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
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
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THESIS

UNDERSTANDING THE PLO

by

Mark E. Morrison

December 1984

Thesis Advisor:

J. A. Amos

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with giving a complete understanding of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The organization of the thesis emphasizes three important factors which help to explain what the PLO is, how it operates, and why it acts as it does: Organizational Structure, Environmental Constraints, and Belief Systems. The Organizational Structure section includes data on PLO organization including the Palestine National Council, Executive Committee, Central Council, Commando Groups, and the medical, educational, trade unions, cultural, and social institutions. The section concerning the Environmental Constraints deals with the various PLO leaders, PLO ideology, strategy, military, and economic history. The Belief System section consists of an Operational Code of the PLO as an institutional entity. After developing all three factors the thesis gives three examples of recent PLO behavior. By understanding the factors of Organizational Structure, Environmental Constraint, and Belief Systems one can more easily and logically comprehend how these factors operate to influence the behavior of the PLO and its leaders.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

At the time of the 1948 emergence of the state of Israel the Palestinian Arabs were hopelessly disorganized and even faced serious internal divisions. The two traditionally prominent families, the al-Husseini and Nashashibi clans, each attracted Palestinian Arabs. The former favoring military opposition to the Jewish immigrants and the British overseers, the latter choosing to work with the British and Jews in trying to effect an agreement along the lines of the 1947 U.N. Partition resolution. One member of the al-Husseini family, Abdul Kader, had organized several thousand irregular forces in Palestine during the 1940's. Another early organizer was Fawzi al-Kawalji who formed a fighting group of about 7,000.¹ But while Palestinian Arab rivalry stewed the Jews successfully organized and trained their partisans. The resulting Jewish military organization, both legal and underground, included the Haganah, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the Stern Gang. When the Jews unilaterally declared the existence of the Jewish state of Israel on 15 May 1948, they held a tremendous advantage over the Palestinian Arabs in terms of training, organization, leadership, and unity. The Arabs in Palestine, despite their internal differences, felt they could rely on their neighboring sister Arab states to defeat this imperialist, Jewish uprising.

In fact, those Arabs who left Palestine in the wake of the 1948 war left with the certainty that they would be only temporarily displaced. The Arab states of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon all sent portions of their armies, amounting to 70-80,000 troops,² to defeat this Zionist army. Although generally poorly trained the Arabs held a numerical advantage over the Jews. Despite this numerical superiority the Jewish forces quickly won the military victory and the state of Israel was born.

This paper deals with the military arm of the Palestinian Nationalist Movement. This military arm cannot stand alone and thus requires first a basic understanding of Palestinian resistance organization, leadership, financial support, and outside cooperation. The Palestinian resistance movement does not constitute a separate nation-state although it does form a political entity. When the Arabs left Palestine in 1948 and again in 1967 they were dispersed throughout the Arab world in general and within the "confrontation states" of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan in particular. Upon arriving in their new homes they discovered that they were not accepted as citizens of these countries. This stemmed partly from their desire to remain aloof, living in "temporary" resettlement camps awaiting the "imminent" recovery of their homeland. When this rapid return failed to materialize and as they became more and more entrenched in and identified with these refugee camps, their pleas for equal treatment and citizenship status went unheeded.

They were considered foreigners and outcasts and were treated as such.³ This may appear puzzling on the surface considering the fact that these refugees were Arabs and Muslims just like their new sponsors. But these Arab regimes had several fears about accepting the Palestinians as citizens or at least treating them equally. First, having just suffered a sound military defeat at the hands of the Israelis the Arabs wanted to let the issue of the Palestinian return to their homeland rest for a bit. The victory by the Israelis was stunning. No Arab thought it was possible for the few Jews in Palestine to defeat the millions of Arabs surrounding them. The 1948 defeat ushered in a period of deep reflection by the Arabs -- and a desire not to prompt another military encounter with Israel. Secondly, the relocation of hundreds of thousands of Arabs created a financial burden upon these states. These Palestinian outsiders, even though they were Arab and Muslim, were taking what was considered an unfair amount of money from the already poor citizens of those countries. Lastly, in Jordan, where a large portion of the population was Palestinian and where the greatest number of Palestinians fled in 1948, the refugees posed a serious political problem. This large group, with a common purpose and goal, was a potential political adversary. With the overwhelming desire to return to Palestine coupled with the Israeli threat many of these Palestinian Arabs might give up the thought of an immediate return to their homeland and settle for control over the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

In 1948, the Palestinian Arabs were a people without a country, leadership, organization, or military. They had been expelled from their homes, not accepted in their new homes, and had little hope of regaining their homeland.

The dispersed Palestinians hoped and expected that their Arab protectors would regain their former lands. The 1956 war marked the beginning of Palestinian disillusionment with the Arab states. Then in the June 1967 war the Palestinian organizations played a role in sparking the conflict. They expected the resulting Arab-Israeli war to restore their homeland to them. With the 1967 defeat and the second Palestinian diaspora the Palestinian leaders forsook the Arab states and struck out on their own. They realized that they could not trust others, even Arab brothers, with achieving their nationalistic goal. Thus in 1967 the Palestinian nationalist movement began to flourish and to operate autonomously.

They soon realized that they lacked the political, military, and financial wherewithall to succeed. They soon realized that they still needed help from outside their organization. Syria, who was competing with Nasser's Egypt for political leadership of the Arab world was happy to sponsor Palestinian resistance groups. The Syrian army trained and equipped Palestinian guerrillas and then sent them on raids into Israel from Jordanian territory. Syria hoped to appear as the only Arab state actively opposing Israel but did not allow raids from Syrian territory. The Palestinians, who scorned dependence

on any Arab state, set up camps in Jordan from which it launched its raids. In this way they drifted away from Syrian control but began to pose a threat to Jordan. By 1970, King Hussein feared a Palestinian political takeover and to prevent this he launched an extermination campaign against the Palestinians. In July 1971 the Palestinians were driven from Jordan and decided that southern Lebanon would be the best place to set up their camps. They found Lebanon to be a country already torn by sectarian strife. Nevertheless the Palestinians secured the right from the government to maintain control over certain portions of southern Lebanon. It was during this time that the 1973 October war erupted. After the war a question arose as to who should represent the Palestinians at the proposed Geneva Conference. Since Jordan was perceived as being not totally committed to the Pan-Arab cause and even seemed to have one foot in the Western camp, the Palestinians saw their chance to take the leadership of the Palestinian cause. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was selected at the Rabat Summit in 1974 to be the spokesman and representative for all Palestinians everywhere. It is at this point in Palestinian history that this paper begins.

B. OVERVIEW

This thesis began as a strict Operational Code of the various Palestinian Resistance groups in an effort to analyze the coalition-forming and compromising nature of PLO policy-making. During the research phase it became clear that the

The PLO continued its guerrilla raids on Israeli villages and military camps across the border. The Israelis tried to end these attacks in 1978 by invading southern Lebanon and advancing to the Litani River. After their withdrawal and the stationing of UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) the Israelis financed Lebanese Christian militia leader, Major Haddad's forces. Haddad gained control over a portion of southern Lebanon called Haddadland. Despite these measures the PLO continued its raids on Israeli military bases and civilian villages in northern Israel. The Israelis prepared for an attack on southern Lebanon with the goal of eliminating the PLO. After considerable planning and an immediate justification, the attempted assassination of the Israeli envoy in London, the Israeli Defense Forces launched a full-scale ground and air attack in June 1982. Within a few days the Israeli forces had pushed the PLO back to Beirut. PLO leaders and fighters were holed up in Beirut while Israeli forces waited outside the city awaiting the final order to finish the job. An agreement was finally reached whereby the PLO would evacuate its forces from Lebanon to various Arab countries. The evacuation did not spell the end of the PLO but it did constitute a new phase in PLO history.

2. Popular Fronts

The so-called Popular Fronts form the second sector of Palestinian resistance groups. Included within this category are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP),

faction-ridden Lebanese government. The infusion of Palestinians created an imbalance among the diverse Lebanese Christian, Shia, Sunni, Druze, and Arab factions. The PLO was also coming of age at this time. The Palestinians were not deeply involved in the 1973 war with Israel and Lebanon did not play a major role after the war in the Geneva Conference. The Geneva Conference was called to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of the problems of the Middle East and the Palestinian question was perceived to be a key problem. Palestinian representation at the Geneva Conference became almost an imperative. Of course two groups vied for status as the representative of the Palestinian people: King Hussein (Jordan) and Arafat (PLO). The Rabat Summit of 1974 settled the issue by declaring the PLO to be the only sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The Rabat Summit also called for the establishment of a national independent government of Palestine under PLO leadership.¹⁹ This Rabat recognition led to a worldwide upswing in diplomatic recognition of the PLO. Later in 1974, Arafat was invited to speak to the United Nations General Assembly. The world was beginning to recognize the Palestinian problem and the PLO as the spokesman for the Palestinian people.

As the 1970's continued the civil war in Lebanon drew the PLO into inter-Arab strife once more. The PLO was attacked by Lebanese Christians and the Syrians as well. This was in addition to the PLO's primary conflict: against the Israelis.

government to create Fatahland in the Mount Herman foothills. From southern Lebanon and from the bases in Jordan, Palestinian guerrilla raids continued to expand throughout 1969 and 1970. Fatah was also challenged by other Palestinian groups. Habash's PFLP sought to catch world attention by staging the world's first airline hijacking. However, Arafat managed to maintain Fatah as the largest and most powerful of all Palestinian resistance groups.

The following two years, 1970-1971, proved to be crucial in Fatah's existence. Jordan's King Hussein had seen Fatah's power and support expand until it became a formidable political opposition. He perceived a unified Fatah as drawing many Jordanian Palestinians into its ranks and challenging his supremacy as the Monarch. To dispel this threat the well-known Black September war took place in 1970. By July 1971 the Palestinian fedayeen were expelled from Jordan. Fatah operations were then organized and carried out from southern Lebanon. In 1972 the Black September Organization was formed. Its major constituents were young, politicized commandos who were disillusioned by the defeat of the Palestinian groups in Jordan. They originally advocated attacks on Jordan to avenge the September 1970 defeat, but later activity, such as the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, were intended to gain worldwide fame and notoriety for the Palestinian cause in general.¹⁸

The Palestinians fled from Jordan and congregated in southern Lebanon. This too caused a problem for the already

Syria's Fatah organization and to provide Arafat with arms, money, training, and military advice. Fatah did not grow as fast as Arafat had expected, largely because of the growth of Habash's PFLP and Syria's creation of their own Palestinian group, Saiqa. In March 1968 an event took place to breathe new life back into the faltering Fatah organization. On 21 March 1968 the Israelis launched an attack on the village of Karameh in retaliation for Palestinian raids which had emanated from that village. The Israeli forces were met by Palestinian and Jordanian opposition. The ensuing battle took the lives of about 200 Palestinians and inflicted substantial damage to the Israeli force. The Battle of Karameh received considerable worldwide media attention and the general feeling was that the Palestinians had "won" the battle. Arafat used this to his advantage and showed the world in general and the Palestinians in particular that his small Fatah group had defeated the Israeli army whereas in 1967 all the combined Arab armies had failed to. The post-Karameh Fatah popularity led to a tremendous increase in fedayeen recruitment and prominence of Fatah. Arafat rode the wake of Karameh to solidify his own position then to undermine the PLO. Fatah members took control of PLO offices in 1968 and negotiated an agreement whereby Fatah would be liberally represented on the Palestine National Council.¹⁷ In February 1969 at the Fifth PNC session Arafat took control of the PLO. Since then he and his Fatah group have dominated the Palestinian parliament. Also, Fatah was allowed by the Lebanese

co-ruler of Jordan.¹⁴ The Fatah organization was split into two camps: the faction led by Arafat and that dominated by Syria. In February a coup in Syria brought a more leftist military junta to power. This group established military ties with the Soviet Union and also sought to tighten control over Arafat's Fatah.¹⁵ Syria assigned Army captain Yusef Urabi to take charge of both Fatah groups. Arafat felt threatened and arranged to have Urabi assassinated. This action prompted a gun battle between Arafat's men and the Syrian-dominated Fatah faction. Arafat, Khalid al-Hassan, Salah Khalef, and eleven other Fatah leaders were arrested and spent the summer of 1966 in a Syrian jail.¹⁶ They were released in late August then fled to southern Lebanon. They learned that their influence in Fatah had waned considerably while Syria continued to control the bulk of the Fatah organization.

The next landmark event in Fatah history was the June 1967 war and its aftermath. The Arab armies were so completely humiliated by the Israeli Defense Forces that it led to total shock and shame among the Palestinians. Fatah's leaders realized that they should no longer depend on their Arab brothers to fight the Israelis and win back their homeland. They were convinced that Fatah would be the primary instrument in creating a Palestinian state. Arafat boldly criticized Syria and other Arab states for their failure to liberate Palestine. Syria's reaction was to give Arafat control over

to fifteen newspaper offices in Beirut. Without confirming the story some of the newspapers printed the "success" of Fatah's first raid not knowing that the saboteurs had been arrested by Lebanese security forces. Nevertheless, Fatah's first "conquest" brought much welcome publicity. Popular support was strengthened and it seemed that all Palestinian refugees knew what Fatah was and Fatah's leaders "became convinced that we were the wave of the future."⁹

Syria took note of Fatah's growing size and influence. In June 1965 the Syrian government placed Mohammad Araka at Fatah's head to organize and train the new recruits.¹⁰ Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir went to the West Bank refugee camps to recruit young Palestinians in 1965, but had little success. By 1966 Syria had taken nearly complete control over Fatah.¹¹ Arafat and his associates felt it was best at least temporarily to forego some of their principles of independence from Arab governmental control. However, as Syrian control grew stronger so did the Fatah leaders' desire to break away and reassert their independence. To accomplish this they turned to Jordan and specifically the East Bank of the Jordan. At this time two separate states grew up on the East Bank: Hussein's Hashemite Kingdom and the Palestinian Fedayeen.¹² Mohammad Araka apparently had two goals: 1) to kill King Hussein and 2) to kill Israeli leaders.¹³ His hatred of Hussein undoubtedly carried over to Arafat and Fatah's leadership. In February 1966 it seemed that Arafat was the de facto ruler or at least

student at King Fued University in Cairo. Nasser had banished the group from Egypt along with the Muslim Brotherhood but the GUPS gained a strong following in Germany. Our Palestine was also reaching Germany and influenced Palestinian students there. In Algeria, Fatah leaders maintained close contact with Algerian revolutionaries in the FLN (Algerian National Liberation Front). During these years in the early 1960's there were two factors which led to the increased growth of Fatah. First, in 1961, Nasser's United Arab Republic broke apart freeing many Syrians to join any political party they chose. Secondly, 35 to 40 Palestinian groups in Kuwait merged with Fatah making it the largest organization there.⁷ A similar unification took place in Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

In 1964, the PLO was created and Fatah had to decide how to react and what policy to follow. At meetings held during that year the Fatah members were split into two groups: the Reasonable Faction and the Adventurers.⁸ The former favored waiting and organizing before launching any guerrilla activity. The Adventurers declared that then was the exact right time to act using guerrilla tactics. In October 1964, the first Fatah military operation was planned and scheduled for 31 December 1964. The plan was to explode a section of the Israeli water carrier project on the Jordan River. Arafat and his fellow leaders wrote up and printed "Fatah Military Communiqué Number 1" taking credit for the anticipated raid before it actually took place. They delivered this communiqué

and its leaders have controlled the PLO. Fatah's basic policy is the liberation of Palestine and the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland. Beyond this Fatah ideology is rather vague. This lack of clarity attracts members from a broad spectrum of Palestinian political philosophy. Fatah has attracted a broad base of support, has enrolled a large number of members, and thus wields more power in the PLO than any other of the Palestinian groups.

Fatah was organized in 1959 by Yasir Arafat, Khalid al-Hassan, Khalil al-Wazir, and Salah Khalef who were all exiled Palestinians. Joining these four in the original organization were Farug al-Qaddumi, Mohammad Yusef, and Zuhayr al-Alami.⁶ These men met in Kuwait where Arafat had established himself as a contractor. These founders decided to separate and concentrate on strengthening three geographic areas: West Germany, Algeria, and Kuwait. Arafat also took an inspiring tour through the Palestinian refugee camps. This tour instilled within him the burning desire to free his homeland even though in this effort he failed to organize formal Fatah cells in the camps. Soon Fatah began publishing a newspaper (really a four-page handbill), Our Palestine, in Kuwait during the fall of 1959. This newspaper continued circulation until early 1962 when it was expanded to 48 pages and began publication in Beirut. At that time the Fatah cells in Germany became affiliated with the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), an organization which Arafat had headed in 1956 as a

the years since 1948 and even before there have been scores of various such groups both very large and very small. Many of these groups have since dropped out of existence or have merged with one of the larger groups. For a detailed summary of many of these groups see John Amos' Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement.⁴ The purpose of this section is to define only the major actors and to deal with the ideological groupings of the resistance factions. The many organizations can be reduced to four primary categories: 1) Fatah - strict Palestinian nationalism; 2) Popular Fronts - groups which focus on revolution throughout the Arab world; 3) Arab-Sponsored Groups - groups which clearly have a client relationship with a particular Arab state; and 4) Other - groups such as the communist-oriented Palestinian groups.

Many Arabs characterize the PLO as a multi-party system. They liken it to a democratic, representative political system where various competing ideologies vie for control and domination. If the PLO is viewed in this light we can identify the dominant groups, the weak factions, the groups whose outlook is strictly ideologically based, and those who rely on outside support. The PLO thus is an arena where power, ideology, support, pragmatism, and coalition-building are common features. With this in mind let us examine each of the four categories before speaking of the PLO itself.

1. Fatah⁵

Fatah is the pre-eminent Palestinian resistance organization in terms of size and influence. Since 1969, Fatah

II. ORGANIZATION

A. INTRODUCTION

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is commonly referred to as an umbrella organization consisting of various nationalist/resistance groups. It is indeed true that a number of Palestinian Nationalist groups are members of the PLO but to assert that the PLO is simply a composite of these groups is totally misleading. This section deals with the PLO organization and will clarify what the PLO actually is and how the various resistance groups fit into that organization. First, this chapter will examine the major categories of the Palestinian groups: 1) Fatah; 2) Popular Fronts; 3) Arab-sponsored groups; and 4) Other groups. Secondly, this chapter will describe the PLO, its institutions, committees, and bureaucracies. This will cover the Palestine National Council (PNC), Executive Committee (EC), and various PLO diplomatic and political institutions. Lastly, this chapter will consider the various Palestinian social and economic organizations such as the Palestine Red Crescent Society, trade unions, and welfare institutions. All of this will hopefully create a more complete picture of what the PLO is, what its component parts are, and how diverse PLO interests are.

B. RESISTANCE GROUPS

The intention of this section is not to provide an exhaustive list of all Palestinian Nationalist groups. Over

hopefully provide the reader with sufficient information to understand the PLO and the role it has played in Middle East regional as well as international affairs. The information given here should also enable a knowledgeable scholar to understand and even predict future PLO actions. The appendices give supplemental and more detailed data to aid in this comprehensive understanding.

Palestine National Council. As this writer researched the Operational Code and belief systems in general it became very clear that belief systems alone do not determine political behavior. The factors already analyzed in Chapters 2,3,4, and 5 make up a large portion of the remainder of the policy-making equation. Belief systems, as defined by the Operational Code, combined with the organizational, leadership, ideological, and strategic factors give a more complete understanding of PLO decision-making. In Chapter 7 another key to PLO policy-making is clarified. Since the PLO does not constitute an independent, sovereign state, it is dependent on outside sources for economic means and military hardware. Knowing which states the PLO depends upon for such support gives an additional insight into PLO dependencies and how those dependencies impact on decision-making. This factor, when considered with all the previous factors, will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the PLO and why and how it chooses to act in the ways that it decides to. Chapter 8 documents PLO emergence onto the international political stage. The three indicators of this emergence are PLO contacts with other foreign governments, official diplomatic recognition by other states, and PLO international mediation efforts. All three factors show an outward reaching trend by the PLO over the last five years. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarizing the points made in the thesis and by describing the current uncertain period in PLO history. This thesis will

5 present the current status of PLO structure, leadership, ideology, and strategy. Chapter 2 describes the organization of each of the major Palestinian Resistance groups. Each group is analyzed in historical perspective as well as in terms of current status. Chapter 2 also presents an organizational look at the PLO as an individual entity. The analysis of each of the PLO's National Council sessions provides a unique and useful approach to viewing PLO organizational metamorphosis. Chapter 3 gives a short biography of the major PLO leaders. The current PLO leaders are the same leaders who headed the PLO and its various factions a decade ago. Chapter 3 thus provides the reader with the biographical facts and the historical perspective of each current PLO leader. Chapter 4 gives the ideological analysis of each Palestinian group. This chapter includes historical evidence and current trends to develop an ideological identity for each resistance group. The military strategy described in Chapter 5 includes analysis of organization, recruitment/training, and doctrine. The PLA, Fatah, and Popular Fronts are considered under each of these headings.

The thesis goes on in Chapter 6 to present the Operational Code of the PLO itself. The PLO consists of various Palestinian Resistance groups and the Palestine National Council sessions' decisions are necessarily based upon compromise and coalition-forming. Chapter 6 defines the current PLO Operational Code as based upon the last three political statements of the

dividing lines of Operational Code belief systems within the PLO do not fall along these factional lines. The belief systems of Fatah and DFLP, for example, do not differ radically from one another. The differing belief systems in the PLO can be divided into other categories such as Right, Moderate, and Left with the members of each category coming from factions of each Palestinian Nationalist group. Fatah itself has clearly defined Right-leaning elements, a Moderate core, and a Leftist faction. Due to the cross-cutting loyalties an Operational Code of each Palestinian Resistance group would not give a clear picture of the competing political belief systems. The next logical step would have been to define these ideological groupings, to perform the Operational Code analysis on each group, and then to analyze the competitive/cooperative relationships between all such groups. This type of study should still be conducted by a rigorous researcher in order to paint a more comprehensive and clear picture of the ideological structure of the PLO. As the research for this thesis continued in laying a foundation for just such a study this writer discovered that there is a current dearth of formal writing concerning PLO structure, leadership, and ideology. In the early 1970's a steady stream of books appeared which described the PLO in terms of historical development, leadership, organization, and ideology. This thesis first of all provides an update on these studies in describing the current status of PLO structure, leadership, organization, and ideology. Chapters 2,3,4, and

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF). These groups are distinguished by their Marxist-Leninist doctrine and their more radical terrorist tactics. It was members of these groups which invented the modern phenomenon of airline hijacking. These groups have also claimed responsibility for other forms of terrorist activity including the use of letter and parcel bombs. These groups trace their origins to the pre-1948 war period.

In early 1947 a Palestinian Arab, Qustantin Zurayk, accurately predicted that if a Jewish state were to be established in Palestine it would soon become an extremely powerful military force in the Middle East.²⁰ Zurayk went on to call for the creation of a "secret elite" of Arab youth to be organized and unified through political parties. This secret elite should be committed to common and pure doctrine, be bound by complete loyalty, and would thus play a major role in liberating the Arab world from the Zionist and Imperialist threat.²¹ Zurayk's plea fell upon the ears of George Habash, then head of a group of students at the American University in Beirut. Habash was inspired by these ideas and set to work to create the "secret elite." Habash and his associates belonged to al-Urwa, an organization of students established in 1918 for the sole purpose of promoting literary abilities of Arab students.²² Habash and a close associate, Hani al-Hindi, were members of the editorial board of al-Urwa's literary

publication. They persuaded all but one or two Baathists in al-Urwa to join them in their goal to liberate Palestine. In 1951 the first cells of what Habash called the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) were created and consisted mostly of members of al-Urwa.²³ After these cells in Beirut were considered to be strong, Habash went to Jordan to set up the organization there. They found that a similar organization called the Amman Conference had already been established since shortly after the 1948 war.²⁴ Habash joined the Amman Conference and recruited new members to his ANM. One of the first to join was Nayif Hawatmeh, who later split from Habash's group and formed his own Palestinian resistance organization. While Habash was in Jordan other ANM leaders went to Kuwait and established cells there. More cells were founded in Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, St. Joseph's University, and in the Palestinian refugee camps. A regional command was created in Iraq with Hawatmeh as the leader.²⁵ Other cells were formed in the Arabian peninsula so that by 1964 the ANM was a widespread organization that was growing rapidly. In 1965 a radical element of the ANM called the Palestine Liberation Front began its own fedayeen operations.²⁶ The following year Habash founded the Heroes of the Return, a terrorist group. Just after the 1967 war another group, the Youth of Vengeance, was created from elements of the ANM. In December 1967 these groups: Palestine Liberation Front, Heroes of the Return, and Youth of Vengeance merged to form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).²⁷

The union of these groups was an attempt to counteract the tremendous growth that Fatah underwent just after the 1967 war. Although the groups had officially combined to form one unitary organization the unity turned out to be in name only. In October 1968 Habash was jailed in Damascus. While in jail Ahmed Jibril, former leader of the Heroes of the Return, took charge of the PFLP. He immediately expelled the Youth of Vengeance faction from the PFLP. Members of the Heroes of the Return retaliated by siding with the Youth of Vengeance and removed Jibril from power.²⁸ Jibril and his followers withdrew and called themselves Section A of the General Command of the PFLP.²⁹ In February 1969 Nayif Hawatmeh wanted to transform Habash's group into a strict Marxist organization. When his attempt failed he left the PFLP and formed the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).³⁰ It can be seen from all of these divisions that ideological differences played a major role in the splintering. Each group wanted to control the entire organization and when it became apparent to them that they would not be successful they split from the parent group to form their own organization. Personality differences also was a major factor. Habash, Hawatmeh, and Jibril each had a loyal following. When the groups were "unified" the members of each sub group still held allegiance to their particular leader. The unity of the PFLP was, of course, short-lived and the resulting split led to the creation of three separate and distinct groups: PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP. All

three of these groups still exist today and by the end of 1969 they were well established and separate from one another. Their trial unity had not worked and had caused an even sharper definition of each group. Since 1969 several attempts have been made to unify all Palestinian groups under Fatah leadership. The Popular Front groups have specifically defined their political ideologies and it is upon this basis that they stress their individuality. They would rather retain their strict ideological framework and remain numerically smaller than to compromise their principles in order to become part of a larger organization. To them the question revolves around their ideology which is the perceived foundation of their strength.

