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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE
MODERNIZATION AND SOVIET-WEST GERMAN
RELATIONS

by

Luanne Aline Turrentine

September 1984

Thesis Advisor:

D. S. Yost

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Since the deployment began in November 1983, no dire consequences have come to pass for the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet Union, in fact, needs to retain positive relations with the Federal Republic because of its need for hard currency and Western technology, and the FRG is the USSR's most valuable Western trade partner. Retaliatory measures taken by the Soviets against the Pershing II's have only amounted to modernization measures already in progress during the negotiations.

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Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Modernization
and Soviet-West German Relations

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND REGARDING SOVIET-WEST
GERMAN RELATIONS AND NATO'S 1979 INTERMEDIATE-
RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) DECISION

In the apt words of Alvin Rubinstein, "[for] more than a century, Moscow has alternated between fascination with and fear of German discipline, drive, and productivity." [Ref. 1: p. 88] The Soviets claim to fear German "revanchism", that West Germany will one day become a military threat to the Soviet Union in an attempt to regain territory lost in World War II. For this reason the Soviet Union opposed West German rearmament in the early 1950's. The Soviets respect and admire the West Germans for their efficiency and productivity, which enabled them to reconstruct their economy after World War II expeditiously enough to possess the fourth largest Gross National Product in the world by 1980.

A reunified Germany, first suggested by Stalin in March 1952 possibly to kill the idea of a European Defense Community and West Germany's integration into NATO, could in reality only be a threat to the Soviet Union. If the reunified Germany were neutral or Western-oriented, by its sheer size and economic potential, it could pose either a political or military threat to the Soviet Union; if the reunified Germany were Communist, it might challenge the Soviet Union ideologically as Communist China has, thus creating a nightmare of a different sort.

The Soviet Union not only opposed the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO in 1955 but has since opposed any qualitative improvement of weapons stationed on its territory. The neutron bomb and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) are cases in point. In both cases the Soviets undertook vast propaganda campaigns to try to stop deployment, successfully in the first case and unsuccessfully in the second.

After the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with the FRG in 1955, Soviet Westpolitik centered on achieving West German renunciation of any claims to its 1937 boundaries and its recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state.

On the West German side three distinct Ostpolitiks have been pursued since 1955. Adenauer's Politik der Staerke, or policy of strength, emphasized restoration of the 1937 boundaries, reunifying Germany, integrating West Berlin into the FRG, and placing West Germany firmly in the Western camp (the European Economic Community, the Western European Union, and NATO). The GDR was considered to be an illegitimate state. [Ref. 2: pp. 108-109] Under Erhard and Kiesinger, the FRG established trade missions in Eastern Europe and other economic levers to modify Soviet Westpolitik, pursuing a policy of "bridge building" and reconciliation with the USSR. However, it was not until the Chancellorship of Willy Brandt that the most far-reaching concessions were negotiated.

Germany was now willing to accept the loss of its 1937 boundaries and ratify the legitimacy of Eastern Europe, and was also prepared to recognize the GDR, while retaining a constitutional commitment to reunification....Brandt thus changed the terms of the debate. He advocated resolving the status of Germany by accepting the status quo as the Soviets had always advocated. [Ref. 2: p. 111]

As early as 1966, Moscow alluded to a West German renunciation of nuclear weapons as a basis for normalization of Soviet-West German relations. In fact, the Nonproliferation Treaty, signed by the FRG on 28 November 1969, which renounced any right to acquire, develop, or use nuclear weapons, was the first of several treaties and agreements which normalized Soviet-West German relations. These treaties and agreements included the 1 February 1970 agreement for the FRG to provide large-diameter pipes in exchange for Soviet natural gas deliveries over a twenty year period and the 12 August 1970 Renunciation of Force Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany also conformed to Soviet preferences by concluding renunciation of force agreements with Prague and Warsaw. By 1978, German credits and exports of an iron and steel complex, turbines for the natural gas pipeline, electronic equipment for petrochemical plants, trucks, and heavy machinery had transformed West Germany into the Soviet Union's leading Western trading partner and source of high-technology imports. [Ref. 3: pp. 98-100]

If the 1970's began on a high note for Soviet-West German relations, the situation had stagnated considerably by the late 1970's, particularly during 1978 and 1979, when the

Soviets became increasingly concerned about Chancellor Schmidt's insistence on countering the threat raised by deployment of the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missile beginning in 1977.

Although the United States withdrew its longer-range INF (LRINF) missiles--the Thor, Jupiter, and Mace (ninety-six of which were stationed in West Germany from 1962-1969)--from Europe in the 1960's, Western European publics, including the West Germans, felt basically secure under the U.S. strategic guarantee and NATO's medium-range bombers, SLBM's and tactical nuclear weapons. This situation began to change, however, in 1977 when the Soviet Union began to deploy the SS-20, which was viewed as qualitatively different from the SS-4's and SS-5's it was intended to replace because of its longer range, mobility, triple warhead, and greater accuracy. Further, the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) codified parity between Soviet and U.S. strategic forces, raising the question of U.S. credibility. If the U.S. was no longer clearly superior strategically to the Soviet Union, would it be able and, if able, willing to protect Europe at great hazard to itself?

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt emphasized the growing disparity in theater nuclear forces in a speech to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in October 1977, noting that:

SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To put it another way: SALT neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities

between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons....Strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. [Ref. 4: pp. 3-4]

Just prior to Helmut Schmidt's speech, at a London summit of NATO Heads of State and Government in May 1977, a Long-Term Defence Program (LTDP) was conceived in order to explore, among other topics, ways of modernizing NATO's own theater nuclear forces (TNF). This particular task became the province of the Nuclear Planning Group, which is NATO's forum for nuclear policy consultation. The Nuclear Planning Group, in turn, established a High Level Group (HLG) to study the modernization issue and come up with recommendations on NATO's long-term needs. This group began its work in December 1977. Later, as it became apparent that any steps to modernize NATO's long-range TNF might generate requirements for arms control, a Special Group on Arms Control was established in April 1979. Although each group worked separately, they did meet in September 1979 to coordinate their final reports. [Ref. 5: pp. 4-6]

As summarized by Kelleher, the HLG's conclusions were largely preordained by broad political concerns about visibility (thus, ground- rather than sea-based) and timeliness (the earliest possible initial operating capabilities). The work of the HLG centered more on 1) the number of forces required to offset, but not match, Soviet deployments, a number believed to be in the 200 to 600 launcher range and 2) the best mix between Pershing II extended-range missiles to be based in Germany alone and GLCMs with a broader basing structure. [Ref. 6: p. 153]

There was also the issue of nonsingularity, which was a West German precondition for any deployment. Basically, this meant that missiles must be based in at least one other non-nuclear continental European state besides the Federal Republic. Otherwise, West Germany's positive relationship with the Soviet Union might be jeopardized by her isolation.

The studies conducted by the High Level and Special Groups culminated in a special meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers and a decision on 12 December 1979 to replace existing Pershing I-A's with 108 Pershing II's and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM). As an integral part of the decision 1000 nuclear warheads were to be withdrawn as soon as possible, and the 572 Pershing II and GLCM warheads were to be accommodated within the reduced ceiling. Further, Alliance members supported the U.S. decision to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms limitations on INF as soon as possible to reduce or even obviate the planned deployment. [Ref. 7: pp. 65-66]

Both systems would help fill the gap between short-range theater nuclear and strategic weapons by providing an additional escalatory step, particularly in the event of an attack on NATO by Soviet SS-20's. If NATO were attacked by the intermediate-range SS-20's, a "grey area" weapon not covered in strategic arms negotiations, it could not respond with its own intermediate-range and land-based missiles. The choice would be to either use its highly vulnerable

medium-range fighters and bombers, its less accurate submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), its short-range tactical nuclear missiles (which could not reach the Soviet Union), or the U.S. strategic missiles. Any U.S. strike against the Soviet homeland would raise the possibility of a Soviet strategic response not only on Europe but also on the United States. NATO governments judged that possession of an effective NATO intermediate-range system would not only provide NATO with more response options but would also assure the Europeans that the U.S. strategic guarantee was again credible by displaying a visible deterrent on European soil linking the United States and the Europeans in war risk-sharing. [Ref. 8]

The Pershing II and the GLCM, with ranges of 1800 and 2500 km., respectively, are the intermediate-range counterparts of the longer-range Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles. While these Soviet missiles are capable of reaching all of Western Europe, the Pershing II's and GLCM's are able to reach only the most Western regions of Soviet territory. As in the case of the SS-20, they are mobile and highly accurate, but their mobility differs in that they will be stationed at permanent bases for dispersal on warning, while the SS-20's are frequently rotated between a multiplicity of preplanned launch sites. Considered highly provocative by the Soviets, who claim it could reach targets in the Soviet Union in six minutes, the Pershing II is described by them as a first

strike weapon. However, as first strike weapons, there are too few Pershing II's to accomplish such a purpose, and the GLCM's are too slow. Moreover, the Soviets never mention what warning time the SS-20's would allow targets in Western Europe. Finally, it should be noted that the six minute warning time the Soviets attribute to the Pershing II is an exaggeration. The Federal Republic of Germany's White Paper 1983 notes that "its flying time is in the order of 12 to 14 minutes--the SS-20 missiles have for years been able to reach any target in Western Europe in that time." [Ref. 9: p. 216] The point is that the Soviets have just as much response time as they allow the West Germans and other Europeans.

