

AD-A152 546

THE NEW MARXIST-LENINIST STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD(U)
RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA F FUKUYAMA SEP 84
RAND/P-7020

1/1

UNCLASSIFIED


F/G 5/4

NL

END

FILMED

DTIC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

2

THE NEW MARXIST-LENINIST STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD

Francis Fukuyama

September 1984

AD-A152 546

DTIC FILE COPY

DTIC
ELECTE
APR 17 1985
S E D

This document has been approved
for release and sale; its
content is unlimited.

85

4 10 020

P-7020

THE NEW MARXIST-LENINIST STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD

I. INTRODUCTION

If one were to survey the full range of Soviet clients in the Third World in the mid-1980s and contrast them with those of a generation earlier, say in the mid-1960s, perhaps the single most salient difference that emerges is the proliferation of regimes claiming Marxism-Leninism as their governing ideology. In the earlier period there were only three: North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. Moscow's other major Third World clients at that time were a heterogeneous collection of left-leaning states like Egypt under Nasser, Syria, India, Indonesia, Mali, Ghana, and the like. Each one professed a vaguely socialist ideology tailored to the country's specific national and cultural traditions, maintained an equally vague non-aligned and anti-imperialist foreign policy, and disavowed any adherence to orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles. Twenty years later, by contrast, the three Communist regimes had not only survived (and in the case of Vietnam substantially expanded), but were joined by at least six others: Afghanistan, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.¹

¹ This list does not include a number of other minor Marxist-Leninist regimes that came to power in the 1970s, including Benin, the People's Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and, until it was overthrown by the United States in October 1983, Grenada. In addition, the Communist Pathet Lao consolidated their hold over Laos in 1975 as a consequence of the North Vietnamese conquest of the south.

Form For	
PA&I	
B	
Need	
ation	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	



The question of exactly what constitutes Marxism-Leninism and a genuine Marxist-Leninist regime is open to a certain amount of debate, and the Soviets themselves have expressed doubts about the ideological correctness of certain of their clients. The actual implementation of scientific Marxism is not an adequate measure, since no state, including the Soviet Union, has ever done this. For the purposes of our analysis, we will consider Marxist-Leninist any state or national liberation movement that explicitly proclaims itself as such, since the mere willingness to do so is an important bellwether of its broader political character. Such states or movements may or may not correspond to the country's official communist party: some Marxist-Leninist regimes like those in Cuba and Nicaragua came to power at the expense of the official party, while others like the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) have gone to elaborate lengths to conceal their Communist programs. More important than official sanction is the condition that the regime's governing ideology not be corrupted by specific national deviations which seek to modify the systematic character of traditional Marxism-Leninism, as in the case of Tanzania's 'African socialism' or the various forms of 'Islamic Marxism' that have cropped up throughout the Middle East.

The argument has been made that the doctrinal commitment to Marxism on the part of Third World regimes is not terribly significant. Many states there have professed left-leaning ideologies of various shades since decolonization, which have by and large given way to more pragmatic foreign and domestic policies. The absorption of Marxism and other European political doctrines, the argument continues, has been

very superficial throughout the Third World and remains a much less potent force than local nationalism or, in some regions, religion. As a consequence, the new Soviet client regimes that sprang up in the 1970s remain more nationalist than Marxist at the core, differing substantially from those of the 1950s and 1960s. Whatever their initial rhetorical commitment to Marxist-Leninist principles in domestic and foreign policy, they will soon find themselves prey to the same problems of economic and political underdevelopment for which the Soviet example offers at best a very inadequate solution, and hence will eventually be susceptible to reincorporation into the broader Western orbit.²

Only time will tell the ultimate truth of this proposition. No socialist regime is exclusively nationalist or Marxist; all are some combination of the two, and the real question is where the relative balance lies. It is apparent, however, that the doctrinal commitment of these new Third World regimes to Marxism-Leninism has led to a striking consistency in both their political structure and behavior, which clearly sets them apart as a group and differentiates them from the non-Communist Soviet client regimes of earlier decades. These common characteristics can be grouped into four categories.

First, in terms of internal institutions and policies, there has been a steady centralization of power in each of these states in the hands of a vanguard party or comparable organization, with the concomitant building of centralized Leninist political, economic, and security institutions and the systematic suppression of political pluralism.

² For an example of this line of argument, see Thomas Henriksen, "Angola, Mozambique, and the Soviet Union" in Warren Weinstein and T. Henriksen, eds, *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 56-75.

Second, in terms of foreign policy, each of these states has followed a course of 'socialist internationalism.' In practice this has meant close alignment with the Soviet Union and its allies, and strong support for fellow Marxist-Leninist regimes and progressive national liberation movements. The internationalist character of their foreign policies is evident in their frequent willingness to support causes well outside their own regions.

Third, in the military sphere, all of the new regimes have shown a much greater inclination to cooperate with the armed forces of the USSR than in the case of their non-Communist counterparts. They have received substantial Soviet bloc military assistance, often critical to their very survival in power, and in return have granted Soviet forces access rights and basing facilities.

Finally, each of these states has demonstrated considerable internal weakness and lack of popular legitimacy. Once these regimes had consolidated their rule (and in some cases even before) they came under attack by indigenous anti-Communist national liberation movements. In several cases--most notably Afghanistan and Angola--the regimes would almost certainly not be able to remain in power without substantial continuing support from Moscow and Havana.

While any of these four categories can be used to describe the subset of Soviet clients in question, in my view they are phenomena that flow from the basic ideological orientation of the regime rather than vice versa. It is not surprising that these states should be dominated by vanguard parties since Leninism is, after all, a method by which a small, elite party can seize and hold state power in order to implement

a Marxist political program. All other considerations being equal, an overtly Communist state is more likely to cooperate with the Soviet Union in foreign policy and military matters than one governed by a syncretist doctrine combining elements of Marxism and local nationalism. And since many of the regimes in question came to power with the help of outside forces, and since the appeal of Marxism in the Third World is not in the end all that great, it is not surprising that these regimes should be under internal attack.

The emergence of these six new Marxist-Leninist states between 1975 and 1980 is certainly no accident, but rather appears to be the result of a shift in Soviet strategy in the mid-70s. Ever since Khrushchev's opening towards the Third World that began with the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms deal, Moscow has had good reason to be skeptical of both the reliability and staying power of many of its non-Communist Third World clients.³ Apart from Cuba, none of these states developed as hoped in the late 1950s and early 1960s according to the principles of scientific socialism into orthodox Communist states, and in the end most proved to be highly nationalistic and prone to opportunism in their dealings with Moscow. The Soviets often found their influence in any given country dependent on the survival or the whims of a single leader at the top, whose death or defection could often seriously undermine their own fortunes. The most spectacular Soviet failure was Egypt, which in spite of twenty years of assiduous cultivation expelled its Soviet advisors in July 1972 and abrogated its Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1976.⁴

³ See my article, "A New Soviet Strategy," *Commentary*, Oct. 1979, and *The Military Dimension of Soviet Policy in the Third World* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, P-6965, Feb. 1984).

⁴ This should not be taken to imply that the Soviets have given up on support for non-Communist Third World regimes where there is no

From the Soviet standpoint, the fact that a regime is Marxist-Leninist does not guarantee its reliability, but provides a somewhat better institutional basis for a long-term relationship. As noted above, an ideologically orthodox regime will have fewer reservations about overt political and military cooperation with the Soviet Union, and its very weakness and internal legitimacy means that it will have nowhere else to turn but the Soviet bloc.

