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BATTLE ANALYSIS REAR AREA OPERATIONS REAR AREA SECURITY 1/1

1ST MARINE DIVISI. (U) ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF


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REAR AREA OPERATIONS
REAR AREA SECURITY

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On 26 October 1950, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment took over security of a supply dump at Kojo, Korea. They were surprised by an attack from organized North Korean units. Two companies were cut off, finally managed to fight off the attack and regained contact with their battalion after losing 27 killed, 49 wounded and 3 missing.			

22 JUL 1984

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REAP AREA OPERATIONS

REAP AREA SECURITY

SET NAME DIVISION

21 OCTOBER - 10 NOVEMBER
1950

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United States Marine Corps. History of the United States Marine Corps. Washington, D.C., 1951.

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1. The first of these is the fact that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies. The second fact is that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies. The third fact is that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies. The fourth fact is that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies. The fifth fact is that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies. The sixth fact is that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies. The seventh fact is that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies. The eighth fact is that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies. The ninth fact is that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies. The tenth fact is that the Japanese have been unable to establish a beachhead on the island of Iwo Jima. This is due to the fact that the Japanese have been unable to land their heavy equipment and supplies.

Figure 1 - IWO JIMA AREA
Figure 2 - MARINE DISPOSITIONS AT IWO JIMA
Figure 3 - MAJON-NI PERIMETER
Figure 4 - MAJON-NI AND ROAD TO WONSU

THE BATTLE OF PUSAN

This is the story of the Battle of PUSAN with the First Marine Division. It is a historical view at what can be termed as a rear area protection mission which would later become a part of our military tactical doctrine. The analysis of the mission and the men is surrounded by a complete examination of the situation, the concept of the operation, the combat service support received by the Marines at PUSAN and the surrounding area, as well as the command and signal that were available and used during the action from 21 October to 13 November 1950 in the country of Korea during what has been commonly termed the Korean War.

1. SITUATION.

a. General Overview:

(1) The near disastrous setbacks suffered by the US and South Korean forces during July and August 1950 were dramatically reversed the following month by a highly successful amphibious operation at INCHON by the 7th US Army Corps. So successful was the operation that General MacArthur announced the liberation of PUSAN on 25 September, less than a week after the Inchon landing. Having severed the North Korean supply

and communication lines, the operation resulted in the rapid collapse of the North Korean offensive. While a few enemy units were able to retain integrity and threaten US forces, enemy activities were mainly limited to delay and withdrawal to the north. MacArthur was quick to capitalize on his success by ordering a push north to cut off and destroy withdrawing North Korean forces. As part of this plan, the 1st Marine Division, which had taken part in the INCHON landing, was to be transferred by sea to the northeast coast of Korea in support of the offensive to the north.

(2) The plan originally called for an assault landing in WONSAN since Republic of Korea (ROK) army elements, moving northward, were well south of the city and encountering scattered resistance from forces withdrawing north. Just as the initial planning had been completed, information was received by the 1st Marine Division that ROK army elements had rapidly advanced north and seized and passed through WONSAN en route to HAMHUI to the north. As a consequence, the mission was changed from an assault to an administrative landing. While underway, the 1st Marine Division received additional changes to the mission, to include sending one battalion, immediately upon landing, to KOTO, 35 miles south of WONSAN.

(7) Task Organization:

LOOJ (TA 0011)

1st Marine Regiment (-),
Forward Command Group
1st Bn, 1st Marine
2d Bn, 1st Marine
F Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Marine
1 Plat, 4.2" Mortar Co
1 Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
Det, Co D, 1st Med Bn
2 Plats, 22d Co., 5th HMC Bn
75mm FG Plat, AT Co
Det, Anglico, 1st Sig Bn

HAGON-NI (TA 3830)

3d Bn, 1st Marine
D Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Marine
1 Plat, 4.2" Mortar Co
Company C (-), 1st Tank Bn

TOSWON (TA 5936)

1st Marine (-), Rear Command Group
Co C (-), 1st Engr Bn
1 Plat, 22d Co, 5th KMC Bn
Det. MP, Hq Bn
Det, Admin Sec, 1st Bn, 1st Marine
Det, Admin Sec, 2d Bn, 1st Marine
Det, Admin Sec, 3d Bn, 1st Marine

b. Enemy Situation:

(1) The enemy order of battle during these operations ran the gamut from retreating North Korean rifle divisions, attempting to thread their way through the 1st Marine Division's zone in order to rejoin the regrouping North Korean People's Army (NKPA), to a Chinese Army from which the remnants of an entire battalion surrendered to US forces at HAGAPU-RI. Several well organized and skillfully led, though outnumbered, NKPA units were encountered defending. It is probable the 1st, 5th, and 15th NKPA battalions, which were all of those withdrawing units, may never be seen. Forward agent and civilian reports indicated

and the women operating as part of organized groups. The number was as high as 15,000. No attempt can be made to estimate the number of stragglers and deserters who appeared in civilian clothing, and were usually accepted throughout the area as local citizens or refugees returning to their homes. In addition, the equipment of the organized units consisted of light and heavy and small crew-served weapons and extensive amounts of ammunition that could be easily carried. Rifles, machine guns and mortars were common. The stragglers and deserters, dressed in civilian clothing, carried no weapons.

(2) North Korean units specifically identified were the 45th, the 48th, and the 50th Regiments of the 15th NKPA Rifle Division which had successfully withdrawn to the north following the United Nations (UN) offensive of 15 September 1950, and had moved to the MAJON-NI area where it was to remain until the communists commenced their counteroffensive in October. Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) crossed the Yalu River. Other North Korean divisions identified were the 7th, 8th, and 10th NKPA Divisions, elements of which executed attacks on the Marines in the WONSAN - MAJON-NI Main Supply Route (MSR) area and against US and UN forces at WONGBUNG. These forces were particularly aggressive and effective in part due to

It was noted that the 12 and 5th NPPA Divisions were the first NPPA units to invade South Korea and were largely composed of troops who had previously served with the CCF in China.

(3) The Chinese Communist order of battle included units from the 3d and 4th CCF Field Armies, veterans of both the fighting against the Japanese in World War II and against the Chinese Nationalists following that war. The general plan for the employment of enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's zone was the assignment of one army, the 42d CCF Army of the 13th Army Group, 4th Field Army, to a delaying action south of the CHOSIN and FUSEK Reservoirs, while bringing up the larger and more effective forces of the 3d CCF Field Army to launch a counteroffensive. The 124th Division of the 42d Army had the specified mission of delaying the advance of the Marines along the HAMHUNG-HAGURU-RI axis.

c. Weather: With the summer over, temperatures would often reach into the high 40's, though it was not uncommon for temperatures to drop into the 20's and lower 30's at night. Towards the latter stages of this operation, it would drop close to zero degrees Fahrenheit at night. The day that the 1st Marine Division completed their administrative amphibious landing south of PONGSAN, it was in the lower 30's and

only winds (15-20 mph) had increased the wind chill factor. This was the first time Marines had seen ice in Korea. The rice paddies throughout the area had a thin layer of ice as a result of the night time temperatures. However, as winter had not yet arrived, the rice paddies had not had a chance to completely freeze. Consequently, movement through these paddies was always met with mud and moisture which hindered foot as well as vehicle movement. Much of the autumn weather in this region was characterized by minor amounts of precipitation which alternated between a cold, slow drizzle and brief periods of light snow flurries, both of which severely limited visibility.

d. Terrain:

(1) During the WONSAN phase of the 1st Marine Division's operation, it was soon realized that the terrain forced North Korean forces, escaping to the north from the PUSAN Perimeter combat in the south, to focus on the most favorable route. This most favorable route of escape entered the 1st Marine Division's zone in the vicinity of KODG in the south, continued to the northwest through ANBYON, westward to MAJON-NI and eventually northward exiting the MAJON-NI valley via the primary north-south road. See Figures 3 & 4. From KODG to KODG was 75 miles; WONSAN to MAJON-NI was 25

valley. The 1st Marine Division zone was 300 miles north to south and 60 miles east to west. A summary of the terrain characteristics pertaining to the zone of the 1st Marines Regiment (Reinforced), or referred throughout this report as Regimental Combat Team One (RCT-1), focuses on KODU and MAJON-NI.

(2) KODU. To date, this was the most attractive area the Marines had seen in Korea; an almost undamaged small seaport flanked by white beaches and clear blue waters of the bay. Surrounding the city of KODU was a flat coastal plain some four to five kilometers in diameter. See Figures 1 & 2. From the outskirts of the city to the rise of the hills which encircle the seaport was a solid field of rice paddies. Northwest of the city was a long ridge of high ground (which became the 1st Battalion's Command Post (CP) location). This ridge ran in a southwesterly direction from the point where it rose from the beach. (It was later occupied by C Company, 1st Battalion and two platoons of A Company because the positions offered by the terrain were separated by numerous ravines and secondary roads). To the south of the city, and east of the railroad track was Hill 109. It overlooked the ocean and two smaller villages (PANGDONG-NI and HANGDONG-NI) located along the coast, as well as an extensive open area covered by rice paddies. These fields and hills, ranging from 150 to 200 feet in

the station, formed a semi-circle or natural perimeter for KOJO. To the northeast of KOJO was a small peninsula.

(3) The supply dump (the original "defend" objective of 1st Battalion's mission) was located at the railroad station in the flat ground to the south of KOJO. This low point of the terrain could be easily approached by the enemy from numerous directions. The most likely avenues of approach were from the south along the secondary coastal road and through the valley leading towards KOJO from the southwest.