II. SOVIET INF DEPLOYMENTS AND ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE FRG
DECISION-MAKING REGARDING INF

The Soviet Union has deployed longer range intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) in Europe since the late 1950's with its SS-4's and SS-5's, each capable of distances of up to 1,900 and 4,100 kilometers, respectively. According to Soviet sources these longer range intermediate-range nuclear missiles were deployed in response to U.S. forward-based submarine and aircraft weapons systems. For example, in an interview with La Stampa, Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the Soviet Union Central Committee International Department, stated that the aim of the Soviet medium-range missile deployments was to match U.S. forward-based systems [Ref. 10: p. ii]. In a TASS dispatch, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev described NATO as having 857 medium-range nuclear delivery vehicles, which include over 650 F-111's and F-4's in West Germany and Great Britain and A-6's and A-7's from U.S. aircraft carriers off the coast of Europe [Ref. 11: p. AA2]. Therefore, the Soviet Union claims that it had to deploy approximately the same number of INF systems. Indeed, as Nikolai Portugalov put it, "If there were no US forward-based systems capable of reaching the Soviet Union..., there would be no need to station a medium-range potential in the European Soviet Union...." [Ref. 12: p. 41] The Soviet

systems, however, have been weighted more on land-based missiles than on aircraft--at least the way the Soviets counted their systems. (The Soviets exclude from their count hundreds of Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft comparable to those they attribute to the U.S.)

A. SOVIET SS-20 RATIONALE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

By the mid-1970's, the Soviets sought to improve on the survivability, reliability, range and accuracy of the SS-4's and SS-5's by developing the SS-20, which was mobile, reliable, had a range of 5,600 kilometers and was accurate to within 300 meters of a target. Thus, modernization is given as the Soviet explanation for the development of the SS-20.

The new, more modern SS-20's have also been presented by the Soviets as replacements for the aging SS-4's and SS-5's. Viktor Vasilyev wrote for New Times that

...for every two SS-20's deployed the Soviet Union simultaneously dismantled three SS-4's and SS-5's. As a result, instead of the 600 missiles it once had in Europe, it now has only 473. The total yield of their warheads was reduced by nearly half. [Ref. 13: p. AA7]

This passage deemphasizes by neglecting to mention, as is the case with many other Soviet writings, that the SS-20 has three warheads, whereas the SS-4's and SS-5's are single warhead missiles. Thus, while their overall number of launchers has decreased, the number of warheads has increased.

As William Garner has stated in his recent monograph on Soviet threat perceptions, "Soviet threat assessments of the new NATO missiles are...based on their operational capability to neutralize Soviet employment options", with the worst case being NATO "achievement of military-technical superiority through potentially decisive surprise and preemption against priority C³I targets." [Ref. 14: pp. 61 and 74]

On the subject of a war limited to Europe, the Soviets are quick to stress that the United States cannot get away with launching a "strategic" attack against the Soviet Union from Europe, a situation inherently unfair, they claim, because they have no medium-range missiles in a position to strike the United States. Meanwhile, the United States, through its NATO deployments, can strike targets in the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, this situation is of grave concern to the Soviets, who have invested 75% of their warheads in their ICBM force, some of which would be at substantial risk [Ref. 14: p. 76]. In the words of Yevgeniy Velikhov, Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

We consider the Pershing missiles to be...outright strategic weapons. This is not only because the Pershing missiles could reach the cities of the Soviet Union, but also because they are extremely accurate and could destroy all our strategic command posts. [Ref. 15: p. AA3]

Velikhov's argument, however, exaggerates the capabilities of a limited number of Pershing II and cruise missiles to threaten the USSR's numerous and redundant strategic command posts.

In another Soviet broadcast cruise missiles were also viewed as first strike weapons because they would be able to hit objectives that cannot be moved in a matter of hours. With their low altitude flight pattern, they might be spotted only at the last minute, thus giving as little warning time for the Soviets as the much faster Pershing II missile would provide. [Ref. 16: p. AA4]

Even if the United States could carry out a first strike on the Soviet Union from Europe, Gerhard Wettig of the Federal Institute for Eastern and International Studies in Cologne reminds the West Europeans that the SS-20's and Backfire bombers:

...for the first time [enable] the Soviets to launch a disarming first strike against NATO in Europe. The Kremlin's obvious aim is to decouple the West European countries from the USA, i.e. to render the extended American deterrence in the European theatre ineffectual. [Ref. 17: p. 38]

The subject of a limited nuclear war was revived by a comment by President Reagan on 16 October 1981, in which he stated, "I could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button." This comment was utilized in Soviet propaganda to frighten the West Germans into thinking that a nuclear war could be limited to West German soil. In such a war only the West Germans would suffer the incredible damage caused by nuclear weapons, with their American allies escaping with no damage at all.

Many Soviet statements, however, do not bear out this scenario. Rather, they indicate that the United States could not hope to escape the consequences of a nuclear war started in Europe. Leonid Brezhnev, for example, stated that "...there can be in general no 'limited' nuclear war. If a nuclear war breaks out,...it would inevitably and unavoidably assume a worldwide character." [Ref. 18: p. 32]

Respected West German scholars have also noted that Soviet statements are frequently contradictory on this issue. For example, Gerhard Wettig has noted:

The threat of a nuclear war that would be restricted to Europe and, hence, feasible for America seems to exist for Moscow only when it addresses itself to Western Europe. The Soviet thesis changes the moment Moscow speaks to the people of North America. The line put forward for North America is that there is no chance of restricting a nuclear war between the superpowers to the European theatre. [Ref. 17: p. 33]

Western analysts have also recognized a "damage limiting" characteristic of the SS-20. Since it is more accurate, it could avoid much of the collateral damage to West European cities and industries located near military targets, thus leaving postwar Europe more intact for the Soviets. [Ref. 14: p. 65]

B. SOVIET STATEMENTS REGARDING THE NATO INF DECISION

In the Soviet press various writers have stressed that the Pershing II's and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) were intended for deployment long before the NATO decision to deploy them was taken in December 1979. For example,

Ye. Rusakov and Yu. Kharlanov have stated in Pravda that the blueprints for the Pershing II's and cruise missiles were on the drawing boards by the late 1960's and early 1970's, when the Soviet Union had not yet deployed the SS-20 [Ref. 19: p. AA7]. Later, "Washington decided to link its long-matured plans for disrupting nuclear equilibrium with the Soviet SS-20 missiles. As of 1977 this linkage began to serve as propaganda cover." [Ref. 19: p. AA8] Not mentioned by the Soviets, of course, is the fact that the SS-20's must also have been designed in the late 1960's in order to be usable by the mid-1970's.

Alluding to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's speech to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in October 1977, with his call to assess Soviet "grey area" weapons in an era of strategic parity between the superpowers, Valentin Falin noted in Izvestiya that

...[the] decision certainly was two-track in the sense that its originators were two--the United States and the FRG. Long before the Soviet SS-20 missiles appeared on the scene, they secretly agreed to bring about the rearmament of the bloc on the basis of the latest technology and to persuade the allies to do this by means of purposeful acts of misinformation. [Ref. 20: p. AA1]

Thus, the West Germans, as well as the Americans, were to blame for the decision to deploy the Pershings and GLCM's.

Prior to the NATO decision, on 6 October 1979, Brezhnev unsuccessfully attempted to head off the Pershing II and GLCM deployment by offering to reduce the number of medium-range

missile systems in the Western Soviet Union if NATO did not make the decision to deploy.

In the opinion of the Soviets, there was parity in medium-range nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in 1979, although in order to arrive at equal numbers of approximately 1000 delivery vehicles for each side, they had to do so

...by under-counting their SS-20s (omitting reloads and SS-20s deployed east of the Urals but capable of striking Western Europe), under-counting their Backfires (omitting those assigned to naval aviation), omitting all their nuclear-capable fighter-bombers (Fencers, Fitters, and Floggers), over-estimating numbers of U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft, exaggerating the range of the Pershing I, and counting British and French systems with U.S. totals. [Ref. 21: p. 418]

Contradictory statements have emerged in the Soviet press on whether or not West Germany has been targeted by Soviet INF systems in the past. During Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in July 1983, Andropov stated that Soviet medium-range missiles

...are not aimed against the West German Armed Forces. But if American missiles are deployed on West German soil, the situation will change. The military threat for West Germany will grow manifold. Relations between our two countries will be bound to suffer certain complications as well. As for the Germans in the FRG and the GDR, they would have, as someone recently put it, to look at one another through thick palisades of missiles. [Ref. 22: p. 3]

In a more candid moment, on the other hand, Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute for Study of the U.S.A. and Canada, admitted in an interview on 23 March 1981 in Der Spiegel that Mannheim and Frankfurt am Main "have been targets for 20

years by missiles you call the SS-4 and SS-5 and nobody got excited." [Ref. 23: p. 25]

Thus, it appears that any Soviet-imposed consequences of a NATO deployment would not be anything new for the West Germans and other West Europeans, although the Soviets would like to make it appear that this is the case.

C. SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO COMMUNICATE VIEWS TO FRG THROUGH THE MEDIA AND PROTEST MOVEMENTS

Since the inception of the NATO deployment decision, the Soviets have exerted both indirect and direct pressure on the West German government, its political, educational, religious, and scientific elites, and the general public. The Soviets have taken advantage of such media as interviews with various West German magazines as Der Spiegel, radio broadcasts in German, and publication of official views in Soviet newspapers and magazines, which are translated into German and read by the attentive public. Although not directly sponsoring the West German anti-missile movement, the Soviets have supported the German Communist Party (DKP) in its organizational efforts and lent a sympathetic ear to "peace movement" members in their media and to individuals or groups, including members of the Greens Party and the SPD, who have visited the Soviet Union.

