

AD-A152 147


SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY(U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL MONTEREY CA C T ORBANN JUN 84


1/3

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 5/4

NL





2

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California

AD-A152 147



THESIS

DTIC
ELECTE
S APR 5 1985 D
A

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY

by

Carl T. Orbann

June 1984

Thesis Advisor:

M. W. Clough

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

DTIC FILE COPY

85 03 18 005

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) South African Defense Policy		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis June 1984
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Carl T. Orbann		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		12. REPORT DATE June 1984
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 200
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) South African Defense Policy, Total Onslaught, Total Strategy, South African Defense Force, ARMSCOR, State Security Council, The Twelve Point Plan, Destabilization in Southern Africa		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The Republic of South Africa is the preeminent regional military and economic power in southern Africa. It is also a country that has earned near universal condemnation over the practice of apartheid. South Africa's strength as opposed to its neighbors' weakness and the fact that South Africa practices internal policies which are condemned by its neighbors and the international community, provide the basis for conflict in southern		

DD FORM 1473
1 JAN 73EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S N 0102-LF-014-6601

1

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

#20 - ABSTRACT - (CONTINUED)

Africa. Further, as South African military capabilities grow, and the ability of outside actors to influence the actions of the Republic is lessened, a better understanding of the defense policies of South Africa becomes even more important to the West.

This paper examines South African defense policy as it is today, and as it has developed historically from 1910. Historical development of the South African Defense Force and South African defense policies are examined in Chapter I. Chapter II is devoted to the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy concept developed and instituted by Prime Minister P.W. Botha. The Total Onslaught is important as it provides the basis for current South African threat assessments. Likewise, the Total National Strategy provides the framework within which defense policies are defined.

Finally, Chapter III is devoted to an examination of current South African defense policies. This chapter examines South Africa's threat perceptions and constraints placed upon South Africa, and the country's assets. Lastly, it examines the defense strategies which have developed in response to these factors.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution	
Availability Codes	
Dist	
H-1	



S N 0102- LF-014-6601

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

South African Defense Policy

by

Carl T. Orbann
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., University of South Florida, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 1984

Author:

Carl T. Orbann

Approved by:

Mr. Carl W. Chappell

Thesis Advisor

David Winterford

Second Reader

Sherman H. Klaid

Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

Kenneth T. Marshall

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

The Republic of South Africa is the preeminent regional military and economic power in southern Africa. It is also a country that has earned near universal condemnation over the practice of apartheid. South Africa's strength as opposed to its neighbors' weakness and the fact that South Africa practices internal policies which are condemned by its neighbors and the international community provide the basis for conflict in southern Africa. Further, as South African military capabilities grow, and the ability of outside actors to influence the actions of the Republic is lessened, a better understanding of the defense policies of South Africa becomes even more important to the West.

This paper examines South African defense policy as it is today, and as it has developed historically from 1910. Historical development of the South African Defense Force and South African defense policies are examined in Chapter I. Chapter II is devoted to the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy concept developed and instituted by Prime Minister P.W. Botha. The Total Onslaught is important as it provides the basis for current South African threat assessments. Likewise, the Total National Strategy provides the framework within which defense policies are defined.

Finally, Chapter III is devoted to an examination of current South African defense policies. This chapter examines South

Africa's threat perceptions, constraints placed upon South Africa, and the country's assets. Lastly, it examines the defense strategies which have developed in response to these factors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE AND SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY --	13
A.	BACKGROUND: TO 1948 -----	13
B.	1948-1960 -----	17
1.	Background -----	17
2.	Defense Policy -----	17
3.	The Changing South African Defense Force -----	20
4.	Summary 1948-1960 -----	21
C.	1960-1973 GROWING ISOLATION -----	22
1.	Background -----	22
a.	Internal Security -----	22
b.	External Pressures -----	23
2.	Foreign Policy -----	24
a.	Verwoerd to 1965 -----	24
b.	Vorster 1966-1973 -----	25
3.	South African Defense Policy 1960-1973 --	27
a.	Threat Perception -----	27
b.	Response -----	30
(1)	Background -----	30
(2)	Defense Expenditures -----	31
(3)	Manpower -----	32
(4)	Arms and the Arms Industry -----	34
(5)	Defense Reorganization -----	36

(6)	Training -----	37
(7)	The Security Establishment -----	38
(a)	The Bureau of State Security -----	38
(b)	The Establishment of the State Security Council ----	40
c.	The Consequences of South African Defense Policy 1960-1973 -----	41
II.	TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY -----	44
A.	1973 AND AFTER: THE INWARD TURNING -----	44
1.	Effects of the Portuguese Coup and South African Intervention in Angola ----	44
2.	Rhodesia -----	46
3.	Confluence of Pressures: Other Events 1974 and After -----	47
a.	Arab Oil Embargo -----	48
b.	South Africa and the United Nations -	49
c.	Internal Unrest -----	50
4.	South African Foreign Policy 1974-1978 --	51
B.	P.W. BOTHA: TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY -	53
1.	The Total Onslaught--Background -----	53
2.	Total Onslaught Defined -----	54
C.	TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY -----	56
1.	Background -----	56
2.	The Twelve-Point Plan -----	57
3.	The Mechanics of the Total National Strategy -----	59
a.	Government Reorganization -----	60
b.	The Rise of the Security Establishment -----	61

(1) Background -----	61
(2) The Security Establishment -----	62
(a) The South African Defense Force/Department of Defense -----	62
(b) The Intelligence Community -----	65
(c) The Intellectual Community -----	66
(d) Arms and Associated Industries -----	66
(e) The South African Police --	68
(f) The State Security Council -----	70
c. Constitutional Change -----	73
(1) Background -----	73
(2) The Constitution -----	74
(3) The New Constitution and the Total National Strategy -----	75
d. Government, Business and Defense ----	76
e. Other Racial Groups -----	78
D. EFFECTS OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY -----	79
1. Internal Effects -----	80
a. Government -----	80
b. The Militarization of Society -----	81
(1) Impact on Government -----	81
(2) Economic Issues -----	82
(3) Social Issues -----	83
c. The Nature of Society -----	85

2. Regional Effects -----	86
3. International Effects of the Total National Strategy -----	88
III. SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY -----	93
A. THE THREAT -----	93
1. Background -----	93
2. The Conventional Threat -----	94
3. The Terrorist Threat -----	98
B. CONSTRAINTS -----	100
1. Population -----	101
a. The Civilian Workforce and Apartheid -----	102
b. Military Manpower -----	102
2. Border Vulnerability -----	104
3. International Opposition -----	106
a. Lack of Defensive Alliances -----	107
b. The United Nations Arms Embargo 1977 -----	109
c. Resource Vulnerabilities -----	110
(1) Water -----	110
(2) Oil -----	111
4. Economic Constraints -----	112
a. Investor Confidence -----	113
b. Balance of Payments Concerns -----	114
c. The Labor Force -----	114
d. The Effect of Government on the Economy -----	116
5. Perceptual Constraints -----	118

C. ASSETS -----	121
1. The South African Defense Force -----	121
a. The Army -----	121
(1) Organization -----	121
(2) Army Equipment -----	126
b. The South African Air Force -----	127
(1) Organization -----	127
(2) SAAF Equipment -----	128
c. The South African Navy -----	129
(1) Organization -----	129
(2) SAN Equipment -----	130
2. The South African Arms Industry -----	130
a. Background -----	130
b. Sources of Arms -----	131
c. The South African Arms Industry and Self Sufficiency -----	135
3. Economic Assets -----	137
a. Transportation Infrastructure -----	137
b. Strategic Resources -----	138
c. Economic Strength -----	139
4. Population Assets -----	140
D. RESPONSE--SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY -----	142
1. Military Actions -----	142
a. Maintenance of a Strong Defense Force -----	142
b. Offensive Warfare--Crossborder Operations -----	144
(1) Goals of Crossborder Operations -----	144

(2) Types of Crossborder Operations -----	147
c. Maritime Strategy -----	148
2. Political Actions -----	149
a. Effective Mobilization of Manpower for Defense -----	149
(1) Conscription -----	150
(2) Utilization of Non-whites -----	150
(3) Immigrants -----	152
b. The Search for Security -----	153
c. Destabilization -----	155
(1) Background -----	155
(2) The Destabilization Program -----	156
(3) The Benefits of Destabilization -	161
d. The South African Nuclear Program ----	162
3. Economic Actions -----	163
a. The Economy and the Government -----	164
b. The Economic Dependence of Southern Africa -----	165
c. Self-Sufficiency in Strategic Materials -----	166
IV. CONCLUSIONS -----	169
APPENDIX A: THE 12-POINT PLAN -----	171
APPENDIX B: MISSIONS OF THE SADF AS DEFINED IN THE 1982 WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE -----	173
APPENDIX C: MILITARY EQUIPMENT PRODUCED IN SOUTH AFRICA -----	175
APPENDIX D: WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES ---	177
ENDNOTES -----	181
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	199

LIST OF TABLES

1. South African Defense Spending 1960 to 1974 -----	31
2. South African Defense Force Composition -----	33
3. South African Government Organization Executive Branch -----	62
4. South African Defense Spending 1974/75--1983/84 ---	64
5. Growth of the South African Defense Force -----	64
6. SADF Service Requirements -----	84
7. The Military Balance in Southern Africa -----	95
8. Population by Racial Composition 1970 and 1980 ----	101
9. Army Order of Battle 1979 -----	123

I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
DEFENSE FORCE AND SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY

A. BACKGROUND: TO 1948¹

South Africa's regular defense force, the Union Defense Force (UDF) was established by the Defense Act of 1912, two years after the Act of Union. In developing the plans for an effective defense force, General Jan C. Smuts, an Afrikaner hero of the Boer War, relied on the military traditions of both the Afrikaner and the English-speaking segments of the country's white population. In the case of the Afrikaners, these traditions reflected the Boer "Commandos," which developed as a sort of frontier militia in the defense of the early settlers, and which had grown into the military arm of the Boer Republics. The military traditions of the English-speaking whites derived from the colonial period when British troops were garrisoned in Cape Province and Natal. The Volunteer Ordinance of 1854 created a militia in these two colonies which trained in accordance with British procedures and were often affiliated with regular army regiments stationed in southern Africa.

Initially, the permanent force of the UDF consisted of about 2500 men organized into headquarters, a training staff, five artillery batteries, and five mounted rifle regiments. In addition, the Active Citizens' Force (ACF) numbered 25,000 reservists serving four year tours in fifteen mounted

rifle regiments and fourteen infantry regiments. Finally, the Defense Act provided for reserve coast artillery batteries, a small flying corps, and a naval reserve. It also reinstated the Commandos as a separate voluntary reserve formation.

The UDF's first operation took place in January 1914, when thousands of reservists were mobilized to maintain order in Witwatersrand during a miner's strike. In World War I, the Union government mobilized reserves for operations against German Southwest Africa, an action which led to much Afrikaner opposition, the resignation of many Afrikaner officers (some of whom organized an armed uprising against the Union), and the defection of an Afrikaner UDF unit to the Germans. It took two months for loyal forces to deal with the Afrikaner rebellion, which pitted pro-Union and anti-British Commandos against one another.

Once internal problems were settled, the UDF turned to Southwest Africa, which was captured in a six month campaign in 1915. In addition, the Union launched a recruiting drive to raise a volunteer expeditionary force, which eventually served the Allied cause in Egypt against pro-Ottoman Arabs, in Palestine against the Turks, and in German East Africa and Europe against the Germans. In addition to white combat troops, 60,000 colored auxiliaries and 25,000 black laborers saw service in World War I.

Between World War I and World War II, a lack of commitment of funds to defense restricted the development of South

Africa's armed forces. After demobilization, reserve levels were kept at about 15,000 men, but reduced pay scales eroded the ranks of the regulars. The last units of the British Army were withdrawn in 1921, although the Royal Navy retained its bases at Simonstown and Walvis Bay. Due to the Afrikaner uprising during World War I, it was 1934 before ACF regiments were formed which used Afrikaans as the language of command.

In 1922, the ACF was again mobilized to deal with miners' strikes at Witwatersrand. In addition, the armed forces were deployed on several occasions to deal with tribal rebellions in Southwest Africa, which had been mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations.

World War II again saw a split between Afrikaners and English-speakers over participation in the war, and a proposal for "qualified neutrality" was narrowly defeated in Parliament. The decision to enter the war had the effect of turning Smuts' Union Party into the party of English speakers and of aligning the majority of Afrikaner speakers against him. It was the issue of participation in the war with Britain which provided the impetus which led to a National Party victory in 1948.²

During the war, South African troops saw service against the Italians in Italian Somaliland, with the British Eighth Army in Egypt and Libya, in Italy, and against the Vichy French in the occupation of Madagascar. In addition, 3000 South African naval personnel were seconded to the Royal

Navy, and the South African air arm served with distinction in many theaters of operations.

The defeat of General Smuts in the 1948 elections brought to an end an era in South African politics, and saw the beginning of another, both for South Africa in general and for the UDF in particular. Four important points must be made about defense policy and the pre-1948 defense establishment. First, other than the employment of forces in the two World Wars, which were exceptions, the military establishment during this period was politically insignificant and militarily weak. At the time of South Africa's decision to enter World War II, the UDF consisted of only 313 officers and 3040 other ranks in the Permanent Force (PF), 1900 in the Air Force, and 432 in the Navy, and the Defense Force had no role in Union politics.³ Second, the UDF was identified as an institution very much dominated by the English speaking portion of the white population. Third, the precedent of the use of the UDF by the Union government to maintain internal order in the 1914 and 1922 labor disputes and against native unrest between the wars was established. Finally, the participation of South Africa in wars outside of the Union and southern Africa proved a divisive issue among South Africa's white population, and eventually was a factor in the coalesce of Afrikaners in the National Party, and in the ascension of that party to power in 1948.

B. 1948-1960

1. Background

The 1948 elections in South Africa brought to power the coalition of the Nationalist Party (NP) and the Afrikaner Party (later absorbed into the NP). From this point on, governments controlled by a growing NP majority sought to implement the apartheid policy and ensure Afrikaner control of the government through legislation and regulation. While a survey of the actual implementation of apartheid is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that from 1948 onwards, South African foreign and security policies have been explicitly and implicitly concerned with the protection of this internal policy, making South Africa a country whose foreign relations are determined almost entirely by a domestic political and social policy.⁴

The ultimate foreign policy goals of the first NP government of Dr. D. F. Malan were first discussed in his 1945 "African Charter." This document called for the preservation of Africa for "Western European Christian Civilization."⁵ It proposed to keep both Asiatics and Communists out of Africa and to forbid the arming of "natives" and their use in white wars.

2. Defense Policy

As the new South African NP government worked to improve its hold on the government and implement apartheid internally, its leaders also sought to frame a basic strategy

for external defense.⁶ While there appeared to be a little threat of outside attack, growing black nationalism, which was seen as a direct result of Communist agitation and part of a global Communist plan to weaken the West through denial of southern Africa's strategic resources, was of much concern.

In defining its strategy, the governments of Malan, and of his successor, J. G. Strijdon, made several strategic assumptions.⁷ First, that South Africa would be a welcome ally of the West due to its strategic position, economic resources, and white, Christian, anti-communist government. Second, that the colonial powers would give a major role to South Africa in African regional affairs. Third, that the colonial powers would defend the status quo in Africa, and that decolonization would be piecemeal, selective, and take many years. Finally, that South Africa was a "small power" and that the main burden of defending Africa must fall to the Western powers.⁸

Based on these assumptions, the South African government developed a two-fold strategy. First, in the event of war against Communism the enemy must be engaged as far from South Africa as possible. Second, South Africa attempted to become involved in a formal Western defense alliance to ensure Western commitment to the defense of Africa.

In view of its strategic assumptions and the strategy which resulted from these assumptions, South Africa undertook policies designed to draw closer to the West. South Africa

undertook policies designed to draw closer to the West. South Africa demonstrated its willingness to embark on anti-Communist missions by providing small but symbolic forces to participate in the Berlin airlift and in the Korean War. Further, South Africa applauded the development of Western defense agreements such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) agreement, and continued lobbying for NATO to extend its coverage into the South Atlantic.⁹ In addition, as early as 1951, Malan was promoting the concept of an African defense organization to include South Africa and the colonial powers in Africa. In 1951 South Africa joined Britain in sponsoring a defense conference in Nairobi, and participated in another at Dakar in 1954. However, in spite of South African statements to the contrary, nothing concrete regarding strategic planning came of either of these meetings.¹⁰ In the early 1950's, South Africa also supported Britain in an attempt to develop a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). This led to the purchase of Centurion tanks and Sabre jet aircraft as a potential contribution to this alliance. However, MEDO was also abandoned.¹¹

The closest South Africa came to obtaining a Western defense commitment was the Simonstown Agreement with Britain in 1955, whereby both the British and South African governments agreed in general terms to contribute forces for the defense of southern Africa against external aggression. The

British naval base at Simonstown was turned over to South Africa, and South Africa in turn made a commitment to expand its navy to assist in the defense of the Cape sea route.¹²

3. The Changing South African Defense Force

This period brought two major changes to the South African Defense Force (SADF). First, the ascension of the National Party to power in 1948 brought an accompanying "Afrikanerization" throughout the government, including both the defense forces and the police. Government institutions, including the SADF, were converted into apartheid institutions to strengthen the party's hold on the state. British trained, English speaking officers were retired early and replaced with Afrikaners. A Defense Amendment Act required fluency in both English and Afrikaans of all officers and non-commissioned officers, and for all members of the Permanent Force. These moves had the effect of decreasing the influence of the English-speakers in the SADF, as they were less likely to be bilingual, and, for a time, lowering the combat efficiency of the SADF as veteran officers and NCO's were replaced by less experienced Afrikaners and as units with long traditions (normally associated with the English speaking community) lost their historic identity.¹³

Secondly, the Simonstown Agreement and attempts to participate in other Western alliances brought the SADF its first modern equipment, albeit in small quantity. Tanks and aircraft were acquired for participation in the stillborn

MEDO, and modern warships and long range maritime patrol aircraft and strike aircraft to comply with the Simonstown Agreement. While defense spending remained low, these acquisitions were the first new major equipment acquired by the SADF since the end of World War II.

4. Summary 1948-1960

The salient points to be made from the discussion of this period center around South Africa's key strategic assumptions. First, some of the perceptions upon which the National Party leaders based their developing foreign policy strategy would evolve into the basis for current South African foreign policy strategy. These perceptions were: 1) That South Africa could be a valuable ally to the West; 2) That South Africa's strategic location and economic importance would be of value to the West; 3) That South Africa was an important player in southern Africa; and, 4) That decolonization would be selective and time consuming.

Several of these key assumptions turned out to be false. Other than the Simonstown Agreement, which was not a full-fledged treaty but a series of letters of agreement, South Africa was never able to generate much Western enthusiasm for defense agreements. Western interests at the time were focused on Europe, and southern Africa seemed far removed and of small importance.¹⁴ Further, doubts among the colonial powers concerning the viability of the colonial system caused Western nations to refrain from becoming too closely associated

with South Africa, thus affording little hope of a defense alliance and small role for South Africa in regional colonial affairs.¹⁵ Finally, once decolonization did come, it came with a rush which was unexpected not only in South Africa, but in the rest of the world.

C. 1960-1973 GROWING ISOLATION

1. Background

a. Internal Security

The first years of the 1960's caused the overriding concern for South Africa to become one of internal security. This period opened with what was seen as the first major threat of black insurrection in South Africa, brought about by the shooting of African demonstrators by South African police units at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960. The disorders which followed lasted until mid-April and led the government to declare a state of emergency. Eventually, more than 11,000 people were detained.¹⁶

In the wake of Sharpeville, African resistance to white policies turned to violence. Resistance movements such as Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) and Poqo (We Alone) grew up as offshoots of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC).¹⁷ From August 1961 to July 1963, 193 acts of sabotage were recorded in South Africa.¹⁸

For its part, by 1963 the South African government had penetrated and destroyed much of the underground

resistance. In its efforts in this direction, the South African Police (SAP) were aided by a series of harsh security laws passed beginning in 1961. During this period, spanning from 1961 to the passage of the Terrorism Act of 1967, South Africa moved away from the protection of individual rights guaranteed under British law to regulations under which the powers of the State were greatly increased. By 1964 incidents of sabotage dropped from 100 a year to 10, and by 1965 internal resistance had disappeared.¹⁹ All the while, the South African government denied the country's internal troubles were related to the racial policies of apartheid, instead claiming incidents like Sharpeville were initiated by "subversive, communist and liberal elements outside South Africa."²⁰

b. External Pressures

The rush of decolonization in the early 1960's led to the establishment of black ruled states throughout Africa, and the sheer number of these states gave them considerable diplomatic weight at the United Nations. Change for South Africa was signalled beginning in 1961, when these new countries joined with India, Pakistan, and Ceylon to give South Africa little choice but to withdraw from the British Commonwealth. This marked the first step in the isolation and inward turning of South Africa.²¹

In 1963, a new source of danger for South Africa came into being with the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). At its first meeting, this organization

resolved to provide arms and assistance to launch guerrilla wars against colonial and white minority governments in Africa.²² Although this threatened action turned out to be easier said than done, formation and rise of the African bloc in the United Nations, coupled with the liberal wave which swept the West in the 1960's led to trouble for South Africa in the UN. In 1960, the United States supported a Security Council resolution against apartheid. In 1963, Britain voted for a General Assembly resolution favoring anti-apartheid actions by member states, and the next year the United Nations passed a voluntary arms embargo against the Republic.²³

2. Foreign Policy

a. Verwoerd to 1965

As regional and international hostility to its domestic policies intensified, South Africa's leaders were forced to search for new strategies to cope with and, if possible, reverse their country's growing isolation. In 1959, Prime Minister Verwoerd embarked on the policy of separate development, providing Bantu homelands for blacks which were ultimately to become independent states. South Africa saw the Bantustan policy as a bridge between internal and external affairs, as "the first link in a chain which started in the Republic, led through the small neighboring black states, and then outward to the rest of the continent and the wider international community."²⁴ While this was a domestic policy, it obviously was influenced by foreign

opinion. Verwoerd saw the Bantustan policy as a counter to both African and international opposition to South Africa's racial policies.²⁵

Regionally, South Africa's focus narrowed to its immediate neighbors. Verwoerd sought unsuccessfully to draw the British territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland into the homelands plan. He also formulated plans for a Southern African Common Market to include South Africa, future independent homelands, and other countries as far north as Zaire.²⁶ In putting forward the Common Market scheme, the South African government assumed economic considerations would become more important than political ones in relations with black African countries, and emphasized South African willingness to provide direct, bilateral aid to these countries.

b. Vorster, 1966-1973

By the time B. J. Vorster succeeded Verwoerd as Prime Minister in 1966, the troubles of the early 1960's had been overcome. Verwoerd's politics of security had resulted in the banning of domestic subversives (such as the ANC and PAC), suppression of internal violence, and, most importantly, restoration of white confidence.²⁷ The internal stability achieved within the country soon gave Vorster maneuvering room to expand upon what had been a cautious policy towards black African nations. The "Outward Movement" was launched in hopes of improving South Africa's foreign relations overall

through a rapprochement within Africa. The Outward Movement was, from South Africa's viewpoint, essentially an externally oriented policy. Importantly, this policy implicitly denied that any domestic change was required.²⁸

The Outward Movement enjoyed some initial success in 1967, when South Africa established diplomatic ties with Malawi. In addition, South Africa was finally able to make good on long-standing offers of aid to black nations. In retrospect, however, it is apparent this policy could never have achieved the success hoped for by Vorster. Contacts were made and economic relations encouraged with many African states, but the fact that most of these states based their relations with South Africa on the condition that there would be change in the Republic's internal policies did not mesh with the South African perception that Outward Movement policies were independent of domestic linkages. In addition, there are some indications that Vorster himself may have lacked sustained interest in the Outward Movement.²⁹

By the early 1970's strong black opposition to any rapprochement with South Africa, as expressed in the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969 and the Mogadishu Declaration of October 1971, made it apparent to South Africa that the Outward Movement had failed.³⁰ The Portuguese Coup of April 1974 and the ensuing South African intervention in Angola effectively marked an end to the Outward Movement as a policy, although South Africa still attempted rapprochement

with individual black states such as Mozambique in 1975. In addition, Vorster continued to pressure the Smith regime in Rhodesia to come to a negotiated settlement, both to gain possible influence among other African nations and to try and prevent the establishment of another black radical state on the Republic's borders. However, in spite of these individual diplomatic efforts, 1975 marked the beginning of a new phase in South African foreign policy. South Africa was not slow to recognize the potential consequences of a Portuguese withdrawal from its African holdings, and from this point on, the Republic concentrated on consolidating its position in southern Africa.³¹

3. South African Defense Policy 1960-1973

a. Threat Perception

The period 1960-1973 was one of rapid change in South African defense thought, beginning with the Sharpeville disturbances and threats of internal revolution and ending with increased white confidence and new feelings of military and economic strength. In short, this era bridges what have been described as the "Years of Crisis and Doubt" and the "Years of Confidence."³² It was during the years 1960-1964 that critical events occurred and judgments were made which affected South African defense policy until the mid-1970's. The events of the early 1960's caused South Africa's defense policy to evolve from one which, in 1960, envisioned a response to the threat of internal unrest to one which, by 1964,

sought a broader response to both internal unrest and external attack. This external threat was vaguely defined at first but was eventually identified as mainly a terrorist or guerrilla threat.³³

The evolution of policy can be seen in the actions of the South African government in the years between 1961 and 1964. In 1961 Defense Minister J. J. Fouché gave three general reasons for rises in defense spending and buildup in the SADF:³⁴ (1) to preserve internal security; (2) to have something to offer when South Africa wanted to enter military alliances with other countries, and; (3) to meet threats of external invasion. This general statement encompassed both recognition of the internal and the external threat, but it became apparent from the government's subsequent actions that much of the defense legislation introduced during early 1961 was aimed at strengthening internal security.³⁵

By 1962, however, the external threat was more clearly outlined during South African House of Assembly debates. By now, the threat was seen to encompass three broad areas of danger:³⁶ (1) An attack by black states with Communist assistance. This was considered by Verwoerd the most dangerous possibility; (2) A major East-West conflict with South Africa involved on the West side. This was later dismissed as the likelihood of such a conflict diminished; (3) A combined international action against South Africa on the pretext of "enforcing international law."