In the following sections we will analyze the similarities of the six new Marxist-Leninist regimes more closely in terms of the four categories listed above--internal structure, foreign policy, military policy, and internal opposition, and conclude with some observations about their place in the Third World more broadly.

II. VANGUARD PARTIES AND THE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER

The seizure of power and the subsequent direction of the revolution by a Communist vanguard party characterized the Bolshevik Revolution and is central to the specifically Leninist aspects of Marxist-Leninist theory. Lenin's innovation, which has been copied by other non-Communist groups like the Nazi party in Germany, has proven to be a powerful tool by which a small band of ideologues can seize and maintain political power when their basis of support is otherwise inadequate, and is an important feature of nearly all Communist regimes.

better alternative. Countries like Libya, Syria, and India remain important Soviet clients, and in the case of Libya are more active participants in the socialist collective security network than some of the more orthodox Marxist-Leninist states.

There are a number of non-Communist Third World states which are ruled by what amount to vanguard parties. The Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath Parties, for example, are elite, highly centralized organizations governed by a coherent ideology and dominated from the top down.⁵ As a general rule, however, most non-Communist states of the Third World have not been ruled by this type of political organization, with power more often than not resting in the hands of the military or some other traditional authoritarian body. Egypt's Nasser, to take one example, came to power as part of a group of nationalist army officers; his power was highly personalistic and he never succeeded in fully institutionalizing the basis of his rule. While he did attempt to establish a mass political party (the Arab Socialist Union, or ASU), this body never exercised meaningful political power and control of the state remained exclusively in his hands.

By contrast, all six of the new Marxist-Leninist states (with the partial exception of Ethiopia) have been ruled by vanguard parties whose internal discipline and organizational structure were largely established well before they had actually come to power. The Ethiopian regime more closely resembles that of Egypt, originating out of a military coup, but even here the ruling Dergue has made efforts (under strong Soviet pressure) to create a vanguard party (the Worker's Party of Ethiopia, or WPE). The vanguard parties exhibit a number of similarities in their origins, internal organization, and the manner in which they have come to power, as well as certain specific differences.

⁵ The Islamic Revolutionary Party (IRP) in Iran shares many of these features as well. Ironically, so does Jonas Savimbi's UNITA fighting the MPLA regime in Luanda.

Origins

Four out of the six new regimes evolved out of earlier national liberation movements which had carried on armed struggle against the existing colonial and/or pro-Western governments: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) in Mozambique, the National Liberation Front (NLF) in South Yemen, and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power in a classic Communist coup d'etat, while the Ethiopian regime evolved out of a military seizure of power.

Of the four national liberation movements, Frelimo was probably the best organized when it came to power. Frelimo was created in 1962 by the merger of three existing nationalist organizations, none of which was clearly Marxist at the outset.⁶ It moved decisively in the direction of Marxism in 1969 after the assassination of its first president, Eduardo Mondlane, and the coming to power of a more radical faction led by Samora Machel. Frelimo gained considerable experience administering the northern parts of the country prior to its final victory, and while explicit references to Marxism-Leninism were muted in the early 1970s, the impact of Marxist doctrine could already be seen in policies there. The movement rejected Julius Nyerere's (and other) concepts of African socialism and stressed traditional Marxist programs like the collectivization of agriculture, opposition to 'feudalism' (in the

⁶ These were UDENAMO (the National Democratic Union of Mozambique), MANU (Mozambique African Nationalist Union), and UNAMI (African Union of independent Mozambique). See Clifford Kiracofe, "The Communist Takeover of Mozambique: An Overview," *Journal of Political and Economic Studies*, 1982, p. 115.

Mozambican case, the traditional tribal chiefs), and the emancipation of women.⁷

Unlike the MPLA in Angola, the party showed some sympathy to Maoism doctrinally and maintained ties with both the PRC and the Soviet Union up until the time it came to power; once in power, it never openly sided with Moscow against Peking although it expressed a clear preference for the former.⁸ The party formally transformed itself into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party at its Third Party Congress in February 1977. The party statutes passed at that time made clear that the new *Frelimo Partida* was not a mass but a vanguard party, with carefully selected cadres.

Unlike Frelimo, the MPLA in Angola began as a Marxist organization and maintained close ties with Moscow and the Stalinist Portuguese Communist Party throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.⁹ It was formed in 1956 from a merger of the Angolan Communist Party and other non-Communist nationalist groups. From the beginning MPLA president Agostinho Neto scorned African socialism and insisted that his movement subscribed to scientific socialism, and was influenced heavily by the theoretician Amilcar Cabral of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau. The USSR began supplying the MPLA with weapons in 1964, and ties to Cuba began at about this time as well. While there were various rivalries within the

⁷ See Marina Ottaway, "Marxism-Leninism in Mozambique and Ethiopia," in David Albright, *Communism in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

⁸ See Thomas H. Henriksen, "Angola, Mozambique, and the Soviet Union: Liberation and the Quest for Influence," in Weinstein (1980), pp. 61-63.

⁹ The MPLA's leader, Agostinho Neto, travelled to Moscow with Portuguese Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal in 1964. See Clifford Kiracofe, "The Communist Takeover of Angola," *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, Winter 1982, pp. 421-423.

leadership (such as the conflict between the Neto, Chipenda, and de Andrade factions before the Portuguese departure and the Nito Alves coup in 1977), there is no evidence that any of these were motivated by serious doctrinal conflicts or disagreement over the movement's fundamental commitment to Marxism. Once in power, the MPLA with help from the Soviet bloc set up a series of schools for training party cadres,¹⁰ and a series of Cuban-style organizations like the Organization of Angolan Pioneers and the National Union for Angolan Workers to carry out grass-roots mobilization and indoctrination.¹¹ At its First Party Congress in December 1977 the MPLA declared itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, changing its name to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola--Party of Labor (MPLA-PT).

The transformation of the South Yemeni NLF into a full-fledged vanguard party, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), took nearly a decade to complete.¹² When the NLF took over power after the departure of the British from Aden in 1968 it was not formally a Marxist organization, but rather a coalition of factions, some of which had strong Marxist tendencies. Its first president, Qahtan al-Shaabi, looked more to Algiers than to Moscow for inspiration.¹³ The National Front government

¹⁰ These included the National Party School in Luanda and nine provincial schools, graduating some 6000 party activists by 1980. See Alexander Alexiev, *The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, N-1995-AF, June 1983), p. 28.

¹¹ Kevin Brown, "Angolan Socialism," in Carl Rosberg and Thomas Callaghy, eds., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, 1979), p. 305.

¹² The following material on South Yemen is drawn almost entirely from Laurie Mylroie, *Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, N-2052-AF, December 1983), pp. 4-29.

¹³ The NLF itself was one of three pre-independence nationalist groups, the others being the Arab nationalist Sons of the Arab League (SAL) and the Nasserite Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY). It was formed under Egyptian auspices out of seven separate organizations in 1963.

moved steadily to the left as a result of a series of internal upheavals. South Yemen's first Marxist president, Mohammed Ali Haytham, who came to power in June 1969, purged the party, army, and security forces, created a popular militia to counterbalance the regular army, and established a new constitution in 1970 with the aid of East German experts. Among the results of increased collaboration with the Soviet bloc was the creation of a school, staffed primarily by East Germans, for training party cadres, which by 1979 had produced more than 10,000 graduates. Under president Selim Rubai Ali (1971-78) the official South Yemeni Communist Party and the Arab nationalist Ba'ath party were brought into the National Front, which was renamed the United Political Organization of the National Front (UPONF). The official communist party retained an independent structure, however, until the formation of a formal unified vanguard party, the YSP, under the leadership of the hardline Marxist Abd al-Fattah Ismail in October 1978. By this time the YSP had obtained all the trappings of a full-fledged Communist Party, with a Politburo, Central Committee, and regular party congresses.

