early morning air strike by the Israeli air force virtually destroyed all Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian air forces on the ground. Israel swiftly secured vast amounts of Arab territories in sweeping military victories including the Gaza Strip, Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh, the Golan Heights, the West Bank of Jordan and the Old City of Jerusalem. At 6:30 p.m., June 10th, a cease-fire took effect that ended what became known as the "Six Day War" (Stookey,

1975; Khouri, 1976; Quandt, 1977; Sachar, 1981).

In intervening years, both Egypt and Syria were rapidly rearmed by the Soviets. A "War of Attrition" was launched against the Israelis by the embittered Egyptians. The stateless Palestinians, with massive support from Arab governments and the Soviets, created a fighting force of their own and began a wave of terrorism that would reach beyond the confines of the region, touching the world (Havens, Leiden and Smith, 1975).

Other events brought sweeping changes to the region. In September 1970, President Nasser died and was replaced by a relative unknown, Anwar Sadat. Sadat set about to consolidate his power, and in doing so ordered the armies of Soviet advisors out of Egypt in 1972. He also planned for a daring, coordinated strike in concert with Syria against Israel to retake Arab territories, restore confidence of the Egyptian armed forces and people, and to "explode forever the myth of an invincible Israel" (Sadat, 1978).

The stage was set for the fourth Arab-Israeli war.

October War of 1973. At 2 p.m. on October 6, 1973, elements of Syrian and Egyptian armed forces, in a coordinated, well planned attack on two fronts, struck poorly manned and ill-prepared Israeli positions in the Sinai and Golan. The Egyptians smashed across the Suez Canal,

destroying large numbers of Israeli armor and aircraft with their Soviet-supplied anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. Syrian troops took strategic ground to the north, breaking through thin Israeli defenses that, as yet, had no reinforcements available to stem the tidal wave of Syrian armored advances (Sachar, 1976; Bill and Leiden, 1979).

But the Arab armies, unable to maintain the momentum of their early successes, were eventually outmaneuvered by the Israelis. Both the Arabs and Israelis received massive supplies of war materiel from their respective patrons, the Soviet Union and the United States, in an effort to tip the balance of the fighting. The Israelis were ultimately successful in breaking through the Egyptian advances and surrounded the Arab army in the Sinai, crossed the Suez and threatened Cairo. To the north, the Golan was retaken after heavy losses on both sides, and Israeli units advanced to within 20 miles of the Syrian capital of Damascus (Stookey, 1975; Bill and Leiden, 1979; Wormser, 1981).

Disregarding a cease-fire called by the U.N. on October 22, 1973, both the Egyptians and the Israelis maneuvered their forces to improve their positions. This prompted a deeper superpower involvement in the war beyond the resupplying of billions of dollars in arms. Both Soviet and American fleets moved closer to the eastern Mediterranean

and the Soviets threatened unilateral intervention in the conflict between the Arabs and Israelis to enforce a cease-fire and prevent the destruction of the surrounded Egyptian army in Sinai. In response, the United States placed all its military forces throughout the world on alert, including its nuclear forces, to counter Russia's threatened intervention. Suddenly this regional conflict had been elevated to a global scale. But the global impact was soon to be more evident.

Angered by what they saw as clear partiality toward Israel by the United States, Arab oil exporting states cut off shipments of petroleum to the U.S. and other Western nations. By this act, the Arabs clearly demonstrated to the West the price of continued support of Israel. For many the lesson was not lost.

For many Americans, the Middle East was not a pressing fact of life until the oil embargo in late 1973. It was no longer only a region caught up in squabbles among its member nations, but a region that could touch the life of every American and threaten our lifestyle. (Rostow, 1976, p. xiii)

Although a cease-fire agreement was finally negotiated and signed on November 11, 1973, after a series of agreements forged through the "shuttle diplomacy" of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Arab-Israeli Conflict was far from over. The 1973 war, as the three wars before it, was inconclusive. It resolved none of the basic issues fundamental to the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Issues of the Arab-Israeli Dispute

According to Bill and Leiden (1979), there are six basic issues at the core of the Arab-Israeli Dispute: the Palestinian problem, recognition of the state of Israel, the right to secure borders, status of Israeli-occupied Arab territories, status of Jerusalem, and the right of navigation through international waters. Each issue is worthy of a more detailed explanation.

Palestinian problem. Central to the resolution of the conflict is the problem of what to do with the almost four million Palestinians who, as a result of the Arab-Israeli wars, remain stateless. The Arabs claim that (1) the Palestinian Arabs were driven from their homes by the Zionists, (2) that they have a right to return to those homes they were driven from, (3) they should receive compensation for seized properties, and (4) that no final settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute can be achieved until Palestinian Arab "rights" are recognized. The Israelis counter Arab claims with arguments that (1) the original Palestinian Arab refugees left their homes and property voluntarily, (2) that it is politically and militarily (from an internal security standpoint) impossible to repatriate refugees, (3) it is economically unfeasible for Israel with her high foreign debt to pay the "inflated" Arab claims for lost property, and (4) the establishment of any

Palestinian "entity" in Israel or contiguous to it (such as on the West Bank) would establish an entity dedicated to the subversion and destruction of Israel and would be utterly impossible to contemplate.

The resolution of these two seemingly intractable views on this single issue is evidence of the complexity of any resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. But, there are more issues.

Recognition. For the Israelis, an issue of equal importance to them as the Palestinian problem is of importance to the Arabs is that of legal recognition of the legitimate right to exist for the state of Israel. The exchange of ambassadors between Israel and her Arab neighbors, flying of flags at the consulates and embassies in each other's countries, and free travel between nations by citizens of each state are all fundamental to Arab acceptance of the legitimate right of Jews to a national homeland in the state called Israel. Recognition -- acceptance of a Jewish state -- is of comparable emotional status to the Israelis as "acceptance" of the Palestinians is to the Arabs.

Security of borders. Both Israelis and Arabs view with suspicion the territorial aspirations of the other. Each believes that the other is bent on aggressiveness and expansionism. Israel feels "surrounded" by millions of hostile Arabs, vowing the destruction of the Jewish

state and promising, as Nasser did, that "Jews would be thrown in the sea." Raids across the borders of each state by "terrorists," "guerrillas," "freedom fighters," or regular troops for whatever purpose agitate the uneasiness of Israeli and Arab alike who fear that their borders are not "secure" from attack. The use of military and paramilitary action to achieve political objectives has been characteristic of both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. To guarantee "secure borders" for both the Arab states and Israel would reduce the fear that compels each to defend and offend against the other.

Occupied territories. Although many Arabs view Israel itself as "occupied Palestine," for purposes of this discussion occupied territories are those lands seized by Israel in war and occupied by her in dispute with Jordan, Syria and Egypt. Possession of these territories by Israel provides a "buffer" between the Jewish state and her "hostile" neighbors. These lands also provide room for expansion of the Israeli population, for agriculture and industry. Possession also prevents a resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute because, as Bill and Leiden (1979) observed, no Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian government could ever abandon Arab lands taken in war, negotiated away in peace, and survive as a government. Popular Arab sentiment would never approve.

Jerusalem. The status of the Old City of Jerusalem,

with its deep religious significance to Jews, Christians and Muslims alike, is a question that incites emotional fervor in both Israelis and Arabs. The careful balancing of religious interests is a delicate issue in the political solution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Right of navigation. Of strategic importance to Israel is the continued access to sea lines of communication to both the Mediterranean on the West and the Indian Ocean to the East. Access to each is contingent on free passage through the Suez Canal of Israeli and Israel-bound ships, and unencumbered access to the Gulf of Aqaba through the Straits of Tiran off Sharm el-Sheikh. The blockade of Israeli shipping by Arab states resulted in wars in both 1956 and 1967.

These six issues are fundamental to any examination of the Middle East, because, as Bill and Leiden (1979) have written:

These . . . are the essential political issues. Together they constitute the Arab-Israeli Dispute. A reconciliation of viewpoints on these issues would constitute a settlement of the dispute itself. (p. 329)

The Press and the Arab-Israeli Dispute

How, then, have the American press treated these issues and the overall Arab-Israeli Dispute since its genesis in 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel?

Treatment of these issues by the press, as shown in Chapter I, will determine both the quantity and quality of information that Americans receive on this critical foreign policy issue. Literature supports the contention that what Americans read, see and hear in the mass media is important to the development of public attitudes on foreign policy issues. Public attitudes, in turn, set the parameters of acceptance within which foreign policy-making officials must function. An understanding, then, of the presses' record on this important issue is fundamental to any analysis of American foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

A thorough examination of the literature reviewing press treatment of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict yielded works of two types: subjective and objective studies. Subjective analyses, which usually covered isolated "events," sought to compare media reports and commentary about those events with the "truth." Most subjective analyses can be easily identified by the medium in which they are published -- usually pro-Arab or pro-Jewish periodicals and journals. Still others can be categorized as subjective by the presumed nationalistic motivations behind the research and researcher as evidenced in this dedication in one study:

This work is dedicated to all of those who have struggled and those who have been struggling to liberate beloved Palestine. (Abu-Helu, 1978)

The claims of these subjective studies run the gamut of opinion and conclusions on press performance. Some attribute American press treatment of the Middle East to "Jewish control" of the media. For example, Ahmad Baha el-Din (in Jabara and Terry, 1971) claimed:

There is undoubtedly a deep bias in the attitude of the Western media toward the Arab question, and it is important for us to understand its roots and what keeps it alive and flourishing. The easiest explanation is that Zionists control world media. This may in a sense be true, but it is one truth among many. (p. 79)

The charge of "Zionist control" is repeated in Howe and Trott's (1977) The Power Peddlers: Lobbyists Mold American Foreign Policy:

Jews head two of the three major networks and own the Washington Post, New York Times, and the New York Post. . . . [But] the main Jewish pressure comes from editorship at all levels, not ownership, which is overwhelmingly non-Jewish. (pp. 277-278)

Contrasted with these criticisms of the press for a pro-Israeli, pro-Jewish bias are claims by Leon T. Hadar (1980) about the New York Times having "aggravated pro-Sadat feelings in Washington." He wrote:

The Times makes a consistent effort to color newswriting and editorial comments for the purposes of weakening American Jewish support for a strong and independent Israel. (p. 56)

Or, Douglas Feith's (1980) article, "Israel, the Post, and the Shaft," in which he claims that in the Washington Post: "The Israeli has been portrayed as the

antagonist of peace [and] the Arabs laugh all the way to the bank" (p. 63).

Despite these charges and counter charges, most subjective studies are critical of the American press performance in its treatment of the Middle East. Most charge that the press is overwhelmingly pro-Israeli (Abu-Laban and Zeadey, 1975; Crow, 1957; Farmer, 1968; Ghareeb, 1976; Ghareeb, 1977; Ibrahim, 1974). Still others have attacked the stereotype presented of the Israelis compared to those presented of the Arabs in the media (Ibrahim, 1974; Suleiman, 1974; Ghareeb, 1977; Jabara and Terry, 1977; Hudson and Wolfe, 1980). In decrying the image of the Arab as presented in the media, Jack Shaheen wrote:

The Arab is depicted as pimp, cheat and backstabber, whether lurking among the shadows in the bazaars of Cairo or sitting in a tent in the middle of the desert surrounded by oil wells. All the worst possible images . . . help to perpetuate the myth that there are no heroic Arabs, only heroic Exoduses. (Quoted in Hudson and Wolfe, 1980, p. 54)

Still other press critics point to omissions of the media in their coverage of the Middle East as evidence of "anti-Arab bias." Janice Terry (1971) used this form of criticism when she contrasted the publication of an editorial in the New York Times laudatory of the visit of the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra with the absence of any mention of the arrival of Egyptian art treasures in that same paper. Such an omission was, in her estimation, evidence of an anti-Arab bias in the New York Times.

To balance the polemics of these subjective "qualitative" works, there have appeared several objective, scientific "quantitative" efforts in the study of press performance in treatment of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Dispute. A detailed examination of these efforts will shed more light on the controversy of whether there is, in fact, a prejudice in the American press in its treatment of the Arabs and Israelis.

Media Bias - Some Objective Studies

Mohammed Batrouka (1961) examined "The Editorial Attitudes of the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor Toward the Arab-Israeli Dispute." His content analysis of editorials spanned 18 months of the conflict covering January 1, 1955, through June 30, 1956. In his analysis Batrouka found that of these two prestige papers, the Times was "more favorably disposed toward Israel than towards the Arabs" in its editorials and "more unfavorably disposed toward the Arab bloc than it was toward Israel." Favorable values were more frequently attributed to the Israelis than to the Arabs in Batrouka's study of these papers.

Michael Suleiman (1965) studied Middle East news coverage in seven American news magazines over a six-month period in 1956, from July through December. This period included the Suez War of 1956, as did Batrouka's (1961)

earlier research of newspaper editorials. Suleiman's study was intended to test the validity of charges by Arabs of the American presses' "complete subservience to the will of Zionists" in their coverage of the Middle East. His study included an examination of editorials and confirmed Batrouka's (1961) finding that the majority of editorials, even in news magazines, were "anti-Arab and/or pro-Israeli." He observed:

The overwhelming majority of all editorials written [n=24] were in defense of, in sympathy with, or in admiration of Israel, often attacking the Arabs at the same time. . . . [N]o one seemed to dare condemn Israel or treat it harshly. (1965, p. 20)

Suleiman's study, he concluded, confirmed the Arab allegation that the United States sees the Middle East conflict "through Israeli eyes."

The Six Day War of 1967 was the object of three studies -- Nishan Havandijian (1972), Samir Badih Zaitoon (1970), and Charles Wagner (1973).

Havandijian's (1972) thesis, "Jews, Arabs, The Press and the 1967 Crisis," was a qualitative comparison of coverage of the 1967 war by the Moscow News and the New York Times. He found in its coverage of the war that the Times "accentuated the traditional American pledges for the safeguard of Israel." The unpopular image of the Arabs was attributed to "overheated statements by Arab officials [which] have not really helped to bring about

a cool, reasonable image." The Egyptians were blamed by the Times for prompting war with Israel by massing troops on Israel's border and the illegal blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Arab armies, according to Havandijian's analysis, were treated in the press as lacking the sense of coherence. The Soviet Union was accused by the American press of adventurism, and Nasser's leadership of Egypt was "harshly evaluated." The results of Havandijian's examination of the Times' coverage of the Six Day War, he concluded, "added fuel to the Arab howls that America is thoroughly pro-Israel."

Quality (prestige) and nonquality (mass appeal) newspapers were compared in Zaitoon's (1970) thesis, "The 1967 Middle East Crisis in Four American Newspapers." Zaitoon employed content analysis techniques to compare coverage of the Six Day War by the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times (quality papers) with that of the New York Post and Honolulu Star Bulletin (nonquality papers). Zaitoon hypothesized that there would be differences between quality and nonquality papers in the quantity of coverage and in bias shown toward either side of the conflict. He found that quality papers carried more news of the Middle East conflict than did nonquality papers, but there was no statistically significant difference in the numbers of opinion columns devoted to the crisis carried in the quality and nonquality papers. His hypothesis that quality

papers would be less biased and more balanced than non-quality papers also did not satisfy statistical tests for significance.

Zaitoon also found that all papers in his study had carried more anti-Arab items than they did pro-Arab ones. Items neutral toward the Arabs outnumbered pro-Arab items. On the other hand, Israel had more items favorable to it than unfavorable printed in the newspapers he examined. However, unfavorable items outnumbered neutral ones for the Israelis in these papers. While an imbalance did exist in all the newspapers, they varied in their biases, according to Zaitoon. He found that the New York Times was the least pro-Israel and anti-Arab of the newspapers studied. The Los Angeles Times was the most pro-Israel and anti-Arab of all the newspapers.

The third study to incorporate a period encompassing the Six Day War of 1967 was reported by Charles Wagner in his chapter, "Elite American Newspaper Opinion and the Middle East: Commitment Versus Isolation" (in Beling, 1973). In his work, Wagner content analyzed the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post from May 1967 through December 1969. Wagner's study of newspaper opinion of the Middle East was to test a hypothesized "disengagement, neo-isolationist phenomenon" in American foreign affairs. A second taxonomy of Wagner's study of these three prestige papers was an examination of their

editorial treatment of the Middle East utilizing theme to measure opinion of U.S. commitment versus disengagement in that part of the world. In his study of editorials, Wagner found a generally pro-Israeli tone with the editorials of the New York Times showing a larger "supportive of Israel" posture than either the Los Angeles Times or the Washington Post. The Los Angeles Times was at the other extreme of the thematic continuum, advocating support for the Arabs, while the Post was somewhere in the middle. While all three newspapers showed a high sympathy for Israel, according to Wagner, the predominant theme was one urging the United States to play an active role in negotiating a settlement between the Arabs and Israelis. Wagner observed that newspaper opinion, as expressed in its editorials, was not a given constant but was situationally responsive. Therefore, the newspapers were more supportive of Israel in times of crisis than in periods when the Jewish state was not perceived as being threatened by outside forces.

In related areas of research, two other studies were performed that examined news reporting from the Middle East. V. M. Mishra (1979) studied news from the Middle East in five U.S. media (four prestige papers and one network news program). Mishra examined three weeks of coverage by these media in 1971 and found only a low level of interest in the Middle East. Only about five percent

of all news items in these media dealt with the Middle East, according to Mishra. Given the time period and U.S. preoccupation with other world events, the low attention level was understandable, he concluded. However, Mishra found that interest by these media in the Middle East was focused primarily on the Arab-Israeli conflict. News items carried by these five media were generally "neutral" and exhibited evidence of a "professional journalism" approach to the region.

E. A. Padelford's (1979) dissertation on regional press reporting and commentary on the Arab-Israeli conflict examined a cross-section of more than 100 newspapers over a three-year period, from 1970 through 1972. He found little difference in news coverage or editorialization in the regional press he surveyed. News reporting was balanced, he concluded, with instances of bias "so rare that bias may be said to not exist." In his examination of their editorials, Padelford found opinion decisively in Israel's favor over the Arabs on the editorial pages of the U.S.'s regional newspapers. However, he noted a continued improvement in the "Arab image" as portrayed in the press editorials and, on occasion, criticism in editorials for Israel, although that criticism was "usually muted."

In a more recent study of regional press treatment of the Middle East, Eviathar Ben-Zedeff (1981) examined

coverage of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 in 17 Texas town and college newspapers. In general, Ben-Zedeff found that the Texas press was significantly more pro-Israeli than it was pro-Arab. However, he noted differences in partisanship between the town and college presses. The town press was less anti-Israeli, less pro-Arab and less anti-Arab than its college counterpart. While both town and college papers showed a generally "pro-Israeli" attitude, Ben-Zedeff observed a shifting toward a more "even-handedness" in the papers he studied. He concluded:

[T]here is no monolithic "pro-Israeli" American press. This study showed that in many occasions during the war, even writers that are known to be very pro-Israeli criticized Israel. (1981, p. 181)

In her study, "Images of Arabs and Israelis in the Prestige Press," Janice Monti Belkaoui (1978) content analyzed articles on the Middle East in news magazines and the Sunday editions of two newspapers: one quality and one nonquality newspaper. Examining selected issues between 1966 and 1974 that encompassed both war and non-war years, Belkaoui tested for a hypothesized shift in treatment of the Arabs and the Israelis in the American press in the aftermath of the October 1973 war and resultant oil embargo. Her hypothesized shift was proven. The prestige press reflected more favorable images of the Arabs in October 1973 than in June 1967, according to Belkaoui. However, her hypothesized decline in support

for Israel was only partly supported by the data. Belkaoui concluded that the image of Israel as the "underdog" of 1967 was gone, and the image of "Israeli invincibility is now a myth and a shattered legend." The Arabs, villains of 1967, were now the heroes in 1973, she observed. This shift in press treatment, of especial importance to the image of the Arabs, was summarized by Belkaoui:

Described as an emotional, angry, chanting atomized mass in 1967, the Arab world emerged in the 1970s with a new spirit of achievement, unity, pride and honor. (p. 737)

The studies described thus far have examined only short periods of time in the 31-year history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A search for studies of longer duration revealed only three works that reported examinations of press treatment of the dispute over time.