While at this time it was not clear what shape the threat from black states would take, it soon became apparent that these states could not match the rising strength of the SADF, and the possibility of conventional attack began to seem more remote. By 1973, the majority of Defense Force training was aimed at counterinsurgency warfare.

Once the threat had been determined to be mainly an unconventional one, it became clear to Pretoria that it was one which could be handled. In 1971, this basic threat perception was further refined by P. W. Botha, who had assumed the Defense portfolio in 1965. He made the final link between the guerrilla threat and the global one, reasoning that, due to the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers, the Communists had been forced to change tactics in their quest for global domination. The first phase of this new "onslaught" had been to create internal unrest, and this had been the cause of South Africa's internal difficulties in the early 1960's. Botha further identified the threat as "...a total indirect strategy which is directed at us, and if and when it has achieved sufficient success, the final conventional confrontation will take place."³⁷

Botha's statements in 1971 are an important precursor of the Total Onslaught/Total Strategy concept which he would bring to the Prime Minister's office.

By the time of the upheavals of the mid-1970's in southern Africa, South African defense objectives were

fairly well defined:³⁸ (1) to implement relations with Western or pro-Western countries and prevent total isolation; (2) to protect frontiers by maintaining close relations with Rhodesia and the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique; (3) to continue attempts to gain a military alliance with NATO or the United States to counter Communist influence in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, or southern Africa.

b. Response

(1) Background. With the increasing perception of threat that grew within the South African government in the early 1960's, there arose in the government a determination to meet the growing threat. When action was taken in 1961 to enlarge the Permanent Force and the Active Citizens' Force, even the opposition in Parliament supported the move. The Permanent Force grew from 9,000 in 1960 to 15,000 in 1964, and National Servicemen under training increased from 2,000 to nearly 20,000 during the same time period. By 1970, the total number of men in uniform, including Commandos and the South African Police (SAP) had grown to 130,000, and the annual intake of conscripts had reached 26,000 men.³⁹

For its part, the government defended its increasing expenditures and military buildup in terms of the rising threat, both internal and external. Verwoerd compared the military preparations to taking out an insurance policy-- saying a man does not expect to be injured, but covers himself for the unexpected.⁴⁰

(2) Defense Expenditures. Until 1960 the SADF had played only a minor role in South African planning, and its budget during this time reflected its lack of significance. Defense spending had totaled less than 7% of the government budget and less than 1% of the Gross National Produce (GNP).⁴¹

In the early 1960's defense costs rose rapidly in total, as a percentage of government spending, and as a percentage of GNP (see Table 1). In defending the size of the increase in defense spending in the 1962 budget, the Minister of Finance called the entire national budget a "budget of national security," adding, "...defense is its dominant theme and its ultimate justification."⁴²

TABLE 1⁴³

South African Defense Spending 1960 to 1974

Financial Year	Defense Budget (million current R)	percent of Budget	percent of GNP	percent increase over previous year
1960/61	44	6.6	0.9	--
1961/62	61	10.0	NA	38
1962/63	120	NA	NA	96
1963/64	120	NA	NA	0
1964/65	230	21.0	NA	92
1965/66	219	NA	NA	NA
1966/67	248	19.0	NA	13
1967/68	256	NA	NA	3
1968/69	252	16.1	2.5	NA
1969/70	272	16.8	2.4	8
1970/71	257	13.0	NA	NA
1971/72	317	12.0	2.6	23
1972/73	335	12.0	2.3	6
1973/74	472	13.7	2.6	41

After the initial large increases, the middle part of the 1960's saw a leveling off in defense spending. From 1964 to 1973, the defense budget averaged 285 million current Rand a year. This leveling off was probably due to several causes:⁴⁴ (1) the terrorist threat seemed not to have increased, and there was the beginning of the shift in perception to the "years of confidence;" (2) the Minister of Defense was under pressure to reduce spending in line with changing threat perception, and; (3) the concern of South African economists caused by the burden of defense spending as a total share of government spending due to its inflationary tendency in an overheating economy, and due to its draw off of badly needed skilled technicians.

In spite of these limits on the defense budget, defense spending increased ten fold during this period, and at times approached 20 percent of all government spending. Had not the South African economy been in a period of rapid expansion, with a GNP increase of 140 percent between 1960 and 1970, it is unlikely this rapid growth in the defense sector could have been achieved without damaging economic strain and a decline in the white standard of living.⁴⁵

(3) Manpower. Throughout the period 1960-1973, the availability of manpower became and remained a critical limitation on the expansion of the SADF. The Defense Force was not only limited by being forced to draw almost exclusively

on the nation's four million whites, but was also forced to compete with the rapidly expanding private sector, which also relied heavily on whites to fill technical and skilled jobs.⁴⁶

In order to fill the manpower requirements of the expanding Defense Force, several steps were taken. In 1967, in order to better compete with the private sector, salaries in the SADF were increased 11 to 50 percent and technical training opportunities were increased.⁴⁷ More importantly, in 1968 the lottery, or selective system of conscription was abolished and all physically able white males were required to enter the National Service, which served under the Permanent Force component for training. National Service personnel were trained while serving on active duty, and became available for later call up in a reserve status in either Citizens' Force or Commando units⁴⁸ (see Table 2).

TABLE 2⁴⁹

South African Defense Force Composition

Branch of Service	Standing Forces		Reserve Forces	
	Permanent Force (career personnel)	National Servicemen (conscripts)	Citizens' Force (regular reserve)	Commandos (militia reserve)
Army	X	X	X	X
Navy	X	X	X	
Air Force	X	X	X	Limited number of units

Another solution to the manpower shortage which was discussed was the large scale recruitment of non-whites. In 1963, the Cape Coloured Corps, which had been disbanded after World War II, was reestablished with white officers and coloured NCOs. The mission of the Cape Coloured Corps was to fulfill non-combat roles. In 1973, the Cape Corps Service Battalion was formed to train coloured volunteers at a rate of 200 a year, and plans were announced to form an Indian Service Battalion.⁵⁰

More problematic for the government was the arming of blacks. In 1972, when the issue was raised in Parliament, Defense Minister Botha stated that while blacks served the SADF as civilians, it would be wrong to create a black military corps.⁵¹ Action in this direction remained some years away.

(4) Arms and the Arms Industry. Through the 1950s, the SADF was dependent upon Britain for much of its material. Under the implicit division of defense responsibility which existed between Britain and South Africa, South Africa developed such defense industries as were required to supplement equipment procured from the United Kingdom. Thus, South African industry produced significant amounts of mortars, light to medium field artillery, armored cars, communications equipment, and ammunition, fuzes and bombs. Major hardware purchases were keyed to "allied" requirements, such as the antisubmarine warfare frigates acquired within the context

of the 1955 Simonstown Agreement.⁵² For the most part, prior to 1960 the SADF's equipment featured outdated and obsolete British and American aircraft, tanks, and armored cars.

Beginning in 1960, the rising pressure of new African states at the United Nations for an arms embargo against South Africa grew stronger each year, and the concern over this pressure prompted Pretoria to take steps towards ensuring its source of arms was secure. In spite of the fact that the UN passed an arms embargo in 1963, South Africa had little difficulty in obtaining the arms it needed during this period, as only the United States and Britain made any realistic effort to restrain the flow of military goods, and in their cases, only on clearly military end products, such as guns, tanks, and combat aircraft.⁵³ Britain was rapidly replaced as South Africa's major arms supplier by France and Italy.

South Africa's determination to modernize and ensure the availability of arms, outlined in the 1960 General Staff review was rapidly carried forward.⁵⁴ To promote local production and self-sufficiency, the Defense Production Board was established in 1964, and the Defense Council in 1966. The Board procured locally manufactured arms while the Council was responsible for guiding and financing weapons research. A further important step was taken in May 1968, when an Act of Parliament established the Armament Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR), which was

funded with the equivalent of \$144 million to "meet as effectively and economically as feasible South Africa's armament requirements..."⁵⁵ by initiating research and development for domestic defense production. Later this came to include buying abroad.⁵⁶

By 1965, South Africa had acquired 127 licenses for the manufacture and assembly of foreign military equipment ranging from French and Belgium small arms to French armored cars and French and Italian aircraft.⁵⁷ However, in spite of these acquisitions, the key to assessing the South African motive for expanding its domestic arms production capability is to note that each step in arms industry development was a result of Western actions to limit arms supplies. Decisive for South Africa were the trade-offs between the desire for Western links and the fear of being cut off from arms supplies on one hand, and between the most economic source and the most reliable source on the other.⁵⁸ The SADF during this period opted for economy and Western defense ties until it became apparent that Western arms sources were no longer reliable.

(5) Defense Reorganization. As the Defense Force grew between the years 1960-1973, it became necessary to reconsider South Africa's command and control practices. In September 1972, the Minister of Defense replaced the Supreme Command, which had functioned as advisor to the Head of the Defense Force, with a Defense Staff Council, headed

by the Commandant General and made up of the General Officer Commanding Joint Combat Forces, Commander Maritime Defense and Chief of the Navy, Chief of Defense Staff, Chief of Air Force, Chief of Defense Force Administration, the Comptroller of the SADF, and the Surgeon General.⁵⁹

In addition, the operational command was also reconfigured. Two commands were charged individually with ground and naval defense, incorporating of all three SADF branches in operations either on land or at sea.⁶⁰ In 1969, ground forces were further reorganized to better support the South African Police in opposing insurgency and terrorism. Army territorial divisions were rearranged to conform to police administrative divisions. Each region was placed under the command of a Permanent Force colonel, and was responsible for the coordination of Army reserve and civil defense actions. The army, through the Commando units, was made responsible for providing the SAP with operational support for counterinsurgency efforts. Commando units were expected to "ensure the immediate and continuous protection of their own home regions" at all times.⁶¹

(6) Training. As the size of the SADF increased, training facilities to handle the growing numbers of servicemen were strained. In response, specialized schools were established for each branch, such as the Commando Training Center, the Army College, and the Air Force College in order to standardize training and economize efforts. The

Permanent Force began to emphasize unconventional warfare techniques while conducting training. Commandos were trained in reconnaissance and unconventional warfare and were in some cases formed into specialized groups, such as Industrial or Urban Commando units.⁶²

The largest training difficulty encountered was related to the manpower shortage. The Permanent Force had been responsible for training National Service inductees, but the Permanent Force represented the smallest part of the armed services and suffered, in addition, from chronic shortages of career personnel. The SADF was forced to supplement Permanent Force instructors with National Servicemen, who were trained specifically to be instructors, and who served in that capacity for their entire service, even though this detracted from the number of troops actually available for operational duty.⁶³

(7) The Security Establishment.

(a) The Bureau of State Security. As the escalating internal strife of the early 1960s brought new and more repressive laws to South Africa, it also brought the recognition that an improvement was needed in the government's security system. Discussions at the time between the Minister of Justice Vorster and the Commissioner of Police led to the appointment of General Hendrik van den Bergh as head of the Security Police to reorganize the country's security set-up.⁶⁴

Van den Bergh had been a close confidant and advisor to Vorster since their internment together during World War II. From the Security Police, he fashioned a covert organization in the early 1960s which became known as the Republican Intelligence. The function of this organization was to gather information both at home and abroad, engage in espionage as required, and strengthen the hand of the government.⁶⁵

In 1969, the still clandestine Republican Intelligence grew into a new department of state, known as the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). While BOSS was intended as a government agency to supplement the military intelligence and the Security Police,⁶⁶ it soon became apparent that van den Bergh, as a close associate and confidant of now Prime Minister Vorster, wielded much informal power. Van den Bergh became Vorster's crisis manager, and BOSS became the clearing house for information gathered by the other intelligence services.⁶⁷

The system for control and implementation of security operations which the South African government employed, and which BOSS exemplified, reflected a lack of coordination and lack of accountability which eventually brought Vorster, van den Bergh, and others into disrepute. However, in 1972 an alternative apparatus for security decision making was established which would later grow in importance. This was the State Security Council (SSC).⁶⁸

(b) The Establishment of the State Security Council. In 1970, partially in response to charges of BOSS involvement in the monitoring of the Parliamentary opposition,⁶⁹ the Potgeiter Commission was ordered to investigate certain intelligence aspects of state security. As a result of recommendations made by this commission in 1972, the State Security Council was established by law, with bipartisan political support.⁷⁰

The membership of the SSC was to consist of the Prime Minister, who would act as chairman, the Senior Minister of the Republic, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Police, other Ministers as required, the Secretary for Security Intelligence, the Commandant-General of the SADF, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary for Justice, the Commissioner of the South African Police, and other heads of Departments as required.⁷¹

The Act which established the SSC also gave it a number of important sounding functions, such as formation of National Policy and Strategy, and responsibility for the execution of that strategy.⁷² In practice, however, the SSC had little impact during its early years. It was only one of twenty cabinet committees to which Vorster paid little attention. The SSC met only occasionally, its agenda was not circulated, and no minutes were kept.⁷³ The growth in the importance of the SSC would come later, under Vorster's successor, P. W. Botha.

c. The Consequences of South African Defense Policy 1960-1973

During the period between Sharpeville in 1960 and the eve of the Portuguese collapse in 1974, South Africa underwent many changes. Internally, non-white opposition was suppressed by means of draconian security laws, and new organizations such as BOSS grew up to further combat internal and external threats. More important, however, was the growth of the defense establishment in South Africa. During this time the SADF grew from a militia-type organization with little influence in the domestic government to a force which made South Africa the preeminent regional power, with important internal and external effects.

Externally, the implications were clear. As South Africa's military power grew and the domestic arms industry provided a larger portion of the SADF's hardware requirements, the Republic's ability to withstand political pressures brought to bear by the United States and other Western nations grew. This marked the beginning of a potential divergence in the interests and policies of South Africa on one hand and of the West on the other. While South Africa would continue to unsuccessfully seek alliances committing the West to the Republic's defense, once South African officials had identified the threat as being mainly internal unrest and externally supported guerrilla war, and decided that threat could be controlled with domestic resources, the need for an outside alliance was lessened. As a consequence,

the ability of the West to influence South Africa's internal and external policies was also lessened.

South Africa's growing military might also had implications for the region. South Africa first deployed forces outside its borders in September 1967 against ANC elements involved in operations with the Zimbabwe United People's Union (ZAPU) in Rhodesia along the Zambezi River. In 1968, Minister of Defense P. W. Botha warned Zambia publicly that acting as a base for guerrillas could provoke South African response against military targets (such as those employed by the Israelis against the PLO).⁷⁴ This was the first time that South Africa made clear that the defense of its borders recognized no frontiers. By 1969, the number of South African paramilitary police in Rhodesia reached 2700.⁷⁵

In 1970, at the height of the Outward Movement, Prime Minister Vorster offered black states a non-aggression pact, saying South Africa's intentions were purely defensive. The move was indeed defensive, for if countries such as Zambia would agree, then guerrillas would lose their bases and training facilities. However, this offer was reinforced by more sinister definitions of South Africa's "defensive" options. The Republic's actions in Rhodesia and Botha's threats of Israeli-style reprisal raids were an implicit part of South Africa's defensive strategy, as was the statement of Vorster to Parliament in 1970, when he said that if

guerrillas invaded South Africa from other countries, "...we shall resist them. If they take to flight we shall chase them and we shall do so right into those countries from which they came."⁷⁶

II. TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY

A. 1973 AND AFTER: THE INWARD TURNING

1. Effects of the Portuguese Coup and South African Intervention in Angola

On 25 April 1974, the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal overthrew the government of that country, and installed in its place the revolutionary government of General Antonio de Spínola. In May 1974, less than one month after the coup, Portuguese leaders began conferring with independence leaders from Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, and on 25 July 1974, General Spínola officially recognized the right of Portugal's overseas possessions to total independence.

Although the guerrilla wars in the Portuguese colonies had been in progress for some time, South Africa was not prepared for the rapid collapse of what had been a vast, white-controlled northern buffer zone which had separated the Republic from independent black Africa. Pretoria was especially concerned by the establishment of self-proclaimed Marxist states on its borders, providing sanctuary for anti-South African movements and access to Namibia, where fighting against the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) had been in progress since 1966,⁷⁷ Rhodesia, and South Africa itself.

The South African response to the independence of Angola and Mozambique was different in each case. On the

one hand, Mozambique was heavily dependent economically on South Africa, therefore when that country gained independence in June 1975, South Africa quickly moved to renew economic ties. Prime Minister Vorster saw a free Mozambique as of little threat and even declined to support a short-lived takeover attempt by unhappy whites.⁷⁸

Angola, on the other hand, was a different situation for Vorster. South Africa had little economic leverage there, and growing strife among the three nationalist groups seemed to indicate the risk of spill-over of violence into South West Africa. There was also the concern that a radical government in Luanda would actively support SWAPO. As fighting intensified in Angola among the former guerrilla groups, South Africa resisted the impulse to intervene directly until October 1975.⁷⁹ Then, between October and December 1975, the SADF undertook three ground operations in Angola. The objectives of these operations, which were conducted without significant mechanized or air support⁸⁰ were unclear, but the result was a catastrophe for South Africa for several reasons:⁸¹ (1) the intervention may have resulted in bringing a large Communist (Cuban) presence onto the border of Southwest Africa in response to South African involvement (although it seems likely the Cuban build-up was at least planned prior to South African involvement);⁸² (2) potential Angolan leaders such as Savimbi were discredited through association with South Africa while

the most radical elements of the MPLA, the group which came to power, were strengthened; (3) hostility by Angola towards South Africa was assured, so there was little hope of a Mozambique-like rapprochement with Angola; and (4) lack of international support for the South African intervention made it clear to South Africa that it could not count on the West to come to its aid even in time of crisis.

2. Rhodesia

From the time of the Portuguese collapse in 1974, Prime Minister Vorster was faced with the prospect of rising violence and increased South African involvement in Rhodesia. From Pretoria's standpoint, the least desirable occurrence in Rhodesia would have been a Communist inspired, black-led take over. Internationalization of the war in Rhodesia would have presented South Africa with the possible need for increased intervention, and left the Republic open to a possible upswing in black urban violence and worsening relations with Angola and Mozambique.⁸³ It is not surprising, therefore, that South Africa supported a negotiated settlement leading to a moderate black government in Rhodesia as opposed to further racial strife. In spite of the fact that Vorster had a domestic political tightrope to walk over the question of support for Rhodesia, it was clear by 1975 that South Africa was supporting a negotiated settlement and pressuring the regime of Ian Smith to go to the bargaining table.

Once the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia had broken down in 1977, South Africa backed Smith's attempts at internal settlement. The government of P. W. Botha, which succeeded Vorster's, provided financial, military and logistic aid to the Muzorewa regime which came to power as a result of the Rhodesian internal settlement. During this period, two SADF battalions operated in southern Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.⁸⁴ However, a lack of international support and growing diplomatic pressures brought all parties back to the conference table in 1979, and in March 1980, as a result of British observed elections, Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was elected to head a new government.

If the Portuguese withdrawal was South Africa's major shock of the mid-1970s, Mugabe's victory was the disappointment of 1980. South Africa had supported Muzorewa in the election, but would have preferred even the election of guerrilla leader Joshua Nkomo to the Mugabe victory. Apprehension over Mugabe's assumption of power in Zimbabwe led P. W. Botha to issue a familiar warning to the new government in that country: "Any neighbor which allows its territory to be used for attacks on or the undermining of South Africa and its security will have to face the full force of the Republic's strength."⁸⁵

3. Confluence of Pressures: Other Events 1974 and After

Although the Portuguese withdrawal and the failure of the Angolan intervention was a major turning point for

South Africa's foreign relations, other events which occurred after 1974 internationally and regionally heightened South Africa's feeling of isolation.

a. Arab Oil Embargo

While the oil embargo called for by the OAU was initiated by oil producing states late in 1973, it had no real effect on South Africa until 1978, due to the non-observance of the embargo by Iran. Iran and South Africa had maintained friendly relations since World War II, when Iran's exiled Reza Shah Pahlavi resided in South Africa. After the 1973 embargo was imposed, Iran continued to meet 90% of South Africa's oil requirements until 1978, when Iranian internal difficulties halted these supplies.⁸⁶

The effects of the embargo were also ameliorated by the fact that South Africa depended upon oil for less than 25% of its energy needs. The balance was met by hydro-electric power, coal, and gas.⁸⁷ After the loss of Iranian supplies, the Republic was still able to satisfy its needs through purchases on the spot market.

The real effect of the embargo was to reveal to South Africa the vulnerability of its economy to interruption of energy supplies. The oil which was imported was critical to communications, defense, and to the chemical and fertilizer industries.⁸⁸ In addition, less obvious but at least as important, the oil embargo had the potential effect of weakening Western opposition to further sanctions

against South Africa, for Western nations were now forced to take into account both the Afro-Arab alliance against South Africa and their own vulnerabilities to oil sanctions.⁸⁹

b. South Africa and the United Nations

Pressures on South Africa in the United Nations dated back to the 1960's. In 1961, the General Assembly called for states to take "separate and collective action" against South Africa.⁹⁰ In August 1963, a resolution was passed calling for a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa, and a coordinated effort by black countries also resulted in South Africa being forced out of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 1963, and from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1964.

United Nations pressure also grew against South Africa's continued occupation of Southwest Africa. In 1973, the General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the "authentic representative of the Namibian people,"⁹¹ and appointed a UN Commissioner for Namibia. During 1974, the UN enacted a decree prohibiting exploitation of the resources of Namibia without UN approval. Finally, on 17 December 1974, the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution demanding that South Africa withdraw from the territory.⁹²

In 1974, after a number of attempts, the UN was finally able to reject the credentials of the South African delegation to the General Assembly, although a further attempt

to remove South Africa from the United Nations altogether, sponsored by the OAU members, was vetoed by France, Great Britain, and the United States. Since 1974, South Africa has maintained its delegation to the UN, but its ambassador has not taken his seat in the General Assembly except when the Namibia question was under debate.

Further important action by the United Nations against South Africa occurred in November 1977, when a resolution banning arms sales to the Republic, previously vetoed in 1975, 1976, and October 1977, was supported by the Western powers.⁹³ This unprecedented ban by the UN against a member country was not only intended to cut South Africa off from its traditional sources of arms supplies, but also to send Pretoria a message that its domestic policies were unacceptable. The unintended message which was also conveyed was that South Africa was marked for further international isolation, and the Republic became more determined to carry on alone.

c. Internal Unrest⁹⁴

In June 1976, South Africa was struck by racial disturbances which surpassed those which followed Sharpeville in 1960 in violence and intensity. The issue which touched off the trouble was the continued use of Afrikans for instruction in black high schools, but the violence which ensued revealed the extent of suppressed discontent among non-whites. By the time the protests had subsided in November

1976, the disorders had spread to almost every non-white township and university in the country.

The response of the government to these internal disorders was to conduct a massive security campaign, enlarging SAP and other police reserves, further tightening security laws, and conducting a wave of arrests, detentions, and bannings. In spite of the fact that the unrest was eventually suppressed, the so-called Soweto period of turmoil had major implications for South Africa. First, coming on the heels of the abortive Angolan venture, the internal disturbances were a further shock to the white population. Second, the violence of the demonstrations and the repression with which they were met reminded the world of the inequitable nature of apartheid and the sense of black frustration which the system had led to. Finally, and most importantly, the blacks who fled the country during and after the riots became the new guerrilla fighters of the PAC and ANC. These organizations, in turn, became increasingly militant. It was after Soweto that armed guerrilla incidents inside South Africa began to increase. For its part, the SAP explicitly linked Soweto and the rise in urban terrorism, and used these incidents to win public support for new counterinsurgency campaigns.

4. South African Foreign Policy 1974-1978

Realization of the implications of the Portuguese coup brought a new phase to Vorster's Outward Movement. This

phase came to be known as detente. The essence of this policy was that South Africa should assert leadership in southern Africa and win the cooperation of black African states in providing regional stability and preventing the spread of radicalism.⁹⁵ Detente, in practice, proved to be short lived. It effectively ended with South Africa's intervention in Angola and with the collapse of the South African-Zambian initiative in Rhodesia.⁹⁶ Further, President Nyerere of Tanzania had already undermined any chance of detente with the Dar es Salaam declaration, signed by sixteen nations in April 1975. While this statement did not reject South African involvement in the settlement of the Rhodesian problem, it did rule out any concessions towards South Africa itself. It further stated that black Africa must be prepared for armed struggle if a peaceful transition to majority rule failed in South Africa.⁹⁷

The remainder of Vorster's administration was spent mainly on the defensive. As 1976 brought a new wave of internal unrest, which in turn led to new government repressions, new waves of black South Africans entered ANC camps in neighboring countries. In 1977, the U.S. Carter administration came to office, and brought with it new tensions to South Africa's relations with the West. The death in September 1977 of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko while in detention in South Africa, followed by new crackdowns on political organizations, individuals, and newspapers by

Vorster, cost South Africa's foreign relations heavily, and led directly to the 1977 UN arms embargo against the Republic.⁹⁸

In September 1978, Vorster was forced to resign due to a scandal within his government. He was succeeded by P. W. Botha, his Minister of Defense.

B. P. W. BOTHA: TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY⁹⁹

1. The Total Onslaught--Background

Upon his assumption of power in 1978, P. W. Botha found South Africa faced with distinctly hostile internal and external positions. Internally, the aftermath of the racial unrest of 1976 was still being felt. In addition, the white population was still reeling under the impact of revelations of scandal in the upper ranks of both the government and the National Party. Externally, the country's position had become increasingly less secure with the loss of the Portuguese buffer and the escalating conflict in Rhodesia. In addition, the rising level of violence along the Namibia-Angola border led to increasing pressure from the United Nations and concurrent loss of South African confidence in the other parties involved in that dispute. Finally, the Republic's relations with the West had deteriorated to new lows due to the impasse over Namibia, the pressures in the UN, and the failure of Western support during the Angolan affair.

It is not surprising, considering the pressures felt by South Africa, that the government would believe the country was faced with a "total onslaught" of internal and external attack aimed at the overthrow of the existing order. Botha realized revolution in South Africa was possible, and he was the first to acknowledge this fact publicly.¹⁰⁰ He also realized that revolutions fail when met by an effective counter-revolutionary strategy which eliminates or diffuses those forces threatening the existing order.¹⁰¹ Botha was determined to mobilize the society to implement such a strategy.