Soon after the NATO deployment decision was taken, Soviet writers began emphasizing that the Federal Republic of Germany and other European countries accepting cruise missiles

would become hostages of the United States as well as targets of the Soviet Union in a retaliatory strike. What seemed to worry the Soviets most of all, however, was the fact that the FRG might also "receive certain nuclear privileges from its senior partner, and...become the USA's chief nuclear agent in Western Europe." [Ref. 24: p. 92] Ignoring the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany does not have unilateral access to any nuclear weapons, the Literary Gazette charged that "the essence of the matter is that the FRG is laying claim to its own nuclear missile equality with the Soviet Union, independently of the American deterrent." [Ref. 25: p. 2] Also of concern to the Soviet Union in regard to the FRG was the Western European Union (WEU) decision to lift the restrictions on West German naval construction which have been in force since 1954. Fearful of a revival of a large West German fleet on the scale of what it possessed during World War II, Radio Moscow saw this move as setting a dangerous precedent for removal of restrictions on nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. [Ref. 26: pp. 4 and 5]

A year later, in June 1981, Soviet spokesman, like Defense Minister Ustinov and Central Committee International Information Department Head Zamyatin, were continuing to exhibit concern for West German access to nuclear weapons and the alleged danger of German revanchism [Ref. 27: p. 2]. And during Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in July 1983, Andropov declared:

It is planned to turn West German territory into a launching site for American first strike nuclear missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies. This would actually mean the revival of the threat of war against the USSR being unleashed from German soil. [Ref. 22: p. 3]

Since negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States did not get underway until November 1981 (except for talks with the Carter administration in late 1980), Moscow stressed to the West Germans that the United States was not really interested in negotiating but only in the deployment. Of course, the actual situation was that at first the Soviets did not want to negotiate, and after President Reagan's election, some time was necessary for the Reagan Administration to assess its negotiating strategy. In addition, Chancellor Schmidt was portrayed as being completely subservient to Washington's point of view (as has been Chancellor Kohl since he assumed office in October 1982).

In an effort to generate more sympathy for its stand on Euromissiles, Moscow attempted to strengthen its detente policies with the FRG by increasing economic ties. This would serve to "demonstrate the USSR's peaceableness and to provide the USSR increased leverage to prevent the FRG from adopting policies inimical to Moscow." [Ref. 28: p. 5] A key element in this policy was the natural gas pipeline agreement signed on 20 November 1981, which was espoused as providing employment and fuel for West Germans and hard currency for the Soviets.

Throughout this period, Soviet writers frequently iterated the danger to the long-term detente efforts between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany if the FRG accepted the NATO missiles on its territory.

The intention to turn West German territory into a proving ground for US nuclear missiles that would "reach Moscow and farther" cannot but affect the relations that were created by the painstaking joint efforts of the USSR and the FRG over an entire decade....the FRG now squarely faces the very real danger of losing the important advantages it acquired owing to its active participation in the processes of detente and cooperation on the European continent. [Ref. 29: p. 12]

In an attempt to influence West German public opinion, the Soviet press has stressed the USSR's efforts to curb the nuclear arms race through various proposals.

Such proposals do not cost the Soviets much to make but impact favorably on West German public opinion, as will be noted in Chapter III's analysis. Examples of this are Leonid Brezhnev's June 1982 unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and the Warsaw Pact's January 1983 proposal for a treaty with NATO on the renunciation of force.

Receiving particular attention in the Soviet press are the major parties and their political elites. Even prior to the December 1979 decision it was apparent that the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was not united on the issue of the deployment. In the words of A. Grigoryants:

It is known that the Congress of the Social Democratic Party in December 1979 consented, under strong pressure from the party leadership, to Nachruestung [complementary armament] under three conditions: if the new American missiles appeared not only on West German soil; if the SALT-2 Treaty was "immediately" ratified; and if the disarmament talks acquired "political priority". [Ref. 30: p. 104]

Later, the SPD leadership's support for the NATO missile decision was seen as responsible for splitting the party into two camps and the ultimate cause of its loss of government leadership, not to mention many of its followers. Thus, when Hans-Jochen Vogel became the party's candidate for Chancellor in the March 1983 elections and ran on a platform of non-deployment of the new NATO missiles, he quickly became Moscow's candidate of choice.

SPD proposals by such party leaders as Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr to take British and French medium-range missiles into consideration at the Geneva talks and to extend the negotiations until agreement is reached have been termed "business-like" by the Soviets.

During a visit of SPD Bundestag deputies to the Soviet Union in September 1983 in which they sought Soviet support for demands for an immediate end to any nuclear armament, reducing the number of SS-20's and renouncing the NATO deployment, Andropov "[expressed] the hope that deputies of the FRG Bundestag...will act with profound awareness of duty and responsibility resting on them" to avert the implementation of the NATO deployment [Ref. 31: p. AA3].

The SPD Congress in November 1983 was termed "a congress of atonement of sins" by Aleksandr Bovin since Helmut Schmidt was considered to be one of the initiators of the NATO two-track decision [Ref. 32: p. G1]. After speeches by such party leaders as Egon Bahr, Karsten Voigt, and Hans-Jochen Vogel which were fearful of a new round in the arms race and critical of the West German government for failure to promote success at the negotiations and ignoring the will of the majority of West Germans and the principles of the Basic Law, the SPD Congress rejected the NATO deployment [Ref. 33: p. G3].

As one of only 14 of 397 delegates so voting at the SPD Congress in November 1983, former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt cast his vote for the deployment. As a catalyst for the NATO decision and the former head of the West German government, Schmidt supported the zero option and deployment on schedule if no results were achieved at the negotiating table.

Likewise, Helmut Kohl, while in the opposition and as Chancellor, supported the NATO decision and U.S. positions at the negotiations, including the exclusion of British and French medium-range missiles from consideration.

As "a party of the cold war and the arms race, revanchist ambitions and pathological anti-Sovietism," [Ref. 34: p. 109] the Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists (CDU/CSU) constantly have received unfavorable comment in the Soviet

press. For example, in a TASS release, Chancellor Kohl "asserted without any ground whatsoever that allegedly the USSR 'threatens the security of its neighbors' by its 'excessive armament'" [Ref. 35: p. G1]. Kohl is portrayed in the Soviet press as nonresponsive to the West German masses who oppose the deployment. Chancellor Kohl also pointed out, to heated Soviet denials, that the Soviet Union did not honor its declared moratorium on deployment of SS-20 missiles [Ref. 36: p. AA6]. Manfred Woerner has been accused of "attempting to get the public to reconcile themselves to the idea that, at the appointed time and in the appointed quantity, the missiles will, regretfully, be deployed" [Ref. 37: p. AA5].

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister under both the Schmidt and Kohl governments, has been criticized by TASS for being more zealous concerning the deployment than Washington [Ref. 38: p. G4].

The Greens have been represented in the Bundestag since the March 1983 elections when they received over 5 per cent of the vote. The Soviet media sees their success as evidence of rejection of the NATO missile deployment by a segment of the population. Former Bundeswehr General Gert Bastian has received favorable treatment in the Soviet media because of his view that the NATO missile deployment was unnecessary because there was already a balance of nuclear weapons in Europe [Ref. 39: p. 20]. The Greens were favored

with an invitation from the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, and a number of Greens deputies visited the Soviet Union between 26 and 30 October 1983 [Ref. 40: pp. G2-G3]. Their request that Moscow set an example in unilateral disarmament, however, met with protests by Boris Ponomarev that the Soviets had repeatedly made unilateral concessions already, including their readiness in October 1979 to reduce their medium-range missiles if there were no NATO decision on a deployment, their renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, and their unilateral moratorium on deployment of missiles in Europe of March 1982 [Ref. 41: p. G2]. Of course, the Greens voted along with the SPD at the Bundestag debate of 22 November to disapprove the deployment of NATO INF missiles.

The West German parliamentary elections of 6 March 1983 were a focal point for Soviet journalists and political figures for several months before the elections. Of the two candidates, Hans-Jochen Vogel of the SPD was clearly favored by the Soviets. Elements of the SPD election platform, including reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, conclusion of an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on mutual renunciation of force, consideration of British and French missiles at the Geneva talks, and making it a goal of the Geneva negotiations to make the missile deployment superfluous, seemed made to order for

preserving detente with the Soviet Union, if not pursuing Finlandization [Ref. 42: p. G12]. Still, the SPD platform was not entirely satisfactory from the Soviet point of view.

The foreign-political formulation of the SPD election program are indeed not fully without contradiction and not quite consistent. They see, for example, the reasons of the current international tensions in the actions of both superpowers, or they expect the Soviet Union at the Geneva negotiations with the United States to make, completely unfounded, some sort of concessions. The inconsistency of the SPD leadership is also demonstrated by its listlessness or its inability to answer clearly and plainly the main question, namely what position will the SPD take with regard to the deployment of new American missiles in Europe if Washington torpedoed the Geneva negotiations. [Ref. 42: p. G13]

While the Soviets charged that the United States was interfering in the West German elections, there was plenty of opportunity for the Soviets to do the same during visits of Vogel to Moscow and Gromyko to Bonn in January. During his visit to Bonn Foreign Minister Gromyko reminded the West Germans that their country would be caught in a nuclear confrontation if the NATO INF missiles were installed [Ref. 43: p. 1] and urged them to follow an independent course in foreign affairs:

We would like the Federal Republic of Germany, in building its relations with the Soviet Union, to express its own personality, to be guided by its own attitudes, to be guided by its own interests, and not to listen to external influences if they are not in accord with those interests and with the interests of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union. [Ref. 44: p. G2]

While in Moscow, Andropov drew Vogel's attention to the dangers that the NATO deployment would have for peace in Europe, while Vogel gave Andropov high marks for constructive peace initiatives [Ref. 45: p. 7].

In analysis of the CDU/CSU election victory, the Soviet press attributed the SPD defeat to vacillations, lack of clarity of its positions, and failure to mobilize the potential of the antiwar movement [Ref. 46: p. G1].

On a brighter note for the Soviets,

...the decisive and uncompromising position of the Greens on the issue of deploying American medium-range nuclear weapons, their categorical "no" to missiles and their intention to continue the struggle against their deployment, both inside parliament and outside its walls, brought success to the party. [Ref. 47: p. G3]

The Soviet explanation for the CDU/CSU victory was its (alleged) control of the mass media and some generous help from industry and business [Ref. 48: p. G4], as well as their promises to revive the economy.

Thus, the Soviet Union's attempts to influence the election succeeded only partially. Their chancellor candidate of choice, Hans-Jochen Vogel, was not elected, but the Greens gained representation in the Bundestag and would promote policies acceptable to the Soviets (e.g., opposition to West German membership in NATO and to a U.S. military presence in West Germany). Further attempts to influence the West German public before the date set for deployment should negotiations fail would have to be concentrated on the "peace" movement.

