Enlistment Supply, Recruiter Objectives, and the All-Volunteer Army
Abstract
This paper suggested and applied a modeling approach that explicitly considers the role of recruiter behavior in the determination of enlistments. This analysis demonstrated that the traditional focus solely on the supply of single categories of enlistments is deficient. This is because recruiters, by allocating their time in response to goals--and the incentives to meet and exceed these goals--can alter both the quantity and quality of enlistments. Ignoring recruiter behavior and the demand factors affecting their choices can yield incorrect estimates of the effects of economic changes and resource expenditures. Of particular importance is the finding that, although Army recruiters appear to be motivated to attain quotas for both high and low quality enlistments, there exist few incentives to exceed them. This strongly suggests that recent efforts utilizing traditional supply models to forecast enlistments or assess the impact of a variety of educational benefits, enlistment bonuses, and advertising expenditures of a limited value. To this point, the modeling of recruiter behavior, though illustrative and of demonstrated empirical importance, has been overly simplistic.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1984
- Accession Number
- ADA152552
Entities
People
- James N. Dertouzos
Organizations
- RAND Corporation