(4) MAJON-NI. Twenty-eight miles inland, to the west, from WONSAN was MAJON-NI, located adjacent to major road junctions for north-south and east-west traffic. This was the main WONSAN, PYONGYANG, SEOUL network. In certain locations, there were altitude differences of over 3000 meters between WONSAN and MAJON-NI. Both of the roads in question had been literally carved out of the walls of barren mountains. In some places, the road had awesome 1,000-foot drop-offs. The roads were generally carved out of the mountains and were made up of loose rocks and boulders. Any travel by road was slow and tedious. Each turn and each bridge represented a potential ambush site.

(5) The village of MAJON-NI is in a "Y"

enclosed valley. (See Figures 3 & 4). It is completely surrounded by high treacherous mountains that drop sharply into a valley. In the valley, outlined by two streams, is the village of MAJON-NI, with a population of less than 400 people. The village was a small, partially self-sufficient community that, for the most part, had remained unchanged for hundreds of years (due partly to its isolated location within the valley surrounded by huge mountains). Yet the "Y" shaped valley provided possible avenues of approach at each apex of the "Y". In addition, the surrounding mountains were covered with numerous natural drainage defiles that converged into the valley. Each drainage defile represented a potential avenue of approach for small guerrilla enemy forces operating on foot. The surrounding terrain was so imposing that the typical defensive perimeter consisting of a series of outposts would be ineffective. Any defense of this valley would require a coordination of reverse and forward slope positions. Supporting fire for such a defensive scheme would also be adversely affected by the terrain. The supporting artillery/mortar fires would have to be positioned to fire in any direction. With the high ground rising immediately in all directions around the valley, artillery would literally be "firing out of a barrel."

a. Friendly Situation:

(1) Strengths:

(a) MAJON-NI (3/1st Marines):

(1) The unit was at full strength with no equipment shortages because they had landed administratively at WONSAN several days prior and were unopposed during the road convoy to MAJON-NI.

(2) Morale was high as the end of the war appeared in sight with the collapse of the NKPA offensive and exploitation north by the allied forces.

(3) Availability and close coordination of fire support means was a significant factor in the defense of MAJON-NI.

(b) KOJO (1/1st Marines):

(1) The unit was at full strength and equipment authorization.

(2) High morale prevailed due to the anticipated end of the war.

(2) Weaknesses:

(a) MAJON-NI (3/1st Marines):

(1) Narrow defiles and enemy ambushes cut off ground resupply creating shortages of

ammunition, fuel, and rations.

(2) Early onset of winter towards the end of the operation found some elements without winter clothing.

(3) Location in hostile territory created security problems as the area had been under Russian influence since WWII.

(4) Large numbers of refugees and POW's strained the capabilities of the Civil Affairs section.

(5) The mountainous terrain prevented close support by artillery and employment of the attached tank company.

(b) KDJJ (1/1st Marines):

(1) Location in hostile territory and large numbers of refugees created security problems.

(2) Company positions were not mutually supporting.

(3) No battalion indirect fire support was available until six hours after the initial attacks began.

3. Dispositions:

(a) 3/1st Marines: A perimeter of 3400 meters circumference around MAJON-NI was formed by the three rifle companies, provisional platoons of Headquarters and Service Companies, and artillery and engineer troops. The Battalion CP was located in the center of the perimeter with the artillery battery about 300 meters south of the CP. Since the commanding ground was too far from the village and too rugged for company outposts, daytime observation posts were established and vigorous patrolling of the three main roads was conducted.

(b) 1/1st Marines: Company B occupied outposts three kilometers south of KOJO to cover the southwestern approaches along the coastal road and the road which ran through the valley leading to KOJO. The northern sector immediately adjacent to the west and one kilometer northwest of KOJO was held by A Company; while to the southwest of A Company, C Company's defensive positions were oriented toward approaches from the northwest.

MISSION. MISSION ANALYSIS

In September 1950, after successful routing elements of the North Korean People's Army, pushing them northward and back across the 38th parallel from SSOK, there developed a pensive moment by the leaders on the ground of both the United Nations' forces and the forces of the Korean Army (ROK). Both General MacArthur and Syngman Rhee believed that they could not, or would not, accept the status quo prior to the North Korean invasion in the previous June. (In retrospect, the controversy over MacArthur's interpretation of his mission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's authority to push north of the 38th parallel was the seat of the problem.) General MacArthur's strategy was to attack across the 38th parallel with the Eighth (US) Army in the west. To do this, he retained X (US) Corps as a separate operational force under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations' Command. X Corps would conduct an amphibious landing at WONSAN on the eastern coast after the amphibious attack on the western side of the peninsula had been initiated. X Corps would then establish a beachhead, attack with assigned, attached, and organic elements to the west for about 125 miles. The intent was to link up with elements of Eighth Army in the vicinity of PONGHANG thus trapping the remnants of the North Korean Army which was retreating. Both the

the 1st and 2nd Corps would proceed together, north of the 38th parallel, towards the Manchurian border.

2. The details of the concept of operation changed several times during the September-October 1950 time frame. Even with the numerous changes to the initial operations plans, the operation was to be executed by the US Marines under the command of the X (US) Corps Commander. On 24 October 1950, the Marine Commander, under the command of the X (US) Corps, was told that the X Corps had received a planning document indicating that the X Corps Commander would become the sole commander of the occupation forces in Korea north of the 38th parallel and east of the Tokopect Mountain range. These forces would consist of a single American Army Division - the 3d Infantry Division - and the First Marine Division. The rest of Eighth Army was to return to Japan. This peaceful attitude prevailed throughout the theater from the headquarters of MacArthur to the foxhole of the forces that were present in Korea. The attitude was of peace falling over the area. A chance to go home. The end of the conflict.

3. As part of the wind-down north of the 38th parallel, the First Marine Division received the following mission from X Corps Operations Order #13, issued on 25 October 1950:

(1) To land on beaches in the vicinity of WONSAN.

(2) To relieve all elements of I ROK Corps in PUDO and zone.

(3) To protect the WONSAN-PUDO-MAJON-NI area, employing not less than one Regimental Combat Team (RCT), and patrolling all roads to the west in zone.

(4) To advance rapidly in zone to the Korean northern border.

(5) To be prepared to land one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) in the CHONGJIN area rapidly on order.

(6) To assist the 101st Engineer Group (C) in the repair of the YONGHUNG-HAMHUNG railroad, employing not less than one engineer company.

d. The 1st Marine Division further assigned these tasks to the following units in their Operations Order 10-21, issued at 0600 hours on 28 October 1950.

Although this was the formal order, most commanders knew the contents of what was coming in the previous night's radio hour:

(1) RCT-1 to relieve elements of the I ROK in the WONSAN-PUDO-MAJON-NI zone, establish necessary road

blocks to prevent movement into the area, patrol roads, and destroy enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at POCO until further orders.

(2) RCT-7 to relieve elements of I (ROK) Corps along the HAMHUNG-CHOSIN Reservoir road, advance rapidly to the northern tip of the reservoir and CHOSIN, prepared for further advance to the northern border of Korea and to destroy enemy in zone.

(3) RCT-5 to move to an assigned zone behind RCT-7, relieve elements of I (ROK) Corps in the vicinity of FUSEN Reservoir, establish necessary road blocks to prevent movement into the area, patrol the roads and destroy the enemy.

(4) BLT 1/5 to be activated on order. Upon activation to report to the designated commander for operational control and landing in the vicinity of CHONGJIN.

(5) The 11th Marines, reinforced and less detachments, from an assembly area in the vicinity of HAKHUS, be prepared for operating in the zone of any RCT.

c. The mission analysis focuses on the US Marine Expeditional Combat Team 1. See Task Organization on page 1. The mission of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine

mission. (This is to be extracted from the previously stated mission). The battalion was currently at a railroad near WONSAN airfield. The unit was bored. The unit was at ease with the new mission. They were to go to HCO and accomplish the mission as it had been stated. A closer look at the mission needs to be in condition so that one can understand more clearly the intent of the orders from the X Corps and the First Marine Division.

4. At HCO, where it backs into the sea, was a depot. This depot was used by the ROK and the Marines and was to be used by the armed forces that were to come later in the area. The First Marine Division gave the mission to the First Battalion to protect that depot. The intent of the mission as provided by the Division and the Corps was clear. The battalion was to protect the depot and to protect the roads in and out of the area, which included the railroad that led into the depot. As indicated by troops available and the terrain analysis, there was an insufficient amount of troops and an irregular land formation for those troops to defend. The latter problem was compounded by enemy troop dispositions in the area. It was a case of underestimation of enemy forces that were present on the terrain on which the Marines were supposed to be employed. The following is the analysis of the weakness of the mission as it is extracted from the

...and the understanding of the
...to subordinate units.

a. The First Battalion received the mission to do
...report on 1010 and relieve the I ROK forces
...were protecting the area as it was interpreted and
...in order from the division. The tanks had
...to service elsewhere in theater and as
...the terrain did not lend itself to tank maneuver, it
...was determined that the tanks were not needed in 1010.
...it turned out, this was a good decision and had no
...effect on the situation in the area at all. The enemy
...the area did not have tanks and the terrain
...restrictions would have prevented their use.

b. The task was to relieve the I ROK units and
...of area consisting of a coastal plain about
...meters in diameter which stretched from the bay to
...hills ranging from 150 to 600 feet in
...the basin was the depot. The mission to
...the basin had not changed. The intent was the
...the depot, but the contents of the
...with departing ROK forces. Now
...the order had to have changed. With
...the depot, just what was the First Battalion
...the depot was empty and the roads seemed
...the I ROK and the "team."