Although apparently not controlled directly by Moscow, the West German antimissile, or "peace," movement has received organizational assistance and funding through the West German Communist Party (DKP), who in turn received funding from the East German Communist Party (SED). Soviet writers like to emphasize that the anti-war movement has arisen spontaneously and includes all segments of West German society--parliamentary parties, churches and trade unions, etc. [Ref. 29: p. 17].

The so-called parliamentary left of the SPD, which was composed of fifty or sixty leftists in the Bundestag, made it difficult for Chancellor Schmidt to get nuclear weapons issues passed, as the government coalition only had a margin of 45 votes. In the words of Wynfred Joshua, the former chancellor thus "became a hostage of the left wing of his party" [Ref. 49: p. 17]. Approximately fifty SPD members participated in the October 1981 demonstration in Bonn, and certain elite SPD members, including Willy Brandt, have spoken at peace demonstrations.

Soviet journalists and the press have stressed the large numbers of West German citizens who have participated in demonstrations, although their numbers are frequently much higher than police estimates for the same demonstrations. Soviet estimates of participation in major demonstrations have included 300,000 for the October 1981 demonstrations

and 800,000 for the 1983 Easter Week demonstrations. By May 1983 Pravda was reporting over 4 million signatures on the anti-missile deployment Krefeld Appeal. [Ref. 50: p. G2]

Particularly as the date set for the missile deployment approached, the Soviet press predicted a "hot fall" with massive demonstrations in the FRG while criticizing a government campaign in support of the NATO decision [Ref. 51: p. AA2].

Actions of all kinds received coverage in the Soviet press, from blockades of military bases to work stoppages, human chains, and the refusal of the crew of the West German container ship "Alemania Express" to transport Pershing II parts from Oakland, California to the Federal Republic [Ref. 52: p. AA9].

Sometimes the anti-missile movement has been actively encouraged in German broadcasts from Moscow. In a recent broadcast, Vladimir Ostrogorskiy stated that

...we owe all the more respect to the courage of the FRG people who consistently advocate the cause of peace, remain loyal to the principle of humanism, and follow the conclusions of commonsense. [Ref. 53: p. G6]

Soviet propaganda themes aimed directly at the West German public and the anti-missile movement include assertions that the United States plans to limit a nuclear war to West German soil, upset the current balance in Eurostrategic weapons and initiate a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union from West German soil, while the

Soviet Union is only interested in detente and proposing new peace initiatives. Its weapons would not pose a threat to the West Germans because they would never be used except in retaliation against a pre-emptive strike launched by the United States from West German soil. Furthermore, the Soviet Union claimed to be more flexible than the United States at the negotiating table; thus, it was the United States that was preventing agreement at Geneva. Moreover, the United States was not even interested in coming to an agreement because it insisted on deploying its missiles regardless of the outcome of the negotiations. [Ref. 54: pp. 17-57]

D. SOVIET VIEWS OF INF NEGOTIATIONS

As Yuri Andropov related in an interview with Der Spiegel magazine, the INF negotiations, which finally got underway in the fall of 1981, did so only at the suggestion of the Soviets, who

...opened them with the resolve to achieve a reduction in USSR and NATO medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in this area, and a radical reciprocal lowering of the level of nuclear confrontation. The U.S. purpose at the Geneva talks, as it became clear, was to add new powerful weapons to the already existing extensive NATO arsenal. The United States would like to reduce the number of Soviet missiles only. [Ref. 55: p. 6]

As was concluded in the Report to Ministers by NATO's Special Consultative Group, the INF negotiations were punctuated by Soviet claims of flexibility while actually demonstrating inflexibility. As Yuri Andropov put it in his replies to questions from Pravda,

American flexibility is no more than verbal...We have displayed and are displaying flexibility in finding specific solutions, given the observance of a single but immutable demand: The balance of forces in Europe in terms of medium-range nuclear armaments must not be violated....This means, first, that the new American missiles must not be deployed in Europe....Second, all the nuclear means of the relevant range on both sides must be taken into consideration--with no exceptions. [Ref. 56: p. AAl]

With all of the foregoing stipulations, however, somehow Soviet "flexibility" is difficult to locate. The bottom line for the Soviets was no NATO deployment of Pershing II's and cruise missiles whatsoever while maintaining a force of at least some SS-20's. This, of course, would leave NATO where it was before the dual track decision was taken in 1979 with no equivalent means of retaliation against the SS-20's.

During the first round of negotiations, which formally commenced in Geneva on 30 November 1981, the United States presented its zero option, which provided for the cancellation of the Pershing II and GLCM deployment if the Soviet Union dismantled all of its SS-4's, SS-5's and SS-20's. The Soviet counter to this was a proposal to limit both Soviet and NATO medium-range missiles and delivery aircraft in Europe to 300 each. Of course, since the Soviets would count British and French systems into this total (they counted 263), this would leave the United States with only 37 aircraft in Europe, which would mean that the U.S. would essentially have to eliminate its dual-capable aircraft in or near Europe. Meanwhile, the Soviets would retain 300 triple-warhead SS-20 missiles. Other proposals made during the opening round,

which would be referred to again and again in propaganda directed toward Western Europe, were a proposal to limit the number of Soviet medium-range forces to equal those of Britain and France and another proposal for the elimination of all medium and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, thus leaving Soviet strategic forces as the only nuclear forces in Europe. [Ref. 57: pp. 9-13]

The Soviet response to the zero option was that it would unilaterally disarm the Soviet Union.

During the second round of negotiations, which lasted from 20 May until 20 July 1982, the Soviets tabled a draft treaty on reducing NATO and Soviet medium-range systems to 300 each while the U.S. tried to clarify ambiguous issues, including inclusion of British and French forces and aircraft and geographic scope. It was during this round that the famous "walk in the woods" discussion between the American and Soviet Ambassadors, Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky, occurred. An agreement on the basis of this discussion would have provided for 75 cruise missiles for the U.S., 75 ballistic missiles for the Soviets, a limit of 90 LRINF missile launchers for the Soviets in the eastern USSR, and no inclusion of aircraft or British/French missiles in the formula. However, when Kvitsinsky returned for the beginning of the third round after having discussed the issue with the Soviet leadership, he informed Nitze that the Soviet Union

insisted on full compensation for British and French medium-range forces, reductions in aircraft and no U.S. deployments at all. [Ref. 57: pp. 15-19]

Throughout the third round, which lasted from 30 September until 30 November 1982 the Soviets proposed minor variations on their old position but still insisted that they be allowed to retain medium-range forces equivalent to those of Britain and France while the United States must not only not be allowed an equivalent force but also virtually eliminate its dual-capable aircraft from Europe.

It increasingly became apparent that the Soviet effort in Geneva was aimed to a significant extent, if not primarily, at public opinion. The Soviets tabled several variations of the same proposal--all of which would have had the same essential outcomes--apparently to position themselves to claim that they had shown "flexibility" and had offered a range of solutions to the INF problem. At the same time, they increasingly stymied progress, even on the smallest of issues, in an effort to create the appearance of a negotiating deadlock, the blame for which they attempted to place on the U.S. [Ref. 57: p. 22]

During 1982 the Soviets reminded the West Germans about all the actions they were taking to halt the arms race. In March Brezhnev declared a unilateral end to further deployment of SS-20's in the eastern Soviet Union. On 15 June Brezhnev pledged no first use of nuclear weapons at a meeting of the United Nations. An excerpt from Pravda gives evidence that the Soviets did, indeed, intend to influence the West Germans by their actions:

Soviet peace initiatives show West Germans that, despite all the slander against the USSR, it in fact seeks to halt the arms race and the growth of the danger of war in Europe. A truly tremendous response was elicited in the FRG by the important initiative which the USSR put forward in mid-June by unilaterally making a solemn promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. [Ref. 58: p. AA6]

During the fourth round of negotiations, which lasted from 26 January until 29 March 1983, the Soviets attempted to make the British and French missiles the cornerstone of their position by tabling a draft treaty tying the level of Soviet missiles in Europe to the level of British and French missiles, which was 162 by their count. At the close of the round, the United States introduced its interim option, which proposed equal levels of warheads on U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles on a global basis. Thus, some Pershing II's and GLCM's would be deployed but not as many as originally planned. [Ref. 57: pp. 23-26]

However, the Soviets were not impressed by the interim option. Andropov complained to Der Spiegel that both the zero and interim options would have the effect of disarming the Soviet Union. In his words,

Try to consider the situation from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union and its legitimate interests: on what grounds and by what right do they want to leave us unarmed in the face of these British and French nuclear missiles aimed at our country?...The Soviet Union has the same right to security as the peoples of America, Britain, France, and other countries. [Ref. 55: pp. 7-8]

In other words, the Soviet idea of security appears to be having the same number of missiles as all NATO countries and China collectively.

During the fifth round of negotiations, which lasted from 17 May until 14 July 1983, the United States tabled a draft treaty embodying the interim option. At this time the Soviets proposed equal ceilings on warheads on INF missiles and aircraft. Since they estimated over 400 warheads currently on British and French missiles, this would result in a small reduction in SS-20's below the level of 162, but they reserved the right to increase their numbers of warheads if the British and French increased theirs. [Ref. 57: pp. 26-29]

In late August General Secretary Andropov proposed in Pravda that the Soviet Union would "liquidate" any excess missiles if a reduction were agreed to at the Geneva talks. At the sixth round, between 6 September and 23 November 1983, however, the Soviets maintained a hard line, still insisting that there be no U.S. deployments and that British and French INF forces must be taken into account. [Ref. 57: pp. 30-31]

In a last minute attempt to influence public opinion before the scheduled deployment, Yuri Andropov announced in an interview with Pravda that the Soviet Union would be willing to reduce to 140 missile launchers in Europe, halt deployment of SS-20's in the eastern USSR, and establish equal levels of medium-range aircraft [Ref. 56: p. AA2].