Another split in the PFLP occurred in 1972 when about 150 members broke away to form the Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PRFLP). This new group did not grow to become a major Palestinian faction but the splintering did point out the division within the DFLP. The mainline PFLP, represented by Wadi Haddad, Ahmed Khalid, and Mohammad Mussalami were considered to be rightist. The leftist faction of the PFLP, led by Abu Shehab, Abu Khaled, and Abu Ali considered the rightists to be relying too much on the Arab states.³¹

In 1974 what became known as the Rejection Front was formed. Fatah and Arafat were expecting to be asked to represent the Palestinians at the Geneva Conference. The Rejection Front was formed to oppose Arafat's position. The

Popular Fronts which made up the Rejection Front were very much opposed to the creation of a mini-state on Gaza and the West Bank. They were opposed to Arafat's idea of a democratic state. They supported the total liberation of Palestine in its entirety.³² The doctrinal make-up of the Rejection Front and the Popular Fronts will be dealt with in the Ideology section of the following chapter. The Rejection Front is cited here as an example of coalition-forming within the PLO. Although each component of the Popular Fronts has its own identity and is strict in its ideological outlook, they can be considered as a whole when we observe the PLO from a macro viewpoint.

3. Arab-Sponsored Groups

In 1948 many of the Palestinian refugees fled to the neighboring Arab states of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. These states did not accept the Palestinians as citizens but set up refugee camps for their "temporary" relocation. Shortly after the 1948 war Egypt was the scene of a coup by young military officers which eventually brought Nasser to power. During the middle 1950's and through the 1960's Nasser's goal was Pan-Arab unification and cooperation. Even though his army was defeated during the 1956 Suez war, the Arabs generally praised Nasser for being able to stand up against the Israeli, French, and British armies as well as his army did. Nasser established the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 as he unified with Syria. The Pan-Arab movement became very popular

and Nasser was clearly recognized as its undisputed leader. The Palestinians felt that this growing Pan-Arab movement would assist them in recovering their homeland. They relied on the Arab confrontation states to militarily support the return of the Palestinians to Palestine. While Nasser was enjoying his fame and success other Arab leaders became jealous. The Syrians found that the UAR was created less to integrate Egyptians and Syrians into one people than it was to subjugate the Syrians to Egypt's and Nasser's rule. Syria dropped out of the UAR in 1961 when it was clear what Nasser's intention was. Syria also felt the strong Pan-Arab popularity and set out to upstage Nasser. In the early to mid 1960's the Syrians trained and supplied Fatah and other Palestinian groups in an effort to show their loyalty to all Arabs. The Palestinian problem became a handy instrument in Syria's hand to build up their Pan-Arab image. Fatah and the Popular Fronts accepted Syrian aid early in the 1960's but soon became wary of falling too heavily under Syrian dominance. In 1966 Syria created a new Palestinian resistance group called Saiqa.³³ This group was financed by Syria and their military arm was equipped and trained by the Syrian army. Saiqa, since it had such inseparable ties with Syria, followed very closely the Pan-Arab philosophy of Syria's political leaders. Saiqa remains strong, in fact it is today the second largest Palestinian group being only eclipsed by Fatah. Today Saiqa is one of the key Palestinian organizations and has been represented on the PLO Executive Committee for many years.

Iraq was not to be left out of the Palestinian resistance organization. Iraq is in a unique position in that it is not one of the confrontation states. Many of the Palestinian organizations found popular support for their causes in Iraq as they began their organizing process. Iraq was a firm supporter of the idea of Palestinian resistance and by 1969 had decided to sponsor their own group, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). Iraq and Syria both had strong Baath Party organizations in their governments but the two Baath Parties were not unified. The Iraqis could not therefore support the Syrian-sponsored Saiqa group because of ideological and political differences. In April 1969 Iraq banned all Palestinian organizations from the country.³⁴ All the Palestinian fedayeen were ordered to leave the country or to join the newly-formed and Iraqi-sponsored group, the Arab Liberation Front. The ALF thus became the official Palestinian group of Iraq. Its military is equipped and trained by the Iraqi military and its political ideology matches that of the Baathist government. The ALF and Saiqa represent the Arab-sponsored Palestinian groups. Iraq and Syria are the two countries which set up and still operate Palestinian organizations that are fully recognized by and represented in the PLO. Libya also supports Palestinian Resistance groups although it does not maintain a client relationship with any group in the same sense as Syria or Iraq. Libya's support is for small, radical factions rather than for conventionally armed and trained forces as Saiqa and ALF.

4. Other Groups

Fatah, PFLP, PFLP-GC, DFLP, Saiqa, and ALF are the Palestinian groups currently represented on the PNC Executive Committee. There are also other groups which play a more marginal role in the PLO. Several Communist-oriented factions have been established but none have gained any real prominence. In 1968 several Arab Communist parties worked together to create a Communist-influenced Palestinian organization called al-Ansar. Acceptance of al-Ansar by the other Palestinian groups was slow and incomplete. Al-Ansar never grew to become larger than about fifty active members. In early 1972 al-Ansar's founding sponsor parties agreed to disband the organization and most of its members joined Fatah but others sided with PFLP.³⁵

The Arab Communist Organization (ACO) was created probably in the early 1970's as an attempt to replace the Communist Parties of the Arab states. The group specialized in terrorist activity such as bank robberies and bombings. These appear to be some links between the ACO and PFLP. Membership figures are unknown with varying reports of between 70 and 1200 members.³⁶

The Palestine National Front (PNF) is another of the Communist-oriented groups. It operates outside the military realm and acts solely on a political level. Its membership is drawn heavily from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israeli Arabs. The failure to develop a strong backing among

Palestinians living in these areas has been a mystery to many leaders of the other Palestinian resistance groups. The PNF was established to link those Palestinians in the occupied territories with the rest of the Palestinian Nationalist Movement. One of the PNF leaders is long-time PLO spokesman and Executive Committee member 'Abd al-Muhsin Mayzar.

In early 1982 a Palestinian Communist Party was established which included Palestinian communists in Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip.³⁷ The party was formed with the formal approval of the Jordanian Communist Party. The new party's goal is "the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the consolidation of the unity of the Palestinian people." It also recognizes the PLO as the Palestinian people's sole, legitimate leader and thus expects to play a part in the PLO organizational operations.

C. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

The PLO was established on 22 May 1964. Nasser of Egypt was instrumental in the creation of the PLO. As noted earlier in this section, Nasser was the undisputed leader of the Pan-Arab movement during the early 1960's. The Palestinian Resistance Movement also began a dramatic increase in support and membership at about this time. Nasser could see that the Palestinians could possibly pose a threat to his Pan-Arab leadership. The Palestinian question became a rallying point for many Pan-Arabists. Nasser deftly suggested and supported the creation of the PLO. He wanted to be the driving force

behind the PLO to enhance his position as the Arab leader. As the primary backer of the PLO he could also keep control of the organization and use it to his advantage. Nasser used his influence in the Arab League to persuade that group to support the creation of the PLO. The PLO was created on 22 May 1964 as a separate Palestinian organization. Since 1964 the PLO has undergone a series of changes. This metamorphosis is best shown by examining the Palestinian parliament-in-exile, the Palestine National Council (PNC). The following section traces the sixteen PNC sessions since 1964 to point out how the PNC is organized, how it has changed over the years, and the role the PNC plays in Palestinian affairs.

1. PNC

The PNC is the equivalent of a democratic parliament. It includes a number of delegates (the exact number varies from year to year) representing the various Palestinian nationalist groups and independent Palestinians outside the established organizations. The PNC meetings are also attended by delegations from many other countries both Arab and non-Arab. The PNC was designed to meet every year, then it was decided to meet every six months, and currently the charter calls for annual meetings. The PNC has had to postpone several sessions because of regional conflicts and one extraordinary session was convened, so a total of sixteen meetings have been held over the nineteen and one half year history of the PNC. The following is a brief account of each of the PNC meetings.³⁸

2. PNC #1

The first PNC session was convened in Jerusalem on 28 May 1964. Ahmed al-Shukairy had previously been appointed head of the organization. Nasser had selected him because of his previous diplomatic experience.³⁹ Shukairy had appointed 200 delegates to attend the first session but 360 delegates actually arrived to take part in the meetings. Among them were Abu Jihad, Yusuf al-Najjar, and Kamal Adwan representing Fatah. At this first session Shukairy appointed the first Executive Committee (EC) and the PLO set out to form its institutions. Hikmet el Masri, Nicola el Durr, and Haidar Abdel Shafei were chosen as vice presidents of the PLO and Abdoul Rahman el Sikseil was selected to be secretary general. These leaders, along with Shukairy, were perceived by the other Palestinian organizations as being controlled by the Arab League sponsors of the new PLO, especially Egypt. The bulk of the work of this first PNC session was taken up by drafting the Palestine National Charter.

3. PNC #2

The second PNC session was held in Cairo from 31 May to 2 June 1965. President Nasser of Egypt gave the opening address. PLO headquarters at this time was located in Jerusalem. The work of the session included refining PLO goals and tactics and setting up the PLO institutions. The PNC saw the need to coordinate between the EC and the various revolutionary Palestinian organizations. Fatah representatives

also attended this session and were able to influence some of the political and military decisions. The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was established just prior to this session. The PNC asked the Arab states to help train the PLA. A national conscription resolution was adopted for all young Palestinians to increase the size of the guerrilla forces. The PNC emphasized that many Palestinians were helping in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to build up the Arab world. They also stated that they expected reciprocity from the Arab states.

4. PNC #3

Session three was convened in Gaza on 20 May and concluded 24 May 1966. Five hundred representatives from the Arab world attended. Egyptian Gaza governor general, Abd al-Munim Husni, gave the opening address on behalf of President Nasser. This session was held during a time of tension between Jordan and the Egyptian-backed PLO. At this session it was announced that PLO troops were being trained in Cairo, Damascus, Iraq, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC was also actively supplying the PLO with arms. Shukairy also announced that he had recently met with Soviet Premier Kosygin.

5. PNC #4

The fourth PNC session took place after the catastrophic Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis. Because of Shukairy's independent action during this war and failure to act collectively seven EC members called for his resignation as PLO

Chairman. Shukairy resigned in late 1967 and a Palestinian lawyer, Yahya Hamouda, was appointed to be caretaker chairman. Fatah called a meeting of the various Palestinian groups on 17 January 1968 in Cairo where they called for the creation of a military council, a permanent bureau for the PNC and election of PNC delegates by a preparatory committee. The EC held joint meetings with the various Palestinian organizations and decided that the fourth PNC session would be composed of 100 members proportionally distributed according to each organization's size. The fourth session was also held in the wake of the 21 March 1968 Karamah victory. Fatah's rapid growth and increased popularity were reflected in its prominence at this PNC session.

The fourth PNC session was held at Arab League Headquarters in Cairo from 10 through 16 July 1968. At this session the power was taken from the PNC Chairman to personally appoint the PNC delegates and the EC members. From this point onward the PNC would elect members to the EC. The guerrilla groups were well represented on the PNC: 38 from Fatah, 12 from PFLP, 10 from PLA. The PNC also decided to meet every six months. The Palestine National Charter was also amended allowing only for armed struggle, rejection of UN resolution 242, and the total liberation of Palestine. (Articles 6 and 15 were amended and article 24 was dropped.)

6. PNC #5

The fifth PNC session convened in Arab League Headquarters in Cairo 1-4 February 1969. During the preceding year

Fatah had been infiltrating PLO offices, taking control over them, and operating them under the name of the PLO. Because of this action, Fatah's dominance in size and influence and through Arafat's political maneuvering he was elected as PLO Chairman at this session. This is a post he has not relinquished since. President Nasser gave the opening address for the first time since PNC #2. PFLP, PLA, and PLF all boycotted the meeting and only 84 delegates attended. In addition to becoming chairman of the EC Arafat became head of PLO military affairs. Other EC members were assigned positions which equate to cabinet-level appointments. The offices on the EC were Political Affairs, Occupied Homeland Affairs, Popular Organization, Financial Affairs, and Guidance and Information. Abd al-Majid Shuman was elected chairman of the Palestine National Fund and Hayha Hammudah was elected chairman of the PNC. The number of PNC seats was increased from 100 to 150 with 33 for Fatah, 12 each for PFLP and Saiqa, 42 for independents, and 6 for PLA.

7. PNC #6

PNC session six was held in Cairo in September 1969. This was a period of Middle East tension and Palestine conflict in particular. Fatah and Saiqa set up Fatahland in southern Lebanon after conflict with Lebanese factions had intensified. Palestinian problems in Jordan were also on the rise. At this session Arafat was unanimously re-elected as PLO chairman. The EC membership was increased from 12 to 15.

PLO politically. In creating, formalizing, and continuing this Palestinian culture the PLO established the following agencies:

1) Arts and National Culture - This agency maintains a collection of traditional Palestinian costumes and dresses. It also teaches Palestinian women the necessary embroidery skills to continue making these costumes.

2) Palestinian Cinema Institution - This institution began in 1967 and produced its first documentary in 1968. Since then its films have won awards at various international film festivals.

3) The Association for Theater and Palestinian Popular Art - This group was established in 1978 and is divided into two branches: folklore/dances and music/song.

4) The Palestinian Folk Dancing Troupe - This troupe was organized in 1971 and includes two children's folk dance troupes. It has entertained abroad since 1973.

5) The Palestine National Theater - The Theater presents plays written and produced by Palestinians about Palestinian experiences. It has toured and performed in several Arab countries.

6) The Plastic Arts Section - This is a division within the Department of Information and Culture of the EC. This group gives support to Palestinian painters. In June 1980, the works of 58 Palestinian painters were on exhibition in Berlin. The PLO also pays rent on two art galleries in Beirut where Palestinian artists display their work.

sometimes depends on the political platform of the supplier or the Palestinian faction. For example, the PFLP traditionally refused to accept direct payments from such "reactionary sources" as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.⁴⁵ But in many cases these "reactionary" regimes refuse to give aid to the radical Palestinian factions such as PFLP or DFLP, preferring to support the moderate Fatah group.⁴⁶ Lastly, the PLO announced in the summer of 1981 that it would compensate Palestinian and Lebanese civilians for the damage or destruction of their homes during the fighting with Israel. This aid amounted to two thousand Lebanese pounds for each house destroyed and one thousand Lebanese pounds for each damaged house.⁴⁷

3. Arts and Culture

The PLO realizes that the Israeli occupation of Palestine included not merely the taking of territory but also represented an attempt to expropriate a culture and folklore. Israeli Jews came from such diverse backgrounds that they had no one, single, common culture. To create a sense of unity the Israelis tried to create an "Israeli" culture. In so doing they usurped the native Palestinian culture and called it Israeli. Seeing this expropriation the PLO sought to protect and develop the traditional Palestinian customs and traditions. They felt that by emphasizing the unique Palestinian culture they would be able to develop a oneness and a sense of belonging which could also benefit the

and university education for the children of the PLO martyrs. Widowed wives and orphaned daughters are taught to sew, embroider, or type. Aid is also provided to civilian Lebanese and Palestinians who have become victims of Israeli attacks. The budget in 1980 for this expense alone was over thirty million dollars. In addition to the PLO expense of subsidizing the Institution for Social Affairs and Welfare for the Martyrs' and Prisoners' Families, there are several other items of note concerning PLO financial dealings. First, the PLO is responsible for the administration of the refugee camps. The PLO pays for the camps' electricity and water and is also responsible for refuse collection, fire and police protection, and ambulance service.⁴¹ Second, the PLO maintains an acting investment portfolio. Many of Fatah's funds are reportedly passed to Abu Hassan who transfers them to bank accounts in Switzerland, Italy, and West Germany. Money from these accounts is used for various business investments. In 1972 the PLO's European investments were estimated to be £30 million.⁴² The PLO owns and manages a Belgian charter airline, industrial plants that produce shoes, clothing, processed food, and furniture.⁴³ Third, the PLO accepts financial grants on a "no strings attached" basis only. A partial reason for the souring of relations between the PLO and Libya was Libya's desire for reciprocity for its financial aid to the PLO. The PLO also denied a report that they paid two dollars per barrel of oil for Iranian aid.⁴⁴ Fourth, Palestinian financial aid

- 1) A continuous child vaccination program (in cooperation with UNICEF).
- 2) Teaching literacy courses to wives and mothers.
- 3) Providing vocational training (sewing, embroidery, language instruction, and typing).
- 4) Selling Palestinian handicrafts and funneling the money back to the artists.
- 5) Maintaining day care centers for PRCS workers.

About one-half of the PRCS budget comes directly from the PLO. Remaining funds come from the International Red Cross, other Red Cross Societies, the World Health Organization, and supporting agencies in Sweden, France, Switzerland, Norway, Finland, as well as from three private groups in the US: United Holy Land Fund, United States Overseas Medical Aid, and the Association for Near East Relief Aid. The PRCS also has observer status in the International Red Cross. It also sends representatives to the Ministries of Health meeting in the WHO. It is also a full voting member of the Arab Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

2. Institution for Social Affairs and Welfare for the Martyrs' and Prisoners' Families

The PLO established this Institution in 1965 to provide monthly subsistence payments to the widows and orphans of PLO combat victims as well as support for all full-time PLO workers and leaders and their families. With branches in Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon the Institution gave aid to over forty thousand persons in 1980. As a part of the Institution's work is a payment for secondary

include a dental clinic as well. These hospitals are each equipped with a specialized unit for maternity, pediatric, or orthopedic care. In addition to these major hospitals the PRCS operates 100 clinics: 60 in Lebanon, 20 in Syria, and the others located throughout the Arab world. The clinics are staffed by one doctor and two nurses. Care in both hospitals and clinics is provided either free of charge or for a very low fee. Clinic visits cost about one dollar while inpatient hospital visits run about five dollars per day. Any PLO employee and his family members receive free care. If a patient requires care which a PRCS facility cannot provide the patient is transferred to a facility outside the PRCS system and the expenses are paid by the PRCS.

Most doctors and nurses in the PRCS system are Palestinians. Salaries are low and there are a number of volunteer teams from Holland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, France, Britain, and elsewhere who come to work in PRCS facilities for three months to a year at a time. Other specialists work for the PRCS under contract and are paid by the World Health Organization.

The PRCS also operates a medical school for 150 students in Beirut. Programs of study include registered nurse, practical nurse, medical technicians, and paramedic. Tuition is free but graduates are expected to work in a PRCS facility for a length of time equaling their PRCS training. The PRCS is also active in the following activities:

D. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS⁴⁰

A quick glance at the type of departments headed by PNC and EC members gives an idea of the diversification of PLO interests. The bulk of PLO publicity has been centered on terrorism and guerrilla activity. The military capabilities and exploits of PLO fedayeen have become well-known to people throughout the world. This section leaves the political and military aspects of PLO organization and focuses on the PLO accomplishments in the field of social welfare. The Palestinians have established a series of institutions to assure their social, welfare, medical, and educational progress. Each of these institutions is dealt with individually below. These data are valid as of June 1982. The Israeli invasion of June 1982 and resulting occupation of Southern Lebanon may have caused a change in some of these organizations and institutions.

1. Palestine Red Crescent Society

The Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) was begun in Jordan in 1968 and the PLO institutionalized it in 1969. The PRCS works in the fields of both preventive and curative medicine. When the Palestinians were expelled from Jordan in 1970 the PRCS relocated most of its facilities to Lebanon. The PRCS maintains thirteen major hospitals: eleven in Lebanon, one in Syria, and one in Egypt. Each hospital has a modern operating room, radiology department, laboratory, pharmacy, blood bank, and outpatient clinic. Most hospitals

resolutions. After several days of committee work the PNC meets in plenary session to discuss and vote on the committee recommendations, to debate and vote on final resolutions, and to vote on new EC members. The EC members represent all the major Palestinian factions plus unaffiliated independent Palestinians. The new EC members are elected not by actual balloting but they are nominated and then their approval is indicated through applause. At the 16th PNC a proposal was made to change from this customary practice to actual tabulation of votes in deciding upon EC members as well as the EC chairman. Despite this proposal the EC members are still chosen on the basis of enthusiastic applause.

The PNC, as has been noted, meets only once every year and sometimes less frequently. Because of the sporadic convening of PNC sessions and because the PNC decides upon very broad strategy the EC was instituted as a smaller, more easily manageable institution to coordinate daily activities. The EC meets usually twice a month. During crisis periods and during PNC sessions the EC meets in permanent session. Representation on the EC is by commando groups and independents. Fatah dominates the EC with Arafat as chairman plus two other EC members. The remainder of the current representation is as follows: one member each representing PFLP, DFLP, Saiqa, ALF, PFLP-GC, and six independents. Each EC member is given a Cabinet-type assignment. Thus, it is the EC of the PNC which wields the actual power in the PLO.

Arafat can do nothing without the consent of the EC and at every PNC session he is subject to what amounts to a vote of confidence when the new EC is elected. When challenges to Arafat's leadership have occurred they have come on the heels of a conflict. The period of Arafat's instability have been: 1) after the 1970 Black September defeat in Jordan, 2) after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, 3) after the 1978 Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon, and 4) after the 1982 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon and the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut. In each of these cases Arafat's opposition has claimed that he was acting independently and collectively as stipulated in the PNC. The PNC appears to have become a well-established institution in which the Palestinian people believe and in which they have placed considerable trust. If the Palestinians eventually attain the statehood which they have for so long struggled they will be organizationally prepared just as the Zionists were in 1948.

The format of PNC sessions follows a very predictable pattern. The opening address is usually given by the head of the host country or his representative. The first session also features speeches by Arafat and other major PLO leaders. For the first two or three days the PNC sessions are occupied by hearing the addresses of delegations from many Arab, socialist, and friendly countries. At the conclusion of these speeches the PNC delegates separate into committee sessions to debate and draft a preliminary committee report and

18. PNC #16

This PNC session was the first since the 1982 evacuation from Beirut. It was held at the Palais des Nations in Algiers from 14 to 22 February 1983. After the dispersion to nine Arab countries in September 1982 the PLO was thought by some to have been hopelessly splintered. This session thus was an important one through which PLO unity could be displayed. Also a series of peace plans had been tendered which the PNC undertook to discuss: the Fahd Plan, the Fez Plan, the Reagan Plan, and the Brezhnev Plan. This session included the first mention of the acceptance of a Palestinian mini-state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at least in principle. Jerusalem was designated to be the capital of such a Palestinian state. Isam Sartawi resigned from the PNC for the second successive session but his resignation was not accepted. A new 14-member EC was elected including a PFLP representative.

The members of the EC act as a Palestinian Cabinet with the Chairman serving as Prime Minister. Yasir Arafat has served in this role since 1969. The other EC members hold such positions on the cabinet level as heads of the following departments: Political, Military, Health, Finance, Education, Popular Organizations, National Relations, Information and National Guidance, and Affairs of the Occupied Homeland. Palestinians view the PNC as a parliament and the EC as a council of ministers. Viewed strictly in this sense,

16. PNC #14

Again conflict in Lebanon delayed the regularly scheduled PNC session. PNC fourteen was convened in Damascus from 15 to 22 January 1979. The PLO decided to meet outside Cairo because of the Camp David capitulation by Egypt. The opening speech was delivered by the host President Assad. The PNC rejected the Camp David accords charging that they were a part of the US global imperialist offensive. At this session there was considerable infighting and jockeying for seats on the EC. Because of this seeming power struggle no new EC was elected. Faruq Qaddumi cleared up this apparent discrepancy by stating that EC members are elected to serve a three-year term and so the current EC's term would not expire until March 1980. Qaddumi said that the new EC would be elected the following year. However, the next PNC session was not to convene until 1981.

17. PNC #15

The fifteenth PNC session was held in Amman, Jordan from 11 to 16 April 1981. President Assad opened the session with an address to the delegates. Delegates from 100 Arab and friendly countries attended. The PNC agreed that the occupied city of Jerusalem to be the capital of Palestine. The PNC also agreed to increase the number of executive committee representatives from 122 to 180. A new 15-member EC was elected but the PFLP and PPSF were not represented on the EC.

independent state on "any part of Palestinian territory to be liberated." They also reaffirmed the strategic objective of the PLO to be "the establishment of a democratic state on the whole of Palestinian territory." At the time of this meeting eight Palestinians were deported by Israeli authorities from the West Bank. These eight Palestinians were accepted as new members of the PNC and three of them became members of the new 14-member EC. The political program adopted at this session guided the PLO during the very important events of 1974: the Rabat Summit and the UN recognition.

15. PNC #13

PNC thirteen was held at Arab League Headquarters once again from 12 to 20 March 1977. This session was delayed because of the 1975-76 Lebanese civil war. Membership on the PNC was increased from 187 to 290. The PNC decided to set up a Palestinian state on any liberated part of Palestine instead of waiting for the liberation of the entire territory. An example of how the PNC operates is the sub-committees which routinely meet and report during the PNC sessions. At PNC #13 the following committees met and produced policy documents: Political, Occupied Homeland, Financial Affairs, Palestinian National Unity, Popular Organizations, Social Affairs and Labor, Legislative, Information and Educational Affairs. Also at this session the PFLP and ALF agreed to work within the PLO and EC.

consisted of 12 members: four from Fatah (including Arafat), two from Saiqa, one each from PFLP, DFLP, ALF, and three independents. The Central Committee was dissolved and its responsibilities were transferred to the EC. The guerrilla groups' representation on the PNC was 85 seats out of 115. Funding for the PLO was reportedly a problem with the only Arab state contribution in 1970 being £62,500 from Qatar.

12. PNC #10

PNC session 10 was held in Cairo from 6 through 12 April 1972. The PNC adopted an organizational platform at this session aimed at unifying the Palestinian resistance groups, the unions, etc.

13. PNC #11

Session eleven was held in Cairo from 3 to 12 January 1973. There were 143 PNC members in attendance. Eighteen delegates were unable to attend because they were detained by Jordanian officials. The PNC decided to reinstitute the Central Council as a connecting link between the PNC and the EC. The Central Council was to consist of 19 to 21 members chosen by the EC. The PNC also called for the overthrow of the monarchy in Jordan.