The FSLN which currently governs Nicaragua was founded in 1961 and began as a guerilla organization in the mountains of northern Nicaragua. The FSLN was from the outset a Marxist-Leninist organization, although there were three tendencies within it which differed on tactics: the Prolonged Popular War (GPP) faction, which advocated Maoist guerilla war, the Proletarian tendency which concentrated on political activities among the urban working class, and the dominant *tercerista* group which advocated mass popular insurrection and wider alliances outside the movement. Under Cuban pressure the three tendencies were unified in May 1979 and formed a joint national directorate, and all are currently

represented in the junta. In contrast to the three preceeding cases, the FSLN has never transformed itself from a movement to a party.

While the Nicaraguan revolution was led by the *tercerista* tendency of the FSLN, it succeeded only because it managed to attract the support of non-Marxist groups representing virtually all segments of Nicaraguan society united in opposition to Somoza, as well as a substantial number of foreign backers, both Communist and non-Communist. The Sandinistas joined with a number of non-Marxist groups in 1978 to form the broad opposition front (FAO), and two of the five members of the initial junta that took power after Somoza's departure were drawn from outside the FSLN. Once coming to power, however, the FSLN took steps to ensure its exclusive predominance. The two non-FSLN junta members were forced out by 1980, the Council of State packed with Sandinista representatives, and a number of mass organizations established under the guidance of the FSLN's Department of Mass Organizations. Succeeding years saw increasing restrictions on the activities of almost all non-Sandinista groups and organizations, including the powerful Catholic Church.

Unlike the preceeding four regimes, the PDPA in Afghanistan did start out as a national liberation guerilla movement, but as a more orthodox Communist Party carrying on political agitation and infiltration; it did not come to power through armed struggle against the preceeding regime but by a coup d'etat facilitated by the party's military adherents. The most notable feature about the PDPA is that it is not one but two parties: while Percham and Khalq are spoken of as factions, their rivalry has been so bitter and their lack of cooperation so thoroughgoing that they are for all practical purposes separate organizational entities.

Like the MPLA and in contrast to Frelimo, the South Yemeni NLF, and the military rulers of Ethiopia, the PDPA did not go through a prolonged evolution into a pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, but rather started out as one. The PDPA was founded on January 1, 1965, by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Babrak Karmal, and soon thereafter split into its two factions, both of which published journals in the late 1960s. Given the traditional anti-Communism of large sectors of the Afghan population, the party went to great lengths to hide its orthodox Marxism-Leninism. This tactic evidently worked quite well, since many observers were labeling it a "reformist-nationalist" party even after it took power in April 1978. The PDPA's true colors are better indicated by its internal constitution, leaked in 1978, which states that the party's ideology "is the practical experience of Marxism-Leninism."¹⁴ There has never been an 'official' Communist party in Afghanistan to compete with the PDPA; other leftist parties of the 1960s and 1970s like the Sholay-e-Jaweid and the Settam-e-Melli were more Maoist in inspiration and do not appear to have any connection with Moscow. While the Soviets have been critical of the party's internal feuding, there has been no evidence whatever of Soviet distrust of the PDPA's Marxist credentials, or serious ideological disagreement except on the level of tactics. Indeed, there is considerable circumstantial evidence of extensive Soviet collaboration with the Afghan Communists in the efforts to recruit officers who would eventually play an important part in the coup, and of frequent contact between the Soviet embassy and leaders of

¹⁴ For the full text, see Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), Appendix A, pp. 149-159, and p. 25.

the party.¹⁵ The Soviets also appear to have played a major role in the unification of Khalq and Percham that took place in 1977, and it is likely that they both knew about and encouraged the actual plotting for the coup.

Of the six new regimes, party structure was most poorly developed in Ethiopia. The military officers who overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974 had no prior history of organization, and to the extent they had an official political doctrine, it was *hebrettesebawinet*, an Ethiopian socialism which claimed to owe nothing to foreign ideas or experiences.¹⁶ The ruling Dergue, whose leftist officers were initially allied to a number of civilian Marxist intellectuals, moved steadily towards a more orthodox Marxism as the result of a series of internal shifts, particularly the February 1977 coup which brought Mengistu Haile Miriam to power. In 1975 an organized Marxist party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), did emerge, which the military leadership regarded as a major rival for power and ruthlessly suppressed in the 'red terror' of 1977-1978. The Dergue itself set up a number of Marxist organizations, including the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON), the Provisional Office of Mass Organization Affairs (POMOA), Wez Ader (Labor League), and Abyot Seded (Revolutionary Torch).¹⁷

Ethiopia had clearly adopted Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology by the late 70s. Although no single document established this conclusively, Marxism was taught in the schools and the rhetoric and symbols used by the regime all pointed in this direction. (Mengistu,

¹⁵ See Arnold (1983), pp. 53-54.

¹⁶ Marina Ottaway, "Marxism-Leninism in Mozambique and Ethiopia," in Albright (1980), p. 132.

¹⁷ Paul Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1981, p. 58.

for example, is referred to as 'The Communist Leader.') The Soviets nonetheless remained distrustful of Ethiopia's socialist credentials. They were unhappy with the institutional confusion evident in the proliferation of so-called Marxist organizations and put strong pressure on the regime to establish a formal vanguard party. As a result the Committee for Organizing the Working People of Ethiopia (COWPE) was formed on Dec. 18, 1979, which on September 12, 1984--the tenth anniversary of the revolution--was transformed into the Workers Party of Ethiopia, with Mengistu as its first chairman. COWPE and its successor differ from the other vanguard parties discussed in this section, however, in that real political power in Ethiopia appears to continue to reside in the hands of the military leadership and not the party. COWPE's function has been more one of agitation and mass mobilization, and it is not clear that it would have been formed in the first place had it not been for Soviet pressure.

Internal Policies

All six new regimes have initiated internal policies typical of other Communist states, including nationalization of private businesses and capital, collectivization of industry and agriculture, and the establishment of strong internal security mechanisms. However, the implementation of these programs (which is, after all, what revolutions are all about) differs greatly from country to country. This in itself should not be surprising, since earlier Communist states, including the Soviet Union itself, exhibited wide divergences in the development of domestic institutions, reflecting specific national conditions.

The most immediate reforms were probably carried out in Afghanistan, where the PDPA government introduced radical land reform measures, cancelled peasant debts, abolished the bride price and declared equal rights for women, and mandated other policies designed to transform Afghanistan into a modern, secular socialist society. While these changes were not as radical as in some other Marxist countries, in the context of conservative Afghan society they amounted to an 'infantile left-wing' program against which Lenin cautioned, and were responsible for creating much of the opposition which the regime subsequently faced.

Collectivization of one sort or another has occurred in all regimes. In Ethiopia, urban dwellers were organized into neighborhood associations called *kebeles*, and peasant associations were created in the countryside. Peasants were organized, sometimes forcibly, by younger party members from the cities, and the countryside occasionally became a battleground for competing factions within the leadership. After nationalizing schools, buildings, and private businesses, the Mozambique government went on to create communal villages involving resettlement of parts of the rural population, extending a practice begun in Frelimo-administered territories prior to the Portuguese withdrawal. The greater part of the agricultural sector was organized into state farms, which absorb much of the regime's budget for agriculture. The PDRY experienced a series of land reforms and land seizures encouraged by the government, leading to the collectivization of a majority of the country's agricultural land. Similar policies were carried out in Angola and Nicaragua as well, although to a lesser

extent.¹⁸ The MPLA in Angola nationalized a large number of businesses and agricultural enterprises, but found that as a result of the Portuguese departure it was unable to run them effectively. As a result, it has developed a fairly tolerant attitude towards private enterprise, the most prominent example of which is the continued operation of Gulf Oil in the Cabinda enclave.

