More on the Evolution of Cooperation,

Abstract

This paper discovers new structure in the suggestive 'world' created by Axelrod, which is based on iterated play of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and was studied to reveal how cooperative behavior can arise in a world of egoists. One of Axelrod's conclusions is that the viability of a strategy depends on how heavily the future is discounted. Our results explain in additional detail the nature of this dependence, and suggest how a specific cooperative strategy, TIT FOR TAT, might evolve from a world of defectors. Originator keywords include: Prisoner's dilemma; Cooperative behavior; and Tit-for-Tat.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 1984
Accession Number
ADA151801

Entities

People

  • C. A. Butler
  • J. J. Bartholdi Iii
  • M. A. Trick

Organizations

  • Georgia Tech

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Cognitive Systems Engineering
  • Communities
  • Computers
  • Cooperation
  • Engineering
  • Military Research
  • Motivation
  • Mutations
  • Observation
  • Personal Information Managers
  • Probability
  • Systems Engineering
  • Viability

Readers

  • Computational Modeling and Simulation
  • Educational Psychology
  • Game Theory.