The final U.S. proposal was for a global ceiling of 420 LRINF warheads, but this was rejected by the Soviets on 17 November [Ref. 57: p. 34].

In a final attempt to influence public opinion before the Bundestag debate in the Federal Republic on 21 and 22 November, Kvitsinskiy on 13 November revealed privately to Ambassador Nitze that the Soviets would be prepared to accept a U.S. proposal to reduce warheads by 572 on each side. This would leave the Soviets with 120 SS-20's, while the U.S. would not be able to deploy any of its Pershing II's or GLCM's. Although the British and French forces would not be mentioned, the Soviets would pursue compensation for them in a future forum. While Ambassador Nitze presented this proposal to Washington, the Soviets delivered notes to several NATO governments describing it as a U.S. proposal and stating that it retained the link to British and French proposals. In any event the offer was unacceptable to the U.S..and was rejected on 19 November. [Ref. 57: pp. 35-36]

Finally, on 23 November, the Soviets suspended negotiations indefinitely after the West German Bundestag voted in favor of deployment since the negotiations had not been successful during the time agreed to be allotted to them.

III. THE IMPACT IN WEST GERMANY OF SOVIET INF-RELATED ACTIVITIES

A. INFLUENCE ON THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT

While Soviet influence seems to have made some inroads among West German public opinion and certain political parties, notably the Social Democrats and the Greens, the West German government, at first under the Social Democrat (SPD)/Free Democrat (FDP) coalition and after 1 October 1982 under the Christian Democrat/Christian Socialist (CDU/CSU)/Free Democrat coalition, has stood firmly behind the NATO decision of 12 December 1979.

For the government the NATO decision linking intermediate-range nuclear force modernization and arms control negotiations complemented the West German security policy of defense and detente. As Chancellor Schmidt noted in his previously mentioned speech to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in October 1977, with the equalization of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance in SALT II, the European military balance was left unsecured. Now that the United States was no longer ahead in the intercontinental field, it would jeopardize West European security if Soviet superiority in intermediate-range weapons (e.g., the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber) continued to increase without a NATO response.

After a year and a half of NATO discussion on the INF problem, at a summit meeting at Guadeloupe in January 1979,

Chancellor Schmidt committed the Federal Republic of Germany to accepting the stationing of LRINF missiles, provided the FRG was not the only European country in which the missiles were deployed, and pressed for a parallel effort to negotiate arms limitations, in order to both satisfy domestic critics and maintain West German-Soviet detente [Ref. 59: pp. 203-204]. As was explicit in his 1977 speech and NATO's 1979 decision, another motive for holding arms control talks was the hope that they might succeed in eliminating the need to deploy counter-vailing NATO weapons systems. Seeking to minimize diplomatic damage with the Soviet Union, the West Germans also decided against the traditional "two-key" arrangement currently in use with the Pershing IA short-range missiles. Thus, the Pershing II's and GLCM's would remain under American control exclusively. [Ref. 60: p. 88]

As members of the NATO High Level Group (HLG), which by late spring 1979 had decided to support deployment of 200-600 Pershing II and GLCM missiles, the West Germans insisted on a force small enough not to be too provocative to the Soviets or to produce a "decoupling" effect, which might obviate the need for the U.S. strategic deterrent [Ref. 59: p. 205].

In a recent article for NATO Review, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher emphasized that the West German government and the Bundestag had been involved from the outset on the steps leading to the formulation of the NATO decision.

Throughout 1979 deliberations were conducted at the Federal Security Council, Federal Cabinet, and Bundestag levels, and the Federal Cabinet approved the draft two-track decision on 10 October 1979. Emphasizing the cooperative spirit of the Western negotiating position, Genscher reiterated that there were no "American" negotiating positions at the Geneva talks but that "each aspect of the Western negotiating position has, ever since 1979, been jointly elaborated in the Special Consultative Group (SCG) set up as a result of a German initiative." [Ref. 61: pp. 4-6]

Chancellor Schmidt also announced in a speech to the SPD Bundestag faction on 13 November 1979 that the NATO proposal to withdraw 1000 nuclear warheads from Europe was a German initiative [Ref. 7: p. 57].

After the NATO decision of 12 December 1979, the Soviets declared that they would not negotiate at all unless NATO rescinded its decision. Committed politically to pursuing the earliest possible start of negotiations, Chancellor Schmidt met with General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow in July 1980 and managed to get the Soviets to agree to hold preliminary talks with the Americans. However, the price, consisting of including NATO forward-based systems (FBS) in the scope of the talks, was steep. As Hans Ruehle postulated, the "Chancellor wanted negotiations at almost any price--and he got the negotiations." [Ref. 62: p. 56]

A 26 May 1981 resolution of the German Bundestag, adopted with only five votes against and six abstentions, further supported the NATO decision, stating,

The German Bundestag supports the Federal Government in the consistent, scheduled implementation of both parts of the NATO decision of 12 December 1979. In this context, it stresses that the West will review NATO's INF requirements in the light of concrete negotiated results. [Ref. 61: p. 5]

Again, in a security policy statement of 31 March 1982, the Federal Government stated that "...concrete negotiated results can only be attained if the Soviet Union knows that, in the event of failure of the negotiations, the deployment of American systems will begin in late 1983." [Ref. 61: p. 7]

With the accession of Chancellor Kohl's CDU/CSU/FDP government on 1 October 1982, the official position of the FRG in relation to the NATO deployment did not change. In his policy statement of 13 October 1982, Chancellor Kohl affirmed:

The Federal Government is wholly committed to the NATO dual-track decision of 1979 which proposes negotiations on the reduction and limitation of Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear systems....The Federal Government adheres to the Western objective of negotiating a mutual zero solution, in other words, the complete renunciation of land-based Soviet and American intermediate-range systems. [Ref. 63: p. 35]

In its White Paper published in October 1983, the Federal Government dealt with aspects of Soviet propaganda aimed at the Federal Republic of Germany and other European governments to dissuade them from complying with the NATO dual-track decision. The White Paper pointed out inconsistencies in Soviet propaganda. For example,

...the Soviets combine the claim they were not threatening Western Europe with the warning that any stationing of new U.S. nuclear weapons would increase the number of targets for the Soviet nuclear weapons and thus be an additional hazard to the countries where U.S. missiles are to be deployed. [Ref. 9: p. 18]

The Federal Government in its White Paper also recognized the SS-20 build-up as more than a modernization because of the SS-20's superiority to the SS-4's and SS-5's in terms of mobility, accuracy, response capability, and survivability as well as the substantial increase in the number of warheads capable of being delivered. Also cited was the fallacy of the use of the Pershing II as a first strike weapon due to its limited range and number. [Ref. 9: pp. 74-77]

Further, the White Paper noted that after Brezhnev's declared moratorium on 16 March 1982 on the deployment of LRINF missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union, the Soviets continued to complete SS-20 sites under construction in that part of the Soviet Union [Ref. 9: p. 196].

An evaluation of the various Soviet negotiating positions resulted in the conclusion that

...the Soviet position remains unchanged in its essentials: the Soviets are intent on negotiating a treaty which rules out the presence of any United States INF missiles in Europe and thus perpetuates their own monopoly in this category of weapon. [Ref. 9: p. 201]

Soviet superiority in Europe was effectively conceded in Andropov's 27 August 1983 offer to reduce the number of Soviet INF missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union

to the number of British and French systems, i.e., 162 missiles, and to scrap all other Soviet INF systems stationed in Europe if the United States waived its deployment [Ref. 9: p. 202].

Soviet negotiating tactics have involved an attempt to appear conciliatory while refusing to accord the nations of Western Europe the same measure of security as the Soviet Union claims for herself.

Along with her negotiating tactics of relinquishing untenable positions only step by step and labelling this approach in public as an indication of flexibility, the Soviet Union has again and again resorted to threats. The catalogue of sanctions threatened in the event of United States INF missiles being deployed in Europe ranges from political reactions--such as discontinuance of negotiations or deterioration of West-East relations--to the cancellation of the unilateral SS-20 moratorium, the deployment of shorter-range INF systems in East European countries, or sanctions against the United States. [Ref. 9: p. 204]

On the subject of the British and French missiles, the White Paper pointed out that when Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher visited Moscow in the summer of 1980, the Soviet Union was prepared to delay consideration of the British and French systems in nuclear arms control negotiations with the U.S., on the model of SALT I and II. Since the inclusion of the British and French missiles was obviously added later to complicate the negotiations and because the nations of Western Europe should have the same right to security as the Soviet Union claims for herself,

Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher urged the Soviets to drop this demand during their July 1983 visit to Moscow. [Ref. 9: pp. 208 and 210]

Finally, after the Bundestag debate on 21 November 1983, on the strength of a CDU/CSU/FDP majority, the West German Bundestag reaffirmed its 26 May 1981 resolution to support the Federal Government in the implementation of both parts of the NATO decision of 12 December 1979. By the end of 1983, the first battery of nine Pershing II missiles was installed in West Germany.

Thus, Soviet efforts to deter the Federal Government from supporting and implementing the NATO dual track decision were unsuccessful.

B. IMPACT ON WEST GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES

The NATO INF modernization has become a heated issue in West German party politics. While the SPD was the party in power at the time the NATO decision was taken, it eventually was to become almost universally opposed to the implementation of the decision, a situation which was evident at the party congress on 19 November 1983.