The first long-term study was done by Robert H. Trice (1979) and reported in his work "The American Elite Press and the Arab Israeli Conflict." Trice studied all editorials pertinent to the Middle East conflict in 11 major elite newspapers from January 1, 1966, through December 31, 1974. In these nine years, he found and coded 2,924 editorials printed in war and non-war years, before and after the Arab oil embargo of 1973. Trice's study was an important departure from previous studies that generalized on press support or criticism for either the Arabs or the Israelis over a narrow period of time or in connection with a single event. Using a more sophisticated survey

instrument, Trice looked at editorial attitudes toward actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict on a cross-section of issues over a longer period of time. He found in his study that most parties in the Arab-Israeli Dispute received little support from the American prestige press for their roles in the conflict. However, in times of conflict editorials appeared to be more supportive of Israel than of the Arabs. That support for Israel and criticism of the Arab states, however, was much weaker than Trice had expected prior to his research. While the press was, in general, "cautiously supportive" of Israel, the elite press was, nevertheless, critical of Israel over a number of actions over the studied time span. While the Arab states were never able to elicit much sympathy from the press, editorials in the elite press were less critical of the Arabs after 1970 than in previous years suggesting that a shift had, in fact, occurred but had begun prior to the October 1973 war and oil embargo. A major conclusion by Trice in his research was that:

While editorial coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict can hardly be characterized as "neutral," neither can it be said that the elite press was "totally supportive" or "totally critical" of any party in the conflict. Rather, the level of support for any party tended to vary according to the specific aspect of the conflict under consideration. (1979, p. 320)

Daugherty and Warden (1979) conducted an extensive examination of press performance over time in their work,

"Prestige Press Editorial Treatment of the Mideast During 11 Crisis Years." Studying the editorials of the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Christian Science Monitor from January 1, 1967, through December 31, 1977, Daugherty and Warden examined the themes of these papers on a supportive-neutral-critical continuum over the 11-year period. Among their findings, they concluded that hostilities stimulated editorial interest in the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. They also found significant differences in editorial treatment of the Arabs and the Israelis between the newspapers studied. For example, the Christian Science Monitor was the most decidedly "neutral" of these four prestige papers in its evaluation of the Middle East conflict. Criticism of either side -- Arabs or Israelis -- was rare for the Monitor. In contrast, the Washington Post was the most critical of Arab states and the least neutral of all the newspapers studied. Daugherty and Warden also concluded that no shift in editorial positions of the individual newspapers had taken place as a result of the Arab oil embargo, even in the business-oriented Wall Street Journal, in contrast to Belkaoui's (1978) findings. Rather than a strident partisan tone to American press editorials concerning the conflict, they found a theme "urging a negotiated peace between belligerents" that confirmed Wagner's (in Beling, 1973) findings. Support for either side in

editorials varied between times of conflict and non-conflict, according to Daugherty and Warden, with editorial support gravitating toward Israel in times of perceived threat.

They concluded that:

[T]he predominant position of the prestige press in treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of support for any negotiated peace settlement and firm denunciation of belligerency on the part of either side. (1979, p. 782)

Both Trice (1979) and Daugherty and Warden (1979) represented examinations of the Arab-Israeli conflict across several years in departure from previous, limited research efforts that usually focused on narrower time frames and specific events. However, neither of these longer-term studies traced the evolution and growth of the Arab-Israeli Dispute as a foreign policy issue from its beginnings in 1948 to the present. Only one study was located that examined the Arab-Israeli conflict for that extended period of time: a study by Janice Terry, a historian, conducted in two separate research projects. But, as a closer examination of Terry's research efforts will prove, both suffer from serious reliability problems that call into question her method and results.

Terry's research was conducted in two separate projects that, combined, purport to document the "points of view" adopted by three U.S. newspapers toward the Arab-Israeli conflict over a 25-year period. Her first project encompassed 20 years of the conflict and was reported in

her chapter, "A Content Analysis of American Newspapers" (in Jabara and Terry, 1971). This effort was continued in a second project that extended Terry's research to a 25-year time span. The results of her second research project together with the conclusions of her first effort were reported in an article, "1973 U.S. Press Coverage of the Middle East" (Terry and Mendenhall, 1974). The purpose of both research projects, Terry contended, was to quantify whether a pro-Israeli bias existed in the American press and if that bias had been consistent over the 25 years covered in her projects. In both projects she found a "consistent pro-Israeli and anti-Arab bias in the three newspapers studied" (New York Times, Washington Press, and Detroit Free Press). Bias was particularly evident in the editorials of the sampled newspapers, she contended.

However, Terry's reported findings must be treated with caution. In both research projects Terry employed a coding scheme that yielded results that were neither statistically significant nor reliable. When subjected to post-hoc analysis and application of standard Chi-square tests, Terry's reported findings yield results which are not statistically significant. In fact, in many instances ill-defined categories in her coding scheme yielded large numbers of empty cells and an expected frequency insufficient to conduct statistical tests of significance.

Nonetheless, she reports her findings as proving a pro-Israel, anti-Arab editorial bias in the American press prevalent throughout a 25-year period.

Researchers and scholars alike should be forewarned that the reliability of Terry's coding scheme is questionable when she reports in her first study (Jabara and Terry, 1971) that:

One of the problems in this method concerns the reliability of the coding system and of the reader [coder of material]. Due to the volume of material and the time factor, it has thus far proven impossible to obtain an adequate reliability check. (p. 96)

Three years later, in the continuation of her research in her second project (Terry and Mendenhall, 1974), Terry reports that, like her first research effort:

The reliability of the coder is still a problem, although for the 1973 articles two coders were employed, but again the volume of material has made it impossible to obtain further reliability checks. (p. 121)

Despite the intervention of three additional years between research projects, Terry was still unable to demonstrate coder reliability adequately in either of her reported studies, yielding inconclusive and speculative results at best. No statistical tests of significance were reported in either project, and secondary, post-hoc analysis revealed that none could be proven. Therefore, both of Terry's projects were rejected as neither objective analyses nor scientifically rigorous research contributing to the study of press performance in the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

With the rejection of Terry's works, no other studies could be located that provided reliable, replicable research yielding empirical evidence of the presses' performance in this critical foreign policy issue from its rise to the present. As this review of the literature has revealed, the results of previous examinations have varied. Some studies have shown that evidence of a "bias" exists in American press treatment of the Arabs and the Israelis; others discount the existence of bias. Some found a shift in press opinion of the Israelis and Arabs after the 1973 oil embargo while still others found no significant shift in the attitudes of the media. This confusion of conclusions leaves little upon which researchers, scholars, political scientists, the mass media or the public can assess press performance in the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

The confusion is compounded by the variety of sampling methods, categories, and time limits imposed in the research just reviewed. No one study or collection of studies has examined a significant segment of the press employing a consistent sample method and set of categories over a sufficient period of time to document press performance during the totality of the Arab-Israeli Dispute -- from its beginning to the present. Neither has any of these studies examined press treatment of those individual issues relevant to the resolution of the dispute to determine trends in that treatment.

The need for an examination of the trends in press performance over time was recognized by Batrouka (1961) in his study of the Arab-Israeli conflict when he observed:

Many investigations have been undertaken to determine change in content over periods of time. If one is to establish the nature of such trends in communication content, it is necessary to employ comparable methods for sampling the total flow of communication at successive points in time and to use the same system of classifications throughout (trend study). (pp. 28-29)

Purpose of this Research Project

This research project endeavors to undertake the task, as Batrouka (1961) has recommended, to research press performance in the Arab-Israeli Dispute applying (1) a single, comparable method of sampling content, (2) utilizing a research methodology that is both replicable and reliable, (3) employing strictly defined categories relevant to the resolution of the conflict and consistently applied throughout the study period and, finally, (4) over a sufficient period of time to permit the evaluation of press content from the beginning of the Arab-Israeli problem to the present.

The purpose, then, of this research project is to empirically document press performance in the Arab-Israeli conflict to determine if a pro-Israeli, anti-Arab bias exists in the American press as has been alleged by critics such as Terry (1971, 1974), Suleiman (1965, 1974), Ghareeb (1976, 1977) and others. If a bias exists, is it consistent throughout the evolution of the conflict, or have shifts occurred

as claimed by Belkaoui (1978)? Does partisanship for one side over the other strengthen or wane during times of crisis or threat as Wagner (in Beling, 1973), and Daugherty and Warden (1979) have observed? Finally, what stands do the press take on the issues relevant to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute? Are the press attentive to all those issues outlined by Bill and Leiden (1979), or are some covered more than others? Is press partisanship on these issues consistent, or does it vary issue to issue, year to year?

In order to document press performance and answer these questions, this researcher chose to study the editorials of the prestige press as the universe of data from which to sample communication content. The prestige press were singled out for study because, as Bernard Cohen (1963) claimed:

[T]hese prestige papers are read by public officials, journalists, scholars and business leaders. They seldom have large circulations, yet they have enormous influence. (p. 136)

Editorials were chosen for examination because they represent the position or positions of newspapers on the issues of the day (Beling, 1973; Daugherty and Warden, 1979) and give the researcher an insight into the editorial policies and biases of the newspapers (Batrouka, 1961). For, as Curtis MacDougall has written of the editorial:

They set the character of the paper . . . to make a public accounting of the newspaper's prejudices, opinions, hopes and hates. (1973, p. 11)

A study of prestige (elite) press editorials, then, is important because, according to Ernest C. Hynds in his

book, American Newspapers in the 1970s (1975):

Elite press editorials are more likely than any other impersonal source to affect the opinions of those Americans with an active and continued interest in foreign policy. (pp. 200-201)

Therefore, if there is a press impact on the foreign process, we would expect to find its ideological roots in the editorial pages of the nation's most prestigious newspapers.

Hypotheses

Based on this review of the literature a set of research hypotheses was formulated against which data could be tested. Hypotheses for this study were divided into three test areas: theme, crisis, and issues.

Hypotheses Relative to Theme

Theme in the analysis of communication content is usually expressed in some measure of positive-negative evaluation of a particular referent. Themes are generally a variation of a positive-neutral-negative, pro-neutral-anti, or favorable-neutral-unfavorable evaluative scale applied as a measure of support or criticism of one theme referent versus another or others.

In the review of the literature just cited, these studies of the Arab-Israeli conflict measured content theme to determine "bias" or proclivity of press content to favor one side -- the Arabs or the Israelis -- over the other. Based on the literature, four hypotheses were posited for

this research project relative to the measurement of theme in communication content.

As demonstrated in longer-term studies of the Arab-Israeli Dispute, and confirmed in Daugherty and Warden (1979) and Ben-Zedeff (1981), the following is hypothesized:

- I. PRESS CONTENT WILL BE PREDOMINANTLY NEUTRAL TOWARDS BOTH SIDES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE.

A second hypothesis, stemming from the first, is:

- II. WHEN THE PRESS DOES TAKE SIDES, THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN THE TREATMENT OF ARABS VERSUS TREATMENT OF THE ISRAELIS.

Hypothesis II has two relevant sub-hypotheses:

- SUB-II (A). THE AMERICAN PRESTIGE PRESS WILL BE MORE SUPPORTIVE AND LESS CRITICAL OF THE ISRAELIS.

- SUB-II (B). THESE PRESTIGE PAPERS WILL BE MORE CRITICAL AND LESS SUPPORTIVE OF THE ARABS.

To test the reported shift in support claimed by Belkaoui (1978), but discounted in others (Daugherty and Warden, 1979), hypothesis III was formulated:

- III. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN AGGREGATE EDITORIAL POSITION OF THESE PRESTIGE PAPERS TOWARD THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS OVER TIME.

As demonstrated in Batrouka (1961), Padelford (1979), Wagner (in Beling, 1973) and Daugherty and Warden (1979), we can expect individual differences among prestige papers in their commentary on the Middle East conflict. This led to the fourth hypothesis relative to theme:

IV. THERE WILL BE DISCERNIBLE, SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN EDITORIAL THEME BETWEEN THE PAPERS IN THIS STUDY.

The second test area in which data are to be collected concerns the impact of crisis on editorialization.

Hypotheses Relative to Crisis

Both Wagner (in Beling, 1973) and Daugherty and Warden (1979) found differences in editorial support for the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli Dispute during times of war or threat of war when compared to times of relative peace. Their observations suggest that conflict or the absence of conflict may have an impact on how the press treats the Arab-Israeli Dispute, its relevant actors and issues. Olfat Hassan Agha (1978), in his work "The Role of Mass Communication in Interstate Conflict," examined editorials in Egypt's Al-Ahram and Israel's Jerusalem Post to measure differences in frequencies, content and "trust" exhibited in intervening periods of conflict and nonconflict. Agha confirmed the findings of an earlier study by Rao (1971) and concluded that conflict does have a measurable effect on editorials.

To carry Agha's (1978) and Rao's (1971) work further and to examine a phenomenon alluded to in Wagner (in Beling, 1973) and Daugherty and Warden (1979), the following hypotheses were formulated relative to crisis and non-crisis periods in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first hypothesis is:

- V. EDITORIAL FREQUENCY WILL BE HIGHER DURING TIMES OF CRISIS (CONFLICT) THAN IN NON-CRISIS (NON-CONFLICT) PERIODS.

Suedfeld, Tetlock and Ramierez (1977) suggested another impact of crisis on the content of communication. They examined United Nations speeches and found that the complexity of speeches before that world body was reduced in times of conflict, while complexity increased as threat diminished and in times of peace among member states. Their findings suggest an examination of editorials may yield similar results when comment in conflict is contrasted to comment in non-conflict periods.

Using the number of issues treated in an editorial as a measure of its complexity, the following is hypothesized:

- VI. THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN THE NUMBER OF ISSUES TREATED IN EDITORIALS BETWEEN CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT SAMPLE PERIODS.

A related sub-hypothesis of the above is:

- SUB-VI. THE NUMBER OF ISSUES TREATED IN CONFLICT PERIOD EDITORIALS WILL BE FEWER THAN THE NUMBER OF ISSUES TREATED IN NON-CONFLICT PERIOD EDITORIALS.

We would also expect to find a measurable difference in the kinds of issues treated between periods, leading to the following hypothesis:

VII. THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN THE ISSUES TREATED BETWEEN CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT PERIODS.

In a hypothesis related to those tested in theme, the researcher posits the following hypothesis and related sub-hypotheses:

VIII. THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN EDITORIAL DIRECTION (THEME) BETWEEN CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT PERIODS.

SUB-VIII (A). EDITORIALS APPEARING DURING CONFLICT PERIODS WILL BE MORE PRO/ANTI IN DIRECTION AND LESS NEUTRAL.

SUB-VIII (B). EDITORIALS APPEARING DURING NON-CONFLICT PERIODS WILL BE MORE "EVEN-HANDED," OR "NEUTRAL" IN DIRECTION.

After this examination of the impact of crisis on editorials, the research effort turns to the issues of the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Hypotheses Relative to Issues

Issues pertinent to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as outlined by Bill and Leiden (1979) earlier in this chapter, will be examined in the prestige press editorials under study. These six issues, together with other issue categories developed and outlined in the following chapter on methodology, will be coded and their treatment analyzed against the following hypothesis:

- IX. EDITORIALS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE WILL BE PREDOMINANTLY "NEUTRAL" WHEN ADDRESSING THE VARIOUS ISSUES RELATIVE TO THE HISTORICAL CONFLICT.

And finally, for those issues the American press chooses to take sides on, the following is hypothesized:

- X. THE MORE SALIENT AN ISSUE CATEGORY, THE LESS LIKELY IT WILL BE CODED "NEUTRAL."

Research Questions

After the examination of these hypotheses, three research questions remain to be answered in the collection of data relevant to this study. These questions are extensions of logical inquiry into the treatment of issues by the prestige press and are stated as:

- (1) WHICH ISSUES IN THIS STUDY WILL PROVE TO BE MORE SALIENT THAN OTHERS AND, THUS, RESULT IN DEVIATION FROM THE "NEUTRAL" CATEGORIZATION OF THE LESS SALIENT ISSUE CATEGORIES?

The answer to this question will provide insight into which issues the prestige press views as most important in its treatment of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. The second research question is:

- (2) WILL AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE SHOW THAT THE PRESTIGE PRESS TREATS ISSUES IDENTICALLY THROUGHOUT THE DURATION OF THE CONFLICT, OR ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN EDITORIAL TREATMENT OVER TIME?

Finally, will research show that there is a difference in how each of the prestige papers views the issues? The research question to be examined is:

- (3) ARE SOME ISSUES MORE SALIENT TO ONE NEWSPAPER THAN TO OTHER PAPERS IN THIS STUDY? IF SO, WHAT DIFFERENCES EXIST IN ISSUES TREATMENT AMONG THE NEWSPAPERS STUDIED?

Operational and Conceptual Definitions

The term "prestige press" has been used interchangeably with "elite" or "quality" press in a variety

of studies of newspaper content. There have been numerous surveys of journalists, academicians, and others citing the "prestige," "elite" or "quality" newspapers in this country and the world (Merrill, 1968; Merrill and Fisher, 1980). These prestige papers represent the elite in American journalism. They provide widespread news coverage, maintain intimate relations with and extensive coverage of government, and are generally widely read abroad and at home by policy makers who seek clues to the dominant attitudes of the American elite (Pool, 1970; Weiss, 1974; Grau, 1976).

To operationally define what newspapers are to be considered "prestige" papers for the purpose of this research, J. C. Merrill's (1968) listing of America's elite newspapers was chosen as the source from which these papers would be selected.

Editorials were chosen for study because an editorial in a newspaper serves as the public accounting of that paper's policies, opinions and prejudices (Daugherty and Warden, 1979). Editorials were operationally defined as:

An unsigned opinion column which reflects a newspaper's views on an issue or event and appears daily in approximately the same place on the editorial page or section. (Windhauser, 1973, p. 562)

Windhauser's definition was adopted for this study of prestige press editorials on the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

This study of opinions as expressed in the editorials of the prestige press seeks, as previous studies of newspaper content before it, to examine the direction, or theme, of those editorial attitudes as they are expressed in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. An analysis of themes was chosen, because, as Berelson (1952) has said:

The theme is among the most useful units of content analysis because it takes the form in which issues and attitudes are usually discussed. (p. 139)

Theme, then, is the direction of bias (favorable to unfavorable) expressed in relationship to specific theme referents. A theme referent may be a person, a country, a policy or an idea (Batrouka, 1978). In this study of editorial attitudes toward the Middle East conflict, the theme referents are the protagonists in the dispute: the Arabs and the Israelis. Thus, an editorial attitude expressed toward a person (Nasser or Sadat, Ben-Gurion or Begin), a country (Egypt or Israel), a policy or an idea is evaluated on its theme (favorable to unfavorable) toward both Arab and Israeli theme referents. The direction of that theme is expressed on a favorable-unfavorable continuum defined as (1) favorable items are those which reflect social cohesion, cooperation, political and economic stability and/or strength; (2) unfavorable items are those which report social conflict and disorganization, and

political and economic instability and/or weakness; and (3) neutral items are those which reflect neither favorable nor unfavorable conditions either through balance of content or lack of controversial material (Budd, Thorp and Donohew, 1967; Rimmer, 1981).

Therefore, "theme" was operationalized in this study to encompass this favorable-neutral-unfavorable continuum and was expressed in three categories for each theme referent: pro-Arab, neutral-Arab, anti-Arab; and pro-Israel, neutral-Israel, anti-Israel.

In addition to the various themes expressed in the editorials to be studied, this research also seeks to determine what issues are addressed in those editorials. Issues were conceptually defined as those six political issues relevant to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute (Bill and Leiden, 1979), in addition to other issue categories derived from a survey of editorial material in a pretest described in the following chapter. This resulted in a set of 17 issue categories for purposes of content codification and subsequent analysis.