14. PNC #12

The twelfth PNC session was held at the Arab League Headquarters in Cairo from 1 to 9 June 1974. At this session the PNC adopted a tenpoint program which included a new Palestinian philosophy. The PNC agreed they would set up an

from Jordan which would take place in July 1971. Prior to this session Arafat had made several attempts to unify all the guerrilla groups under his command. He was opposed by the PFLP and DFLP who had no intention of submitting to Arafat's rule. Syria also refused to relinquish its control over Saiqa. Fatah came to this PNC session prepared to offer a new organizational framework. The 115 PNC members approved the following: 1) The PLO was to embrace all Palestinian revolutionary forces, 2) The Charter was to define the PLO aims and to guide its course, 3) The PNC was to draw up strategy for political, military, information, and financial affairs, 4) A Command was created to command the Palestinian struggle from three levels -- regular forces, fedayeen, and popular militia, 5) A Central Committee was to consist of 21 members to meet every three months, 6) A political bureau of nine members was created to meet on a weekly basis and was to supervise the daily affairs of the Palestinian struggle, 7) "bodies, establishments and offices" were created to carry out the PNC decisions. One hundred fifty PNC members were elected from among the guerrilla organizations, trade and craft unions, and intellectuals and specialists to serve a three-year term.

11. PNC #9 This session met from 7 to 13 July 1971 in Cairo at the Arab League Headquarters building. At this session Arafat became Commander-in-Chief of the PLO, Chairman of the EC, and Commander-in-Chief of the PLA. The new EC

8. PNC #7

This session was held in Cairo in June 1970. At this time Palestinian clashes with Jordanian armed forces were about to reach a climax during Black September. At this session the Palestine Central Council was established as a separate organization from the EC. It was intended to be a link between the PNC and the EC.

9. PNC Extraordinary Session

This session was held just weeks after the previous session. This extraordinary session was held at Widhat refugee camp in Amman, Jordan. PLO leaders called this meeting to deal with two issues: 1) How to respond to the US Roger's Plan and 2) How to defeat the Jordanian plots to exterminate the Palestinian resistance fighters. Foreign delegations at this session included those from Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, South Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and the American Black Panthers. At this time there were 115 PNC members. For the first time all eleven guerrilla groups were represented on the PNC. This was also the first PNC meeting to be held outside Egypt and Nasser's influence. The mood was decidedly anti-Nasser because of his recent acceptance of the Roger's Plan and Egypt's ceasefire agreement with the Israelis.

10. PNC #8

This PNC session was held at Arab League Headquarters in Cairo from 27 February to 5 March 1971. This was after Black September but before the total expulsion of the fedayeen

7) Graphic Work - Palestinian artists also work to produce posters, greeting cards, emblems, book covers, post cards, and other such works. The PLO uses the medium of graphic art to convey messages to the masses who do not visit the art galleries.

8) Research Center - The Palestine Research Center was established in Beirut in 1965. It is the repository of Palestinian culture and historical heritage. It has its own printing press and publishes a professional journal, Palestinian Affairs.

In addition to these cultural agencies the PLO has declared a number of national holidays:

1 January	The Birth of the Palestinian Revolution
7 January	Day of the Martyrs
17 February	Prisoners Day
8 March	Students Day
30 March	Land Day
1 May	Workers Day
15 May	The Loss of Palestine
29 November	International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People

The Palestinians have also adopted a national anthem, "Biladi, Biladi" (My Land, My Land). It is sung on every possible occasion. The Palestinian national flag has also been accepted and is a prominent symbol to the Palestinian people everywhere.

4. Popular Organizations

Practically every Palestinian worker can find at least one union to which he may choose to belong. Along with union membership comes political activity since all unions are granted seats on the PNC proportionally based on size of the union. The unions play an import role in Palestinian decision-making in areas of economic, educational, welfare, and political concerns. The unions include:

- General Union of Palestinian Workers
- General Union of Palestinian Women
- General Union of Palestinian Teachers
- General Union of Palestinian Students
- General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists
- General Union of Palestinian Lawyers
- General Union of Palestinian Engineers
- General Union of Palestinian Artists
- General Union of Palestinian Youth
- General Union of Palestinian Medical Professionals

The Palestinians living in the diaspora have found that they have not been accepted in their host countries with the same rights as the natives of those countries. Palestinians are treated as foreigners, discriminated against, and must abide by special laws and restrictions. In the occupied territories they are prohibited from organizing outside the Israeli labor institution, the Histadrut. The largest Palestinian union is the General Union of Palestinian Workers

(GUPW). GUPW has thirteen branches in the Arab world as well as in East Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Australia, and Belgium. This union works to protect Palestinian workers and to secure their equal treatment with other workers. GUPW also has established cooperatives in order to provide basic commodities to all workers at a moderate cost. GUPW enjoys observer status in the International Labor Organization. Another large Palestinian union is the General Union of Palestinian Women. This union is active wherever Palestinians live. The union operates women's centers where women are taught such skills as typing, needlepoint, embroidery, language proficiency, preventive medicine, hygiene, and nutrition. An important aspect of the Women's Union is the Children's Steadfastness House. This is an orphanage in which the children are organized into "families" of seven or eight led by a surrogate mother. The Home operates nursery schools and kindergartens for its two hundred children. Also employed by the Home is a pediatrician, two psychologists, and two social workers.

One other large Palestinian union is the General Union of Palestinian Teachers. This union was established in 1969 and now has fifteen branches in which it assists the 63,000 Palestinian teachers throughout the world. The goal of the Union is to secure better educational opportunities for Palestinian children, to improve the quality of Palestinian schools, and to combat illiteracy. The union reaches the

occupied territories and other Palestinians through its radio broadcast programs. An international exchange program is available to all Palestinian children everywhere whereby they may attend summer camp in the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany.

All the other Palestinian unions seek to secure and maintain the rights of their constituent members. Several unions participate in international organizations and receive support from concerned groups and countries throughout the world. The unions are also represented in the PLO leadership institutions such as the Central Council and the Executive Committee. PLO funds are expended in some instances to support union activities. One of the PLO Cabinet-level Departments is the Department of Popular Organizations which maintains close contact with each of the Unions.

This chapter has presented the structural aspects of the PLO. There is obviously more to the PLO than a military organization which carries out terrorist and guerrilla activities against Israel. The PLO is active in internal political development, establishment and maintenance of Palestinian culture, and improvement in Palestinian medical and educational levels. The sum of all of these activities gives one a more complete understanding of what the PLO is; that it is not just a loosely organized collection of disgruntled political radicals but a well-organized group of leaders dedicated to a worthy cause.

III. LEADERSHIP

Since its inception in 1964 PLO leadership has undergone relatively few leadership changes. At the top the PLO chairmanship has been held by only three people. From 1964 to 1967 Ahmed Shukairy was chairman. Yahya Hamouda took over after Shukairy's resignation and remained chairman until February 1969 when Yasir Arafat emerged as the new chairman. On the EC level the leadership has remained fairly constant since 1974. Eight of 1974's EC members are still serving on the Committee. Each of the major fadayeen organizations have also maintained fairly stable leadership. Fatah has been led by Arafat, Faruq Qaddumi, Salah Khalef, and Khalil al-Wazir since the group's creation in 1959. George Habash has led PFLP since 1967 when it came into being. Nayif Hawatmeh still leads DFLP since he split with PFLP in 1969. Ahmed Jibril remains the leader of PFLP-GC after forming the group in 1969. In this section each of the primary Palestinian leaders will be examined.

A. YASIR ARAFAT

Since his rise to power within Fatah and the PLO Arafat has been reluctant to reveal much information concerning his life, especially about his early years. A biography of Arafat was published in 1976 by Thomas Kiernan which gives a fairly thorough outline of his life. Through extensive interviews with Arafat and his friends and relatives Kiernan pieced

together the life of the PLO's most famous leader. Arafat's birthplace has been under dispute, some claiming he was born in Cairo, others say he was born in Gaza, while Arafat himself claims he was born in Jerusalem.⁴⁸ He prefers to claim Jerusalem so that he can claim a birthright in the heart of Palestine. Arafat's mother was the daughter of a cousin to Haj Amin al-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.⁴⁹ The al-Husseinis had been a traditionally prominent family since the seventeenth century. Arafat spent his early years in Cairo where he attended elementary school and apparently received special religious training, his parents believing he had a rare spiritual gift.⁵⁰ In 1939, at the age of ten, Arafat and his family moved to Gaza where his father had been assigned by the Muslim Brotherhood to work for them. Arafat had several contacts with Arab terrorists and was involved in revolutionary youth groups. In his late teens Arafat's family moved back to Cairo where Arafat enrolled in an Egyptian technological high school.⁵¹ In 1951 Arafat entered King Fuad University in Cairo studying civil engineering. While a student he participated in the Palestinian Student Federation which had been active at the university.⁵² Soon he became an officer in the Federation and directed many of its activities. In 1953 Arafat and other Palestinian students formed a new group which they called the Palestine Student Union.⁵³ During this time Arafat met two Palestinians about his age who had come to Cairo to receive guerrilla training, Salah Khalef and Khalil al-Wazir.⁵⁴ These two were trained by

the Egyptian army and were commissioned as lieutenants in a special Gazan brigade. Arafat volunteered for military training and was selected to receive extra training which led to a commission. He returned to Cairo in December 1955 with his commission and set out to help organize a new Palestinian group, the General Union of Palestinian Students.⁵⁵ Arafat became the President of the Union in 1956 just about the time of the Suez crisis. Arafat was particularly disillusioned by Egypt's actions during the war. He saw Egyptian disorganization, desertion, cowardice, and little positive action.

In 1956 after the Suez war several GUPS students, including Arafat, Khalef, and al-Wazir, were part of an Egyptian delegation to an international student conference in Prague.⁵⁶ While there they received word that if they returned to Cairo they would be immediately arrested. The three managed to go to Stuttgart, Germany but were unable to obtain much support among Palestinians there. After only a few months in Stuttgart, Arafat left for Kuwait where he worked first for the Department of Water Supply.⁵⁷ Later he opened his own contracting firm, the Free Palestine Construction Company. Soon another young Palestinian, Faruq Qaddumi, came to work for him and later his friends, al-Wazir and Khalef, joined him. Before long about twenty Palestinians had joined this group and they decided to officially organize themselves. Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir, Salah Khalef, Khalid al-Hassan, Faruq Qaddumi, Mohammad Yusef, and Zuhayr al-Alami formed the inner circle of the new group called Fatah.⁵⁸

From the beginning Fatah sought to lead through a ruling committee rather than relying on a single leader. They sought to avoid any kind of personality cult which often develops when a single leader emerges. After the 1967 war, when Fatah became known throughout the world, pressure began to mount for Fatah to reveal who its supreme leader was. Apparently because he was absent from a high-level meeting or because of security reasons Arafat was declared to be Fatah's chief.⁵⁹ Since that declaration Arafat has been the leader of Fatah and since 1969 the leader of the PLO. He has become exactly what the early leaders tried to avoid -- an almost legendary hero. The whole world focuses on Arafat and it is Arafat who most Palestinians accept as their spokesman and leader.⁶⁰ Arafat has survived several challenges to his leadership, the most significant being in 1978 and 1983. In 1978 the Rejection Front demanded new PLO leadership claiming that political decisions were being made individually instead of in a collective manner. Some elements within Fatah joined the Rejection Front in making these charges.⁶¹ Arafat regained control by renewing the pledges of support from Saudi Arabia, East Germany, Syria, Algeria, Libya, and within Fatah itself.⁶² In 1983 a rebellion was sparked within Fatah. Reportedly 70% of Fatah members supported the uprising which was caused by Arafat's appointments of officers to military posts which were seemingly based upon political considerations. Arafat was also accused of treading a moderate course when the majority of Palestinians felt a radical path

was most appropriate. Arafat tried to maintain his leadership by again appealing for outside support. He traveled to Romania, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and India to obtain promises of support.⁶³ The rebellion was apparently fueled by Syria who sought to gain control of the PLO after the fedayeen expulsion from Beirut. It appears that some aid to the anti-Arafat factions came from Libya. At this time Arafat still maintains control over Fatah and the PLO but it is too early to determine how long this control will survive.

B. GEORGE HABASH

George Habash has been a prominent Palestinian leader for many years and is known throughout the world as the mastermind of the airline hijacking tactic. Habash's political ideology is much more rigid than Arafat's and thus he has attracted a much smaller, yet politically more loyal organization. His background is quite different than Arafat's yet both are Palestinians struggling for the return to their homeland.

Habash was born to Christian parents in 1925 and he grew up in the Lydda-Ramle area about midway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. His family was well-to-do, his father being an importer of food products who then sold them to local shopkeepers. Habash was a bright boy and a dynamic student. He and his family were driven from their home during the 1948 war. This left a very strong impression with Habash and created within him an intense feeling of revenge. According to him he had no other choice than to "become a revolutionary and fight for the

cause."⁶⁴ After the war Habash enrolled in the American University in Beirut where he studied medicine.⁶⁵ He was also active in a student organization called al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (The Firm Tie). Al-Urwa had been established in 1918 to be a non-political student society to promote the literary abilities of Arab students. In 1950 Habash was elected President of al-Urwa after serving as a member of the editorial board of the society's literary journal. Habash used the society to expound his own ideas and by 1951 all but one or two of the Baathists in al-Urwa became adherents to Habash's philosophy. In 1951 Habash graduated from AUB medical school with distinction. He had every promise of becoming an excellent physician.⁶⁶ Habash and other leaders organized cells of the group which was named the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), until 1952.⁶⁷ At that time Habash and an associate, Wadi Haddad, went to Amman where they established a medical clinic to treat Palestinian refugees on a gratis basis. They also formed a school there for combating illiteracy.⁶⁸ One of the first new recruits to Habash's group in Amman was a young East Jordanian, Nayif Hawatmeh. In 1956 Habash was jailed in Jordan for a short time but was released to run with a few comrades for Parliament in the national elections.⁶⁹ He was unsuccessful in this bid but through the campaign he was able to introduce the ANM to a wide range of Palestinians. By 1958 repressive measures taken by the Jordanian government crushed the organizational work Habash had accomplished. During the next five years Habash was in Syria.

Throughout this time period the ANM expanded throughout the Arab world. Delegations were sent to Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Although cells of the group were so widely dispersed the leadership remained centralized. In early 1956 a conference was held in Amman which was attended by eight delegations: four from Lebanon, two from Jordan (Habash and Haddad), and one each from Syria and Kuwait.⁷⁰ At this conference the leadership decided to create a formal structure. Up to this time the ANM had operated under the cell system whereby cell members knew only one or two other members and were unaware of the existence of other cells. The cell leaders were also organized into similar cells. The conference established a National Conference as the highest authority of the ANM. An Executive Committee of this National Conference was created to manage the daily affairs of the ANM. At the level of each Arab country a Regional Command was established to direct ANM activities throughout that country. Next in hierarchical order came the Shuba, which led the Movement in a province or town. Next came the Rabita (League) which was the cell. The cells recruited new members and trained them before they passed on to higher levels of the Movement. Such tight control required very few central leaders and those leaders could maintain close contact with each other to preserve ideological unity.

In the early 1960's the concept of class struggle entered to explain the Syrian coup of 1961 which spelled the end of the

UAR. Two opposing groups had emerged within the ANM: 1) the majority who favored the already established organization and ideology and 2) a minority who believed in the principles of the dialectic. Habash favored the former stance and Hawatmeh the latter. Habash was jailed in Syria in July 1962 and was not released until March 1963.⁷¹ After his release he found that Hawatmeh's group had grown in size and influence. Habash maintained that the ANM represented but one stream flowing into Nasserism while Hawatmeh insisted on following a strict Marxist line.⁷²

This ideological infighting continued until the June 1967 war. In December 1967 Habash and his comrades established the PFLP.⁷³ Less than a year later Ahmed Jibril withdrew from PFLP to establish his own separate group which he called PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC). Disagreement between Habash and Hawatmeh continued until 1969 when Hawatmeh broke away to form the DFLP. Since that time Habash has maintained control over the PFLP. PFLP leadership has been restricted in size and unitary in ideology. Since 1967 the PFLP has participated with the PLO but has been expelled or has withdrawn on several occasions.⁷⁴ Habash has been at the forefront of Palestinian affairs since the early 1950's and remains at the head of one of the strongest of the Popular Fronts. Some analysts have remarked that if Habash's given name had been Mohammed or Rahman he would have commanded a much larger following. They maintain that being labeled as a Christian has cost him considerable support from

the Muslim community. Religion is not an official part of the Palestinian struggle but some ingrained traditions are difficult if not impossible to breach.

C. NAYIF HAWATMEH

Hawatmeh was born northwest of Amman in the es-Salt district. His family belonged to a small Christian tribe of no political significance or influence. Hawatmeh's family belonged to a poorer section of the tribe. His uncle owned a chicken farm and so could afford to send Hawatmeh and his younger brother to elementary school in Amman.⁷⁵ It was not until 1966 and through Hawatmeh's involvement in the ANM that he could attend college. His education was subsidized by the ANM and he enrolled in the Beirut Arab University where he majored in philosophy.

In 1953, when Habash and Haddad came to Jordan to recruit for the ANM, Hawatmeh was one of the first to join the group. During the 1958 Lebanese civil war Hawatmeh was assigned to al-Mina, near Tripoli, to head the ANM's committee there.⁷⁶ Later that year he was posted to Iraq with the charge to unify all sympathetic groups under the ANM. Hawatmeh became head of the Iraqi Regional Command but was arrested near the end of 1961 and was held until February 1963. Upon his release he was deported to Beirut and there he became one of the leaders of the Marxist-oriented element within the ANM. He led this faction until he split with Habash's PFLP in 1969. He subscribed to a strict Marxist-Leninist program which may be the most sophisticated of any Palestinian resistance group's philosophy.

Hawatmeh is close to the USSR and has traveled there at the Soviet's invitation.⁷⁷ Recently, the Soviets have promised support for Hawatmeh and the DFLP. Hawatmeh was the first Palestinian leader to advocate the creation of a ministate on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.⁷⁸ His group has been represented on the EC of the PNC continuously since 1973. The DFLP, under Hawatmeh's leadership, has participated actively in PNC debates. During the latest challenge to Arafat's leadership Hawatmeh, along with Habash, publicly supported Arafat and called upon Palestinians everywhere to solidify their support for Arafat.

The Palestinian leaders described here do not follow a particular pattern in family background, educational level, socio-economic background, or even political philosophy. They each are, however, captivating personalities. Each is able to fire up a crowd moving it skillfully from tears to cheers. They often deliver speeches lasting for hours at a time. A part of the Arab and Palestinian heritage is allegiance to a group -- family, clan, or, in this case, Palestinian guerrilla group. Rallying around such a common ground fits the Arab personality. The rise to prominence of such leaders as Arafat, Habash, and Hawatmeh is natural. According to Abu Iyad, a Fatah leader, George Habash uses his intellectual and oratory skills to attract and keep his followers. In public Habash is very dogmatic, intransigent, incredibly violent and mesmerizes crowds with his fiery speeches. In private, however, he is soft-spoken and calm, listens with utmost attention and expresses

The DFLP advocates the mutual recognition of Israeli and Palestinian peoples by one another.¹²³ All of these philosophies coincide with Fatah and Hawatmeh admits that his views and Arafat's are very similar.

3. PFLP-GC

Ahmed Jibril split with Habash in late 1967 to lead his own group which he called the PFLP-General Command. Jibril has maintained an independent stance regarding cooperation with other Palestinian groups. Nevertheless, the PFLP-GC has been represented continuously since 1974 on the EC. The PFLP-GC stresses terrorist tactics and has used hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and guerrilla attacks to fight against the Israelis. Jibril has not been a scrupulous political ideologue but has developed an intense military training program in which he personally acts as an instructor.¹²⁴ Jibril does not often give speeches or public statements and his group acts independently from the other Palestinian groups. In 1972 and again in 1981 the PFLP-GC ignored ceasefire agreements and continues to fight.¹²⁵ Jibril is supported by Syria and falls at least nominally under Syrian control.¹²⁶

2. DFLP

Nayif Hawatmeh views the Middle East in stricter Marxist terms than Habash. Hawatmeh even accuses Habash's PFLP as being dominated by the bourgeoisie.¹¹⁶ Hawatmeh considers the class struggle to exist throughout the Arab world and not only among the Palestinians. The leadership of the DFLP represents then the workers, peasants, and poor refugees. The DFLP considers all members to be both political and military activists.¹¹⁷ The members study the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao, Giap, and Guevara as indoctrination to Marxist philosophy. They criticize other Palestinian groups on several fronts: 1) those groups fail to base their activities and support on the Arab masses, 2) they are controlled too much by the Arab countries, 3) their leadership has evolved into a bourgeoisie class, and 4) they have resorted to unacceptable tactics such as airline hijackings.¹¹⁸ In 1973, Hawatmeh was the first Palestinian resistance leader to seriously consider the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an interim goal.¹¹⁹ Since 1973 this has become the current official PLO strategy.

Hawatmeh's current strategy includes armed struggle but only within the occupied territories.¹²⁰ He also stresses Arab unity and cooperation in thwarting what he considers the US-Zionist imperialist strategy.¹²¹ Hawatmeh also has urged Palestinians to seek direct contacts with progressive Israelis, an undertaking which right-wing Fatah leaders have also sought.¹²²

Habash also viewed the Middle East conflict in class struggle terms thus seeing the Arab capitalists collaborating with the international capitalists.¹¹² This made them enemies of the Palestinians and the target of PFLP tactics. Habash claimed that this group could attack one of these Arab countries to gain the respect of the other states and to prevent an Arab movement from concluding a peace agreement without the PFLP. Habash stated: "We are the joker in the deck. Without our consent the other Arabs can do nothing, and we will never agree to a peaceful settlement. If the Arab countries think they can gang up and make peace over our heads they are mistaken. All we have to do is assert our power in one country and the rest will lose their resolve and start backsliding."¹¹³

This basic philosophy has not changed over the years. In the wake of the 1982 expulsion of the PLO forces from Beirut PFLP continued to call for establishing a Palestinian state on "a part of the national Palestinian soil without limitations or conditions."¹¹⁴ An integral part of this strategy is to struggle against the Camp David plan for autonomous Palestinian rule. The method for carrying out this policy is to continue the armed struggle. In connection with this strategy the PFLP called for close ties with Syria "at the highest levels" and to maintain and strengthen the alliance between the PLO, Syria, and the Lebanese Nationalist Movement.¹¹⁵

Palestinian homeland.¹⁰⁶ Just one year later, on 23 July 1968, three PFLP members hijacked an El Al airliner to Algiers while it was enroute from Rome to Israel.¹⁰⁷ This marked the beginning of a series of hijackings. PFLP strategy called for other unique tactics such as bombings and kidnappings of targets in Israel as well as outside the Middle East. PFLP philosophy dictated that these dramatic attacks were more psychologically damaging than military forays. Because there are so many Jews in Europe and because the European states support the Zionists, the Europeans are also legitimate targets for the PFLP. According to Habash burning a store in London was worth more than burning two kibbutzim in Israel.¹⁰⁸ These PFLP tactics, including airline hijackings, brought the Palestinian cause wide public exposure. The publicity, however, did not lead to the recovery of the Palestinian homeland as they had hoped the world public opinion would. These tactics had succeeded in publicizing the plight of the Palestinians but at the same time had failed to gain sympathy for the Palestinian cause. By 1973 Habash decided the PFLP should stop the airline hijackings and turn toward Moscow for support.¹⁰⁹

PFLP strategy called for attacks on Israel, international Zionism, and international imperialism.¹¹⁰ Included in the international imperialism category were the US and the Arab reactionary governments. During the 1970 Black September conflict in Jordan Habash was in North Korea studying Kim Il-Sung's "Revolutionary Strategy Against American Imperialism."¹¹¹

party.¹⁰³ PFLP theorist al-Hakim Darwara explained that "nationalism is the mental and emotional condition through which the nation realizes its collective unitary existence. From this evolves the collective will of the people."¹⁰⁴ At this early stage the ANM stressed Arab unity and the leaders supported the UAR and Hashemite Federation in 1958 plus any other hint of Arab unity. Union was considered the magic cure for all Arab maladies.

In the early 1960's ANM theorists introduced the concept of class struggle. With this the ideology shifted away from Arab unity and toward a marxist program. The other primary PFLP theorist, Mushin Ibrahim, in analyzing ANM history since World War II claimed that the Arab bourgeoisie had failed to bring about Arab unity and that the leadership had passed into the hands of the Arab middle class.¹⁰⁵ This drift to the left conflicted with Habash and his comrades' emphasis on Arab unity. The ensuing internal dispute sowed the seeds for the eventual split between Habash's PFLP, Jibril's PFLP-GC, and Hawatmeh's DFLP.

In 1967 the overriding objectives of Habash's PFLP were:

- 1) to dramatize internationally the plight of the Palestinians,
- 2) to force the world to return the Palestinians to their homeland,
- 3) to show the other Palestinian resistance groups that desperate measures would work, and
- 4) to make it clear to the Arab states that the PFLP would not have any part of a peaceful settlement with Israel that did not return the

Arafat again managed to maintain control.¹⁰⁰ Fourth, in the spring of 1983 Arafat made two military appointments based on what appeared to be political rather than military bases.¹⁰¹ The ensuing uprising within Fatah seemed to be sponsored by Syria. Arafat was able to keep control of Fatah although many analysts felt that he would need to take a more Left-leaning ideological stand to maintain his strong leadership position.

B. POPULAR FRONTS

If Fatah is characterized by having a moderate and ill-defined ideological construct the Popular Fronts generally espouse a narrow, Marxist doctrine. The three principle factions of the Popular Fronts are the PFLP led by George Habash, the DFLP led by Nayif Hawatmeh, and the PFLP-GC led by Ahmed Jibril. Habash's PFLP was organized in 1967 from the ANM. Jibril and Hawatmeh became members of the PFLP but soon after split to form their own groups. These three groups are currently represented in the PNC and on the EC.

1. PFLP

The PFLP views Palestinian history since the Mandate in Marxist, dialectic terms. Habash viewed the British rule as imperialist oppression.¹⁰² The prominent Palestinian families (al-Husseini and Nashashibi) were considered aristocratic. There was a great divergence between these families and the Arab governments and the Palestinian masses. Over the years a new entity emerged in the Arab world: a working class

democratic state of Palestine would be established over all of Palestine. Thus the strategy remains the same, the moderation coming only in the tactics to achieve it. Fatah ideology has shifted somewhat concerning recognition of Israel. Issam Sartawi, formerly a leading Fatah right-wing spokesman, was commissioned to meet with and hold meetings with moderate Israelis. He held several such meetings but was assassinated by an outcast Fatah organization, Black June, for such behavior.

Since Fatah is the PLO's largest and most influential group, Fatah is ideologically dominant in official PLO ideology.