The explanation for this seeming about-face lies in the assumption of most SPD members that the arms control aspect of the decision would be emphasized at the expense of the modernization aspect. Members of the SPD Left, led by Herbert Wehner, thought that Soviet military power should be

regarded as defensive rather than aggressive and that arms control negotiations must be pursued before any deployments might take place; indeed, negotiations would almost certainly obviate the planned NATO modernization. This position was accepted not only by the SPD Left but by the party as a whole. [Ref. 64: pp. 538-539]

Besides assuming that arms control negotiations would have greater emphasis (to the point of being successful), SPD members at the December 1979 party congress linked the approval of the NATO decision with ratification of the SALT II Treaty. As Hans Ruehlephrased it, "it was the consensus of the discussants that negotiations over TNF could be conducted successfully only in an arms control climate that had been positively influenced by the ratification of the SALT II Treaty." [Ref. 62: p. 56]

After the October 1980 election, the SPD Left became stronger when twenty-four younger, left-oriented SPD members replaced older SPD deputies, and a hard core of 50-70 SPD members formed in opposition to the NATO decision. Other factors making the SPD Left more attractive included the deterioration in East-West detente generated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the nonratification of SALT II, which appeared to endanger West German-Soviet detente and SPD declarations of support for peace rallies and various appeals for the reversal of government support for the NATO decision, e.g., the Krefeld and Bielefeld appeals. [Ref. 64: pp. 544-545]

By early 1982, it looked as if a vote at the April 1982 SPD congress might reject the NATO decision. Therefore, the executive committee decided that the vote to evaluate the results of the Geneva negotiations should be postponed until the fall of 1983. The resolution on security policy adopted by the SPD at its April congress confirmed that there must be no stationing automatism, i.e., no missiles must be stationed in the FRG until the SPD assessed the results of the negotiations. The SPD also endorsed the Soviet position of including the French and British systems in the East-West balance at this congress. [Ref. 65: p. 6]

Once the SPD passed into the opposition after losing in a vote of no confidence to a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition headed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 1 October 1982, the SPD was free of the restraints of office and could pursue a more ideologically pure course. Instead of concentrating on the economic issues that brought down the SPD/FDP government, Hans-Jochen Vogel, in his bid for the chancellorship in the 6 March 1983 elections, concentrated on foreign policy issues, specifically the INF deployment. By this time the party was split into three groups: a right wing under Schmidt, a left wing under Vogel and Brandt, and a group of defectors to the Greens. Due to his support for the inclusion of French and British nuclear systems and for U.S. abandonment of its "zero option" in the Geneva negotiations, Vogel was given

very favorable treatment in the Soviet capital and in the Soviet press during his visit to the Soviet Union in January 1983. He was the candidate of choice for the Soviets.

After its defeat in the March 1983 election, the SPD went even further in the direction of opposition to nuclear weapons on West German territory. In a report submitted to the SPD Executive Committee by a Working Group on "New Strategies," SPD members suggested that nuclear weapons should not be stationed on the territory of states which do not possess such weapons (with the ultimate aim of a nuclear-free Europe) and that non-nuclear states should have the right to co-determination in the nuclear strategic planning policy of the states which do possess nuclear weapons. [Ref. 66: pp. 27-28]

By the time of the SPD special congress in Cologne on 19 November 1983, a negative vote on the deployment was a foregone conclusion, and (as noted earlier) the vast majority of delegates (383 out of 397) voted against the deployment. Schmidt staunchly remained a member of the overwhelmed minority at the party congress and voted against a resolution to oppose the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Germany.

In a speech to the Bundestag during its debate on 21 November 1983, Helmut Schmidt stressed the importance of the Federal Republic keeping its word in regard to the missile deployment as important for alliance solidarity and

preserving the political balance in Europe vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He also stressed the most recent progress of the negotiations with the U.S. willing to concede the Soviet Union 140 SS-20's, while the Soviet Union still demanded that the United States deploy no missiles at all. Ironically, those who supported Schmidt's viewpoint were no longer members of his own party but members of his former opposition, the CDU and CSU.

Since the party congress and Bundestag debate, the SPD, under the leadership of Willy Brandt, has been striving to coopt the protest and "peace" movement by assimilating its themes [Ref. 67: p. 30].

The Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists have supported the NATO dual-track decision from the beginning, even while in the opposition. However, such foreign policy experts as Manfred Woerner and Alois Mertes emphasized more strongly the necessity of modernizing as a response to the Eastern buildup. [Ref. 7: p. 56] Soviet attacks on the CDU/CSU since they came to power in October 1982 have not affected the CDU/CSU number of party supporters to any great extent.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP), led by Hans-Dietrich Genscher under both governing coalitions, has placed an equal priority on arms control and modernization, although at a party conference in May 1981, as many as 47% of the voting delegates refused to endorse the NATO decision [Ref. 68: p. 49].

Like the SPD, the FDP has had trouble with the allegiance of its younger members. The Young Democrats, or JUDO's, some of whom draw a parallel between U.S. missiles in the Federal Republic and Soviet missiles in Cuba, officially split from the party on 27 November 1982 [Ref. 69: p. J3], many joining the new social-liberal party established on 28 November, because they could not obtain agreement for their ideas in regard to renunciation of plans to site Pershing II's and GLCM's in the Federal Republic at the party congress earlier in the month [Ref. 70: p. J2]. The FDP's switch of allegiance in October 1982 from the SPD to the CDU/CSU over economic issues also alienated some of its more moderate members. In June 1984, for the first time, the FDP failed to gain enough votes to be represented in the European Parliament. Whether this means that the FDP will also fail to obtain the minimum 5% of the vote in future West German elections is unclear.

The Greens, including such spokesmen as Petra Kelly, Otto Schily and Marie Beck-Oberdorf, have grown in size by absorbing disgruntled members of the SPD and FDP, claiming to be "the anti-party party." [Ref. 71: p. 27] For the first time the Greens gained entrance to the Bundestag in the March 1983 elections by obtaining over 5% of the vote. The Green Party represents the anti-nuclear movement and is strongly

...opposed to the INF modernization on the grounds that the new deployments would increase rather than decrease tensions; that they would make limited war more rather than less likely; and that they would only fuel the arms race. [Ref. 72: p. 110]

The Greens have been active in anti-missile demonstrations, although they have had their differences with the West German Communist Party (DKP), which they accuse of attempting to exercise too much control over the anti-nuclear movement and which declines to condemn both Soviet and American missiles [Ref. 73: p. 15]. At first, it appeared that various factions, such as the "fundamentalists," who are concerned about preserving the party's protest roots, and the "pragmatists," who are more concerned about having an impact on national policy, might split the party [Ref. 74: p. 29]. However, the Greens have since toned down some of their theatrics to the extent that their popularity has grown to over 8%, and they have gained representation in the recent European Parliament elections.

The West German Communist Party, the DKP, while not a major political party represented in the Bundestag, nevertheless figures prominently in the anti-missile movement. Receiving some funding through the East German Communist Party, the SED, the DKP is an organizing factor behind many of the anti-missile demonstrations, partly because it has the funding available to transport participants to demonstration sites and pay other necessary expenses.

C. IMPACT ON PROTEST MOVEMENTS

Manfred Woerner defines the genesis of the West German "peace movement" in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the SPD's subsequent 1980 election theme as the only party capable of maintaining peace. This brought security issues to the center of public debate, and the 1979 NATO deployment decision became the principal vehicle for this debate.

[Ref. 75: p. 16]

In the Federal Republic of Germany protest movements have been instrumental in bringing negative interpretations of the NATO Pershing II and GLCM deployment before the population. Assisting the "peace movement" in this regard, the Soviets employed a wide variety of covert and overt activities in the hope of cancelling the modernization in the event the results of the negotiations were not satisfactory to them. These activities, or "active measures," were based on deception and

...include the use of agents of influence, local communist parties and local and international communist front organizations; the spreading of disinformation, false letters and forgeries; the manipulation of media, and the funding of anti-INF and anti-NATO efforts. [Ref. 49: p. 10]

Joshua saw the anti-INF campaign as being orchestrated by the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International Department. Other Soviet agencies active in the propaganda effort included the International Information Department, the KGB, and members of the such research institutes as the

Institute of the USA and Canada. Soviet spokesmen who are leaders of these organizations, e.g., Boris Ponomarev, Vadim Zagladin, Leonid Zamyatin, and Georgiy Arbatov, frequently iterated the Soviet propaganda line in statements to the press. [Ref. 49: pp. 10-11]

The Soviets knew better than to get directly involved in the anti-missile movement and exerted their influence through such front organizations as the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation (KFAZ), which was instrumental in preparing for the first major European demonstration held in Bonn on 10 October 1981 [Ref. 76: p. 50]. Another front organization, the German Peace Union, organized the Krefeld Forum of church groups, front organizations, pacifists and Green Party members in November 1980, eventually claiming some five million signatures against the INF deployment [Ref. 49: p. 15].

The organizational core of the "peace movement" in the Federal Republic was the DKP, which received DM fifty million annually from the East German Communist Party (SED). However, the DKP's insistence on absolute organizational control began to antagonize the Greens, who accused the DKP of dominating and manipulating an organizational meeting of peace activists in Bad Godesberg on 4 April 1982. [Ref. 76: p. 54]

Besides the Greens and the churches, the SPD left has been active in various peace demonstrations with 58 SPD

Bundestag deputies signing a declaration supporting the October 1981 Bonn demonstration [Ref. 49: p. 17]. Also, SPD elite members, such as Erhard Eppler and Willy Brandt, have spoken at peace demonstrations.

Other major groups participating in the "peace movement" included the ASF (Aktion Suehnezeichen Friedensdienste), DFG (Deutsche Friedens Gesellschaft), BBU (Bundesverband Buergerinitiativen Umweltschutz), Pax Christi, Women for Peace, and the youth wings of the SPD and FDP (JUSO's and JUDO's) [Ref. 77: p. 29].