A "crisis" variable was also chosen for measurement in this study to determine what effect, if any, an environment characterized by "crisis" or the absence of "crisis" would have on editorialization. This crisis variable was conceptualized as two distinct periods in which editorialization would occur: conflict periods and non-conflict

periods. Wagner (in Beling, 1973) defined conflict periods as times characterized by actions or events that threatened imminent danger or war. Snyder and Diesing (1977) defined crisis periods as sequences of interactions between two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of dangerously high probability of war. Noncrisis periods were those not marked by armed conflict but, instead, characterized by relative peace among states, attempts at settlement through negotiation, and diplomacy.

Another variable to be examined was the "complexity" of editorials. Suedfeld et al. (1977) had found in their study of United Nations speeches that the complexity of messages (speeches) increased in peace, while decreasing in times up to and including war. Suedfeld et al. used an integrative complexity scoring system for speeches not strictly applicable to the coding of editorials. However, as a substitute, a simpler method of summing the number of issues addressed in an editorial was used as a general measure of editorial "complexity." The higher the number of issues addressed in an editorial, the more complex; the fewer issues addressed, the simpler, less complex an editorial would be. This constituted the operational definition of "complexity" for the purpose of this study editorials. No a priori standard was applied to establish whether or not an editorial was "complex" nor to establish

a complexity index. Instead, this study sought only to determine whether crisis had an effect on the numbers of issues addressed in editorials -- the complexity of those editorials -- as was found in speeches in Suedfeld et al.'s study (1977).

These variables incorporated into the hypotheses and research questions stated in this chapter would be tested in the data analysis portion of the study and reported in Chapter IV. Analysis would seek to confirm or reject the hypotheses by applying statistical tests to data distributions to determine whether differences and reported relationships were real and not random. Research such as this, concerned with differences and contingencies among frequencies, employ a variety of statistical tests such as the Chi-square test. In using Chi-square, the generally agreed upon .05 or higher level of significance is considered real and not attributable to randomness (Emmert and Brooks, 1970). Therefore, the criterion for significance in this study is operationalized as achieving .05 level of significance and greater values for acceptance or rejection of research hypotheses.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Content Analysis

The analysis of the content of communication can be traced as far back as 150 years ago to a simplified "count of categories" (Beard, 1944). However, the development of the research methodology of "content analysis" in its modern form is most often attributed to the mid-1920s. It was during this time that the method of "analysis of content" was used by students of journalism in their study of newspapers. Malcolm Willey's 1926 study, The Country Newspaper, and Julian Woodward's (1930) analysis of foreign news in newspapers typified the application of elemental techniques later refined into what is known today as the research technique of "content analysis."

The father of modern-day content analysis, Harold D. Lasswell, a political scientist, brought to the field of then a highly specialized content analysis, the rigor and widespread utilization outside the study of newspapers. Lasswell's expansion of the research method of content analysis beyond the study of newspapers made the method a truly interdisciplinary technique -- widely accepted, used, refined, and, thus, enriched. Lasswell had, as his

central thesis in the use of the technique, the substantive concern for the analysis of the "symbolic environment" and its consequences for both human behavior and political morality (Janowitz, 1968-69). His efforts in both World Politics (1935) and his hallmark work, Language of Politics (1949), served to make content analysis as a research technique an integral part of the continuing study of international relations.

Berelson's (1952) Content Analysis in Communication Research represented a further refinement in the use of the technique now popularized by Lasswell and gaining in widespread use as a research tool. Ithiel de Sola Pool's (1970) collective works in the study of the prestige press through the vehicle of content analysis contributed to the evolution of the technique.

Today, the technique of content analysis can be ascribed not only to specialists across disciplines, but also to specialties within disciplines themselves -- from television stereotyping to computer-assisted analysis (Pool, 1959; Gerbner, 1969). Therefore, based on its proven application in the fields of both journalism and international relations, the technique of content analysis is the most appropriate research method for this study of American prestige press editorials.

Definition of Content Analysis

What, then, is "content analysis?"

While it is a diffuse concept, it is a rather narrow term specific in scope to many fields. While social scientists are concerned with the analysis of content, perhaps the content of newspapers, historians are concerned with the study of original documents -- the diaries of great historical figures. Scholars of law trace the development of case law with it. Anthropologists use it to record and classify folk tales (Pool, 1959).

The common technique utilized may be content analysis, but the unifying concern -- the key variable under scrutiny -- is the analysis of content as indicative and even predictive of symbolic behavior. After all, as Janowitz (1968-69) noted in his examination of Lasswell's contribution to the field of content analysis, communication is symbolic behavior.

Communication Content. Within the process of communication a central position must be occupied by the content of that communication. By communication content, we mean "that body of meanings through symbols . . . which makes up the communication itself" (Berelson, 1952, p. 13).

As Berelson (1952) asserts, the analysis of at least one portion in the communicative process -- the symbolic behavior of man through the use of messages --

then focuses upon the content of those messages. About this, Berelson (1952) wrote:

Since the content represents the means through which one person or group communicates with another, it is important for communication research that it [content] be described with accuracy and interpreted with insight. (p. 13) (emphasis added)

Each of us, through daily exposure to a seemingly infinite variety of "messages," intuitively "analyze" the content of those messages and make judgments based on our respective "frames of reference" (Schramm and Roberts, 1972). Our analysis of those messages is then based upon our individual experiences, background and education as well as such external factors as "noise" (Schramm and Roberts, 1972). We are all, then, involved in a constant form of analysis of content. We are all involved in content analysis in the nonscientific sense, but what of the scientific method of content analysis?

Scientific Analysis of Content. In the scientific endeavor to analyze the message content, we must be concerned with content characteristics, symbols isolated from the communicator and receiver. The message, defined as "the actual symbol sequence that is being communicated" for the purposes of examination:

[S]tands suspended in time and space between the source that created it and the destination that will ultimately receive it. . . . The message, in short, contains a remarkably concentrated expression of some of the major factors involved in

communication. It is perhaps this concentration of forces that content analysis -- the scientific study of messages -- has become a central technique in communication research. (Nafziger and White, 1963, pp. 180-181)

We are, therefore, isolating the symbol sequence, commonly referred to as the "message," for the purpose of scientific observation and study through the technique of content analysis. But what distinguishes this "scientific" method of analysis of content from the "naturalistic" form utilized daily by the nonscientific observer? To answer this we must refer to the numerous and varied definitions of content analysis that will reveal some of the obvious distinctions drawn between the two methods.

Content Analysis Defined. Pool (1970) defines content analysis in such a way as to permit distinctions to be made and comparisons to be drawn. He writes:

Content analysis is a systematic and vigorous way of doing what humanists have always done, namely, to note what symbols are used in available bodies of text and thereby document the evolution of ideas. Such observation of the flow of symbols may be called content analysis if enough attention is paid to the procedures of observation to make the operation replicable. (p. x) (emphasis added)

In Pool's definition above he highlights three distinguishing factors in the scientific method that set it apart from the humanistic method of the analysis of content:

(1) It must be systematic, specifying what bodies of text are to be observed, when they are to be sampled, how they are to be sampled, etc.;

(2) Procedures of observation must be rigorous, symbols must be documented within strict definitions and guidelines specified in advance; and finally,

(3) The operation must be replicable with a system and set of rules that can be duplicated by independent observers to verify results.

Unlike Pool's scientific method of content analysis, the "humanist" or "naturalistic" method of analysis of message content is neither systematic nor done in a manner consistent with well defined procedures that would permit conclusions to be drawn applicable to larger groups. Indeed, the observations and conclusions drawn by the humanist observer could rarely be generalized to groups beyond the total population of one -- the observer himself.

Pool's definition provides a useful transition from the natural form of analysis of day-to-day communication to the more exacting and rigorous scientific technique utilized in communication research. However, Pool's definition does not encompass all the manifestations of the scientific method of content analysis. For this we must defer to definitions from other sources.

Some definitions offered in the varied literature shed further light. Irving Janis (1943) defined content analysis as:

[A]ny technique for the classification of sign-vehicles; which relies solely on the judgments -- which, theoretically, may range from perceptual

discriminations to sheer guesses -- of an analyst or group of analysts as to which sign-vehicles fall into which categories; on the basis of explicitly formulated rules; provided that the analyst's judgments are regarded as the reports of a scientific observer. The results of a content analysis state the frequency of occurrence of signs -- or groups of signs -- for each category in a classification scheme. (p. 429)

Kaplan et al. (1943) offered their definition of content analysis as a technique which "attempts to characterize the meanings in a given body of discourse in a systematic and quantitative fashion" (p. 230).

But perhaps the most oft-quoted definition of the research technique of content analysis was offered by Berelson (1942) when he wrote:

Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. (p. 18) (emphasis added)

The key words in Berelson's definition, as emphasized above, are: objective, systematic, quantitative, and manifest. Danielson (in Nafziger and White, 1963) offers this explanation of these key words:

(1) Objective -- categories used in coding of content for analysis should be defined with extreme precision to enable others to analyze the same data with essentially the same results.

(2) Systematic -- implies that content selected for analysis must be chosen through some theoretically sound, predetermined, formalized and thus unbiased method. Pool (1970, p. 26) writes, "generally, in content analysis [the sampled content] is obtained by using suitably designed samples of predetermined universes, whose limits have been predetermined either empirically or theoretically."

(3) Quantitative -- documentation is done through some form designed to yield numerical expressions in the analysis of the "flow of symbols." Quantification thus lends itself to mathematically sound statistical tests previously unavailable through less objective analytical methodology.

(4) Manifest -- the analysis of symbols is usually limited to linguistic and semantic scope ordinarily of a fairly direct and simple kind. This method, described by Pool as "reading on the lines," rather than inferring meaning, aids in the replicability and verification of findings.
(pp. 181-182)

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to detailing the methodology employed in this study to demonstrate that this project satisfies Berelson's requirements for an objective, systematic, quantitative description of the manifest content of communication represented in the editorials of four American prestige press newspapers on a single subject: the Arab-Israeli conflict.

However, it is important to state at the outset that this study, as others before it utilizing the technique of content analysis, makes certain assumptions.

Assumptions. Berelson (1952) distinguished three assumptions prevalent in the use of content analysis as a meaningful research tool. First, the assumption that inferences about the relationship between the intent of the communicator and the content, or between content and effect on the audience, can be validly made or that actual relationships can be established. Secondly, the study

of manifest content itself is meaningful. Third, quantitative descriptions of symbol flow are meaningful and insightful. This implies that frequency of occurrence in content is an important factor in the communication process. To these three underlying assumptions of Berelson's, we add a fourth: that individual bias of the analyst or groups of analysts can be sufficiently controlled to yield objective, replicable findings generalizable to a population beyond that of the analyst or group of analysts alone. This fourth assumption will be treated later in the "Reliability" portion of this chapter.

Time Frame of Study

The Arab-Israeli Dispute is not only a topic of international consequence, concern and attentiveness, but it is also an issue whose development can be traced within specified parameters and chronologically defined for the purpose of long-term, systematic content analysis.

Although the historical conflict between Arabs and Jews extends over many centuries, for the purpose of this study we will explore the Arab-Israeli Dispute in its "modern" form -- the conflict between the Arab states and the state of Israel. The beginning of our study will thus start with the official proclamation of the creation of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948, and will extend through each successive year until the conclusion of the

data collection portion of this study on September 17, 1978, with the end of the Camp David Summit (September 5 to 17) between the leaders of the United States, Egypt, and Israel.

This time frame encompasses all wars between the Arab states and the state of Israel as well as all intervening years of alternating peace and tensions between the Jewish state and her Arab neighbors.

The Newspapers

Four "prestige press" newspapers were selected for content analysis of their editorials during this time frame. The newspaper selection played a critical role in the research design. The papers sought for study had to be "opinion leaders," not "opinion followers" -- a role occupied by a relatively few "prestige" papers in this country.

In order to standardize the analysis, these papers had to be selected on the basis of some objective criteria. For the purpose of this research project, the criteria established by Mishra (1979) in his study of "News from the Middle East in Five U.S. Media" were adopted. Mishra's criteria for selection of newspapers for analysis were based on:

- (1) the daily publication of the newspapers

- (2) the relatively large circulation of the newspapers published principally from the large metropolitan centers of the United States
- (3) the "elite" nature of the newspapers
- (4) the geographic representation of the United States by the newspapers
- (5) the newspapers' representation in the Middle East countries through their own correspondents. (p. 375)

The four U.S. newspapers meeting these criteria were the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, and the Washington Post. All these newspapers met the criteria for being members of the "prestige press" or "elite" press in the United States (Merrill, 1968).

Secondly, each maintains foreign correspondents in the area of study, although the numbers of correspondents and their locations in the region vary throughout the study period (Overseas Press Club Directory, 1975). However, the significant investment of manpower and capital by each of the papers is indicative of their interest in and coverage of this region. Presumably, the maintenance of foreign correspondents in the region gives editors of these publications access to considerably more information of a higher quality and quantity on the nations, people, issues and events that transpire there than do editors of publications

who are dependent on sources outside their own news-gathering organizations.

Mishra's criterion of geographic representation of the United States is also met with the selection of these four newspapers. The Los Angeles Times represents the West. The Chicago Tribune is representative of the Midwest region of the country. The New York Times is not only representative of the East, but it is also noted for its "international" outlook on the news and world events. The Washington Post, also an "international" paper, also represents the capital view of world events with its location in the nation's capital with direct access to the Congress, the Executive and the diplomatic corps. Therefore, while each of these papers is very similar, they reflect differing perspectives of world events and issues impacting their journalistic constituencies in the West, Midwest, East and the world as representatives of the United States' "prestige press."

All of these newspapers are dailies, publishing at least one edition seven days each week, and were published throughout the time period of this study. Each carries as a regular daily feature at least one editorial page on which appears a minimum of one "unsigned" editorial that states the paper's editorial opinion or position on an issue or issues.

Finally, each of these newspapers was available in the General Libraries of The University of Texas at Austin in either microfilm, bound or single issue form for the purpose of study and coding.

It is important to note that all of these sampled newspapers are significant sources of independent opinion for not only their own local readership, but are also important sources of information and opinion on foreign affairs for leaders of United States foreign policy as well -- especially members of both the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate (Rosenau, 1961; Weiss, 1974; Grau, 1976).

Therefore, study of these four newspapers will provide academic insight into the content of the United States' "prestige press" in regards to a very important aspect of foreign affairs -- the Arab-Israeli Dispute -- for the 31-year time frame this research covers.

Having selected a research technique and the newspapers for study, four other methodological problems must be addressed. According to Stemple in his chapter on "Content Analysis Procedure" (Stemple and Westley, 1981), the researcher undertaking a content analysis study must deal with the following methodological problems: sampling of content, selection of the unit of analysis, category construction, and reliability of coding. The remainder of this chapter will deal with these problems in the research design.

Sampling of Content

In the time frame represented in this study, May 1948 to September 1978, over 31 years have transpired in the evolutionary development of the socio-political phenomenon known as the Arab-Israeli Dispute. This artificial "universe" designed for the purpose of our study presents more than 328,000 days in which each of the newspapers studied was published; or over 1.3 million individual issues from these four prestige papers alone.

✓ This universe of possible data represented a volume too large to manage for research purposes. Therefore, this researcher had to "employ random methods to select a sample that is large enough to contain sufficient information and small enough for analysis" (Krippendorff, 1980) for the purpose of content analysis. Determining what method would best satisfy the researcher's intent to study the Arab-Israeli Dispute through the 31-year continuum while reducing the population of data to a manageable, yet sufficient, base for analysis was a difficult methodological challenge.

Previous studies have employed a variety of sampling techniques including the "constructed week" or "constructed month" through random sampling of weekdays to construct a "week" or a "month" of issues for the purpose of analysis (Markham, 1961). Hachten (1961) in his study of changes

in the American Sunday newspaper over a 20-year period randomly selected three Sunday issues each year from every publication in his research. However, instead of content analyzing every year in his 20-year continuum, Hachten chose only every fifth year. Stemple (1952) found in his work "Sample Size for Classifying Subject Matter in Dailies," that for studying single subjects in a single newspaper, increased sample sizes beyond 12 did not produce marked differences in content analysis results.

Given the diversity of sampling options available, selection of a sampling scheme had to be based upon the following criteria for this research project, according to Krippendorff (1980):

- (1) To meet the practical need of reducing this large volume of potential data to a manageable size.
- (2) To provide a sample of data that are collectively representative of the population of interest.
- (3) That each unit has the same chance of being represented in the collection of sampled units.
- (4) That the procedure established assures that there is no bias in either the inclusion [or exclusion] of units in the sample.

Based on these criteria and the hypothetical propositions to be tested in this research design, a purposive sampling of "key events" in the Arab-Israeli conflict was elected as the sampling scheme for this project. A list of "key events" in the chronology of the Arab-Israeli Dispute for the time frame specified for examination was drawn from two extra media sources: volumes of the Middle East Journal published from 1948 to 1978, and editions of Congressional Quarterly's public affairs book The Middle East (Third Edition, 1977; Fifth Edition, 1981). This method of drawing up a list of crucial events from which to draw a sample was advocated by Martin and Nelson (1956), and employed by Becker (1977) in the study of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Belkaoui (1978) used a similar methodology in her examination of publication dates "clustered" around significant "key events" in the Arab-Israeli conflict in her study of "Images of Arabs and Israelis in the Prestige Press, 1966-1974."

Using the "key events" list drawn from outside sources, a random sampling technique was used to select a single event in each of the 31 years surveyed in this study. This single "key event," selected by the roll of dice for each year, served as the focal point for examination of newspaper issues. In addition to these randomly selected "key events," six other events in the Arab-Israeli conflict chronology were included in this purposive sampling:

(1) May 14, 1948 -- Proclamation of the creation of the state of Israel, recognition by the United States and subsequent invasion of the new state by Arab armies, marking the first Arab-Israeli war.

(2) October 30, 1956 -- The second Arab-Israeli war breaks out between Israel and Egypt.

(3) June 5, 1967 -- The third war between the Arabs and Israelis begins.

(4) October 6, 1973 -- The fourth and last of the wars thus far between the Arabs and Israelis begins.

(5) November 19, 1977 -- Egyptian President Anwar Sadat arrives in Israel, the first Arab leader to visit that nation since its establishment in 1948.

(6) September 17, 1978 -- The Camp David Summit between the leaders of the United States, Egypt and Israel concludes with the signing of two documents: "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and a "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt."

These purposively and randomly selected "key events" served as the cluster dates around which publication dates of the selected newspapers would be sampled. Publication dates one week prior and one week following each selected "key event," a total of 15 days, were examined for each of the newspapers in this study. Each of the 15-day periods served as the randomly selected universe from which our population of data would be drawn for analysis.

Selected key events were also coded as "conflict" or "nonconflict" based on previously established operational and conceptual definitions in Chapter 2. A list of these 37 "key events" (19 "conflict" events and 18 "nonconflict" events) are included as Appendix A.

Selection of the Unit of Analysis

All unsigned editorials appearing on the opinion pages of the selected newspapers were examined for each 15-day sample period clustering around these "key events." Editorials addressing the Arab-Israeli Dispute, any of its individual states, actors or actions were selected for coding and subsequent analysis.

Every editorial thus selected would then be coded for certain descriptive, quantitative and qualitative data that would facilitate computer scoring and analysis. The coding process was based on a strictly defined set of operational definitions and coding instructions established in advance of the full-scale data collection phase of this study. These instructions were followed by the researcher/coder during the coding process, by independent observers during coder reliability tests, and in a test-retest process of previously coded material.

Context Unit. Geller, Kaplan and Lasswell (1942) reported that different procedures for measuring newspaper content yield dissimilar results. The four context or

coding units popularly used in content analysis of newspapers are: the sentence, paragraph, three sentence, or article (Geller, Kaplan and Lasswell, 1942).

Choice of which of these context units to use for coding depends on the problem under investigation and other research variables such as article coding speed desired. Geller et al. (1942) found the following differences between these four context units:

(1) Sentence, paragraph, three-sentence and article coding of the same editorial content give consistent differences in the count of symbol frequencies.

(2) The four methods agree in describing the direction of bias (favorable, unfavorable) though they differ in showing the degree of bias.