Within Fatah there are at least three major categories:

1) Right-wing - which Sartawi was associated with, 2) Left-wing - led by Abu Iyad, and 3) Moderate - led by Arafat.⁹⁷ Since Fatah's ideology and policy frequently represents a compromise hammered out by Arafat, it appears that Fatah is taking a moderate stand on most issues. It is precisely on this point that opposition has arisen against Arafat both within Fatah and among the other fedayeen groups. At least four major challenges to Arafat's leadership have taken place. First, in 1971, he was accused of creating a cult of personality.⁹⁸ Fatah Left-wing leaders spearheaded the opposition. Second, after the October 1973 war, Abu Nidal separated himself from Fatah and was supported by Iraq. In 1974 Abu Nidal mounted a coup attempt to oust Arafat but he was unsuccessful.⁹⁹ Third, in 1978, the Rejection Front organizations unitedly opposed Arafat for taking individual rather than collective political decisions.

terrorism. Its most famous act being the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre. The activities of BSO brought immediate and intense worldwide recognition of the Palestinian cause. BSO was linked to Fatah and the leaders seemed willing to accept the recognition and some even claimed that BSO was actually the Fatah intelligence branch.⁹⁴ In this case Fatah's official policy was to reject international terrorism as a tactic but to accept the publicity that accompanied BSO activities. This points out again the pragmatic, moderate policy of Fatah.

Fatah's policy toward the liberation of Palestine became the official PLO policy at the fifth PNC session in 1969. This plan was to work for the creation of a democratic state where Jews and Arabs would live together harmoniously as equal citizens.⁹⁵ Originally the goal was to establish a Palestinian state on all of Palestinian territory. Thus the 1947 UN Partition plan was not acceptable since it would allot a portion of Palestine to the Arabs and a portion to the Jews. Fatah's ideology called for acceptance of only a democratic state comprising all the Palestinian homeland. Within this territory Jews and Arabs would be allowed to live together under a democratic government. Another aspect of this question was the strict refusal to recognize Israel or to negotiate with her leaders. Fatah's position has also softened on these points. Fatah has accepted the concept of setting up a Palestinian state on a portion of Palestinian territory.⁹⁶ This ministate, of course, would merely be a temporary reality. Eventually a

government. Arafat likes to claim that his fedayeen did cause the 1967 war. The result of that war, of course, was just the opposite of what he had expected. Instead of total liberation, thousands of more Palestinians became refugees and major portions of Palestinian territory came under Israeli suzerainty. This terrible defeat jolted the Fatah leadership out of their dependence on the Arab states. Fatah decided they needed to undertake the struggle themselves. They sought to take control of the PLO, whose image had also been tarnished in the 1967 defeat, and to unify all the fedayeen groups to continue a solitary fight against Zionist imperialism.

Fatah has sought to unify all the Palestinian resistance groups within the framework of the PLO. This policy did not include the use of international terrorism which had been popularized by the Popular Fronts. In the late 1960's Arafat repeatedly denounced the use of international terror by Palestinian groups. Abu Iyad in 1971 distinguished between terrorism and revolutionary violence.⁹² Terrorism, he explained, is an individual act performed outside the context of an organization and without strategic vision. Revolutionary violence, on the other hand, is part of a large, structured movement and constitutes a political act. Iyad was emphatic in his resolute opposition to political assassinations. Despite eschewing the use of international terrorism a splinter group of Fatah, the Black September Organization (BSO), emerged in 1971.⁹³ This organization was deeply involved in international

- 1) Establishment of a consolidated leadership -- the Revolution's pioneers.
- 2) Winning the people's confidence in the leadership, clarifying the movement's objectives.
- 3) Planting trustworthy, indoctrinated members in all institutions in order to create a hierarchy of command.
- 4) Begin the military struggle.⁸⁷

Fatah established a clear, consolidated leadership and eventually gained a degree of popular support, but the full organizational process referred to in phases two and three were largely overlooked. The movement began phase four before laying the firm foundation they had planned in 1965.

Fatah leaders conferred with other revolutionary leaders as a part of their own ideological education. Fatah has been especially attracted by the Algerian FLN and the writings of Franz Fanon.⁸⁸ Fatah leaders have also conferred with Che Guevara,⁸⁹ Mao, Giap, and Castro.⁹⁰ While meeting with General Giap in North Vietnam in 1970 Arafat was lectured on the necessity of sometimes accepting concessions such as the division of their claimed territory.⁹¹ It was this type of thinking which led to the acceptance of a ministate concept regarding the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an interim step toward the total liberation of the Palestinian homeland.

Prior to the June 1967 war Fatah policy was to precipitate an Arab-Israeli war. The ensuing conflict would undoubtedly result in the Arab redemption of Palestine. The Palestinians would victoriously return to their homes and set up their own

the Baathist, Muslim Brotherhood, or the Communists. They felt that action would transcend rhetoric.⁸³ In 1958 the Fatah guiding principles were:

- 1) Revolutionary violence is the only means available to liberate the homeland.
- 2) Violence must be exerted by the masses.
- 3) The object is to liquidate the political, economic, and military institutions of Zionism.
- 4) The movement should be free of outside state control.
- 5) The struggle of necessity will continue over a long period of time.
- 6) The Arab revolution is spearheaded by the Palestinians.⁸⁴

The Baathists, Muslim Brotherhood, and others were active at this time and maintained that the liberation of Palestine would be one of the fruits of Arab unity. Fatah reversed this creed and declared that the liberation of Palestine itself would create Arab unity.⁸⁵ Of the above six guiding principles Fatah was unable to abide by two. Fatah and other Palestinian factions have been unable to successfully organize the Palestinians living in the occupied territories which has caused deep consternation to Fatah leaders.⁸⁶ In the 1960's the Fatah leadership found it temporarily expedient to accept Syrian sponsorship. It was Syrian equipment, funding, and training which enabled Fatah to emerge as a powerful fedayeen organization.

In 1965 a Fatah pamphlet, "How an Armed Popular Revolution Breaks Out," the following four phases of development were described:

as clearly defined or restrictive as that of the Popular Fronts, but it is misleading to state that Fatah is a "moderate, non-ideological movement." Fatah leaders have spent considerable time developing and defining their ideology. It is true that Fatah's ideology is more moderate than some of the other group's but it is not this moderation only that has attracted a large number of followers. Fatah does not claim to be the leader of a pan-Arab revolution but Fatah is concerned with the restoration of the Palestinian homeland and the rights of the Palestinian people. These are issues of vital concern to the Palestinian refugees. They are generally not primarily concerned with a Marxist philosophy of the Palestinian people leading the Middle East class struggle. For most Palestinians the liberation of their homeland is preeminent. Fatah has attracted more members than any other group by simplifying its doctrine to focus on the single most important issue to the Palestinians then by leading in the active struggle to attain that goal.

Salah Khalef (Abu Iyad), considered second in Fatah command to Arafat, has stated very clearly and basically the foundation of Fatah Ideology:

"Our goal was to become the catalyst of a unitary and revolutionary Arab force, the spearhead of a wide front which alone would be capable of restoring Palestinian rights. Such was and remains our strategy."⁸²

When the founders of Fatah established their organization they felt they would not be able to compete ideologically with

IV. IDEOLOGY

During the Mandate years various groups of Palestinians were organized with a distinct anti-Zionist and anti-British ideology. All of these groups, however large or well organized adopted a basically universal goal of denying the Zionists a foothold in Palestine. What was glaringly lacking was an active push for a pro-Palestinian government. A prevalent attitude harked back to the era of the Crusades. The Crusader Kingdom, the Palestinian Arabs reasoned, lasted less than one hundred years and so would this Zionist phase.⁸⁰ This gives the hint of history being on the side of the Palestinians. Given sufficient time they would be able to overcome. The rise of Palestinian political awareness took various forms as evidenced by the numerous fedayeen groups which arose after the 1948 war. Some Palestinian groups gained power because of a strict, well-defined ideological platform while others grew despite an elaborate ideology. This chapter deals with the various ideological positions of the principle Palestinian resistance organizations.

A. FATAH

It is generally accepted among Palestinian experts that Fatah lacks a distinct ideology and has thereby been able to attract support from the entire spectrum of the Palestinian masses.⁸¹ It is true that Fatah's ideological platform is not

reasonable opinions rather than fanatical convictions like other Popular Front leaders.⁷⁹ Similar differences between public and private behavior have been reported among other Palestinian leaders. The key to future PLO and Palestinian actions depends on the future leadership. The new leadership will likely include a better educated, politically more aware group which has never lived in Palestine but which was born in the diaspora.

V. MILITARY STRATEGY

In considering the PLO's military capabilities and its strategy several points need to be stressed. First, an understanding of PLO military formal organization forms the foundation upon which the military establishment is built. Second, the methods of recruitment and the training of Palestinian fighters acquaint one with the PLO military capabilities -- both conventional and guerrilla. Third, a discussion of PLO military doctrine points out the external sources of Palestinian strategy and tactics. Last, a brief list of types of PLO weapons and major suppliers also gives an indication of where PLO political support lies.

A. ORGANIZATION

The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was established in 1965 about one year after the PLO. As with the PLO Egypt played the major role in the PLA's creation. It is generally considered that Nasser felt, as leader of the pan-Arab movement, he was threatened by the rise of Palestinian consciousness. He therefore agreed to help create and thereafter control the PLO as well as the PLA. In the words of Abu Iyad, "It (the PLA) was not designed to fight Israel -- which all the Arab regimes wanted to avoid at all costs -- but rather to sidetrack the Palestinians, to keep them from waging an autonomous struggle."¹²⁷ The PLA was initially trained and stationed as

a small militia in Gaza. The early organization and training followed the pattern set by the Algerian FLN.¹²⁸

The PLA grew until the 1967 war when its strength was about 8-10,000.¹²⁹ Since the PLA had been established under Egyptian and other Arab state guidance the PLA officers and men were trained by the militaries of these Arab states. As a result the PLA developed as a conventional force trained to fight large-scale, mechanized operations.¹³⁰ Because of this training the PLA leaders disapproved of the various guerrilla tactics employed by the emerging Palestinian resistance groups. As the PLA grew it also began to form an opposition to the PLO. The PLA sought to take control of the PLO in the early years (1965-1968) and then tried to dilute the influence of the commando groups in 1968.¹³¹ The PLA boycotted the fifth PNC session at which Arafat and Fatah took over leadership of the PLO.¹³² With the change of command in the PLO to the guerrilla organizations came a decline in PLA influence. The PLO emphasized military activity on a guerrilla level. The PLA forces in Syria generally came to be controlled by the Syrian military.¹³³

The PLA saw action in the 1967 war but its forces were quickly overrun.¹³⁴ After this poor showing in the war the PLA fell to pieces.¹³⁵ PLA forces in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were split up and were formed into a "new" PLA made up of three brigades: 1) the 'Ain Jalut Brigade in Egypt, 2) the Hittin Brigade in Syria, and 3) the al-Qadisiyah Brigade in

Iraq. The Hittin and al-Qadisiyah Brigades attached themselves to the Syrian-sponsored Saiqa and Iraqi-sponsored ALF respectively.¹³⁶ A fourth Brigade, the Yarmouk, was later created from elements of the Hittin and al-Qadisiyah forces and deserters from the Jordanian army. During the 1973 war the PLA made a better showing compared to the 1967 experience. A number of PLA units were helicoptered behind Israeli lines in the first day of action. They were successful in seizing a section of the Golan area.¹³⁷ Several attempts have been made to draw the PLA into the PLO military organization and thereby to control the PLA. For example, in 1970 Arafat was proclaimed supreme commander of the PLA.¹³⁸ These efforts were opposed by PLA commanders and the PLA has maintained an independent force under supervision of the EC. After six years of preparation Fatah launched its first military operation on 18 August 1964 when a fedayeen patrol on a reconnaissance mission to Gesher (a kibbutz in the Jordan Valley) met Israeli soldiers and clashed with them.¹³⁹ Fatah's military arm is called al-Asifa (the Storm) and in the beginning it was not explicitly stated that al-Asifa was a part of Fatah. Originally al-Asifa was backed, financed, and trained by Syria.¹⁴⁰ At the time of the 1967 war al-Asifa consisted of a force of about 500 men.¹⁴¹ Four events are considered by Fatah to most critical in its development and in the solid establishment of its military arm: 1) November 1966 - Israel attacked the West Bank village of Samu. This attack promoted the Jordanian government to

allow the fedayeen to arm themselves, 2) 1967 War - This war proved the ineffectiveness of the conventional Arab armies and led to an increase in Fatah membership, 3) 20 August 1967 - The Fatah leadership decided to resume large-scale guerrilla operations in the occupied territories despite the June 1976 war disaster, 4) 21 March 1968 - The battle of Karameh. This was possibly the most important date in the history of the Palestinian struggle.¹⁴² The Israelis decided to attack the Palestinian training center in Karameh but were met by a strong resistance composed of about 300 Palestinian fighters who were supported by the Jordanian army. During the battle the Israelis were forced to retreat. Although the Palestinians suffered greater numerical losses than the Israelis, compared to the devastating Israeli offensive just nine months earlier the Battle of Karameh was hailed as a Palestinian victory. In the eyes of the Palestinians and some Arabs the small Palestinian forces were able to defeat the Israelis whereas the united Arab armies had been so humiliated in June 1967. The Karameh "victory" greatly facilitated Fatah recruitment and led to the decision to increase the number of guerrilla raids.¹⁴³

Fatah has organized its military forces with the Military Command at the head. The Military Command makes basic Fatah military strategy and issues a Plan of Action covering three months and sends the Plan to each of the Sector Commanders.¹⁴⁴ This Plan of Action may be specific but more likely it consists of a vague statement such as, "It's time we did something."

The Sector Commanders elaborate on the Plan, determine the immediate objectives, establish the timing, and then send the Plan to their subordinate Group Commanders. The Group Commanders then have considerable latitude in carrying out this detailed plan. In establishing its general military program Fatah uses information about the enemy which it obtains through its intelligence unit, Jihaz al-Rasd (or Rasd).

The Popular Fronts have concerned themselves more in terrorist tactics than in guerrilla raids or conventional warfare. The Popular Fronts also have fewer total members and thus comprise only a relatively small percentage of all Palestinian fighters. The PFLP has favored the creation of small, mobile units which could operate away from Israeli strongholds.¹⁴⁶ To make the best use of all manpower resources and for purposes of unity of effort and coordination, the PLO in 1969 began to organize all fedayeen groups into a single fighting force. Meanwhile the two Arab sponsored Palestinian groups, Saiqa and ALF, were strengthened in 1967-68 by the addition of PLA forces to their ranks.¹⁴⁷ These two groups eventually became integrated into the military structures of their respective Arab sponsor countries.

Arafat became head of the PLO in February 1969 and just two months later the PLO under direction of Fatah established the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC).¹⁴⁸ Eight Palestinian groups joined the PASC and agreed that the PASC would be their military coordinator.¹⁴⁹ The PASC was also

designed to dictate military strategy and to control PLO propaganda.¹⁵⁰ Although its charter called for the PASC to unite the various fedayeen groups it turned out to become nothing more than an office through which the groups issued their communiqués taking credit for their separate guerrilla attacks.¹⁵¹ In 1970 a Unified Military Command was formed to replace the PASC. Members of this Command included Fatah, PFLP, DPFLP, PLA, AOLP, ALF, Saiqa, APO, FPPS, and AMLP.¹⁵² Subordinate to the Unified Command were the Commando-Lebanese Committee and the Commando-Jordanian Committee.¹⁵³ In September 1970 the civil war in Jordan and near-liquidation of the Palestinian guerrillas brought a reorganization of PLO forces. Arafat was appointed "General Commander of all the Armed Forces of the Revolution."¹⁵⁴

At the March 1971 PNC session the Palestinian Military Command was designated to lead a united Palestinian struggle. The Palestinian fighters were divided into three types of forces: 1) Regular, 2) Fedayeen, and 3) Popular Militia. Later that year at the ninth PNC session Arafat was designated as Commander-in Chief of the PLA, PLO, Fatah, and the Revolution. From this basic structure evolved the PLO military organizations which are still in existence today. The PLO convenes a Supreme Military Committee comprised of military commanders of the guerrilla groups and PLA. This Committee meets periodically to discuss strategy but leaves much of the overall direction of the military to the Higher Military

Committee. The Higher Military Committee plans and coordinates strategy and tactics. It is also involved in arms procurement and foreign military training. The committee in 1982 sent a delegation to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁵ The lowest level of PLO military command is the Military Council. Arafat usually chairs the meetings of the Military Council which convenes about once a month. This Committee controls and directs the daily affairs of the unified PLO forces. At a level above the PLO is a Joint Command which consists of the Secretaries General of the Palestinian revolutionary groups, the Lebanese Nationalist Movement, and several PLO EC members.¹⁵⁶ The Joint Command coordinates the activities of the PLO forces in concert with the forces of the Lebanese Nationalist Movement and the Syrian armed forces. This close coordination was active during the 1982 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon as evidenced by Brigadier General Tahir al-Khadra, PLA Chief of Staff: "There is complete military coordination among the Palestinian revolution groups, Lebanese Nationalist Movement, and the Syrian forces in Lebanon."¹⁵⁷

B. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

In the early years of Fatah and the Popular Fronts recruitment became linked to the success or publicity of each groups' guerrilla efforts. Many of the commando group leaders traveled through the refugee camps, the confrontation states,

and elsewhere in the Arab world to recruit dedicated Palestinians. The early military "successes" such as Karamah prompted many young Palestinians to volunteer. These volunteers were then trained in military skills and political philosophy to keep them active in the struggle. Another incentive to join the fedayeen and to stay was the monetary benefits associated with fedayeen activity. In 1972 Fatah paid its members £15-50 per month depending on the number of dependents.¹⁵⁸ This amount was considered to be substantial wages in the Arab world. The Popular Fronts paid £8-15 per month which comparable to the wages of a Beirut office boy. The PLA paid about the same as most of the Arab armies and the Syrian-sponsored Saiqa was reported to pay its guerrilla better than any other group.

After establishing a cadre of dedicated members the commando groups established a training program to teach the young Palestinian boys and to encourage them to follow their fathers, uncles, and brothers in joining the struggle. Fatah began a training program in 1968 called the Ashbals (Lion Cubs). Within a year the PFLP had set up a parallel organization.¹⁵⁹ Training for the boys began at age eight and included military training and political indoctrination.¹⁶⁰ The Ashbals are taught to fire a variety of automatic weapons, to compete in various sports such as volleyball, soccer, judo, and boxing.¹⁶¹ In September 1969 the PFLP had 2,000 boys in the Ashbal training program.¹⁶² The PFLP used some of their Ashbal in

the 1969 bombings of the Israeli embassy in Bonn and the Hague.¹⁶³ However, to point out the varied goals of the Ashbal, one Ashbal leader said, "We are not just a paramilitary organization. This is a morale-building and educational movement to prepare the well-rounded citizen of Palestine -- equipped and trained to defend his nation but also to be a good, productive citizen."¹⁶⁴ Abu Yusef, a Palestinian leader, stated in 1973, "We know that our generation will never reach the sea (the Palestinian coast). We sow the seeds, but others will reap the harvest. We shall likely be killed, for we face a ferocious enemy, but young Palestinians will take our place. They are the future; we belong to the past. The Israelis will soon realize the true value of these young men."¹⁶⁵

Early Fatah training consisted of only ten days' instruction in weapons handling and sabotage techniques.¹⁶⁶ The training was physical and very rough. Desertion rates were high. The instructors were mostly officers and NCO's from Arab armies who had been seconded to Fatah to train the Palestinians. By 1969 the severe physical punishment techniques had been discarded and many instructors now were Chinese.¹⁶⁷ Political education also increased to ten hours of instruction per week. Every camp had a library on revolutionary theory and guerrilla warfare.¹⁶⁸ By 1970 several months of infantry and commando training was added to the basic military training.¹⁶⁹ After this training those recruits who showed the most promise were sent to officer's school or specialists school in Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Libya, Iraq, China, Vietnam, or Cuba.

PFLP training had a slightly different goal. The PFLP training program was intense and included endurance marches on which the members were required to find whatever food they could, often subsisting on cockroaches and snakes.¹⁷⁰ The courses lasted 18 to 20 weeks and were taught in Jordan and later in Lebanon. Political education was based on the writings and careers of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.¹⁷¹ The training program was geared to establish a cadre of leaders who could supervise PFLP fedayeen bases, form cells and give the cells a specific purpose, and plan and execute sabotage activity.¹⁷²

As the Palestinian resistance movement gained worldwide recognition it began to associate itself with other states in terms of sending Palestinians for military training as well as in training foreign nationals in guerrilla tactics. In 1978 Cuba and the PLO signed an agreement calling for Cuban training of PLO guerrillas.¹⁷³ The PLO set up a training camp on the Egyptian-Libyan border in 1980 to teach anti-Qaddafi units to carry out military activity inside Libya or against Libyan interests abroad.¹⁷⁴ This camp was set up and operated in cooperation with Egyptian intelligence personnel. In August 1980 a Palestinian military delegation left for Nicaragua to supervise the training of Palestinian forces there.¹⁷⁵ These forces were being taught techniques using "Eastern bloc weapons and equipment." Also in 1980 Fatah leader Abu Iyad was reportedly secretly financing Kurdish

guerrilla operations in Iraq.¹⁷⁶ The strong link between the PLO and the Soviet Union was emphasized in 1981 by Brigadier Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaier, head of the PLO Moscow office. He reported, "Scores and hundreds of Palestinian officers eligible to command major sectors, such as brigades, had graduated from Soviet military academies."¹⁷⁷ He went on to claim that 2,000 Palestinians were currently studying in Soviet schools and that 300 scholarships to Soviet schools per year are reserved for the PLO. Other such training arrangements have been made with El Salvador¹⁷⁸ and North Korea.¹⁷⁹ The PLO has also trained foreigners in terrorist training camps in Lebanon. In 1981 it was reported that 1,700 terrorists from South America, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Angola received training.¹⁸⁰

The PLO in 1980 decided to implement obligatory military service for all Palestinians.¹⁸¹ This was part of a general mobilization order issued that year.¹⁸² The mobilization order covered all males in the 16 to 49 age range. It covered a time period of 1 May 1980 to 30 June 1981. It also applied to the Palestinian factions. The men were to report to various PLA centers throughout Lebanon. The only exemptions were: 1) the only son of a family, 2) the medically unfit and permanently handicapped, 3) those under 16 or over 49 years of age, 4) preparatory, secondary, and university students, and 5) doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and bakery workers. This mobilization order apparently led to the return of Palestinians from East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union.¹⁸³ According

to PLO military operations branch chief, Abu Walid, the mobilization would bring Palestinian forces up to 40,000.¹⁸⁴

Also during this mobilization period the PLO carried out a series of military exercises. The exercise in December 1980 was intended to practice protective measures to take in case of an Israeli chemical attack.¹⁸⁵ In October 1981 a brigade level tactical exercise "The Road of Return" was conducted using medium and heavy weapons including tanks.¹⁸⁶ Also in October 1981 the PLO held a wide-scale anti-aircraft exercise using their most modern equipment.¹⁸⁷ On New year's day 1982 the PLO held a large military parade in Beirut to help keep the Palestinian morale high.¹⁸⁸ The parade included such military equipment as missiles, heavy artillery, modern tanks, and a US-built howitzer. The mobilization order, obligatory military service, military exercises, military parades, and basic and advanced military training all point out how sophisticated the PLO military establishment has become.

C. DOCTRINE

The military doctrine of Fatah has been spelled out by the group's leader. "We carry out two kinds of actions," Arafat said, "commando and guerrilla. The commandos infiltrate, perform their mission and then return to their bases. The guerrillas remain in their zone, move about, disguise themselves and attack..."¹⁸⁹ Fatah began their guerrilla attacks on Israeli units and positions and has continued this activity

since 1965. In fact it was these guerrilla raids and the losses the Israelis suffered that led to the Israeli plan to execute the 1978 and 1982 invasions of southern Lebanon. The PFLP on the other hand has used international terror tactics such as airline hijackings, parcel, book, and letter bombs coupled with guerrilla raids. George Habash explained PFLP strategy, "The way to destroy the enemy is to give a little blow here, a little blow there; to advance step by step, inch by inch, for years, decades, with the determination, doggedness and patience, and we will continue our present strategy."¹⁹⁰ On the battlefield the Israelis report that the Palestinians used Soviet tactics.¹⁹¹ Under this doctrine two squads deploy for the attack with the soldiers firing as they advance. A third squad runs in a column in the rear to complete the maneuver.

In the pre-1967 war era the Palestinian strategy was to spark a major Arab-Israeli war which they were certain the Arabs would win. When the Arabs were miserably defeated in 1967 the Palestinians had to switch their strategy. They began to engage in international terrorist acts intended to rivet world attention on the injustice to the Palestinian people. Even Fatah seemingly favored this strategy by encouraging if not assisting the Black September Organization. Also, very early the fedayeen groups found it necessary to align themselves closely with an Arab state such as Syria, Egypt, or Jordan. After it became apparent that the Arab

tates were not totally committed to their work in assisting the wronged Palestinians and that the Arab states were incapable of defeating the Israeli military, the Palestinians decided they must operate independently. The current Palestinian policy is that they will accept any part of the Palestinian territory to set up a Palestinian state, but only as an interim step. This ministate would preferably be established on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But the Palestinian dream of total recovery of all Palestinian territory remains alive even if the hope of rapid recovery remains buried.

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
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
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VI. OPERATIONAL CODE OF THE PLO

The "Black Box" of international politics is a conglomerate of individual political leaders. How that Black Box operates, what roles it plays, and how it makes decisions have been the subject of many political scientist's debates. The study of the elites which make up that "Black Box" has received considerable attention and has undergone numerous types of testing. The purpose has been to define the personal political beliefs of these elites in an effort to better understand and predict their future political behavior.

Such political leaders as Napoleon, Churchill, Gandhi, Hitler, Ataturk, Stalin, and FDR were men who made a profound difference in their own country and throughout the world. Were they able to accomplish this because of their unique personal characteristics? Did they possess certain traits that allowed them to gain such power? Did they simply occupy a position of power when history dictated that significant events would transpire? Did it matter that those specific persons were the ones in power or was it the position they held that was the primary source of power? What role does the individual political leader play? How significant are his ideas, ambitions, and actions? Some scholars discount the entire notion of the power of an individual leader. They view international relations from the macro-level. Each state in the international

system consists of a "Black Box" and individual political leaders within that Black Box do not significantly contribute to political policy-making. It is the type of Black Box that makes the difference. On the other hand, other scholars maintain that the leader is constrained by organizational factors. Bureaucracies block the way of individuals and eliminate significant input by specific persons. The bureaucracy takes control and blunts any individual inputs. Still others contend that the great accomplishments of Hitler or Gandhi or Ataturk took place because "the time was right." The situation was ripe for a change to occur. A gentle nudge from any political leader would set a similar chain of events in motion. Many scholars consider the individual leader as being an important factor in this political decision-making system. The literature surrounding personality and politics is extensive but far from conclusive. This study will focus on individuals and their contribution to political policy-making.