2. Total Onslaught Defined¹⁰²

As can be seen from previous discussion, South Africa has for some time seen itself as the target of external threats. Since 1945, the country has perceived a Communist inspired threat to its security.¹⁰³ As the perception of threat grew through the internal unrest of the 1960s and the increasing pressures of the 1970s, the onslaught was still perceived as Communist inspired, but the threat was no longer seen as confined to Communist sources.

General Magnus Malan, Defense Minister and former head of the SADF saw the onslaught as being directed against the whole Western World, of which South Africa is a part. He defined the onslaught as

...an ideologically motivated struggle...the aim (of which) is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state. The aim is also therefore total, not only in terms of the ideology, but also as regards the political, social, economic, and technical areas.¹⁰⁴

In the onslaught, South Africa was seen as a key due to its strategic location, mineral wealth, strong economy, and highly developed infrastructure.

The threats against South Africa posed by the total onslaught were seen to be many. The conventional military threat was believed by Prime Minister Botha to be limited, as the SADF's strength would exact too heavy a toll on an enemy. Therefore, the military threat was mainly an indirect one of Communist backing for terrorists and guerrillas. This threat perception was similar to that developed by Botha in the early 1960s and refined in 1971.¹⁰⁵ This did not, however, mean that the threat of conventional war could be discounted. General Malan has stated that while "it is primarily an unconventional war,...the threat of a conventional war in the near future can by no means be excluded."¹⁰⁶

In addition to the threat of military action against the Republic, the onslaught also envisioned anti-South African actions in the political, diplomatic, religious, psychological, cultural, social, and sports spheres. In General Malan's view, the onslaught is directed at South Africa's four "power bases:" (1) the political/diplomatic; (2) the economic; (3) the social/psychological; and, (4) the security.

While the Communists were still seen as the main force behind the total onslaught, they were not seen as the only one. The OAU, the UN, and other groupings of black states figured in the onslaught. Also considered was the

threat posed by South Africa's neighbors due to the harboring of terrorists and the build up of Soviet supplied conventional arms in Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia.

As the West pressured South Africa for internal reforms, Western nations also came to be seen as an indirect part of the onslaught. In General Malan's words, in order to protect their interests in black Africa, "it can be... justifiably claimed that the Western Powers make themselves available as handymen of the communists and they are indirectly contributing to the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of world communism."¹⁰⁷

There are two important points to be taken from this distillation of South Africa's multifaceted threat into the "Total Onslaught." First, the threat appraisal ignores the possibility that South Africa's internal policies could be a cause of the country's internal tensions, instead rationalizing the cause for internal unrest as the external onslaught. This is consistent with South African appraisal of domestic problems since the 1960 Sharpeville disturbances. Secondly, and what is more important for South Africa's policies, is that the concept of "Total Onslaught" can be used to justify the implementation of the "Total National Strategy."

C. TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY

1. Background

The concept of the Total Onslaught assumed more importance and was further defined as P. w. Botha came to

office, for it was a concept which had grown from the strategic thinking of the defense establishment and the SADF. In the 1977 Defense White Paper, the Total National Strategy was defined as "the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A Total National Strategy is not, therefore, confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable to all levels and to all functions of the state structure."¹⁰⁸ Just as Botha defined the onslaught, he also devised the counter-revolutionary strategy to meet it. In May 1979, Botha, while holding high level meetings to devise his strategy, said that "a country which is facing a total onslaught has to have a total strategy to combat it..." and "...it was essential that South Africa's strategy should be a total one in which military, political, and economic factors could all play a part."¹⁰⁹

2. The Twelve-Point Plan

Throughout the first half of 1979, Botha and his main spokesman, General Malan, continued to expand upon the total conflict and the need for a strategy to combat the threats it posed.¹¹⁰ In June, Malan called for cohesion of population groups to face the communist conventional, unconventional, and psychological threats.¹¹¹ In July, P. W. Botha raised the "Total Conflict" issue with regard to South Africa's position in Namibia.¹¹²

By August, 1979, Botha was ready to unveil his new strategy. Speaking at the Natal National Party Congress, he outlined what has come to be known as the 12-point plan.¹¹³ This plan as it was stated and fine-tuned over the following months, was an attempt to define policy objectives for the government over a wide range of interests. Botha presented the plan as one to which the government was totally committed, and as the only hope for salvation in the face of the Total Onslaught.¹¹⁴ (See Appendix A for the specific points of the plan.)

The first six points of the plan dealt with what were mainly domestic political matters. In short, these six stated the ideological foundation of the plan, making it clear that the plan is a restatement of National Party policy, committing South Africa to separate development. The seventh point recognizes the economic integration between the races which had already occurred, and can be seen as a government move to remove ideology from economic activity.

The eighth point declares what had already become a major foreign policy initiative of the Botha regime: the creation of a "peaceful constellation of states in southern Africa." The formation of this constellation was seen as inevitable as conditions, especially economic conditions, but also political and security considerations, drew the states of the region into closer relationships. In short, the constellation was a South African attempt to detach

pressures concerning its internal policies from its external relations, and to draw its neighbors closer through mainly economic means.¹¹⁵

The ninth, tenth, and eleventh points deal with South Africa's defense policies. The ninth states South Africa's determination to defend itself from all outside interference in all ways. The tenth calls for a policy of neutrality in the East-West conflict. The eleventh concerns the "maintenance of effective decision making by the state, which rests on a strong Defense Force and Police Force to guarantee orderly government as well as efficient, clear administration."¹¹⁶ This point reflects Botha's style of governing and his upcoming reorganization, and the increasing role of the military in South Africa's government.

Point twelve commits the South African government to the maintenance of free enterprise as the economic basis of the country. This point reflects Botha's attempt to draw the economic sector into his plans for both the constellation and internal change, and thus relates to points seven and eight.

3. The Mechanics of the Total National Strategy

As can be seen from the diverse areas covered in the 12-point plan, it is obvious that the Total National Strategy would have far reaching consequences. Plans and policies devised under the heading of Total National Strategy (TNS) affected all of South Africa through the reorganization of

the government, through more repressive controls on the population, and through the increasing importance of the security establishment and the military.

a. Government Reorganization

In 1978, disclosure of the now famous information scandal showed that government under Vorster was at worst corrupt and at best administratively sloppy, and led to Vorsters' downfall.¹¹⁷ His successor, P. W. Botha, announced administrative reforms in government beginning in 1979, but it took several years for his initiatives to be fully implemented. This reorganization would serve to tighten up the slack practices of Vorster's government, however, they were not conducted solely to correct past mistakes. There were other perceived shortcomings to be corrected.¹¹⁸ First, South Africa's involvement in the Angolan civil war in 1975 had revealed the need for a more formalized method of government decision making.¹¹⁹ In order to correct these shortcomings and to provide a better decision making process, the security management system was established.

Second, Botha's concern for the internal and external security of South Africa led to the development of the Total National Strategy in order to make better use of South Africa's resources in meeting the Total Onslaught. Third, Botha's definition of a Total National Strategy gave government a sense of direction which had previously been lacking. Finally, the scandal which had brought down Vorster's


government left the country with the feeling that change in government was needed. Botha was able to capitalize on this feeling to institute his programs.

In Phase I of Botha's government reorganization, known as the rationalization program, the number of cabinet committees was reduced from 22 to five, including National Security (the SSC), Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Finance. This number was later reduced by one when the Committee for Finance was merged with the Committee for Economic Affairs. In addition, the Committee for Internal Affairs was renamed the Committee for Constitutional Affairs. Table 3 reflects the South African government organization as it is today.

While all four cabinet committees are theoretically equal, several factors combine to set the State Security Council (SSC) off as the dominant committee. The SSC will be discussed in greater detail below.

b. The Rise of the Security Establishment

(1) Background. Botha's government reorganization in the name of the Total National Strategy has had the effect of centralizing power in the Cabinet, and, even further, into a few departments informally called the inner Cabinet at the expense of Parliament and the National Party. As power has become centralized in the executive under Botha, and previously important institutions such as BOSS (now the National Intelligence Service--NIS) and the Information

TABLE 3¹²⁰SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Department were downgraded, reorganized, or dismantled. The security establishment gained influence at the expense of other bodies.

(2) The Security Establishment.

(a) The South African Defense Force/

Department of Defense. P. W. Botha came to power from the defense establishment, where he had served for 14 years as Minister of Defense and had presided over the enlargement of the SADF and buildup of the defense industry. During his tenure as Minister of Defense, he came to admire the managerial

style of the military, and upon becoming Prime Minister, he brought with him high ranking SADF personnel as advisors.

The Permanent Force officers in government became involved in the construction and execution of overall defense strategy, especially with regard to Namibia. In addition, these officers also became involved with other governmental, political, and economic elites in agencies such as the SSC.

As previously discussed, the buildup of the SADF and the arms industry in South Africa began in response to the threats of the early 1960s. The events of the mid-1970s acted as the catalyst for even larger increases in both the size of the SADF and in defense spending. After 1974, defense spending continued to increase at a rapid pace (see Table 4).

What was even more significant about the rise in defense spending was the fact that it took place during a period of general economic slowdown. By 1983/84, spending on defense had tripled over the 1975/76 budget.

During this period, the SADF also increased in size and changed in composition. As Table 5 shows, the size of the Defense Force almost doubled between 1974/75 and 1983/84. As this growth began to strain available white manpower assets, first women and then non-whites were accepted in increasing numbers. Within the expansion of the SADF was included an attempt to increase the size of the

TABLE 4¹²²SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE SPENDING
1974/75 to 1983/84

FINANCIAL YEAR	DEFENSE BUDGET (MILLION CUR- RENT RAND)	PERCENT OF BUDGET	PERCENT OF GNP	PERCENT IN- CREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR
1974/75	692	16.0	3.2	47
1975/76	948	18.5	3.7	37
1976/77	1,400	17.0	4.1	48
1977/78	1,526*	19.0	5.1	9
1978/79	1,682	NA	NA	10.3
1979/80	1,857	NA	NA	10.4
1980/81	2,865	NA	NA	54.3
1981/82	2,465	NA	NA	-13
1982/83	2,700	NA	NA	8
1983/84	3,090	NA	NA	15.9

*Revised downward due to the cancellation of R128 million shipbuilding contract by France.

TABLE 5¹²³GROWTH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE
(numbers in '000)

	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
TOTAL ARMED FORCES	47.45	50.5	51.5	55.0	65.5	63.25	86.05	92.7	81.4	82.4
-Conscripts	31.75	35.4	35.4	38.4	48.9	45.25	66.25	66.1	53.1	53.1
ARMY	34.5	38.0	38.0	41.0	50.0	48.5	71.0	76.0	67.4	67.4
-White	7	7	7	7	NA	6	6	10	10	10
Regulars										
-Coloured/ Black	0	0	0	0	NA	2.5	3	4	5.4	5.4
Regulars										
-Women	0	0	.18	2.1	2.1	NA	2	2	2	2
-Conscripts	27.5	31	31	34	43	40	60	60	50	50
REQUIRED ACTIVE SERVICE	9-12 mo.	1 yr	1 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr

Permanent Force, as the numbers of regulars in the army increased from 7000 whites in 1974/75 to 15,400 of all races in 1983/84. Conscription policies also changed during this period to fuel the SADF's rising manpower demands.

(b) The Intelligence Community. The influence of this community has been marked by continual flux. It is made up of the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI), the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the Security Police.

The South African intelligence apparatus had long been the arena for intense inter-service rivalry. When BOSS was established in the 1960's, its head, General van den Bergh, had Prime Minister Vorster's confidence, and was appointed Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in 1968. When this happened, DMI suspected that BOSS intended to assume some of the duties assigned to military intelligence. This led to an intense rivalry between BOSS and DMI, and clashes between van den Bergh and Minister of Defense Botha. However, van den Bergh fell from power with Vorster, and Botha chose to consolidate central intelligence functions under DMI.

To date there is still rivalry between all three security services. BOSS has evolved through a name change to Department of National Security (DONS) to become NIS, and now functions mostly as an intelligence think tank rather than as a gatherer of intelligence. DMI seems

to have assumed the function of external intelligence gathering, with policy advice coming from SADF personnel. The position of the Security Police was also enhanced with the demise of BOSS/DONS/NIS, and the former head of the Security Police is now Commissioner of Police.

(c) The Intellectual Community. This group consists of the segments of South African society which serve the defense establishment on an ad hoc basis. There are centers of strategic studies at Rand Afrikaans University, the University of Pretoria, and the University of South Africa. There are also independent bodies such as the Terrorism Research Center in Capetown, and individual academics on call to the government.

(d) Arms and Associated Industries. The leading defense related industries are the large parastatal corporations, such as the Armament Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) and the State Petroleum firm (SASOL). ARMSCOR is South Africa's largest industrial venture with 1.2 billion Rand in assets. As a result of ARMSCOR's actions, South Africa is now the tenth largest producer of armaments in the world. ARMSCOR directly employs 29,000 workers and provides employment for nearly 100,000 through its subsidiaries and private subcontractors. Its subsidiaries and their products include:¹²⁴

1. Atlas Aircraft Corporation--aircraft manufacture, maintenance, and service.

2. INFOPLAN--computer services.
3. Kentron--guide weapons and optical equipment.
4. Lyttleton Engineering Works--small arms and guns.
5. Musgrave Manufactures and Distributors--commercial small arms and shotguns.
6. Naschem, Lenz, and Potchefstran--heavy ammunition and bombs.
7. Pretoria Metal Pressing--small calibre ammunition.
8. Swartklip Products--pyrotechnics, detonators, mines, hand grenades and commercial ammunition.

Through these subsidiaries and their subcontractors ARMSCOR has ties with every area of the country and with every industry. In addition, since his tenure as Minister of Defense, P. W. Botha utilized leading industrialists as advisors and to head ARMSCOR and its subsidiaries. He has continued this practice as Prime Minister. For example, in 1980, the ARMSCOR Board of Directors included as members the Executive Director of Barlow Rand, South Africa's largest corporation, the South African Resident Representative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Chief General Manager of the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, just to note a few.¹²⁵

ARMSCOR also reaches into the country's educational system by providing scholarships and apprentice training to students and workers in various fields.¹²⁶

Other parastatals, such as ISCOR and SASOL have defense and security links through planning bodies, sales to security forces and other state departments. Finally, the Total National Strategy ties the business community in general to the government by the inclusion of economic factors in the 12-point plan. The Defense Advisory Board, whose members are business elites, provides further links between business, defense, and the government.

(e) The South African Police (SAP).¹²⁷

The South African Police developed from the variety of security forces established over the years in response to different conditions and perceived threats. After the Act of Union in 1910, the police forces of the provinces of South Africa were consolidated into two law enforcement agencies. These were the South African Mounted Riflemen, detailed to rural areas, and the SAP, responsible for urban areas. The SAP subsequently absorbed the Mounted Riflemen and, in 1936, were given jurisdiction throughout the country. In 1939, SAP responsibilities were extended to include Southwest Africa, and later amendments to the Police Act permitted the SAP to be employed outside the country when requested by friendly governments, and when these operations were deemed to be in the best interest of South Africa's internal security. In the 1960's and 1970's SAP units were involved in counterinsurgency operations in Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique.

As it exists today, the SAP is a paramilitary organization, the primary function of which is the maintenance of internal security. SAP operates under the authority of the Minister of Police and is administered by the Commissioner of Police, who holds the rank of general. In 1983, the South African budget allowed 546 million Rand for the SAP, and increase of 17.1% over the previous year's expenditures.¹²⁸

In 1983, the SAP had a strength of 35,500, of which 19,500 were white and 16,000 were non-white.¹²⁹ In addition, the Police Reserve consisted of about 20,000 men who had received paramilitary training, and an amendment to the Defense Act allowed military reservists and Commandos to be mobilized on short notice to assist the SAP in emergencies.

Organizationally, the SAP is divided into three branches. (1) The Uniformed Branch is mainly concerned with routine police work and crime prevention, as well as with clerical duties, overall SAP administration, and supply and maintenance of police equipment and transport. (2) The Detective Branch operates from SAP headquarters and is subdivided into the Criminal Investigation Division, which is responsible for the assignment of plainclothesmen, and the Special Branch, which is responsible for police intelligence gathering, surveillance, and investigation of subversive activities. (3) Finally, the Security Branch is responsible for border patrol and

internal security activities in South Africa and Namibia which are not otherwise assigned to the SADF. All Security branch units are self-sufficient in weapons, transport, communications, and logistic support. These units have operated in Namibia with the SADF.

The SAP conducts its own training and recruiting. Personnel are enlisted on a voluntary basis from throughout South Africa. Most white police are Afrikaners, while most blacks are from rural areas. Since the passage of the Group Areas Act in 1950, non-white police personnel have been made responsible for duties in non-white areas. Black police were normally brought in from different parts of South Africa to avoid any sympathy for the local population. Whites enlisting in the SAP are exempted from National Service with the SADF. A women's contingent was established in 1972.

(f) The State Security Council.¹³⁰ Many of the organizations discussed above are brought together by the State Security Council (SSC). While technically the SSC is only one of four cabinet committees which are formally equal, there is little doubt that the SSC is the principal of these committees.

Several features set the SSC off from the other cabinet committees.¹³¹ (1) The SSC is the only cabinet committee established by law, and which consists of a membership established by law. (2) The

SSC is the only cabinet committee chaired by the Prime Minister. (3) The SSC concerns itself with a greater range of issues than any of the other committees. (4) The SSC's network of supporting bodies is more comprehensive than those of other committees. (5) The SSC's meetings are closed to the participation of non-members, who may only attend if specifically invited or co-opted. (6) The SSC is exempt from the rule that decisions of cabinet committees must be circulated with cabinet minutes. SSC decisions are not subject to confirmation by the full cabinet.

Even if the membership and scope of the SSC did not give it a preeminent status, it would still assume enhanced importance due to its size, organization, and resources. The secretary of the SSC, Lieutenant General Andries Jacobus van Deventer, has a secretariat which is much larger than those employed by the other cabinet committees. The Secretariat of the SSC (SSSC) consists of three branches: National Intelligence Interpretation, Total Strategy, and another, the name of which is classified. While technically the SSC reports administratively to the NIS, it is directly responsible to the Prime Minister.

In addition, General van Deventer possesses a large amount of bureaucratic influence. Besides serving as Secretariat of the SSC, he also sits as a member of the working groups of the other three cabinet committees (see Table 3), and is also involved in the distribution and

channeling of all policy papers destined for cabinet considerations due to the fact that he also holds the position of cabinet secretariat jointly with John H. Huyser, a retired intelligence officer.

Also subordinate to the SSC working committee are some 15 interdepartmental committees (IDC's) which are the originators of nearly all policy recommendations. The IDC's cover a wide range, including the Political Action Committee, the Coordinating Economic Committee, the Manpower Committee, and the Transport Coordinating Committee, to name just a few. IDC membership consists mainly of heads of departments, senior deputies, legal advisors, and an SADF representative on each committee who reports directly to van Deventer.

Finally, the SSC network includes a series of Joint Management Centers (known as GBS for the Afrikaans GESAMENTLIKE BESTUURSENTRUMS). There are nine GBS which serve geographical areas of South Africa and which coincide with the area commands of the SADF, and there is a tenth for Walvis Bay. There are also four GBS's for certain southern African countries, including Namibia. All are based within South Africa and all are designed to carry the Total National Strategy throughout the country in an organized manner.

It is apparent that the SSC has become the preeminent governing body within the South African

government. All questions with security implications are brought to it, and through the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy concept almost every aspect of government can be interpreted as having security implications. In addition, through its influence over the cabinet secretariat and its membership, the SSC can influence many of the decisions of the other cabinet committees. Not only is the SSC the principal cabinet committee, it also serves as an inner cabinet of the Prime Minister and his highest ranking experts. When the SSC recommends policy, the full cabinet is not likely to deny that policy.

c. Constitutional Change

(1) Background. Recently, talk of reorganizing the government by constitutional change has been much discussed by the elite of the National Party. As the expression of Western European political liberalism, the Westminster system made it difficult to maintain government secrecy, and was not in consonance with the harsher security measures taken after 1960. The National Party had been considering a constitutional alternative more in keeping with the visions of a plural society.¹³²

In 1976, the Theron Commission, which had been investigating Coloured matters since 1973, suggested that the Westminster system of government be reconsidered.¹³³ This report led to the appointment of a cabinet committee chaired by P. W. Botha, then Minister of Defense, to consider

whether a new political formula could be found. Botha's proposals in 1977 included power sharing between white, coloured, and Asian peoples, and were later approved by provincial congresses of the National Party and submitted to Parliament as a draft bill in 1979. This draft bill was in turn submitted to the Schlebusch Commission.

The 1980 report of the Schlenbusch Commission led to the appointment of a President's Council to draft a new constitution. This President's Council included white, coloured, and Asian representatives, but excluded blacks. The President's Council submitted its recommendations in May 1982.

(2) The Constitution. P. W. Botha slightly modified the recommendations of the President's Council in forming his constitutional plan. This plan envisioned a new structure of government in South Africa, laid out as follows:¹³⁴

1. A President as executive head of state, combining the former offices of State President and Prime Minister, to be elected by an electoral college.
2. An electoral college of 50 white, 25 coloured, and 13 Asian members appointed by their respective chambers in Parliament.
3. A tricameral Parliament for the three population groups, white, coloured, and Asian, each to determine policy on matters affecting its own group.
4. A cabinet appointed by the President, to include members of all three racial groups.

5. A President's Council of 20 whites, 10 coloured, and 5 Asians, elected by their representative chambers, and 25 members appointed by the President, to act as final arbiter in disputes.

The new constitution was approved on 2 November 1983 by a 66% majority of white voters. No referendum was held for coloured or Asian voters, and blacks were excluded from participation.

(3) The New Constitution and the Total National Strategy. Viewed in the context of Botha's Total National Strategy, the new constitution has several potential goals. First, including population groups other than whites has the effect of co-opting those groups and weakening their support for potential opposition movements. It also has the potential to garner international support due to indications of reform. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the system embodied in the new Constitution was very adaptable to the strong leader, thus completing the movement towards the consolidation of power in the executive begun by Botha in his reorganization of the cabinet. It seems apparent that the SSC would assume even greater importance in acting as the de facto secretariat of the President, while other cabinet committees and even the Parliament became less important. Finally, as an additional strength, inclusion of Asians and coloureds in the government would probably make members of those groups liable for the same compulsory military service to which whites are subjected.

d. Government, Business, and Defense

The Total National Strategy was intended to be concerned with more than the reorganization of government in order to better meet the onslaught against South Africa. In an analysis of the Total National Strategy as a counter-revolutionary strategy, Philip Frankel of the University of Witwatersrand recognized the role of the private sector in the TNS, saying the TNS is "sociologically deeper than government reorganization...and actually involves reforming the elite coalition."¹³⁵ This reformation includes an alliance between business, government, and the military on one hand, and the inclusion of racial groups other than whites in government on the other. This was discussed in point seven of the 12-point plan, which recognized the role and importance of non-whites in the economy and condoned official moves towards the de-idealization of the economic sector.¹³⁶

Business was seen to act as a source of managerial skills and capital in support of the Total National Strategy. The Botha style of government as reflected in his reorganizations since becoming Prime Minister resembled the style of a corporate president,¹³⁷ and he included important business leaders in the governmental decision making processes (see the discussion of ARMSCOR, above). In addition, Botha also saw private capital as a source of funds for rural and urban development. In rural areas,

capital was to be employed through actions of large corporations or through government sponsored institutions designed to stimulate regional trade cooperation. In urban areas, the government looked to organizations such as the Urban Foundation to absorb some of the costs of apartheid.¹³⁸

The response of business to this proposed role in the Total National Strategy was generally favorable. In the past, the enforcement of apartheid rules led to government intervention in the economic sector, curbing private ventures and constraining productivity. The 12-Point Plan's emphasis on the free market and its moves towards the deregulation of the economy was encouraging to South African businessmen. In addition, the eighth point of the 12-Point Plan called for a "Constellation of States in southern Africa, which included the promise of work towards closer economic ties between the Republic and neighboring states, and it was expected South African businessmen would assume the lead in cementing these relationships."¹³⁹

Finally, there was also the desire of the government to link the private sector and the Defense Force, especially in the field of arms development and production. As previously discussed, a Defense Advisory Board composed of South African business elites was established to further involve the private sector in defense activities. The fact that ARMSCOR made maximum use of the private sector further indicates the growing links between business and defense.

The defense establishment looked to private industry for the manufacture of 70% of all of the country's domestic arms production, while defense in turn provides leadership, research and development, and access to a small but growing export market.¹⁴⁰

e. Other Racial Groups

The 12-Point Plan in the area of relations between the races adheres to the tenets of separate development, but with a difference. Points one through three reconfirm the commitment of South Africa to apartheid. Point four assigns some political power in the newly reorganized government to coloured and Asian peoples.¹⁴¹ In addition, administrative exemptions in the Group Areas Act now allow Asians and coloureds the right to house black servants, and Asians and coloureds to receive general preference over blacks in the expenditure of government money. In these and other matters, it is apparently the intention of the government to blur the racial boundary between coloureds, Asians, and whites while widening the inequalities between these groups and blacks. This can be seen as an attempt to pull two ambiguously situated groups into the white camp, thereby denying their support to the black majority.

Under the Total National Strategy concept, blacks are dealt with in a two-fold strategy. First, rural blacks are handled by the homeland policy, the goal of which is to create a system of semi-independent, semi-autonomous states

dominated by South Africa. Political development in these states is carefully monitored to ensure that these states remain dependent on and under the control of South Africa.¹⁴³

Second, urban blacks receive a new deal which allows them some local political power, limited rights of citizenship and property holding, and the promise of participation in the constellation of states. Moves to accommodate urban blacks have resulted in new reform measures and greater responsiveness to the needs of this group. However, when considered in the light of the Total National Strategy, it seems that these moves are intended to further split opposition to white dominance by separating rural and urban blacks. Just as the "political dispensation" accorded to Asians and coloureds is intended to split these groups from blacks, giving urban blacks a stake in the system is intended to separate them from rural blacks. As Frankel states, "...Total Strategy is also devoted to realizing the old liberal belief that the existence of a 'stable' black middle class committed to the ideals of free enterprise capitalism is an important ingredient in the maintenance of the system."¹⁴⁴

D. EFFECTS OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY

The Total National Strategy, as discussed above, has had major impacts on the internal organization and operation of the South African government, on South African society, and on the Republic's relations with other countries.