The Marines had to determine

what the mission was. There is no indication that the commander of the battalion asked for clarification of his orders or that he interpreted them any differently than he had when he received them aboard the USS Mount McKinley two days earlier. The intent remained the same - protect the depot.

1. The area that was drawn on the map for the battalion was clear to the commanders of the Marine companies on the ground. (See Figures 1 & 2). They had to spread their companies outside the safety of the mutual support of the adjoining forces. There was no doctrine of the time in the hands of the Marines that indicated there was such a mission as rear area protection, nor was there any statement in the mission or task that would indicate that the units were to conduct a rear area protection mission. Indeed, after having had to land over the beaches and to establish a defense along the railroad and the port cities, it is clear to the person reading the mission that there was no rear area problem of which one could possibly be aware. The situation was not that accurate.

2. But there was an enemy threat to the rear of the battalion. The only way which it could be handled would be to have the friendly forces reorganize on the terrain and to better define the threat that existed. Since there appears to be no doctrine at the particular

time that substantiated this situation and there appears to be no change of mission for the First Battalion, it can only be stated that the battalion had to stick to its original course of action and to protect the empty depot against the threats of what then was considered to be an organized enemy and not the enemy that they faced.

H. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins provides a clear interpretation of the mission in which the First Battalion was involved. It is recounted from his documentation of the area and the mission. It was done prior to the knowledge that the depot had been emptied by the departing ROK forces.

"Mindful of my mission - to protect the supply dump until removed - I had disposed the battalion in a way designated to accomplish this end. The supply dump was located at the railroad station in the flat ground south of K030 - a point difficult to defend, since it was on the low ground and could be approached by the enemy from any direction." (1)

(NOTE: LTC D. M. Schmuck assumed command of the 1/1 from LTC Hawkins on 16 Nov 50.)

The intent of the commander who issued the order was fully understood and was not questioned. LTC Hawkins did not see a better way to accomplish the mission.

The 2d Battalion, First Marine Division, assigned to BCT-1, was designated the Regimental

reserve and initially left aboard the ships. The enemy situation did not indicate that the masses would be needed so soon after the first wave of PCT-1 landed at KOJONG--particularly since the 1st Battalion landed without incident. However, in retrospect, this reserve would be used. As the 1st Battalion developed the situation on the shore, the Regimental Commander made the important decision to commit the 2d Battalion to KOJONG to reinforce the 1st Battalion's initial positions. In order to accomplish this task, the Battalion was ordered to land over the beaches at WONSAN and to use the train to move to KOJONG. This was done on 28 October 1950. After arriving in the late afternoon, the battalion boarded the gondola cars of the available Korean train and arrived in KOJONG at about 2230 hours. This occurred without significant incident. The battalion commander of the reinforcing battalion understood his mission, was prepared to accomplish it, and did it without misunderstanding. The 2d Battalion tied in with the 1st Battalion thus complementing the efforts of the Regimental Combat Team.

iii. The 3d Marine Battalion was ordered to depart WONSAN on 28 October. Its mission was to relieve the 2dth ROK Regiment at HAJONG-NI. The Battalion was given the mission of establishing defensive positions at HAJONG-NI, destroying any enemy forces that were not met.

be left behind) and to deny the enemy the use of the roads in the area - specifically the complete road network in the area. The mission statement to the battalion also specified the patrolling of roads to the north, south, and east of MAJON-NI and to keep the road open between MAJON-NI and WONSAN. The overriding significance of the area was characterized by the junction of the roads leading east to WONSAN, south to SEDUL, and north to PYONGYANG. These roads would obviously be used by retreating, or more appropriately, escaping forces of the North Korean Army as they moved back to the north.

n. After a reconnaissance of the area, LTC Thomas L. Ridge, Commander of the 3d Battalion, concluded that the difficult terrain (a 28 mile, steep, twisting road through deep gorges and passes that invited ambushes and landslides which would block the roads) could not be kept open 100 percent of the time, as required in order to accomplish the mission. LTC Ridge received oral orders from the Commander, RCT-1, which actually relieved the battalion from the mission of keeping the WONSAN to MAJON-NI road open. With this modification to the mission, the 3d Battalion understood the mission to be one that consisted of becoming a force for blocking and screening. Because of the size of the area, the battalion perimeter was

established using company observation points. The large spaces between the observation posts were covered by patrols. The primary road network was patrolled, but this was mainly during daylight hours. In retrospect--and with a larger force--it may have been wise to have patrolled at night. Patrolling at night may have been necessary as it may have resulted in a greater degree of success.

d. The attachments that would occur after 28 October should be briefly mentioned so that their mission is understood as their involvement is explained later in the analysis. The commitment of the regimental reserve on 28 October to reinforce the 1st Battalion at KOJO, and the departure of the 3d Battalion to maintain the road network in the MAJON-N1 area, resulted in WONSAN, the original landing position and the area that should have remained secure, being left with no security force.

e. Commander, 1st Marine Division, attached the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, as well as elements of the 5th Korean Marine Corps (KMC), to the Regimental Combat Team 1. Their mission was to patrol the roads into the WONSAN area. Additionally, the battalion, as attached, was to maintain blocking positions at ANBYON and to secure the airfield and the harbor at WONSAN. This latter task should require further study to determine

for effectiveness of these attachments, but will not be included in its entirety here.

1. GENERAL.

1.1. Introduction of actions:

(1) General. KOJO, MAJON-NI and other actions dedicated to the protection of MSR's were one part of the Corps' campaign in northeast Korea. Each engagement affected subsequent battles. For the purpose of this study we will address the general events prior to the 1st Marine Division's administrative landing at WONSAN, the landing itself, and combat actions at KOJO and MAJON-NI. This spans a time frame of 21 October 1950 to 13 November 1950.

(2) Rear Area Security. WONSAN itself was basically within enemy territory. Although the 3d ROK Division advanced far north of WONSAN itself, it trailed long risky Lines of Communication (LOC's). This vulnerability required the 1st Marine Division to move from SEOUL to WONSAN and create a viable supply depot at sea and relieve ROK units. In some ways, the subsequent actions in the KOJO-MAJON-NI-WONSAN area were rear area protection missions in a tactical analysis, and deep battle from the operational perspective. Furthermore, the threat itself was illusive. Marine commanders were often unable to coordinate against the various regular BPP activities. Understanding these ambiguities, we will describe the situation of forces, intentions, etc., at the time of

the battle to events, and the outcome for both FROG and MASON-NI.

(3) FROG.

(a) Disposition of Forces.

(1) Enemy. Major opposing forces consisted of the depleted 5th, 7th, and 10th NKPA divisions, retreating north from their battle positions around the FUSAN perimeter. The retreat was organized, and included harrassing actions to disrupt US supply routes. The goal of the retreating North Koreans was to link up with the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) that had already crossed the Yalu River. On 13 October 1950, the first CCF elements of the 4th Field Army came south. By 15 October 1950, 120,000 Chinese veterans were inside North Korea, and by 25 October, one entire CCF Field Army was in the X Corps zone. In general, the NKPA forces were well clothed and equipped; in essence, they relied on automatic weapons and grenades with very little heavy combat support. The 5th NKPA Division moved north from the FUSAN perimeter to MASON-NI, northeast to FROG and then west. Its nominal strength was 7000 men and its mission was to link up with CCF and eventually join with CCF forces. The division was manned with combat veterans and had previously served with the CCF in China.

In addition to the 11th Regiment, and the forces of Red Division, there appeared to be a great deal in favor of thousands of small armed forces growing in small areas around food and loot--the violence of Korean civil war. Called guerrillas by the enemy, they were actually outlaws and criminals, loyal to no cause. And by virtue of their very furtiveness, they were capable of doing a great deal of damage to organized forces." (2)

(2) Friendly Forces. On 14 October, the 1st Marine Division departed INCHEON after being relieved by 8th Army units around SEOUL. Its destination was WONSAN. The Navy began minesweeping off WONSAN on 10 October, but the harbor was not completely clear on the Division's arrival in WONSAN harbor on 20 October. The 1st Marine Regiment (1/1), one of three infantry regiments in the 1st Marine Division, was ordered "to relieve elements of I ROK Corps in WONSAN-KOJO-NAJON-NI zone, establish necessary road blocks to prevent movement into the area, patrol roads, and destroy enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at KOJO until further orders." (3) The short warning time precluded detailed coordination or battalion planning. After a successful administrative landing on 26 October, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines assembled at WONSAN airfield for further movement to KOJO. At 1330 hours, the first element of the 1st Battalion departed WONSAN for KOJO with the last element departing at approximately 2000

about 17 October. All supplies and equipment which could not be moved by rail were loaded on a truck train. The immediate task for 11 was to reinforce POK units and protect an area consisting of a coastal plain 400 square in diameter and a semicircle of hills 1.50 to 200 feet in height. With the arrival of the 1st Marine, the POK regiment departed by train for North Korea on the morning of 27 October. Ironically, the reports that 11 was supposed to guard were removed by the departing POK units. This fact made the 1st Marine's mission somewhat nonsensical, but apparently, only the South Koreans knew the dump was empty. In terms of enemy activity, "they [ROK] admitted that small bands of escaping NKPA soldiers had sometimes raided the villages for rice, but added that 60th patrols had scoured the hills without meeting any organized resistance." (4)

(b) Opening Moves.