It is apparent that political action rests upon three factors: the personal political beliefs of the decision-maker, the external situation or environment, and the organizational bureaucracy within which the leader operates. Each of these factors play a role and the outcome of their interaction results in the political behavior of the group. Fred Greenstein had two of these factors in mind when he stated:

"behavior...is a function of both the environment situations in which actors find themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to these situations...It is also sometimes instructive to think of attitude and situation as being in a kind of push-pull relationship: The stronger the attitudinal press for a course of action, the less the need for situational stimuli, and vice versa."¹⁹²

Graham Allison's well-known analysis of decision-making theory helps to lay a foundation for understanding. He postulates three models: First, the Rational Actor Model. This defines decision-makers as individuals and recognizes that they indeed make policy. They consciously analyze the problem, list possible courses of action, then select the best course of action. All this assumes that the decision-maker thinks and acts rationally. Allison's second model is the Organizational Model. Allison assumes that groups, agencies, departments, and offices in the governing structure have established standard operating procedures, traditions, or rules for dealing with decision-making. When a decision must be made this organizational machinery is set in motion to pound out the approved solution. After the prescribed set of procedures is followed the decision is churned out. This model assumes a systems approach: input, output, throughout. The last of Allison's models is the Bureaucratic Politics Model. Under this model a decision is reached after considerable bureaucratic squabbling, compromise, and in-fighting. Each bureaucratic office concerned has its own vested interest in a solution which is favorable to that office. Thus, the various

bureaucracies meet and settle on a compromise option which invariably is less satisfactory to all offices than any one of their own proposals.

In considering the individual decision-maker and his impact on policy decision-making many analytical tools have been devised to determine the role and influence of the individual. One such method of research is the Operational Code. The Operational Code framework for analysis attempts to isolate a subject's salient beliefs and to define them. To accomplish this a series of research questions are posed, the answer to which constitutes the subject's operational code. The questions are categorized as focusing on philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs. Upon assessing the answers to these questions the researcher can accurately define the subject's political belief system. The researcher can then attempt to draw a casual relationship between the subject's political beliefs and his political behavior. The set of political beliefs defined by the categories of philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs serves to define the actor's belief system as this term is defined by Philip E. Converse. Converse sees a belief system as:

"A configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence. The individual beliefs in an operational code have this kind of internal consistency or interconnectedness for the actor, though not necessarily a logical consistence."¹⁹³

Thus, when the Operational Code defines the political belief system of a political actor the researcher has achieved

one of the three milestones for understanding the policy-making process: political beliefs, situational/environmental stress, and organizational/bureaucratic structure. Once the researcher fully and analytically defines what the actor's political belief system is he is then prepared to deal with environmental/situational and organizational/bureaucratic factors.

Earlier chapters of this thesis have described and defined the organizational structure of the PLO to show what constraints that organization may present to the PLO's political decision-making. The factor of environment can also be considered from the historical sections in the introduction as well as from the development of the ideology and strategy of the various Palestinian Resistance Groups. The Operational Code, linked with the preceding chapters of this thesis, helps to establish specifically how the PLO is organized, who the PLO leaders are, what their ideological positions are, what the basic PLO strategies are, and what the PLO belief systems are. Armed with this information the researcher is better able to understand what the PLO is, why it has historically acted the way that it has, and predict how it may act in the future.

In this Operational Code chapter only the PLO as an independent entity has been considered. None of the individual resistance groups was analyzed. In the previous chapters these major groups were described in terms of their organization, leadership, ideology, and strategy. The serious researcher can

infer from the information contained in these chapters the basic beliefs of each group is. This chapter deals with the PLO itself to show how the divergent beliefs or the resistance merge to form the Operational Code of the PLO. To establish the PLO's Operational Code the Political Statements from the last three Palestine National Council Sessions were analyzed. These three were selected because of the shift in PLO political position after the signing of the Camp David accords. These three Sessions constitute all of the meetings of the PNC since that historic event. A qualitative content analysis of the three political statements was undertaken to define the most current Operational Code of the PLO. The results of that research follows.

A. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

1a. What is the "essential" nature of political life?

- Is the political universe basically conflictual or harmonious?
- What are the sources of conflict?
- What are the conditions of peace?
- What is the nature of conflict?
- What is the scope of the conflict?
- What is the role of conflict?

The PLO sees political life as being basically conflictual in nature. The cause of this conflict is the oppression of peoples by outside forces. The PLO blames imperialism for the oppression of Palestinians as well as of other peoples throughout the world. According to the PLO many people are not allowed to enjoy freedom in their political lives because of the presence of imperialistic forces. Since the

Zionists began to settle in Palestine in the late 19th Century there has been oppression of the Palestinian Arabs to one degree or another. The various Arab revolts and riots in the 1920's and 1930's were manifestations of the reaction to this oppression by the British and Zionists. The 1948 declaration of the State of Israel marked the dispersion of thousands of Palestinians from their homes and the beginnings of the Arabs' struggle to return to their homes. The neighboring Arab states of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt all endured colonial rule. The experiences of the Palestinian people and the other local Arab states with colonial and imperialist powers served to program the PLO's mind. Since 1948 the Palestinians have sought to overcome the domination of outside powers and to establish their own political control over their homeland.

In the case of the Palestinians the conflict deals with imperialism and an illegal usurpation of their homeland. This, however, is but one symptom of a worldwide problem. Throughout the world imperialist powers seek to dominate local peoples and prevent them from achieving political independence. In viewing the conflict this way the PLO has sought to become affiliated with national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Because of the Palestinian's lack of territory, political legitimacy, and numerical strength the PLO sees armed struggle as the only road to the defeat of the imperialists and the return of their people to their homeland. For the PLO, once the military victory is

accomplished, the return to their homeland will occur, political independence will be established, the basic conflict will be dissipated, but imperialism will continue to be an influence to be dealt with.

1b. What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents and of other significant political actors?

- What is the nature of the opponent's goals?
- What are the sources of the opponent's goals?
- Is the adversary's opposition permanent and general or limited and specific?
- How is the opponent likely to respond to our conciliatory actions?
- How is the opponent likely to respond to our policies of firmness?
- What is the opponent's image of one's own nation?
- What is the opponent's view of conflict?
- What is the nature of the opponent's decision-making process?
- What is the opponent's "Operational Code?"

The PLO is very clear and explicit in stating who their enemies are: the United States and Israel. In general terms the PLO strikes out against imperialism, Zionism, and racism. They claim that the US and Zionist imperialists violate international law and the UN Charter. They denounce the US and Israel for using terrorism as an official and organized tactic. During the past three PNC Sessions the PLO has levied specific charges against the US and Israel in this regard.

The PLO claims that the US goal in the Middle East is to control the destinies and resources of the region and uses various means to accomplish this goal. The US is accused of providing "deadly arms" to support the Zionist's "blatant aggression." The US is considered the leader of the camp which is hostile to the Palestinian issue. The US, during

this time period, has begun to establish military bases in the Middle East region, another indication to the PLO of US imperialist designs. Additionally, the US has joined with various Arab armies in joint military exercises. These activities are but American tools to strengthen its domination of the peoples of the region. The Camp Davis accords, signed 17 September 1978, are viewed as a capitulation by the Egyptian regime, but, more importantly, as another US effort to eliminate the PLO. The PLO sees the Camp David agreements as a crucial danger and as perpetuating Zionist and imperialist colonialism. The Reagan Plan of 1 September 1982 is totally unacceptable to the PLO as a framework by which peace negotiations can be established. Since the Reagan Plan fails to specifically guarantee an independent Palestinian state with the PLO as its leader, the PLO sees it as another method to destroy the PLO, sidestep the Palestinian problem, and dominate the Middle East.

The PLO's other primary adversary, of course, is Israel, or the "Zionist entity." The PLO summarizes the Zionist threat as carrying out "policies of persecution, despotism, and settlement."¹⁹⁴ The PLO charges Israel with usurpation of land in 1948, 1967, and de facto in 1982. The annexation of the Golan Heights and Jerusalem are viewed as violations of Palestinian rights and international law. Coupled with the occupation and annexation of territory is the Israeli settlement policy. The recent Israeli plan of building settlements

in the occupied territories is labeled as a conspiracy aimed at preventing Palestinians from obtaining independence in these lands. The Israeli government's policy of intimidation and persecution of Palestinians living in the occupied territories are also viewed as violations of human rights. In fighting the Palestinians the Israelis use deadly weapons provided by its imperialist partner, the US.

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score?

- What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?
- Should one be optimistic or pessimistic? About long term goals? About specific undertakings?
- Is the optimism or pessimism conditional?
- On whose side is time?

The PLO's basic aim is to effect the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland where they can establish their own independent, democratic state. PNC #14 political statement declared that the unified Palestinian and Arab stand in rejecting Camp David "make us more determined to confront the conspiracy and more confident of its defeat."¹⁹⁵ Such optimistic statements are found in all three PNC political statements considered in this study. At PNC #15 the PLO urged support for UNRWA "until the time comes for our refugees to practice their unshaken right in returning to their homes and taking over their properties."¹⁹⁶ Also at PNC #15 the PLO stated its optimism in a short-term goal by proclaiming its belief in "the inevitable triumph of the will of our Arab people in Egypt so that Egypt would resume its role of leading

the Arab struggle against imperialism and Zionism."¹⁹⁷ Other optimistic examples are found in the political statement of PNC #16. In this document the PLO clearly states, concerning the Palestinians and other oppressed peoples, "The triumph of peoples will undoubtedly be achieved."¹⁹⁸ And, concluding the PNC #16 statement is the confidently bold declaration, "Revolution until victory!"¹⁹⁹

These statements, taken at face value, decidedly point to unshaken confidence in the eventual achievement of PLO goals. From reading the statements there remains little doubt that the Palestinians are confident of their inevitable victory. Caution, however, is suggested on two accounts. First, the PNC political statements are produced for a subsidiary function of propaganda. In other words, the statements seemingly must portray a positive tone in order to engender support for the PLO. The optimism and positive attitude keep the Movement moving forward. If negative or pessimistic themes were evident the Movement would not instill the enthusiasm and support it requires to sustain itself. Second, the Arabs as a people generally speak in optimistic terms. The Arab society is based on honor and shame. Words which would discredit or bring shame to the PLO are culturally incorrect. Thus, the PLO is bound by cultural values to express optimism for the eventual achievement of their goals.

Concerning the factor of time and which side is benefited by the time the PLO makes it clear that time is on

their side. PLO leaders remind their followers of the Crusader Kingdom which lasted only for a relatively short time. The Crusader "victory" was only very short-lived with Arab domination eventually taking control. Arafat and the other PLO leaders consider the current Zionist threat to be only a temporary phenomenon. Eventually, they reason, the Palestinians will succeed in establishing their state on their historical homeland.

3. Is the Political future predictable? In what sense and to what degree? What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?
 - Is political life capricious, or does it conform to a more or less discernable pattern?
 - What aspects of political life are predictable or unpredictable?
 - What degree of unpredictability exists in political life?

The note in the previous section concerning the role of time also applies to the PLO view concerning predicatability of future events. The PLO seems to be tied very closely to history and views history as a cyclical system. For example, since the Crusaders were expelled after only a relatively short term the PLO expects the Zionist threat to be expelled after a brief tenure. This "brief tenure" is given in historical terms which lead us to believe that it could control Palestine for up to several hundred years. In the macro sense the PLO views the political future as being generally predictable. On the micro level the PLO is also confident in the predictability of political events. Since the 14th PNC session in March 1979 the PLO has actively sought diplomatic recognition

factors into account. The PLO recognizes Israel's tremendous military power which is supplied and supported by the US. The PLO knows that it cannot unilaterally confront Israel on the conventional military level. The PLO has therefore sought to use other means to combat Israel. The PLO has tried to isolate Israel in the international community. Much of this activity has taken place in the forum of the United Nations. Recent UN resolutions have proclaimed near worldwide unanimity in recognition of and support for the Palestinian position. The PLO has also worked to ally itself with the socialist states of the world led by the Soviet Union, with national liberation movements in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, with the states of the Non-Aligned Movement, and with the Western European states and Japan. In addition to these diplomatic actions the PLO uses such tools to advance their cause as educational improvements, Palestinian media expansions, various social programs, and economic cooperation. This Operational Code is thus a valuable tool in describing the aims, actions, and ambitions of the PLO.

The PLO has been quite consistent and specific in stating its goals. The PLO has continually voiced its policy of non-recognition of Israel, the legality of the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and the unification of all Palestinian people. These have been the basic goals of the Palestinian Resistance Movement since 1964 but recently several modifications have been made. The PLO has stated that it was prepared to recognize Israel in exchange for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Another modification which Arafat attempted to institute was to negotiate a peace rather than using the traditional means of armed struggle to accomplish this goal. It was this trend toward apparent moderation which touched off the challenge to Arafat's leadership in the spring and summer of 1983. The PLO also publically delineated the acceptable boundaries of an independent Palestinian state: the West Bank and Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as the capital.²²¹ This represents a modification of the previously stated goal of accepting nothing but the liberation of the entire territory of Palestine. These recent modifications may have come about because of the perceived political expediency and gains which were expected to be achieved. Also, the PLO may have decided that the time was right to pursue these modified policies -- that this was in their long-term best interest.

In calculating the balance of power between the Palestinian forces and their enemies the PLO has taken several

however, assures the Palestinian people that their cause is just and right. Therefore they will eventually succeed in their aims. In his speech at the 15th PNC session in April 1981 Arafat stated that "in 1947 we were swallowed up in the political and geographical domains. Palestine was simply swallowed up. It no longer existed, neither on the geographical nor on the political maps. The most important work we have done and the most important achievement scored by this Palestinian rifle and this incessant flow of Palestinian blood is the fact that Palestine has again been placed on the political map. Palestine has returned to the political map. Brothers, we once again speak in this view: what one returns to the political map will unavoidably be returned to the geographical map. The question is one of a time."²²⁰ At this same 15th PNC session Arab League Secretary General, Chedli Klibi, labeled the US stand concerning Palestine as being abnormal. When UN votes concerning the Palestinians are taken many times the only two dissenting votes come from the US and Israel. Because of the support for the Palestinian cause by most of the states in the world community the PLO feels very optimistic that they will succeed. The PLO is also convinced that their struggle cannot be carried out by outside Arab forces but that the PLO itself is responsible and most effective in struggling for their rights. The PLO recognizes the need to maintain friendly relations with the local Arab states but it shuns any domination by any outside power.

airline hijackings in 1968 and continued this policy for several years. Other forms of international terrorism included letter and parcel bombs, kidnappings, and the bombings of buildings and autos. These activities were later discouraged and finally eliminated as official PLO policy. Currently international terrorism is not considered to be an officially approved PLO practice.

This Operational Code of the PLO reveals a quite concise yet broad conception of PLO goals, intentions, and methods. To review the preceding Operational Code questions, the PLO considers political life to be basically conflictual. The PLO clearly accepts the US and Israel as the primary imperialist power and its arch enemies. The PLO perceives the US as realizing the value of the Middle East to US national interests and planning to dominate the region through its proxy, Israel. The primary US client is Israel which America bankrolls and supplies with considerable modern and (according to the PLO) illegal weapons. The PLO views the Israeli occupation of Palestine since 1948 to be illegal and Israeli territorial expansion since then to be equally unlawful. Because of the illegality of Israeli and American actions the PLO sees itself as being justified in seeking to return to their homeland. The Palestinian people have been persecuted and driven from their homes and many have been killed. From the PLO point of view the Zionist presence and expansion in Palestine has been a truly brutal experience. PLO philosophy,

as being the cardinal task."²¹⁹ There have been, however, other methods and sources of the struggle. First, the Palestinians have had a long and enduring interest in the education of its people. The PLO called for the continuation of UNRWA educational projects when it appeared that the Agency's programs might have been curtailed. The Palestinians have the highest literacy rate of any Arab society in the Middle East. Secondly, the PLO supports and finances several mass media approaches. The PLO operates radio stations, film-making facilities, newspaper presses, and propaganda workshops all with the intention of widely disseminating the truth about the Palestinian problem. Thirdly, the PLO has consistently tried to stabilize and develop the Palestinian culture through the theater and arts, traditional costumes, national flag and anthem, and cultural history. All of these efforts to maintain a unique Palestinian culture have created a stronger Palestinian unity and identity. Fourthly, the PLO has called upon its Arab neighbors to provide financial support for the Palestinian cause. This financial aid comes in various forms including direct monetary payments to the PLO and other Arab confrontation states. Financial support from other Arab states comes in the form of the regulation of oil production and export. This includes the 1973 oil embargo aimed at the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Another method which has been used by groups within the PLO in an attempt to further the struggle is international terrorism. The PFLP inaugurated the well-known

peaceful negotiations. The 13th PNC session in March 1977 called for contacts to be established between PLO and moderate Israeli leaders. Arafat also urged the approval of King Hussein to be the negotiator for the Palestinians in conjunction with the US' Reagan Plan. It was this moderate position of Arafat which sparked the leadership challenge of 1983. This opposition was evidence that the PLO considered this to be an inappropriate time to encourage PLO moderation and in fact to emphasize belligerent action.

Thirdly, during the late 1970's the PLO began a push for international recognition of the Palestinian problem and the PLO as spokesman for the Palestinian people. This program's major pillar included seeking official diplomatic recognition of the PLO as a political entity. The 15th PNC session in April 1981 and the 16th PNC session in February 1983 specifically spelled out the policy of expanding PLO recognition in Western Europe and Japan as well as throughout the Third World and socialist states. Prior to 1978 the time was apparently not yet correct to pursue this type of diplomatic policy.

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests? What resources can one draw upon in the effort to advance one's interests?

- What are the preferred tactics?
- How is the power conceptualized?

The PLO has developed a number of different means for advancing its interests. The PLO still views the "development and escalation of the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy

unification are to be carried out in addition to the unity of the Palestinian people themselves. The PLO calls for the unity of the "national, social, trade union, and popular organizations."²¹⁷

4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?

- How important is timing in the achievement of major, long-term aspirations?
- How important is timing in the success of specific policy undertakings?
- When is action required, permitted, or prohibited?

The PLO has exhibited its attitudes toward the timing of its actions in several ways. First, since the PLO's inception in 1964 the PLO has increasingly advocated armed struggle as the means to accomplish its goal of liberating the Palestinian homeland. This policy has been continuous and PLO guerrillas have been active for nearly twenty years participating in this armed struggle. It appears that in this case timing was important in 1964 but since that time has not been an overriding factor. In 1967 the PLO felt it had to rely on its own resources and less on outside Arab states' assistance. Since in 1967 the timing was apparently right for the armed struggle to begin and to continue the PLO vigorously advocated armed struggle as the primary means for the liberation of their homeland. The time is supposedly still right since the 16th PNC session called for the PLO to "develop and escalate the armed struggle."²¹⁸

Secondly, the PLO leadership in the person of Yasir Arafat has recently turned to a more moderate position regarding

The PLO has stated the conflict in which they have been engaged as a struggle between Zionist/US/Imperialist forces and Palestinian/Arab/worldwide national liberation movement/socialist forces. By viewing the conflict in these terms the PLO has sought to strengthen its forces. In solidifying its side the PLO takes into account the threat and risks of the Zionist/US/Imperialist forces. The PLO affirmed the importance of a "strong alliance among the world's revolutionary forces."²¹⁵ Included within these forces are specifically the states of Africa (including Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa), Latin America and the Caribbean region, the socialist states led by the Soviet Union, and the states of the Non Aligned Movement. The PLO called for the widening and strengthening of relations with these states. The PLO has also sought to improve its contacts with the Arab and Islamic states. The PLO specifically mentioned the need to improve the ties with Lebanon (especially through the Lebanese National Movement), Egyptian people, Syria, Jordan, Iran, and Iraq. Also on the Arab/Islamic front the PLO called for increased emphasis on strengthening the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front as well as establishing relations with Arab states based on mutual respect for the resolutions of the Algiers, Rabat, Baghdad, and Tunis summits. Additionally, the PLO claimed "adherence to the principles and the charter of the United Nations and its resolutions which affirm the inalienable and indisposible rights of the Palestinian people."²¹⁶ All of the above approaches to

entire homeland they must first establish sovereignty over at least a portion of their homeland.

In pursuing its goals the PLO has always used the military approach. Since the Palestinian Nationalists groups were established guerrilla military activity has been the hallmark of their struggle. Armed struggle remains a cardinal point in the pursuit of PLO objectives but in recent years other approaches have been made. The PLO has encouraged more conventional means of struggle, namely through diplomatic channels. At the 15th PNC session the PLO "emphasized the importance of widening the circle of recognition for the PLO."²¹¹ The PNC pledged its effort to "continue its political and diplomatic moves and activity at the international level, including the states of West Europe."²¹² Another angle on the diplomatic approach concerns the PLO attitudes toward Israel which takes two fronts. First, the PLO stress "continuing the struggle to isolate the Zionist state in the United Nations and in other forums."²¹³ Secondly, the PLO called on the Executive Committee to study the best methods for establishing and maintaining contacts with moderate Jewish leaders."²¹⁴

3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

- How are risks assessed?
- What approaches should be used to limit or control risk?
- How should one deal with various types of tradeoffs associated with risk?
- Under what circumstances are high risk (or low risk) policies mandatory? Permissible? Prohibited?

just and lasting solution of the Palestine and the Arab-Zionist conflict."²⁰⁸ The PLO position concerning the necessity of including Jerusalem as capital of the future Palestinian state is equally steadfast. The PLO understanding is that "the occupied city of Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine" and the PLO views the "Zionist occupation of Jerusalem as violation of the Palestinian people's rights and a defiance of international laws."²⁰⁹ These examples point out rather graphically the intractability of the PLO goals and intentions.

2. How are the goals of political action pursued most effectively?

- Under what circumstances is it permissible to modify, substitute for or abandon a goal?
- What approaches should be used in the pursuit of goals?
- Under what circumstances should one push harder, be prepared to compromise, or retreat from a previously held position?
- Under the circumstances is unilateral action preferred? Multilateral action?

The PLO has been very reluctant to modify its goals in recent years. The only sign of a modification of a goal has been the willingness to accept a Palestinian state on the smallest piece of land that Israel will vacate. This shift was made because "we believe that this alone can be an initial positive step toward solving our problems."²¹⁰ The PLO has never been able to act unilaterally without outside interference by one Arab state or another. The decision to modify this goal was made by realizing that in order to recover the

Another long-term PLO goal is the unification of all Palestinians. PLO efforts to unify the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied homeland has been a major goal which they have only partially been successful in achieving. This unification has included a merger of military organizations and activities, representation of Palestinians from the occupied territories on the PNC, financial and moral support from Palestinians living outside the confrontation area, and the creation of a national front which is active in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and seeks to strengthen PLO influence there.

Since 1948 fifty-three separate peace proposals for the settlement of the Palestinian problem have been presented. So far all have failed to establish lasting peace. Currently the Reagan Plan, the Brezhnev Plan, the Fahd Plan, and the Fez Plan are on the table. Speaking of these plans the PLO is very strict in stating its stance in relation to these offers. The PLO declared its "rejection of all the resettlement plans and affirmed its full adherence to our people's right to return to their homeland -- Palestine."²⁰⁵ The PLO calls for the "rejection of all schemes aimed at harming the PLO position as the sole representative of the Palestinian people."²⁰⁶ The PLO considers "the Fez summit resolutions as the minimum for political moves by the Arab states."²⁰⁷ Of the Reagan proposal the PLO declares, "Reagan's plan, in style and content, does not respect the established national rights of the Palestinian people" and is thus not acceptable "as a sound basis for the

B. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
 - How should one establish the goals for political action?
 - Should one seek optimal goals or is it better to seek satisfactory ones?
 - How many paths are there to the achievement of ultimate goals?
 - How should one deal with value conflict?

Over the years the PLO has very consistently demanded the same goals: to restore the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, to establish in that homeland an independent state free of outside interference, and to thwart the designs of the Zionists who would seek to continue to control the region. The "homeland" issue has remained central to the PLO political platform and to the PLO there is no possible "substitute homeland" as Palestine is "the sole historical homeland of the Palestinian people."²⁰⁴ It is these goals that stand out as being paramount for the PLO and their struggle is aimed at accomplishing these objectives. The only sign of PLO acquiescence concerning these goals has been the recent PLO statements which accept a "Palestinian state on the smallest piece of land that Israel will vacate." This should not be taken as a renunciation of the former position. The PLO clearly states its position as working for the return to all of Palestine. The acceptance of a Palestinian state on a "piece of land" would only represent an interim step toward full sovereignty over all of Palestine.

and relations with any Arab regime will be determined by that regime's commitment to the Algiers and Rabat summit resolution, by its rejection of the Camp David agreements."²⁰⁰ The PLO is convinced that "the only alternative for resolving the Palestinian problem is the Palestinian alternative."²⁰¹ It is to this end that the PLO has succeeded in establishing a "complete cohesion with the PLO and occupied homeland."²⁰² The PLO is proud to have attained a "standard of struggle" and to have been an example to other revolutionary movements of the world.

The PLO has also taken specific actions to control or shape historical developments. The PLO has brought about a broad international recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people through the forum of the United Nations. These accomplishments are embodied in UN Resolutions 3236 and 3237. The PLO has also been active in mediation efforts. In the political statement of PNC #16 the PLO makes laudatory note of the PNC Executive Committee's efforts to mediate a peaceful end to the Iran-Iraq conflict.²⁰³ The PLO expressed its desire for the end of this war so all the Arab and Muslim states could unite their efforts to fight for the liberation of Palestine. The Executive Committee had been active in mediating between Iran and Iraq and this PNC political statement called on the Executive Committee to continue. The PLO was playing an active role in accelerating the historical development toward the liberation of Palestine.

by the sovereign states of the world. The PLO has expressed pride in the actual recognition accorded them and expects this trend to continue. In dealing with other states on a government to government basis the PLO treats political life much the same way as the other states in the world community. For example, when Arafat officially visits another country he is generally given the same formal welcome as any visiting head of state would receive. Also, the PLO deals with many countries on a diplomatic level by maintaining diplomatic representatives in many countries and at many international organizations. Concerning the final point of the role of chance, there is no indication in the last three PNC political statements which indicate a PLO belief in chance in political affairs. Chance apparently does not play a significant role in political life according to the PLO.