1. Internal Effects

a. Government

As noted above, the impact of the Total National Strategy on the government has been profound. Internally, Botha's reorganization of the cabinet and his elevation of the importance of the SSC has tended to short-circuit the influence of the full cabinet and increase the power of the Prime Minister over the policy making and implementation apparatus. In addition, his streamlining of the cabinet has provided for a more administratively sound system. As a result of this accretion of influence to the SSC, the real control of power has slipped away from the elected members of Parliament and other departments of government.

The new constitution, approved in November 1983 and now in the process of being implemented, also had a major impact on how the Republic is governed. For one thing, for the first time non-whites will be included as elected representatives in the South African government, although how much real power and influence the coloured and Asian chambers will possess is still questionable. Further, and more importantly, the new constitution supports the centralization of power begun by the reorganization of the government. The new system provides for a strong executive president. It is further assumed that in serving as the secretariat to the presidential system, the SSC will gain even more in importance at the expense of the other cabinet committees and the Parliament.¹⁴⁵

b. The Militarization of Society

There is no doubt that the influence and impact of the SADF in South African government has been rising as the Defense Force becomes more important to the defense of white South Africa. This increasing influence and its actual extent has been much discussed, and it is important to note where it has affected South African society itself.

(1) Impact on Government. The Total National Strategy is mainly a creation of P. W. Botha, developed and fine-tuned during his days as Minister of Defense, and implemented through the military as a solution to the "total war" being conducted in Namibia.¹⁴⁶ As Minister of Defense, Botha was influenced by military management efficiency and planning, and when he became Prime Minister, it was natural that he bring with him to government the administrators whose skills he admired, and whom he had promoted in the SADF. For example, General Magnus Malan was appointed by Botha as the youngest ever Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the Army, Chief of the SADF, and finally Minister of Defense.¹⁴⁷ Malan has often served as Botha's communicator, stumping the country to keep the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy before the population.

The military influence has also increased with the rise of the SSC. All military and security matters are concerns of the SSC, and the SADF is involved in all decisions on these matters through the SSC. Further, the

secretary of the SSC, Lieutenant General van Deventer, is a military man, and the staff of the secretariat draws heavily on the SADF for 70% of its personnel.¹⁴⁸ In addition, van Deventer also serves as the secretary to the cabinet and as such has much influence over what issues are dealt with by which cabinet committees. Finally, SADF representatives sit on all fifteen interdepartmental committees of the SSC. No other ministry can claim inclusion on more than four of these committees.¹⁴⁹

(2) Economic Issues. The relation between defense, government, and industry has already been discussed, and the fact that the Total National Strategy requires a healthy economy and infusions of private money to succeed domestically already recognized. However, there are other security issues which have an economic impact.

First, great effort and resources have been expended to make South Africa self-sufficient in areas which are deemed of strategic importance. This includes the South African nuclear program, the oil-from-coal program and the efforts of the defense industry. These programs have often had negative economic impacts, as economy and sophistication are sacrificed for local content in the name of self-reliance and national security.

Secondly, and even more important to the discussion of the militarization of society, is the cooptation of many industries through government security planning,

including legislation such as the National Key Points Act of 1980, the Atomic Energy Act, the National Supplies Procurement Act, and the Petroleum Products Amendment Act.¹⁵⁰ These acts involve private industry, including subsidiaries of foreign transnational firms, in secrecy about their operations. They also provide for the militarization of employees through the establishment of "industrial commandos" for their protection.¹⁵¹

(3) Social Issues. The permeation of military influence through ARMSCOR and the armament industry, and through the involvement of industry in security matters has already been noted. However, there are other, more profound ways in which the military influences South African society.

First, as more demands for manpower are made upon white society by the SADF, more men and women are exposed to military training of some kind. In addition, the demands of the Defense Force on society are growing, as the amount of time spent in uniform by the average white male increases. In 1973, this average white male could expect to spend 9 to 12 months on active duty and then another 78 days on three call-ups during a nine-year reserve commitment. In 1983, the average time spent in uniform for the same person had increased to two years on active duty, followed by a reserve commitment of alternate 30 and 90 day callups for twelve years, for a total of 720 days in service (see Table 6).

TABLE 6

SADF Service Requirements

	1973	1974	1978	1983
Initial National Service Requirements (Months)	9-12*	12	24	24
Active Reserve Duty Period (Years)	9*	5	8	12
Number of Callups	3*	5	8	12**
Standard Callup Period (Days)	26*	19	30	60
Total Active Reserve Duty (Days)	78	95	240	720
Controlled Reserve Duty Period (Years)	0	4	0	0

* Figures are for those National Servicemen who joined the Citizen's Force. Those who joined the Commandos were obligated to spend 30-90 days on active duty for the first year and then 19 days a year for the next 15 years for a total of 285 days.

** Upon completion of 12 years in reserve, National Servicemen are then transferred to the Commandos where they are eligible to be called up for 12 days a year to age 55.

Second, the need for manpower has led to the utilization of men of other races and of white women in the Defense Force on a voluntary basis. Further, it can be expected that now that coloureds and Asians have been included in the government and given a limited franchise, pressure to include them in mandatory conscription schemes will increase. Both Asians and coloureds have maintained they will not serve in the SADF on other than a voluntary basis until blacks are included in the government.¹⁵²

Finally, military influence even reaches into the country's educational system. In 1977, the number of "school cadets" receiving military training at school was doubled to 300,000, and a year later the decision was made to conduct cadet training on school holidays and to make attendance obligatory at cadet "adventure camps."¹⁵³ In October 1982, it was announced that the Defense Force would establish military units at colleges of education and technicons.¹⁵⁴

As the above discussion illustrates, the military influence and military service follows the white male South African from his early school years right up to retirement, and his obligation to the military system has grown significantly in the past ten years.

c. The Nature of Society

Frankel has argued that the Total National Strategy is bringing about fundamental changes in the make-up of South African society.¹⁵⁵ Including some areas already discussed, these changes are:

1. Reforming the elite coalition through the inclusion of coloureds and Asians and through the strengthening of the government-military-business alliance.
2. A "new deal" for urban blacks in an attempt to create a black middle class interested in maintaining the system as it exists.
3. The rise in non-partisan civilian and military specialists to positions of political decision

making, weakening the traditional power of the National Party.

2. Regional Effects

The main regional thrust of the Total National Strategy was centered in points eight and nine of the twelve-point plan. Point eight calls for a constellation of southern African states "with respect for each other's cultures, traditions, and ideals....," while point nine addresses "South Africa's firm determination to defend itself against interference in every possible way."¹⁵⁶

The constellation concept predated the Twelve Point Plan by some time. P. W. Botha made it a major foreign policy initiative upon succeeding Vorster in 1978. The basis of the concept and objectives of the constellation as it was developed were based on a set of critical assumptions:¹⁵⁷

1. A constellation would offer the opportunity to find regional solutions to regional problems.
2. The "moderate" countries of southern Africa all face a common Marxist threat and cannot rely on the West for support.
3. The Marxist threat would lead to military cooperation.
4. Mutual interest in trade, agriculture, health, transportation, and so forth would act to bring southern African nations together. This cooperation in turn would yield positive political results for South Africa.

5. The constellation would include South Africa's neighbors and the newly independent homelands.
6. The constellation would be based on the political realities of South African society. In other words, international cooperation among states would not involve South Africa's internal commitment to apartheid.

Through the constellation initiative, Botha hoped to rely on economic forces and mutual security needs to pull southern Africa together. This cooperation would, in turn, lead to positive political gains in the international arena for South Africa. This was a strategy which can be traced back to the time of Verwoerd, when South Africa canvassed Africa for technical cooperation and a live and let live attitude from others,¹⁵⁸ and has so far met with just as little success in its current form. No black state is likely to associate with the non-recognized homelands, or compromise itself with regards to the OAU's stand against separate development. When nine countries of southern Africa formed the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC) to promote independence, it appeared that the constellation concept had failed. As Dr. Geldenhuys recently stated, the Republic "has not succeeded in creating exactly the kind of regional environment it desired."¹⁵⁹

In light of the failure to gain regional support for the southern African constellation in a form resembling the original concept, the other regional impact of the Total

National Strategy to be considered is the military impact. The military aspect of the Total National Strategy has had the greatest effect on South Africa's neighbors. South Africa's proclivity to intervene in the affairs of other countries in the interest of its own national security pre-dates the Total National Strategy. Yet the growing strength of the SADF, the growing influence of the military in South African government decision making, the centralization of power under Botha, and the failure of the constellation initiative are all events which have coincided with a growing use of South African military might in support of political objectives. As Dr. Geldenhuys states, "the grandiose scheme for a regional constellation of states has given way to an overriding concern with security."¹⁶⁰

3. International Effects of the Total National Strategy

In defining the Total National Strategy, P. W. Botha pointed out that there are five strategic options open to South African interests:¹⁶¹

1. Alignment with the West, which has been the option traditionally selected by South Africa.
2. Qualified neutrality.
3. Alignment with the East.
4. Alliance with middle-ranked powers with similar political philosophies (the so-called "pariah" option).
5. Concentration on regional relations.

From the thrust of the Twelve-Point Plan, it seems that South Africa considers these five options as not

mutually exclusive. In his analysis of the Total National Strategy, Geldenhuys points out that in fact only the first option has been totally rejected, although it seems unlikely that little of value could come of the third.

Point ten of the Twelve-Point Plan calls for, "a policy of neutrality in the conflict between the superpowers, with priority given to South African interests."¹⁶² Yet, South African movement away from the West predates the Total National Strategy. Suggestions that the Republic assume a more neutral stance between East and West were very much a product of the mid-1970's. South African disenchantment with the West grew as Western criticism of South Africa's domestic policies increased. In 1977, this pressure culminated in the UN mandatory arms embargo. Prior to the arms embargo, however, P. W. Botha had already raised the possibility of a more neutral stance for South Africa. After the arms embargo was enacted, South Africa informed the West that responsibility for the protection of the Cape sea route would no longer be South Africa's. Significantly, it was once again P. W. Botha who made the announcement, saying, "no arms, no service."¹⁶³ Therefore, it is not unexpected that the neutral option was given new prominence when Botha became Prime Minister. There is also an apparent relationship between the neutral option and the constellation, as South Africa attempts to focus on regional issues. In March 1979, Foreign Minister R. F. Botha stated "our sole commitment ought

to be towards the security and advancement of our own southern African region. Southern Africa could steer a new course of its own midway between East and West."¹⁶⁴

While talk of the increased emphasis on neutrality and regional considerations has increased, the effect of the invocation of this theme in the international forum has been slight. As Geldenhuys points out in his analysis, most non-aligned states enjoy a measure of acceptance from both East and West. South African non-alignment would be a new variation on the non-alignment theme: "based not on its acceptability...but instead on its unacceptability."¹⁶⁵

The fourth strategic option, alliance with other middle ranked powers, has some international benefits for South Africa. Between 1976 and 1980, South Africa exchanged visits with both Israel and Taiwan, and signed a variety of agreements for cooperation with these nations. While the possibility or usefulness of mutual defense arrangements between these countries appears slim, South Africa has gained useful economic, technical and military benefits from these relationships.

Another facet of the fourth option does not involve the other so-called "pariah" states, but is the culmination of what has been a major strand in South African strategic thought dating back to the 1950's: the idea of a treaty organization covering the southern Atlantic Ocean. As discussed earlier, it was this concept which involved South

Africa in the Simonstown Agreement in 1955, and which led to the first purchases of modern warships for the South African Navy. Since then, South Africa has continued to work to make itself an attractive defense partner, stressing the importance of the Cape sea route, and building naval facilities far in excess of its own needs in hope of attracting an alliance with a Western nation.

Failure to attract a Western partner probably caused South Africa to look elsewhere for security arrangements. It has been reported that in the early 1970's South Africa entered into a secret pact with Israel, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.¹⁶⁶ Whether or not this arrangement ever existed, the talk of it is significant in that it indicates that South Africa is moving away from the West in its search for security.

In addition, as South African power and confidence in its expanding military might grew, the Republic began to look more towards itself for not only self-protection, but for regional protection. In a radio commentary entitled, "A Monroe Doctrine for Southern Africa,"¹⁶⁷ parallels were drawn between the role of the United States in the Americas and South Africa in southern Africa. "As the most advanced and powerful state in the region, South Africa as a special responsibility towards it, as the United States has long had towards its own continent."

In summary, then, it is apparent that through the Total National Strategy, P. W. Botha has brought together

several strands of South African strategic thought. These are a movement away from the West, the quest for alliances among other middle power nations, and an expanding military role for South Africa in the southern African region. Internationally, the effect is probably seen as a very limited increase in diplomatic flexibility for South Africa through ties to other countries, and a further decrease in Western influence as South Africa downplays (but not eliminates) attempts to gain a western alliance and becomes militarily more powerful and regionally more dominant. Most importantly for Western interests, this redefinition of South African strategy indicates a growing divergence between Western and South African interests in southern Africa.

III. SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY

A. THE THREAT

1. Background

South Africa's perception of the threat has developed in a logical progression from 1960. As discussed in Chapter I, the early 1960's were seen as the "Years of Crisis," and the specific threats were seen to derive mainly from two sources: internal unrest, or externally supported terrorism and guerrilla activity. Initial fears of an external conventional military threat from black states diminished as the strength of the SADF grew. Consequently, prior to the Portuguese withdrawal, the organization and training of the landward defense forces were aimed primarily at counterinsurgency operations.

Once these initial threat assessments had formed, there was little apparent change in South African thought until the 1973 White Paper on Defense, which introduced the "Total Strategy" defensive doctrine. The initial development of this strategy was done by P. W. Botha during his tenure as Minister of Defense, and refined considerably by him when he became Prime Minister. In spite of the new widened perspectives put forward by the "Total Strategy," however, the major threat during the period 1973-1975 was still seen to be guerrilla activity in Namibia and Rhodesia,

and SADF training and organization continued to reflect the major role assigned to unconventional warfare methods.¹⁶⁸

As in many other areas of South African history, 1975 proved to be a watershed year for defense policy. The independence of Angola and Mozambique put radical, black, leftist governments associated with the Soviet Union not only in southern Africa, but directly on South Africa's borders. At the same time, Britain abrogated the Simonstown agreement, which had for years been the Republic's only defense relationship with the West. While SADF training during this turbulent time continued to emphasize counterinsurgency tactics, preoccupation with a perceived Soviet threat began to become apparent in South African defense writings, and preparations were begun to meet a more conventionally oriented outside threat. The Army was reorganized under separate conventional and counterinsurgency commands as a new strand of thought on conventional warfare was developed.¹⁶⁹

Since 1975, it has been apparent that South African strategic thought envisions a two-fold threat. The 1982 Defense White Paper discusses the threat in broad terms of the Marxist-Leninist onslaught against Africa, but specifically assigns both conventional and counterinsurgency roles to the combat branches of the SADF.

2. The Conventional Threat

In June 1979, then Chief of the South African Defense Force, General Magnus Malan, stated that "the possibility of

a conventional military threat to South Africa in the not too distant future cannot be ruled out."¹⁷⁰ However, a review of the forces which could be involved in a confrontation between South Africa and any one or combination of the Front-line States show that with regard to equipment alone, South Africa is at least equal to, and in many areas, superior to all potential regional adversaries (see Table 7).

TABLE 7¹⁷¹

The Military Balance in Southern Africa

	Angola	Botswana	Zambia	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Total	South Africa
Total Armed Forces	37,500*	3000	14,300	12,650	41,300	108,750	82,400**
Tanks	375	0	34	195+	28	632+***	250
Armored/ Scout Cars	200	Some	130	35	43	408	1400
APC/MICV	150	30	13	200	20	413	1700
Artillery (over 76mm)	200	0	128	250	34	612	230
Missile Armed Naval Vessels	2	0	0	0	0	2	11
Submarines	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Combat Aircraft	67@	5	51	35	30	188@@	313
Helicopters	51	0	21	0	36	108	167

*Some 25,000 Cubans and 450 East Germans operate aircraft/heavy equipment.
There are also Portuguese and 700 Soviet advisors.

**Potential for over 404,000 upon total mobilization.

***Includes some 385 T-34s of questionable value.

@Equipment totals and serviceability uncertain.

@@60 are MIG-17s of questionable value.

AD-A152 147


SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY(U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL MONTEREY CA C T ORBANN JUN 84


2/3

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 5/4

NL





In addition to material considerations, a brief review of many other areas related to the armed forces of these nations, including sources of recruitment, military traditions and backgrounds, defense infrastructure, and reserve organizations would also indicate the superiority of the SADF.¹⁷²

Another consideration in addition to the threat posed solely by South Africa's neighbors is the perceived conventional threat of the Soviet Union and its proxies. South Africa has within the past several years expanded its concept of the conventional threat to include the possibility of an attack by Soviet, Cuban, or Eastern European troops staging through neighboring countries and utilizing prepositioned military equipment. In February 1981, General Malan, now Minister of Defense, stated, "there is an unprecedented buildup of conventional heavy armaments in Southern Africa and should these be manned and used by Communist proxy forces, it could very rapidly lead to a conventional onslaught against South Africa."¹⁷³ Further, in 1982, General Malan said, "The presence of sophisticated weaponry of Russian origin in South Africa's neighboring states indicates that South Africa and Southwest Africa/Namibia could become targets of a conventional onslaught."¹⁷⁴

Finally, the possibility of a conventional attack is seen in conjunction with other pressures. This type of conventional threat could come in the form of conventional force raids conducted in coordination with terrorist tactics, and might include maritime actions.

These themes have been discussed from 1979 on, and have received even more attention since 1981. Yet while planning to meet the threat of a conventional attack is apparent in the composition and training of the current SADF, it is also apparent that the possibility of a conventional attack has been used, in part, to justify rising defense expenditures, new security legislation, and in support of a new conscription law. It was in support of this law, which was introduced in 1982, that General Malan stated "the possibility of a conventional attack against South Africa is the main reason for the country's new national service system..."¹⁷⁵

This use of the threat of conventional attack makes sense when viewed within the framework of justifying the implementation of various facets of the Total National Strategy, and in part explains the difference between South African statements and the real military potentials of the Republic's neighbors. What is probably a more accurate description of South African defense planners estimates of the conventional threat faced by South Africa was put forward by General C. L. Viljoen, Chief of the SADF, in 1983. In examining the conventional threat, he concluded that

In light...of factors such as poor economic conditions, internal instability, relatively deficient physical infrastructures, the inability to properly maintain or to replace advanced military equipment and discord arising from old regional conflicts, the African countries (individually and collectively) pose no real offensive military threat to the RSA.¹⁷⁶

According to General Vilojen, the real threat of conventional weapons in South Africa's neighbors is in the possibility of these weapons being provided to "terrorist" organizations, and in the use of these weapons by host countries in defending "terrorist" bases and headquarters against South African pre-emption and reprisals. The real threat of conventional conflict in southern Africa is the threat of South African reaction against "terrorist" operations with conventional arms, or in the case of a "drastic escalation of the East-West conflict..."¹⁷⁷

3. The Terrorist Threat

Many observers of South African affairs see two other types of threat to the Republic in addition to the conventional threat.¹⁷⁸ The first of these is the threat presented by internally and externally supported guerrilla movements, such as UMKONTO WE SIZWE. The second is the threat of internal unrest in response to the repression of apartheid, such as occurred during the 1976 Soweto disturbances. However, it is clear that South African defense planners do not make a differentiation between these two types of threat. This tendency to group all non-conventional threats under the general classification of a "terrorist" threat can be seen in the statements of South African government officials. For example, in 1981, the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General J. J. Geldenjuys, defined two types of modern warfare, "insurgency or terrorist warfare,

and conventional warfare."¹⁷⁹ Further, the missions assigned to the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the 1982 White Paper on Defense were divided between conventional and counterinsurgency (see Appendix B for a discussion of these missions). Two points should be made about the South African definition of the threat. First, the terms terrorism, insurgency, insurrection, and guerrilla warfare are all used interchangeably by South African government officials. Secondly, missions assigned to the armed forces also make no distinction between meeting externally supported and mounted threats and assisting the SAP in the enforcement of internal security regulations. It is all assigned as counterinsurgency duties.

The tendency in South Africa not to differentiate between the external non-conventional threat and internal unrest, and instead to lump all forms of unconventional threat under the heading "terrorism" is significant for two reasons. First, this view allows, within the framework of the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy, a logical connection between the communist threat, "terrorist" organizations, and internal unrest in South Africa. Once this connection is made, it is possible to see internal unrest, such as boycotts and the actions of labor unions, as occurring not as a result of South Africa's internal apartheid policies, but as a result of external interference from black Africa and the Soviet Union. In 1981, Prime Minister Botha stated,

"...that within South Africa, Russia was providing the financial support for revolutionary organizations such as the banned ANC and, in addition some neighbor states were allowing terrorist bases on their territory."¹⁸⁰

Second, this view of the terrorist threat as one inspired by external interference as opposed to internal policies has implications for South Africa's neighbors. Ever since the initial involvement in Angola, South Africa has justified crossborder operations as a reaction to disturbances within South Africa. "It is the clear and repeatedly stated policy of the South African government that it will take whatever measures are necessary to counter political violence. That policy includes striking at terrorists in their bases wherever they may be."¹⁸¹

As long as internal unrest can be linked by South Africa to intervention by its neighbors in the Republic's internal affairs, justification can be made by South Africa for a wide range of responses in self-defense. These responses include escalation of violence from hot pursuit operations, through pre-emptive strikes, up to actual occupation of territory and the destabilization of neighboring governments.

B. CONSTRAINTS

South African strategic thinking is influenced by a number of important constraints. These constraints act to limit the range of actions open to South Africa in responding

to perceived threats. These constraints include those imposed by population, border vulnerability, international opposition, resource vulnerability, economic constraints, and by the perceptions of South African government officials themselves.

1. Population

South Africa is one of the most heavily populated nations in Africa, with a population of over 28 million reported in 1980. However, as Table 8 shows, the majority of this population is black. In addition, black population as a percentage of total population is increasing. The fact that whites make up less than 20% of the country's population has serious consequences when considered together with the National Party's apartheid policies.

TABLE 8¹⁸²

Population by Racial Composition
1970 and 1980

Race	1970		1980	
	Population	% of Total	Population	% of Total
Black	15,339,975	70.4	20,609,000*	72.5
White	3,773,282	17.3	4,453,273	15.7
Coloured	2,050,699	9.4	2,554,039	9.0
Asian	630,372	2.9	794,693	2.8
Total	21,794,328	100.0	28,410,951	100.0

* Includes Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda.

a. The Civilian Workforce and Apartheid¹⁸³

Upon coming to power in 1948, the National Party institutionalized policies which were based on the view that black workers had no place in the white area beyond certain work levels. As a result, only limited training facilities were made available for blacks. As the South African economy expanded in the 1970's, the supply of white skilled workers dried up, and the resulting shortage of skilled workers led to the beginning of the abolishment of job reservations for whites. However, despite increasing acceptance of blacks in the skilled workforce and a depressed economy, by 1980, it was estimated that professional and semi-professional work sectors were short on the order of 5.6%, with the biggest deficiencies in middle management, artisan, and other specialist vocations.¹⁸⁴

b. Military Manpower

By the beginning of the 1980's, it was estimated that South Africa had a potential military manpower pool of more than 5 million men of all races of military age. However, the Defense Act of 1957 limited mandatory military service to whites, reducing this pool to about 1.2 million men aged sixteen to sixty-five, of which 750,000 were of the prime military ages eighteen to thirty-five. As the SADF was built up to provide for both a larger conventional force and to meet the demands of the long term war in Namibia, South Africa's white manpower resources were strained almost

to the limit. The 1977 Defense White Paper placed primary emphasis on manpower problems and on drawbacks in the manpower system.¹⁸⁶ In 1979, some Citizens Force reservists returning from active duty were ordered to report for an additional tour due to an insufficient supply of new recruits.

In addition to an inadequate number of draftees, other manpower shortages have affected the SADF. The Permanent Force has continually fallen short of its authorized strength. In 1980, with 20,000 regulars in uniform, Permanent Force strength was only 80% of its authorized level, with the most acute shortages in the ranks of junior officers and experienced NCO's. Continued shortages caused plans for the formation of a Permanent Force brigade to act as a standing force, scheduled for 1980, to be postponed.

The military and the economy in South Africa also interact in two ways involving manpower. First, the SADF suffers from the same skills shortages which affect the private sector. The Defense Force must compete with business and industry for scarce, technically trained personnel. In 1981, then Chief of the Air Force Lieutenant General A. M. Mueller noted that the skills shortage in the armed forces was affecting the ability of the services to conduct even routine equipment maintenance. General Mueller pointed out that much maintenance must be conducted by the private sector, resulting in a further loss of skill by military technicians.¹⁸⁷ In addition, much of the skills shortage in the military,

especially among pilots and aircrews, were due to the ability of trained personnel to earn more in business than in the SADF.

Second, serving National Servicemen were being forced to do longer duty in operational areas in order to limit the disruptive effects on the economy of mobilizing Commando and Citizen's Force units. In 1978, a SADF¹⁸⁸ spokesman said, "We are doing everything in our power to cause as little disruption to the economy as possible. To call up a member of the Commandos or the Citizens Force who is already economically active will obviously cause far greater disruption than by using men who are as yet not actively engaged in the country's economy."¹⁸⁹

2. Border Vulnerability

Today South Africa's borders are less secure than at any time in the country's history. These borders cover over two thousand miles from Atlantic to Indian Oceans, and are shared with countries which have exhibited hostility toward South Africa. The Portuguese withdrawal put a black Marxist government directly on the Republic's borders when Mozambique gained independence in 1975, and the election of Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 1980 added another. Only in the west, where South Africa borders Namibia, can the country said to be bordered by a "friendly" neighbor, and even this could change rapidly as a result of ongoing negotiations over the fate of Namibia.