As in other efforts at socialist construction, these collectivization measures have had a destructive effect on the economies of the countries in question. In South Yemen, for example, total production of key crops declined between 1971 and 1977 despite heavy government investment in agriculture.¹⁹ The Mozambican economy suffered a sharp setback after 1975, due not only to regime policies but natural disasters and the departure of the skilled Portuguese work force as well. This has led to a certain degree of backtracking by Frelimo, which towards the end of the decade began to encourage a limited return of private enterprise and investment by Western corporations.²⁰

The consolidation of power by a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party has inevitably required the development of strong internal security organs, almost as a necessary precondition to its continued survival in power. In many cases this has gone hand-in-hand with the buildup of military forces against external enemies and the overall militarization of society.²¹

¹⁸ In Angola, collectivization of agriculture was inhibited by the government's lack of control over a good deal of the countryside.

¹⁹ Mylroie (1984), p. 33.

²⁰ Thomas Henriksen, "Mozambique: The Enemy Within," *Current History*, March 1982, p. 114.

²¹ In many states the buildup of the military frequently serves the purposes of internal politicization and mobilization. Paul Henze documents how dramatically Ethiopian military expenditures increased following the revolution in *Arming the Horn, 1960-1980* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center International Security Studies Program, August 1982).

The Soviets and their allies, especially the East Germans, have been particularly active in building up the internal security apparatus in each one of the six countries in question. This serves not only to enhance the regime's staying power, but gives the Soviets a direct and qualitatively different source of leverage over the client regime, as well as providing timely intelligence about internal developments. In the PDRY, the Cubans trained the People's Militia, which served as a counterweight to the army, while the East Germans built up the internal security apparatus under the leadership of Mohammed Muhsin al-Sharjabi. The latter was instrumental in removing president Selim Rubai Ali when he appeared to be seeking detente with the conservative Gulf states and other pro-Western regimes in June 1978. In Nicaragua, the East Germans have helped to establish the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) to control counterrevolutionary activity. The most extensive terror campaigns were launched in Afghanistan and Ethiopia, where the regime struck out, often indiscriminately, against opponents both inside and outside the ruling party; victims in both cases are numbered in the tens of thousands.

Internal Structure and Factionalization

One unique feature of the new Marxist-Leninist regimes that sets them apart from many earlier Communist states is the extent to which they have been beset by types of factional strife, which according to traditional Marxist analysis should not exist in socialist societies. European Communist parties have of course also experienced factional infighting, but this has usually been over overt issues of doctrine or personalities rather than questions of ethnic or tribal origin

reflecting the particular cultural and historical background of the country in question.

The most extreme example of this phenomenon is the PDPA in Afghanistan, whose ranks have been decimated by the Khalq-Percham infighting. While some observers have tried to see in this an ideological split, the real explanation probably lies more in the social backgrounds of the two factions and in the Afghan tradition of *badal*, or revenge. The Khalq of Taraki and Hafizullah Amin attracted less educated, often rural Afghans of Pushtun origin, with fairly conservative views on social issues such as the role of women. Babrak Karmal's Percham, by contrast, was composed of urbanized, well-educated, Westernized and progressive Afghans. The feud (similar to those afflicting the Mujahedeen resistance) soon acquired a momentum of its own out of all proportion to any real issues between the two factions. While the Russians have not been above exploiting the split for their own purposes, it has generally had a highly damaging effect on the party.

The same is true to a lesser extent for the other regimes. The MPLA in Angola was led primarily by urban *mestizo* intellectuals and counted many whites in its leadership, a fact which was resented by many blacks in the party (e.g., Nito Alves, who staged an abortive coup in 1977) and exploited by regime opponents like Jonas Savimbi. The MPLA also has a perceived connection to certain tribal groups like the Mbundu and has been hurt by Savimbi's strength among the populous Ovimbundu tribe. Many of the factional disputes in the PDRY between leaders like Rubai Ali, Abd al-Fattah Ismail, Ali Nasser Mohammed, and Ali Antar can be traced to the different cross-cutting rivalries in South Yemen

between northerners and southerners, Adenese and those from the hinterland, tribal and non-tribal types, etc. And much of the Ethiopian Dergue's energies have been consumed by ethnic conflict, not only with separatist opponents of the regime like the Eritreans (whose ethnic identity is more important than their Marxism), Tigreans, and Oromos, but within the ruling group itself (Mengistu, a Galla, comes from outside the dominant Amhara ethnic group).

III. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SUPPORT FOR LOCAL CONFLICTS

The second characteristic that the six new Marxist-Leninist regimes share in common is close alignment with the USSR in foreign policy and, more broadly, support for like-minded states and national liberation movements.

The Soviet Union and its non-Communist clients in the Third World have of course often had similar foreign policy objectives; indeed, more so in the realm of foreign than domestic policy. But the Soviets have over the years experienced severe problems in influencing or otherwise controlling the behavior of its erstwhile clients. For example, the Syrians invaded Lebanon on the eve of a visit to Damascus in June 1976 by Soviet foreign minister Gromyko in direct defiance of Soviet wishes. The Iraqis resisted Soviet pressure to restrict arms and economic ties with the West, while Egypt, worst of all, took itself out of the Soviet orbit altogether and aligned itself with the United States. Nearly all of the USSR's non-Communist clients at one time or another have found it necessary to clamp down on domestic Communists, which the Soviets have not been able to prevent.

As numerous observers are quick to point out, the Soviets have had many foreign policy quarrels with their supposedly reliable Marxist-Leninist clients as well, not to speak of countries like Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China. Ideology is obviously no guarantee of reliability, particularly over the long run. But even if it is only a matter of degree, there is an observable difference in the extent to which Marxist-Leninist Third World states as a group are willing to collaborate with Moscow when compared with bourgeois nationalists, and, being ideological states, they are more inclined to support causes beyond their own borders that have limited relevance to their own security interests. There are several measures for close political alignment, including signature of Friendship Treaties and other manifest signs of political cooperation; trade, aid, and advisory missions with the Soviet bloc; and support for local conflicts and participation in the larger Soviet collective security network.

Friendship and Cooperation Treaties

Five of the six new Marxist-Leninist regimes signed Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union shortly after coming to power: Angola (Oct. 8, 1976), Mozambique (March 31, 1977), Ethiopia (November 20, 1978), Afghanistan (December 20, 1978), and the PDRY (October 25, 1979).²² Communist Vietnam also signed a Friendship Treaty on November 3, 1978. It is interesting to note that two non-Communist clients, Egypt and Somalia, abrogated their Friendship Treaties in this same period, while relations with a third, Iraq, reached a nadir. The

²² See Zafar Imam, "Soviet Treaties with Third World Countries," *Soviet Studies*, Jan. 1983, p. 53.

one country of the six that did not sign a treaty, Nicaragua, has not done so, most likely not out of ideological reluctance but for fear of unnecessarily provoking the United States. (Cuba, it should be recalled, has also not signed a Friendship treaty with the USSR.)