(3) The degree of bias is emphasized by paragraph and article coding.

(4) The three-sentence method is the slowest procedure, while article coding is the most rapid.

(pp. 367-368)

Given these findings, the context unit chosen for this study was the article. Thus, each unsigned editorial found in the sampling procedure was treated as a single "context unit" for coding purposes. If a bias existed in the editorials of these prestige papers, as hypothesized, this coding method would serve to emphasize and empirically document its existence. This context unit also served

to permit the most rapid coding of large volumes of editorial material examined and recorded during the data collection phase of this study.

Category Construction

Two general categories of quantitative and qualitative data were coded for each editorial: issue treatment and theme. An extensive review of the literature revealed that a category system was readily available for editorial direction, or theme, but not for issue treatment. Thematic content categories on a favorable-unfavorable continuum exist in a wide variety of content analysis studies and were applicable for the purposes of this research. However, issue categories specific to the Arab-Israeli conflict and satisfactory for the purpose of hypotheses testing in this study were not readily available in the literature reviewed. Therefore, it was necessary to establish a set of a priori issue categories to meet the objectives of this research.

To create a set of a priori categories required three things, according to Stemple (in Stemple and Westley, 1981):

- (1) Categories must be pertinent to the objectives of the study.
- (2) Categories should be functional.

(3) The system of categories must be manageable.

(p. 123)

For the purposes of this study, an issue category set must be pertinent to those issues deemed salient by editors of the sampled newspapers, be relevant to the issues directly impacting the Arab-Israeli Dispute, and specific enough to permit ready recognition and recording by the coder or coders. These requirements meet Stemple's criteria for establishment of an a priori set of categories and yielded sufficient data against which hypotheses can be tested.

Issue Categories. A set of issue categories was created based on a pretest of the sampled newspaper editorials. Approximately 10 percent of the sample universe of editorials was randomly drawn from each of the 31 years to be coded (n=50). These sampled editorials were evenly distributed among all of the selected newspapers.

All issues treated in these 50 editorials were listed and tabulated. Wherever possible, specific issue items found in these editorials were collapsed into broader, more generalized issue categories. This provided a set of categories salient to editors of these sampled newspapers in their commentary on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In addition, those six issues outlined by Bill and Leiden (1979) as relevant to the resolution of the

Arab-Israeli Dispute were used to develop a generalized set of issue categories pertinent to this study. These 17 issue categories were used for coding the presence or absence of issues in each of the editorials to be coded in the data collection for this study. The general set of categories along with the more specific set of issue items under each category were included in the coding instructions booklet developed prior to the data collection. This instruction booklet is contained in Appendix B.

Having arrived at a set of issue categories to be utilized in coding the content of editorials, a separate set of theme categories was needed to determine the direction each editorial took in treatment of the relevant actors in this study -- the Arabs and the Israelis.

Theme Categories. Each editorial was judged for editorial direction by the editor. Direction, according to Berelson (1959), is the "pro or con treatment of subject matter." Every editorial was coded for its "pro or con treatment" of the Arabs and Israelis. This direction was coded on a favorable-neutral-unfavorable scale for each of these two referent groups. The result, then, was a theme code for every sampled editorial. The theme categories coded by the researcher in this study were: pro-Arab, neutral-Arab, anti-Arab; and pro-Israel, neutral-Israel, anti-Israel.

Coding. Sampled editorials were examined and certain descriptive, quantitative and qualitative data were coded for each. Since post-hoc analysis and tabulations would be performed by computer, coding sheets were developed and a set of coding instructions were established in advance of the data collection process. A sample of a code sheet is included as Appendix C.

Descriptive data were first annotated on the coding sheet to indicate: the paper sampled; month, date and year the editorial appeared; and sample cell (conflict or nonconflict) from which the editorial was drawn.

Next, the researcher was directed to determine whether any, all, or none of the issue categories or specific issue items were present in the editorial. Each of the issue categories was coded as being "present" or "absent" in every editorial examined. The numbers of issues treated in that editorial by category were summed and the total entered on the coding sheet. This provided the quantitative data to be computed in analysis.

The researcher then decided the "predominant direction of favorability" for the Israelis for that editorial being coded using the theme category set of "pro," "neutral," or "anti" for that referent group. The same determination would be made for the Arab referent group, determining the predominant direction of favorability for the Arabs on a pro-neutral-anti scale. This coding process provided

the qualitative data for post-hoc analysis against which hypotheses would be tested.

The coding process was, thus, completed for that editorial and these same procedures followed for every other editorial selected in this sampling scheme for the study period.

The completed coding sheets from each day's data collection session were key-punched onto machine-readable 80-column format data cards for computer processing later. To ensure data transposition from code sheet to data cards was done accurately, each key-punched card was compared at least twice to the source code sheet.

Coder Reliability

As stated earlier in this chapter, one of the assumptions of this and other content analysis studies is that individual bias of the analyst can be sufficiently controlled to yield objective, replicable findings. In the highly subjective field of communication analysis where inferences must be drawn and judgments made, the infusion of analyst bias is a presumed and inevitable outcome. To the extent the researcher systematically and rigorously defines his procedures to control for bias, validity and replicability are enhanced. The test used most often to describe this assumption in the research technique of content analysis is "coder reliability."

Ideally speaking, two coders, whether they code material in the same study at the same time or later for verification, should be able to assign the same codes to the same categories. In such cases, reliability in the coding is said to be perfect -- 100 percent agreement. Such perfection is highly unusual and unlikely.

Variations in coding due to differing judgments of coders or even simple carelessness make attention to coder reliability a central concern to the content analyst. Consistent errors in judgment might be attributed to imprecision in definitions or the inadequacy of coders through either inadequate training or improper application of the coding scheme (Woodward and Franzen, 1948).

Statistical expressions of coder reliability, then, seek to answer certain questions in the objective examination of findings in any content analysis study. How often did coders agree with each other? How often did they disagree? How precise were category definitions? Finally, how closely will the results of the study agree when the content analysis is repeated by a different group of analysts (Woodward and Franzen, 1948; Janis, 1943)?

To answer these questions, a statistic is reported as a standard for reliability implying a consistency of measurement against which the researcher and scholar alike can judge the findings reported in a content analysis study. That consistency of measurement is of two kinds in the

content analysis technique: consistency among analysts and consistency through time (Berelson, 1952).

Danielson, in his chapter "Content Analysis in Communication Research" (in Nafziger and White, 1963) explained that consistency among analysts is tested by putting different (independent) coders to work on the same material and checking the degree of correlation between the results of those coders to determine whether they apply the same method in the same manner and obtain the same results.

Consistency through time, according to Danielson, means that coders doing the initial coding of content are required to recode a randomly selected portion of material coded earlier after a lapse of time. Coding would then be computed between the two coding periods to determine whether they will do it the same way the second time (Nafziger and White, 1963).

The acceptance of any content analysis study depends to a large degree upon the achievement of a high measure of reliability on both counts of consistency: among analysts and through time.

Testing Coder Reliability. Stemple (1955) observed that content analysis tests to determine the measure of reliability are usually conducted using three methods:

(1) Test-Retest Method -- the same test is given to the same individual under comparable conditions at two

separate times.

(2) Equivalent Forms Method -- equivalent forms of the same test are given to the same individual under comparable conditions at two different times.

(3) Split-Halves Method -- this is a statistical manipulation in which the test is divided into two equal parts and the scores of the halves compared.

The method frequently reported in communication research is a variation of the Equivalent Forms Method. In this variation, the coders or groups of coders are given identical material to code. Comparisons are then made between coders, averaged to give a percentage of agreement (Nafziger and White, 1963). This figure does not represent an individual analyst's reliability, but a group or mean reliability (Lasswell, Leites et al., 1949).

To test reliability in communication research, Stemple (1955) advocates an item analysis approach to testing and reporting reliability between analysts. In item analysis coders are compared with each other item by item rather than by gross category frequencies. Danielson (in Nafziger and White, 1963) refines and improves on Stemple's method of comparing coder pairings item by item. In Danielson's test, where coders, coding identical material, agree on an item, that item is counted as "agreement." Coder reliability for that pairing of coders is then computed as a ratio of "agreements" over agreements plus disagreements

(or the total number of decisions).

Danielson's test can be expressed in the following formula where total agreement is "A," and disagreements are "D." Reliability (R) is then averaged utilizing the formula

$$R = \frac{A}{A+D}$$

Reliability is then expressed as a percentage.

According to Danielson (Nafziger and White, 1963), content to be coded for the purpose of testing coder reliability requires an identical number of decisions, ranging from 100 to 200, by paired coders. The analyst should be compared with at least two other independent coders. Pairings of the analyst with each independent coder should then be computed for all possible combinations and a reliability standard arrived at for each pairing. The average percent of agreement is then computed and utilized as a measure of reliability between analysts (Nafziger and White, 1963; Stemple, 1955). This test method was utilized to determine inter-coder reliability for this research project, satisfying one of Berelson's (1952) counts of consistency -- consistency among analysts.

Consistency Among Analysts. Ten editorials were randomly selected from the universe of all sampled editorials to be coded by the researcher/analyst. Two graduate students in The University of Texas Department of Journalism (one

male, one female) coded the 10 selected editorials (N of decisions per coder = 190) utilizing the same coding instructions as those used by the coder/analyst. Averaging all possible pairings of coders to determine consistency among analysts yielded a reliability standard for this study of 86 percent.

Consistency Through Time. To measure the consistency of analysis through time, a test-retest measure of reliability as outlined by Stemple (1955, p. 449) was administered. The purpose of the test-retest was to compare identical samples of content already coded to that same content recoded after an appreciable lapse of time. Utilizing the same method employed in the earlier test for inter-coder reliability as reported above, the researcher/analyst recoded 10 randomly selected editorials representative of the total sample.

The recoded decisions (n=190) were compared with the researcher/analyst's original coding of the same material to determine the coding percentage of agreement between the two independent coding operations -- the original and recoded sample. The recodes were compared on an item-by-item basis, noting agreements and disagreements and pairing the analyst with himself to determine the averaged percentage of agreement to provide a measure of reliability in coding over time. Administration of this test-retest

resulted in a reliability standard for this study across time of 92 percent.

The results of both measures of consistency -- among analysts (inter-coder) and through time (test-retest) -- were considered satisfactory in establishing a coder reliability standard acceptable for hypotheses testing and reporting of the results of this research.

CHAPTER IV


FINDINGS

The sampling method employed in this study yielded 462 editorials for coding and subsequent analysis. This chapter is devoted to the presentation of that analysis. Results will be presented beginning with general frequencies followed by the analysis of results as they pertain to theme, crisis and issue hypotheses. The chapter will conclude with findings as they pertain to the research questions outlined in Chapter II.

Frequencies

While each newspaper had an equivalent opportunity in which to editorialize about the Middle East during the sampled cluster weeks, the distribution of editorial frequencies was far from equal (Figure 1). The New York Times yielded 182 editorials, or almost 40 percent of the total number of editorials in this sampling. This percentage of editorials published in the New York Times alone is indicative of the Times' unique and continuing interest in foreign affairs that particularly sets it apart from others in the prestige press for its interest in the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

FIGURE 1
EDITORIAL FREQUENCY OF SAMPLED NEWSPAPERS



The Washington Post had the second highest number of editorials, ranking far behind the New York Times with 123 of the coded editorials (26.6 percent). The Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times published significantly fewer editorials, printing 80 (17.3 percent) and 77 (16.7 percent) of the coded opinion pieces, respectively.

These prestige papers on the whole averaged 14.9 editorials in each of the 31 years of the study period. However, prior to the 1967 Six Day War, editorial mention of the Middle East was left largely to the war years alone. The four newspapers sampled averaged only 10.1 editorials each year from 1948 through 1966. After 1966, editorial interest in the Middle East increased dramatically with the papers averaging 22.5 editorials per year between 1967 and 1978, twice the number of previous years. Table 1 represents a breakdown of the number of editorials coded per year for each of the 31 years covered in this study.

The number of issues addressed in each editorial was summed during the coding process to provide a raw measure of editorial complexity. Issue sums ranged from zero to 11, with the mean number of issues treated per editorial of 3.59. More than three quarters of all editorials addressed from one to five of the issue categories per coded editorial. Only 11 editorials were coded as containing none of the issues listed in 17 issue categories established for this research project.

Table 1
Editorial Frequency Distribution by Year

Year	Freq	%	Year	Freq	%
1948	30	6	1964	5	1
1949	4	1	1965	1	0
1950	3	1	1966	6	1
1951	4	1	1967	83	18
1952	8	2	1968	5	1
1953	7	2	1969	11	2
1954	0	0	1970	14	3
1955	3	1	1971	13	3
1956	67	15	1972	25	5
1957	8	2	1973	38	8
1958	16	3	1974	15	3
1959	7	2	1975	15	3
1960	8	2	1976	12	3
1961	4	1	1977	17	4
1962	5	1	1978	22	5
1963	6	1	TOTAL	462	100%

Note: All percentages are rounded to nearest whole number.

Issue categories in the coding scheme contained six issues identified as relevant to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. The remaining 11 issues were obtained in the pretest of coded material described in Chapter III. These 17 issue categories and their relative frequency of appearance in the coded editorials of this study are listed in Table 2. Definitions of the 17 issue categories are contained in the code booklet contained in Appendix B.

This research sample provided sufficient data against which hypotheses could be tested and results analyzed. The following results are presented as they relate to specific hypotheses.

Findings Relative to Theme

Hypothesis I. The first hypothesis relative to theme posited that the predominant position taken by the prestige press editorials would be "neutral" when commenting on the Arab-Israeli Dispute. This hypothesis was confirmed by the data.

"Neutral" coded editorials accounted for 60.4 percent (n=279) of all themes measuring support or criticism of Israel and accounted for 55.8 percent (n=258) of all Arab themes. Therefore, this study confirmed the findings of Wagner (1973) and Daugherty and Warden (1979). The American prestige press, as measured in these samples of their

Table 2
Frequency of Editorial Issues

Issue Category	Frequency	%
Jerusalem	25	5.4
Navigation	77	16.7
Occupied Territories	118	25.5
Palestinians	95	20.6
Recognition	94	20.4
Security	228	49.4
War or Peace	286	61.9
Immigration of Jews	23	5.0
Oil	69	14.9
United Nations	230	49.8
U.S. Aid	93	20.1
Soviet Aid	65	14.1
U.S.-Israel Relations	63	13.6
U.S.-Arab Relations	49	10.6
U.S.S.R.-Israel Relations	11	2.4
U.S.S.R.-Arab Relations	79	17.1
U.S.-Soviet Relations	58	12.6


communications content, were predominantly neutral in their commentary on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Dispute. A solid majority of editorial themes were coded "neutral" for both the Israelis and the Arabs in the unsigned opinion pieces of these four prestige newspapers.

However, when the papers did side editorially with either the Israelis or the Arabs in the dispute, press partisanship clearly favored the Israelis as addressed in the second and related sub-hypotheses.

Hypothesis II. The second hypothesis, plus its two related sub-hypotheses, predicted that when the press sided editorially there would be a significant difference in the editorial treatment of the Israelis versus the Arabs. The two sub-hypotheses stated that the Israelis would receive more support and less criticism from the prestige papers, while the Arabs received more criticism and less support. The data collected in this study strongly confirmed Hypothesis II and both related sub-hypotheses.

As depicted in Figure 2, when the prestige press chose sides between the Arabs and the Israelis, the Israelis enjoyed more favorable treatment than did the Arabs by a ratio of 3.5 to 1. In its partisanship, the prestige papers published 148 (32 percent) "pro-Israel" editorials while printing only 42 editorials (9.1 percent) coded as "pro-Arab."

FIGURE 2
COMPARISON OF EDITORIAL THEMES FOR ARABS AND ISRAELIS



In their criticism, the press singled out the Arabs. By an almost 5 to 1 ratio, editorials coded as "anti-Arab" outnumbered those coded "anti-Israel." "Anti-Arab" editorials accounted for more than one third of all Arab theme referents (n=162, 35.1 percent). However, "anti-Israel" coded editorials accounted for only 35 editorials, or 7.6 percent of all Israeli theme referents.

A significant difference in treatment was found when Israeli themes were compared to Arab themes. As evidenced in Table 3, when themes were cross-tabulated and subjected to Chi-square tests, a definite pattern of partisanship emerged that proved highly significant ($X^2 = 58.14$, 4df, $p < .001$).

Whenever the prestige press was "pro-Israel," it was most often also "anti-Arab" in the same editorial. Over half of all "pro-Israel" coded editorials were also coded "anti-Arab" in this study (n=78, 52.7 percent). Whenever an editorial was "neutral-Israel," the Arabs were also treated neutrally almost two thirds of the time. "Anti-Israel" editorials were also coded "neutral-Arab" more than three quarters of the time.

In contrast, whenever a "pro-Arab" editorial appeared on the pages of these prestige papers, the Israelis were also treated favorably, with over half of the "pro-Arab" editorials also coded "pro-Israel" (n=24, 57 percent).

Table 3
Editorial Theme for Israel
by Editorial Theme for Arabs

<u>Theme</u>	<u>Pro-Arab</u>		<u>Neutral Arab</u>		<u>Anti-Arab</u>	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Pro-Israel	24	16.2	46	31.1	78	52.7
Neutral Israel	15	5.4	185	66.3	79	28.3
Anti-Israel	3	8.6	27	77.1	5	14.3

$X^2 = 58.14,$ 4 df, $p < .001$

"Anti-Arab" editorials usually treated the Israelis in either a favorable light ("pro-Israel," n=78, 48 percent), or neutrally ("neutral-Israel," n=79, 48.8 percent).

Therefore, when these prestige papers treated Israel favorably, it was most often at the expense of the Arabs. Whenever the Israelis were criticized, only rarely did the Arabs receive praise in that same editorial. In its partisanship, the prestige press was highly favorable to the Israelis and most often critical of their Arab counterparts. But whenever the Israelis came in for rare criticism in editorials, the Arabs were just as rarely praised in that same editorial. When the press was critical of Israel, the Arabs were treated neutrally. In contrast, when the Arabs were criticized in editorials, the Israelis were most often praised in that same commentary.

The aggregate treatment of the Israelis versus the Arabs in the editorials of the prestige press has been to the advantage of Israel. But, has this press partisanship been consistent throughout the 31-year continuum of the Arab-Israeli Dispute, or have there been changes over time?

Hypothesis III. This third hypothesis sought to determine whether a shift in aggregate editorial opinion had taken place over the history of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. Hypothesis III posited that there would be no shift. Analysis of the data, however, disproved this hypothesis and confirmed,

partially, Belkaoui's (1978) reported shift in editorial treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Data accumulated by the researcher was collapsed and divided into four periods, each marked by one of the four Arab-Israeli wars to test Hypothesis III. The results were subjected to cross-tabulation of theme for each referent group. Chi-square tests revealed that there was, in fact, a statistically significant difference in theme for both the Israelis ($X^2=50.39$, 6 df, $p<.001$) and the Arabs ($X^2=57.88$, 6 df, $p<.001$) between these four periods. The data are presented for both Arab and Israeli theme referents at Table 4.

While cumulatively the prestige press has been primarily "neutral" in its editorials toward both the Arabs and the Israelis (see Hypothesis I), that level of relative neutrality has varied over the years. The prestige press was most "neutral" toward the Israelis during the 1956 to 1966 period of this study. Over three quarters of the editorials during this time period were coded "neutral-Israel" ($n=103$, 77.4 percent).

The prestige papers were least "neutral" toward Israel in the period 1973 to 1978, with slightly less than one half (49.6 percent) of the 119 editorials published during that time period coded as "neutral" for the Israel referent.