(1) Although there was no hint of an enemy surprise attack, the Marines were cautious in North Korea. The major camp was at the railroad station on the flat ground south of 1000. It was fortified to defend against an invasion on the ground that the POK had reported as the main NKPA attack route. "The 1st Marine was the only unit in the area that had been alerted to the possibility of a surprise attack. The 1st Marine was the only unit in the area that had been alerted to the possibility of a surprise attack." (5)

...reason. For that reason, he deployed B Company to the south side of the approaches. The remainder of the battalion positioned themselves in surrounding hills to protect the supply depot. (Figures 1 & 2).

(C) LTC Hawkins did not expect an attack by large enemy forces. In such an event, he did think that B Company would withdraw to the hillside position. Hawkins' behavior in protecting the supply depot deserves explanation. He deployed his forces before learning that the POK's had taken the contents of the supply dump with them. For added firepower, the battalion reinforced B Company with light machine guns, 3.2" rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, 75mm recoilless rifles, flame throwers, and 81mm mortars. On the afternoon of 27 October, Hawkins faced an additional burden. Appearing in the valley southwest of K000, 2000-3000 refugees streamed toward the seaport. Hawkins did not have time to screen all the refugees before nightfall, so he concentrated them into the peninsula northeast of K000. Also in the afternoon, 1/1 received probing fire from several directions. At 1600 hours, a patrol team received fire from Hill 185 (Figures 1 & 2).

(D) At 1600 hours, Hawkins received a report and jeep driver at seaport area of enemy fire from Hill 185. Subsequently, 1/1 received

13. The 1st Platoon of B Company was positioned on the left flank of the 2nd Platoon. The 2nd Platoon was positioned on the right flank of the 1st Platoon. The Marines were under constant observation by the enemy. At 2100 hours, the first coordinated attack was launched at approximately 2100 hours.

14. Shortly after the 2nd and 3d platoons of B Company received fire, the NKP attacked the positions of C Company. On this assault, the enemy had infiltrated within grenade distance. They confused the Americans by shouting "Come this way! Don't shoot! We're friends!" when challenged. Completely surprised, the 1st Platoon of B Company was overrun by two platoons of North Koreans. Seven Marines died before they got out of their sleeping bags. The NKP attacked 3d Platoon and the B Company. The NKP moved three points to the south and southeast. Three platoons of communists retreated after barrages of 60mm and 120mm mortar fires were concentrated directly on the Marine positions. At C Company, North Koreans moved within 10 feet of the Marines before being repulsed. This was the fiercest attack, but C Company held its ground that night. In the south, E Company did not fare as well. The 11th platoon sustained a heavy attack at 2100 and the 1st Platoon of E Company was forced to retreat. At 2300 hours, the 1st Platoon of E Company requested assistance from the 1st Platoon of B Company. The 1st Platoon of B Company was unable to provide assistance due to the heavy fighting.

1. B Company Withdrawal. At 0200 hours, F Battery of the 11th Marines arrived at RD00 and placed their howitzers on the beach northeast of town. Still under attack, B Company regained radio contact with the 4.2" mortars after repairing some damaged antennae. At 0300 hours, the mortars reengaged and broke up the ongoing NKPA attack. By 0300 hours, the artillery was operational, but the enemy threat had passed. If the artillery had reached RD00 before nightfall on 27 October, B Company's evacuation may have been smoother. At 0330 hours, the NKPA disengaged and moved east of the railroad track, then north towards RD00. B Company resumed withdrawal along the track north of CHONCHON-N1, assisted by A Company. This evacuation was nearly complete when 200 enemy troops moved west out of RD00 into an open field of fire. A and B Company, supported by F Battery, killed or wounded 75 enemy. The engagement finally ended when Marine Corsairs completed some uncontrolled fire over support missions that forced the NKPA to withdraw.

2. Reinforcement. At 0412 hours on 28 October, the 1st Battalion transmitted a message to the 10th Marine. Picked up by the 7th Marines, it was relayed to the 1st Marines at 0500 hours. The message stated that the battalion had been under attack

since 1700 hours on the 27th by 1000 NKPA. It requested helicopters for evacuation of the wounded, and Landing Ship Transport-Hospital (LSTHs) for less seriously injured soldiers. Another message left KOUJO at 1000. Basically, it asked "shall we hold here, or withdraw north," requested regimental reinforcement, and finally mentioned that the ROK supply dump was empty. Corps and Division agreed that KOUJO should be held, since a large scale NKPA attack seemed likely. (Another factor in this decision was the ROK supply dump. Nobody at the Division CP seemed to know as yet that it had been removed.) (7) but General Smith, 1st Marine Division Commander, ordered the 1st Marines to send a battalion of reinforcements anyway. Slated for the task was COL Puller's regimental headquarters and the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Using the railroad from WONSAN, the first trains left for KOUJO at 1630 hours and arrived at 2230 hours on 28 October. In terms of additional combat support, 1/1 recommended a second destroyer for gunfire support. Since the roads and bridges out of WONSAN were not sturdy enough to hold more, 1st Marines also sent an LST loaded with tanks. Finally, the 2/11 Marine Artillery (-) plus the motor transport of 2/1 was ordered to move to KOUJO on the morning of 29 October. "Making up a train and loading it with a reinforced battalion and extra supplies in three and one-half hours had been something of an

The 1st Battalion's reserves were all in WONSAN and the convoys and water transport were too slow to assure rapid reinforcement. For all practical purposes, the reinforcement effort was lost energy.

(3) Consolidation. COL Fuller's reinforcement of FDOJO left his zone relatively unoccupied. The 1st Marines' major mission was support of the MONSAR beachhead. With the 2d Battalion supporting the 1st Battalion at KOJO, and the 3d Battalion relieving the ROK's at MAJON-NI, there were relatively few troops available to patrol the H35 and various blocking positions at AMPYON. In addition, operations efforts centered on expanding the

atmosphere. As an example, the ten tanks and LST's which were transported ran aground at WONSAN on the 28th and 29th on 28 October. In a repeat performance, they ran aground again on 29 October on arrival at KOJO. At the time a Navy tugboat came to the LST's aid, the tanks were superfluous to KOJO. With the enemy disappearing into the western foothills, the 1st Marines ordered the tanks returned to WONSAN -- without ever being unloaded. Patrols in KOJO itself and west of the coastal plain were fruitless. The enemy was gone. Even so, in the two days of action, Marine air strikes and Navy destroyers leveled 60% of KOJO. On 30 October, a 1st Battalion patrol moving south from KOJO along the railroad track found the bodies of 12 Marines near Hill 109. As they approached the outskirts of TANGCHON, the patrol received sniper fire. Wasting no time, Corsairs were called again, resulting in the death of 16 more North Koreans. The patrol estimated 50% of TANGCHON was destroyed. This was the last major action in the KOJO operation. Marines casualties were 27 KIA, 17 MIA, and 4 MIA. The Marines estimated enemy losses at 250 KIA from an actual body count of 165. Additionally, there were 37 POWs. In this phase, intelligence was slow again. Patrols vainly searched south for NVA forces that had already passed the Chongchi and moved northwest. Indeed, the offensive which into KOJO opened on WONSAN for a

Wonsan effect that had the potential to hobble the United X Corps operation. Perhaps the 3d Battalion in KONGH-NI deterred the enemy from such an operation.

(4) Relief. It was now clear to the 1st Marines that KOJO was no longer a hot spot in their zone of operations. With the security of WONSAN in mind, the 1st Marine Division sent the 5th KMC Battalion to relieve the 1st Battalion in KOJO. 1/1 departed KOJO at 0700 hours on 2 November by LST. Arriving at WONSAN at approximately 1230 hours, they took up defensive positions around the city. The 2d Battalion left KOJO by rail and motor convoy on 3 November. After some minor guerrilla contact on the route north, they arrived at WONSAN at 1200 hours on 4 November.

(d) Key Events. The KOJO operation had several key events. The first was the decision to send the 1st Battalion south. With the long LOC's (39 miles from the logistic beach head), relative isolation, and poor command and control, KOJO was a questionable objective to defend. The 1st Battalion Commander contributed to this failure. By placing his companies to defend a perimeter that did not exist, he directly allowed isolation of B and C Companies, resulting in the overruning of B Company, positions and 27 dead. The final decision to send the 1st Battalion

reinforcement. It was too late with too much of the wrong equipment. The excessive artillery and beached armor characterized the ineffective reinforcement effort. All of these events played into the hands of the NKPA. Although estimated enemy losses were high, they successfully disrupted the southern flank of the ROKSAR logistics encirclement, diverted resources to a non-critical area, and endangered the MSR's.

(e) Outcome. KDOO was a qualified success for the NKPA. Apparently armed with more accurate intelligence than was available to the Marines, they used violent, night tactics to shatter isolated 1st Battalion positions. They quickly broke off the battle when faced with superior firepower. Having already fought up and down the length of the Korean peninsula, the North Koreans used their vast experience to concentrate forces to achieve local superiority and overwhelm the defenses. The Marines were a much heavier force than the NKPA; therefore, reinforcement was slower and less flexible. On the other hand, the North Koreans relied on light machine guns and mortars; consequently, they did not need to shoulder an onerous logistics burden. In defense of the Marines, there was insufficient time for them to react, prepare, and issue orders. This spread confusion in the command level. It was clear that

there was little understanding of the Division Commander's concept for KOJO. The final result was that the communists harassed the Marine forces, interdicted their support LOC's, and blended into the hills in preparation for their linkup with the CCF.

(4) MAJON-NI.

(a) Disposition of Forces.