These groups are committed to nonviolent direct action, which means that the action does not take place within existing governmental structures and laws but comes directly from the people. Additionally, no direct violence is used against people, although acts of violence against objects are permissible. [Ref. 78: p. 15]

Manfred Woerner has defined the "peace movement" as a heterogeneous group with five basic categories of pacifist currents. These include: 1) the "pacifism of faith," which attracts representatives of organized religions, 2) the "pacifism of fear," which attracts those afraid of war and the future, 3) the "pacifism of welfare," which attracts those interested in protecting their own economic well-being at the expense of defense outlays, 4) the "pacifism of expedience," whose adherents take their orders directly

from the Soviet Union, and 5) a "reunification (or nationalist-neutralist) pacifism." [Ref. 75: p. 17]

Besides the pacifist currents, Wilfried von Bredow recognized three additional intellectual and political streams which contributed to the "peace movement." These included the ecologists, the undogmatic socialists, and the Communists. [Ref. 79: pp. 42-43]

The young make up a very large component of the "peace movement." Stephen Szabo demonstrated a larger degree of support for the "peace movement" from those born since World War II, who grew up in a period of great affluence and who are now facing economic insecurity due to a job market which offers fewer jobs [Ref. 80: pp. 46 and 49]. This generation expects the "continuation of prosperity and the detente of the 1970s as the normal state of international affairs" and "sees any addition to Western...nuclear capabilities as unnecessary and probably immoral as well." [Ref. 81: pp. 93 and 94] Pierre Hassner put it best when he wrote:

To be told that the party is over and that one should return to the priority of the Soviet threat and of military budgets just at a time when economic scarcity and austerity also attack the new priorities based on affluence produces a feeling of disbelief and revolt. This is the well-known 'Tocqueville effect' according to which the reversal of a favorable trend is much less easily accepted than the situation which this trend had begun to change. It is combined with the generational problem since the generation of detente would admit defeat if it accepted to return to the values and priorities of their parents, based on an experience which is essentially alien to them. [Ref. 82: pp. 14-15]

Among young university students, Gerhard Wettig has defined an "alternative lifestyle personality type," those who have come primarily from the middle class and have managed to grow up without having any firm values imparted to them. Emotionally self-centered and morally arrogant towards policy makers (in that they consider themselves the sole repositories of virtue and good faith), these young people feel they no longer have anything in common with West Germany's politicians and the system they represent. Thus, they have become hard-core pacifists and environmentalists. [Ref. 83: pp. 225-228]

The activities of the anti-missile movement centered primarily around demonstrations, human chains, hunger strikes, and blockages of military installations at key times, such as during Easter Week and on the anniversary of the NATO deployment decision. Organizers typically overestimate the numbers of participants. For example, during the 1982 Easter Week demonstrations, organizers estimated participation of 140,000 people throughout the Federal Republic on 10 April; police estimates were around half this figure [Ref. 84: p. J1].

The "peace movement" has been more noted for what it is against rather than what it is for and has generally confined itself to criticizing NATO and nuclear weapons. "Peace movement" participants have been particularly sensitive to arguments that the superpowers may try to limit a nuclear war to West German soil, that there are already too many nuclear

weapons on West German soil, that any new installations of nuclear weapons would provide additional targets for the Soviets, and that the United States should set the example for halting the arms race by nondeployment of the Pershing II's and GLCM's. Some "peace movement" participants (although not a majority) advocate a neutralist policy by dropping out of NATO; others favor SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr's proposal to make the Federal Republic a nuclear-free zone [Ref. 85: pp. 105 and 108].

During the course of the Soviet INF campaign, it became extremely useful for the Soviet Union to utilize these fears of nuclear devastation, hoping that the "peace movement" would grow to such an extent that overwhelming public opposition might curtail the missile deployment.

D. OPINION POLLS

If the Soviets can be said to have had any success, given the failure of the negotiations and the beginning of the NATO INF deployment, it must be in the area of transformation of West German public opinion. Various opinion polls have demonstrated that there has been a notable shift in West German public opinion from pro- to anti-INF deployment, both at the general public and elite levels, since the inception of the NATO INF deployment decision.

Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca suggest that the key factors in this non-support of the INF deployment by the general public in Europe were "a new loss of confidence in the current political leadership of the United States combined with a longstanding popular reluctance to rely as confidently as do their governments on nuclear deterrence." [Ref. 86: p. 179] Remarks by President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig in the fall of 1981 about limiting a nuclear war to Europe clearly upset the West Germans and tended to undermine their confidence in the basic prudence and reliability of the United States.

Peter Schmidt credits the Soviet Union with success in improving its image in the Federal Republic over the past four years. According to Gallup, the percentage of West Germans who believe in the commitment of the Soviet Union to seek a reconciliation with the West increased from 16% in January 1980 to 45% in January 1983. [Ref. 87: p. 37] To the extent that both the Soviet Union and the United States are accused of not doing enough to bring the INF negotiations to a successful conclusion (70% of those queried by STERN magazine in October 1983 were of this opinion), the Soviet Union has succeeded in presenting itself to the West German public as an entity no more unreasonable than the Federal Republic's ally, the United States [Ref. 88: p. 76].

Even among West German security policy elites, who would usually be expected to exhibit the most pro-INF deployment responses, the Science Center Berlin Mail Survey of August 1983 revealed that with the deployment of Pershing II's and GLCM's, the majority (53%) of these elites felt that security and stability in Europe would decrease. Again a majority (54%) felt that the deployment would lower the nuclear threshold in Europe, and the danger of war would increase. This line of reasoning appears to follow from the security elites' majority view (57%) that there is a rough balance between the military strength of the East and the West; thus, an increase in Western INF forces would create an imbalance. [Ref. 89: p. 7]

Yet, a majority (75%) of these security elites felt that the implementation of the 1979 NATO INF decision was moderately to very important for alliance cohesion [Ref. 89: p. 12].

The STERN opinion poll covered several aspects of the NATO modernization during two time periods--November 1982 and September/October 1983 and separated its results by sex, age, and political party. STERN noted that the majority of West Germans feared the consequences of the deployment, to include greater danger of war, new East-West tensions, worsening of the relationship with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and increasing dependence on the United States. [Ref. 88: p. 70]

During both time periods about one-third of those queried indicated that they were supporters of the "peace movement." However, only 3-4% considered themselves to be active supporters, the rest being more in the category of sympathizers. The typical "peace movement" supporter was slightly more likely to be female than male (37 versus 33%), young (46% less than 30 years old), and a member of the Green Party. However, 70% of those queried did not believe that the "peace movement" could prevent the stationing of the new missiles, and 76% were against protestors utilizing force. [Ref. 88: pp. 70-71]

In June 1982, a clear majority (69%) felt that the Federal Republic needed the alliance and that it would be too weak by itself to ensure its own security as a neutral state. By September 1983, this majority had declined to 58%, half the difference being taken up by people who had since become undecided. [Ref. 88: p. 71]

Between two polls conducted in August and September/October 1983, opposition grew from 40% to 46% (including 87% of the Greens and 65% of the SPD members) against the NATO deployment in the event the Geneva negotiations failed and the Soviet Union left its SS-20's directed against Europe in place. Nevertheless, 68% of those polled believed that in the event of a breakdown of negotiations, the NATO missiles would be installed, and even after all this 63% believed negotiations would eventually be renewed. [Ref. 88: p. 72]

An interesting aspect of the poll was the degree of participation people might take in the anti-missile movement. One out of every two persons polled stated that they might take part in a discussion or attend a church service. Approximately one out of three persons would take part in a peaceful demonstration. One out of four would wear a button or have a bumper sticker on his/her car. One out of five might actually contribute money to the "peace movement." Only 7% would actually participate in a blockade of a military installation. Fully a quarter of those polled, however, would not participate in the "peace movement" in any way, especially if they were CDU/CSU supporters or over 45 years of age. [Ref. 88: p. 75]

Other significant opinion polls include one conducted by SINUS (Social-Scientific Institute Nowack and Soergel in Munich), which was ordered by the Schmidt government and completed under Chancellor Kohl in January 1983. In this poll, 61% favored a postponement of the NATO deployment while only 22% advocated deployment in the event no agreement was reached at the negotiations. Even among CDU/CSU voters 54% advocated postponement while only 32% supported a fall deployment. 65% of SPD voters were in favor of postponement while only 17% were for deployment. In this poll 49% of FRG citizens were of the opinion that more American missiles would intensify the risk of a nuclear war; only 24% thought that counterarmament would ensure peace. [Ref. 90: pp. J4-5]

A public opinion poll conducted by the ZDF television network showed 75% of all FRG citizens to be against the deployment of new missiles in the event an agreement was not reached. Only 20% of the interviewees recommended the official government policy. [Ref. 91: p. J2]

Reportage of polls like those mentioned have dominated the West German media, although there have been other polls, such as a Gallup poll in January 1983 [Ref. 90: p. J5], which showed that the majority of FRG citizens advocated the deployment. Of course, the polls which were noted in the Soviet press were always the ones showing that a large percentage of West Germans opposed the NATO missile deployment.

Whether the Soviet propaganda campaign can claim all of the credit for the change in West German public opinion is questionable, but it appears that their reassurances of peaceful intent and the smokescreen of minor alterations in their negotiating position while retaining their basic position, i.e., no NATO deployment, had some of the desired effects on public opinion even though these were not sufficient to alter the government position and prevent the NATO deployment.

IV. ANALYSIS

The 22 November 1983 Bundestag vote in favor of beginning the NATO deployment was a severe setback for the Soviet Union's propaganda efforts to avert the missile deployment. The next day the Soviets walked out of the Geneva negotiations, and the day after that a statement was issued in Andropov's name stating that countermeasures would be forthcoming. This seems to indicate that the Soviets' eyes were on the Federal Republic of Germany, and the German response triggered the Soviet response. After all, although the Soviet Union, in its propaganda efforts, made much of the cruise missiles, it must have really been the Pershing II, with its short flight time, which was more feared, and West Germany was the only European country slated to accept the Pershing II. If the Pershing II was now going to be deployed, there was no need to continue the pretense of negotiations from the Soviet viewpoint.

On the other hand, it may also be noted that the Soviets probably placed special emphasis on the Pershing II precisely because West Germany alone was scheduled to receive this type of missile. The Soviets could thus isolate West Germany and attempt to play upon its special vulnerabilities. The extent to which the Soviets truly fear the relatively small

number of Pershing II's, which are vulnerable to pre-emptive Soviet attack, is not certain. It is possible that the fears were exaggerated in an attempt to generate feelings of hysteria in impressionable sectors of West German opinion.