In reality, however, South Africa is not extremely vulnerable over the entire length of its borders. In the event of Namibian independence under a hostile SWAPO-dominated government, South Africa's border with Namibia would be protected in part by the natural barrier of the Orange River. In addition, the sparsely inhabited desert and steppe topography of this area would pose a serious obstacle to off-road penetration by any sizable guerrilla force.¹⁹¹ In the east, the Mozambique-South African border near the coast is swampy and undeveloped, posing similar problems to guerrilla penetration, and making Swaziland a preferred passage for guerrillas from Mozambique.¹⁹²

More dangerous are the Republic's borders with Zimbabwe and Botswana. While the border with Zimbabwe is protected for 125 miles by a thirteen foot high double fence topped with barbed wire on the South African side, the frontier with Botswana is easily crossed, especially in the winter months of June to September, when the Limpopo River is fordable at many points.¹⁹³ Any enemy force entering through Botswana would have easy access to South Africa's industrial heartland.

The vulnerability of South Africa's border with Botswana and Zimbabwe is of concern to South Africa for two other reasons. The first is the dwindling number of white settlers in this area. It has been feared that the departure of whites from this border would lead to the

opening of the much-feared "second front," as ANC guerrillas would be able to move from one black farm to another towards the country's northern urban industrial areas.¹⁹⁴ To counter this movement of whites, the government proposed a law requiring at least one white person live on each border farm.¹⁹⁵ Further, it has been proposed that a chain of fortified farms, settled by ex-servicemen, be established as defensive strongholds along these borders. To these ends, interest free loans have been offered to men with military experience to take up farming in key areas, and existing farmers given credits for occupying their property and managing it in accordance with Defense Force guidelines.¹⁹⁶

The second concern is that presented by the "independent" homelands. As parts of South Africa near the borders are given over to the homelands, tough problems of border defense are raised. The homelands occupy strategic territory on the borders of South Africa, forming a semi-circle around the industrial and mining heart of the Republic. In addition, they are populated by ethnic groups that flow into neighboring states.¹⁹⁷

3. International Opposition

As can be seen from previous discussions, South Africa's apartheid policies cause constraints to be placed on its foreign policies through the linkage between internal policies and external relations. Attempts to separate internal policies from foreign affairs, while a major focus of South Africa, have met with little success. The Outward

Movement, Detente, and the Constellation schemes made few international gains. In fact, South Africa's international options narrowed during the periods these plans were being implemented.¹⁹⁸

Internal opposition to internal policies have had effects on South Africa in ways almost too numerous to count. These include sports, commercial relationships, diplomatic relations, and international recognition, to name but a few. However, several areas can be singled out for further discussion due to their impacts on South African defense planning.

a. Lack of Defensive Alliances

A strand which has run through South African foreign policy since 1948 has been the attempt to obtain a Western commitment to the defense of South Africa. In the 1950's it was support for MEDO, participation in the Nairobi and Dakar conferences with the colonial powers, and the execution of the Simonstown agreement with Britain. Since then, South Africa has continued to work toward obtaining a NATO commitment or the organization of a NATO style alliance in the South Atlantic. In doing so, South Africa is quick to point out its key position on the Cape sea route and its economic importance to the West. Naval facilities in the Republic have been expanded far in excess of domestic requirements and new command and control networks utilizing NATO-compatible equipment have been built.¹⁹⁹

South Africa's Angolan intervention was a turning point in defense planning with regard to alliances. In spite of the fact that the efforts of the 1950's and 1960's did not result in any formal alliance with the West, until this time South African planning assumed the West would still provide aid if the Cape sea route were threatened. However, the lack of Western support in 1975 brought this assumption under question, and South Africa began to look elsewhere for security arrangements. On one hand, the growing military strength of the Republic caused it to become more self-reliant and less in need of Western assurances. Discussion turned towards the so-called "neutral" or regional options of South Africa.²⁰⁰ On the other hand, options with regard to security arrangements with South American nations, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay were discussed.

And yet, in spite of the fact that South Africa seems to be charting a more independent course in defense affairs, it appears the SADF would still desire a Western defense commitment, if the price were not too high. As late as May 1982, as the Falklands War brought new attention to the South Atlantic, the head of the SADF, General Viljoen, called for a revision of Western naval policy towards South Africa, offering to resume the protection of the Cape sea route which South Africa had renounced in 1978 in response to the 1977 UN arms embargo.²⁰¹

b. The United Nations Arms Embargo, 1977

By the time the UN's mandatory arms embargo was enacted in November 1977, South Africa had had a program to develop arms self-sufficiency for nearly 15 years. The South African response to the embargo was that it had a strong enough arms industry to surmount its effects. Minister of Defense P. W. Botha stated at the time, "We are self-sufficient enough, without great effort, to fight any non-conventional war against us, and with special effort, we can sustain anything of a conventional nature they can throw against us."²⁰²

In spite of this bravado, it is apparent that the embargo placed some limitations on South Africa. First, arms-related equipment and especially spare parts for equipment already in hand had now to be acquired through the black market, leading to higher costs and unreliable sources of supply. Second, the embargo denied to South Africa a narrow type of military equipment which it could not build for itself, but still desired to have. This included helicopters, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, large naval vessels and submarines, modern artillery, and some types of rockets and missiles. With regard to these types of equipment, South Africa was faced with the choice of doing without or of going to the expense of trying to develop variations of their own.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the arms embargo made the replacement of military equipment nearing

the end of useful life difficult at best. In retiring old Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft, South Africa was forced to modify some of a limited number of C-130 transports to fill the maritime patrol function due to the lack of a suitable replacement aircraft. As other equipment gets older, this problem will become more important to the SADF.

c. Resource Vulnerabilities

South Africa has always been quick to point out its importance to the Western world due to the great mineral wealth it possesses. However, there are two important resources which the Republic is lacking in: water and oil. Supplies of these two items either have been or could be subject to outside interference.

(1) Water. Water is needed in South Africa for irrigation, mineral exploitation, and the generation of hydroelectric power. Due to the fact that the region experiences frequent drought and possesses negligible surface water, large portions of South Africa are unsuitable for irrigation. This lack of surface water also affects trade patterns, as there are no navigable rivers in the Republic.

To make up for these shortcomings in water resources, South Africa has invested heavily in two major hydroelectric programs in what was at the time Portuguese territory. The Cunene River project, located in Angola

nine miles north of the Namibian frontier, and the Cahora Bassa project deep in Mozambique on the Zambeze River both serve South Africa today. As South Africa becomes more dependent on these projects for power, it becomes more vulnerable to threats against them.

However, South African dependence on power from these sources outside its borders also has implications for Angola and Mozambique. In the case of the Cunene River project, concern over the security of this project led to the initial South African presence in southern Angola in 1975 on the grounds of protecting its investment there. In the case of Mozambique, South Africa, Mozambique, and Portugal have recently signed the Cahora Bassa agreement whereby electricity will be supplied to South Africa by Mozambique. At the signing ceremony, P. W. Botha pointed out that the Cahora Bassa agreement was made possible by the Nkomati agreement signed six weeks earlier.²⁰⁴ When it is considered that the Nkomati agreement was made possible in part by South Africa's destabilization of Mozambique, it can be assumed that South Africa would consider further destabilizations against Angola or Mozambique to protect Cunene or Cahora Bassa.

(2) Oil.²⁰⁵ The 1973 Arab oil embargo against South Africa had less effect on the Republic than did the Portuguese withdrawal. In fact, the oil embargo was represented by the black states of southern Africa, which relied on South Africa for refined petroleum products, and was

not implemented by Iran, which supplied 90% of South Africa's oil requirements. The cut in Iranian production in 1979, followed by the overthrow of the Shah cut off supplies of Iranian oil to South Africa, but by 1980, it appeared that all of South Africa's needs were being met thorough the spot market at higher prices. In fact, production of petroleum products went up between 1979 and 1980, the last year energy related production figures were published by South Africa.²⁰⁶

In spite of the small short-term impact of the loss of traditional oil supplies, the cutoff had the effect of revealing a vulnerable aspect of South Africa's economy. The more than 100 million barrels of oil imported annually are crucial to communications, transportation, and defense. In addition, the higher price of oil initially available on the spot market increased the price of economic growth, although this influence has probably been lessened by the fall in oil prices in the early 1980's.

4. Economic Constraints²⁰⁷

South Africa has a strong economy based mainly on a super-abundance of minerals. Despite a dependence on Western capital, technology, and markets, South Africa is the most developed economy on the African continent, and possesses the potential to become a leading middle economic power. Yet, since 1948, the government's apartheid policies have placed serious handicaps on the economy, and many of

the economic constraints under which the Republic labors are either directly or indirectly a result of these policies. In some cases, the effects of apartheid are obvious, and in others, not so. In addition, there are other economic constraints not related at all to separate development.

The following is a survey of some of the more important economic constraints which affect the strategic policies of South Africa.

a. Investor Confidence

The relationship between the economy and the political environment is important in all countries, but it is especially so in South Africa. Potential investors, foreign and domestic, must evaluate the impact of the various internal racial, social, and political tensions and divisions, together with the military and political position of South Africa in southern Africa before even considering the economic viability of the potential investment.

Moreover, the relationship between economic variables and the political environment in South Africa is seldom straightforward. When the economic and political environment are healthy, growth in the economy seems assured. Conversely, when both are not favorable, as during the 1975-1978 time period, growth is inhibited. In periods where economic and political signals are mixed, such as after Sharpeville in 1960, and in the early 1980's, economic growth has ensued, although the chance of risk was higher.

b. Balance of Payment Concerns

Due to the limited size of its domestic markets, South Africa is dependent upon maintaining a flow of exports. The economy is vulnerable to reduced earnings and to shortages of foreign capital, in that the South African government has preferred to inhibit growth when faced with balance of payments difficulties rather than rely on loans through international money markets. Export growth is required for continued expansion of import consumption and investment expenditures.

An important factor in South Africa's import-export equation is the international price of gold. One of the major factors responsible for the recession in South Africa in the latter 1970's was the drop in gold prices. Gold fell from \$161 an ounce in 1975 to less than \$110 an ounce in 1976, costing South Africa at least \$575 million in annual revenues.²⁰⁸ Again, between 1980 and 1982, a drop in the international price of gold from \$613 an ounce to \$357 an ounce in part caused South Africa to experience a large trade deficit and high inflation due to balance of payments difficulties,²⁰⁹ and ultimately led to a devaluation of the Rand and cutbacks in government spending.

c. The Labor Force

As an industrialized, populous country, South Africa's labor force should be an economic asset, and yet there are a number of constraints put on the Republic by

the combination of the composition of the work force and government policy.

First, as discussed above under manpower considerations, there is the effect of the shortage of skilled workers both in the economy and in the SADF. In addition to the considerations already touched upon, it is also important to note that as the SADF and the economy continue to compete for skilled labor, and as more whites are involved for longer periods in the military, the economy becomes more dependent on the black work force.²¹⁰

Second, as the need for skilled workers grows, the government is forced to amend the apartheid system to allow the utilization of the black majority of the work force. In 1979 the Wiehahn Commission recommended the abolition of the color bar and the training of black apprentices in white urban areas. The political significance of these changes is two-fold. First, these changes have the effect of blurring apartheid in economic areas, altering relationships between workers, and potentially providing spillover in political areas. Second, as black workers become skilled and gain more income, their expectations grow as they gain more economic leverage.

Third, and related to the economic leverage being acquired by blacks, is the rise in black trade unions. The Wiehahn Commission conceded that all workers should have union representation, and the government has allowed the

provisional registration of black unions. While these unions are heavily regulated, the implications are clear and potentially disruptive. They include the use of black union power for political ends and the danger of backlash from white unions.

Fourth is the economy's dependence on foreign African labor to work in gold mines where South African blacks are reluctant to go. In 1976, foreign workers composed a full third of the black labor force. The government has tried with little success to reduce this dependence by encouraging South African laborers to take jobs normally held by foreigners.²¹¹

Finally, the inability to absorb the rising number of black workers into the work force has led to an estimated unemployed black population of between one and two million, or about 10-20% of the work force. It is estimated that South Africa would have to maintain a growth in GNP of 8% a year to fully utilize this mostly unskilled excess. This paradox of unemployment amid worker shortage does not in itself inhibit economic growth, but has great potential to be politically destabilizing.

d. The Effect of Government on the Economy

The recent trend in South Africa has been away from government interference in the economy. P. W. Botha, as part of the Twelve-Point Plan, committed South Africa to a free enterprise philosophy. Import controls were

dismantled, foreign exchange controls relaxed, rent controls abolished, and limited labor reforms undertaken. And yet there are still government actions which have had major negative effects on the economy which must be noted.

First, the economic costs of apartheid has acted as a major inhibitor of economic growth. The effect of the lack of training programs and educational opportunities for non-whites and the effects of these shortcomings on the labor force has already been discussed. In addition, the actual monetary cost of supporting apartheid must be considered. The Rand cost of maintaining separate facilities for the races, enforcing security and influx control laws, and maintaining separate homelands which are not economically viable has never been fully calculated. However, one author estimated that in 1977 the cost of operating the pass system alone was 112,825,327 Rand a year.²¹²

Second, the rising cost of defense has become an increasing drain on the economy. Even in 1981-82, in what was described as a "moderately contractionary" budget, defense spending rose 30% over the previous year.²¹³ Government officials justify these continuing increases by pointing to the threats arrayed against the country. In 1981, the SADF Chief of Staff for Finance, Lieutenant General W. J. Berg, stated, "It is important that certain matters in the budget must enjoy priority. Defense is one of these. The economy cannot be placed on a healthy basis if there is no

peace and tranquility in the country and its inhabitants feel insecure."²¹⁴ In addition, the South African government has been quick to point out that at 3.5% of the GNP, defense spending is actually comparatively low.²¹⁵ However, the important points to be made are not related to the size of South Africa's defense expenditures when compared to other nations, rather how rapidly that spending has risen, and how it continues to rise in the face of poor economic conditions. The 1981 defense budget was 860% higher than that of ten years before.²¹⁶

A final area which must be considered is the cost of stockpiling strategic materials. While statistical data on South Africa's oil consumption are classified under the Petroleum Products Act, it was estimated in 1983 that South Africa's strategic oil reserve equaled about three years consumption and represented the largest reserve of crude oil relative to size of economy of any oil-importing nation.²¹⁷ The cost of stockpiling, when added to the costs of other projects related to strategic materials, such as SASOL's coal-to-oil project, the continued search for domestic sources of oil, and the cost of the nuclear program, represents another significant drain on the country's economic resources.

5. Perceptual Constraints

As discussed by K. J. Holsti in his consideration of the foreign policy output of nations,²¹⁸ different policy

makers faced with the same choices under similar circumstances will react differently. This is the result of the fact that many variables besides the immediate situation affect the images of the decision maker. These variables are the policy maker's beliefs, values, attitudes, and ideology, and they are important in providing the framework within which events are analyzed and decisions are made.

With respect to South Africa, the framework for analysis and formation of policy is based upon the perceptions and beliefs of white South Africans. The ideology which forms the basis for their perceptions is that of the volk as an ethnic group with its own distinct religion, culture, and political sovereignty.²¹⁹

It is the survival of the volk which has occupied Afrikaners for 150 years. The assumption of power by the National Party in 1948 did not allay the feelings of concern over the preservation of this identity. Instead, having a majority in Parliament meant that for the first time Afrikaners would be able to control the government and ensure the survival of the volk. As internal and external pressures on South Africa have grown since 1960, the focus of the South African response has remained the preservation of their identity. The debate between verligte (enlightened) and verkrampte (closed off) among Afrikaners is not a struggle between liberal and conservative, but a more narrow dispute over the means utilized to accomplish the same end.

Religious and legal principles form an important part of the Afrikaner world view. Maintenance of Christian values in the face of Western materialism and communist atheism is a real concern of the Dutch Reformed churches of South Africa, and a concern which is shared with many South African English-speaking churches. Regard for law and morality in international relations is included in Afrikaner University instruction. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is an often-quoted legal principle, reflecting South Africa's disinterest in the affairs of other nations and the desire of South Africa to detach its own domestic affairs from its dealings with other countries.

Another facet of the concern with law and religion is a preoccupation with the view that South Africa stands alone as an isolated outpost of Western Christian civilization against a growing onslaught against these values. The communists of the Soviet Union are responsible for this attack, but they are unintentionally supported by other forces which weaken the Western world, including liberalism, materialism, secularism, and socialism. South African leaders take seriously the idea that the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union is world domination, and also apparently view other communist states, such as the Peoples' Republic of China, as acting as Soviet agents. The 1982 Defense White Paper defines the threat in these terms:

The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and replace it with a Marxist-oriented form of

government to further the objectives of the USSR, therefore all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This includes instigating social and labor unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of Black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This onslaught is supported by a world-wide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations, such as trade unions and even certain church organizations and leaders.²²⁰

It can be seen in a number of instances that South African perceptions have led to faulty assumptions about the country's strategic situation. These assumptions, in turn, have led to defense policies which, in light of real world events, did not best meet South African needs. As already discussed, during the period 1948-1960, many of the key strategic assumptions upon which the country's foreign policies were based, turned out to be faulty. Further, it was probably South Africa's perception that the Republic could count on support from the United States and from moderate black countries which led to increasing involvement in the Angolan civil war, with results which were plainly not in South Africa's best interests.²²¹

C. ASSETS

1. The South African Defense Force

a. The Army

(1) Organization.²²² The strength of the standing army of South Africa in 1983 was 67,400, including 5,400 non-white regulars, 2,000 women, and 50,000 National Servicemen completing two years of required active duty.

This number is supplemented by reservists called up for periods of active duty of up to three months from an Active Citizens Force pool of at least 130,00 men. Reservists serve in the Citizens Force for 12 years, during which they spend 720 days in uniform, and after which they may be allocated to the Commando Force, where they are liable to serve 12 days a year to age 55.

In the early 1980's, the Army was restructured in order to counter all forms of insurgency while at the same time maintaining a creditable conventional force (see Table 9). To meet these requirements, the Army is subdivided into conventional and counterinsurgency forces. The counterinsurgency forces are further divided into nine territorial commands, each of which is responsible to the Chief of the Army. This force consists of members of the Permanent Force, Commandos, and a few selected Citizens Force units.

The Citizens Force provides the organization for conventional defense. For the most part, the Citizens Force is organized conventionally as a corps made up of two divisions (see Table 9), each with a number of brigades. Corps headquarters is at Pretoria and divisional/brigade headquarters are staffed by Permanent Force personnel in main population areas. These units provide the cadres around which full scale mobilization of the Citizens Force can be accomplished.²²⁵

TABLE 9

Army Order of Battle 1979²²⁴

Conventional Forces

7th Division (Johannesburg)	8th Division
71st Motorized Brigade (Capetown)	81st Armored Brigade (Pretoria)
Capetown Highlanders (Capetown)	Pretoria Highlanders (Pretoria)
Capetown Rifles (Capetown)	Pretoria Regiment (Pretoria)
Western Provinces Regiment (Stellenbosch)	Regiment Boland (Pretoria)
72nd Motorized Brigade	82nd Mechanized Brigade
(Johannesburg)	(Potchefstroom)
Johannesburg Regiment	Regiment de la Rey (Germiston)
(Johannesburg)	Regiment de Wet (Kroonstat)
1st Battalion Transvaal	Witwatersrand Regiment
Scottish (Johannesburg)	(Germiston)
2nd Battalion Transvaal	84th Motorized Brigade
Scottish (Johannesburg)	1st Battalion Royal Durban
73rd Motorized Brigade	Light Infantry (Durban)
Rand Light Infantry	2nd Battalion Royal Durban
(Johannesburg)	Light Infantry (Durban)
Regiment Louw Werpner	Prince Alfred's Guard (Port
(Landbrand)	Elizabeth)
Kimberley Regiment	Divisional Troops
(Kimberley)	Umvoiti Mounted Rifles (AC)
Division Troops	(Greytown)
Light Horse Regiment (AC)	Transvaal Staats Artillery
(Johannesburg)	(Greytown)
Capetown Field Artillery	Transvaal Horse Artillery
(Capetown)	(Greytown)
14th Field Artillery	
(Potchefstroom)	
7th LAA Regiment	

Counterinsurgency Forces

Western Province Command (Capetown):	Orange Free State Command
Cape Garrison Artillery (Capetown)	(Bloemfontein)
101st Signals Squadron (Capetown)	2nd Field Engineering Regiment
Cape Corps Service Battalion	(Bethlehem)
(Eerste River)	17th Field Squadron (Bethlehem)
6th BOD (Capetown)	35th Engineering Supplementary
Command Workshops (Capetown)	Unit (Kroonstat)
2nd Military Hospital (Wynberg)	Tank Squadron 1st Special
3rd Field Ambulance (Wynberg)	Service Brigade (Bloemfontein)
11th STD (Wynberg)	1st South African Infantry
Cape Flats Commando (Wynberg)	(Bloemfontein)
Worcester Commando (Wynberg)	1st Parachute Battalion
Stellenbosch Commando (Wynberg)	(Bloemfontein)
10th AA Regiment (Youngsfield)	3rd Military Hospital
4th Electronic Workshops	(Bloemfontein)
(Youngsfield)	

TABLE 9 (CONTINUED)

Eastern Province Command	Parachute Commando (Kroonstat)
(Port Elizabeth):	School of Engineering (Kroonstat)
6th South African Infantry	
(Grahamstown)	West Transvaal Command (-):
84th Technical Service Corps	2nd Signals Regiment
(Grahamstown)	(Voortrekkehoogte)
11th Commando (Kimberley)	5th B.O.D. (Pretoria)
East Cape Province Commando	61st Brigade Workshop (Lyttleon)
(Kimberley)	81st Brigade Workshop (Lyttleon)
Port Elizabeth Commando	Pretoria Oos Commando (-)
(Kimberley)	Horse and Dog Centre
Danie Theron Combat School	(Voortrekkehoogte)
(Kimberley)	South African Military College
	(Voortrekkehoogte)
Natal Command (Durban):	Technical Service Centre
5th South African Infantry	(Voortrekkehoogte)
(Ladysmith)	Services School (Voortrekkehoogte)
15th Maintenance Unit	SAMS Training Centre
(Durban)	(Voortrekkehoogte)
Tugela Commando (Durban)	School of Technical Training
Umvoiti Commando (Durban)	(Pretoria)
	Northern Transvaal Command (-):
	Command Workshop (-)
	Frankfort Commando (-)
	North Western Command
	(Potchefstroom)
	3rd South African Infantry (-)
	Command Workshop (-)
	Witwatersrand Command
	(Johannesburg)
	Johannesburg Noord Commando
	(Johannesburg)
	South West Africa (Windhoek)

In addition to organic formations, the SADF has been involved in the establishment and training of territorial forces in Namibia and in the "independent" homelands. In Namibia, the Southwest Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) was established on 1 August 1980 as a separate force under South African control. It consists of four area commands, North, Eastern, Central, and Southern, comprising 26 area force units organized along the lines of South Africa's Commandos. Air elements consist of one Citizens Force squadron equipped with light aircraft. In addition, the North Area force consists of six regular SWATF light infantry battalions and one mounted unit, and there is a mobile reserve brigade of mixed regular and Citizens Force units.

The first Homelands Defense Force created was that of Transkei. Upon "independence" the Transkei Defense Force (TDF) consisted of one battalion of 254 men, along with 30 seconded SADF Permanent Force officers. Relations between the TDF and the SADF were close until Transkei broke diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1978. Afterward, to counter a decline in the efficiency of the TDF after the departure of seconded SADF personnel, Transkei appointed Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, formerly commander of Rhodesia's Selous Scouts to rebuild the TDF. In 1982, the TDF consisted of a Permanent Force brigade of two battalions. The SADF still provides assistance with supplies, logistics, intelligence, and coastal defense.

Bophuthatswana, as the second "independent" homeland also fielded an armed force upon independence. The Bophuthatswana National Guard consists of about 220 men trained by the SADF. Relations between Bophuthatswana and South Africa remain close, and the first Bophuthatswana Minister of Defense was Hennie Riekert, a former Brigadier with the SADF. The BNG is effectively a unit of the SADF's Northwestern Command.

Upon "independence" in September 1979, the Venda National Force combined the functions of army, police, traffic police, and detention services. This force is commanded by a former South African policeman, Lieutenant Colonel T. R. Mudautzi. In 1980, the VNF numbered about 450 men.²²⁶

(2) Army Equipment.²²⁷

Tanks	200	OLIFANT (CENTURION) MBT
Armored Cars/	1400	ELAND Mk IV/VI (Panhard AML-60/90) Armored Cars
Armored Personnel		
Carriers	1200	RATEL Armored Cars
	500	RHINO/HIPPO Armored Personnel Carriers
	280	SARACEN Armored Personnel Carriers
	230	FERRET Armored Cars (in reserve)
	50	M3A1/STAGHOUND Armored Cars (In reserve)
Artillery	125	25pdr Field Guns
	75	5.5" Towed Guns
	50	Sexton 25pdr Self-Propelled Guns
	40	155mm Towed Guns
	40	G5 155mm Towed Guns/G6 155mm Self-Propelled Guns
	Some	VALKIRI Self-Propelled 127mm Multiple Rocket Launchers
	Some	81mm Mortars

	200	120mm mortars
	900	6pdr, 17pdr, M-67 90mm Antitank guns
	Some	106mm Recoiless Rifles
	55	K63 Twin 35mm Antiaircraft Guns
	24	L70 Twin 40mm Antiaircraft Guns
	15	3.7" Antiaircraft guns
Missiles	54	Tigercat Surface to Air Missiles
	54	Cactus (CROTALE) Surface to Air Missiles
	120	ENTAC Antitank Guided Weapons

b. The South African Air Force

(1) Organization. In terms of training, maintenance, and quality of personnel, the South African Air Force (SAAF) is the most powerful in subsaharan Africa. It has a complement of 10,000 men, including 9,000 Permanent Force regulars and 1000 National Service personnel. The Citizens Force reserve numbers 25,000, including many experienced pilots and maintenance crewmen who are regularly called to active duty.

The SAAF is organized tactically into four operational commands: (1) Main Threat Area; (2) Southern Air Command; (3) Western Air Command; and (4) Training Command. In addition, the Citizens Force operates six reserve squadrons with about 100 aircraft that can be adapted to strike and Counterinsurgency missions, and the Commandos maintain another thirteen squadrons of light aircraft. Air Force personnel are also responsible for the South African air defense alert system and man early warning radars.