4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?

-- What is the role of the leader?

Although the PLO sees historical development as following a basic pattern and an inevitable track the PLO also perceives itself as a catalyst in achieving these outcomes. The PLO sees itself as being a major player in establishing the Palestinian question at the crux of the entire Middle East peace settlement. The PLO and its leaders play a major role in shaping and directing events in the region. In the 14th PNC political statement the PLO explains that "its position

VII. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT

The intent of this section is to accomplish the goal of describing the arms transfer and financial aid history of the Palestinian National Movement. During the research for this section at the Naval Postgraduate School as well as at the University of California, Berkeley and at Stanford University no books or articles were found which describe the financial and military history of the PLO in any detail. These histories are considered to be vital to a complete understanding of the PLO but they have been apparently ignored. During the research phase of this section problems were unearthed. Although these were not insurmountable the data compilation task was tremendously arduous. No record of financial aid and military arms transfers to the PLO has been maintained. In fact, the PLO is very secretive about its financial status and holdings. They are also quiet about stating the numbers and types of military equipment they possess. A major research task was to compile a historical record of arms/financial transfers. The research began with the year 1974 because the Rabat Summit had officially recognized the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Also, by 1974 all the major Palestinian factions had been solidly established and could be easily separated and identified. The data in this section are admittedly incomplete and not comprehensive. Compiling such

a list is virtually impossible given the PLO's secretive nature and the numerous conflicting PLO claims and Israeli reports. The following sources have been searched rather thoroughly: An-Nahar Arab Report and Record, Arab World Weekly, Middle East Research and Information Project reports, the Middle East monthly magazine, Middle East Economic Digest, Facts on File, and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Other sources include the New York Times, the Middle East and North Africa Yearbook, and numerous other books concerning the PLO. The search of FBIS is not complete prior to September 1978. More research needs to be completed from 1974 to 1978. Another stumblingblock was the lack of recently published accounts of PLO history. A rash of such documents were produced in the early to mid 1970's. Since that time only very few have been printed. This lack of current study and writing on Palestinian history left a void which required primary research to fill. Despite facing these problems and seemingly endless research the necessary data lists were compiled.

A. MILITARY ARMS TRANSFERS

The research of military arms transfers to the Palestinian nationalist organizations was begun knowing full well that the goal of compiling a comprehensive and exhaustive record would not be reached. The PLO is very secretive when it comes to revealing its sources of arms and the amounts and types of arms it possesses. The information which was uncovered was

frequently from a third party source. Many times Kuwait or another country would report Palestinian arms deliveries. Israel would periodically report its intelligence estimates of the "terrorist" strength. No attempt was made to determine actual numbers of particular weapons possessed by the PLO although a list was made of the types of weapons mentioned in the various reports. By tracing the arms transfers over a period of several years many significant details and trends began to emerge. The primary findings are outlined below under the headings: Types/Amounts of Arms, Sources of Arms, and Delivery/Payment.

1. Types/Amounts of Arms

The PLO accumulated an impressive amount and variety of military equipment up to June 1982 when compared with many Third World countries. Table One below gives a list of the types of Equipment specifically stated to be in possession of the PLO.

TABLE ONE

Types of Military Equipment

<u>Armor</u>	<u>Artillery</u>	<u>Missiles/Rockets</u>	<u>Other</u>
T-34	60mm Mortar	SA-6	Submarines
T-54/55	105mm Howitzer	SA-7	RDX Explosives
BRDM-2	106mm Cannon	SA-9	Helicopters
BTR-152	120mm Mortar	SA-12	Jet Trainers
	122mm Howitzer	Frog	MIG-21
	130mm Mortar	BM-21 MRL	Transport
	130mm Howitzer	ZSU-23-4	Aircraft
	155mm Mortar	RPG-7	
	155mm Howitzer	76mm Anti-Tank Gun	
	160mm Mortar	85mm Anti-Tank Gun	
		100mm Anti-Tank Gun	

In addition to these items should be added many types of small arms, machine guns, hand grenades, mines, ammunition, bazookas, anti-aircraft guns, armored personnel carriers, trucks, transport vehicles, and anti-tank missiles. During the summer of 1982 when the Israeli forces discovered PLO arms caches in southern Lebanon they valued the total worth of the arms as being \$5 billion.²²² They found caches in Sidon, Tyre, and vicinity filled with enough food, ammunition, and arms to supply a "population of hundreds of thousands for a very long time."²²³ They found hundreds of tanks,²²⁴ artillery pieces, and hundreds of tons of "fighting weapons."²²⁵ Another Israeli report indicated that there were enough new, light weapons and equipment to outfit a division.²²⁶ It appears that the PLO had sufficient arms either for a prolonged conflict or to outfit an outside army. Indeed, this was the speculation of some last summer.

Over the time period of this research (1974-1982) the type of equipment delivered to the PLO changed. In the mid-1970's, the PLO was equipped with an continued to receive small arms, machine guns, grenades, mines, and some artillery and armor. During this time they were involved in guerrilla raids on Israeli settlements and military posts on northern Israel. They also were involved in the Lebanese civil war from 1976-78. During this time and in this type of conflict they required ammunition, small arms, and artillery to meet their strategic and tactical needs. Also, during the mid-1970's,

the Israelis began to intensify their air raids in Palestinian camps and military centers in southern Lebanon. As the effectiveness of these attacks grew so did the PLO desire to obtain weapons to counter this increased threat. As early as the spring of 1975 Arafat made a request to the Soviet Union for "sophisticated rockets" to fire at Israeli aircraft.²²⁷ Apparently this request was denied. It is evident, however, that beginning in the late 1970's the PLO began to receive anti-aircraft missiles, including the SA-6.²²⁸ The PLO also received other more sophisticated arms in the early 1980's, such as the SA-9²²⁹ and sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles "never before exported outside the Warsaw Pact."²³⁰ The PLO at this time was developing a conventional military force to augment its well-established guerrilla force. In addition to this ground equipment the PLO also developed a naval capability. PLO guerrillas have attacked Israel by sending commando teams down the Mediterranean coast in small boats. But in 1978 it was reported that the PLO was acquiring a submarine.²³¹ It appears that the deal was concluded and that the PLO took possession soon after and used the craft on guerrilla raids.²³² In 1979 the PLO reportedly received from Libya two SX 404 miniature submarines.²³³ The PLO has also been developing its air force. The first mention of PLO air power came in 1980 when they received helicopters and jet trainers from India.²³⁴ After the 1982 fighting had ended the PLO reported that they had purchased an unspecified number of

planes for transporting their dispersed troops throughout the Arab world.²³⁵ The PLO also mentioned that a Palestinian pilot had died while on a training flight in North Yemen. One Palestinian source claims that PLO pilots have been training since the early 1970's in French Mirage and Soviet MiG-21,23, and 25 fighter aircraft. The source further reports that the PLO now has "squadrons of planes now stationed" in Libya, North Yemen, South Yemen, and Syria.²³⁶

After the summer of 1982 and the fighting with Israel had ended very little activity was noted by the PLO in recouping its military losses. With the Israeli capture of huge amounts of arms it is obvious that the PLO had very little military capability when it dispersed the PLO fighters to widely scattered areas. The Israelis thought that when the leadership of the PLO was forced to operate outside the confrontation states the PLO military arm would be quickly weakened. There remained, of course, in Lebanon some PLO fighters stationed with Syrian troops, but the PLO central authority was absent and Arafat's clash with President Assad along with the challenge to his authority from within Fatah leave the situation still unsettled. Only with the passage of time will we be able to see if the PLO will be able to recover its military might and operational capability.

As we look at the general trend of amounts of arms transferred to the PLO from 1974-1982 it is obvious that a climax was reached in early 1982. Although the data is not

totally complete it is sufficient to discern an upward movement in amounts of deliveries. The frequency of delivery stepped up in 1979 and continued at a steady rate until June 1982 when the last significant deliveries were made. Also during this time period there was an improvement in the quality of weapons delivered to the PLO. Prior to the late 1970's the PLO relied basically on standard conventional arms. From 1978 onward the PLO began to receive and field sophisticated Soviet missiles.

2. Sources of Arms

The PLO has received arms from a great variety of suppliers although it is dependent upon only a few major arms exporters. Some suppliers work through third countries while others prefer to do business directly with the PLO. The PLO gets many small arms and ammunition on the open market using the money it receives from various sources to finance their deals. The PLO even has some U.S. equipment including a 105mm howitzer that it obtained from the Lebanese army which had purchased it from the U.S.²³⁷

The PLO first began obtaining arms by collecting abandoned Egyptian weapons from the 1967 battlefield. About the same time they began to smuggle weapons into their camps via bedouins and professional smugglers. As early as May 1969 the Chinese started their delivery of arms by supplying £1.5 million of arms.²³⁸ The Chinese were the major supplier of arms into the early 1970's. The USSR did not begin direct

shipment of arms to the PLO until late September 1972.²³⁹ Even then they delivered only small arms, machine guns, and mortars. Since the mid to late 1970's many of the Palestinian arms have been manufactured by the Soviets or Chinese and many have been delivered by those two countries. This increase in Soviet arms deliveries coincides with the closing of diplomatic and arms supply relations with the Egyptians. The Soviet Union remains the PLO's primary source of sophisticated arms and their most important supplier. Libya has served as a middleman for a number of PLO arms deals. In 1979, when the PLO was asking the Soviet Union for SA-6 missiles, the Soviets told them to ask the Libyans for such hardware. Three days after asking "an Arab country" put up \$16 million to help finance the SA-6 deal through the Soviet Union.²⁴⁰ Later on in 1979, Libya worked out a deal with the Swiss Oerlikon company for the delivery of twenty 35mm anti-aircraft batteries to the PLO.²⁴¹ In 1978, Libya had also helped the PLO by arranging a \$40 million arms deal with East Germany.

Much of the PLO military activity is related to guerrilla warfare, smallscale skirmishes, and limited, short-term conventional engagements. Because of this a great amount of their equipment needs consist of small arms, machineguns, mortars, grenades, and the like. Part of this supply is obtained directly from their major suppliers but a significant amount is purchased on the international open arms market. There are five or six major arms dealers in the world from

whom can be purchased all but the most sophisticated weapons.²⁴² These dealers carry extensive stocks and can arrange very large and complex delivery schemes. Below this level of major dealers lie 40 to 50 expert dealers who understand the arms transaction business well and know where to obtain particular items. Their personal contacts with the major arms manufacturers make it possible for them to fill almost any arms order. The third level of arms dealers are the many smaller dealers who hope for a major sell but do not usually get the large orders. The top two rungs of dealers bring together sellers prepared to do business for cash and buyers who have considerable money to make the transaction. It seems that the key to underground arms sales is cash. If the cash is available, the arms can be easily purchased and delivered. Since an export of arms outside the manufacturing country will take place two documents must be obtained before the governmental authorities will allow the transaction to be completed. The first is an "end-user certificate." This is a government-signed document stating that the weapons are required by the buying country and that the weapons will not be re-sold or re-exported. The end-user certificate is usually issued by the foreign or defense ministry of the selling country. The second document is the export license. The exporting government issues the export license when it is assured, through evidence of the end-user certificate, that the weapons deal is legitimate. Once the export license is issued the deal can

take place. This system for making arms deals can be circumvented. This can be done in two ways. First, a government which is sympathetic to the buyer will supply the documents required to make the deal. Secondly, and more common, the buyer can purchase an end-user certificate from any of a number of corrupt politicians. Such certificates are reportedly be purchased for between £500 and £1500. The author of the article in the Middle East, Peter Durisch, bought one himself for £1000. There seems to be no lack of embassies willing to sell such documents. There are eighteen such sources in London and a similar number in Paris. One caution in arranging these deals is to be sure that the buyer is requesting items which the purported buyer has in its inventory. For example, if the PLO wanted artillery rounds for their 155mm field guns they would have to be sure that the country under whose name they were importing them actually had a hypothetical need for that type rounds. It must appear that the country making the deal appears to be the actual buyer.

In the case of the PLO they most frequently use friendly Arab states to arrange their arms deals. From the evidence I gathered it appears that Libya and Algeria are the most active in playing the role of middleman. In June 1978 it was reported that Libya arranged a \$40 million arms deal between the PLO and East Germany.²⁴³ In June 1982, Algerian diplomats in Beirut received an urgent and very detailed list of small arms that Arafat was requesting from the Soviets.²⁴⁴

The Algerian diplomats contacted their home office in Algiers and President Benejedid called an emergency cabinet meeting at 11 pm that night. At 4 am he called upon the Soviet ambassador, gave him the list of weapons along with a check for \$20 million, and asked him to contact Moscow concerning delivery. A few days later the Soviet arms were airlifted to Damascus as well as two plane loads of weapons from Algeria. From these two examples and considering the amount of cash the PLO reportedly possesses it is quite obvious that such transactions have taken place and will continue to be an integral part of the PLO arms acquisition network in the future.

3. Arms Delivery

Lebanon and Syria have been the final destination for many of the PLO arms imports. China began its first shipments of arms to the PLO in 1964.²⁴⁵ In March of the following year China delivered its arms to the PLO by air via Damascus and by sea to Syrian ports. Also, in 1970, China sent three plane loads of arms to Damascus to aid the PLO during their fighting with Jordan.²⁴⁶ The Soviet Union's first direct arms delivery to the PLO occurred in September 1972 when they sent twelve tons of small arms, machine guns, and mortars.²⁴⁷ Some of the arms shipments by sea have been interdicted by the Israeli navy. In 1975, ships bearing arms for Palestinian and Lebanese leftist groups were intercepted by the Israelis and the arms were turned over to the Lebanese Phalangists.²⁴⁸ During last summer's Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon

huge Palestinian arms caches were discovered at the port cities of Tyre and Sidon. In one instance the Israelis timed their raid into this area waiting until a new arms shipment had arrived so they could destroy the arms or capture them.²⁴⁹ In the mid-1970's arms deliveries were also traced from Bulgaria and Eastern Europe arriving in Syria overland via Turkey.²⁵⁰

In recent years more deliveries have been made by air. The Soviet Union's friendly relations with Syria have allowed them to airlift PLO supplies to Damascus. For five days during the heavy fighting in mid-June 1982 between three and five Soviet IL-76 Candid heavy transport aircraft landed at Damascus loaded with military equipment for the PLO.²⁵¹ Even with these Soviet deliveries the PLO leadership was still discouraged that support was not greater. But, in the words of the Soviet ambassador to Lebanon in speaking to Fatah's second-in-command, Abu Iyad, "Do you think you can tell the Soviet Union what aid it should give or what it should do?"²⁵²

India provides a good example of the delivery problem of which Palestinian faction should take possession of the arms when they are delivered. In June 1980 India made a delivery of helicopters, jet trainers, and military vehicles to a PLO training base in northern Iraq, near Mosul.²⁵³ Indian officials made it clear that these items were for Fatah's use only. This caused a stir of objection within the various Palestinian factions. The spokesman for the dissenters was

Nayif Hawatmeh, leader of the DFLP. He said that all Palestinian organizations should agree that all military equipment should come to the PLO centrally and from there be dispersed to the various factions. This, of course, did not take place and other countries continue to aid only one faction or another. Notable among these are the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia who both favor Fatah, although for differing reasons. The Saudis prefer to deal with Fatah because it is a moderate organization and thus the Saudis are not forced to provide embarrassing support to a radical Palestinian element. The Soviets on the other hand support Fatah because it is the largest and most influential of the Palestinian organizations. There are other Palestinian groups (PFLP, DFLP) whose official ideology is unmistakably Marxist in orientation but are considered to be too small in numbers to be of much consequence in the overall Palestinian revolution to warrant Soviet support.

B. FINANCIAL AID

1. Sources of Aid

Even before the PLO was created in 1964 Palestinian groups were active in establishing financial backing for their organizations. Fatah, the largest and oldest of Palestinian groups, depended in donations by its members for financial aid in its early days. In 1959, Fatah's policy was not to seek aid from Arab countries but to require sacrifice of its members, some of whom gave one-half or more of their wages to

the organization.²⁵⁴ By the early 1960's Fatah had established an elaborate network of contributors throughout the Arab world. They concentrated on soliciting from Palestinians and their sympathizers in the Arabian peninsula.²⁵⁵ The PLO was established in 1964 under the guardianship of Egypt and with support from the Arab League. PLO Chairman Ahmed al-Shukairy was given a seat on the League and the Arab League voted to provide the PLO with yearly payments to support the organization. This annual payment was set at £15 million but it was cut off after the 1967 war.²⁵⁶ In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab defeat came the Palestinian disillusionment with the Arab states. The PLO realized that they would not be able to depend on the established Arab states to fight and win back their homeland for them. The Palestinians began an intensive campaign to gain broad popular support from throughout the Arab world. As a consequence financial aid skyrocketed in the years 1967-1970. During March 1968 £200,000 was collected during a fund raising drive in Lebanon. In Kuwait, a 5% tax was levied on the wages of Palestinian workers with the funds which were collected going to Fatah.²⁵⁷ Most Arab countries also added a 2% surcharge on all entertainment tickets.²⁵⁸ Funds from this so-called "Fedayeen tax" were turned over to the PLO.²⁵⁹ Money was also extorted from wealthy Palestinian businessmen living outside the confrontation area. During this time Saudi financial support amounted to £1.4 million per year.²⁶⁰ In September 1969, at the Islamic Summit, Saudi

that the PLO was recognized as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. For several years prior to the Rabat Conference some Arabs maintained that King Hussein of Jordan should be the spokesman for the Palestinians since so many refugees lived within his territory. The PLO leaders refused to allow Hussein to speak for them and for all Palestinians since it had seemed that Hussein had shown such close ties with the "imperialist" West and since he had not proved faithful to the Palestinian cause. Indeed, in 1948 Jordan had been quick to expropriate the West Bank lands and to incorporate this area into the Hashemite Kingdom. In fact, the British splitting of the Mandate of Palestine in 1921 into two separate Mandates, Palestine and Transjordan, was considered illegal. The distrust between the Palestinians and the Jordanians began long ago and continued up to the Rabat Conference in 1974. The Rabat Conference recognition brought with it the recognition of each of the twenty Arab states represented there. Thus, the recognition of the PLO, not Jordan, as the Palestinian people's only spokesman was very significant for the PLO.

It was also during this time, Autumn of 1974, that the United Nations General Assembly granted recognition to the PLO.²⁹⁰ Arafat was invited to the General Assembly and while there he gave his now famous "gun and the olive branch" speech. About the same time the PLO was granted observer status at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

and in receiving foreign delegations. This trend is also borne out in the following section which deals with worldwide recognition of the PLO.

B. DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

Another indicator of PLO behavior is that of international recognition. Included within this category is the PLO's observer status and membership in international organizations as well as official diplomatic recognition by foreign countries. Several countries have upgraded their PLO recognition status but have not accorded full diplomatic relations including the exchange of ambassadors. Also, some countries have allowed the PLO to operate information offices within their countries but have not accorded further diplomatic recognition. All of these instances have been counted as recognition. The intention was to paint a clear picture of worldwide acceptance of the PLO by foreign governments. Ideally it would be best to have pinpointed exactly when each individual country granted any of these forms of recognition. A source of such information has not been available and the author had to rely on piecing the data together from numerous sources. As of early 1980, 115 countries had recognized the PLO which are more countries than recognize the state of Israel. The recognition history of the PLO is traced beginning with the Rabat Conference of November 1974.

The Rabat Conference marked a very significant turning point for the PLO. It was at this conference of Arab states

of the sixteen NATO members,²⁸⁹ all of the Warsaw Pact countries, and other regional powers such as India and Japan. As the research is completed and the history traced from 1974 one would expect to find that PLO contacts with West and with other international powers to increase year by year showing an outward reach by the PLO for increasing international recognition. One interesting note is that in 1982, when the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon cut off the PLO from the international community at least temporarily, the PLO contacted the greatest number of different countries. Table Three below provides a graphic description of the contacts with the PLO over the last four years.

TABLE THREE

	<u>PLO Intergovernmental Contacts</u>			
	1979	1980	1981	1982
Number of Contacts	44	61	51	48
Number of Countries Visited	19	15	16	20

From the above table it is clear that during 1979-1982 the variation between contacts made and number of countries contacted did not change significantly. What can be shown, however, is that the PLO maintained a constant contact with a wide and diverse number of countries at least since 1979. For some time now the PLO has been active in traveling abroad

able to trace the history of such visits for the full time periods of 1974-1982.

The results of the September 1978 - December 1982 data are inconclusive. Due to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in June 1982 the data for that year are skewed because of the inability of Palestinian leaders to travel abroad and the reluctance of foreign leaders to contact the PLO in a combat zone. The data for this abbreviated time period does, nevertheless, reveal some interesting information. The Warsaw Pact countries accounted for about one-half of all contacts by Palestinians. Of these Warsaw Pact visits the percentage of contacts with the Soviet Union rose from 19% in 1979 to 61% in 1980. The ratio fell to 56% in 1981, and dropped again in 1982 to 50%. Contacts with Cuban representatives were more frequent than with Chinese representatives. Contacts with Western European representatives held steady at about 50% of Warsaw Pact contacts except the year 1980 when the ratio was 1:4. Most of the Western European contacts were made with Austria and France. The other Western European countries which had contact with the PLO were Spain, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Netherlands, Finland, and Greece. The "other" countries with PLO contact were India, Vietnam, Canada, Japan, Sri Lanka, as well as delegations from Latin America and Africa. It should be remembered that all of these contacts were at a high diplomatic level, i.e. Ambassadorial or Head of State. It is interesting that the PLO has had such contact with seven of

All three of these lists needed to be generated by this writer. The research task of generating these three data sets concerning subjects which had not previously been examined was formidable. Hence, the data collection is certainly not complete. The sources used in the previous section concerning military and financial aid were used in compiling the data found in this chapter.

A. INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS

In assessing the behavioral changes in the PLO as related to the military and economic aid received the various forms of contact between PLO officials and official representatives of foreign governments was measured. Counted were all official visits of this nature from September 1978 to December 1982. All contacts between PLO leaders and officials of other countries were counted. The officials of the other countries included only national leaders (President, Prime Minister, Chancellor, etc.), diplomatic representatives (Ambassadors or Chargés), and official envoys (only officially appointed representatives). No differentiation was made between PLO leaders of the various Palestinian factions, although most of the contacts were made with Fatah leaders. No differentiation was made between a Palestinian visit abroad and a foreign official visiting a Palestinian group in the Middle East. The primary interest was in the frequency of contact between the PLO and foreign representatives. Because the author has not been able to extend the research back to the baseline year he has not been

VIII. THE PLO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR

This chapter is an attempt to link arms transfers/financial aid to the behavior of the Palestinian Nationalist Movement on the international level. In defining behavior, several factors were analyzed: 1) Intergovernmental contacts; 2) Diplomatic recognition by other countries; and 3) Palestinian (PLO) mediation efforts. All of these indicators show an outward-reaching philosophy on the part of the PLO. The contacts, recognition, and mediation factors as related to the supplier countries might show a link of increasing dependency of the PLO on certain outside powers. Also, this section focuses on the Soviet involvement on Palestinian affairs and how that relationship has evolved. The research in this section begins with the year 1974 because the Rabat Summit which was held that year had officially recognized the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Also, by 1974 all the major factions in the PLO had been solidly established and could be easily separated and identified.

The measurement of the Palestinian behavior variables was as difficult as measuring the military and financial aid to the PLO. There are no running records of which countries have granted full recognition status to the PLO, the contacts made by PLO officials with diplomats of foreign countries, or efforts by the PLO to mediate in disputes between sovereign states.

as a solid economic factor to be seriously considered in any future Middle East peace negotiations.

Second, the PLO has an active investment program. Many of Fatah's funds are passed to Abu Hassan who transfers them to bank accounts in Switzerland, Italy, and West Germany. Money from these accounts is used for various business investments. In 1972 the PLO's foreign investments were estimated to be £30 million.²⁸⁵ The PLO owns and manages a Belgian charter airline, industrial plants which produce shoes, clothing, processed food, and furniture.²⁸⁶ Third, Palestinian financial aid sometimes depends on the political platform of the supplier or the Palestinian faction. For example, the PFLP traditionally refused to accept direct payments from such "reactionary sources" as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.²⁸⁷ But in many cases these "reactionary" regimes refuse to give aid to radical Palestinian factions such as the PFLP and PDFLP, preferring to support the moderate Fatah group. Last, the PLO announced in the summer of 1981 that it would compensate Palestinian and Lebanese civilians for the damage or destruction of their homes during the fighting with Israel. This aid amounted to 2,000 Lebanese pounds per house destroyed and 1,000 Lebanese pounds for each damaged house.²⁸⁸

All these financial inputs and expenditures amount to an estimated PLO budget to \$500 million to \$1 billion per year. With that cash flow the PLO has managed to create a society which provides much of its own secondary education, medical services, welfare care, tax collection, and industrial production. The PLO thus has established itself

scattered throughout the middle east to accommodate the dispersed Palestinians. Services at the hospitals and clinics are provided either free or for a very low fee. Table Two indicates the services the PRCS provided in 1981.

TABLE TWO
PRCS Hospital Care

<u>Type of Care</u>	<u>1981</u>
Emergency room visits	260,639
Hospital admissions	8,153*
X-rays	52,283
Laboratory tests	127,732
Dental visits	44,226
Clinic visits	183,910
Specialty clinic visits	123,921
Surgical operations	3,807*

*These figures are for the first six months of 1981 only.

Source: Rubenberg, p. 51.

The PRCS also has operated a medical training school in Beirut for 150 students leading to certificates as registered nurses, practical nurses, medical technicians, and paramedics. Tuition is free and the graduates are expected to work for the PRCS for the same amount of time as their training period.