Soviet countermeasures to the NATO INF deployment were gradually revealed. The Soviets announced that the moratorium on SS-20 deployment in the European part of the Soviet Union (which Western governments said was never observed anyway) had been lifted. Controversial as the U.S. forward-based systems were during the INF negotiations, the Soviets decided to respond to the land-based Pershing II and cruise missile deployment with more FBS systems of their own: additional missiles on submarines off the coast of the United States [Ref. 92: pp. 1 and 4]. Of more immediate importance to the West Germans, although not unexpected, has been the installation of additional shorter-range SS-21's, SS-22's, and SS-23's in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. It is generally felt, however, that this deployment of shorter-range nuclear missiles is the continuation of a long-planned modernization and scarcely counts as a response to the NATO INF deployment.

Soviet attempts to influence the West German government have continued since the breakdown of the negotiations and have included a letter from Andropov suggesting that the situation arising from the stationing of the Pershing II's was not "irreversible." [Ref. 93: p. 1] The Soviet idea of

"reversible," however, constitutes the removal of NATO deployments already in place before negotiations can be reinitiated. The Soviets must have their doubts about their abilities to influence the current West German conservative government now that the deployment has already begun, since they were not successful earlier.

The timing of Soviet announcements on countermeasures suggests that the Soviets were trying to inject new momentum into the anti-missile protests [Ref. 92: p. 4]. The anti-missile movement lost a great deal of momentum after the deployment began. Even Petra Kelly, founder of the Greens, has "noticed an incredible weakening of the peace movement," [Ref. 94: p. E4] and the NATO decision anniversary and Easter Week demonstrations drew substantially fewer demonstrators than prior to the deployment. Indeed, in the words of Walter Jens, a Tuebingen professor, "In the peace movement there is a growing criticism of the Soviet Union," which is thought to be controlled by its military [Ref. 94: p. E4]. James Markham suggests that the "peace movement" is now searching for new themes but has not come up with anything which could draw a large following as in the pre-deployment timeframe, and with the employment situation so critical, enlistment in the Bundeswehr is at an all-time high [Ref. 94: p. E4].

Since the deployment the SPD has seen the necessity of reestablishing its credentials as a supporter of NATO and has broadened the nuclear weapons issue by proposing an accelerated removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Federal Republic, a drawdown of the chemical weapons inventory, and the creation of a nuclear-free zone on each side of the West German-East German border. Left-wingers, like Oskar Lafontaine, who has called for the Federal Republic's withdrawal from NATO, have been disparaged, even by those SPD members who also opposed the deployment. Thus, it appears that Karl Kaiser's analogy of the SPD to a pendulum is accurate; after a swing to the left, the pendulum is moving back closer to the center, which might be viewed as discouraging to the Soviets. [Ref. 95: p. 3]

The European Parliament elections (though less important in practical terms than national elections) in June 1984 revealed that the Greens, now concentrating more on environmental themes and playing down the pacifist issues, were gaining in support. With 8.2% of the vote, which is a gain of almost 3% since the March 1983 West German elections, the party appears to be gaining in popularity. The current success of the Greens might be seen as encouraging for the Soviets, who have perceived them as a receptive audience in the past which would be sympathetic to future Soviet arms control initiatives. [Ref. 96: p. 3]

Meanwhile, the FDP failed to get the 5% of the popular vote necessary for reelection to the European Parliament and thus can be considered as a party in decline. Since its switch of allegiance to the CDU/CSU, the FDP lost many of its supporters, particularly among the young. In an attempt to stem the exodus from the party, Hans-Dietrich Genscher has declared he will step down early next year from the party leadership. This would clear the way for younger leaders and hopefully help the party regain some popularity. [Ref. 100: p. 3]

While the negotiations were ongoing, Soviet leaders threatened the West Germans with various consequences. As noted previously, some of these consequences had already been, or were in the process of being, implemented, e.g., deployment of intermediate-range missiles directed toward West Germany and modernized short-range missiles in East Germany. However, they were emphasized because of their propaganda effect. Other threatened consequences were more nebulous, e.g., making the risk of war more probable if NATO INF were deployed, but threats like this could be readily disbelieved since they sounded like traditional Soviet rhetoric.

It is doubtful that the Soviets would ever consider economic sanctions against the West Germans as they need the hard currency and the technology. In 1983 the Soviet Union increased its trade with Western Europe by 6.4% [Ref. 98: p. 31]. Even before the INF negotiations were

discontinued, at the German-Soviet Economic Commission meeting in Moscow in early November 1983, the Soviets promised to "make every effort to expand our economic cooperation" and pressed the West Germans to buy more natural gas [Ref. 99: p. 77]. The Federal Republic is also a major supplier of industrial and farm machinery and equipment. Thus, it appears that the Soviets value economic benefits highly enough to maintain the economic relationship with West Germany. There has been no move at all to diminish trade with Western Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany.

Those in the Federal Republic who feared a worsening of relations with East Germany have also had their minds set at rest. Since the NATO deployment began, East German party leader Erich Honecker has assured the West Germans that he would not allow relations between the two Germanys to deteriorate. The East Germans reciprocated a DM one billion loan to East Germany in June 1983 with the largest number of East Germans allowed to emigrate to West Germany since the Berlin wall was built in 1961--some 30,000 thus far in 1984. Intra-German trade has become very important for the East Germans, who, by trading with the West Germans, have enjoyed the benefits of being a de facto member of the European Economic Community. With a hard-currency debt of \$7.9 billion, East Germany needs the West German credits to service its loans [Ref. 100: p. 3]. Honecker has also recently lifted the minimum currency exchange requirement for children under

fourteen years of age travelling to East Germany, although the West German government feels he needs to go further after almost doubling the exchange requirement to DM 25 per day in 1980 and refusing to exempt pensioners and children [Ref. 101: p. J3]. Most recently, in July 1984, another loan for \$340 million to East Germany has been guaranteed by Bonn [Ref. 102: p. 12].

Honecker apparently feels he has more to gain by remaining on good terms with the Federal Republic. Maintaining an autonomous line from Moscow on the INF issue, Honecker asserted that the new Soviet shorter-range missiles brought "no joy" to the East Germans. As James Markham has observed:

By pressing for better relations with Bonn immediately after the stationing of the first Pershing 2 missiles in West Germany, the East German [Honecker] has destroyed the Soviet propaganda theme that ties between East and West Germany would be blocked by 'a palisade of rockets' rising between the two states. [Ref. 103: p. 4]

In conclusion, there is no evidence that Soviet-West German relations have been permanently harmed by the GLCM and Pershing II deployment. Negative Soviet rhetoric will continue, but the Soviets realize they will have to deal with Chancellor Kohl for the next few years, and they need the West Germans economically.

V. CONCLUSIONS

From the inception of the NATO decision to modernize its INF, the Soviet Union has exercised phenomenal efforts to prevent the deployment of the GLCM's and Pershing II's in West Germany. As previously noted, the Soviets professed to fear the latter missiles much more than the cruise missiles because of their short flight time. To this end the Soviets waged a campaign of threats, exaggerations, misrepresentations, and lies in order to impress the West Germans with Soviet vulnerability and peaceful intentions.

The Soviet campaign against the NATO deployment was unsuccessful, but the Federal Republic of Germany was polarized around the deployment issue. On the one hand, the Greens and, later, the SPD opposed the deployment, thereby repudiating former Chancellor Schmidt's support for the decision, while the CDU/CSU and FDP supported it. An anti-missile movement was able to mobilize thousands of people from assorted groups, and opinion polls suggested that the government elected in March 1983 was no longer supported by the majority of the West Germans, at least on the NATO deployment issue. After a heated debate in the Bundestag, the government approved the implementation decision by a narrow margin. What had once been a government and opposition defense consensus no longer existed. Or did it?

1984 has seen the move back toward the center by the SPD and a surge in popularity of the Greens after they decided to become more than just a one-issue party, i.e., anti-missile deployment. The "peace movement" has stagnated and no longer draws the large crowds at demonstrations that it once did.

Although the West German government had now done precisely the thing that the Soviet Union said would cost them much in detente, it was the Kremlin's turn to decide that it was really the Soviet Union that needed Ostpolitik, trade, and Western technology. East Germany as well was not willing to give up the gains it had made under Ostpolitik and appreciated the short-range SS-21's, SS-22's, and SS-23's stationed on East German territory as little as the West Germans did.

The Soviet Union, of course, will continue to pressure the West Germans not to accept the full complement of Pershing II's and cruise missiles, though they may realize the chances of this are not that great. But the Soviets also realize they have to cooperate with the conservative Kohl government for the next few years and will have to do so in order to maintain their mutually beneficial economic ties.

While the Soviets have suffered a setback in prestige by not being able to prevent the NATO deployments, they must have a certain amount of satisfaction that their propaganda campaign did generate so much polarization and dissension. Although the situation in the Federal Republic has become

much more subdued since November 1983, it will undoubtedly be difficult in the future to implement any further nuclear arms modernization. The public consciousness has been raised, and any future attempts to extend the range of the Pershing II, increase its numbers, MIRV its warheads, or provide reloads in order to keep pace with further SS-20 deployments will most assuredly be met with stiff resistance--to say nothing of nuclear modernization in other areas, such as enhanced radiation battlefield weapons. Meanwhile, the gap in intermediate-range warheads in Europe will widen to the advantage of the Soviets.

Perhaps the Soviets did not do so badly after all; they may have lost the battle to prevent NATO's INF deployment, but they may continue to hope to erode NATO's will to resist Soviet attempts to achieve political hegemony. At the least, the USSR may remain confident of retaining and enhancing its nuclear superiority in Europe, partly because it will be most difficult in political terms for NATO to undertake any further nuclear modernization.

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