Table 4
Editorial Theme for Israel and Arabs
by Year Groups

Theme	1948-1955	1956-1966	1967-1972	1973-1978
Pro-Israel	n=22 (37.3%)	12 (9.0)	60 (39.7)	54 (45.4)
Neutral-Israel	33 (55.9)	103 (77.4)	84 (55.6)	59 (49.6)
Anti-Israel	4 (6.8)	18 (13.5)	7 (4.6)	6 (5.0)
TOTAL	59 (100)	133 (100)	151 (100)	119 (100)

$X^2=50.39$, 6 df, $p < .001$

Theme	1948-1955	1956-1966	1967-1972	1973-1978
Pro-Arab	n=9 (15.3%)	7 (5.3)	3 (2.0)	23 (19.3)
Neutral-Arab	44 (74.6)	88 (66.2)	74 (49.0)	52 (43.7)
Anti-Arab	6 (10.2)	38 (28.6)	74 (49.0)	44 (37.0)
TOTAL	59 (100)	133 (100)	151 (100)	119 (100)

$X^2=57.88$, 6 df, $p < .001$

In contrast, these prestige newspapers were most "neutral" toward the Arabs during the 1948 to 1955 period when almost three quarters (74.6 percent) of the editorials printed in those years were coded as "neutral-Arab." As with Israel, the Arabs saw the period of 1973 to 1978 as least "neutral" editorially for them on the opinion pages of these four American newspapers (see Table 4).

The prestige press was most supportive of Israel during 1973 to 1978 with 45.4 percent of its editorials coded as "pro-Israel" in this time frame. These papers were least supportive of Israel during 1956 to 1966 when "anti-Israel" editorials (n=18, 13.5 percent) outnumbered "pro-Israel" ones (n=12, 9 percent) for the only time in this study.

"Pro-Arab" editorials outnumbered "anti-Arab" ones only during the 1948 to 1955 period. "Anti-Arab" editorials outnumbered "pro-Arab" opinion pieces consistently thereafter. However, the 1973 to 1978 time period saw both a decline in "anti-Arab" editorials and an increase in "pro-Arab" commentary, although "anti-Arab" editorials still outnumbered "pro-Arab" ones, 44 (37 percent) to 23 (19.3 percent), respectively (see Table 4).

This finding partially confirmed Belkaoui's (1978) hypothesis that a positive shift would occur in treatment of the Arabs after the 1978 oil embargo. That shift in more positive treatment in the American press, at least

in their editorials, has apparently occurred. However, the corollary hypothesis in Belkaoui's (1978) study was that support for Israel would wane in the American prestige press. While Belkaoui (1978) contended that some support was evident for this predicted loss of support for Israel, this study disputes those findings. In fact, this research shows that the opposite effect has occurred since 1973 in American prestige press editorial treatment of Israel. Instead of a decrease in support for Israel, an increase in support was evident on the editorial pages of these prestige papers. Support for Israel had never been higher in the 31 years of the Arab-Israeli conflict than it was in the 1973 to 1978 time frame -- support that surpassed even that given the new state of Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Therefore, the 1973 to 1978 period has demonstrated a pronounced and significant change in prestige press editorial treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Treatment of both Arabs and Israelis has been increasingly favorable with a decrease in criticism. The opinion of the prestige press has been shifting away from neutrality in its editorials and criticism of the Arabs and is moving toward increasingly favorable treatment of both the Arabs and Israelis in the editorials of 1973 to 1978.

Hypothesis IV. This final hypothesis relative to theme predicted that there would be significant differences

among the four newspapers in this study in editorial treatment of the Arabs and the Israelis. This hypothesis was also confirmed by the data. Editorial theme distribution by paper is provided in Table 5.

Differences between newspapers in editorial themes for Israel were significant when subjected to Chi-square tests ($X^2=15.37$, 6 df, $p < .02$). The New York Times was the most "pro-Israeli" of the sampled newspapers with over one third of its editorials coded as favorable to the Jewish state. The Chicago Tribune was the second most "pro-Israeli" of the four sampled newspapers with 28.8 percent ($n=23$) of its editorials favoring Israel, followed by the Los Angeles Times ($n=22$, 28.6 percent) and the Washington Post ($n=35$, 28.5 percent).

The Chicago Tribune was also most critical of Israel with 15 percent ($n=12$) of its editorials coded "anti-Israel." The Los Angeles Times was the second most critical of Israel ($n=8$, 10.4 percent), followed by the Washington Post ($n=10$, 8.1 percent). The New York Times was, by far, the least critical of Israel of all the prestige papers, publishing only five (2.7 percent) "anti-Israel" editorials of the 182 published by the Times and coded between 1948 and 1978.

Therefore, in their partisanship toward Israel, the New York Times proved most supportive and least critical of the prestige papers in its commentary. As a percentage of its editorials, the New York Times carried the

Table 5
Newspaper by Editorial Theme
for Israel and Arabs

Newspaper	Editorial Theme			N
	Pro-Israel	Neutral-Israel	Anti-Israel	
Chicago Tribune	n=23 (28.8%)	45 (56.3)	12 (15.0)	80 (100)
Los Angeles Times	22 (28.6)	47 (61.0)	8 (10.4)	77 (100)
New York Times	68 (37.4)	109 (59.9)	5 (2.7)	182 (100)
Washington Post	35 (28.5)	78 (63.4)	10 (8.1)	123 (100)
TOTAL				462

$X^2=15.37$, 6 df, $p < .01$

Newspaper	Editorial Theme			N
	Pro-Arab	Neutral-Arab	Anti-Arab	
Chicago Tribune	N=5 (6.3%)	51 (63.8)	24 (30.0)	80 (100)
Los Angeles Times	7 (9.1)	40 (51.9)	30 (39.0)	77 (100)
New York Times	12 (6.6)	93 (51.1)	77 (42.3)	182 (100)
Washington Post	18 (14.6)	74 (60.2)	31 (25.2)	123 (100)
TOTAL				462

$X^2=15.42$, 6 df, $p < .01$

most "pro-Israel" editorials while the Washington Post published the fewest. The Chicago Tribune was the most critical of Israel while the New York Times rarely criticized the Jewish state in its editorial commentary. Of the four newspapers in this sample, the Washington Post was the most "balanced" in its treatment of the Israelis, publishing more "neutral" coded editorials than partisan ones toward the Israelis throughout the study period.

There was also a significant difference among these newspapers in their treatment of the Arabs ($X^2=15.42$, 6 df, $p<.02$). In contrast to the numerous "pro-Israel" editorials, "pro-Arab" opinion pieces were a rarity on the editorial pages of these four prestige papers. Only 42 editorials were coded as "pro-Arab" in the 31-year sample period of this study. When it came to treatment of the Arabs in editorials, the prestige press also proved to be less "neutral" and more "anti" towards the Arabs, Arab nations and their causes.

Of these sampled newspapers, the New York Times proved most "anti-Arab" publishing almost one half of all the coded "anti-Arab" editorials in this sample ($n=77$, 47.5 percent). The second most critical of the Arabs proved to be the Washington Post. However, the Post's criticism fell far behind that of the New York Times, with the Post carrying fewer than half of the editorials ($n=31$, 19.1

percent) coded as "anti-Arab" than did the far more critical New York Times. The New York Times and the Washington Post were followed by the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune in the distribution of "anti-Arab" editorial pieces in this sample.

In their treatment of the Arabs, the New York Times was the leading critic, while the Washington Post proved to be the most "pro-Arab." The Chicago Tribune was the most "neutral" in its editorial treatment of the Arabs. Almost two thirds (63.8 percent) of its editorials were categorized as "neutral-Arab" in this study.

Findings Relative to Crisis

Data were collected to determine what impact an editorial environment characterized by "conflict" or "non-conflict" would have on commentary in these prestige papers.

Hypothesis V. This fifth hypothesis predicted that editorial frequency would be higher in times of crisis (conflict) than in times of relative peace (nonconflict). This hypothesis was not confirmed by the data.

Conflict periods did yield more editorials than did nonconflict periods (n=246 and 216, respectively). However, the initial sample included 19 "conflict" periods and only 18 "nonconflict" sample periods. This gave a disproportionate opportunity for more editorials to occur in conflict versus nonconflict sample cells. To accommodate

the sampling disparity, frequencies were weighted to determine whether a significant difference existed in editorial distributions between conflict and nonconflict sample cells. Even with weighting the resultant frequency distribution did not prove statistically significant when conflict and nonconflict periods were compared. Therefore, Hypothesis V was rejected in this study.

Hypothesis VI. Using the sum of issues per editorial as a generalized measure of the complexity of an editorial, this sixth hypothesis and its related sub-hypothesis predicted a significant difference in the number of issues treated per editorial in conflict versus nonconflict periods. A related sub-hypothesis predicted that conflict editorials would address fewer issues than editorials published in nonconflict periods. Both Hypothesis VI and the related sub-hypothesis were rejected in the analysis of results. When subjected to Chi-square tests, no statistically significant relationship was found between the number of issues treated per editorial during conflict or nonconflict sample periods. Therefore, it was determined that crisis did not affect the complexity of editorials on the Arab-Israeli Dispute in these prestige papers.

Hypothesis VII. The seventh hypothesis of this study predicted significant differences in those issues treated during conflict periods when compared to issues

treated during nonconflict periods. The data partially supported this hypothesis (see Table 6).

There were few statistically significant differences in the frequency of treatment for the individual issues in this study between conflict and nonconflict coding periods. Of the 17 issue categories coded, only four showed a statistically significant difference in frequency distribution during conflict versus nonconflict samples. Those four issues were the "Status of Jerusalem," "Occupied Territories," "Security" and "United States-Israel Relations."

The issue category "Status of Jerusalem" was most often coded in editorials that appeared in periods of nonconflict. Access to the holy places of the city and control of that access were the predominant concerns of these four prestige papers; concerns aired most often in noncombative, peaceful periods of diplomacy. "Status of Jerusalem" received mention in only slightly more than 5 percent (n=25) of the 462 coded editorials in this study. Although only infrequently mentioned as an issue in the Arab-Israeli Dispute, when the press did comment editorially on the holy city and shrines of old Jerusalem, it was done in nonconflict versus conflict periods by a ratio of 3 to 1. Over three quarters (n=19, 76 percent) of all editorials coded as discussing the "Status of Jerusalem" were coded in nonconflict periods. Only six editorials (24 percent) mentioned this issue during times of conflict. The

Table 6

Issue Frequency by Conflict/Nonconflict Sample Periods

Issue Category	Conflict Frequency	Nonconflict Frequency
Jerusalem	n=6 (24.0%)	19 (76.0%)
Occupied Territories	47 (39.8)	71 (60.2)
*Palestinians	46 (48.4)	49 (51.6)
*Recognition	45 (47.9)	49 (52.1)
Security	143 (62.7)	85 (37.3)
*Navigation	38 (49.4)	39 (50.6)
*War or Peace	158 (55.2)	128 (44.8)
*Immigration of Jews	15 (65.2)	8 (34.8)
*Oil	42 (60.9)	27 (39.1)
*United Nations	120 (52.2)	110 (47.8)
*U.S. Aid	54 (58.1)	39 (41.9)
*Soviet Aid	29 (44.6)	36 (55.4)
U.S.-Israel Relations	41 (65.1)	22 (34.9)
*U.S.-Arab Relations	23 (46.9)	26 (53.1)
*USSR-Israel Relations	9 (81.8)	2 (18.2)
*USSR-Arab Relations	42 (53.2)	37 (46.8)
*U.S.-Soviet Relations	35 (60.3)	23 (39.7)

* Note: Indicates not significant to the .05 level.

difference in frequencies between nonconflict and conflict periods proved statistically significant (Corrected $X^2=5.72$, 1 df, $p<.02$).

The second issue receiving significantly more frequent mention in periods of nonconflict was the issue category of "Occupied Territories." One of every four editorials coded in this study included mention of the issue "Occupied Territories" ($n=118$, 25.5 percent). However, the presence of this issue in an editorial was most likely during periods of nonconflict than in times of conflict, according to the data. Editorials addressing this issue category were distributed more heavily in nonconflict periods ($n=71$, 60.2 percent) versus conflict periods ($n=47$, 39.8 percent). This difference in distribution also proved to be statistically significant (Corrected $X^2=4.48$, 1 df, $p<.05$).

By contrast, conflict periods yielded two issue categories that proved significant in their frequency distributions -- the issues of "Security" and "United States-Israel Relations."

"Security" was coded in almost half of all editorials in this 31-year sample period ($n=228$, 49.4 percent). Of these 228 editorials, 143 of them (62.7 percent) were published during conflict sample periods, while the remaining 85 editorials (37.3 percent) occurred during periods of nonconflict. This difference in distribution was also

significant when Chi-square statistical tests were performed (Corrected $X^2=14.25$, 1 df, $p<.001$).

Relations between between the United States and Israel received significantly greater mention in editorials of conflict periods during this study. By a margin of almost two to one, the 63 editorials addressing this issue were coded in conflict ($n=41$, 65.1 percent) versus nonconflict ($n=22$, 34.9 percent) sample periods. Again, Chi-square tests revealed this to be a statistically significant difference in distribution of this issue category (Corrected $X^2=5.14$, 1 df, $p<.05$).

These four issues of the 17 issue categories coded were the only ones to prove significantly different in frequency distributions between conflict and nonconflict editorial samples. While the predicted difference did not hold true across all issue categories, Hypothesis VII can be said to have been confirmed for these four issues.

Hypothesis VIII. This final hypothesis relative to crisis and its two related sub-hypotheses dealt with editorial theme in times of conflict and nonconflict. Hypothesis VIII posited there would be a significant difference in editorial theme for the Israelis and the Arabs when conflict period editorials were compared to nonconflict editorials. The two sub-hypotheses predicted that the prestige press will take sides more frequently in conflict periods than in nonconflict times. In nonconflict times,

the press would be more "neutral" toward both the Israelis and the Arabs. Data were collected against which this hypothesis and sub-hypotheses could be tested. Analysis revealed a partial confirmation of this hypothesis for only editorial treatment of the Arabs. Table 7 provides a breakdown of theme by conflict/nonconflict cells for both the Israelis and the Arabs.

Support, neutrality or criticism of Israel showed no predictive predilection for either conflict or nonconflict periods. Support, criticism and neutrality themes showed no statistically significant differences in distribution when conflict period editorials were compared to nonconflict comment pieces. This finding differed with that of Daugherty and Warden (1979) who found a shift toward Israel whenever the American press felt the Jewish state was threatened by its Arab neighbors. The aggregate editorial position of these four prestige papers demonstrated no significant shifts attributable to a crisis or noncrisis environment as defined and measured in this study (see Table 7).

However, treatment of the Arabs did show some differences when conflict and nonconflict editorial samples were compared. Conflict or the absence of conflict did not affect the neutrality or "even-handedness" of prestige press editorial treatment of the Arabs, thus rejecting the second sub-hypothesis. "Neutral" coded editorials

Table 7

Editorial Theme for Israel and the Arabs
During Conflict and Nonconflict Sample Periods

Theme	<u>Editorial Sample Periods</u>		
	Conflict	Nonconflict	N
Pro-Arab	n=13 (31%)	29 (69.0)	42 (9.1)
Neutral-Arab	128 (49.6)	130 (50.4)	258 (55.8)
Anti-Arab	105 (64.8)	57 (35.2)	162 (35.1)
TOTAL			462 (100)

$X^2=18.46$, 2 df, $p < .001$

Theme	<u>Editorial Sample Periods</u>		
	Conflict	Nonconflict	N
Pro-Israel	n=85 (57.4%)	63 (42.6)	148 (32.0)
Neutral-Israel	141 (50.5)	138 (49.5)	279 (60.4)
Anti-Israel	20 (57.1)	15 (42.9)	35 (7.6)
TOTAL			462 (100)

$X^2=2.08$, 2 df, $p > .35$ (Not Significant)

appeared with almost equal frequency in either conflict or nonconflict periods for the Arabs. "Anti-Arab" sentiments, on the other hand, occurred most strongly during conflict period editorials. "Pro-Arab" editorials, when they were infrequently printed, appeared overwhelmingly during nonconflict periods. This difference in distribution for Arab themes between conflict and nonconflict periods proved statistically significant ($X^2=18.46$, 2 df, $p<.001$).

This finding partially supports Hypothesis VIII and, therefore, the hypothesis can be partially accepted, but only for the Arab theme referents. Treatment of the Israelis was not affected by conflict or nonconflict sample periods; support for Israel remained consistent through both samples. The first sub-hypothesis was confirmed only for the Arab referents, rejected for the Israeli referent. The second sub-hypothesis was rejected for both the Israelis and the Arabs.

Findings Relative to Issues

Having examined the data and tested hypotheses relative to both theme and crisis, analysis turned to the remaining two hypotheses and findings relative to the issues outlined in this study. For purposes of examination the 17 issue categories in this study were divided into two groups: primary issues and secondary issues. Primary issue categories were those six issues outlined in

Chapter II and relevant to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute (Bill and Leiden, 1979). Secondary issues were those remaining issue categories derived from a pre-test of editorial material that yielded an a priori set of 11 issue categories described in Chapter III.

The two hypotheses relative to the issues and against which data were compared were Hypotheses IX and X.

Hypothesis IX. This hypothesis stated that editorials on the Arab-Israeli Dispute would be predominantly "neutral" when addressing the various issues relative to the historical conflict. These prestige papers, then, were expected to take neither the side of the Arabs nor the Israelis in dealing with those six issues relevant to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict (primary issues). This hypothesis was not confirmed by the data (see Tables 8 and 9).

Hypothesis X. The tenth hypothesis posited that the more salient an issue category, the less likely it would be coded "neutral." In this hypothesis, analysis of data would provide an index of what issues the prestige press deemed "salient" by determining which of the 17 issue categories deviated from the thematic position of neutrality. Those issues on which the press took a partisan stand ("pro" or "anti") would be the issues these prestige papers treated as "salient" to their publics in commentary on the Arab-

Table 8
Editorial Theme for Israel by Primary Issue Category

Theme	Jerusalem	Navigation	Occupied Territories	Palestinians	Recognition	Security
Pro-Israel	n=8 (32.0%)	33 (42.9)	51 (43.2)	50 (52.6)	57 (60.6)	91 (39.9)
Neutral-Israel	12 (48.0)	41 (53.2)	54 (45.8)	41 (43.2)	33 (35.1)	114 (50.0)
Anti-Israel	5 (20.0)	3 (3.9)	13 (11.0)	4 (4.2)	4 (4.3)	23 (9.1)
TOTAL	25* (100)	77 (100)	118 (100)	95 (100)	94 (100)	228 (100)

* Note: Indicates not statistically significant to .05 level.

Table 9
Editorial Theme for Arabs by Primary Issue Category

Theme	Occupied Territories						
	Jerusalem	Navigation	Territories	Palestinians	Recognition	Security	
Pro-Arab	n=3 (12.0%)	1 (1.3)	17 (14.4)	17 (17.9)	20 (21.3)	16 (7.0)	
Neutral-Arab	16 (64.0)	29 (37.7)	58 (49.2)	35 (36.8)	45 (47.9)	101 (44.3)	
Anti-Arab	6 (24.0)	47 (61.0)	43 (36.4)	43 (45.3)	29 (30.9)	111 (48.7)	
TOTAL	25 (100)	77 (100)	118 (100)	95 (100)	94 (100)	228 (100)	

Israeli Dispute. Several issues in the 17 issue categories of this study received strong partisan support for one or both theme referents, thus confirming Hypothesis X.

Tables 8 and 9 provide a breakdown of editorial themes for Israel and the Arabs, respectively, for the six primary issues of historical importance to the resolution of the Middle East conflict. However, a detailed examination of these issues is necessary to explain the findings relative to both Hypotheses IX and X of this study.

Status of Jerusalem. These prestige papers took the side of neither the Arabs nor the Israelis in their commentary on the issue of "Status of Jerusalem." The majority of editorials treating the subject (n=25) were coded either "neutral-Israel" (n=12, 48 percent) or "neutral-Arab" (n=16, 64 percent). When the press did take sides on this issue, it was partisan towards the Israelis and against the Arabs. "Pro-Israel" editorials accounted for 32 percent (n=8) of those Israeli theme referents while "anti-Arab" editorials numbered 6 (24 percent). However, tests for statistical significance in the distributions of editorials revealed that only the distribution of Arab theme referents proved significant ($X^2=11.12$, 2 df, $p<.01$).