(1) Enemy. Threat units at MAJON-NI were similar in origin to the NKPA forces that fought the 1st Battalion at KOJO. The major opposing force was the 15th NKPA Division. Although they were also retreating north from the PUSAN perimeter, the unit was a veteran force with CCF experience prior to the Korean conflict. The 15th NKPA Division, under Maj Gen Pak Chun Sol, consisted of three regiments (45th, 48th, and 50th) of uncertain strength. Their mission was occupation and control of the upper Imjin River Valley for unconventional operations. MAJON-NI was one of their main objectives.

(2) Friendly Forces. MAJON-NI was a critical North Korean village for several reasons. In terms of LOC's, it was a major junction in the roads to PYONGYANG, SEOUL and WONSAN (Fig 3). Politically, MAJON-NI was the hub of forced culture in the doctrine of the communist puppet state set up in

the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines relieved the 21st ROK Regiment. The Marines arrived via truck convoys from WONSAN, and the ROK's returned in the same vehicles. The 1st Marines did provide some combat support to the 3d Battalion. They attached D Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines for artillery support; the 1st platoon of the 4.2" Mortar Company for light indirect fire; and finally, C Company(-) of the 1st Tank Battalion. 1st Marines issued two missions to the 3d Battalion: 1) "Form a defensive position at MAJON-NI, destroy enemy forces, and deny them the use of this central road net"(10) and 2) "patrol roads to north, south, and west and keep the road open between MAJON-NI and WONSAN."(11) After publication of the orders, an oral amendment eliminated the second requirement. The road between WONSAN and MAJON-NI twisted through a 3000 foot pass -- excellent terrain for ambushes. On arrival at MAJON-NI, the 3d Battalion circled a perimeter approximately 3400 meters in circumference. The 3d Battalion commander placed the six D Battery howitzers to properly cover any avenue of approach. In the realm of refugee control, MAJON-NI was a point of entry for Korean transients. The 3d Battalion's support unit processed those refugees in

roads and other lines of communication. The road was close cropped before the attack, so it was on some 1/2 mile at the neck, or bottleneck point. To understand the magnitude of the civil affairs problem, an average daily rate of 92 POWs captured in 17 days of operation in the MAJON-NI area.

(b) Opening Moves. The next two weeks of combat at MAJON-NI revealed that resupply of the garrison would be the central theme. As an immediate task, 3d Battalion established patrol sectors by company: G Company on the WONSAN road, H Company on the BECK Road, and I Company on the primary thoroughfare to PYONGYANG. First combat occurred on the morning of 2 November. At 0900 hours, an unidentified size NCPA force ambushed a resupply convoy bound for MAJON-NI. See Figure 4. An "OY flying cover for convoy tried to signal he had spotted road block and for convoy to turn around, but his signal was unobserved or not understood." (12) The Koreans disabled the center surface of the narrow road, and followed with devastating small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire. There was no recourse but return to POWs. The initial losses were five trucks and seven other vehicles. The 1st Marines responded by sending a combined force lead by five tanks to the rescue of the ambush. Airstrikes dispersed the enemy and the Korean withdrawal, but friendly losses were 1 killed, 10 KIA, 13 WIA, and 3 damaged trucks.

and the rest of the damaged trucks were burned
and salvaged. While this action was taking place
west of MAJDN-NI, there was more fighting in the south
that same morning. NKP elements ambushed a motorized
patrol from H Company near YDHAE-RI at approximately
1050 hours. As the attack continued, the platoon sent
a jeep back to MAJDN-NI. Radio problems delayed
external reinforcement, so the 3d Battalion dispatched
the remainder of H Company. Artillery fire assisted in
this second Marine withdrawal of the day. Losses
included 5 KIA and 16 WIA. In both of the day's
ambushes, enemy losses were undetermined, but light.
In a more successful vein, supporting fire was quite
effective. Marine Corsairs dispersed the enemy
attacking the convoy, and D Battery saved the enfiladed
H Company platoon. Unfortunately, both actions show a
general Marine disregard for security. A platoon
convoy escort was obviously insufficient to react to an
ambush. Intelligence apparently ignored enemy presence
or did not have the true picture. In sum, the first
day's engagement was an NKP victory and repeated the
American trend of attempting to react to disaster, as
opposed to properly organizing forces to meet the
threat.

CONCLUDE PHASES OF BATTLE.

1. General Operations. Within

the night before. LTC Ridge (3d Battalion Commander) felt the successions of his closed MSR's. Anticipating the worst, he conducted a successful practice run on 1 November. The 3d Battalion ordered and received a massive drop at 0900 hours on 3 November that included 21 tons of gasoline, rations, grenades, and artillery shells. Air Force C-47's of the 1st Air Delivery Platoon out of WONSAN airfield dropped 152 parachutes on the MAJON-NI perimeter. While this drop alleviated the situation, therefore, he ordered a second convoy to go to MAJON-NI at 1000 hours on 3 November. As the convoy departed WONSAN, there were significant communications problems between MAJON-NI and WONSAN. Due to the mountainous terrain, radio communications were unreliable. Messages delivered by helicopter and OY became the primary means of communications. Despite these difficulties, the convoy included heavier combat support assets than assigned on the prior day. In the place of an infantry platoon, an entire rifle company (A Company, 1st Battalion) under CPT Robert Barrow joined the supply train. Additionally, 1st Marines included engineers, a section of 81mm mortars, and a 60mm recoilless rifle section. An OY aircraft insured the convoy's reconnaissance. In a tactical innovation, CPT Barrow placed the engineers and a few of their vehicles at the point of the convoy. This allowed the engineers to bulldoze or dig four un defended craters on their way

On 12 Oct 68, in midafternoon, the NLFPA struck again. The force of 100. With the OY spotting the enemy on the road ahead, one platoon of infantry left their trucks and engaged the enemy. The fire fight gradually progressed from the lead elements down the left flank of the entire convoy. The OY called for airstrikes, and the F4D section marked enemy positions with white phosphorous. Since this action occurred at 1700 hours, it was dusk and the close air support was only effective in suppressing enemy fire, as opposed to destroying enemy forces and positions. The enemy attack intensified as night dominated the battlefield. In a seemingly impulsive decision, CPT Barrow ordered lights out and the trucks turned around while the infantry units continued covering. While this may have been the only realistic choice, the results were disastrous. One truck went over a cliff with 30 troops aboard; by miracle, no one died as a result of the accident and only 16 were injured. On the other hand, as the Marines escaped the ambush and counted their losses, the head count was discouraging. The mission failed and the Marines reported 8 KIA. Furthermore, five vehicles were lost, including a jeep, personnel carrier, dump truck, and two 2 1/2 ton trucks. The number of the enemy was, once again, undetermined, and unobtainable. As CPT Barrow returned to the rearward command post at 2000 hours, 101 Fuller

Although CPT Barrow's judgment was not faulted, the significant question is why CPT Puller attempted to force another convoy through the MSR without clearing the area with a reconnaissance in force. With the morning's successful airdrop, the 3d Battalion did have a viable, albeit tenuous, supply line. In hindsight, the losses of 3 November were a tragic mistake. Learning from his mistake, CPT Barrow modified his tactics for the next convoy. Departing MONSAM on 4 November at 0830 hours, he adopted more flexible security measures and regained the tactical initiative. Deploying his infantry platoons on foot, 1000 yards in advance of the lead vehicles, the Marines surprised approximately 70 guerrillas who were leisurely enjoying a late morning breakfast. Turning the tables, the Marines killed 51 NKPA, took 3 POW's, and counted no friendly casualties. The chain of events regarding the resupply operations from 2 to 4 November was typical for the 1st Marines throughout the COMBAT-SEA-BAJOP-RI operation. Although they were unable to foresee enemy objectives or transform their known tactics into a tangible threat, the Marines continually adjusted their techniques to meet the enemy's needs. Usually, the cost of the enemy's mistakes were Marine casualties.

(C) Defender Defense. While

received word that directly confirmed the ROK threat was
small. In addition, the situation at MAJONG-NI was much
more secure. On 5 November, the Counter Intelligence
Force Team (CIFT) warned of a probable NARA attack on
MAJONG-NI at 0100 hours on 7 November. In response to
this warning, 1st Marines attached A Company, 1st
Battalion, to the 7th Battalion. With this
battalion, LTC Froese initially strengthened his
perimeter. In a mission that competed for the
resources at MAJONG-NI, 1st Marines ordered a
reinforcement in force of the TURJU-SAN mine works to
insure a buildup of possibly 2000-3000 North
Koreans. Comprising a task force, G and I companies
received the mission, with combat support from the
artillery battery at MAJONG-NI. Returning at
approximately 1700 hours on 6 November, the Marines
detected no recent NARA activity. They did gather 70
killing prisoners. With this mission complete, A
Company returned to regimental control, and G and I
companies resumed their perimeter defense. In the
evening hours of 7 November, USPA probing attacks
suggested CIFT's threat prediction. At approximately
0100 hours, two thirds of the Marine perimeter received
a mortar attack which included a full attack by the 45th
Regiment, with USPA at 0100 hours. At 0100 hours, CIFT
warned, despite the fact that the attack was a full
scale attack. The attack was a full scale attack.