There are several other items of note concerning the PLO's financial dealings. First, the PLO maintains responsibility for the refugee camps' management. In this role the PLO pays for the camps' electricity and water and provides refuse collection, fire, police, and ambulance services.²⁸⁴

twice that amount. Saiqa pays its military members the highest wages of all Palestinian groups. Also, the PLO established in 1965 the Institution for Social Affairs and Welfare for the Martyrs' and Prisoners' Families. This organization provides monetary subsistence payments to the widows and orphans of PLO combat victims as well as support for all full-time PLO workers and leaders, and their families. With branches in Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon the Institution gave aid to over 40,000 persons in 1980.²⁸² As a part of the Institution is a payment for secondary and university education for the children of PLO martyrs. Widowed wives and orphaned daughters are taught to sew, embroider, or type. Aid is also provided to civilian Lebanese and Palestinians who have been victims of Israeli attacks. The budget in 1980 for this expense alone was over \$30 million. In addition to the PLO expense of subsidizing the Institution for Social Affairs and Welfare for the Martyrs' and Prisoners' Families, the PLO funds the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS). The PRCS was organized in Jordan in 1968 and has grown since until, as of June 1982, it owned and operated thirteen major hospitals in Lebanon (11), Syria (1), and Egypt (1). Each hospital is equipped with an operating room, radiology department, laboratory, pharmacy, blood bank, outpatient clinic, and most include a dental clinic.²⁸³ In addition to these thirteen hospitals the PRCS runs 100 smaller clinics in Lebanon (60) and Syria (20) with the remainder

training of their troops. In February 1981, the head of the PLO office in Moscow, Brigadier Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaier, said, "Scores and hundreds of Palestinian officers eligible to command major sectors, such as brigades, had graduated from Soviet military academies."²⁷⁷ He further stated that 2,000 Palestinians were then studying in Soviet schools and that 300 scholarships per year are reserved for the PLO. The PLO also finances military operations in foreign countries. In 1979, the PLO was aiding Iran by sending automatic rifles to Iran and by training "hundreds of Iranians" in Lebanon.²⁷⁸ This activity was continued in 1980 when Abu Iyad secretly financed Kurdish guerrilla operations in Iraq.²⁷⁹ The PLO trained and equipped terrorists through Left- and Right-wing organizations in Europe and Latin America. One more example of PLO aid abroad concerns Libya. In May 1980 it was reported that the PLO, in conjunction with Egyptian intelligence services, had set up a training camp on the Egypt-Libya border.²⁸⁰ The troops at this anti-Qaddafi camp were trained for one month in carrying out military activity inside Libya or against Libyan interests abroad. Additionally, Fatah was active in Europe in the early 1970's in organizing and financing an elaborate network of 23 terrorist branches.²⁸¹

The various factions of the PLO pay the members of their military arm with average or better comparable Arab wages. PLA and PFLP soldiers are paid about the same as their Arab counterparts while Fatah military men are paid about

treasury may never be known exactly. The financial report to the Palestine National Council is careful not divulge publicly any references to amounts of money collected or invested. But what comes through very clearly is that the PLO has considerable wealth and that it receives its aid solely from Arab sources. It is interesting that there are no reports of financial aid coming to the PLO from other than Arab or Islamic sources. With such a considerable amount of cash on hand, let us now turn to what the PLO does with the money.

2. Financial Expenditures

Since the PLO has a tremendous amount of capital to work with it is natural that a good portion of it would be used to build up its military capability. The PLO has certainly used its financial resources to build up a force of conventionally armed and trained troops who have fought nearly continuously since 1965 against foes both Jewish and Arab. The previous section on military arms transfers pointed out how this build-up of arms occurred and the types of weapons accumulated by the PLO. The Israeli estimate of \$5 billion worth of arms and sabotage material found in southern Lebanon in 1982 attests to the fact that the PLO indeed has poured huge sums into hardware acquisition.²⁷⁵ Another source estimates that the PLO used \$10 billion of aid money for its armed forces during the decade 1973-1982.²⁷⁶ In addition to arms acquisition the PLO has also become more active in foreign

In April 1977, the Arab League set up the Arab Monetary Fund with capital assets set at \$757 million which the members could draw from for various uses.²⁶⁷ Another Foreign Ministers' Conference was convened in Baghdad in November 1978 at which the PLO was granted \$150 million with another \$150 million earmarked for the Steadfastness Forces in the occupied territories.²⁶⁸ All of these examples point out the apparent fact that the PLO has no problem obtaining sufficient funds. To get a clearer picture of the PLO financial status one must add occasional "additional funds" periodically donated by the Saudis,²⁶⁹ payments by Egypt which is no longer a member of many Arab organizations,²⁷⁰ and a series of "open funds" in the US and Europe²⁷¹ and it seems that financial aid is overwhelming. Indeed, that is the conclusion of the Israelis who have estimated PLO wealth to be \$70 billion.²⁷² The Israelis quickly point out that Saudi Arabia has been most liberal in its aid to Fatah. Says one press dispatch, "So far Saudi Arabia has given the PLO approximately \$200 million, of which about \$33 million is slated for what is called 'strengthening the firm stand of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.'"²⁷³ In an interview in 1982 former Israeli Prime Minister Begin told of a recent visit he had had with a "head of state." Begin told his guest that Saudi Arabia had given \$400 million to the "terrorists" to which the visiting head of state replied, "Billions, billions, not \$400 million. They had unlimited money."²⁷⁴ The total amount in the PLO

Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya agreed to collectively supply the PLO with £110 million per year.²⁶¹ The Fifth Arab Summit in Rabat held in December 1969 promised the PLO £26 million and King Hassan of Morocco separately pledged £20 million.²⁶² In 1970 Fortune magazine estimated Fatah's war chest stood at \$25 million and that its annual income was \$10 million.²⁶³ The exact amount of financial aid given to the Palestinians is not known but from the information given here it is evident that the PLO has received millions of dollars per year from Arab sources.

There have also been attempts throughout the 1970's by various Arab organizations to collectively provide financial support to the PLO. In 1974, at the Rabat conference which recognized the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the Arab states voted to give \$50 million per year to the PLO.²⁶⁴ In May 1976 at the Seventh Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Istanbul, the delegates resolved to set up a fund for assisting the Arabs in Jerusalem.²⁶⁵ The PLO was a voting member at this conference and Palestinians benefited from the aid which this fund provided. Another Foreign Ministers' conference was held in Riyadh in January 1977.²⁶⁶ The foreign ministers agreed to pay \$27 million to the PLO in 1977 and 1978. This was intended to make up for the \$26 million per year which had been promised at the December 1969 Rabat Conference but which had later been suspended.

(UNESCO).²⁹¹ In 1975 the African, Asian, and Middle Eastern foreign ministers met at an Islamic Summit where they also recognized the PLO. Also in 1975 France allowed the PLO to open an information office in Paris²⁹² and India granted the PLO full diplomatic status.²⁹³ In 1976 the PLO became a full voting member of two international organizations, the Arab League²⁹⁴ and the Non-Aligned Nations.²⁹⁵

The next flurry of recognition activity occurred in 1979. In July of that year United States UN ambassador, Andrew Young, had a controversial meeting with the PLO's UN representative at the home of the Kuwaiti UN ambassador.²⁹⁶ Because of the US administration's policy of no contact with the PLO, Andrew Young felt compelled to resign which he did 15 August 1979. During this time period other Americans, including many Black leaders, held meetings with PLO officials. Leaders of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference officially supported PLO rights²⁹⁷ and Jesse Jackson visited the Middle East and met with PLO leaders.²⁹⁸ There seemed to be a momentum carrying the US toward recognition of or at least contact with the PLO. The Camp David summit and the PLO rejection of the resulting Palestinian autonomy negotiation process, however, halted these moves toward recognition. Later in 1979 the UN declared an International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.²⁹⁹ This Day was celebrated in many capitals around the world but was boycotted by the US and Israel.

The PLO entered the 1980's as a widely recognized organization and during the early 1980's official recognition surged ahead on

a state by state basis. Austria bestowed a new form of diplomatic recognition (short of the exchange of ambassadors) in March 1980.³⁰⁰ Nicaragua's Sandinista government recognized the PLO in July 1980.³⁰¹ In 1981, the USSR and Greece granted full diplomatic status.³⁰² After the Soviet recognition was granted it was assumed that the other Warsaw Pact states would follow suit. Hungary did and announced recognition in February 1982.³⁰³ Sri Lanka granted the PLO official status in April just prior to the Israeli invasion.³⁰⁴ After the summer of 1982 fighting and the PLO had withdrawn from Beirut, Arafat was granted a twenty-minute audience with Pope John Paul II.³⁰⁵ This again was evidence of the PLO's rising international standing and prestige. In December 1982 Bolivia established official relations with the PLO.³⁰⁶ These examples do not obviously represent all of the states which recognize the PLO and in whose countries the PLO has information offices, but a trend can be noted. In 1974, the twenty Arab states recognized the PLO, but few other countries did. In 1974, the PLO operated six regional offices, all of them in the Arab world.³⁰⁷ By 1977, PLO regional offices were located in an additional six countries, none of which were Arab.³⁰⁸ These six countries included the two Superpowers, the PRC, France, Brazil, and a Warsaw Pact country, Hungary. In 1978, Japan and Austria were added to the list. By 1981 the number and location of regional offices changed dramatically. Thirty-one countries hosted PLO offices including three Warsaw Pact

countries, seven Western European countries, six other Western countries and six additional countries.³⁰⁹ Added to this list in 1982 were three European states -- Belgium, Ireland, and Switzerland.³¹⁰ Another European country joined the list in 1982 -- Italy.³¹¹ All of this points out the trend that the PLO has been expanding its operations throughout the world. Its offices are located in Eastern European capitals, in Western Europe, North America, Central and South America, and Asia. Their offices are located in the free world as well as behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. This expansion has been steady since 1974 and corresponds in the late 1970's and early 1980's with the increased military and financial aid which the PLO recieved. Again, although this list is not exhaustive and does not document each country that recognizes the PLO, it does provide enough evidence to trace the unmistakable trend toward greater recognition of the PLO and its increased status in the world community.

C. MEDIATION EFFORTS

As the PLO became generally accepted as a political entity it also began to act more and more like an international actor. The previous section dealt with how the various nations of the world have come to officially recognize the PLO. This has brought the Palestinians the international exposure and publicity they had previously sought through terrorist acts. This section deals with a new facet of PLO activity -- mediation on the international level.

The US has called upon the PLO at least twice to assist during international crises. The first instance was during the Lebanese Civil War in 1975-76. In 1976, the US decided to evacuate American civilians from Lebanon.³¹² Because of the fighting which was occurring, the danger to the Americans, and the need to evacuate them quickly the US turned to the PLO to assist them. The PLO was apparently the only group in Lebanon who could effectively spirit the Americans safely out of Lebanon. The American citizens were safely evacuated and the US government gave official thanks to the PLO. The second incident occurred during the Iranian hostage crisis.³¹³ The US attempted several mediation approaches to negotiate the release of the US hostages. One of the mediating groups the US employed was the PLO. A PLO delegation met with Iranian officials but was unsuccessful in securing the hostages' release.

There are at least four other mediation efforts in which the PLO played the major role. None of these four efforts involved the US. The first of these incidents occurred in July 1980. Relations between Iraq and Syria had been deteriorating for some time. The PLO was concerned that each country supported separate Palestinian organizations and that each country disapproved of PLO good relations with the other. In an effort to cool Iraqi-Syrian tensions Arafat went to Damascus to hold talks with President Assad while PLO political chief, Faruq Qaddumi, traveled to Baghdad to speak with Iraqi leaders.³¹⁴

This two-pronged approach succeeded in at least temporarily averting a Syrian-Iraqi conflict. But less than two months later the Iraqis launched an attack on Iran. This Iraq-Iran War is now over four years old with no end in sight. During this conflict the PLO has played a role in attempting to negotiate a peaceful settlement. It is significant that the Palestinians were called upon to mediate in this dispute between warring Islamic states. The next PLO effort to mediate came in February 1982.³¹⁵ The Soviets decided they wanted to upgrade their relations with Saudi Arabia. The Soviets requested the PLO to negotiate with the Saudis in an effort to allow the USSR to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. The last PLO mediation effort was between Mitterand's France and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). This mediation effort extended over the years 1980-1983 with the goal of reducing ASALA attacks on French personnel and interests.³¹⁶

For the purposes of this study the outcome of these five mediation efforts is immaterial. What is significant is that the PLO has begun to operate in a new role. Never before was the PLO called upon to act in the role of mediator. These six examples include two requests by the US, a nation whose official policy is not to recognize the PLO or to have any contact with them. The US government asked for PLO help and gave official thanks after receiving that aid. The third mediation effort was in an inter-Arab dispute and was apparently undertaken

solely on PLO initiative. The fourth incident was an inter-Islamic conflict and the PLO was one of several Arab and Islamic groups to mediate. The next effort came at the request of the Soviets. They wanted to upgrade their relations in the moderate Arab world and called upon the PLO to offer their good offices to effect that upgrade. The last effort was between a Middle East terrorist/National Liberation Group and a Western European power.

The PLO as mediator is a new function for the Palestinians. The PLO first was called upon in this role in 1978 and all the other instances have occurred after that time. The action of the PLO as mediator pulls them even more securely onto the international political stage as a full-fledged actor. This brings the PLO closer to receiving international sympathy for their cause and eventual settlement of their grievances. The mediation efforts, linked with the trend in official diplomatic recognition, brings the PLO up to the level of other officially recognized states. Acting as a mediator also shows the PLO as an organization not only bent on destruction and prone to using terrorist acts, but presents the PLO as an organization which actively seeks peace through diplomatic channels.

D. CONCLUSIONS

As we consider the factors of Military Aid, Financial Support, Intergovernmental Contacts, Official Recognition, and Mediation we can see trends which link all five indicators. The amount of military aid has increased since 1978. The PLO

managed to purchase and stockpile enormous amounts of military hardware from 1978-1982. For the first time the PLO received sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. The types of weapons increased in capabilities. For example, the receipt of the SA-6, SA-9, and SA-12 missiles from the Soviets plus certain unspecified weapons reportedly never before exported outside the Warsaw Pact point out the new sophisticated weapons the PLO was able to acquire. The PLO source of arms narrowed as the USSR became more forthcoming in arms delivery. As the Soviet aid increased in amount and capability of weapons so did the Soviet diplomatic relations with the PLO. The Soviets officially recognized the PLO in 1981 and stepped up diplomatic contact with PLO officials. Arafat has made several trips to Moscow at the invitation of Soviet leaders. He also increased his contact with the Soviet ambassador to Lebanon. The Soviets have also asked the PLO to help in mediating for improved relations with the Saudi government.

This upgrade in Soviet-PLO relations occurred during a shift in Soviet relations with the Arab world in general. After the 1973 war the Soviets were involved in the Geneva Conference which was intended to provide a forum for the overall peace settlement in the Middle East including the Palestinian question. The Geneva talks failed however, the Soviets were expelled from Egypt, Sadat and Begin signed a series of treaties, and President Carter hosted the historic Camp David Summit. All of these events excluded the USSR from the Middle East peace

process and estranged them from much of the Arab world. The Soviets began to upgrade relations with other Arab states including Libya, South Yemen, Iraq, and the PLO. The PLO became the recipient of increased Soviet attention and aid which in turn elevated the PLO to higher levels in world affairs.

The PLO entered the 1970's by being expelled forceably from Jordan. From Jordan the PLO headquarters were transferred to southern Lebanon where the PLO had established Fatahland. The introduction of the PLO to faction-riddled Lebanon became a destabilizing influence. The PLO prompted military crises on two fronts. First, the inter-factional conflict was exacerbated by the infusion of PLO forces into southern Lebanon. The PLO wanted to help create peaceful conditions in Lebanon so that it would be able to successfully carry out its primary goal of fighting Zionism. The Lebanese civil war erupted in 1975 and continued until 1978 with the PLO participating fully. Secondly, the PLO continued its guerrilla attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon. The resulting Israeli retaliatory and pre-emptive attacks into southern Lebanon created even worse feelings for the Palestinians. Early in the Lebanese civil war the PLO was opposed by its once staunch supporter, Syria. It was during this time period that the PLO was able to improve its world image. The Arab world became better able to financially support the PLO with increasing financial contributions. With this monetary aid the PLO massively increased its

military capability and shored up its social programs. The PLO became the recognized leader of the Palestinian people. This recognition began with the Arab states, spread to the Third World, then to the Communist states, and to the West. The PLO was able to gain worldwide recognition at the UN and in 115 countries of the world. All of this is a very significant shift in PLO stature since the lowly Black September beginning of the 1970's.

On 6 June 1982, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a combined ground, air, and sea invasion of Southern Lebanon. One of the IDF's stated missions was to destroy the PLO military structure and political institutions. By 4 July 1982, the IDF had encircled Beirut where thousands of PLO fighters and leaders were holed up and defending themselves. In September 1982, the evacuation of the PLO leadership and guerrilla fighters took place and the IDF had apparently accomplished their goal. The PLO fighters and leaders were dispersed to eight Arab countries and it seemed that the unity of the Palestinian political and military structures was destroyed. The PLO headquarters was established in Tunis, far from the homeland of Palestine. Arafat began to devise a scheme leading to a negotiated settlement with Israel and the establishment of a ministate in conjunction with Jordan. Arafat's moderate style and President Assad's desire to acquire control over the PLO sparked a revolt within the PLO generally and within Fatah in particular. Although Arafat has endured

previous challenges this threat appears to be more deep-seated and better coordinated. The PLO, in order to be effective in opposing Israel, must establish itself in one of the border states: Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan. Egypt's peace treaty with Israel and her commitment to the Camp David peace process make Egypt an unlikely candidate for hosting and supporting a major active PLO presence. Lebanon, with the IDF entrenched south of the Awali River, the Syrian army in the Beqaa region, and with the multi-national force in Beirut, is also a dismal choice. The Syrian-sponsored fight against Arafat in northern Lebanon threatens to entirely expel Arafat's PLO partisans from Lebanon. Syria has already forced Arafat to leave Syria. Syria supports the Fatah rebels and obviously Damascus would like to control Fatah as well as the entire PLO. Jordan is the only state which cannot be immediately ruled out as a refuge for Arafat and a restructured PLO. Hussein may be willing to accept a moderate, Arafat-led PLO in Jordan. Hussein offered a plan for the creation of a confederated Kingdom with Palestinian rule on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Arafat still maintains a strong and loyal following in the occupied territories. A combination of these factors point to a rapprochement between Arafat and Hussein and a movement toward the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza.

In the wake of the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982, the expulsion of PLO forces from Beirut, and the power struggle within Fatah many scholars have predicted Arafat's

fall from power and a Syrian takeover of the PLO. Many of these scholars see the final days of the PLO and the end of an era. The information presented in this thesis leads to an alternate prediction. The PLO is very strong organizationally and is very well-established. A broad core of leadership has been in control of the PNC and EC for many years. These leaders are generally not a part of the Syrian-sponsored opposition. Habash and Hawatmeh, both leaders of Palestinian groups which have been traditionally opposed to Arafat's Fatah, have pledged to support Arafat and the PLO. They recognize the validity of the Palestine National Charter and are pledged to abide by the PLO institutional structure. They support the PNC and EC and believe that only through these bodies should changes occur within the PLO. They consider the PLO to be a very democratic organization. The PLO has spent considerable sums of money to build up military, economic, social, educational, medical, and cultural institutions which have served thousands of Palestinians. The PLO had been the organization which has cared for the material needs of the Palestinian people and those Palestinians have come to depend upon the PLO. The PLO as an organization and political movement has been recognized throughout the world with various forms of diplomatic status. The PLO has overwhelming support in the UN General Assembly. It appears that the PLO is too widely accepted, too universally supported, too well-established, too entrenched in Palestinian daily life, and too tied to success in international recognition

to be overcome by a Syrian-sponsored coup. Syria may succeed in defeating Arafat's forces in Lebanon and driving him from that country but this would not spell the end of the PLO. Leadership of the PLO rests in the EC and the PNC. Syria would gain more Palestinian supporters but would not be able to control the PLO.

APPENDIX A

THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER OF 1964*

THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER

Preamble

We, the Palestinian Arab people: Who have waged vigorous and continuous battles to defend our homelands, and to safeguard our dignity and honor; and who have through the years given generously of martyrs and blood, and have written glorious pages of self-sacrifice;

We, the Palestinian Arab people: Against whom the forces of injustice, evil and aggression have conspired, and the forces of international Zionism and colonialism have colluded to displace and disperse us, to usurp our homeland and our property, and to desecrate what we hold sacred; but who, through it all, have never surrendered, and never wavered in our resistance;

We, the Palestinian Arab people: With faith in our Arabism and in our right to regain our homeland and realize our freedom and dignity; and with determination to mobilize all our energies and potentialities, in order to continue our struggle and to press forward on its path until final victory;

We, the Palestinian Arab people: Depending on our right to self-defense and to the recapture of our usurped homeland in its entirety— a right which has been recognized by international conventions and charters, foremost among which is the United Nations Charter;

In application of the principles of the rights of man;

Realizing the nature of international political relations, in their divers dimensions and aims;

Recalling and considering past experiences relating to the causes of the Palestine catastrophe and the methods of contending with them;

In view of the Palestinian Arab reality; and in pursuit of the dignity of the Palestinian and his right to a free and respectable life;

And conscious of the grave national responsibility laid upon us:

For all this,

We, the Palestinian Arab people,

Enunciate and proclaim this *Palestinian National Charter*, and vow to realize it.

Article 1

Palestine is an Arab homeland, bound by the ties of Arab nationalism to the other Arab countries--which, together with Palestine, constitute the greater Arab homeland.

Article 2

Palestine, within the boundaries it had during the period of the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3

The Palestinian Arab people possesses the legal right to its homeland. It is an indivisible part of the Arab nation, sharing in its aspirations and sufferings, as well as in its striving for freedom, sovereignty, progress, and unity.

Article 4

After the liberation of its homeland has been achieved, the people of Palestine shall determine its own destiny, in accordance with its own wishes, free will, and choice.

Article 5

The Palestinian identity is an inherent, essential, and inalienable attribute; it is transmitted from parents to children.

Article 6

Palestinians are those Arab citizens who, until 1947, had normally resided in Palestine, regardless of whether they have been evicted from it or have stayed in it. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father whether inside Palestine or outside it--is also a Palestinian.

Article 7

Jews of Palestinian origin shall be considered Palestinian if they desire to undertake to live in loyalty and peace in Palestine.

residing in Lebanon and to guarantee their rights to residence, movement, work, and freedom of political and social activity.

4. Working for an end to the politically motivated mass and individual arrests of detainees in the jails of the Lebanese authorities and for their release.

Relations With Syria:

Relations with sister Syria are based on the resolutions of successive PNC sessions which confirm the importance of the strategic relationship between the PLO and Syria in the service of the nationalist and pan-Arab interests of struggle and in order to confront the imperialist and the Zionist enemy, in light of the PLO's and Syria's constituting the vanguard in the face of the common danger.

The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front:

The PNC entrusts the PLO Executive Committee to have talks with the sides of the pan-Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to discuss how it should be revived anew on sound, clear, and effective foundations, working from the premise that the front was not at the level of the tasks requested of it during the Zionist invasion of Lebanon.

Egypt:

The PNC confirms its (?rejection) of the Camp David accords and the autonomy and civil administrations plans linked to them. From the premise of the firm belief in the role of Egypt and its great people in Arab struggle, the council confirms that it stands by the struggle of the Egyptian people and their nationalist forces to end the Camp David policy so that Egypt may return to its position of struggle in the heart of our Arab nation. The council calls on the Executive Committee to develop PLO relations with Egyptian nationalist, democratic, and popular forces struggling against moves to normalize relations with the Zionist enemy in all their forms, considering that this expresses the basic interests of the Arab nation and consolidates the struggle of our Palestinian people for their national rights. The council calls on the Executive Committee to define relations with the Egyptian regime on the basis of its abandoning the Camp David policy.

The Iranian-Iraqi War:

The PNC admires the efforts which have been exerted by the PLO Executive Committee to end the Iraqi-Iranian war through the two committees of the nonaligned states and the Muslim states. The council calls on the Executive Committee to persist in these efforts so as to end this war now that Iraq

C. Adherence to the question of sole representation and national unity and respect for national and independent Palestinian decisionmaking.

D. Rejection of all schemes aimed at harming the right of PLO to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people through any formula such as assigning powers, acting on its behalf, or sharing its right of representation.

E. The PNC calls for strengthening Arab solidarity on the basis of the resolutions of Arab summit conferences and in light of the aforementioned bases.

The Resolutions of the Fes Summit:

The Arab Peace Plan:

The PNC considers the Fes summit resolutions as the minimum for political moves by the Arab states, moves which must complement military action with all its requirements for adjusting the balance of forces in favor of the struggle and Palestinian and Arab rights. The council, in understanding these resolutions, affirms it is not in conflict with the commitment to the political program and the resolutions of the National Council.

Jordan:

Emphasizing the special and distinctive relations linking the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples and the need for action to develop them in harmony with the national interest of the two peoples and the Arab nation, and in order to realize the rights the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, both inside and outside the occupied land, the PNC deems that future relations with Jordan should be founded on the basis of a confederation between two independent states.

Lebanon:

1. Deepening relations with the Lebanese people and their National Forces and extending support and backing to them in their valiant struggle to resist the Zionist occupation and its instruments.

2. At the forefront of the current missions of the Palestinian revolution will be participation with the Lebanese masses and their National and democratic forces in the fight against and the ending of Zionist occupation.

3. The council invites the Executive Committee to work for holding talks between the PLO and the Lebanese Government in order to ensure the security and safety of Palestinian nationals

5. The National Council salutes the steadfastness of its people living in the areas occupied in 1948 and is proud of their struggle, in the face of racist Zionism, to assert their national identity, it being an indivisible part of the Palestinian people. The council asserts the need to provide all the means of backing for them so as to consolidate their unity and that of their national forces.

6. The council conveys greeting of appreciation and pride to the prisoners and the detainees in the jails of the enemy inside the occupied homeland and in southern Lebanon.

II. Our Dispersed People:

The PNC asserts the need to mobilize the resources of our people wherever they reside outside our occupied land and to consolidate their rallying around the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of our people. It recommends to the Executive Committee to work to preserve the social and economic interests of Palestinians and to defend their gained rights and their basic liberties and security.

Contacts With Jewish Forces:

In affirming resolution No 14 of the political declaration of the PNC at its 13th session on 12 March 1977, the PNC calls on the Executive Committee to study movement within this framework in line with the interest of the cause of Palestine and the Palestinian national interest.