Navigation. In contrast, these prestige papers sided strongly with Israel against the Arabs on the issue of the right of navigation. Of the 77 editorials coded as treating the issue of "Navigation," 33 were "pro-Israel"

(42.9 percent), while 47 (61 percent) were coded "anti-Arab." When statistical tests were applied to thematic treatment for both Arab and Israeli referents, each proved significant (Arab $X^2=41.86$, 2 df, $p<.001$; Israeli $X^2=31.27$, 2 df, $p<.001$).

Occupied Territories. The prestige press was largely "neutral" on the issue of "Occupied Territories," with "neutral-Israel" (n=54, 45.8 percent) and "neutral-Arab" (n=58, 49.2 percent) editorials accounting for the majority of themes in the 118 published editorials addressing this issue. When the press did take sides on this issue, it was most often favorable to the Israelis and unfavorable to the Arabs with "pro-Israel" (n=51, 43.2 percent) and "anti-Arab" (n=43, 36.4 percent) editorials dominating the partisan opinion pieces. Treatment of the issue of "Occupied Territories" proved statistically significant for both Israel ($X^2=26.56$, 2 df, $p<.001$) and for the Arabs ($X^2=21.88$, 2 df, $p<.001$).

Palestinians. The issue of the "Palestinian Problem" (excluding terrorism) was noted in 95 of the 462 coded editorials. Coding showed the Israelis received more positive treatment by these prestige papers than did the Arabs. Over one half of the editorials coded as addressing this issue were "pro-Israel" (n=50, 52.6 percent), while the Arabs received more negative treatment with 43 editorials (45.3 percent) coded as "anti-Arab." Thematic treatment for this issue proved statistically significant for both Israel ($X^2=37.54$,

2 df, $p < .001$) and for the Arabs ($X^2 = 11.20$, 2 df, $p < .01$).

Recognition. These prestige papers were strongly supportive of Israel editorially on the issue of "Recognition" of the Jewish state. Of the 94 editorials coded as treating this issue, the majority were coded "pro-Israel" ($n = 57$, 60.6 percent). Treatment of the Arabs on the issue of "Recognition" was largely "neutral," with 45 editorials coded as "neutral-Arab" (47.9 percent). Both theme codings proved significant for the Israelis ($X^2 = 44.76$, 2 df, $p < .001$), and the Arabs ($X^2 = 10.23$, 2 df, $p < .01$).

Security. On the issue of "Security," the freedom of a nation from attack, the newspapers differed in their editorial treatment of the Arabs and the Israelis. The majority of the 228 editorials addressing this issue were coded "neutral-Israel" ($n = 114$, 50 percent) and "anti-Arab" ($n = 111$, 48.7 percent). Again, both thematic codings were statistically significant at greater than the .001 level for both the Israelis ($X^2 = 58.92$, 2 df) and the Arabs ($X^2 = 71.71$, 2 df).

As evidenced by the data, these prestige papers did not treat these six issues neutrally for both the Israelis and the Arabs as predicted in Hypothesis IX. These four newspapers were predominantly "neutral" toward both sides only on the issue of "Status of Jerusalem." On the issue of "Occupied Territories" these prestige papers were "neutral" toward the Arabs, but were closely split between "neutral" and "pro-Israel" on this crucial issue. In the remaining categories

of these primary issues, the press usually sided with Israel or criticized the Arabs. Interestingly, these four American prestige papers were never predominantly critical of the Israelis nor "pro-Arab" on any of the issues of relevance to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. Therefore, Hypothesis IX was not supported in this analysis. However, data did support Hypothesis X on five of these six primary issue categories.

But what of the remaining 11 issue categories? Which of these were "salient" to the prestige press? Tables 10 and 11 present a breakdown of editorial themes for Israel and the Arabs, respectively, on these 11 secondary issues. A detailed examination of those findings follows.

War or Peace. The majority of editorials in the sampled newspapers took neither side in addressing this issue of "War or Peace." Both the Arab and the Israel theme coding showed that editorials preferred neither referent in commentary on the threat of war or need for peace in the region. Of the 286 editorials treating the issue, 150 (52.4 percent) were coded "neutral-Israel" and 143 (60 percent) were coded "neutral-Arab." These prestige papers clearly preferred to remain nonpartisan on the issue of "War or Peace." The thematic distributions did prove to be significant for Israeli ($X^2=84.02$, 2 df, $p<.001$) and Arab ($X^2=63.7$, 2 df, $p<.001$) theme referents.

Immigration of Jews. Of the only 23 editorials

Table 10

Editorial Theme for Israel by Secondary Issue Category

Theme	War or Peace	Immigration of Jews	Oil	United Nations	U.S. Aid	USSR Aid	U.S.-Israel Relations	U.S.-Arab Relations	USSR-Israel Relations	USSR-Arab Relations	U.S.-Soviet Relations
Pro- Israel	n=110 (38.5%)	6 (26.1)	15 (21.7)	74 (32.2)	32 (52.7)	22 (33.8)	39 (61.9)	28 (57.1)	4 (36.4)	31 (39.2)	19 (32.8)
Neutral- Israel	150 (52.4)	17 (73.9)	53 (76.8)	134 (58.3)	49 (52.7)	39 (60.0)	19 (30.2)	19 (38.8)	5 (45.5)	44 (55.7)	38 (65.5)
Anti- Israel	26 (9.1)	0 (0.0)	1 (1.4)	22 (9.6)	12 (12.9)	4 (6.2)	5 (7.9)	2 (4.1)	2 (18.2)	4 (5.1)	1 (1.7)
TOTAL	286 (100)	23 (100)	69 (100)	230 (100)	93 (100)	65 (100)	63 (100)	49 (100)	11* (100)	79 (100)	58 (100)

* Note: Indicates not significant to the .05 level.

Table 11
 Editorial Theme for Arabs by Secondary Issue Category

Theme	War or Peace	Immigration of Jews	Oil	United Nations	U.S. Aid	USSR Aid	U.S.-Israel Relations	U.S.-Arab Relations	USSR-Israel Relations	USSR-Arab Relations	U.S.-Soviet Relations
Pro-Arab	n=35 (12.2%)	0 (0)	5 (7.3)	12 (5.2)	5 (5.4)	1 (1.5)	13 (20.6)	14 (28.6)	1 (9.1)	4 (5.1)	2 (3.4)
Neutral-Arab	143 (60.0)	15 (65.2)	31 (44.9)	127 (55.2)	59 (63.4)	31 (47.7)	24 (38.1)	20 (40.8)	7 (63.6)	33 (41.8)	39 (67.2)
Anti-Arab	108 (37.8)	8 (34.8)	33 (47.8)	91 (39.6)	29 (31.2)	33 (50.8)	26 (41.3)	15 (30.6)	3 (27.3)	42 (53.2)	17 (29.3)
TOTAL	286 (100)	23 (100)	69 (100)	230 (100)	93 (100)	65 (100)	63* (100)	49* (100)	11* (100)	79 (100)	58 (100)

*Note: Indicates not significant to the .05 level.

addressing this issue in the 31-year sample period, the majority took neither the Arab nor the Israeli side.

"Neutral-Israel" and "neutral-Arab" coded editorials accounted for 73.9 percent (n=17) and 65.2 percent (n=15), respectively. Both Arab and Israeli thematic coding distributions proved to be statistically significant (Israel $X^2=19.38$, 2 df, $p<.001$; Arab $X^2=14.69$, 2 df, $p<.001$).

Oil. The impact of the oil issue did not prove to have a "balancing" effect on the editorialization of these prestige papers as some previous studies had hypothesized (i.e. Belkaoui, 1978). The issue of "Oil" was addressed in 69 editorials, and of them 53 (76.8 percent) were coded as "neutral-Israel" while "neutral-Arab" editorials numbered 31 (44.9 percent). The "Oil" issue, however, had a negative impact on the thematic codings for the Arabs with 33 editorials (47.8 percent), a majority of those editorials in this issue category for the Arabs, were coded as "anti-Arab." Both theme distributions for Israel ($X^2=62.95$, 2 df, $p<.001$) and the Arabs ($X^2=21.22$, 2 df, $p<.001$) proved statistically significant.

United Nations. Treatment for the Arabs and Israel was primarily "neutral" for both actors in the 230 editorials addressing the world forum. "Neutral-Israel" editorials accounted for 134 (58.3 percent) of Israel theme referents while 127 (55.2 percent) of the coded editorials were judged "neutral-Arab." When these papers did side with either the

Israelis or the Arabs, it was heavily in favor of Israel with 32.2 percent (n=74) coded as "pro-Israel" while 39.6 percent (n=91) were judged "anti-Arab." The distribution of editorial themes was statistically significant for Israel ($X^2=81.94$, 2 df, $p<.001$) and the Arabs ($X^2=90.27$, 2 df, $p<.001$).

United States Aid. The issue of "U.S. Aid" was recorded in 93 (20.1 percent) of the 462 editorials coded in this sample. In their commentary, the sampled newspapers were predominantly "neutral" toward both the Israelis and the Arabs. "Neutral-Israel" coded editorials accounted for over half of the Israeli theme referents in this issue category (n=49, 52.7 percent), while "neutral-Arab" editorials comprised 63.4 percent (n=59) of the Arab referents. Frequency distributions proved statistically significant on this issue for both the Israelis ($X^2=22.13$, 2 df, $p<.001$) and for the Arabs ($X^2=47.23$, 2 df, $p<.001$).

Soviet Aid. The question of "Soviet Aid" was addressed in only 65 (14.1 percent) editorials of the 462 recorded. On this issue category, these prestige newspapers treated Israel and the Arabs differently. For Israel, the issue of "Soviet Aid" generated predominantly "neutral" editorials with 60 percent (n=39) of the editorials coded as "neutral-Israel." However, press treatment of this issue for the Arabs resulted in over half of the editorials (n=33, 50.8 percent) coded as "anti-Arab." The distributions of editorials by theme, again, proved to be statistically significant for Israel ($X^2=28.19$,

2 df, $p < .001$) and the Arabs ($X^2 = 29.66$, 2 df, $p < .001$).

United States - Israel Relations. Of the sampled editorials, 63 (13.6 percent) addressed U.S. and Israeli relations. On this issue, the press was strongly "pro-Israel" with 61.9 percent ($n = 39$) of the editorials coded in favor of the Jewish state. In its treatment of the Arabs on this issue category, the press was closely split between "neutral" and "anti" coded editorials for the Arab theme referents. However, for the Arabs theme distributions did not satisfy statistical tests for significance. On the other hand, Israeli theme referent distributions were highly significant ($X^2 = 27.81$, 2 df, $p < .001$).

United States - Arab Relations. Only one in ten editorials addressed the issue of U.S. relations with the Arab states ($n = 49$, 10.6 percent). Interestingly, when the issue was addressed the prestige press sided with Israel but remained largely "neutral" toward the Arabs. "Pro-Israel" editorials accounted for well over half of the Israeli theme referents ($n = 28$, 57.1 percent) while "pro-Arab" editorials numbered only 14 (28.6 percent). A plurality of Arab theme referents were coded "neutral-Arab" in this issue category ($n = 20$, 40.8 percent) with the remainder coded as "anti-Arab" ($n = 15$, 30.6 percent). While this distribution did not satisfy statistical tests of significance for the Arabs, it did prove highly significant for the Israelis ($X^2 = 21.36$, 2 df, $p < .001$).

Soviet - Israeli Relations. Fewer than 3 percent of the coded editorials addressed the issue of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Israel (n=11, 2.4 percent). For both the Arabs and the Israelis this issue resulted in largely "neutral" coded editorials, although numbers were too small to perform adequate statistical tests to determine significance.

Soviet - Arab Relations. This issue category yielded 79 (17.1 percent) editorials coded as addressing the subject of Soviet relations with the Arab states. While this issue resulted in a majority of "neutral" coded editorials for Israel theme referents, the Arabs were criticized in over half of the editorials (n=42, 53.2 percent). These differences proved statistically significant for both the Israeli ($X^2=31.63$, 2 df, $p<.001$) and the Arab theme referents ($X^2=29.96$, 2 df, $p<.001$).

United States - Soviet Relations. The issue of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union in the context of the Arab-Israeli Dispute was addressed in 58 (12.6 percent) of the coded editorials. On this issue the press was "neutral" in its treatment of both the Arabs and the Israelis. Two out of three editorials addressing "United States - Soviet Relations" were coded "neutral-Israel" (n=38, 65.5 percent) and "neutral-Arab" (n=39, 67.2 percent). The frequency distributions for both Israel ($X^2=35.42$, 2 df, $p<.001$) and Arab ($X^2=35.84$, 2 df, $p<.001$) theme referents proved highly significant for this final issue category.

As proposed in Hypothesis X, the prestige press did deviate from neutrality on several issue categories for both Israeli and Arab theme referents. On the basis of conceptual and operational definitions, those issue categories in which the press deviated from a "neutral" position were considered "salient" to the four prestige papers in their commentary on the Arab-Israeli Dispute. Considering only those issue categories in which frequency distributions proved statistically significant, data shows that in their partisanship these prestige papers consistently sided with the Israelis on all "salient" issue categories and criticized the Arabs. The prestige press sided with Israel on four of the 17 issue categories recorded ("Palestinians," "Recognition," "U.S.-Israel Relations," and "U.S.-Arab Relations"). No issue category was coded as predominantly "anti-Israel" for this study.

In contrast, these prestige papers were critical of the Arabs on six of the 17 issue categories coded ("Navigation," "Palestinians," "Security," "Oil," "Soviet Aid," and "Soviet-Arab Relations"). No issue category was coded as predominantly "pro-Arab" throughout the 31 years encompassed by this research.

The press, then, in its partisan evaluation of issues sided with Israel and was heavily critical of the Arabs. The presses' index of "salient" issues differed for the Arabs when compared to the Israelis. On only one issue did the press take sides for both Israeli and Arab theme referents:

the issue of the "Palestinians."

Findings Relative to Research Questions

Three research questions were posed in Chapter II. Data were compared to each of these three questions to provide further insight into prestige press treatment of the various issue categories of this project. Analysis produced the following findings relative to the research questions formulated in this study.

Research Question 1. This question, restated, was "which issues in this study will prove to be more salient than others?" As evidenced in the analysis of Hypothesis IX and Hypothesis X, there was a significant difference in the treatment of issues for both Arab and Israeli theme referents. Deviation from the nonpartisan thematic position of "neutral" toward either referent constituted, for this study, the criterion for saliency of an issue category for these four prestige papers. As stated earlier in this chapter, four issue categories proved "salient" for the Israeli referent while six proved "salient" for the Arabs of the set of 17 issue categories examined in this research. These "salient" issue categories provide an index of issues these four newspapers considered relevant to their commentary on the Arab-Israeli conflict. See Table 12 for presentation of those 17 issue categories and their salience for both Arab and Israeli theme referents.

Table 12
Editorial Issue Agenda
for Arab and Israeli Theme Referents

Editorial Issue Category	Theme Referents	
	Arab	Israeli
Status of Jerusalem	∅	∅
Right of Navigation	-	∅
Occupied Territories	∅	+ / ∅
Palestinians	-	+
Recognition	∅	+
Security	-	∅
War or Peace	∅	∅
Immigration of Jews	∅	∅
Oil	-	∅
United Nations	∅	∅
United States Aid	∅	∅
Soviet Aid	-	∅
U.S.-Israel Relations	-	+
U.S.-Arab Relations	+ / -	+
Soviet-Israel Relations	∅	∅
Soviet-Arab Relations	-	∅
U.S.-Soviet Relations	∅	∅

Legend:

+ Favorable (Pro) - Unfavorable (Anti) ∅ Neutral

On those six primary issues pertinent to the resolution of the dispute, the press sided with Israel on two while remaining neutral toward the Jewish state on the remaining four issue categories. For the Arabs, these prestige papers were critical on three of the six issue categories. The issue category of "Palestinians" was the only area in which these newspapers deviated from neutrality for both Israel and the Arabs -- supporting the Israelis while criticizing the Arabs.

On the 11 secondary issues in this study, the press sided with Israel twice while remaining "neutral" on the remaining nine. The Arabs were criticized in three of the secondary issue categories with the remainder of the categories coded predominantly "neutral-Arab." On secondary issues there was no convergence of partisanship on any issue category for both Israeli and Arab theme referents. Therefore, it can be said that in their treatment of the Arab-Israeli Dispute these prestige papers viewed differently the indices of salient issues for the Israelis when compared to the Arabs. These differing issue agendas, depicted in Table 12, illustrate that in their commentary the prestige press not only view the issues differently for both the Arabs and Israelis, but they also consistently treat each side differently. For example, in their editorialization on the issue agenda for Israel, these papers are consistently

supportive of the Jewish state. However, in their commentary on the Arab issue agenda, these papers are regularly critical of the Arab states, actors and their causes.

While this observation held true for aggregate treatment of issues, has this been true throughout the 31-year history of the Arab-Israeli conflict? The second research question addressed the effect of time on issue saliency.

Research Question 2. This second research question was used to investigate whether these prestige papers treated the issues identically throughout the conflict, or were there differences in issue frequency over time? The data from the 31 individual years examined in this study were again collapsed into four groups, each encompassing one of the four Arab-Israeli wars and intervening years. When compared through time, there was a statistically significant difference in issue frequency between the four year groups for 14 of the 17 issue categories. Therefore, time was a significant research variable in the study of American prestige press treatment of issues in the Arab-Israeli Dispute. Table 13 presents a detailed breakdown of frequencies by year group for each of the 17 issue categories of this project. Unless otherwise indicated in the table, each of the frequency distributions was statistically significant at .05 or higher levels of significance.

Research Question 3. This third research question was used to inquire whether there would be differences

Table 13

Issue Frequency Distribution by Year Group

Issue	1948-1955	1956-1966	1967-1972	1973-1978
*Jerusalem	n=9 (36.0%)	3 (12.0)	10 (40.0)	3 (12.0)
Navigation	0 (0.0)	34 (44.2)	43 (55.8)	0 (0.0)
Occupied Territories	2 (1.7)	31 (26.3)	39 (33.1)	46 (39.0)
Palestinians	7 (7.4)	14 (14.7)	31 (32.6)	43 (45.3)
Recognition	29 (30.9)	10 (10.6)	25 (26.6)	30 (31.9)
Security	25 (11.0)	62 (27.2)	76 (33.3)	65 (28.5)
War/Peace	34 (11.9)	67 (23.4)	106 (37.1)	79 (27.6)
*Immigration	7 (30.4)	3 (13.0)	4 (17.4)	9 (39.1)
Oil	4 (5.8)	20 (29.0)	24 (34.8)	21 (30.4)
United Nations	40 (17.4)	81 (35.2)	74 (32.2)	35 (15.2)
U.S. Aid	12 (12.9)	32 (34.4)	31 (33.3)	18 (19.4)
USSR Aid	0 (0.0)	22 (33.8)	33 (50.8)	10 (15.4)
U.S.-Israel Relations	8 (12.7)	4 (6.3)	16 (25.4)	35 (55.6)
U.S.-Arab Relations	3 (6.1)	10 (20.4)	11 (22.4)	25 (51.0)
*USSR-Israel Relations	2 (18.2)	1 (9.1)	7 (63.6)	1 (9.1)
USSR-Arab Relations	1 (1.3)	24 (30.4)	38 (48.1)	16 (20.3)
U.S.-USSR Relations	1 (1.7)	8 (13.8)	30 (50.1)	19 (32.8)

* Note: Indicates results not statistically significant at .05 level.

between the newspapers of this study in the issues they treated in their editorials on the Arab-Israeli Dispute. The data show that there were, in fact, significant differences in distribution of issues among the four newspapers of this study in 12 of the 17 issue categories coded.