...the 1st Battalion's position after the fight ended. The 1st Battalion moved over HADJON-NI. Marine Company close to the front gradually drove the enemy from the perimeter. At 0515 hours the attack ended: this time with a Marine victory. While the 1st Battalion had 3 KIA, Marines estimated the enemy loss was 53 killed and 11 wounded. This estimate was questionable: the enemy carried off their dead and wounded. With the North Koreans fleeing into the foothills surrounding HADJON-NI, 1st Marines detached A Company from the 3d Battalion and recalled them to WONSAN. Using a truck company, A Company escorted 619 North Korean POWs to WONSAN. In addition to ordering the return of A Company, COL Fuller ordered the 2d Battalion to MUNCHON-NI, an intermediate village near the top of the highest pass on the TOSWAN-MUNCHON-NI road. The 2d Battalion's mission was identical to the 3d Battalion task: block enemy movement north and screen civilians. With only enough trucks for one reinforced rifle company, E Company was the first unit of the 2d Battalion to depart WONSAN. At a horseshoe bend 8 kilometers N of TOSWAN, the BSA repeated a now familiar tactic. From the N, stopping the lead vehicles with a machine gun barrage, the North Koreans trapped the column against a steep cliffside. From cliffs 200 meters above the column, with no other recourse, the column was forced to retreat to its original position. At 0130

night, 1st Marines sent F Company to reinforce the beleaguered E Company. They arrived at 1515, about the same time A Company's convoy came from the west. By then, the battle was over. Requesting emergency helicopter evacuation, the Marines listed 8 KIA and 27 MIA. Enemy losses were in excess of 40. While absorbing these substantial losses, the Marines did destroy 50 cases of 120mm ammunition and 300 cases of small arms ordnance that the North Koreans left in their hasty retreat. With the action complete, 2d Battalion continued to MUNCHON-NI. In analyzing both the perimeter defense and the E Company convoy, surprise and security were the pivotal principles of war. The forewarned Marines in MAJON-NI successfully beat off the 45th NKPA attack; but the North Koreans badly bloodied the tactically blind and understrength E Company convoy. Reminiscent of KOJO and other convoy operations, the 1st Marines did not adequately protect its forces and waited for disaster before dispatching the required troops. As usual, the reinforcements arrived to find the enemy melting into the hills. Whence the 1st Marines used their combat experience for the MAJON-NI perimeter defense and the 4 November convoy, they lapsed back into old ways for the E Company debacle.

(2) Relief at MAJON-NI. The increased combat activity at MAJON-NI concerned the 1st

Marine Commanders. On 10 November, CIC Fuller attacked the 3d KMC Battalion at 3.1. Arriving with a small convoy, they assumed the perimeter sector vacated by A Company of the 1st Battalion. That same day, an OP spotted 300 North Koreans four miles west of MAJON-NI. In a good display of responsive indirect fire, C Battery howitzers dispersed the enemy concentration. Anticipating further NKPA offensives, the CIC warned of another attack on the MAJON-NI perimeter on the night of 11-12 November. This was a correct prediction as the 45th NKPA regiment began their typical probes around 0130 hours on 12 November. The main attack focused on the 3d KMC front, but never developed momentum. The North Koreans wandered into a "Bouncing Betty" minefield that achieved a debilitating affect on the enemy. With the attack ending again at daybreak, Marine losses were two killed and six wounded. At 1030 hours the following morning, the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division (US) departed WONSAN to relieve the Marines at MAJON-NI. The soldiers, exploiting their Marine counterparts, bogged down at some North Korean roadblocks and spent the night in a defensive perimeter astride the TOGWAN road. They finally arrived at MAJON-NI at 1530 hours. The 3d Battalion departed for WONSAN at 1015 hours on 14 November. The next day, the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, relieved 2.1 at MUNCHON-NI. In effect, the

MAJON-NI operation was over for the 1st Marines. The final losses for the 3d Battalion were 16 KIA, 4 MIA, and 15 WIA against an estimated 525 NKPA dead and unknown number of wounded. This enemy KIA figure is probably grossly inflated due to their lack of reliable body counts. The various supply convoys registered more casualties: 9 killed and 61 wounded. With the relief of its major maneuver battalions, RCT-1 displaced north to CHIBYONG. They were no longer responsible for the WONSAN-MAJON-NI-KOJO area.

(d) Key Events. There were two critical events in the MAJON-NI operations for the 1st Marines: the initial perimeter defense of MAJON-NI on 7 November, and A Company's convoy success on 4 November. The successful perimeter defense demonstrated to the NKPA that the Marine forces in the town itself were well organized and entrenched. The 3d Battalion took advantage of their combat support assets: the D Battery howitzers covered all axes of attack, air strikes interdicted enemy movement during the day, and careful civilian and POW interrogation warned the defenders of significant attack. The overwhelming influence of these combat multipliers neutralized the rather negative effects of poor planning and task organization that occasionally ruined supply operations. The only good convoy attempt was the 4

November operation under CPT Robert Barlow. Adapting his tactics to suit the enemy threat, he wrested the initiative from the NKPA, killed more than 144 North Koreans, and pushed the convoy to its destination safely. After this success, why did the Marines resume their past habit of undermanned, defensive convoys? Eight more Marines died at the horseshoe east of KUMCHON-NI because of a failure to exploit proven tactics. The entire 1st Marine tactical plan was inconsistent. Generally, the key events favored the Marines; but they failed to exploit their tactical advantages in MSR control.

(e) Outcome. There was no clear tactical victory for either force. Both sides accomplished their missions: the Marines kept the MSRs open and massed enormous numbers of FOWs. On the other hand, the 15th NKPA Division successfully disrupted Marine supply operations and destroyed a valuable portion of Marine supplies and personnel. Accordingly, both adversaries revealed specific strengths. The North Koreans used the principles of concentration and mobility to maintain tactical advantage over the Marines. They would only fight when they possessed clear numerical superiority; as Marine reinforcements arrived, they terminated the engagement. Although the Division was not at full strength, it clearly outnumbered the RCT-1 forces in the WONSAN-MAOON-NI

and similar to their sister units who fought at Chosin. The 15th NKPA Division had substantial battle experience. They were veterans of the Korean War and JCF operations prior to 1950. They used the terrain to maintain an offensive posture throughout the entire battle. Marine operations displayed the traditional American strengths. The quality and quantity of weapons vastly outclassed the NKPA. Especially in terms of combat support, arrival of US close air support and artillery usually terminated the Korean attacks. Marine morale was noteworthy. Continuously under pressure, they doggedly pursued their objectives. Indeed, perseverance characterized these operations much more than informed analysis of their situation, or innovative response. The Marines survived due to the massive available logistical support. When one logistical convoy failed, the Marines dispatched another one. If the MSR's were temporarily closed, then a massive airdrop similar to the 3 November MAJORN-NI resupply was sufficient. The Marines were seldom short of fighting equipment or materiel. Casualties were expeditiously moved by both armies. The NKPA typically removed their wounded and dead from the battlefield. This habit deprived Marine intelligence of reliable unit strength estimates. For emergency cases, the Marines often relied on evacuation helicopters. In fact, the final outcome was a draw. This battle was

just a minor prelude to future operations in the north. The NKPA trudged north to join Chinese units preparing for attack in force; and the Marines wearily displaced to CHIBONG for yet another mission, another battle, in the same war.

E. Analysis.

(1) The administrative landings of the 1st Marine Division at WONSAN in October and the actions of the following weeks should have resulted in the largest defeat of NKPA soldiers of the war. However, the successes of prior weeks had bred overconfidence, and the X (US) Corps was oriented to the north for continued success. This opened the left flank and rear of the 1st Marine Division to large numbers of infiltrating NKPA. The realization of this threat to the division rear area resulted in the entire 1st Marine Regiment being dedicated to securing base areas and main supply routes against organized guerrillas and elements of the 5th Division NKPA from 24 October through 17 November. The reactive posture that the 1st Marine Regiment was forced into detracted from the primary mission of the division. Additionally, had the division been more attuned to threat capabilities and directed greater attention to the withdrawing enemy force, the flank and rear would not have been exposed. Furthermore, the failure to close the door on the

Withdrawing enemy left a disciplined force to fight again. Analysis of the actions of this brief period of rear area operations assesses immediate and long term benefits. Finally, the lessons learned from the operation are summarized.

(2) The operations conducted by the 1st Marine Regiment were indecisive to the overall conduct of the war. Although the entire regiment was directed to the mission of securing base areas and main supply routes, this did not significantly detract from the tactical mission of the 1st Marine Division's accomplishment of its tactical mission. Consequently, little or no tactical advantage was gained by the NKPA.

(3) The enemy achieved surprise initially at POGO. This is primarily attributed to military intelligence not properly developing the situation. There was insufficient planning time afforded to the regiment or the battalion. This recognition of deficiencies does not detract from the question of whether or not there was an urgency for the battalion to deploy to POGO at that time. It only identifies and reinforces the importance of rapid and correct intelligence as well as the need for sufficient planning time for a unit to tactically employ forces against the tactical enemy threat.

14. The tactical operations were at small scale. The enemy attempted and achieved surprise, isolation and destruction. Although this is not unlike the previous tactics employed, the successes gained were not without significant enemy losses. The most successful reaction to NKPA tactics was the use of air cover to alert convoys to enemy roadblocks on the HACHU-KI MSR. The aerial observer would identify the roadblock and alert the ground commander who would dismount and deploy forces. The air cover would then provide close air support. Initially, there were some coordination problems with this concept. However, with continued use, it was successful in countering subsequent enemy attempts to block the MSR.

15. The harshest immediate realization for the 1st Marine Division forces was that the NKPA was not defeated. The enemy's ability to strike and inflict significant damage while in full retreat was quickly realized. The threat to the 1st Marine Division rear area was from a very disciplined force conducting an organized withdrawal. It required the attention of the entire 1st Marine Regiment.