In addition to treaties with the Soviet Union, the new Marxist-Leninist regimes have signed Friendship and Cooperation Treaties with other members of the Soviet bloc, as well as with each other. East Germany, for example, one of the most active Soviet allies in Africa, signed treaties containing military cooperation clauses with Angola and Mozambique in February 1979, and with Ethiopia the following November.²³ Soviet clients have also signed treaties with one another, as in the case of the tripartite Ethiopian-PDRY-Libyan pact of 1981.

It is important not to overstate the importance of these documents. The legal commitment undertaken by the Soviet Union is carefully hedged and in no case amounts to more than a promise to consult in the event of threats to the client state's security. The limitations of this commitment were made evident by Moscow's inaction (apart from military assistance and vague threats) when the PRC invaded Vietnam after the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty. The treaties are significant rather as an indicator of the state of political relations between the two governments. Moscow's non-Communist clients were reluctant to sign Friendship treaties until forced by circumstances to do so: Egypt's Sadat signed his in 1971 to shore up a shaky domestic position, as did Syria's Assad in 1980, while both India and Iraq signed theirs in anticipation of major conflicts, the former with Pakistan and

²³ Michael Sodaro, "The GDR and the Third World: Supplicant and Surrogate," in Michael Radu, ed., *Eastern Europe and the Third World: East v. South* (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 159-161.

the latter with Western oil companies. The Marxist states, by contrast, signed treaties soon after coming to power, with no particular motive other than the wish to demonstrate their solidarity with the Soviet bloc.

Apart from Friendship Treaties, there are other measures of political cooperation. Soviet Marxist clients seldom if ever vote against a Soviet position in the United Nations, even on issues controversial in the Third World like the invasion of Afghanistan (Iraq, by contrast, voted to condemn the Soviet Union, while India abstained.) All six, as well as Vietnam and Cuba, joined the Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics.

Support for Local Conflicts

In addition to cementing ties with the Soviet bloc, the six new regimes have lent support in varying degrees to other Marxist and national liberation causes, and have played important subsidiary roles in the exploitation of instability in the Third World. In most cases these involvements have been in local or regional conflicts, but in others they have ranged much further afield.

Both of the Marxist regimes in southern Africa have sustained forces fighting the neighboring white settler states. Mozambique gave strong support to Robert Mugabe's ZANU guerilla movement in Rhodesia prior to the Lancaster House settlement in 1980. Mozambique closed its borders to Rhodesian traffic, many of whose exports went through the port of Maputo, in March 1976, and permitted ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU, to operate from bases on its territory. Regular Frelimo forces were reportedly integrated with ZANLA, and a large number were killed while operating inside of Rhodesia. Support for Mugabe proved to be a

costly policy, due to lost transit revenues and heavy retaliatory strikes into Mozambique by Rhodesian security forces.²⁴ After the Zimbabwean settlement, Mozambique continued to support the African National Congress and other guerillas operating against the regime in Pretoria, with similar consequences.

Similarly, the MPLA regime in Angola has given sanctuary and military support to guerillas of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) fighting for black rule in Namibia. As in the case of Mozambique, South African security forces have staged hot pursuit and retaliatory raids deep into Angolan territory, and have occupied parts of Angola on an extended basis. The cost of these incursions to Luanda has been very high. Angola also served as a base for the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC). This organization with East German help staged the Shaba I and II incursions into Zaire, with the ultimate objective of destabilizing the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko.²⁵

The PDRY has played a major role in promoting instability among the conservative regimes of the Persian Gulf. Chief among these has been its repeated attempts to overthrow the regime in Sanaa. North and South Yemen fought a brief border war in 1972; in June 1978 the president of North Yemen, Ahmed al-Gashmi, was assassinated by a bomb planted on a diplomatic representative from the south; in mid-1979 another border clash occurred, with PDRY forces penetrating 20 km across the South Yemeni border; and the PDRY has supported the National Democratic Front (NDF) insurgency along the southern border of North Yemen over a period

²⁴ Clifford Kiracofe, "The Communist Takeover of Mozambique: An Overview", *Journal of Political and Economic Studies*, 1982, p. 119.

²⁵ See Jiri Valenta and Shannon Butler, "East German Security Policies in Africa," in Radu (1981), pp. 153-154.

of years, until its defeat (for the moment, at least), in the summer of 1982. The PDRY was also an early supporter of the Popular Front from the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) until it signed a truce with Oman's Sultan Qaboos, and served as a haven for the Iraqi Communist Party when it was purged by the Ba'ath regime in Baghdad after 1977. The PDRY has also provided support and training for various radical factions of the PLO.

The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has collaborated extensively with Cuba in supporting the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador with materiel, and serves as a sanctuary and command and control center for the guerillas. There is some evidence that Nicaraguan support tapered off somewhat as a result of American pressure in 1982-83. While the extent of this support has become murkier as a result of the current politicization of debate on Central America, the real question is the importance of this aid to the overall success of the insurgency and not its existence *per se*. Indeed, it would be very surprising if the Sandinistas did not support the FMLN given their background and ideological proclivities.

Indeed, the number and variety of sources of support for the Salvadorian insurgency demonstrate the impressive international character of the Soviet 'collective security system' as a whole. In addition to support from Nicaragua, the Salvadorian guerillas have received arms from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria; Western-origin weapons from Ethiopia and Vietnam, a \$500,000 "logistic donation" from Iraq, as well as logistics support from Libya (whose transport planes were interned in Brazil on their way to Mangua).²⁶

²⁶ See Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983) pp.102-103.

The two states probably least involved in regional conflicts are Ethiopia and Afghanistan, largely because they have been thoroughly preoccupied with instability within their own borders. Addis Ababa did engage in a full-scale conventional war with Somalia in late 1977, but it is doubtful this would have occurred in the absence of Somali provocation. The Ethiopians have, however, cooperated with Libya in carrying out individual acts of sabotage and terrorism designed to destabilize the Sudan. The PDPA regime in Afghanistan does not appear to have made a major effort to promote Baluch or Pushtun separatism in neighboring Pakistan, as previous governments in Kabul have done. This is curious insofar as one likely motive for Soviet support of the original PDPA takeover was former president Daud's dropping of the Pushtunistan issue and his apparent efforts to improve relations with Islamabad. The explanation probably lies in the extreme weakness of the Afghan regime, and perhaps a Soviet desire not to provoke Pakistan unduly in hopes of limiting its support for the Afghan Mujahedeen. Afghanistan has, however, harbored a number of Pakistani opposition figures and organizations, such as the radical al-Zulfiqar group headed by the son of the late Pakistani President Bhutto.

IV. MILITARY COOPERATION

All of the new Marxist-Leninist regimes have cooperated extensively with the Soviets and Cubans in military matters. Again, the closeness of this collaboration differs in degree from Moscow's non-Communist Third World clients. It is true that countries like Egypt, Syria, and Somalia granted the USSR what amounted to air and naval facilities in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the first two cases, however, this

was done very reluctantly after years of Soviet prodding for access. Egypt, for example, resisted Soviet pressure for use of port facilities in Alexandria and gave in only after the June 1967 war, when the country's desperate military situation left Nasser with few alternatives. By contrast, the Soviet Union played a critical role as midwife and early protector of the new Marxist regimes, with close military cooperation from the start. While nearly all of these governments loudly protest that they are non-aligned and have not granted Moscow base rights, this is true only in a narrow legal sense; almost all of them have permitted Soviet forces use of facilities, landing rights, port privileges, etc. In addition, all of the new regimes have devoted considerable effort to building up their own military infrastructures with Soviet assistance far beyond the levels that existed under the previous regimes. These forces have been used primarily against internal enemies, but in some instances have been used in support of other elements of the socialist 'collective security' network as well.