In its commentary on the primary issues of relevance to the resolution of the conflict, the New York Times consistently editorialized more frequently than the other three prestige papers in this study. Since the New York Times accounted for almost 40 percent of all editorials in this sample, it was not surprising that the Times ranked highly in its treatment of these issues. However, when the frequencies were weighted to compensate for the disparity between the Times and the other three newspapers, the New York paper still editorialized more frequently in four of the six primary issue categories. The Washington Post ranked second in attentiveness to these crucial issues, followed by the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune. The Tribune ranked last in attentiveness for five of the six primary issue categories in this study. Table 14 presents the breakdown of issue frequencies by newspaper and weighted rankings for each newspaper on these primary issues in the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

In their treatment of the secondary issues in this project, the rankings of the newspapers alter. The New York Times ranked first in only three of the 11 issue

Table 14
Sampled Newspaper Distribution of Primary Issues

Newspapers	Jerusalem	Navigation	Occupied Territories	Palestinians	Recognition	Security
Chicago Tribune [Rank]	n=2 (8.0%) [4]	11 (14.3) [4]	17 (14.4) [4]	13 (13.7) [4]	11 (11.7) [4]	37 (16.2) [3]
Los Angeles Times [Rank]	3 (12.0) [3]	12 (15.6) [2]	23 (19.5) [1]	15 (15.8) [3]	13 (13.8) [3]	36 (15.8) [2]
New York Times [Rank]	15 (60.0) [1]	37 (48.1) [1]	43 (36.4) [3]	40 (42.1) [1]	40 (42.6) [2]	99 (43.4) [1]
Washington Post [Rank]	5 (20.0) [2]	17 (22.1) [3]	35 (29.7) [2]	27 (28.4) [2]	30 (31.9) [1]	56 (24.6) [4]
TOTAL	25	77	118	95	94	228

categories while the Washington Post predominated in five. Weighted frequencies resulted in the Washington Post ranking as the most attentive of these four prestige papers in its treatment of the secondary issues of this study. The Post was followed by the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and the Chicago Tribune in rank order in their attentiveness to these 11 issue categories. Table 15 presents the breakdown of issue frequencies and weighted rank order for each issue by newspaper for these secondary issue categories.

This examination of the data has clearly shown that in the examination of the issues of the Arab-Israeli Dispute, significant differences in treatment exist between the newspapers of this study.

Table 15
 Sampled Newspaper Distribution of Secondary Issues

Paper	War or Peace	Immigration of Jews	Oil	United Nations	U.S. Aid	USSR Aid	U.S.-Israel Relations	U.S.-Arab Relations	USSR-Israel Relations	USSR-Arab Relations	U.S.-Soviet Relations
Chicago Tribune [Rank]	n=44 (8%) [4]	5 (21.7) [2]	9 (13.0) [4]	31 (13.5) [4]	21 (22.6) [1]	14 (21.5) [1]	6 (9.5) [4]	7 (14.3) [3]	2 (18.2) [2]	6 (7.6) [4]	6 (10.3) [4]
Los Angeles Times [Rank]	46 (16.1) [2]	3 (13.0) [3]	14 (20.3) [2]	31 (13.5) [3]	19 (20.4) [2]	12 (18.5) [2]	12 (19.0) [2]	9 (18.4) [2]	2 (18.2) [1]	12 (15.2) [3]	7 (12.1) [3]
New York Times [Rank]	123 (43.0) [1]	7 (30.4) [4]	23 (33.3) [3]	108 (47.0) [1]	28 (30.1) [4]	23 (35.4) [4]	22 (34.9) [3]	15 (30.6) [4]	4 (36.4) [4]	38 (48.1) [1]	25 (43.1) [2]
Washington Post [Rank]	73 (25.5) [3]	8 (34.8) [1]	23 (33.3) [1]	60 (26.1) [2]	25 (26.9) [3]	16 (24.6) [3]	23 (36.5) [1]	18 (36.7) [1]	3 (27.3) [3]	23 (29.1) [2]	20 (34.5) [1]
TOTAL	286	23*	69	230	93*	65*	63	49*	11*	79	58

* Note: Indicates not significant to the .05 level or greater levels of significance.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

In Chapter I, the press was shown to be a key actor in the foreign policy process in America. The American media are the central linkage mechanism between relevant groups involved in the foreign policy process. The importance of the press in drawing our "relevant maps of reality" makes it imperative that press performance be continually examined to determine what course these journalist "lookouts" have charted for the American ship of state.

The analysis of mass communication content is a particularly useful research tool with which to examine press performance in the foreign policy arena. However, as this author has noted, previous research efforts have tended to focus on policy events versus the more long-term, complex foreign policy issues. One foreign policy issue uniquely suited for examination from its genesis to the present was the Arab-Israeli Dispute. No work of reliable, replicable research was found in the review of the literature that yielded substantive empirical evidence of press performance on this critical, contemporary foreign policy issue from its beginning to the present. What research did exist revealed that a wide variety of time frames,

categories and sampling methods had been employed that yielded numerous, often conflicting results and conclusions.

Therefore, this project sought to fill a research void in the study of press performance on the vital foreign policy issue of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. This study sought to employ:

- (1) a single, comparable method of sampling content
- (2) utilizing a research methodology that was both replicable and reliable,
- (3) using a strictly defined set of issue categories relevant to the resolution of the conflict and consistently applied throughout the study period,
- (4) over a sufficient period of time to permit the evaluation of press content from the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the present.

In this effort, 10 hypotheses and three research questions were promulgated against which data were compared for analysis and reporting. These hypotheses were divided into three broad areas of examination: theme, crisis, and issues. Data were collected and compared in the aggregate, between newspapers, and over time to provide insight into American prestige press editorial treatment of the issues and themes relevant to the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Findings resulted in acceptance of four hypotheses, partial acceptance of two others, while four others were rejected in the analysis of data. Empirical evidence substantiated the three research questions also chosen for examination. It is useful, then, to summarize the findings pertinent to these hypotheses and research questions and to draw conclusions relevant to the performance of these prestige newspapers in their commentary on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Review of Hypotheses-Related Findings

Hypothesis I, predicting that these prestige papers would be predominantly "neutral" toward both the Arabs and the Israelis, was accepted. A solid majority of both Arab and Israeli theme referents was coded "neutral" for those editorials sampled in this project. Therefore, it can be said of these four prestige papers that they take a predominantly "neutral" stand in their commentary on this Middle East conflict, favoring neither the Arab nor Israeli cause in most of their unsigned editorials.

However, not all editorials were "even-handed" -- many did exhibit partisanship in their commentary, although partisan editorials were a minority in this study. Hypothesis II and its two related subhypotheses predicted that there would be a significant difference in partisanship

toward the Arabs and the Israelis by the prestige press. Again, data proved this hypothesis correct. When the papers were partisan in their commentary, the Israelis enjoyed highly favorable treatment while the Arabs were consistently criticized. "Pro-Israel" editorials outnumbered "pro-Arab" ones by a ratio of 3.5 to 1. The press singled out the Arabs for criticism by a ratio of 5 to 1 when "anti-Arab" editorials were compared to "anti-Israel" comment pieces.

Hypothesis III, positing that there would be no significant shift in editorial position over time, was rejected. During the four time periods analyzed, pronounced shifts in editorial position toward both the Arabs and Israelis were evident. Analysis of editorial theme over time showed that there had been a shift away from the predominant position of neutrality and a marked increase in favorable codings for both the Arabs and the Israelis, especially after 1973. These data clearly demonstrated that time was a significant variable in thematic treatment of both Arabs and Israelis through the 31-year history of their conflict. Studies that had not taken this time variable into account yielded results not strictly applicable to the Arab-Israeli Dispute in its totality as a foreign policy issue and, therefore, limited the generalizability of their research findings.

As time proved to be a significant variable in the examination of press commentary on the dispute, so too did

the selection of newspapers yield significantly different findings in this research. Hypothesis IV predicted significant differences in editorial theme among the newspapers of this study. The data confirmed this hypothesis. In its treatment of Israel, the New York Times proved the most supportive and least critical of the Jewish state among the four newspapers chosen for examination. Of the others, the Chicago Tribune proved most critical while the Washington Post was the most "balanced" in treatment of Israel. The New York Times also proved to be the most "anti-Arab" of the four newspapers examined, while the Post proved most "pro-Arab." In its commentary the Chicago Tribune was the most "neutral" toward the Arabs. These findings demonstrated that the selection of newspapers for study will have a significant impact on research findings and the generalizability of those findings. Studies that examine solely the New York Times' treatment of the Middle East will reflect the long-term pro-Israel, anti-Arab partisanship of that publication. Likewise, studies focusing only on the Washington Post will reflect that paper's pro-Arab proclivity. The inclusion of several newspapers, representing a cross-section of influences, readership and regions, as was done in this study, will be required in future research efforts to minimize individual newspaper differences.

The second set of hypotheses sought to determine what effect, if any, an editorial environment characterized

by conflict would have over a nonconflict environment on the editorial comment of these prestige newspapers. Based on the review of the literature, several effects were hypothesized, but data showed only partial evidence of a crisis phenomenon on communication content.

Hypothesis V had predicted that editorial frequency would be greater during conflict than nonconflict periods. This hypothesis was disproven by the data. There was no statistically significant difference in editorial frequency when conflict sample periods were compared to nonconflict periods. However, this researcher believes that the similarity in editorial frequency between the periods was owed more to research design than an undisputable rejection of this crisis phenomenon. Since sample cells were limited in the research design to just 15 days surrounding a "key event," any sustaining effect that crisis might have had on editorial attention was artificially constrained. Therefore, crisis should not be dismissed as a phenomenon generating editorial interest. Future research designs should take into account this crisis phenomenon and, without constrained cell sizes, will likely discover that crisis stimulates longer term editorial interest in the Middle East when compared to noncrisis periods. While Hypothesis V was rejected for this study, it should be considered in future research projects as a phenomenon worthy of closer examination.

Hypothesis VI posited that conflict editorials would address fewer issues per editorial than would comment pieces published during nonconflict periods. Examination of the data disproved this hypothesis. However, the literature upon which this hypothesis was based measured the impact of "crisis" on the communications between belligerent states. Since this study examined only American newspapers and the United States was not actively engaged in or threatened by the Arab-Israeli wars, this crisis phenomenon may not have been applicable. These results do suggest that a crisis and editorial complexity phenomenon might apply to future studies of communication content of the press in countries engaged in armed conflict or the threat of conflict, but not to third countries not directly embroiled in hostilities.

The next crisis-related hypothesis, Hypothesis VII, predicted that there would be a significant difference in the issues treated in conflict periods compared to nonconflict sample periods. This hypothesis was partially supported by the data. Of the 17 issue categories examined in this study, the crisis phenomenon resulted in significant frequency distribution differences in four: "Status of Jerusalem," "Occupied Territories," "Security," and "U.S.-Israel Relations." The remaining 13 issue categories showed no significant distribution differences between conflict and nonconflict editorial samples. These results suggested that crisis and the absence of crisis affected the editorial agenda of

the prestige press, but only on these four issue categories. The acceptance, then, of the hypothesized effect of crisis on issue category frequencies was limited to these four issues in the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Hypothesis VIII posited that editorial theme would be significantly different in conflict versus nonconflict periods. This hypothesis predicted that conflict editorials would be more "partisan," resulting in more editorials coded as "pro" or "anti," than nonconflict editorials which would be coded "neutral." This hypothesis was partially supported by the data. Analysis showed that there was, in fact, a difference in editorial themes for the Arabs during conflict and nonconflict periods. However, data showed no similar significance in theme treatment for the Israelis. "Neutral" coded editorials occurred with similar frequency for both Arab and Israeli theme referents in conflict and nonconflict sample periods. Therefore, it can be said that crisis had no impact on neutrality of American prestige press editorials. However, crisis did reveal significant differences in editorial themes for Arabs in these newspapers. "Pro-Arab" editorials appeared twice as often in nonconflict samples as in conflict period editorials. In contrast, "anti-Arab" editorials were printed in conflict versus nonconflict sample periods by a ratio of 2 to 1. In sum, the crisis phenomenon had no impact on neutral themes for either the Arabs or the

Israelis, but demonstrated significant differences in partisan treatment afforded the Arabs. Thus, Hypothesis VIII could be said to have been partially proven, at least for Arab theme referents.

Examination of the data then focused on the two remaining hypotheses and three research questions relative to findings on treatment of issues in the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Hypothesis IX, predicting that the press would be "neutral" in its treatment of the primary issues of this study, was rejected. In its treatment of these issues relevant to the resolution of the dispute (primary issue categories), these prestige papers were partisan on five issues and neutral toward both the Israelis and Arabs on only one. On these primary issues the press consistently favored Israel and were critical of the Arabs. This editorial stance casts doubt on what future role the American press will editorially support for the United States as arbiter between the Arab states and Israel.

Hypothesis X predicted that these papers would deviate from the thematic position of neutrality for Arab and Israeli theme referents on issues they deemed "salient" to the dispute. This hypothesis was confirmed on several issue categories, both primary and secondary, for Arab and Israeli theme referents. Four of the 17 issue categories were "salient" for Israel in these newspaper editorials, while six categories proved "salient" for the Arabs. On

all other issues the press viewed differently the editorial agenda "salient" to commentary on Arabs when compared to commentary on Israel. In their partisanship these papers again consistently favored Israel while maintaining their critical evaluation of the Arabs. No issue category was ever coded predominantly "pro-Arab" nor "anti-Israel" in this study.

Review of Research Question - Related Findings

The three research questions of this study sought to examine what issues were viewed as "salient" by these prestige papers, whether issues were treated uniformly throughout the 31 years of the dispute, and if differences existed between the papers in their evaluation of the issues.

The data showed that these papers held different issue agendas for the Israelis than were held for the Arabs. On only one issue -- the Palestinian problem -- did these papers converge, evaluating it as relevant to their commentary for both Arabs and Israel. Again, it was significant that in their partisanship on issues the press consistently favored Israel and just as consistently criticized the Arabs. However, it is also important to note that on the majority of the 17 issue categories, the prestige press remained predominantly "neutral" toward both the Arabs and Israelis. On only a minority of issues did the predominant partisanship favoring Israel and critical of the Arabs become apparent.

An examination of the issues distribution throughout this 31-year continuum also revealed some interesting conclusions. One notable observation was the fact that the issue of the "Palestinians" was a fairly recent editorial phenomenon for the prestige press. Over three fourths (77.9 percent) of all editorials addressing the issue of "Palestinians" were published since 1967. Prior to the Six Day War, the plight of the Palestinians received little attention on the editorial pages of the American prestige press. Another issue, "oil," is not the recent concern of editorialists as some studies have presumed. Many researchers have ascribed inordinate importance to "oil" and the "oil weapon," attributing increased attention to the Arab-Israeli problem to the rise of "oil" in importance to the West. According to data in this research, oil has been a topic consistently addressed in near equal proportions since 1956, and not a recent editorial "discovery" since the 1973 oil embargo.

On other issues, similarly interesting results were noted. For example, the issue category "United Nations" was viewed, until 1973, as a significant force for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict by these prestige press editorialists. However, data showed a declining interest in the United Nations from 1973 to the conclusion of the study in 1978. This declining editorial attention was owed, perhaps, to a growing disenchantment in these newspapers

with the United Nations. Likewise, the Soviet Union was less a concern to the editorialists of these newspapers in the later years of the survey, while relations between the United States and the Arab states had risen to an all-time high as an editorial concern of these prestige papers.

Differences in treatment of the issues also existed between the newspapers of this study. The New York Times was preeminent in its interest in the primary issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Chicago Tribune was least attentive of all the newspapers to those issues central to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. In its examination of the secondary issues, the Washington Post prevailed, while the Chicago Tribune again ranked last in its commentary on these 11 issue categories. These differences between newspapers are significant in the design of future research projects. The New York Times and the Washington Post were both, predictively, attentive to the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Dispute. Surprisingly, the Los Angeles Times also ranked very high in its attentiveness to the issues of the dispute. However, the Chicago Tribune ranked at the very bottom of these four newspapers in its editorial commentary on both primary and secondary issues relevant to this conflict.

Some Concluding Observations

Perhaps the two most significant contributions of this study of 31 years of prestige press performance in the treatment of the Arab-Israeli Dispute have been the examinations of both themes and issues over the history of the conflict.

While the data presented here generally proved that the press were predominantly neutral toward both Arab and Israeli theme referents, a definite bias existed in their editorials that deviated from this "neutral" theme. A cross-tabulation of Arab and Israeli themes produced a significant distribution pattern of partisanship. This pattern proved to be highly predictive in comparing Israeli to Arab editorial theme pairings. Data supporting these pairings were provided in Table 3 of Chapter IV. However, given the distinct pattern of partisanship demonstrated, it was possible to develop an editorial theme matrix, presented here as Table 16. The predictive value of this theme matrix for this study of prestige press editorials should be considered for future replication and hypothesis testing in other content analysis studies of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A second contribution of these findings was the insight data provided on press treatment of those six issues relevant to the political resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. The examination of these issues indicated that certain categorical statements can be made.

Table 16

Arab-Israeli Dispute Editorial Theme Matrix

If an editorial is . . .	Then it will be . . .
Pro-Israel	Anti-Arab
Neutral-Israel	Neutral-Arab
Anti-Israel	Neutral-Arab
Pro-Arab	Pro-Israel
Neutral-Arab	Neutral-Israel
Anti-Arab	Neutral/Pro-Israel

Status of Jerusalem. On this issue the press sided neither with the Israelis nor the Arabs and was a proponent of unrestricted access to the holy places of Jerusalem by Christian, Jew and Muslim alike. The American press supported, editorially, shared policing or some international control over the Old City of Jerusalem and its holy sites and shrines.

Right of Navigation. The press clearly supported Israel's claim of right of access to its ports by shipping and to the free travel of Israeli ships and Israel-bound goods through all international waterways including the Suez Canal, Gulf of Aqaba, and Strait of Tiran. The Arabs were overwhelmingly criticized in the American press for their efforts to deny rights of navigation or to blockade Israeli ports.

Occupied Territories. While the prestige press generally supported a return of some occupied territories captured by the Israelis in wars, return of those lands to the Arabs was supported by the press only with certain preconditions. These preconditions included guarantee of Israel's security from attack (a reason often cited to keep the territories was to serve as a "buffer" from these attacks), face-to-face negotiations between the Arabs and Israel, recognition of the right to exist for the Jewish state by its Arab neighbors, and the retention of some captured territories for legitimate "security" interests. Therefore,

in its evaluation of the issue of "Occupied Territories" these prestige papers sided with Israel on the need to maintain some captured lands and to return others only at a high political price exacted from the Arab states. On the pages of these newspapers, the Arabs found little sympathy for their demands that Israel return captured Arab territories.

Palestinians. The Arabs received little support from the American press while Israel enjoyed highly favorable treatment. The Palestinians themselves received little sympathy from the American press, save for the occasional editorials in the early years about the plight of thousands of refugees in tent camps administered by the United Nations. Palestinian claims to lands, bank accounts and personal property seized or left behind in the violent birth of the Jewish state received little notice and rare editorial sympathy from the prestige press. On the question of the status of the Palestinian people, their rights and claims, the American press sided strongly with Israel. Only in the later years covered by this study did these papers seriously discuss the rights of the Palestinian people to a homeland, a state, an "entity" or self-determination of some kind. But, on this issue of central importance to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute, the American press supported Israel overwhelmingly and was critical of the Arabs.

Recognition. These papers strongly supported the right to exist of the Jewish state of Israel and consistently urged formal recognition and exchange of ambassadors between Israel and her neighbors. On this issue, the American press sided most strongly with Israel in its quest for recognition in the world community.

Security. The freedom of a nation and people, Arab or Jew, from attack was an issue on which these prestige papers harshly evaluated the record of the Arabs. These American newspapers continued to view Israel as a "surrounded" state, enveloped on all sides by enemies bent on its destruction. The Arabs, in their oft-quoted rhetoric, did little to dispel this popular image on the pages of America's most prestigious newspapers. The issue of terrorism -- against the state of Israel, Israeli citizens at home and abroad, and Jews throughout the world -- was universally condemned by these papers. In more recent times, editorials have condemned Israeli offenses against the "security" of other nations, although such criticism has been mild in comparison to treatment given their Arab counterparts.