16. Tactically, the actions reinforced the importance of integration of fires and mutually supporting positions. The failure to have artillery or aerial observation available initially at 1000 detracted


and the defense. Additionally, the defensive positions were not mutually supporting and afforded little benefit in the overall tactical defense plan. This was probably a result of a lack of intelligence of the enemy; however, it clearly demonstrated the importance for integration of fires and air cover to a mutually supported defense plan.

(7) Significant long term benefits are not obvious. The tactics employed by the enemy were the same in withdrawal as demonstrated during the offensive. It did reinforce the discipline and professionalism of the enemy. Even while in retreat and suffering heavy losses, the NKPA was capable of mounting serious threats to the 1st Marine Division rear areas.

(8) It is no sweeping revelation that surprise can counterbalance superior forces. Inadequate intelligence preparation of the battlefield had permitted the enemy to achieve surprise at K0J0. The need to provide sufficient intelligence and planning time for a force to successfully accomplish a mission is reiterated.

4. Lesson. Lessons should be identified to support the tactical and operational plan. The actions at K0J0 are in defense of a supply depot that had already been captured. The employment of a force

is well established. It is not a fair statement to say that the supporting forces will be able to create a supply depot that in actuality consisted of only a few oil drums, was a waste of resources.



1. SUMMARY REPORT

1.1. Title: Logistics and Administrative Problems

(1) Introduction: This report discusses the logistical and administrative operations which supported the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in their combat role in the context of 1950. Korea, during the period 21 September through 13 November 1950. Some background information will be given on the support plans leading up to these operations, and a brief mention will be made of the problems faced by the opposing force.

(2) Background:

(a) Logistics posed a problem for the 1st Marine Division from the very start of its operations in Northeastern Korea. The original D-Day for the WONSAN landing was set for 15 October 1950. Due to a number of factors, most of which had to do with an underestimation of the difficulty of getting within the required 10 day levels of Classes of supply, the D-Day was postponed to the Division's arrival at INCHON. D-Day was eventually slipped to 20 October 1950. The tidal basin at INCHON could only handle one lift at a time, and then only at high tide. As well, there were serious problems which made necessary the use of air-lifted elevators going on and off the

the line distances involved added to the
navigation problems. These were as follows:

HOUSON to P-170	79 miles
HOUSON to P-10N-111	26 miles
HOUSON to KAPPAUNG	70 miles

(c) The mission assigned to RCT-7 was in an amphibious area that it was necessary to devote almost the entire 1st Motor Transport Battalion (less Auto Maintenance and Supply Companies) to support that RCT. This action, while essential, left the division short of motor transport assets in an area where almost all traffic was limited to existing road and rail lines. In fact, so vital were the roads to the overall operations in the Chosin Reservoir area that RCT-1's mission was to secure them as NSRs behind the area of operations of RCT-5 and RCT-7. This mission was soon removed and added the responsibility for security of the Division Supply Depot at KODO. The 1st was dispatched on 2 October 1950, immediately on arrival at KODO.

Ref: AGO, CH: 10, carry out that task.

(c) The transportation available to move
the goods from the ship will be reduced or sold

... their air base was established immediately, and
... and their, carrying supplies and reinforcements,
... planned for the next day. A road convoy would be
used on 27 October to bring up the rest of the unit.
less artillery, which was left behind due to a shortage
of employment areas at KOJO. Both trains and the road
convoy arrived in KOJO without incident.

(e) After the surprise attack of the
night of 27 October at KOJO, it was necessary to
reinforce with 21st Marines by rail from WONSAN. X
Corps, at WONSAN, was requested to assemble a train, at
1000 hours, 28 October. Arrangements were made to use
an LST to move 10 tanks by sea because the roads and
bridges were too light to support their weight. In
response to a request for helicopters to evacuate
casualties, a second LSTH was sent to KOJO.

(f) 2/1 went directly from their landing
craft, at WONSAN, onto a train on the rail siding, and
3 and 1 1/2 hours later, with the Regimental Command
Group, departed for KOJO. They were followed by a
second train one hour later. Both arrived safely in
KOJO. The trip being seven hours in complete. Five
helicopters were used to evacuate the wounded of 1st
Battalion, 27 October. After the initial contact,
the 27th and 28th Battalions were left with 1st Battalion,
and the 29th and 30th Battalions were left with 2nd Battalion.

(g) Upon their relief at KOJO on 30 October and 1 November, 1/1 was removed by LST to WONSAN, arriving there at 1230 hours on 2 November. 3/1 moved to WONSAN the next day by road, with most of the soldiers marching and a limited number of trucks being used to move equipment. A railroad train was also used. The decision to march the troops was made for two reasons: a lack of transportation and to keep them moving to prevent frostbite. They completed the 38 mile route in two days, having to halt twice to provide perimeter security for crews repairing the rail line following guerrilla attacks on it.

(h) At this point, responsibility for the rear area security in the area of operations (AO) was passed to the Third Battalion, operating out of MAJON-NI, where they arrived by road transport to relieve the 26th ROK Regiment at 1600 hours, 28 October. The MAJON-NI deployment offered a challenge to logistics planners, since there were no rail connections as there had been at KOJO, and the MSR was a narrow, winding route that rose through a steep pass (3000 ft) early in its 28 mile run. So vulnerable was this road to attack that the mission of 3/1 was quickly amended to include the responsibility for keeping it open. To have done so would have over-taxed the entire resources of the unit, threatening their primary

tion of securing the vital road junction at MAJON-NI, and destroying enemy forces in its vicinity.

(i) As a result of this decision, it became necessary to rely on helicopters for transportation between MAJON-NI and WONSAN, and to resupply by fighting convoys through enemy ambushes on the road. One such convoy was forced back close to WONSAN itself, on 2 November. This led to the first of a total of 377 tons of supplies being dropped by air, using Air Force C-47 aircraft, during the month of November.

(j) The combination of bad roads and enemy action made road resupply of the garrison at MAJON-NI very difficult. It became necessary to provide each convoy with engineers to dismantle roadblocks and infantry to fight off ambushes. Eventually, this procedure seems to have become an accepted method of getting the enemy out into the open, where a counter-ambush could be employed to fix and

destroy them.

(k) The Marines were relieved at MAJON-NI on 11 November by the 1st Battalion, 15th Marine Regiment (USMC), which required two days to clear the enemy-controlled road between MAJON-NI and WONSAN.

1. ANALYSIS:

(1) Transportation and movement were clearly the major logistical problems encountered by the 1st, 2d and 3d Marine battalions in their AO during this period. The Marines displayed great flexibility in their moves from sea to rail and road, and the dispatch of reinforcements from WONSAN to KORO by rail on 28 October in the space of a few hours indicates that the Corps staff had a good grip on the situation. It would appear the Korean and Chinese forces had little access to either motor transport or rail assets; this no doubt had an adverse effect on their ability to concentrate fighting forces, but enabled them to use ambush and infiltration techniques to good effect. The difficulties in passing supplies to fighting troops is remarked on by several commentators, but at no time was this acknowledged to be a serious threat to the success of the mission. The use of airdrops of supplies into MAJON-NI was quite successful in making sure that the minimum amount of supplies needed got through despite the blocked road; this success may have been due in part to a rehearsal carried out before the drops were actually needed.

(2) Air evacuation of wounded troops was used extensively, even though plans were obviously in existence to evacuate wounded from KORO by LST. This

procedure had enhanced morale. Several comments are made in the official special action reports regarding the harmful effect a lack of medical treatment had on the enemy's forces.

(3) A minor difficulty was encountered with water sources at KOJO. There was no problem in this regard at MAJON-NI, where clean water was abundant and a water point soon established.

(4) The cold weather had an adverse effect on personnel, in that several cases of frostbite were reported. Lubrication of weapons was also affected. The grease and oil issued to clean and service personal arms were reported to be not suited for the Korean winter climate.

(5) Analysis of the operations at KOJO and MAJON-NI offers little insight into personnel issues. Enemy forces were in retreat, and their efforts were aimed at regrouping as many of their forces as possible. The limited Marine losses did not cause any significant personnel shortages. After action reports concluded that the Marine Corps Personnel System was sound and well adapted to combat conditions. Based on the gradually improving administrative and personnel management performance of officers as they gained experience in Korea, it was recommended that more

adequate training in these areas be given to certain Marine officers prior to participation in combat.

(6) The actions around KODO demonstrated the potential importance of civil affairs (CA) in rear area operations. Both refugees and retreating enemy soldiers in civilian clothes were encountered by Marine units in zone. In addition to the normal requirements for humane treatment of displaced persons demanded by international law and the need to ensure that refugees did not interfere with military operations, the Marines needed to quickly segregate retreating enemy soldiers from the other Korean transients in order to prevent the former from returning to their units in the countryside. To accomplish this task quickly, all transients were "processed" by a Civil Affairs officer. POWs were kept in limited facilities, and since these were strained by the need to err on the safe side when making determinations as to exactly who should be detained, the need for trained and knowledgeable CA personnel was noted.

(7) Strict troop discipline and cooperation with local civilian leaders in the MAGON-NI area produced favorable results for the Marines. Villagers in MAGON-NI were allowed to continue to have their own mayor and council and to follow all customs and laws that did not directly conflict with the Marine mission.

In addition to creating favorable words and local conditions, such fair treatment of civilians was highly respected by local civilians, who warned the Marines of various NLFN attacks on several occasions.

(6) In conclusion, the logistical and administrative procedures carried out by the Marines at LAC and MAJON-41 were both effective and economical. While they cannot be said to have played a decisive part in the success of the mission, it is clear that without such actions, particularly in the areas of transport utilization and civil affairs, the mission would not have been done as well.