(2) SAAF Equipment. 228

Bombers	5	CANBERRA B(I) 12
	3	CANBERRA T-4
	6	BUCCANEER S-50
Fighters/ Ground Attack	32	MIRAGE F-1AZ
	22	MIRAGE III CZ/EZ
	57	MB 326 M/K IMPALA I/II
Interceptors	13	MIRAGE F-1CZ
Reconnaissance	6	MIRAGE RZ/R2Z
	5	SHACKLETON MR-3 (being retired)
	18	PIAGGIO P-166S ALBATROSS
Trainers	60	MB 326 M/K IMPALA I/II
	26	MIRAGE III (10 EZ, 10 D2Z, 6 R2Z)
	100	HARVARD T-6G
	12	C-47 DAKOTA
	30	ALOUETTE II/III
Helicopters	12	SUPER FRELON
	48	PUMA
	40	ALOUETTE II
	10	HAS-1 WASP
	27	ALOUETTE III
Transports/ Liaison	7	C-130B HERCULES
	9	TRANSALL C-160Z
	7	DC-4
	24	C-47 DAKOTA
	4	HS-125 MERCURIUS
	1	BAC VISCOUNT 781
	6	MERLIN IVA AIR AMBULANCE
	15	AM-3C BOSBOK
	25	C-4M KUDU
	20	CESSNA CE-185
Citizen Force	96	MB 326 M/K IMPALA I/II
	15	L-100 HERCULES in civil service
Commandos		13 Air commando squadrons with registered private aircraft
Air-to-Air Missiles	R530	
	R550 Magic	
	SIDEWINDER	
	KUKRI V-3	

c. The South African Navy

(1) Organization.²²⁹ Originally formed to augment the Royal Navy in the defense of the Cape sea route, the South African Navy (SAN) attempted to assume this role alone after the British pullback from east of the Suez. However, creditable development of a blue water navy became impossible after 1978 when France observed the UN arms embargo and cancelled the delivery of two corvettes and two submarines.

Without access to more powerful ships and, more importantly, with the shift in emphasis from open ocean ASW to a mission of counterinsurgency patrols against the possibility of hostile landings, sabotage, and attacks on coastal traffic, the complexion of the SAN has changed in the past five years. British supplied destroyers and frigates have been retired in favor of smaller vessels, and a 900 man marine force added to assist in harbor security. In 1983 the SAN was manned by 5000 men, including the marines, of which 2100 were conscripts, and 2000 Citizens Force reservists.

The Navy infrastructure has also undergone a period of improvement since the Simonstown naval base was transferred from Britain in 1957. In November 1969, the SAAF transferred Langebaan air base to the SAN, and it became SAS Flamingo air-sea rescue base. In 1972, a new base, SAS Hugo Biermann, was opened to accommodate South Africa's new submarine force, and in March 1983 the new

maritime headquarters at Silvermine was opened. In 1980, SAS Hugo Biermann was enlarged, and the naval base at Sailsbury Island, Durban was reopened after being closed for 23 years. Finally, establishment of the Marines in the early 1980's brought the development of a new marine base at Simonstown, called SAS Simonsberg.

(2) SAN Equipment.²³⁰

Submarines	3	DAPHNE Class
Frigates	1	PRESIDENT Class
Fast Attack boats (missile)	8	MINISTER OF DEFENSE Class (6 SKERPION SSM)
	3	(2 SKERPION SSM)
Patrol Boats	5	FORD Class
	2	Modified TON Class
	30	NAMACURRA Class Harbor Patrol Craft
Mine Warfare	6	TON Class Minesweepers
	2	TON Class Minehunters
Auxiliaries	1	Fleet Replenishment Ship
	1	Ocean Hydrographic Ship
	1	Inshore Hydrographic Ship

2. The South African Arms Industry

a. Background

As has been previously discussed, the growing pressures of the early 1960's, culminating with the 1963 voluntary arms embargo, had the effect of increasing the desire of South Africa to become more self-sufficient in defense equipment. By the eve of the 1977 mandatory arms embargo, the combination of South Africa's arms production using local design, license production, and embargo evasion,

coupled with weapons procured prior to 1977, offered South Africa a moderate level of independence from external sources of supply.²³¹

b. Sources of Arms

After the second United Nations arms embargo, South Africa continued to work towards self-sufficiency in arms production. In 1977, according to estimates of the South African Defense White Paper of that year, South Africa's defense industry could produce military equipment adequate for internal protection, but not that required to repel a "conventional external threat."²³² At that time it was estimated that foreign sources of supply were still required. By 1980 new estimates showed that as a result of the concerted effort to mobilize the economy as a part of the Total National Strategy, South Africa was considered to be 80% self-sufficient in overall arms requirements, and 100% independent in infantry arms up to and including armored cars.²³³

Since 1977, South Africa has utilized a number of methods to manufacture or otherwise obtain end-product weapons which could not be manufactured in the country. These methods include:²³⁴

1. Transfer of Technology--In order to acquire the capability to produce an end-product weapon domestically, South Africa could procure a license for production, and build the capability with design and technical assistance from

the weapon's original manufacturer. Once the ability to produce a weapon is acquired, it cannot be withdrawn, even if the seller cancels the license. The Atlas Aircraft Corporation was built with British and Italian personnel and technical assistance.

2. Establishment of a subsidiary--A weapon supplier can evade the arms embargo by transferring an entire industry rather than just a weapon or license. This can be done by opening a subsidiary or branch office in South Africa. For example, this method was used by the British Imperial Chemical Industries, which owns 43% of the South African Explosives and Chemical Industries. South African Explosives and Chemical controls two munitions plants whose entire production is geared towards SADF needs. South Africa has also stated that, under South African law, foreign industries in South Africa can be ordered to convert production to military purposes if required.

3. Investments in producer countries--By underwriting the cost of weapons research and development in another country, South Africa acquires weapons and technology. The link between the South African CACTUS air defense system and the French CROTALE are well known. The systems' characteristics were specified by South Africa, and the Republic paid for 85% of the development costs, working in conjunction with Matra and CSF in France. Other South African links with the French defense industry include procurement of MIRAGE aircraft and associated equipment.²³⁵

4. Defining military equipment as civilian--Suppliers continue to deal successfully with South Africa in material which lies in the gray area between civilian and military use. This equipment includes electronics, radar and communications equipment, computers, and dual use aircraft, such as the Lockheed L-100/C-130. Utilizing "civilian equipment," South Africa installed a communications system useful in reporting guerrilla activities. In addition, in 1980, air commando squadrons flying light aircraft provided aerial reconnaissance for army units.²³⁶

5. Exports of spare parts and equipment for maintenance of military equipment--Although spare parts were covered in both the 1963 and the 1977 arms embargos, no exporting country considered it possible or practical to adhere to these restrictions. Not only was it regarded as contrary to normal commercial practice, but enforcement was difficult at best.

6. Re-exporting of arms by way of a third party--Many exporters of arms insist on provisions against re-export of weapons in their contract. Some, such as Sweden and Switzerland, do not. The Bofors and Oerlikon antiaircraft guns possessed by South Africa were not bought directly from the manufacturer, but through a third party. This was true for South Africa's TIGERCAT surface to air missile system (UK via Jordan), Centurion tanks (UK via Jordan, UK via Israel, UK via India via an arms broker), and Rolls Royce Viper engines for IMPALA aircraft (UK via license to Italy).

7. Dealings with other international "pariah" states--
It is interesting to note that the only major end-product weapons acquired by South Africa since the arms embargo came from another nation which has suffered a degree of international isolation. Israel provided three RESHEF class guided missile patrol boats and the technology to build more of these craft in South Africa. In addition, Israel has transferred the GABRIEL surface to surface missile (called the SKERPIOEN in South Africa) to arm these craft. While relations between South Africa and Israel remain low key, there have been reports that South Africa is interested in acquiring the KFIR aircraft and other military equipment from Israel in exchange for raw materials.²³⁷

8. Smuggling--There are a number of ways of smuggling arms throughout the world, with or without the involvement of the governments. While it is difficult to trace, it seems that rather than drying up South Africa's sources of arms, the 1977 arms embargo had the effect of driving the market underground. There have been sufficient reports of smuggling to South Africa to indicate that South Africa is able to acquire most of the military equipment it requires with little trouble.

9. Use of captured weapons--As the late 1970's and 1980's brought a growing proclivity of South Africa to conduct crossborder, offensive operations against groups such as SWAPO, large amounts of military equipment began to fall into the SADF's hands. Some of this equipment proved useful

enough, or was captured in great enough quantity, to allow its adoption for use by the SADF. It has been reported that SADF units in the operational area have been issued with Soviet RPG-7 rocket launchers as an anti-vehicle weapon.²³⁸ It has also been reported that South African artillery units have been issued with Soviet made antiaircraft artillery and that a training course in the use of this type of equipment had been instituted in South Africa in 1982.²³⁹ Finally, it has also been reported that South Africa had captured a number of SAM-3, SAM-6, and SAM-7 missile batteries in raids into Angola.²⁴⁰

c. The South African Arms Industry and Self-Sufficiency

An examination of the SADF's requirements and the country's ability to meet these requirements leads to a categorization of weapons types and the steps South Africa has taken to acquire them:

1. Items which South Africa is producing, either as its own design or as a modification of imported designs. This includes armored vehicles, soft-skinned vehicles, small arms, explosives, artillery, most ammunition, and some types of missiles.

2. License built items incorporating imported designs and components. This includes light aircraft, combat aircraft up to the MIRAGE F1, missile patrol boats, and some types of missiles.

3. Items in which major investments are now being made to design, develop, and produce local models. These may

be based on existing models produced elsewhere, but which can be built by South Africa, including helicopters, heavy artillery, large naval vessels, and multiple artillery rocket systems.

4. Items which were acquired abroad and modified for South African use, but which South Africa is not attempting to build either because further procurement is not required or because production of the item is clearly beyond South African capabilities. This includes gray area items which can be acquired as civilian use material, such as communications and electronic equipment.

5. Items which South Africa does not possess and is not contemplating production of due to lack of production capability or lack of a requirement. This includes long range maritime patrol aircraft, advanced avionics, electronic countermeasure equipment, and major naval vessels beyond corvettes and submarines.

It seems that, with some important limitations, South Africa produces or is able to acquire sufficient arms to meet any credible or likely threat. Further, a good indication of the country's self-sufficiency is the fact that for the first time in 1982, South Africa attempted to enter the arms export market. At first, during the Falklands conflict, there were rumors that South Africa had supplied Argentina with weapons and spare parts. Then, in October 1982, South Africa made a surprise appearance at the Greek

Defendory Exposition as the beginning of a major effort to increase the foreign sale of arms.²⁴¹ South Africa offered armored vehicles, artillery, missiles, and a wide variety of small arms, ammunition, and electronic equipment.

3. Economic Assets

In spite of the economic constraints on South Africa discussed above, the country's economy remains in many ways a valuable asset. Natural and human resources, commitment to growth-oriented free enterprise, and the ability to attract substantial foreign capital have resulted in great economic advances in spite of the limitations imposed by apartheid and growing defense expenditures. Further, the Botha government's attempts to mobilize the economy to support the Total National Strategy, as embodied in points 7, 8, and 12 of the Twelve Point Plan, have made the business sector a valuable ally in meeting the Total Onslaught. This economic viability has been useful in a number of ways as South Africa attempts to meet the "onslaught" and improve its international position.

a. Transportation Infrastructure²⁴²

South Africa has the most highly developed transportation system on the African continent. Internally railroads link all main population centers and are capable of moving large quantities of bulk goods over long distances. In addition, except in the lightly populated northwest, South Africa is criss-crossed by a dense system of modern,

all weather roads. Externally, the country is served by six major ports--Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Capetown, Richards Bay, and Saldanha Bay--and a number of smaller ones. South Africa also maintains a claim to Walvis Bay, the only deepwater port in Namibia.

The transportation infrastructure is strategically important to South Africa for two reasons. First, the highly developed transportation system allows the rapid movement of SADF units in response to threats. Second, all of the states of southern Africa rely on South African transport facilities for the import and export of goods. Swaziland, for example, is dependent on the ports of Durban and Richards Bay for nearly all exports. This dependence gives South Africa a lever to use in relations with its neighbors. It also provides a buffer for South Africa against the threat of sanctions. As South Africans are quick to point out, any sanctions against South Africa would be just as damaging to the rest of southern Africa as they would be to South Africa.²⁴³

b. Strategic Resources

While lacking in oil and water, South Africa has proved to be a storehouse of valuable minerals. Mining accounted for 12% of GDP between 1972 and 1977. By 1979, this share had risen to 19% of GDP. Gold, Platinum group metals, and diamonds are especially important to the South African economy as major sources of income. In addition,

large reserves of coal and uranium give the country an alternative to oil in the production of energy. Finally, South Africa possesses major shares of the free world's known reserves of many important minerals, such as chromium, manganese, antimony, copper, and titanium.

Maintaining access to strategic minerals has long been a concern of the industrial states of the West, and this in itself is an asset to South Africa. In addition, these resources provide other benefits to the Republic. For example, the value of gold exports in the 1970s in part financed the military buildup of that period. In addition, the employment of large numbers of foreign workers in the mining sector provides the Republic as host country with a certain amount of leverage over the countries which supply these laborers. Mozambique, for example, is dependent upon the income earned by expatriate workers for foreign currency.

c. Economic Strength

In spite of the economic constraints discussed earlier, the fact that South Africa has the most developed, strongest economy in southern Africa remains a valuable asset for two major reasons. First, South Africa's strong economy has allowed economic integration with Western economies. Some 350 American companies had a total of more than \$1.7 billion in direct investments in South Africa in 1978, with outstanding loans and credits of U.S. banks totalling another \$2.2 billion. During the same time

period, South Africa was the recipient of 20% of all of the United Kingdom's foreign investment.²⁴⁴ This closeness to Western economies is important in providing South Africa with sources of international capital, and in providing further protection against the threat of sanctions.

Second, South Africa's economic influence in southern Africa gives the Republic further ways in which to influence the actions of its neighbors. By 1978, South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa totalled \$1 billion in exports and \$1/2 billion in imports annually, accounting for 70% of the GNP of the nations of southern Africa.²⁴⁵ In addition, South Africa is the primary source of imports by neighboring countries, the main supplier of investment funds and management skills, and a key user of both goods and labor from black southern Africa.

4. Population Assets

While the fact that an oppressed, majority, black population is a constraint upon South Africa, there is also an important population asset which must be considered. That is the unity of the white population when issues of defense are involved. This is not to say that all the whites in South Africa will be united behind the government on every issue. There is a traditional split between Afrikaner and English-speaking South Africans to be considered, and the newer split between the National Party and the recently formed Conservative Party. What is important within the

context of South African Defense policy is how white South Africans support the government on defense matters and how willing white South Africans are to endure military service in support of, as they see it, their way of life.

With regard for white support for government defense policies, it is useful to examine a public opinion survey taken by Geldenjuys in 1982.²⁴⁶ This survey found that the government's explanation of the communist threat was shared by the majority of the white population. Further, there were also indications that the majority of the white population supported government defense policies such as cross-border operations in opposing the threat.

In addition, white South Africans have endured an ever-increasing burden with regard to military service with little outward display of opposition. The amount of time spent in uniform by the average white male has already been discussed, but what is important to this discussion is the fact that this increasing commitment has been accepted with little opposition and minimal evidence of draft evasion.

This does not mean that opposition to government defense policies and conscription could not increase in response to increased pressure on South Africa, as happened in Rhodesia in the waning days of the Smith regime. It does mean that as long as the government can redirect, diffuse, or effectively respond to these pressures, white approval will probably remain high, allowing the government to rely

on a continued high level of support from the nation's white population.

D. RESPONSES--SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY

In meeting the perceived threats to its security, South Africa has taken a number of actions to ensure its continued security. These actions are devised within parameters defined on one hand by the constraints under which South Africa must operate, and on the other by the assets and strengths which South Africa possesses. These actions in total make up South Africa's defense policies.

It is important to note that, in the case of South Africa, these policies are not only designed to ensure the survival of the regime, but the survival of the government of the National Party and, by extension, the survival of the Afrikaner volk. This includes ensuring the supremacy of whites in South Africa.

For convenience, actions taken by South Africa are divided below into military, political, and economic areas. In many cases it is problematical whether an action is classified under one heading or another, for all of these actions are related and interdependent, in many cases overlapping into all three areas. The classification is done for convenience of discussion only.

1. Military Actions

a. Maintenance of a Strong Defense Force

The historical connection between the growing perception of threat to South Africa which rose out of the

early 1960's and the increasing strength and influence of the SADF has already been discussed. Also discussed was the changing organizational and training orientation of the SADF in response to changing threat perceptions. Finally, the strength of the SADF in comparison with the armed forces of the rest of southern Africa has also been noted.

Maintenance of a strong defense force is important to South Africa for several reasons:

1. In view of the possibility of internal unrest, the SADF performs important functions in support of the SAP in enforcement of internal security laws.
2. In view of the hostility of the rest of Africa to South Africa's internal policies, the Defense Force provides protection against external attack, either conventional or unconventional.
3. The SADF is also capable of carrying out a variety of operations either directly against or in support of dissidents operating against neighboring governments in support of the political or economic objectives of the South African government. These types of operations will be discussed in greater detail below.
4. The strength of the Defense Force protects South Africa from outside interference in South Africa's internal affairs, allowing the Republic to institute its own brand of internal reform without regard for the opinion of the rest of the international community:

Another vital reason for the strength of the South African Defense Force is that this country is bringing about far-reaching changes in its Constitution and is abandoning the Westminster form of government. It wishes to do so without outside interference, and today the South African Defense Force is providing this country with the umbrella of confidence it requires to bring about this reform."²⁴⁷

b. Offensive Warfare--Crossborder Operations

In 1983, General J. J. Geldenhuys told a seminar on revolutionary warfare that it was more economical to fight a terrorist war offensively than defensively. "You don't win any war through defense...it is generally more economical to fight a war offensively."²⁴⁸

Since 1975, the SADF has acted offensively by crossing into the territory of South Africa's neighbors. A variety of crossborder operations have been conducted to achieve a variety of different results.

(1) Goals of Crossborder Operations. Attacks on the territory of South Africa's neighbors can be seen as having a number of different goals. First, and probably most importantly, these actions are intended to cripple the ability of guerrilla forces to conduct raids into South Africa or Namibia by attacking guerrilla bases. In 1983, General Vilojoen, Chief of the SADF, said he believed it possible to prevent the ANC from intensifying a sabotage campaign in South Africa by shutting the group's military wing out of neighboring black countries, saying, "...if we deny them bases in our neighboring states either through the

cooperation of the states themselves...or by military action against them, then they have only two ways to come in, by air or by sea. It makes it almost impossible for them."²⁴⁹ Therefore, preemption to delay or destroy an insurgent military capability is an important consideration.

Second, and related to attempts to shut guerrillas out of neighboring states, South African cross-border operations are intended to make a state which harbors anti-South African groups pay a price for their actions.

...any government so misguided as to offer its territory as a launching pad for terrorism against the south must accept the inevitable consequences...there has never been any doubt about these consequences. It is the clear and repeated stated policy of the South African government that it will take whatever measures are necessary to counter political violence. That policy includes striking at terrorists wherever they may be. The internationally recognized right of preemptive strike is a firmly established element of South Africa's defense strategy.²⁵⁰

In this context, then, crossborder operations are used not only to hinder guerrilla operations, but to serve as a warning to neighboring states not to harbor anti-South African groups through offensive deterrence.

Third, crossborder operations are intended to punish guerrilla groups and neighboring countries for attacks conducted within South Africa. The Republic has stated that lack of response to terrorist attack merely encourages further attacks, and it is against this background that South Africa has warned its neighbors against providing sanctuary from which these attacks can be made. Therefore,

crossborder attacks in response to attacks on South Africa are another use of this strategy.

A fourth rationale for pursuing crossborder operations is to demonstrate to South Africa's white population that action can be and is taken against the forces arrayed against the country. While this remains more an implied than a stated strategy, the National Party government from the time of Verwoerd has remained concerned about the confidence of the white population. Therefore, policies such as the growing strength and successful employment of the SADF, the growing independence of the South African arms industry, and the general ability of the country to "go it alone" are well reported in the South African press. As General Malan has stated, "no self-respecting country that had the welfare and security of its people at heart could allow terrorist organizations to try and jeopardize its future."²⁵¹

A fifth reason for the use of crossborder operations is in the "hot pursuit" of guerrillas who have carried out attacks on South Africa or South African forces, and have fled into a neighboring state. South Africa maintains it has a legal right under international law to conduct "hot pursuit" operations as part of its right of self-defense.

Finally, crossborder operations have been conducted in support of political goals, such as in assisting

anti-government guerrillas in neighboring states, in support of South Africa's campaigns of destabilization, and to damage the economic infrastructure of other countries to ensure their continued dependence upon South Africa.

(2) Types of Crossborder Operations. Just as South Africa sees a number of different purposes associated with the conduct of crossborder operations, so too does the Republic utilize a number of different types of crossborder operations. These can be classified as follows:²⁵²

1. Reconnaissance flights over neighboring countries, such as those conducted routinely over the southern Angolan provinces of Mocamedes, Huila, and Cuando-Cubango. The purpose of this type of operations is to gather information about guerrilla bases and movements. On at least one occasion these flights have resulted in an air-to-air encounter with the Angolan Air Force, resulting in the destruction of an Angolan MIG-21 by an SAAF MIRAGE.

2. Air attacks and associated battle damage assessment flights, either as operations in their own right, such as the air raid on Maputo, or in support of ground operations, such as during various operations in Southern Angola.

3. Small scale, commando type ground actions by the Army, such as the raid into Maseru, Lesotho in December 1982, or the dramatic long-range attack on the Petrangol State oil refinery in Luanda in November 1981. These operations are conducted by a combination of air, sea, and land forces.

4. Large-scale, combined arms operations in neighboring countries, conducted so far only in Angola. Recently, the forces involved in these types of operations have grown tremendously in size and capability. For example, Operation Protea in August 1981 involved the largest mobilization of the SADF since World War II. The force involved was made up of three infantry brigades totalling 11,000 men, three squadrons of MIRAGE and BUCCANEER aircraft, 90 OLIFANT tanks, heavy artillery, and 250 armored cars.²⁵³

c. Maritime Strategy

Landward defense has always received the major share of the attention and budget due to South Africa's perception of the threats it faced. Due to the lack of naval capabilities among South Africa's neighbors, it was logical that the Army and Air Force take precedence.

However, the role assigned to the Navy has changed the most drastically of any branch of the SADF since 1975. This change has been due more to necessity rather than choice. First, the unilateral abrogation of the Simons-town agreement by Britain in 1975 meant South Africa no longer needed to maintain a British style, blue water, anti-submarine warfare oriented naval force. Second, the 1977 arms embargo cost South Africa its sources of larger naval vessels and submarines, and caused the navy to turn to smaller, missile-armed craft which could be domestically produced.

Under these changing conditions, the SAN has evolved into a force oriented towards coastal defense, harbor security, support of counterinsurgency and cross-border operations, and protection of South Africa's offshore economic zone. Protection of the Cape Sea route was renounced in 1978 as a response to the UN arms embargo, although South Africa has since offered to reassume this responsibility as a consideration for Western favor. In 1981 the Navy added a Marine force to perform duties associated with harbor security and counterinsurgency operations.

2. Political Actions

South Africa has instituted a number of actions internally and externally which can be grouped under the general heading of political actions. Some of these actions were taken in response to a threat. Others were intended to deal with perceived constraints. Some have been achieved through military action, but are still part of a political program.

a. Effective Mobilization of Manpower for Defense

As discussed previously, manpower shortages affect the SADF's military capabilities in a number of ways. The nation's limited white manpower reserves limit the strength of the SADF, causes competition between the military and civilian sectors for available skills, and place a heavy burden of military service on the white male population.

In order to efficiently utilize the existing manpower pool, and to increase the size of that pool, the

government of South Africa has taken a number of positive steps to ensure the manpower requirements of the SADF can be met.

(1) Conscription. In 1982, a new law affecting National Service was enacted. In this law, National Service requirements were increased from 240 total days to 720 total days spread over 12 years instead of over eight. In addition, all men below age 55 who had not previously been drafted or who had only one year of National Service became liable for 30 days basic training and 12 days call-up a year until age 55. As a result, it has been estimated that the pool of white males available for call-up would increase by 800,000.²⁵⁴ See Table 6 for a survey of the changing service requirements for white males.

(2) Utilization of Non-Whites. In recent years, the South African government has taken steps to expand the participation of other population groups in the military. As already mentioned, coloureds have served in the SADF since 1963, when the Cape Coloured Corps was reestablished. By 1977, the government had accepted in principal the recommendation of a special commission of coloured affairs which called for National Service and a cadet force for coloureds.²⁵⁵ In the creation of an Indian training battalion in 1975, Asians were also admitted into the SADF. However, induction of men of these groups remains limited due to shortages in facilities. In 1983, for example, the SADF accepted 153 of 608 Asians, and 1600 of 2300 coloured volunteers.²⁵⁶

The arming of blacks has proceeded at an even slower pace. It was noted previously that, in the 1970's, while Minister of Defense P. W. Botha was opposed to the involvement of blacks in combat training. However, by 1975, training for black volunteers had been instituted in the SADF. By 1978 the Army's black complement had grown to battalion strength, and the 21st South African Infantry Battalion of 515 men with white officers had been formed. This battalion has served on the Angolan border with distinction.

In addition to the 21st, the SADF has also trained six ethnic battalions of Namibians, which have also served border duty. These battalions now form the SWATF. Finally, the SADF has been involved in the training of the defense forces of the "independent" homelands, which, in some cases, are closely integrated with the Army's counterinsurgency forces.²⁵⁷

The issue still to be resolved with regard to the inclusions of non-whites in the SADF is that of required National Service for Asians and coloureds now that these groups have received their "political dispensations" under the new constitution. In this question, Botha is faced with a political tightrope. On one hand, he will be pressured by whites to include these groups in mandatory service once they have been given political rights. On the other, prominent coloured and Asian groups, such as the

Coloured Labor Party, which will have to support the new Constitution if it is to have any credibility, have already rejected mandatory military service until "all people are free in a new South Africa."²⁵⁸

(3) Immigrants.²⁵⁹ As the manpower demands of the SADF increased, the government also began to look towards immigrants as a source of men for military service. Until recently, an immigrant to South Africa could declare he did not want South African citizenship and thereby not be eligible for conscription without losing permanent residence status. Pressures to involve immigrants in the SADF began in the 1970's. In 1978, the South African Citizenship Act was amended to reduce the period required for naturalization from five years to two to make naturalized citizens available to the Defense Force sooner after their arrival.