On these six issues central to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli Dispute, the American prestige press has consistently sided with Israel. Only recently have these papers seriously favorably considered the Arab point of view on many of these issues. The dramatic trip to Jerusalem by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the

negotiations leading to the Camp David Summit in 1978 served to elevate all sides of these issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the level of genuine debate and commentary in the American press. As a result, the necessary process of "competitive discussion in front of a critical audience" (Almond, 1950) essential to the foreign policy process has belatedly begun on the editorial pages of the American prestige press.

The debate, far from being over with the signing of the Camp David Accords, has, for the American people, just begun.

Recommendations for Future Research

This study clearly demonstrated that long-term, trend studies of selected foreign policy issues are possible without sacrificing reliability and replicability. The issue categories developed for this study proved to be reliable and yielded sufficient data against which hypotheses could be tested. Their use in future content analysis studies of press treatment of the Arab-Israeli Dispute is highly recommended.

Continued study of American press treatment of this and other foreign policy issues is necessary to provide an essential barometer against which press performance can be measured. Future studies of the Arab-Israeli Dispute

are required to monitor the steadily evolving changes that have occurred in recent years in press coverage and commentary on this vitally important foreign policy issue. An expansion of this trend study to include other facets of prestige newspapers -- the editorial cartoon, the columnists, letters to the editor, op-ed pieces and other opinion vehicles -- is recommended. The inclusion of content studies of network television news, public affairs programs and entertainment programs (source of many of the "stereotypes" of the Arabs on television) is needed to complete the assessment of the mass media's performance in coverage and commentary on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF SAMPLED CONFLICT
AND NONCONFLICT KEY EVENTS

- May 14, 1948 - Proclamation of the creation of the state of Israel, recognition by the United States and subsequent invasion of the Jewish state by Arab armies marking the first Arab-Israeli war. (Conflict)
- September 20, 1948 - The U.N. released Count Bernadotte's final report on the Palestine situation, including his recommendations. (Nonconflict)
- February 24, 1948 - Egypt and Israel signed an armistice agreement. (Nonconflict)
- December 3, 1950 - Fighting between Israeli troops and the Arab Legion broke out in the eastern Negev area. The U.N. ordered a ceasefire and Israel filed a protest with the Mixed Armistice Commission and called for an emergency meeting. (Conflict)
- September 24, 1951 - The U.N. Conciliations Commission for Palestine made public a 5-point proposal presented to the Arab states and Israel for an overall Palestine settlement. (Nonconflict)
- November 4, 1952 - It was reported that an Israeli patrol attacked a small village near Ramallah. (Conflict)
- November 1, 1953 - King Hussayn, in a speech opening the Parliament, declared that his country would continue to champion a policy of no compromise between Israel and Arab states. (Nonconflict)
- July 1, 1954 - Two days of sporadic shooting and mortar fire results in the deaths of 4 Arabs and the wounding of 25 with 4 Israelis killed and 31 wounded in the city of Jerusalem. (Conflict)
- June 25, 1955 - Israel and Egypt agreed to meet under U.N. supervision to discuss means of quieting the Gaza conflict, including earlier proposals for joint patrols, barbed wire fences to prevent infiltration, as well as Egyptian proposals for a wider demilitarized zone. (Nonconflict)

October 30, 1956 - The second Arab-Israeli war breaks out between Israel and Egypt. (Conflict)

November 16, 1956 - Simon Peres, Director General of the Israeli Defense Ministry, listed three conditions under which Israel would withdraw from the Sinai and Gaza including assurances that neither would be used as bases for fedayeen raids on Israel, guarantee that Sinai would remain demilitarized and not used as a springboard for future invasions of Israel, and free access to Israeli shipping to the port of Elath. (Nonconflict)

December 3, 1957 - Secretary General Hammarskjold arrived in Jerusalem for discussions with Israeli leader Ben-Gurion over easing of border tensions between Israel and Jordan. (Nonconflict)

February 17, 1958 - Israelis reported a policeman was gunned down by Jordanian forces in renewed border clashes between the two countries. (Conflict)

January 30, 1959 - Israel complained to the U.N. Security Council that "constant attacks" were being made against Israel from Syrian territory. Ambassador Eban called for stern action by the U.N. in imposing "an injunction rigorously binding on Syrian forces." (Nonconflict)

October 19, 1960 - In renewed fighting, Israeli jets reported hitting a UAR jet in flight over the Negev. Egyptians reported that all planes returned safely after hitting one of four Israeli jets in the encounter. (Conflict)

August 24, 1961 - President Nasser said in an interview shown on U.S. television that President Kennedy had written to him that he wanted to see an end to tensions in the Middle East and offered his help in seeking a solution to the Arab refugee problem. (Nonconflict)

March 17, 1962 - An army spokesman in Jerusalem estimated that 30 Syrians were killed in an Israeli air raid that destroyed fortifications in Syrian territory near the Sea of Galilee. Syria filed a complaint with the Mixed Armistice Commission against the alleged shelling of four villages by Israeli artillery and the bombings of three others by Israeli planes. (Conflict)

June 9, 1963 - Syria charged that two Israeli jets and a gunboat attacked an outpost and a village on the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee. (Conflict)

April 15, 1964 - In Washington, King Hussayn of Jordan commented that the problem "at the core of most of the turmoil, the tensions and the international realignments" in the Middle East was the plight of the Palestinian refugees. He urged the U.S. to take a "new look" at its policy toward Palestine. (Non-conflict)

October 30, 1965 - A pitched battle between Jordanians and Israelis ensued over the plowing of the same land by the two countries. The battle lasted for three hours. Fifteen Israelis were reported killed. A ceasefire was arranged by U.N. observers. (Conflict)

November 13, 1966 - Israeli forces backed by air, tank and artillery support launched a three-hour attack on the Jordanian village of Samu', accused of being a base for terrorists. (conflict)

June 5, 1967 - The third war between the Arabs and Israel begins. (Conflict)

June 20, 1967 - Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, speaking before the U.N. General Assembly, called for condemnation of Israel as an aggressor, reparations by Israel for damages and withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territory. (Nonconflict)

September 25, 1968 - A compromise peace plan was revealed as proposed by the U.S.S.R. which would include Israel's withdrawal to pre-June 1967 boundaries, a revival of U.N. presence in the Middle East in those areas evacuated by Israel, and a four-power guarantee by the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain and France of future peace between countries. (Nonconflict)

April 30, 1969 - Israeli commandos struck deep inside Egyptian territory cutting power lines to Cairo from the Nile and bridges in "upper Egypt." Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir stated that the raids were reprisals for recent Egyptian commando actions. (Conflict)

May 22, 1970 - An Israeli school bus near the Lebanese border was attacked by guerrillas using bazookas, killing 11 and wounding 21. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed credit for the attack. (Conflict)

February 4, 1971 - President Sadat said that he would extend the ceasefire for 30 more days and would reopen the Suez providing Israel began a partial withdrawal from the east bank of the Canal. (Nonconflict)

September 5, 1972 - Eight Palestinian guerrillas broke into the Israel quarters in the Olympic village in Munich, killing two Israelis and taking nine others hostage. The guerrillas demanded the release of 200 Palestinian prisoners from Israel. In a gun battle between West German police and the terrorists, five were killed and all nine Israeli hostages were killed. (Conflict)

March 29, 1973 - Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, in a speech, declared that oil supplies to the U.S. were not a significant factor in the determination of U.S. foreign policy toward Israel and the Middle East. He called for a "step-by-step" approach to peace in the Middle East first through a reopening of the Suez through negotiations. (Nonconflict)

October 6, 1973 - The fourth and last of the wars thus far between the Arabs and Israelis begins. (Conflict)

December 12, 1974 - Israeli planes attacked two Palestinian refugee camps near Beirut. (Conflict)

July 5, 1975 - U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger publicly called on Israel to "take a chance" on territorial concessions to Egypt because "any other approach is going to lead to war sooner or later. . . ." (Nonconflict)

July 4, 1976 - Israeli commandos raid Entebbe airport in Uganda, freeing 103 hostages held there by hijackers. (Conflict)

November 1, 1976 - Over U.S. objections, the U.N. Security Council voted to allow the PLO to participate in debate over occupied Arab territory. (Nonconflict)

November 19, 1977 - Egyptian President Anwar Sadat arrives in Israel, the first Arab leader to visit that nation since its establishment in 1948. (Nonconflict)

March 14, 1978 - Israel attacks Palestinian bases in Lebanon in retaliation for a terrorist raid that killed 30 Israeli civilians. (Conflict)

September 17, 1978 - The Camp David Summit between the leaders of the U.S., Egypt and Israel concludes with the signing of two documents: "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East," and a "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt." (Nonconflict)

APPENDIX B

CODING INSTRUCTION BOOKLET

For the purposes of this study, you will be coding editorials randomly selected from those appearing in four prominent American newspapers during the period of May 1948 through September 1978 concerning the issue of the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

You are asked to read the instructions and accompanying definitions carefully before looking at the editorials. After you have completed reading the instructions and definitions of terms, you are asked to survey the editorial pages of each newspaper on each publication day during the 15-day sample period. Only unsigned editorials will be coded. Read the editorials in the order they are sampled and code each editorial as instructed. Editorials should be coded while read. Read each editorial only once. Do not attempt to reread the editorial in its entirety.

You will be coding two areas addressed in each editorial -- theme (the direction of favorability), and issue treatment (those issues or topics addressed in the context of the editorial). As you read each editorial you are asked to make several decisions concerning its content. First, during the course of the reading, determine whether or not the issues listed on your code sheet are addressed at all in the editorial you are reading. This is best accomplished by placing a tick mark in the appropriate issue column as you come across it in the first mention in the editorial. Issues need only be marked once for each editorial. Further references to that issue need not be coded again for that editorial.

Next, after having read the editorial in its entirety, you are asked to make a decision as to its direction of favorability for the two sides: one decision for how the Israelis were treated in the editorial, and the second decision on how the Arabs were treated.

Coding instructions are:

1. Read the editorial in its entirety.
2. Code each issue treated for the appropriate editorial by circling those categories of issues having received mention in the context of the editorial discourse.

3. Finally, decide the predominant direction of favorability for the Israelis and enter the appropriate code number. Next, code the predominant direction of favorability for the Arabs by entering the appropriate number for that same editorial.
4. Proceed to the next editorial and repeat steps 1, 2 and 3.

Definition of terms and categories used in this test are attached.

DEFINITIONS

Theme of an editorial is defined as the predominant direction of favorability judged by the coder for the relevant actors portrayed within the context of the editorial. For our purposes, the relevant actors of this study are the Arabs and the Israelis.

The Israelis are represented by the state of Israel and the people of Israel (not necessarily by the Jews) and all political instruments as well as personages and military units identified as being from or a part of the state of Israel. For this purpose, this will include leaders and spokespersons from the state who purport to represent the state. This will include newspaper accounts carried in newspapers printed in Israel.

The Arabs are identified as both an ethnic group (often referred to as the Arabs, the Arab world, Arab states, etc.). There are also numerous predominantly Arab countries, many of which we are not concerned with and will not consider in our coding. Those states we will consider in our coding for the purposes of theme as representing that category labeled "Arabs" include Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Yemen, North Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Also, the Palestinians (Arabs) will be included as representing an Arab state thus categorized under the label of Arabs for theme coding. Like the Israelis, all political instruments as well as personages, organizations and military (real or quasi) identified as belonging to one or several of the above states will be considered as representing the Arabs.

At the conclusion of your reading of each editorial you are asked to make a decision concerning how the editorial treated each of these two groups -- Israelis and Arabs. Was it sympathetic toward one side and not the other? Was it sympathetic towards neither, etc.?

Coding units are:

- 1 - The editorial is predominantly supportive of, favorable to or sympathetic toward the group to be coded.
- 2 - The editorial is predominantly neutral, noncommittal, ambiguous toward or confusing in its stand toward the group to be coded. When the

group is absent from the coded editorial completely, it is coded as neutral for that group. Takes no stand, shows no favor, no sympathy.

- 3 - The editorial is predominantly nonsupportive of, unfavorable to, or unsympathetic toward the group coded.

NOTE: If you are in doubt or confused about the direction of favorability for any category, code it as neutral.

Each editorial will then be coded for the direction of favorability toward the Israelis and then the Arabs by noting a 1, 2 or 3 for each group in the appropriate column on the coding sheet.

Issues are to be coded as present or not present for each editorial. If an issue is addressed within the context of the editorial, it will be coded as present simply by placing a tick mark under that category for the editorial. It will be coded as "not present" simply by leaving it unmarked. Issues need only be coded once as "present" for each editorial. Once an issue has been coded as present for that editorial, all other mentions or references to it need not be recorded.

Issues must be explicitly stated in the editorial under one or several of the following descriptions or strongly implied to be coded as present:

- Jerusalem
- the status of the Old City of Jerusalem (do not code if only mentioned as the site of a particular event).
 - Holy Places of the Old City, access to them
 - Internationalization of the Holy Places
 - Control, administration, jurisdiction over
 - Annexation of
 - Disposition of lands, property and relics from, or in
 - Access to the Old City of

Navigation

- Right of free passage through waterways, including the Strait of Tiran, Gulf of Aqaba, the Suez Canal
- Freedom of passage of Israeli-bound goods
- Passage of Israeli produce by water to other countries
- Blockade
- Security of vessels in international waterways
- Control of the Suez Canal
- Nationalization of the Suez Canal
- Treaty of Constantinople
- "The question of Suez"
- The lifeline of the Suez
- The dispute over the Suez

*Territories

- Occupied territories, status of disputed lands
- Calls for withdrawal from occupied lands seized in military action
- The administration, taxation and control of occupied territories
- Seizure of lands in occupied territories from owners
- Settlements
- Disputes over resources of occupied territories or disputed lands (including farming of, planting, groves, water and oil, etc.)

Palestinians

- Status of the Palestinian peoples
- Refugees, including refugee programs, relief and aid
- Repatriation of Palestinian Arabs

- Compensation for seized lands or abandoned lands and property as a result of war, partition or the Declaration of the state of Israel
- Expropriation of Palestinians (except in occupied territories, or Old City of Jerusalem)
- Status of bank accounts in Israeli banks of Palestinian Arab holdings
- Status of Palestinians as a people, a nation, a government
- Representation of the Palestinians
- Palestinian state, homeland, entity, etc.
- Rights of Palestinians
- NOT terrorism, guerrilla activity by Palestinians

Recognition

- Recognition of the existence of the state of Israel
- the new state of Israel
- a Jewish state, Jewish homeland, national home for the Jews
- Partition, acceptance of partition of Palestine
- Relations between countries, including de facto or de jure recognition, establishment of diplomatic ties, exchange of ambassadors, representatives; withdrawal of recognition, etc.
- Sanctions taken against any country as a result of establishing diplomatic ties to the state of Israel, or economic sanctions taken against countries as a result of dealing in or with Israeli goods or the state of Israel (including BLACKLISTING, BOYCOTTING, etc.), except oil embargoes (see OIL)

- The status of resources within the borders of the state of Israel (except occupied or disputed lands, mentioned above), especially diversion of the water of the Jordan River
- Customs or travel restrictions to the state of Israel

Security

- The freedom of a state from attack, invasion or terroristic acts, to include the freedom of a country's citizens to work, live, and travel without fear of kidnapping or hijacking for political purposes
- Any reference to one country invading, attacking, conducting terrorist actions against or in, reprisals against, etc.
- Guerrilla raids, terrorist bombings, hijackings (only by Palestinians or Arab sympathizers or by Israelis)
- Discussions of "secure borders," freedom of borders from attack, invasion, etc.
- All exchanges of gunfire, artillery duels, rocket attacks, mortar attacks, etc., between countries except in declared wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 only)
- Freedom from outside intervention
- Colonialism, imperialism (freedom from)

Secondary Issues

War or Peace

- Discussion of wars, possibilities of wars, the prospects for peace, armistices, treaties, ceasefires, world peace, truces, etc. To include derivatives of the terms (war-like, peaceful, etc.)

Immigration

- Immigration or emigration of Jews to the state or from the state of Israel or Palestine

Oil

- Any mention of the word in the editorial, including oil embargo

United Nations --The organization, League of Nations, Security Council, General Assembly and all other commissions, committees and subgroups from the U.N.; referenda and resolutions, debate, etc., emanating from, to or within the United Nations. All operations, including peace-keeping forces, of the United Nations. Includes all references to dues to the organization, votes in, vetos, etc.

U.S.-Israel Relations -- Relations between the states of and the peoples of the two countries. Any reference in which both countries are tied together (i.e., America and Israel agree, the U.S. and Israeli position on the matter is..., where both countries are obviously tied). Client relationship between U.S.-Israel, "special" relationship between the U.S.-Israel, etc. (except governmental recognition)

U.S.-Arab Relations -- Relations between the states of and the peoples of the United States and the Arabs. Any reference in which both countries are tied together (i.e., The U.S. and Jordan..., where both are obviously tied together). U.S. interests in the Arabs or Arab states, including commercial interests, business and strategic interests.

U.S.S.R.-Israel Relations -- Same as U.S.-Israel Relations, substituting the Soviets.

U.S.S.R.-Arab Relations -- Same as U.S.-Arab Relations. Includes references in the context of the Middle East to the "client" of the Soviets.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations -- Relations between the states and the peoples. Includes references to "detente," arms race between the two, etc.

U.S. Aid --Economic, technical assistance to countries; military arms or troops or U.S. military intervention in a country or dispute

U.S.S.R. Aid --Same as above.

*NOTE: For the purposes of coding, the state of Israel is presumed to be in existence, legally, as of May 14, 1948, and existing more or less within

those boundaries. This is to avoid the complication of this question for the purposes of coding and providing as relatively strictly defined issue categories as are practical for this study. As this is an underlying assumption of those newspapers coded, it will thus be considered moot for coding purposes.

APPENDIX C

CODING KEY

<u>Label</u>	<u>Column</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
PAPERID	1	1	Chicago Tribune
		2	Los Angeles Times
		3	New York Times
		4	Washington Post
DATE	2-7		Publication Date
	2-3	01-12	Numerical Month
	4-5	01-31	Date of Month
	6-7	48-78	Year
CELL	8	1	Conflict Sample Period
		2	Nonconflict Sample Period
THEME	9	1	Pro-Israel
		2	Neutral Israel
		3	Anti-Israel
	10	1	Pro-Arab
		2	Neutral-Arab
		3	Anti-Arab
ISSUESUM	11-12	00-99	Sum of Issues Present in Editorial
ISSUES			
Jerusalem	13	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
Navigation	14	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
Occupied Territories	15	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
Palestinians	16	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
Recognition	17	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
Security	18	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
War or Peace	19	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
Reserved	20		Not used
Immigration	21	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
Oil	22	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated

United Nations	23	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
U.S. Aid	24	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
USSR Aid	25	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
U.S.-Israel Relations	26	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
U.S.-Arab Relations	27	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
USSR-Israel Relations	28	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
USSR-Arab Relations	29	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated
U.S.-USSR Relations	30	0	Issue not treated
		1	Issue treated

NOTE: Column numbers on coding sheet correspond to column numbers on 80-column Fortran keypunch card.

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After graduating with honors from James Madison High School, Portland, Oregon, he entered Texas Tech University at Lubbock, Texas, where he majored in Journalism. While attending Texas Tech he was named to Who's Who Among Students and the National Student Register. At Tech he served on numerous university committees and commissions, was a student senator for the College of Arts and Sciences, president of Kappa Alpha Order fraternity, vice president of Sigma Delta Chi - Society for Professional Journalists, vice president of Omicron Delta Kappa scholastic-leadership honorary, and editor his senior year of The University Daily student newspaper. He graduated in 1974 with a Bachelor of Arts and was named Outstanding Journalism Graduate of 1974. Commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force in May 1974, he entered active duty in January 1975 serving as a Public Affairs Officer in a variety of assignments. In January 1978, he entered the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin. After completing his coursework, he returned to duties in the Air Force as a Public Affairs Officer. In 1979, he was married to Sharon