11. FORWARD AND SIGNAL.

a. Command:

(1) Relationships:

(a) The 1st Marine Division was under the operational control of X (US) Corps during this period of operations. The X (US) Corps Commander, General Almond, had his command post in WONSAN from 24 October until 2 November, when he moved it to HAMHUNG. The 1st Marine Division Commander was Major General Smith. From the USS Mount McKinley, his division command post moved to a location a mile north of WONSAN on 27 October, and then to HUNGNAM on 4 November. The Assistant Division Commander was Brigadier General Edward A. Craig.

(b) The formation of self-sustaining Regimental Combat Team (RCT) task organizations was the normal rule rather than the exception at this time. The term "detachment" was used with these task organizations in order to allow flexibility to the RCT in choice of size and composition of the various detachments as required by the situation and available transportation.

(c) RCT-1 was commanded by Colonel Fuller. He had three battalions under him: 1st

1st Battalion, 1st Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins; 2d Battalion, 1st Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter; and 3d Battalion, 1st Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge. Upon landing at WONSAN, the 1st Battalion initially moved to KOJO, the 2d Battalion remained at WONSAN, and the 3d Battalion moved to MAJON-NI.

(2) Locations:

(a) 1st Battalion was in the vicinity of KOJO at 1700 hours on 27 October. The command post was located on the slopes north of two platoons from A Company (Figure 1). B Company was in an outpost position two miles south and southwest of KOJO. 1st Platoon of B Company was located on the east slope of Hill 109, 2d Platoon was on Hill 185, and 3d Platoon and Company Headquarters were on the high ground west and south of 1st Platoon. C Company was in position a mile and a half north of B Company in a line of foxholes in the hills with the platoons arranged with 2d Platoon, 1st Platoon, and 3d Platoon respectively from west to east. A Company had its 2d and 3d platoons located 225 meters east of C Company and 1st Platoon located at Hill 117. F Battery, 11th Marines, the artillery support, was located on the beach northeast of KOJO. When B Company was attacked during the night of 27 October, it withdrew from its outpost

positions and organized a 360 degree defense on both sides of the railway track just south of CHONCHON-RI.

(b) On 28 October, due to the attack of the previous night, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines was sent to KOJO from WONSAN. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and the 5th PNC Battalion were then attached to the 1st Marine Division to patrol the roads in the WONSAN area and maintain blocking positions at ANBYON. They remained attached until 2 November when they detached to comply with new orders.

(c) From 28 to 31 October, 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Marines occupied positions in a semicircle around Hill 117 at KOJO. Each rifle company set up outposts in front of its zone. At 0700 hours on 1 November, 1st Battalion left KOJO from WONSAN by LST. On 2 November they took up positions at the road block near KATSUMA, four miles southeast of WONSAN. 2d Battalion and the artillery battery stayed in KOJO until 3 November when they returned to WONSAN.

(d) Third Battalion, 1st Marines plus its attached elements were located in MAJON-RI on 28 October. The battalion command post was located in the schoolhouse (Figure 3). A battalion perimeter was established with daytime company observation posts and the patrolling of the three main roads which intersected in the town. G Company was responsible for

the road to WONSAN, H Company the road to SEOUL, and I Company the road to PYONGYANG.

(e) On 5 November, A Company, 1st Battalion was assigned as the guard to a truck convoy bringing supplies from WONSAN to the 3d Battalion at MAJON-NI. After its arrival, Colonel Fuller placed it under the operational control of the 3d Battalion for defense because an attack was expected that night. The three rifle platoons and their reinforcing elements were assigned a sector between G and H Companies on the perimeter. The next day, 6 November, A Company returned to WONSAN and 1st Battalion control.

(f) On 6 November, 2d Battalion (-) was ordered by Colonel Fuller to go to MUNCHON-NI via the MA ON-NI road. The mission was to block enemy movement along the trails leading north and to screen civilians. The 3d LMC Battalion arrived at MAJON-NI on 10 November as reinforcements. It was assigned to the sector in the perimeter where A Company, 1st Battalion had been on 5-6 November.

(g) On 13 November elements of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, U.S. 3d Infantry Division arrived in MAJON-NI to take over the perimeter defense. At 1015 on 14 November, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines left MAJON-NI for WONSAN.

On 14 November, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines redeployed to CHIBONG, eight miles southwest of HANHUNG. The 2d Battalion arrived at CHIBONG on 15 November, and the 3d Battalion on 17 November. With these movements, the 1st Marine Division achieved a relative degree of concentration with the shortest distance between elements being less than 60 miles.

(3) Analysis: There were no command relationship problems associated with this operation. The RCT task organization provided a flexible organization for combat. Units could be attached and detached without problem. The manner in which this was done met the changing circumstances of the operation. Span of control of the number of subordinate units was well within the parameters for effective management. The physical span of control caused significant problems for the commanders involved because of the abnormal distances between units. The operation orders and plans that placed these units in such a widespread configuration were executed rather quickly based on the rapidly changing situation in Korea. If more time for planning and coordination had been available, RCT-1 may not have been given the mission to protect an empty supply depot.

Signal:

(1) Task Organization:

(a) Prior to landing at WONSAN:

1st Marine Division
1st Sig Bn, less detachments
Carrier Plt, FMFPac
Det, 4th Sig Bn
2d Sig Rep Unit
Det, 205 Sig Rep Co
RHC, RIT Team

RCT-1
Det, 1st Sig Bn
Sig Co (O-5)
ANGLICO

(b) After the landing at WONSAN:

1st Marine Division
1st Sig Bn, less detachments
Carrier Plt, FMFPac

RCT-1
Det, 1st Sig Bn

(2) Planning and Operations: The 1st Marine

Division was assigned a zone of action 300 miles north-south by 60 miles east-west. RCT-1 was assigned responsibility for the KOJO-WONSAN-MAJON-NI area. These certainly represented abnormal distances for communications. Some distances to keep in mind are:

WONSAN to KOJO - 39 miles
WONSAN to MAJON-NI - 28 miles
WONSAN to HANHUNG - 78 miles

In addition to the distances involved, the terrain was extremely mountainous. In order to communicate, RCTs were supplemented with high power signal company and signal battalion radios. The amplitude modulated (AM) continuous wave (CW) radios had tailored antennae cut

for the frequencies on which they were to operate. The 1st Marine Division operated two to three division-
related nets, usually directly to RCTs or battalions.
Additionally, the 1st Marine Division operated an
administrative net to the naval shore station to handle
Marine out-of-theater message traffic. This was
unpleasant, because of the delays trying to get
administrative messages through the X Corps nets. Wire
was not a practical solution to communications
requirements except for intra-DP communications.
Extreme importance was placed on radio relay and
helicopter air messenger service. Because the 1st
Marine Division was working with the army, X Corps
assigned blocks of frequencies and callsigns. At KQJO,
RCT-1 was assigned a detachment of ANGLICO to control
and coordinate naval gun fire.

(3) Analysis:

(a) RCT-1's Special Action Report
indicates that the regimental communications were
generally adequate, but that communication to division
was only possible through the attached signal element's
radios.

(b) Equipment: Many of the batteries
operated organizational radios only worked if the
temperatures were above freezing. Not only were there


actual equipment failures but there was also considerable damage to equipment. At KODO four pieces of communications equipment which were lost were recovered, but all had been burned and were unusable. This is an indication that the North Korean forces were well aware of our dependence on communications. At KODO there are references to the last operational radio and to having to combine parts of two radios to reestablish communications. Adequate spares and maintenance were both significant problems, as well as the transportation problems associated with moving equipment to and from the nearest repair facility.


(c) Effectiveness: There were numerous instances cited of poor air-to-ground communications and misunderstandings of signals between ground personnel and FAC's. Delays in messages were extremely common. The message of the fight at KODO had to be relayed to the 1st Marine Division by the 7th Marines. The 1st Marines requested that instructions be forwarded by both radio and air messenger. Messages requesting help and air support from an ambush site on the HADON-HI road were delayed. Even the radio communications between HADON-HI and WONSAN were possible only for a few hours at night because of the intense anti-air masses surrounding 3rd Marines.

(d) Summary: Generally, communications

lower the division and the regiments were ineffective. This led to difficulties in the higher headquarters determining what actions were occurring at the regimental levels. This also caused delays in responding to situations as they developed at the remote ambush sites. In many areas, the communications problems experienced in Korea in 1950 will still exist in rear area operations today. Long distances, reliance on radio, inability to use wire, susceptibility of radio to jamming, and guerrilla interdiction will cause significant problems for the units conducting rear area operations.

1. W. S. Allen and Montross, Lynn, U.S. Marines in Korea, Vol. III
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1951, p. 48.
2. Ibid., p. 55.
3. Ibid., p. 56.
4. Ibid., p. 56.
5. Ibid., p. 48.
6. Ibid., p. 54.
7. Ibid., p. 54.
8. Ibid., p. 55.
9. Ibid., p. 61.
10. Ibid., p. 61.
11. Ibid., p. 61-62.
12. Annex "Peter Peter" to 1st Marine Division
Special Action Report (Yongch'on, Korea:
Headquarters, 1st Marines, (Reinf), 15 Jan
1951), p. 7.





MAJON-NI PERIMETER

1:50,000



FIG 3





FIG 3



- A NKPA Ambush of 2 Nov 50
- B NKPA Ambush of 3 Nov 50
- C NKPA Ambush of 7 Nov 50
- D NKPA Ambush of 12 Nov 50
- E H CO/3rd BN Ambush of 2 Nov 50

1/500000

END

FILMED

5-85

DTIC