In 1984, the final step was taken in closing what was perceived as the immigrant loophole with the introduction of the South African Citizen Amendment Bill. Under this bill, all aliens who have been permanent residents of South Africa for more than five years obtain South African citizenship automatically by naturalization. In addition, the bill also provides that such aliens may declare they do not want to become naturalized citizens, but by doing so they will lose their permanent residence benefits. "Now immigrants will have to make the same sacrifices as South African citizens."²⁶⁰

b. The Search for Security²⁶¹

As South Africa is a moderate sized power, seemingly surrounded by potential enemies, a common element of all past South African defense policies has been the search for allies. As previously discussed, South Africa has made strenuous efforts to find foreign allies. Since 1960, significant resources have been expended in enlarging and modernizing naval communications, docking, and repair facilities in hopes of attracting allies and gaining entrance into a Western defense alliance. During the same period, South Africa made attempts to persuade moderate African states to enter into regional security arrangements, and to advance the idea of southern hemisphere security among potential Latin American allies.

Undoubtedly, South Africa's preference would still be a defense alliance with the West. The advantages of such an arrangement would be the deterrent effect it would have on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and on the anticipated "Total Onslaught" directed against South Africa. It would also show black Africa that white rule in South Africa was underwritten by the Western powers. Finally, such an alliance would have a beneficial effect on white confidence within the Republic, and give South Africa access to Western arms and military technology. However, it is apparent that potential Western allies would demand a higher price in the form of internal change for such an arrangement than South Africa

would be willing to pay. Only the prospects of imminent collapse or a massive invasion would cause South Africa to agree to any major dismantling of apartheid.

While South Africa has apparently written off any chance of a closer alignment with the West for the time being, the prospects for regional arrangements appear to be improving. South African efforts in this direction have followed two different tracks. The more recent of these is Botha's Constellation of States, which was originally intended to include eight to ten southern African countries. This mainly economic approach also hoped for positive spillover into political and security functions. At present, the Constellation plan seems to have narrowed to include only South Africa and the homelands.

The other track was perceived before the Constellation, and can be seen as a logical continuation of programs aimed at black states beginning in 1970 with the offer of non-aggression pacts by South Africa, and continuing through the Outward Movement and Detente programs. These programs of contact with other African countries on the basis of economic and technical programs have continued at low levels all along. Further, as recent events have shown, when South Africa added destabilization in earnest to its programs in the 1980's, it was able to extract even greater contacts from its neighbors. The Nkomati Accord and Cahora Bassa treaty with Mozambique and the reported non-aggression pact

with Swaziland are good examples of this new Outward Movement conducted by force of arms.

c. Destabilization

(1) Background. In early 1983, The New York Times quoted P. W. Botha as saying that South Africa would consider giving aid to anti-communist guerrillas in southern Africa if they asked for it, saying that if "fellow Africans were threatened by the evils of communism, then South Africa would assist them if assistance was required."²⁶² Further, in the same interview, he said South Africa would be willing to enter into non-aggression pacts with neighbors, irrespective of their political systems. These agreements would not allow either country to be used as a point of attack for insurgents. Finally, Mr. Botha denied reports South Africa was trying to destabilize governments in neighboring countries, but hinted that, if neighboring countries allowed terrorists to use their territories as points from which to attack, South Africa could do the same.²⁶³

This interview provided an insight into South Africa's destabilization programs. The instruments used by the Republic in carrying out these programs were aid to anti-communist guerrillas and the use of South African territory as points from which to attack. South Africa's goal was to push the bases of potential adversary groups back from its borders: thus the offer of mutual non-aggression pacts.

The pressures on South Africa grew in the 1970's as its neighbors acted in support of internal and external opposition to apartheid. South Africa rightly saw these pressures as attempts to destabilize the Republic. According to one South African analyst, the ANC made no secret of its aims to seize power in South Africa, and six black states in the region, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Tanzania, were members of the frontline group dedicated to assist in this attempt.²⁶⁴ However, South Africa also came to see destabilization as a two-way street, and became involved in actions aimed at improving its own security at the expense of its neighbors. As one observer of South Africa wrote, "The South African political system is under challenge, and the challengers of such a powerful system must accept the consequences of 'declaring war' against it...there should therefore be no surprise when Pretoria flexes its military and economic muscle against weaker organized opposition."²⁶⁵

(2) The Destabilization Program. The destabilization of its neighbors has become one of the most important South African concerns since 1978. However, it was in 1981 that this program apparently came to the fore. The increasing importance of this program was probably due to three separate considerations. First, the end of the 1970's brought P. W. Botha to power, which had the effect of increasing the military influence, through the new importance

attached to the SSC, in the South African government. In addition, Botha came to power with much of his potential opposition discredited by the scandal which deposed Vorster. This allowed Botha much leeway in the implementation of the Total National Strategy.

Second, the defeat of the South African supported forces of moderation in the form of Bishop Muzrwa and the victory of Mugabe in Zimbabwe completed the encirclement of South Africa and Namibia by potentially unfriendly countries. Finally, the events of the 1970's had shown South Africa that not only could the west and the moderate African countries not be trusted, as exhibited by their failure to support South Africa in Angola in 1975, but that the SADF was fully capable of handling itself in confrontation with black armies and the Cubans.

While crossborder operations from Namibia into Angola had been conducted for some time, 1981 brought a new dimension to the use of these operations. Operation Protea in that year was more than a campaign to harass SWAPO. It was a major invasion of southern Angola which established South African military supremacy over much of southern Angola, and allowed UNITA to expand its operations against the Angolan government.²⁶⁶ After 1981 it seems likely that South African actions in Angola were not aimed at overthrowing the MPLA regime or at installing a friendly UNITA government in its place. It is more likely South Africa's interests lay in economic dislocation aimed at keeping Angola on the defensive.

For its part, Zambia has been described by South Africa as a center for subversion and as a "Marxist satellite state engaged in Soviet-inspired conspiracy against the Republic."²⁶⁸ In response to the alleged Zambian threat, South Africa has reportedly trained up to 600 Zambian dissidents and been involved in at least two conspiracies in that country since 1980. In addition, South Africa has also engaged in economic destabilization against Zambia. Since 1980 direct attacks have been made against Zambian economic targets from the Caprivi Strip, including one in April 1982 by two battalions of the SADF resulting in a decline in agricultural production and a deterrence of mineral prospecting in the area. In July 1982, southern Zambia was declared a disaster zone, partly due to these deprivations.

Most incidents involving Botswana have been clashes between Botsawanan and South African forces around the Caprivi Strip, and attacks on South African refugees in Botswana. Protests by Botswana have elicited little response from South Africa or, in some cases, simply flat denial that any incident ever occurred. In spite of these incidents, Botswana has not suffered the same kinds of attacks that other neighbors of South Africa have. One possible reason for this is that Botswana keeps tight control over South African refugees and is careful to discourage any attempts either to smuggle arms across the border to South Africa, or to allow armed attacks against South Africa or Bophuthatswana to originate in Botswana.

Zimbabwe is a special case for South Africa. It is the only state in the region in which there appeared there was a chance a stable, multi-racial society could be established. It has also been seen by South Africa to be the only state in the region outside of the Republic capable of becoming an industrial power. Shortly after Zimbabwean independence, South Africa transported a number of former black Rhodesian troops and ZIPRA guerrillas to camps in the northern Transvaal, from where the Ndebele language "Radio Truth" operates. In Zimbabwe, South Africa has also apparently been involved in sabotage, such as the destruction of two-thirds of the country's air force at Gweru in July 1982, and the heavy handed use of economic pressures, such as the withdrawal of railroad equipment needed to haul the country's record harvest in 1981. South Africa could hardly deny involvement in the so-called "month of the hawks" in December 1982, when the destruction of the oil depot at Beria by commandos, sabotage to the rail route between Maputo and Chicualacuala, and a supposed labor dispute on the South African railway lines to Zimbabwe all combined to put a serious economic squeeze on Zimbabwe. While fuel supplies eventually reached the country, South Africa made a point of just how much pressure it could apply.²⁶⁹

In Lesotho, collusion between the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) and South Africa is an open secret. LLA personnel shelter in South Africa and must cross its

territory to make their attacks. South Africa has also conducted crossborder operations into Lesotho against purported ANC targets, such as the 9 December 1982 raid on Maseru in which 37 people were killed. Economic pressures on Lesotho, which as a land locked country entirely surrounded by South Africa is highly vulnerable, have resulted in the expulsion of ANC personnel.

Swaziland has, like Botswana, always been careful in not giving unnecessary offense to South Africa. Alarmed by the Maseru raid, Swaziland reacted by rounding up ANC refugees and either expelling them or removing them to a detention camp at Makerns.

Finally, South Africa's attitude towards Mozambique has been ambivalent. On one hand, when Mozambique achieved independence South Africa moved to help run Port Maputo and to upgrade its facilities. In addition, South Africa continues to accept 60,000 Mozambiquan workers, remitting up to \$30 million a year in foreign exchange. On the other hand, however, South Africa has conducted raids into Mozambique, such as those in January 1981 on Matola and in May 1983 on Maputo itself. Further, there is little doubt South Africa supports the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). At the time of Zimbabwe's independence, the MNR headquarters, personnel, and radio station was moved from Zimbabwe to a camp at Phalaborwa in the northern Transvaal. Since its connection was established with South Africa, the

MNR has concentrated not on establishing "liberated zones," but in the disruption of Mozambique's economy. It has concentrated its attacks on the rail line from Maputo to Zimbabwe, on the oil pipeline and railway connection between Beria and Mutri, and on the rail and road routes from Malawi to the sea. These attacks, coupled with the current drought in southern Africa and the mismanagement of the Mozambique economy have all but ruined Mozambique, and in great part led to the conditions which caused the consumation of the Nkomati accord between that country and South Africa.

(3) The Benefits of Destabilization. In conducting its widespread campaign of destabilization against its neighbors, South Africa achieves a variety of benefits. These include:

1. Improved security for South Africa as the countries on its borders are put on the defensive and are unlikely to be able to conduct any type of coordinated conventional attack on South Africa. In addition, potential guerrilla groups are pushed back from South Africa's borders, losing support as countries such as Mozambique can no longer afford the cost of supporting them imposed by South Africa.

2. Keeping South Africa's neighbors weak and economically dependent on South Africa. Disruption of economies also serves to discredit Marxism in Africa, thereby short-circuiting the "Marxist onslaught." Finally, keeping its neighbors weak and dependent on South Africa brings about P. W. Botha's Constellation by other than voluntary means.

3. The negotiation of the long-offered non-aggression pacts with black states is achieved. These pacts have been signed with Mozambique and Swaziland, and high level negotiations have been underway with Angola for over a year. These pacts not only increase South Africa's security, but give the Republic a measure of long-desired international legitimacy. It is not coincidence that a major Botha trip through various European countries followed on the heels of the Nkomati/Cahora Bassa agreements.

d. The South African Nuclear Program²⁷⁰

Whether or not South Africa has a "bomb in the basement" has been the subject of much speculation since the late 1970's. The alleged detection of a nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic in 1979 has alternately been blamed on India, South Africa, Israel, and Israel and South Africa acting in concert. Conflicting statements by South African government officials and the country's refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty serve only to further muddy the issue. However, on at least one aspect of South African nuclear development there is agreement. That is, that South Africa has the capacity to design and produce nuclear weapons.

Taken within the context of the Total National Strategy, there could be two possible answers to the question of whether South Africa does or does not have nuclear weapons. First, evidence indicating possession of such a

weapon could be a South African hoax, designed to instill doubt in the minds of potential enemies. Second, that South Africa does indeed have nuclear weapons. With the Total Strategy in mind, it seems likely that if South Africa were able to add yet another weapon to its arsenal it would do so, and if it were threatened enough, it would use it.

If it is assumed that South Africa possesses nuclear weapons, it becomes necessary to speculate on how and when it might use them. The following possible employment options are possible:

1. To meet the worst case conventional scenario, that of a massive Soviet intervention in support of groups opposing the government.
2. To use in a maritime environment against forces possibly blockading South Africa.
3. To use as a demonstration deterrent.
4. To break up large enemy troop concentrations threatening South Africa's industrial and population centers.
5. To use as a weapon of last resort, if the survival of Afrikanerdom were threatened.
6. To use as a tactical battlefield weapon in conventional warfare.
7. To use as a strategic deterrent to threaten its neighbors in the event of attack.

3. Economic Actions

There are three main thrusts to South Africa's economic actions taken in support of strategic doctrine.

These are to maintain government integration with the economic sector as called for by the Total National Strategy, to increase the economic dependence of southern Africa on South Africa, and to ensure self-sufficiency in strategic materials, i.e., oil.

a. The Economy and the Government

Much has already been said concerning the importance of the economy to the South African government and the attempts of the government to further utilize the business sector through the Total National Strategy. The government relies on the private sector to increase economic integration with Western economies, to provide contacts with Western technologies and capital, to provide skill and capital for the development of the Homelands and for economic contacts with the rest of Africa, and to provide the research and development for the growing arms industry. In addition, within the context of the Constellation of States, the strength of the economic sector is vital to provide economic links within the southern Africa region.

In order to encourage the participation of business in required programs, the government, under the Twelve-Point Plan, has committed itself to a free enterprise economy. Economic growth is stimulated by government action, with recent trends towards a welcome deregulation of the economic sector. Government action has also encouraged foreign investment through programs such as the 1979 introduction

of the financial Rand, designed to permit nonresidents to import investment capital.

The Botha government realizes it requires the assistance of the economic sector to carry out its programs, and business has responded to this challenge.

b. The Economic Dependence of Southern Africa²⁷¹

As seen previously, a major thrust of South African foreign policy for over two decades has been the attempts of the government to build economic ties to other African states and hope for positive spillover in other areas, such as political and security. To this end, South Africa has offered aid, capital, and skilled assistance to neighboring countries. It has also used the force of the most powerful economy on the continent to increase the dependence of other countries on the South African economy.

South Africa's regional domination is as pervasive economically as it is militarily. The Republic produces 77% of the Gross National Product of Africa south of Zaire and Tanzania, and makes up two thirds of the output of coal, iron, wheat, maize, electrical power, and rail transport. About 90% of the regions' energy consumption occurs in South Africa, and South Africa's per capita GNP of \$2200 a year is three times the regional average.

The trade of all SADCC countries depends heavily on South Africa. More importantly, this dependence is all one way. South Africa has no reciprocal dependence on its

neighbors, as its trade is widely diversified, exporting less to all of Africa than to Britain or Switzerland and importing an insignificant amount from its neighbors.

As a result of the economic power of South Africa, the dream of an anti-South African regional economic community will remain a dream. South Africa will continue to dominate the region's economic activity, and will continue to possess and use powerful economic weapons against its neighbors in the context of the Total National Strategy.

c. Self-Sufficiency in Strategic Materials

As the 1973 Arab oil embargo pointed out, South Africa was vulnerable to disruption in its energy supply. Since the enactment of that embargo, South Africa has taken steps to reduce its dependence on foreign sources of energy. These steps have been varied, and include several major programs.

The first response to the embargo was stockpiling of oil. As previously noted, in 1983 it was speculated that South Africa had amassed a strategic oil reserve equal to three years normal consumption.²⁷² This meant that South Africa had more oil in reserve relative to the size of its economy than any other oil importing nation.

Second, South Africa has continued to seek domestic sources of oil. For several years the government has financed the exploration of the SOEKOR company, which has been drilling both within the country and in offshore waters. In 1982, these efforts resulted in the discovery

of a "promising" find at an offshore site south of Mossel Bay in the Indian Ocean.²⁷³ However, the search for a commercially exploitable discovery has still failed to reveal a reliable source of oil.

To counteract the lack of domestic oil sources, South Africa has turned to alternative forms of energy. As a large producer of coal, the Republic has established a large coal fired power industry. Additionally, new sources of hydroelectric power have been obtained through deals with neighboring countries for South African investment, such as the Cahora Bassa project in Mozambique. Finally, South Africa has long been involved in programs to obtain oil from coal. In 1950, SASOL I was constructed, and production of 4500-5000 barrels of oil a day was begun in 1955. SASOL II, announced in 1974, was recently scheduled to come on line with a capacity of 45,000 barrels a day. In 1979, further plans were announced for the construction of SASOL III.²⁷⁴ SASOL I and II are expected to provide one third of the country's fuel needs by the mid-1980's.

South Africa has also turned to nuclear power. A nuclear power station was begun at Koeberg in 1976, consisting of two French-built 922 megawatt reactors. In spite of sabotage to the installation in 1982, the Koeberg station was able to start up on 14 March 1984.²⁷⁵

Finally, in its quest for energy sources, South Africa has turned to new technologies beyond the coal to oil

conversion process. In 1981, it was announced that the country would install the largest solar energy system in the southern hemisphere at Betty's Bay to power telecommunications installations.²⁷⁶

IV. CONCLUSIONS

South African strategic doctrine developed in response to a set of threats, constraints, and assets which are inherent in the nature of the South African physical, social, economic, political, and defense situation. While the roots of this doctrine can be traced back to the 1950's and 1960's, its present character has been shaped primarily by rapid changes in the country's position caused by the increasing pressures of the 1970's.

The pattern of South Africa's actions over the past 36 years is one of both constancy and change. The constants of strategy derive from enduring constraints and threats, such as manpower limitations, the country's population makeup, and its geographic position, and in the white commitment to apartheid. Changes have been linked to new perceptions of threats, assets, or constraints. These include the growing strength of the SADF, changes in the political shape of southern Africa, and the success of some of South Africa's policies, such as destabilization.

Despite many flaws in South African strategic thinking over the past twenty-five years, South Africa has shown itself able to rapidly adapt to changes in its position and to the threats and opportunities it perceives. These changes have ranged from the disruption of oil supplies, to growing

international pressures, to almost overnight change in the governments of southern Africa. Especially since the assumption of power of P. W. Botha, South Africa has acted and reacted to new threats and changing circumstances forcefully, vigorously, and independently, and South African policies have become increasingly tough, flexible, and aggressive. Based on the apparent success of these policies, it seems likely that in the short term, South Africa will move in new, more independent directions. The implications for the West are clear. As the Republic perceives its best opportunities are related to "going it alone," and as its capability to do so increases, Western countries will have less opportunity to influence the direction of South Africa's policies.

For South Africa, in spite of its new aggressiveness and growth in capability, as long as apartheid remains the main factor in the country's ideology and institutions, the range of choices available to planners will become more limited, and the use of the military will probably become even more attractive.

APPENDIX A

THE 12-POINT PLAN

The 12-point plan, as spelled out by Mr. P. W. Botha in his address to the National Party Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979, reads as follows:

- Point 1: The recognition and acceptance of the existence of multinationalism and of minorities in the Republic of South Africa.
- Point 2: The acceptance of vertical differentiation with a built-in principle of self-determination at as many levels as possible.
- Point 3: The establishment of constitutional structures which make provision for the complete independence of the various black nations in the RSA, meaningful consolidation of the black states and areas and the acceptance of a socio-economic programme directed at the development of such black states and areas.
- Point 4: The willingness to cooperate as equals and to consult on matters of common interest, with a balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community, and the removal of hurtful unnecessary discriminatory measures.
- Point 5: The acceptance of the principle that where at all possible each population group should have its own schools and live in its own community as being fundamental to social contentment. In my view this is not discrimination, it is the recognition of each others' rights. The preparedness to consult as equals on matters of common interest with a sound balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community.
- Point 6: I have said that those discriminatory measures that are unnecessary and create bad feeling should be removed...But I am not in favour of a system of compulsory integration in South Africa, and I am not in favour of endangering my own people's right to self-determination.

- Point 7: The recognition of economic interdependence and the properly planned utilisation of manpower.
- Point 8: Development of peaceful constellation of Southern African states with respect for each other's cultures, traditions and ideals. To talk of a federation or a confederation at this stage would, in my view, be premature. A pact between states becomes possible only when the will is there. One first has to make all those states equal through independence, and then leave it to them to decide what they want to belong to.
- Point 9: South Africa's firm determination to defend itself against interference from outside in every possible way. And allow me to say here tonight, not boastfully, but we are better able tonight to defend South Africa militarily than ever before in the country's history. And I want to warn those who think that we practise our politics from a position of weakness: We are not speaking from a position of weakness, we are speaking from a position of decency. If they want to test us, our strength, we will hit back for the sake of South Africa's self-respect.
- Point 10: As far as possible, a policy of neutrality in the conflict between super powers, with priority given to Southern African interests.
- Point 11: The maintenance of effective decision-making by the State, which rests on a strong Defence Force to guarantee orderly government as well as efficient, clean administration. Clean administration is essential at all levels. And strong security forces with contented members are of the utmost importance in today's dangerous world.
- Point 12: The maintenance of free enterprise as the basis of our economic and financial policy. This also presupposes the most effective training and utilisation of manpower.

APPENDIX B

MISSIONS OF THE SADF AS DEFINED IN THE 1982 WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE

	Conventional	Counterinsurgency	Other
Army	1. Maintain a balanced and prepared land force in order to discourage or repulse conventional, semi-conventional or insurgency attacks against the RSA and SWA. 2. Conventional warfare training to increase readiness of the conventional force.	2. Preparation of a COIN Force for anti-terrorist operations in RSA. 3. Area protection by Commandos for protection, intelligence, early warning and initial operations until additional forces arrive. 4. Support of the SAP in combatting terrorism.	1. Create goodwill and establish & maintain sound relations with other population groups in areas where an Army presence is maintained.
Air Force	1. Ensure safety of SWA Territory. 2. Provide air cover. 3. Air traffic, air defense, and air defense artillery coordination by air space control. 4. Point defense of vital areas by Missile/AAA systems.	1. Provide air support to the SA army, SAP and SAR Railway Police during COIN and other Security Force actions. 2. Ensure safety of SWA territory. 3. Conduct pre-emptive strikes. 4. Provide air reconnaissance.	1. Carry out air-sea rescue in Southern Atlantic and Indian Ocean. 2. Provide assistance to other government departments by providing air transport. 3. Air support for anti-crime operations.

- Navy
1. Ensure right of RSA to use surrounding waters and deny their use to enemies.
 2. Safeguard RSA's marine assets.
 3. Defense of RSA coastline and harbors.
 4. Maritime reconnaissance of offshore areas.
 5. Exercise of authority in territorial waters and economic exploitation zone.
 6. Exercise right of peaceful passage through international waters.

1. Training of marine element and rotation of the units to the operational area.
2. Protection of national key point harbors and harbor installations.

1. Promote maritime cooperation with other states.

APPENDIX C

MILITARY EQUIPMENT PRODUCED IN SOUTH AFRICA²⁷⁷

Equipment	Producer	Remarks
MIRAGE F-1AZ	Atlas	Ordered from France for local assembly by Atlas; eventually to be totally manufactured in South Africa; run of 100 expected.
MB-326M IMPALA I/ MB-326K IMPALA II	Atlas	Built under license from Aermacchi of Italy.
C-4M KUDU	Atlas	General purpose light transport; derivative of Italian Aermacchi AM-3C
Helicopters	N.A.	ARMSCOR announces in September 1983 that South Africa possessed the capability to produce helicopters and that Atlas aviation would be organized to build them in the near future. ²⁷⁸
MINISTER OF DEFENSE missile attack boats	Durban Shipyard	Israeli RESHEF class; three were built in Haifa by Israel, eight additional to be built at Durban.
Harbor patrol craft	N.A.	9 meter patrol boats
AML-60/90 (Pan- hard) ELAND armored cars	Sandock-Austral Beperk, Ltd.	800 vehicles produced under French license 1961-72; South African version of French armored car.
RATEL MICV	N.A.	Designed and manufactured in South Africa; combination armored car and armored personnel carrier; first introduced in 1976.
RHINO/HIPPO armored per- sonnel carrier	N.A.	Designed and manufactured in South Africa; Mine resistant armor and wheels; HIPPO is South African police version.

G5 155mm Towed Howitzer ²⁷⁹	Krygkor	Medium towed howitzer
G6 155mm Self- Propelled Howitzer	Krygkor	Introduced September 1982. Designed in Canada by now defunct Space Research Corporation.
OLIFANT MBT	N.A.	South Africa claims all that remains of its obsolete CENTURIONS are the hull and turret, and that it has been upgunned, re-engined, and equipped with improved fire control, transmission, drive, and suspension. ²⁸⁰
VALKIRI 127mm Multiple Rocket Launcher	Kentron	Based on captured Soviet BM-21; designed and produced in South Africa.
81mm Mortars	N.A.	
120mm Mortars	N.A.	
12.7mm Light Antiaircraft Guns	N.A.	
FN 7.62mm and R1 Automatic Rifles	N.A.	Manufactured in South Africa under Belgian license.
R4 5.56mm Assault Rifle	N.A.	Based on Israeli GALIL ²⁸¹
CACTUS SAM	N.A.	Developed and built in France as CROTALE, but 85% of research and development funded by South Africa.
SKERPIOEN SSM	N.A.	Based on Israeli GABRIEL with equivalent performance. How much of SKERPIOEN is built domestically is unclear. ²⁸²
KUKRI V3B Air-to- Air Missile	Kentron	SIDEWINDER type missile; developed in South Africa, made available for export in 1982. ²⁸³

APPENDIX D²⁸⁴

WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES

Equipment	Origin	Number in Inventory	Remarks
BAC CANBERRA B(1)12, T-4	UK	5 B(1)12 3 T-4	
Hawker-Siddeley BUCCANEER S-50	UK	6	Sixteen Delivered in 1965.
Dassault MIRAGE III CZ/EZ	FRANCE	22	
Dassault MIRAGE RZ/R2Z	FRANCE	6	
Dassault MIRAGE F-1CZ	FRANCE	13	Imported complete 1974-75.
Hawker-Siddeley SHACKLETOWN MR-3	UK	5	Have undergone service life extension in South Africa.
Piaggio P-166S	ITALY	18	9 delivered 1969, 9 1973-74.
Dassault MIRAGE III BZ/DZ/D1Z	FRANCE	16	
BAC VISCOUNT 781	UK	1	
Hawker-Siddeley HS-125	UK	4	
Lockheed C-130B HERCULES	U.S.	7	Delivered in 1963.
McDonnell-Douglas C-47B DAKOTA	U.S.	36	
McDonnell-Douglas DC-4	U.S.	7	
Swearington MERLIN	UK	7	Delivered 1975-76.