While the Soviets may have encouraged the original PDPA coup in Afghanistan, there is no evidence that Soviet military forces were directly involved in bringing it to power. With the growth of the Afghan resistance in 1978-1979, however, it became quite clear that the regime could not survive without massive Soviet military assistance. Hundreds of Soviet bloc advisors began flooding into the country not long after the coup, and two senior Soviet generals, Yepishev and Pavlovskiy, surveyed the situation in the country for extended periods in 1979. The ultimate result was that Afghanistan became the beneficiary of the largest Soviet presence of any country outside

Europe, with approximately 110,000 regular Soviet troops stationed there since early 1980. The ideological temper of the Afghan Communist leadership is evident in Babrak Karmal's *post facto* invitation to the Soviets to invade the country, something virtually no self-respecting nationalist leader would have been willing to do.²⁷ The purpose of this massive troop presence has obviously been to keep the PDPA regime in power, but the Soviet presence in Afghanistan enhances Moscow's ability to project forces elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. Since the invasion the Soviets have developed six airbases in Afghanistan, including a large facility at Shindand in the southwestern corner of the country. By operating out of Afghan bases, Soviet reconnaissance planes and bombers are able to range approximately 500 miles further south operating towards the Indian Ocean.

The Soviets, Cubans, East Germans, and others have been very active training the South Yemeni armed forces, People's Militia, and internal security services. As noted earlier, the Cubans and East Germans appeared to have played a major role in the coup that brought the hardline Abd al-Fattah Ismail to power in June 1979; Cuban forces from Ethiopia were actually brought in by Soviet transport aircraft to suppress troops loyal to Rubai Ali. In return, the PDRY has provided the Soviets with port and communications facilities in Aden, a sheltered anchorage off Socotra, and use of Khormaksar airfield. Sitting astride the straits of Bab al-Mandab at the southern end of the Red Sea, South Yemen occupies a strategic location and is highly useful in sustaining the operations of the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron, particularly after the loss of the naval base at Berbera, Somalia. In peacetime the PDRY

²⁷ This was presumably not true of Hafizullah Amin, who was arrested by Soviet troops and summarily executed.

provides support for reconnaissance of U.S. forces near the Persian Gulf. Aden's wartime utility would be somewhat smaller, though in the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict it would be very valuable in sustaining the sea line of communication between European Russia and the Soviet Far East. In addition, the PDRY has played a major role in supporting other Soviet Third World interventions, for example by serving as an entrepot for Soviet war materiel going to support the Ethiopian regime during its conflict with Somalia in 1977-1978.

As in the case of Afghanistan, the Soviets were not involved militarily in the coming to power of the Ethiopian regime, but were crucial in ensuring its survival. Moscow coordinated the massive intervention by Cuban troops and arms supply effort in response to the Somali invasion, an operation that cost an estimated \$1 billion initially and another billion in subsequent years. At the peak of the intervention some 20,000 foreign troops were ferried into Ethiopia. In return, the Soviets received access to the anchorage off Dahlak Island on the Red Sea, port facilities at Massawa and Assab, and the airfield at Asmara. These facilities are by no means comparable to the sophisticated naval base which the Soviets lost in Somalia as a result of their support for Ethiopia, but together with those in the PDRY serve to cushion the loss. Soviet willingness to lose the Berbera facility indicates that they are not necessarily driven by specific military objectives, but rather seek to maximize their general political influence over the long run.

The Soviet Union and Cuba were directly responsible for the coming to power of the MPLA in Angola. The Soviets supported the MPLA insurgency against Portugal since the early 1960s and, except for a

brief hiatus after the defection of Daniel Chipenda in 1974, continued to do so until its final victory. Some observers have argued that the Soviets intervened only in response to the South Africa and Zairian intervention in August 1975.²⁸ In fact, the Soviets did what was necessary to ensure the success of the MPLA: the level of assistance it provided was significantly higher than that provided by the West and the PRC to the FLNA and UNITA, both before and after the South African intervention. Since then, the Soviet bloc presence has continued to be very heavy as a result of continuing pressure from UNITA and South Africa, with an estimated 19,000 Cuban troops still in Angola in 1981. The Soviets, in return, have received port privileges and have based TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft in Luanda.

The Soviets played a somewhat less crucial role in bringing the regimes in Mozambique and Nicaragua to power and sustaining them there subsequently, though the Soviets provided considerable military assistance to both governments. While the Soviet Union has for a long time supported Frelimo, the latter, unlike the MPLA, did not have any major competitors for power at the time of the departure of the Portuguese in 1975. Only subsequently did a serious internal resistance movement begin to gain ground (see below), and Mozambique's support of various regional guerilla organizations brought it into direct military conflict with white Rhodesia and South Africa. The Soviet Union has become Mozambique's principal arms supplier and the bloc provides substantial numbers of advisors, but as of yet the country has not required massive influxes of Soviet and Cuban troops like Ethiopia, Angola, and Afghanistan. As in Angola, the Soviet military has been

²⁸ See for example Gerald Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1978.

given access to the ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala, and airfields from which it can carry out reconnaissance and logistics missions. In addition, a floating dock was constructed at Maputo in 1982.

Similarly, Nicaragua's Somoza was overthrown by a broad coalition of forces which did not depend on either Cuba or the Soviet Union for its success. This is not to say that Cuba did not play a major role in the revolution: it provided the FSLN with weapons, money, and sanctuary since the movement was founded in the early 1960s. Castro reportedly intervened personally to seek the unification of the three guerilla tendencies in 1979, provided 200 advisors and 450 tons of weapons during the Sandinista final offensive, and set up an intelligence center in its embassy in San Jose, Costa Rica, under the direction of Julian Lopez. The Soviet Union has played a more overt military role since the revolution, primarily in arms supply. The Nicaraguan military has increased dramatically in size, consisting of 25,000 regular troops, 25,000 reserves, and 30,000 militia, compared with Somoza's 9,000-man National Guard.²⁹

Nicaragua's military relationship with the Soviet Union is complicated considerably by its small size and proximity to the United States. There seems to be no ideological bar on the part of the Sandinistas to a substantially larger Soviet presence; Cuba, after all, is host to at least a brigade of regular Soviet ground forces. The real obstacle is rather fear of provoking an American intervention, as occurred in Grenada. The Soviets and Cubans have had to walk a tight line in Nicaragua, providing enough military support to deter a U.S.

²⁹ See the appendix on Nicaragua in Vol. II of the *Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America* (Washington: USGPO, March 1984).

invasion, but not enough so as to bring it on in the first place. If Cuba is any precedent, the Soviets will continue to increase their presence incrementally until strongly resisted by the United States. Whether this will be sufficient to protect the regime in Managua over the long run is another matter.

V. INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND REGIME VULNERABILITIES

One striking feature of the new Marxist-Leninist regimes is the fact that all of them have been the objects of guerilla insurgencies, reflecting their internal weaknesses and lack of legitimacy. This is not the first time that there have been, in effect, anti-Soviet national liberation movements: both the Basmachi in Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s and the Lithuanians after World War II fought guerilla campaigns against Soviet rule. What is unprecedented is the number and strength of the contemporary movements, and the fact that they are being fought outside of Soviet territory. To some extent this phenomenon is not surprising, since it is a corollary of Moscow's unprecedented expansion in the Third World in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the 1950s the situation was reversed: the USSR remained a largely continental power while the United States was burdened with a wide variety of overseas Third World commitments. But there is a further explanation as well. Most of Moscow's major clients in the 50s and 60s, like India, Egypt, and Indonesia, were large and, for the Third World, relatively well-established countries which had emerged from colonialism largely on the basis of their own efforts. While individual leaders like Nkrumah, Keita, or Sadat might prove highly fickle, the regimes which they represented were nationalist at the core and had a certain

kind of broad legitimacy and support among their domestic populations. Many of the new Marxist-Leninist regimes, by contrast, have internationalist ideologies which explicitly reject many elements of nationalism, and have come to or remained in power only through the massive intervention of Soviet bloc forces. Hence it is the character of these new clients, their very weakness and malleability that in other respects make them attractive to Moscow, that lies at the root of their internal instability.

The most important of these anti-Marxist insurgencies is taking place in Afghanistan. There are several reasons for the strength of the resistance. First, Afghanistan is a deeply conservative Islamic country at a time when Islam is undergoing a worldwide revival. While there are many conservative Islamic countries, few remain as tribal and as untouched by modern culture as Afghanistan. Second, Afghanistan's level of political development and social integration is very low; very few governments have ever successfully extended administrative control over the entire countryside. And finally, both the PDPA and the Soviets acted in ways designed to exacerbate the inevitable nationalist-religious reaction, for example by attacking Islam and various tribal practices head-on, failing to coopt any but the narrowest sector of the Afghan urban population,³⁰ using overt Communist symbols such as a bright red flag, etc.

The war reached a stalemate soon after the Soviet intervention, in which the mujahedeen, or resistance fighters, control a large part of the countryside while the Soviets and Afghan government control the

³⁰ Soviet policy in Afghanistan should be contrasted with its consolidation of power in Central Asia in the 20s, where the Communists were able to coopt a significant number of local elites and intellectual like Sultan Galiev.

cities and important lines of communication. Although the mujahedeen have increased the sophistication of their operations in individual regions like the Panjshir Valley, they remain critically weakened by severe infighting--often to the point of outright violence--and lack of coordination. The Soviets for their part have not shown a willingness to increase the size of their military force in Afghanistan sufficiently to extend control over the countryside--not surprisingly, since this could require upwards of half a million men. If past practice against the Basmachi or Lithuanians is any guide, the Soviets will probably be able to continue to fight a low-level insurgency for a period of years, until they can coopt or demoralize a significant part of the mujahedeen. Indeed, it is hard to foresee any other outcome unless the mujahedeen are able to better coordinate their activities and their outside supporters--primarily Pakistan, but also the United States, China, and other sympathetic countries--dramatically increase their level of support.

Equally widespread has been the insurgency of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Unlike Holden Roberto's FNLA, which collapsed after the MPLA victory in 1975, UNITA continued to fight a guerilla war against the regime in Luanda and, over the years, improved its position such that it represents a serious threat to the MPLA's survival.³¹ Savimbi's movement is incomparably more sophisticated than that of the Afghan mujahedeen. Solidly based upon Angola's most populous tribal group, the Ovimbundu, UNITA currently exercises firm control over the southeastern third of the country, and is able to operate in as much as another third. It has

³¹ In addition to UNITA, there is a small separatist movement fighting in the Cabinda enclave, backed by Zaire.

succeeded in cutting the important revenue-producing Benguela railroad which connects Zaire to the ocean. In its own territory UNITA is unchallenged, running a well-organized system of schools, hospitals, and a large, disciplined military establishment. UNITA administration reflects Jonas Savimbi's early Chinese training in guerilla warfare and techniques of political mobilization. While Savimbi has and continues to receive assistance from South Africa, even supporters of the MPLA admit that UNITA attracts significant popular support and is in no way a creature of Pretoria. Indeed, it is probably only the presence of the approximately 20,000 Cuban troops and Moscow's ability to up the ante in a crisis that currently keeps the MPLA in power.

Ironically, Savimbi's very success makes less likely other efforts to wean Luanda away from the Soviet orbit. The Reagan Administration has been trying for several years to use the prospect of a Namibia settlement as a lure with which to induce Angola to reduce or expel altogether its Cuban advisor presence. While this may have been possible at one time, UNITA's strength makes it highly unlikely that the MPLA will want to throw off its Cuban security blanket. In the meantime, UNITA does not seem to be in a position to break the current deadlock militarily, and is prohibited by U.S. law (the Clark Amendment) from receiving American assistance to do so. If UNITA's position continues to improve to the point where the MPLA appears to be in serious danger of falling, the Soviets and Cubans will face a difficult decision of whether or not to dramatically increase their level of assistance.

In Mozambique Frelimo has been under similar attack by the Mozambican National Resistance (RMN). The RMN was founded in 1976 during the Zimbabwean war and was supported by Rhodesian and subsequently South African intelligence. While its membership currently includes former guerillas, tribal elements disaffected with Frelimo rule, and former white Portuguese settlers, it is to a much greater degree than UNITA sustained by South Africa. The RMN, led by Alfonso Dhlakama, has its headquarters in Sitatonga and operates the Voice of Free Africa radio from the Transvaal in South Africa. It has carried out sabotage operations in all but one of Mozambique's provinces, striking primarily at economic targets. These attacks have had a devastating effect on the Mozambican economy.³² As a result of RMN operations, Mozambique and Zimbabwe signed an agreement in October 1980 permitting Mozambican forces to pursue guerillas into Zimbabwean territory. Most recently, Samora Machel was driven to seek a non-aggression pact with South Africa. The so-called Nkomati agreement provides for South Africa to reduce support for the RNM in return for an end of Frelimo support for the African National Congress and other nationalist groups in South Africa.

Nicaragua has faced similar guerilla attacks on the part of a number of opposition groups commonly referred to as the *contras*. Formed initially from contingents of ex-National Guardsmen, the *contras* began operating primarily along the Honduran border in northern Nicaragua. Major organizations include the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the Misura Revolutionary Front in the Northeast, and the Revolutionary

³² See Sean Gervasi, "South Africa's Terrorist Army," *Southern Africa*, December 1982, and Kiracofe (1982), p. 124.

Democratic Alliance (ARDE) in the southeast. ARDE was originally led by Eden Pastora, a former Sandinista commander of the *tercerista* tendency who grew disenchanted with FSLN rule after it came to power, and Alfonso Robelo, a member of the first junta of the Government of National Reconstruction. The FDN has been supported by the United States as a means of putting pressure on the Sandinista regime to cease support for the guerillas in El Salvador, and has been denounced by Pastora as "somocista." Total *contra* strength is said to be upwards of 10,000 armed men, a considerable number when compared to the 9,000 guerillas said to be fighting the regime in El Salvador. The scale and seriousness of guerilla attacks increased markedly in 1983, though the movement remains divided and does not seem to be in a position to seriously threaten the FSLN government in Managua any time in the near future.

Ethiopia, as noted earlier, has been engaged in a prolonged struggle against a variety of ethnic separatist movements, primarily the Eritreans led by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF), and the Eritrean Liberation Front - Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF). There are numerous ironies in Addis Ababa's situation. Unlike the groups opposing the other Marxist-Leninist regimes, which are all anti-Communist and supported by the West, the Eritrean separatists claim to be Marxist and have traditionally been supported by the Soviet bloc. Since the Eritreans are also largely Muslim, they have also gotten assistance from a number of conservative Arab states. The rise of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Addis put the Eritreans' backers in a difficult position, to which they reacted differently: the Soviets quietly ended their support for

Eritrean separatism, while the Cubans, perhaps more principled, continued their support and urged the Dergue to seek a political settlement meeting at least some of the Eritreans' demands.³³ Eritrean separatism has probably proven to be a bigger drain on the Mengistu regime than it was for Haile Selassie, in terms of both money and manpower, and does not seem likely to be resolved any time in the near future.

Opposition to the PDRY regime is probably the least organized of the six. In spite of its veneer of modern political development--with Party Congresses, Central Committees, and the like--politics in both Yemens remains feudal and tribal to a large extent. Regimes in both Sanaa and Aden have attempted to undermine each other through the support of dissident factions. In the early 1970s Saudi Arabia organized the Army of National Salvation (ANS) and North Yemen the National United Front (NUF), both groups composed of South Yemeni exiles hoping to overthrow the PDRY regime. The ANS and NUF staged attacks into South Yemen in 1972 that ultimately led to a short border war between north and south in October.³⁴ While the Saudis and others later sporadically supported efforts to destabilize the PDRY, none of these amounted to a sustained opposition movement, and they were not pursued after the detente that emerged in south Arabia after mid-1982.

An interesting common feature of many of the groups opposing the new Marxist-Leninist regimes is that while they may be to the right in terms of the substance of their political programs, in form they have

³³ See Nelson P. Valdes, "Cuba in the Horn of Africa," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago and June Belkin, eds., *Cuba in Africa* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1982), pp. 78-90.

³⁴ Mylroie (1983), 39-40.

borrowed many of the tactics and organizational practices of the left. In a way this should not be surprising, since opposition leaders like Jonas Savimbi, Eden Pastora, and elements of the RMN started out as leftists, and in Savimbi's case received actual training in guerilla warfare in the PRC. At the same time, the Soviet Union and its allies have been put in the unfamiliar and uncomfortable position of fighting prolonged counterinsurgency wars. This has led to some ironic outcomes, such as Samora Machel's seeking of advice and training in counterinsurgency operations from the Portuguese military.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

It is evident from the above that the six new Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World have a number of common characteristics which distinguish them as a group from Moscow's other clients. These generalizations could be extended if we were to consider other states and national liberation movements not covered here, such as Cuba, Vietnam, Guinea-Bissau, the Salvadorian guerillas, Grenada, etc. The patterns of internal development, foreign, and military policies are of course not completely uniform, and numerous specific differences and exceptions to these generalizations have been noted. Moreover, some of these patterns will apply to a number of non-Communist Soviet clients as well. For example, involvement in regional conflicts and efforts to destabilize rivals and opponents is hardly unique to Marxist states; indeed, it is hard to think of a Third World country that has not participated in this type of activity at one time or another. Many other states, moreover, are themselves subject to internal insurgencies; the only thing new about countries like Afghanistan and Angola is the character of the regime under attack. It is clear that left-wing Third

World regimes, both Communist and non-Communist, fall along something of a continuum, with greater and lesser degrees of alignment with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, we are dealing here not with natural but with social phenomena, and cannot expect to have perfectly neat results. The real issue is that states which conceive of themselves as Marxist-Leninist do exhibit certain systematic behavior patterns which have more or less predictable consequences for their internal and external development, and which set them apart from other states.

From the standpoint of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the new Third World Marxist-Leninist regimes has both advantages and disadvantages. Clearly, the quality of influence that Moscow can expect to exert over these new states is much higher than for the bulk of its traditional bourgeois nationalist clients. The overtly internationalist ideologies espoused by these states means that they will be less resistant to open cooperation with the Soviet Union and its allies from the start. Consolidation of rule by vanguard parties provides Moscow with greater assurance that there will be some institutional basis for continued collaboration beyond the whims of the single leader at the top, and provides multiple points of access and influence. This point is perhaps best demonstrated in the case of the PDRY, where intimate Soviet, Cuban, and East German involvement in the training of party cadres and the internal security apparatus allowed Moscow and Havana to manipulate internal party factional rivalries to their own benefit, and in Afghanistan, where the Soviets have played the Parchamis off against the Khalqis. Soviet bloc participation in the development of internal state structures and institutions gives Moscow a much clearer idea of a client's internal politics and creates an ongoing dependency which can

be translated into political leverage much more readily than, say, arms and economic aid by themselves. This dependency is only enhanced by the regime's underlying weakness and lack of popular legitimacy. Thus, pointing out a Marxist regime's nationalistic tendencies and areas of disagreement with Moscow in a way misses the point: even if the leader of a country like Angola resented the Soviet-Cuban presence and wanted to expel Soviet bloc advisors as Sadat did, it is not clear that he could afford to do so. Not only would he have to worry about being driven from power by the internal opposition, but those very fraternal advisors might turn against him and replace him with someone who was more compliant.

On the other hand, the new Marxist regimes have certain important drawbacks from the Soviet standpoint as well. In the first place, they are as a group not particularly important or well-placed strategically. The USSR has been able to encourage but not choose the locale of Marxist insurgencies and takeovers; such takeovers, moreover, tend not to occur in big countries with strong national traditions. Thus the PDRY, while occupying an important position at the mouth of the Red Sea, is hardly adequate compensation for the loss of Egypt. Given the choice, the Soviets would undoubtedly have preferred to retain the latter as a client. Nicaragua and the other countries of the Caribbean Basin undergoing insurgencies are a useful embarrassment to the United States, but less significant than the countries of the Southern Cone, where the Soviets and Cubans have unsuccessfully tried to encourage revolution in the past. Afghanistan may be an ominous harbinger of future Soviet moves towards the Persian Gulf, but Iran and Saudi Arabia are clearly the main prizes there.

The second disadvantage is that the Soviet burden of empire has been rising rapidly. Precisely because of the heightened level of Soviet bloc involvement, clients like Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Angola, and Vietnam have been very costly to acquire and maintain. In a period when the rate of growth of the Soviet GNP has begun to slow dramatically, there has been increased questioning within the Soviet Union itself as to whether Moscow's investment in certain Third World clients has paid off and whether it should not be exercising a certain greater selectivity.

Finally, Moscow in the near future will be facing some unpleasant choices between seeing some of its recent gains rolled back, or significantly upping the ante by intervening militarily on behalf of its clients, with all the risks of confrontation with the U.S. and other pro-Western countries that this entails. In spite of the rather extreme lengths to which the Soviets have already gone in Afghanistan to preserve the position of their client, it appears that the initial commitment of over 100,000 troops may not be the end of the story. In Angola Cuban troop strength has risen in response to UNITA's advances, and ultimate success is likely to require re-intervention on the scale of late 1975. And in Grenada, the Soviets had no choice but to sit back and watch the United States overthrow one of their most recent acquisitions. Such choices, and the military requirements of fighting prolonged counterinsurgency wars, are familiar to colonial powers and to the United States in a somewhat different context, but they are largely new to the Soviet Union.

On balance, the Soviet Union is clearly better off with its new clients than without them. Even if the six new regimes are less well placed strategically than earlier Soviet allies or prospective clients that Moscow might hope to acquire some time in the future, they at least provide a starting point and a firm anchor for Soviet influence in a number of important parts of the Third World. How durable this anchor proves will be dependent in large measure on the policy of states aligned with the West. Angola, Mozambique, and the PDRY have already sought formal detente with their neighbors in order to relieve the pressure that these states have been able to bring to bear on them. Western support for anti-Communist wars of national liberation, and Moscow's responses to such conflicts, may in large measure determine the shape of the East-West rivalry in the Third World over the upcoming decade.

END

FILMED

5-85

DTIC