Transall C-160Z	FRANCE	9	Delivered 1969-70.
Rockwell T-6 HARVARD	U.S.	110	
Aeritalia AM-3C BOSBOK	ITALY	36	
Cessena CE-185	U.S.	20	
Aerospatiale SA-316 ALOUETTE III	FRANCE	40	Unconfirmed reports of an additional 20 delivered in 1975.
Aerospatiale SA-321L SUPER FRELON	FRANCE	12	16 delivered 1966-67.
Aerospatiale SA-330 PIMA	FRANCE	48	20 delivered 1970-71; 20 delivered 1975.
Westland HAS-1 WASP	UK	10	
DAPHNE class submarine	FRANCE	3	Launched 1969-70
PRESIDENT class Frigate	UK	1	Launched 1962. Last of 3.
MINISTER OF DEFENSE class Fast Attack Boat	Israel	3	Built at Haifa. Addi- tional units have been built by South Africa at Durban.
FORD class Large Patrol Craft	UK	5	Transferred 1954-59.
TON class Patrol Craft, Minesweeps, Minehunters	UK	10	Purchased 1957-59.
Replenishment Ship	DENMARK	1	Purchased 1965.
Survey Ship	UK	1	Transferred 1969.
Survey Ship	UK	1	Transferred 1978.
OLIPHANT/CENTURION MBT	Various	200 (approx.)	Reworked/regunned in South Africa; 168 delivered from UK be- tween 1955-59; 100 sold to Switzerland

1960-61; 32 received from Israel 1962; 41 received from Jordan 1974; 60 obtained from India via an arms broker 1978.

COMET MBT	UK	20	40 delivered 1950.
FERRET Armored Car	UK	230	Delivered 1963-64.
M3A1 Armored Car	U.S.	50	Delivered 1957-58.
M-6 STAGHOUND Armored Car	U.S.	N.A.	
SARACEN Armored Personnel Carrier	UK	250	Delivered 1956-60. Now used by South African Police.
25pdr. Field Gun	UK	125	
SEXTON 25pdr Self-Propelled Gun	UK	50	
5.5" Field Gun	UK	75	
155mm Towed Gun	UK	40	
Oerlikon 35mm Antiaircraft Gun	SWITZERLAND	55	
Bofers 40mm Antiaircraft Gun	UK	25	Obtained early 1960's; manufactured by British firm under license from Sweden.
M67 90mm, 6pdr, 17pdr Antitank Guns	UK	900	
CACTUS (CROTALE) SAM	FRANCE	18	Three Batteries delivered 1971-73.
TIGERCAT SAM	JORDAN	54	UK system; obtained from Jordan.
ENTAC MGM-32 Anti-tank Missile	FRANCE	N.A.	
GABRIEL SSM	ISRAEL	N.A.	
R-530 Air-to-Air Missile	FRANCE	96	Delivered 1963.

MAGIC R-550 Air-to-Air Missile

FRANCE

N.A.

Reported to be on order.

AS-20/30 Air-to-Ground Missile

FRANCE

60

Delivered 1965-66.

ENDNOTES

1. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1981), p. 350.
2. Kenneth W. Grundy, Defense Legislation and Communal Politics: The Evolution of a White South African Nation as Reflected in the Controversy Over the Assignment of Armed Forces Abroad, 1912-1976 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978), pp. 23-24.
3. Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power (Braamfontein: South African Institute of Strategic Affairs, 1981), p. 2.
4. John de St. Jorre, "South Africa: Up Against the World," Foreign Policy, 28 (Fall 1977), p. 53.
5. Sam C. Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa: A Study in Ideology and Foreign Policy (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 46-47.
6. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 6.
7. Ibid.
8. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 82.
9. Ibid.
10. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, p. 7.
11. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, p. 83.
12. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, p. 7.
13. Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power, p. 2.
14. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, p. 6.

15. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, pp. 86-87.
16. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, p. 10.
17. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, p. 126.
18. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, p. 10.
19. Ibid.
20. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, p. 128.
21. R. W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 129.
22. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, p. 143.
23. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, p. 11.
24. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, p. 231.
25. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," in Michael Clough, ed., Changing Realities in Southern Africa: Implications for American Policy (Berkley: Institute of International Studies, 1982), p. 129.
26. Ibid, pp. 130-131.
27. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," pp. 132-147.
28. Ibid.
29. See, for example, John Seiler, "South African Perspectives and Responses to External Pressures," Journal of Modern African Studies 13, 3 (1975), pp. 455-458.
30. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," p. 135.
31. Ibid, p. 136.
32. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, p. 190.

33. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, p. 191.
34. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 11.
35. Ibid.
36. James Barber, South African Foreign Policy, 1945-1970, pp. 190-191.
37. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 12.
38. Michael T. Schieber, "Apartheid Under Pressure: South Africa's Military Strength in a Changing Political Context," Africa Today, January-March 1976, p. 30.
39. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 12.
40. James Barber, South African Foreign Policy, 1945-1970, p. 192.
41. South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the White Papers 1965-79, DIA Report DDB-2610-32-80 of June 1980, p. 1.
42. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 16.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid, pp. 16-17.
45. Ibid, p. 17.
46. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, pp. 12-13.
47. Ibid, p. 13.
48. South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the White Papers 1965-79, p. 3.
49. Ibid.
50. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, p. 13.
51. Ibid.

52. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping With Vulnerability (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1981), pp. 8-16.
53. Ibid, p. 42.
54. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 14.
55. Harold D. Nelson, ed., South Africa: A Country Study, p. 344.
56. "South African Defense Philosophy and Policies: Building a Strong Military Posture," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1973, pp. 26-35.
57. Strategic Survey 1972 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 35.
58. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping With Vulnerability, p. 43.
59. "South African Defense Philosophy and Policies: Building a Strong Military Posture," p. 27.
60. South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the White Papers, 1965-1979, p. 4.
61. Ibid, p. 5.
62. Ibid, p. 5.
63. Ibid.
64. Boss, The First Five Years (London: International Defense Aid Fund, 1975), p. 7.
65. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa," CSIS Africa Notes, #22, 28 December 1983, p. 5.
66. "Boss, The First Five Years," p. 7.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid, pp. 18-20.
70. "State Security Council: Not Sinister," Paratus, November 1983, p. 9.

71. Ibid.
72. Ibid, pp. 9-10.
73. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa," p. 5.
74. Christopher Coker, "South Africa: A New Military Role in Southern Africa," International Institute of Strategic Studies Survival, March-April 1983, pp. 59-67.
75. Ibid.
76. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, p. 266.
77. For a summary of events in South West Africa prior to 1973, see John Reed, "Frontline Southwest Africa," parts 1 and 2, in Armed Forces, January 1984, pp. 18-20; and March 1984, pp. 59-61.
78. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 21.
79. Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in Angola 1975-76," African Affairs, July 1978, pp. 347-386.
80. Christopher Coker, "South Africa: A New Military Role in Southern Africa," p. 60.
81. R. W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive, pp. 156-162.
82. See Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in Angola 1975-76," for a discussion of the timing of the Cuban build-up in comparison to the SADF's involvement in Angola.
83. Colin Legum, Southern Africa, Year of the Whirlwind (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 28-30.
84. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 34.
85. Deon Geldenjuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," p. 157.
86. Harold D. Nelson, ed., South Africa: A Country Study, pp. 192-194.
87. Timothy M. Shaw, "Oil, Israel, and the OAU: An Introduction to the Political Economy of Energy in Southern Africa," Africa Today, January-March 1976, pp. 24-25.

88. Ibid, p. 25.
89. R. W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive, p. 101.
90. Harold D. Nelson, ed., South Africa: A Country Study, p. 90.
91. Michael Clough, "From Southwest Africa to Namibia," in Michael Clough, ed., Changing Realities in Southern Africa: Implications for American Policy (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1982), pp. 66-67.
92. Ibid, p. 67.
93. David Anable, "What Arms Ban Means to South Africa," Christian Science Monitor, 4 November 1977, p. 1.
94. Adapted from Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," pp. 25-26.
95. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 22.
96. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," p. 137.
97. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 22.
98. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," p. 147.
99. Ibid, pp. 148-149.
100. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa," p. 6.
101. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy'," Journal of Commonwealth Comparative Politics, November 1980, p. 274.
102. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section adapted from Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' (Braamfontein: South African Institute for International Affairs, 1981).
103. Deon Geldenhuys, South Africa's Search for Security Since the Second World War (Braamfontein: South African Institute for International Affairs, 1978), pp. 2-9.
104. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', p. 3.

105. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 12.
106. "Malan Urges Cohesion of Population Groups," Capetown Die Burger, 13 June 1979, p. 15, quoted in JPRS 73885 18 July 1979, Subsaharan Africa Report #2132.
107. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', p. 6.
108. Ibid, p. 9.
109. Johannesburg International Service, 3 May 1979, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa, 4 May 1979, p. E4.
110. Capetown Die Burger, 13 June 1979, p. 15, as quoted in JPRS 73885, 18 July 1979, Subsaharan Africa Report #2132, p. 119.
111. Ibid.
112. Johannesburg International Service, 28 July 1979, as quoted in FBIS, Mideast and Africa, 30 July 1979, p. E2.
113. Information Service of South Africa, 16 August 1979, as quoted in FBIS, 20 August 1979, Mideast and Africa 20 August 1979, p. E3.
114. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', p. 12.
115. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," p. 151.
116. Deon Geldenjys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', p. 37.
117. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," Current History, March 1983, p. 111.
118. Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotze, "Aspects of Political Decision Making in South Africa," South African Journal of Political Science, 10, 1 (June 1983), pp. 35-36.
119. Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in Angola 1975-1976," African Affairs, July 1978, pp. 381-385.
120. "State Security Council: Not Sinister!," Paratus, November 1983, p. 11.

121. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section adapted from Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power, pp. 11-17, and "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," pp. 111-112.
122. Compiled from a variety of sources.
123. Compiled from a variety of sources. As the South African Army is the largest service of the SADF, it is used here for illustration.
124. ARMSCOR: South Africa's Armaments Industry, p. 83.
125. ARMSCOR and the South African Defense Industry, DIA Report DDB-1920-118-80 of December 1980, p. 4.
126. "Arms Supply Corporation's Growth in Various Fields," Capetown Die Burger, 12 September 1981, p. 11, quoted in JPRS 19198 Subsaharan Africa #2501, 13 October 1981, pp. 43-44.
127. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, pp. 361-368.
128. Africa Research Bulletin, Economic series, March 15--April 14 1983, p. 6809.
129. The Military Balance 1983-84 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 74.
130. Unless otherwise noted, adapted from Robert I. Rotberg, "The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa," Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotze, "Aspects of Political Decision Making in South Africa," and Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power.
131. Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotze, "Aspects of Political Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa," pp. 37-38.
132. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," p. 113.
133. Pierre Hugo, Quislings or Realists: A Documentary Study of 'Coloured' Politics in South Africa (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1978), pp. 1-11.
134. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," p. 114.

135. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy'," p. 277.
136. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', p. 17.
137. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," p. 111.
138. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy'," p. 128.
139. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', pp. 21-22.
140. "ARMSCOR: South Africa's Armaments Industry," p. 49.
141. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', pp. 13-15.
142. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy'," p. 279.
143. Ibid, p. 280.
144. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy'," pp. 283-284.
145. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa," p. 29.
146. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy'," p. 38.
147. Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power, pp. 10-11.
148. Robert I. Rotberg: "Race and Counterrevolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy'," p. 16.
149. Ibid, p. 38.
150. Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power, p. 21.
151. See, for example, "Modderfontein Commando Opens New Headquarters," Johannesburg Armed Forces, October 1983, p. 22, quoted in JPRS 84978 20 December 1983, Subsaharan Africa #2885, p. 68.

152. See, for example, "Coloureds Divided by Military Call-up Issue," Johannesburg The Citizen, 16 November 1983, p. 17.
153. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 28.
154. "Army Wants University Military Units," Johannesburg Domestic Service, 28 October 1982, quoted in FBIS Mbabane WZ 281537Z October 1982.
155. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy'," pp. 284-287.
156. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', p. 61.
157. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," pp. 149-151.
158. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, p. 175.
159. Bert Van Hees, "Academic Says Border Pact Will Not Solve Security Problems," Johannesburg The Citizen, 8 March 1984, p. 15; as quoted in JPRS SSA-84-039, 29 March 1984, p. 29.
160. Ibid.
161. Unless otherwise noted, adopted from Geon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', pp. 25-37.
162. Ibid, p. 25.
163. "South Africa to Drop Protection of Cape Sea Route," Pretoria Department of Information Broadcast, 7 April 1978, quoted in FBIS 7 April 1978, Subsaharan Africa, p. E4.
164. Quoted in Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy', p. 28.
165. Ibid.
166. "Government Linked with Taiwan, Israel in Pact," Paris AFP, 11 April 1982, quoted in FBIS, 13 April 1982, Southern Africa, p. U3.
167. "A Monroe Doctrine for Southern Africa," Johannesburg Domestic Service, 7 December 1982, quoted in FBIS Southern Africa 9 December 1982, p. U10.

168. South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the White Papers, 1965-79, p. 6.
169. Ibid, pp. 8-9.
170. Ibid.
171. The Military Balance 1983-84, pp. 67-81.
172. John Keegan, ed., World Armies (New York: Facts on File, 1979), Angola, pp. 12-15, Botswana, p. 76, Mozambique, pp. 475-477, South Africa, pp. 633-643, Zambia. p. 825.
173. "Defense Chief on Arms Buildup, Terrorist Attack," Johannesburg International Service, 17 February 1981, quoted in FBIS subsaharan Africa 18 February 1981, p. U2.
174. "Malan Sees Military Threat to South Africa," Johannesburg International Service, 2 October 1982, quoted in FBIS Subsaharan Africa, 4 October 1982, p. U2.
175. "Attack Envisioned From Neighboring States," Johannesburg International Service, 23 March 1982, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa, 24 March 1982, p. U1.
176. C. L. Vilojen, "Conventional Threat to Republic of South Africa/Southwest Africa," ISSUP Strategic Review (June 1983), p. 2, quoted in JPRS 83909 18 July 1983 Subsaharan Africa #2822, pp. 47-48.
177. Ibid, p. 48.
178. See, for example, Kenneth Adelman, "The Strategy of Defiance: South Africa," Comparative Strategy 1, 1 and 2, pp. 33-52.
179. "Chief of Army Says Strong Willpower Factor Against Insurgency," Johannesburg Die Transvaler, 6 August 1981, p. 14, quoted in JPRS 79027 21 September 1981, Subsaharan Africa Report #2480.
180. "South African Prime Minister Says USSR Using 'Terrorism' by Proxy," Johannesburg International Service, 27 March 1981, quoted in FBIS London UK, 272220Z Mar 81.
181. "Johannesburg Explains Raids on SWAPO in Angola," Johannesburg International Service, 7 December 1981, quoted in FBIS 8 December 1981, p. U1.
182. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, p. 377.

AD-A152 147 SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY(U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL MONTEREY CA C T ORBANN JUN 84


3/3

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 5/4

NL

END



183. Ibid, pp. 212-214.
184. Bill Cain, "Manpower Crisis Worse Than Expected," Johannesburg Sunday Times-Business Times, 18 May 1980, p. 1, quoted in JPRS 75920 23 June 1980, Subsaharan Africa #2258, pp. 157-158.
185. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, pp. 351-355.
186. South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the White Papers, 1965-79, p. 9.
187. "Armed Forces Suffer From Too Few Technicians," Capetown Die Burger, 14 November 1981, p. 3, quoted in JPRS 79677 17 December 1981, Subsaharan Africa #2540, pp. 41-42.
188. Gherhard Pieterse, "Longer Border Duty," Johannesburg Sunday Times, 24 September 1978, quoted in JPRS 72062, 17 October 1978, Subsaharan Africa #2009, pp. 47-48.
189. Ibid.
190. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," African Studies Review 10 (September 1977), pp. 89-99.
191. Harm J. de Blij, A Geography of Subsaharan Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 82.
192. Herve Guilbaud, "Moves to Counter White Exodus Reported," Johannesburg Africa AFP, pp. 22-23, quoted in JPRS 81102, 22 June 1982, Subsaharan Africa #2644, pp. 45-47.
193. Ibid.
194. Ibid.
195. "New Law Proposed to Halt 'White Exodus'," Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail, 17 September 1982, p. 1, as quoted in FBIS Mbabane, 171143Z Sep 82.
196. Richard Leonard, "Mobilizing for Total War," Southern Africa, January-February 1981, p. 14.
197. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Regional Defense Plans: The Homeland Army," in Thomas M. Callaghy, ed., South Africa in Southern Africa (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 147.
198. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," p. 97.

199. "Defending the South Atlantic--A Quandry for the West?" Armed Forces, July 1982, p. 234.
200. See the discussions of this option in Chapter II discussions of the Twelve-Point Plan.
201. "Viljoen Urges New Naval Strategy in Southern Atlantic, Indian Ocean," Paris AFP, 7 May 1982, quoted in JPRS 80909, 26 May 1982, Subsaharan Africa #2629, p. 102.
202. John F. Burns, "South Africa Defies U.S. On Arms, Says It Can Surmount An Embargo," New York Times, 27 October 1977, p. 1.
203. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," p. 95.
204. "Further on Signing of Cahora Bassa Agreement," Johannesburg Domestic Service, 2 May 1984, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa, 3 May 1984, p. U6.
205. Timothy M. Shaw, "Oil, Israel, and the OAU: An Introduction to the Political Economy of Energy in Southern Africa."
206. Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa Publications, 1983), p. 763.
207. J. P. Blumenfeld, "The South African Economy: Potential and Pitfalls," World Today, September 1980, pp. 334-342.
208. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," p. 95.
209. Colin Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record 1981-82 (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981).
210. "300 Years of Resistance," Southern Africa, January-February 1981, p. 25.
211. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," pp. 95-96.
212. Michael Savage, "Costs of Enforcing Apartheid and Problems of Change," African Affairs, July 1977, p. 299.
213. African Research Bulletin, August 15--September 14 1981, pp. 6151-6154.
214. "Defense Spending Comparatively Small," Capetown Die Burger, 14 August 1981, p. 27, quoted in JPRS 79027 21 September 1981 Subsaharan Africa #2488, pp. 89-90.

215. Ibid.
216. Colin Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record 1981-82, p. B731.
217. Simon Willson, "Prime Minister Claims Sufficient Oil for Embargo," Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail Business Day Section, 31 October 1983, p. 1, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa 1 November 1983, pp. U5-U6.
218. K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1983), pp. 319-330.
219. John Seiler, "South African Perspectives and Responses to External Pressures," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 13, 3 (1975), pp. 447-468.
220. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defense and Armament Supply (Pretoria: Republic of South Africa, 1982), p. 2.
221. Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in Angola 1975-76," pp. 383-386.
222. IISS Military Balance 1983-84, p. 74.
223. John Keegan, ed., World Armies, pp. 637-638.
224. Ibid, p. 639.
225. Ibid, p. 638.
226. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Regional Defense Plans: The Homeland Army," pp. 137-143.
227. Compiled from a variety of sources, including IISS The Military Balance 1983-84, Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, and DMS Market Intelligence Report (Greenwich: DMS, 1979), South Africa, p. 4.
228. IISS The Military Balance 1983-84, p. 74.
229. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, pp. 334-335.
230. IISS Military Balance 1983-84, p. 73.
231. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping With Vulnerability, p. 51.
232. South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the White Papers, 1965-79, p. 12.

233. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, p. 343.
234. Signe Landgren-Bäckström, "Seven Methods of Evading an Arms Embargo," in Southern Africa Research Group, Weapon Against Apartheid (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1979), pp. 15-31.
235. Ronald T. Petty, "South African KURKI Air-to-Air Missile," Jane's Defense Review, Vol. 4, #6, 1983, pp. 513-522.
236. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, p. 337.
237. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping With Vulnerability, p. 51.
238. Ian V. Hogg, "Infantry Weapons of the SADF," Jane's Defense Weekly, 25 February 1984, p. 291.
239. "Military Uses Captured Weapons," Johannesburg Domestic Service, 8 September 1982, quoted by FBIS Mbabane Wz 081410Z September 1982.
240. "Recent Weapons Acquisitions Listed by Nation," Afrique Defense, #66, September 1983, pp. 64-65, quoted in JPRS 84750 15 November 1983, Africa #2870, pp. 3-8.
241. Robert Boyle, "South Africa Starts Arms Export Drive," International Defense Review, Vol. 16, #3, 1983, pp. 268-271.
242. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, pp. 194-204.
243. See, for example, "The Threat of Sanctions," Johannesburg International Service, 5 December 1983, quoted in JPRS 85009 Subsaharan Africa #2887, pp. 77-78.
244. Kenneth Adelman, "The Strategy of Defiance: South Africa," pp. 34-35.
245. Ibid, p. 38.
246. Deon Geldenhuys, A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues (Bräamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1982).
247. "South Africa's Military Strength," Johannesburg International Service, 1 October 1982, quoted in FBIS 1 October 1982 Middle East and Africa, p. U3.

248. Sheryl Raine, "General Backs Offensive Tactics Against SWAPO," Johannesburg Star, 29 June 1983, p. 3, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa 1 July 1983, p. U3.
249. Joseph Lelyveld, "South Africa's Strategy: To Isolate the Rebels," New York Times, 6 June 1983, p. 5.
250. "Johannesburg Explains Raids on SWAPO in Angola," Johannesburg International Service, 7 December 1981, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa 8 December 1981, p. U1.
251. "Defense Minister Defends Angolan Incursion," Johannesburg International Service 21 November 1981, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa, 23 November 1981, p. U2.
252. Christopher Coker, "South Africa: A New Military Role in Southern Africa 1969-82," pp. 61-62.
253. Ibid, p. 61.
254. "The Twenty-Percent Gets All the Effort," The Economist, 3 April 1982, p. 72.
255. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," p. 30.
256. Johannesburg The Citizen, 7 March 1984, p. 4, quoted in JPRS SSA-84-039, pp. 52-53.
257. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Regional Defense Plans: The Homeland Army."
258. "Labor Will Not Accept Conscription for Coloureds," Umtate Capital Radio, 9 February 1983, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa 10 February 1982, p. U4.
259. "Bill Would Obligate Immigrants for Military Service," Johannesburg International Service, 7 March 1984, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa 7 March 1984, p. U5.
260. "Call-Up," Johannesburg The Citizen, 24 December 1983, p. 6, quoted in JPRS SSA-84-009, 20 January 1984, pp. 104-105.
261. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section adapted from Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," pp. 36-47; 42-43.
262. "Botha, RSA Would Consider Aid to Anti-Communists," Johannesburg Domestic Service, 18 February 1983, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa, 23 February 1983, pp. U4-U5.

263. Ibid.
264. "South Africa Said to be 'Real Target' of Destabilization Efforts," Johannesburg The Citizen, 29 August 1983, p. 10, quoted in JPRS 84344 Subsaharan Africa #2846, p. 27.
265. Colin Legum, "South Africa's Power Game," New African March 1983, pp. 11-14.
266. Unless otherwise noted, adopted from Christopher Coker, "South Africa: A New Military Role in Southern Africa, 1969-82," and Colin Legum, "South Africa's Power Game."
267. "Destabilization in Southern Africa," The Economist, 16 July 1983, pp. 20-21.
268. Christopher Coker, "South Africa: A New Military Role in Southern Africa, 1969-82," p. 63.
269. "Destabilization in Southern Africa," pp. 24-26.
270. Adopted from Robert S. Jaster, "Politics and the Afrikaner Bomb," Orbis, Winter 1984, pp. 825-851.
271. "Front Line on the Defensive," The Economist, 16 July 1983, pp. 26-27.
272. Simon Willson, "Prime Minister Claims Sufficient Oil for Embargo."
273. Johannesburg The Citizen, 6 October 1982, p. 1, quoted in JPRS 82107 Subsaharan Africa #2711, 28 October 1982, p. 63.
274. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, pp. 193-194.
275. "Koeburg Nuclear Power Plant Started up 1 March," Johannesburg SAPA, 14 March 1984, quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa, 15 March 1984, p. U4.
276. "Solar Energy System," Johannesburg The Citizen, 29 April 1981, p. 7, quoted in JPRS 78046, 11 May 1981, #2408.
277. Compiled from a variety of sources, including DMS Market Report, IISS Military Balance 1983-84, Bill Gunston, ed., The Encyclopedia of World Air Power (New York: Crescent Books, 1980), p. 37; and Jean Labayle Couhat, ed., Combat Fleets of the World 1980/81 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980, p. 444. Other sources are indicated individually.

- 278. "Arms Industry Ready to Produce Helicopters," JPRS 84317 14 September 1983, Subsaharan Africa #2843, p. 31.
- 279. "G5 Cannon Developed, Manufactured Entirely in South Africa," JPRS 81202 2 July 1982, Subsaharan Africa #2651, p. 57.
- 280. Willem Steenkamp, "Weapons Procurement Role of ARMSCOR Discussed," JPRS 83953, 21 July 1983, Subsaharan Africa #2823, p. 96.
- 281. Ronald T. Pretty, "South Africa Valkiri Multiple Artillery Rocket System," Jane's Defense Review, Vol. 4, #7, 1983, pp. 645-650.
- 282. Steenkamp, "Weapons Procurement Role of ARMSCOR Discussed."
- 283. Ronald T. Pretty, "South African Kukri Air-to-Air Missile," Jane's Defense Review, Vol. 4, #6, 1983, pp. 513-522.
- 284. As note 277, compiled from a variety of sources.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22314	2
2. Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, Calif. 93943	2
3. Department Chairman, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, Calif. 93943	1
4. Center for Naval Analysis 2000 North Beauregard St. P.O. Box 11280 Alexandria, VA 22311	1
5. Dr. Michael W. Clough, Code 56Cg Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, Calif. 93943	3
6. Dr. David Winterford, Code 56Wb Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, Calif. 93943	1
7. Lieutenant Commander Carl T. Orbann 12876 Firethorn Lane Jacksonville, Florida 32216	4
8. Helen Kitchen Director African Studies Program CSIS 1800 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006	1

9. John de St. Jorre 1
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
11 Dupont Circle
Washington, D.C. 20036
10. Robert Jaster 1
Amsbury Hill
Rockport, Maine 04856

END

FILMED

5-85

DTIC