On the Arab Level:

Arab Relations:

Deepening cohesion between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab national liberation movement throughout the Arab homeland so as to effectively stand up to the imperialist and Zionist plots and liquidation plans, particularly the Camp David accords and the Reagan plan and also ending the Zionist occupation of the occupied Arab land, relations between the PLO and the Arab states shall be based on the following:

A. Commitment to the causes of the Arab struggle, first and foremost the cause of and struggle for Palestine.

B. Adherence to the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return, self-determination, and the establishment of their own independent state under the leadership of the PLO -- rights that were confirmed by the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences.

APPENDIX C

1983 PNC POLITICAL STATEMENT

1. Palestinian National Unity:

The battle of steadfastness of heroism in Lebanon and Beirut epitomizes Palestinian national unity in its best form. Out of this leading Palestinian experience, the PNC affirms the need to bolster national unity among the revolution's detachments within the framework of the PLO and to exert efforts to improve organizational relations in all PLO institutions and bodies on the basis of forward action and collective leadership, and on the basis of the organizational and political program endorsed by the 14th PNC session.

Independent Palestinian Decision:

The PNC affirms continued adherence to independent Palestinian decisionmaking, its protection, and the resisting of all pressures from whatever source to detract from this independence.

Palestinian Armed Struggle:

The PNC affirms the need to develop and escalate the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy. It affirms the right of the Palestine revolution forces to carry out military action against the Zionist enemy from all Arab fronts. It also affirms the need to unify the forces of the Palestine revolution within the framework of a single National Liberation Army.

2. The Occupied Homeland:

The PNC salutes our steadfast masses in the occupied territory in the face of the occupation, colonization, and uprooting. It also salutes their comprehensive national unity and their complete rallying around the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, both internally and externally. The PNC condemns and denounces all the suspect Israeli and American attempts to strike at Palestinian national unanimity and calls on the masses of our people to resist them.

3. The PNC affirms the need to bolster the unity of national, social, trade union, and popular organizations and to work for the revival and development of the national front internally.

4. The PNC affirms the need to intensify efforts to bolster the steadfastness of our people inside the occupied homeland and to provide them with all the requisites for this steadfastness in order to end forced emigration, to protect the land, and to develop the national economy.

Article 25: For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization will perform its role in the liberation of Palestine in accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.

Article 26: The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle--to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination it--in all military, political and financial fields and also for whatever may be required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels.

Article 27: The Palestine Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its potentialities; and will adopt a neutral policy among them in the light of the requirements of the war of liberation; and on this basis it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

Article 28: The Palestinian Arab people assert the genuineness and independence of their national revolution and reject all forms of intervention, trusteeship and subordination.

Article 29: The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude towards all states and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt vis-à-vis the Palestinian case and the extent of the support they offer to the Palestinian revolution to fulfill the aims of the Palestinian people.

Article 30: Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31: The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem. All this shall be decided upon in accordance with a special regulation.

Article 32: Regulations, which shall be known as the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, shall be annexed to this Charter. It shall lay down the manner in which the Organization, and its organs and institutions, shall be constituted; the respective competence of each; and the requirements of its obligations under the Charter.

Article 33: This Charter shall not be amended save by (vote of) a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization (taken) at a special session convened for that purpose.

contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-determination.

Article 20: The Balfour Declaration, the mandate for Palestine and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong.

Article 21: The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization.

Article 22: Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and a geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat *vis-a-vis* peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for the support of all the progressive and peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective of their affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people all aid and support in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland.

Article 23: The demands of security and peace, as well as the demands of right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples may be preserved and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safe safeguarded.

Article 24: The Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity and in the right of all peoples to exercise them.

Article 14: The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in the realization of this sacred national goal.

Article 15: The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation--peoples and governments--with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, human, moral and spiritual capabilities to participate actively with the Palestinian people in the liberation of Palestine. It must, particularly in the phase of the armed Palestinian revolution, offer and furnish the Palestinian people with all possible help, and material and human support, and make available to them the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to carry out their leading role in the armed revolution, until they liberate their homeland.

Article 16: The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the Holy Land with an atmosphere of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of worship and of visit to all, without discrimination of race, color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17: The liberation of Palestine, from a human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his dignity, pride and freedom. Accordingly the Palestinian Arab people look forward to the support of all those who believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in the world.

Article 18: The liberation of Palestine, from an international point of view, is a defensive action necessitated by the demands of self-defence. Accordingly, the Palestinian people, desirous as they are of the friendship of all people, look to freedom-loving, justice-loving and peace-loving states for support in order to restore their legitimate rights in Palestine, to re-establish peace and security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19: The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were

Article 8: The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now living, is that of national struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the conflicts among the Palestinian national forces are secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic conflict that exists between the forces of Zionism and of imperialism on the one hand, and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses, regardless of whether they are residing in the national homeland or in diaspora, constitute--both their organizations and the individuals--one national front working for the retrieval of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.

Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.

Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national struggle among the different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and the Arab masses so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, its escalation and victory.

Article 11: The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national unity, national mobilization and liberation.

Article 12: The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share towards the attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.

Article 13: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine; the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work towards the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work towards the realization of the other.

APPENDIX B

THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER OF 1968

Article 1: Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

Article 2: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3: The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.

Article 4: The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership of the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them.

Article 5: The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father--whether inside Palestine or outside it--is also a Palestinian.

Article 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

Article 7: That there is a Palestinian community and that it has inaterial, spiritual and historical connection with Palestine are indisputable facts. It is a national duty to bring up individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner. All means of information and education must be adopted in order to acquaint the Palestinian with his country in the most profound manner, both spiritual and material, that is possible. He must be prepared for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation.

Article 28

A Regulation, which shall be known as the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, shall be annexed to this Charter. It shall lay down the manner in which the Organization, and its organs and institution, shall be constituted; the respective competence of each; and the requirements of its obligations under this Charter.

Article 29

This Charter shall not be amended save by (vote of) a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization, (taken) at a special session convened for that purpose.

Article 22

The Palestinian people believes in peaceful coexistence on the basis of legitimate existence: for there can be no peaceful coexistence with aggression, and no peace with (foreign) occupation and colonialism.

Article 23

For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization shall perform its complete role in the liberation of Palestine, in accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.

Article 24

This Organization shall not exercise any territorial sovereignty over the West-Bank (region of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Gaza Strip, or the Himmah area. Its activities, in the liberational, organizational, political and financial fields, shall be on the national-popular level.

Article 25

This Organization shall be responsible for the movement of the Palestinian people in its struggle for the liberation of its homeland, in all liberational, organizational, political, and financial fields, and also for whatever may be required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels.

Article 26

The Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its potentialities; and it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

Article 27

This Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance, and anthem. All of this shall be decided upon in accordance with a special Regulation.

because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and its natural right in its homeland, and inconsistent with the general principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-determination.

Article 18

The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are compatible neither with the facts of history nor with the sound conception of the components of statehood. Judaism, as a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong.

Article 19

Zionism is a movement which is colonial in its origin, aggressive and expansionist in its objectives, racist and fanatic in its nature, and fascist in its ends and means. Israel, being the spearhead of this subversive movement and a base for imperialism, is a source of constant tension and turmoil, in the Middle East in particular and in the international community in general. Accordingly, the people of Palestine deserve the support and backing of the international community.

Article 20

The demands of security and peace, as well as the demands of right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples may be preserved, and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded.

Article 21

The Palestinian people believes in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, and human dignity, and in the right of all peoples to exercise and enjoy them. It also supports all international efforts which aim at the consolidation of peace on the basis of right and free international cooperation.

Article 13

The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine case. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine plays the role of the vanguard in the realization of this sacred national goal.

Article 14

From an Arab standpoint, the liberation of Palestine is a national obligation, the full responsibility for which lies upon the Arab nation as a whole, governments as well as peoples, with the people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly, the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, material, and spiritual capabilities for the liberation of Palestine; and it must, in particular, furnish the Palestinian Arab people with help and support, and make available to it the means and the opportunities that it will enable it to assume its role in the liberation of its homeland.

Article 15

From a spiritual standpoint, the liberation of Palestine will provide the Holy Land with an atmosphere of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's religious sanctities and guarantee the freedom of worship and of visit to all, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 16

From an international standpoint, the liberation of Palestine is a defensive action necessitated by the demands of self-defense, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Palestinian people, desirous as it is of the friendship of all peoples, looks to freedom-loving justice-loving and peace-loving states for support in order to restore legitimate conditions to Palestine to re-establish peace and security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 17

The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time,

Article 8

To provide the Palestinian youth with an Arab national upbringing is a cardinal national obligation. All means of information and education should be utilized in order to give the new generation such profound spiritual knowledge of its homeland as would bind it intimately and firmly thereto.

Article 9

Ideological systems--whether political, social or economic--shall not divert the attention of the population of Palestine from their primary duty: the liberation of their homeland. All Palestinians shall be one national front, working together--in complete dedication, and with all their spiritual and material power--toward the liberation of their homeland.

Article 10

Palestinians shall have three mottoes: national unity, national mobilization, and liberation. Once the liberation of the homeland is accomplished, the Palestinian people shall be free to adopt, for its public life, the political, economic or social system of its choice.

Article 11

The Palestinian people believes in Arab unity. In order to contribute its share towards the attainment of that objective, however, it must, at the present stage of its struggle, safeguard its Palestinian identity and the components thereof, develop its consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.

Article 12

Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives the attainment of each of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine; the Liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work toward the realization of each objective proceeds side by side with work toward the realization of the other.

has announced the withdrawal of its forces from Iranian territory in response to the appeal of the Palestinian revolution and to mass all energies for the battle of the liberation of Palestine.

On the International Level:

Breshnev's Plan:

The PNC expresses its appreciation and support for the proposals contained in President Brezhnev's plan of 16 September 1982 which asserts the established national rights of our people, including the right to return and the right to self-determination and to set up the independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO, this people's sole legitimate representative. It also expresses its appreciation of the stands of the socialist community states toward the just cause of our people, which is underlined in the Prague statement of 3 January 1983 on the Middle East situation.

Reagan's Plan:

Reagan's plan, in style [ar nahj] and content, does not respect the established national rights of the Palestinian people since it denies the right of return and self-determination and the setting up of the independent Palestinian state and also the PLO -- the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people -- and since it contradicts international legality. Therefore the PNC rejects the considering of this plan [rafd i'tibarihi asaeen salihan lil-hal al-'adil wa-adda'imi liqadiyat filistin wa-lisira' al-'arabi as-suhuni] as a sound basis for the just and lasting solution of the cause of the Palestine and the Arab-Zionist conflict.

III. International Relations:

1. Developing and deepening relations of alliance and friendship between the PLO and the socialist states, led by the Soviet Union, and all anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, anticolonialist, and antiracist liberation and progressive forces in the world.
2. Deepening relations with the nonaligned states and the Islamic and African states for the sake of the cause of Palestine and the other liberation causes.
3. Strengthening relations with friendly states in Latin America and working to widen the circle of friends in the area.
4. The intensification of political action with the West European states and Japan with a view to developing their stances and widening the recognition of the PLO and the right

of the Palestinian people to establish an independent Palestinian state. The PNC salutes all anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and antiracist democratic and progressive forces in the states of West Europe and all capitalist states, the latter being a fundamental ally in those countries. It calls on the Executive Committee to act jointly with these forces so that their states recognize the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the PLO.

5. Continuing the struggle to isolate the Zionist state in the United Nations and in other forums.

6. Standing up to U.S. imperialism and its policy by regarding it as the leader of the camp which is hostile to our just issue and the issues of the struggling peoples.

7. The council affirms the (?need) to continue the struggle against the policy of racial discrimination [passage indistinct].

The (?council) salutes the struggle of the people of Namibia, under the leadership of SWAPO, for freedom and independence. The council also salutes the struggle of the peoples of South Africa against racism and discrimination and oppression.

8. The PNC strongly denounces terrorism and international terrorists, in particular official American and Israeli terrorism, which is organized against the Palestinian people and the PLO, the people of Lebanon, the Arab nation, and the rest of the liberation movements in the world.

9. The National Council affirms its adherence to the principles and the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions which affirm the inalienable and indisposable national rights of the Palestinian people to establish a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East and the right of all peoples subject to occupation to exercise all forms of struggle for the sake of achieving liberation and national independence.

The council also stresses its firm condemnation of all imperialism and Israeli practices which violate international legality, the International Declaration of Human Rights, and the principles and Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions.

10. The PNC appreciates the activities and achievements of the UN special committee concerned with enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable rights to Palestine. It greets the efforts of its members, and in particular the UN General Assembly resolution calling for an international conference in the summer of 1983 to support the Palestinian people so that they realize their inalienable rights. The council also appreciates the achievements of the special

secretariat for an international conference at the United Nations to prepare and pave the way for the success of this conference. It urges all fraternal Arab states and friendly states to take part effectively in the work of the conference and also in the preparatory regional meetings in order to guarantee the success of such an important conference.

Finally, the council thanks Algeria with deep warmth and appreciation -- the president, government, party, and people -- for hosting the council and its guests, for its great concern with ensuring its success, for the efforts exerted for coverage of its activities by the information media, for providing conditions permitting the smooth running of its debates, for guaranteeing its security, and for the tranquility of its members and guests.

The council extends special thanks to the militant brother, President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and secretary general of its party, particularly for the official stand he announced regarding the independence of the Palestinian decision, the readiness of Algeria to support this decision, and to continue to support and back the Palestinian struggle until the achievement of victory and the setting up of the independent Palestinian states.

The council expresses thanks and appreciation to all the official and popular delegations which took part in the work of our council and announced their support and backing for the PLO and the cause of the Palestinian people. This international support for our revolution is without doubt a basic element of the success of our march, with which free people prove their solidarity in the face of the common enemy -- represented in imperialism and Zionism -- and for the freedom of peoples, their independence and progress. As for our brothers in the Arab delegations which have taken part in our council, we thank them in particular for their moving role in the Arab arena in order to create better conditions in support of our struggle and to confront the plans of the enemy.

We extend special greetings to the UN special committee which follows Israel's violations of human rights against Palestinians in the occupied land. The PNC promises the Palestinian and Arab masses and the forces of struggle and liberation throughout the world to continue the struggle in all its military and political forms toward the achievement of the objectives of our people. It believes that this Palestinian, Arab, and international cohesion, seen in this council as an effective weapon among the weapons of support and solidarity among peoples, must have results in reaching the desired objectives. The triumph of peoples will undoubtedly be achieved, and the solidarity of peace-loving peoples is a solidarity of which we are proud and to which we cling.

The National Council greets all the masses of our heroic people, inside and outside the homeland, and also our brave fighters, who have preserved the honor of their revolution, arms, and nation, the souls of all the martyrs of our Palestinian and Lebanese people who soaked with blood the soil of the homeland and who have proved that the cause of freedom in our land will not die.

The PNC greets the brothers in the Syrian forces who took part with us in the heroic battle in Beirut and other regions, as well as their revered martyrs.

The council addresses greetings and appreciation to all the Arab, Muslim, and friendly volunteers who rose to contribute with the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces in the battles of Beirut and Lebanon, and we greet their heroic martyrs. The National Council appreciates all the countries and friendly and fraternal forces which provided support in the form of arms, money, military effort, training, and equipment, foremost the Arab and Islamic countries, the nonaligned and African states, and the socialist countries.

Long live the victorious Palestinian revolution! Long live the PLO, framework of the unity of our people and the leader of its struggle! Long live the unity of the struggle of Arab peoples and the peoples of the world for freedom, national independence, and the defeat of imperialism, racism, and Zionism! Glory and eternal life for our revered martyrs! Revolution until victory!

APPENDIX D
MILITARY EQUIPMENT

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBERS</u>	<u>VALUE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1967	machineguns bazookas grenades explosives	-- -- -- --	-- -- -- --	Retreating Egyptians
1967	weapons	--	--	Bedouins Professional smugglers
May 1969	arms	--	\$1.5 mil.	China
1969-72	Katyusha	--	--	France
	60mm mortar (some French)	--	--	USSR
	120mm mortar (some French)	--	--	
	light machineguns (Russian)	--	--	
	heavy machineguns	--	--	
	explosives	--	--	
March 1970	arms	--	--	China via air- Pakistan to Damascus via sea- to Syria
July 1970	supplies	--	--	Cuba
August 1970	arms to PLO (none to Habash)	--	--	China
September 1970	three planeloads of arms	--	--	China to Damascus
July 1971	tanks machineguns ammunition	200 thousands millions of rounds	-- -- -- --	China
28 Sep 1972	small arms machine guns mortars	12 tons	--	First open delivery by the USSR to the PLO

1975	arms for the PLO & Lebanon	--	--	Interdicted by the Israeli Navy -- arms given to the Phalangists
22 Sep 1975	request: Arafat asks for sophisticated rockets	--	--	USSR
13 Jan 1977	at end of Lebanon civil war: armored vehicles artillery pieces anti-aircraft guns large caliber machineguns mortars	--	--	--
14 Nov 1977	heavy weapons	--	--	USSR
20 Mar 1978	arms	--	--	arms delivered to Tyre
21 Jun 1978	arms deal	--	\$40 mill.	Libya deals with GDR
5 Dec 1978	submarine (medium)	1	--	Libya
11 May 1979	small nuclear bomb	1	--	China refused to give to PLO. PLO sought another donor.
12 Jun 1979	sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles	--	--	USSR told PLO to get them from Libya.
13 Jun 1979	SA-6	--	--	Libya
6 Jul 1979	SA-6 requested 1 Year ago. Not delivered.	--	--	USSR
9 Jul 1979	SAMs	--	\$16 mill.	"an Arab country"
29 Aug 1979	105mm howitzer ammunition RDX explosives 130mm cannons 155mm cannons Katyusha rockets	-- -- 100 -- --	-- -- -- --	Lebanon- US arms from \$100 mill. arms transfer. Saudi Arabia- US arms from previous arms deal

12 Oct 1979	35mm anti-aircraft batteries	20	--	Libya arranged a deal with Swiss Oerlikon Co.
10 Sep 1979	infantry equipment			
10 Sep 1979	infantry equipment	--	--	USSR- some of the equip- ment had reportedly never
	sophisticated anti- aircraft missiles	--	--	been exported outside the Warsaw Pact
	sophisticated anti- tank missiles	--	--	
12 Feb 1980	T-34	--	--	Syria
	T-62	--	--	Syria
	missiles	--	--	Syria
	long-range cannons	--	--	Syria
10 Jun 1980	missiles	--	--	USSR
	missiles	--	--	Brazil
	helicopters	--	--	India
	jet trainers	--	--	India
	military transport vehicles	--	--	India
27 Aug 1980	arms	--	--	USSR and
	equipment	--	--	Eastern
	training	--	--	Europe
5 Sep	various armored vehicles	--	--	PLO statement of
	artillery pices	--	--	military equipment
	missiles	--	--	inventory.
	navy	--	--	
26 Sep	weapons	enough to outfit 30,000	--	China
12 Feb 1980	T-34	60	--	USSR
27 Apr 1981	arms	--		
	ammunition	--	\$33 mill.	Saudi Arabia
	explosives			
23 Jun 1981	advanced weapons	--	--	North Korea
22 Jul 1981	Katyusha	--	--	Israeli estimate
	130mm cannons	--	--	
28 Jul 1981	request: Frog	--	--	Israeli reported that
	SA-6	--	--	PLO requested these
	SA-12	--	--	arms from the USSR.

4 Aug 1981	SA-6 "fresh supplies of weapons"	--	--	Kuwait
		--	--	Saudi Arabia
3 Sep 1981	large quantities of heavy weapons	--	--	China
10 Sep 1981	large quantities of heavy weapons	--	--	China
20 Oct 1981	request: anti-air- craft missiles	--	--	USSR
2 Feb 1982	request: SAM missiles	--	--	USSR
	Frog	--	--	USSR
	Heavy mil- itary equip- ment	--	--	USSR
5 Feb 1982	sophisticated weapons	--	--	USSR
5 Feb 1982	missiles	--	--	Military parade in
	heavy artillery	--	--	Beirut. The howitzer
	modern tanks	--	--	came to the PLO from
	US-built howitzer	1	--	North Yemen.
18 Feb 1982	106mm cannons	--	--	--
	anti-aircraft guns	--	--	--
2 Apr 1982	arms	large	--	USSR and East Europe
	ammunition	quantity	--	via Syria.
12 Apr 1982	SA-7	--	--	PLO military capability
	SA-9	--	--	statement.
22 Apr 1982	130mm cannons	60	--	Israeli
	cannons (long-range)	240	--	estimate
	160mm mortar	200	--	
	T-54/55	another 20		
14 Jun 1982	request: ammunition	--	--	Soviet ambassadors in
	arms	--	--	Lebanon and Libya.
15 Jun 1982	arms	--	--	USSR airlift
	fighting weapons	scores, hundreds		
		of tons	--	Israeli report of
	artillery pieces	hundreds	--	PLO weapons found
	tanks	hundreds	--	hidden in Lebanon.
	ammunition	enough for a		
	food	population of		
	arms	hundreds of		
		thousands for a		
		very long		
		time	--	

16 Jun 1982	equipment	--	--	USSR- airlift began. Three to five IL-76 Candids land at Damascus over next five days.
1 Jul 1982	total PLO arms	--	\$5 billion	Israeli estimate
20 Sep 1982	arms	large caches	--	Israeli report
19 Nov 1982	planes PLO pilot killed in MIG-21	some --	-- --	PLO military statement Training in North Yemen.
11 Jan 1983	MIG-21 MIG-23 MIG-25 French Mirage	-- -- -- --	-- -- -- --	PLO statement: PLO pilots have training since early 1970's. "Squadrons of Palestinian pilots now stationed" in Libya, North Yemen, South Yemen, and Syria.
12 Jan 1983	military aid	2,200 tons	--	China- delivery blocked by Syria
13 Jan 1983	naval base training	-- --	-- --	Egypt and Sudan.
25 Jan 1983	military arms	--	--	USSR: Andropov told Arafat, "You must co- ordinate with Syria if you want to remain alive."
11 Feb 1983	T-54	10	--	Transferred to PLO near Zahlah in Bekaa valley.
17 Feb 1983	weapons ammunition	-- --	-- --	Shipment to West Bank Palestinians.
25 Mar 1983	mines	18,000	--	Mines still remain in Beirut. PLO took detailed maps of the mine fields with them when they left.

APPENDIX E
FINANCIAL AID

<u>DATE</u>	<u>AMOUNT OF AID</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1959-1964	Fatah set up vast contribution net work among all Palestinians and sympathizers.	--
Jul 1964	Financial backing	Arab League
Jun 1967	10,000 Dinars	Libya
12 Jun 1967	Huge fund-raising campaign to begin.	Arabian peninsula
1967	\$15 million per year (cut off after 1967 war)	Arab League
Mar 1968	\$200,000 5% tax on Palestinian workers	Lebanon Kuwait
summer 1968	"support committees set up to collect donations 7% tax on Palestinian workers	Saudi Arabia promised to match all funds raised.
May 1969	£1.4 million per year	Saudi Arabia
23 Sep 1969	£110 million per year	Saudi Arabia Kuwait Libya
19-25 Dec 1969	£26 million £20 million	Fifth Arab Summit Morocco
1970	PFLP refuses to accept money from "reactionary sources"- Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.	
1970	Saudi Arabia gives aid to Fatah but not to the PLO.	
1970	tax on Palestinians outside the war zone 2% "Fedayeen tax" on all entertainment tickets extortion on wealthy Palestinians current war chest - \$25 million annual income - \$10 million	Saudi Arabia -- -- -- --
2 Mar 1971	£3 million (Palestine National Fund revenue for the year 1970-1)	--
7 Jul 1971	£62,500 (This was the only contribution for 1970)	Qatar

<u>DATE</u>	<u>AMOUNT OF AID</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1 Jul 1970-	2,394,290 Jordanian Dinars	Expenses
	2,068,829 Jordanian Dinars	Income
	<u>325,461</u> Jordanian Dinars	Deficit (covered from reserve fund)
Top contributors during this fiscal year were Palestinian workers in Arab countries.		
1 Jul 1970- 30 Jun 1971	Arab country-committed donations not yet received --\$15,896,065	Arab countries
1972	Money in Fatah passed to Abu Hassan. He deposits the money in accounts in Switzerland, Italy, and West Germany. Total investment in Europe is \$30 million.	
1972	£1 million Algerian Pounds to Fatah. Annual contribution.	Algeria
26 Feb 1973	\$3 million to PLO. (Most taken by Fatah)	Iraq
4 Jun 1974	As of 31 Mar 1974 Arab states' arrears to PLO: \$24,896,056. (\$8,157,256 for PLO budget; 16,738,800 for PLA)	--
29 Oct 1974	\$50 million per year for PLO.	Rabat Conference
4 Nov 1974	\$100 million offered to PLO.	Rabat Conference
13 Jan 1977	\$27 million for PLO (1977 and 1978)	Foreign Ministers Conferences, Riyadh.
21 Jun 1978	\$40 million for PLO	Libya
1 Nov 1978	\$150 million to PLO \$150 million to Steadfastness Forces in occupied territories.	Baghdad Arab Foreign Ministers Conference
4 Aug 1979	\$9 million (part of the money promised at the Baghdad Foreign Ministers Conference).	Iraq
17 Sep 1979	\$100,000 for Palestine Red Crescent Society	Saudi Arabia.
Dec 1979	\$150 million per year for ten years to the Fund for Steadfastness	Baghdad Summit
19 Mar 1980	PLO rejected offer of aid from Libya because of PLO "no strings attached" policy	Libya
15 Sep 1980	\$10 million loan for PLO	IMF/World Bank

<u>DATE</u>	<u>AMOUNT OF AID</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
3 Nov 1980	Abu Iyad received millions of dollars from Libya to finance Kurds in Iraq.	Libya
8 Dec 1980	\$92 million	Jordan
27 Apr 1981	\$200 million (total contributed) \$ 85 million (per year) 5% of Palestinian workers' wages (continuous)	Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia
18 May 1981	"additional funds"	Saudi Arabia
22 Jul 1981	100,000 dinars for Palestine Red Crescent Society	Bahrain
19 Aug 1981	\$100 million (during 1980) \$138 million (during 1981)	Egypt Egypt
16 Nov 1981	\$28,571,407	Saudi Arabia
Nov 1981	\$100 million per year (PLO annual budget) \$250 million per year (annual Arab donations) other sources of income: -- Palestinian tax -- Investments	-- Arab states
9 Jun 1982	Seven "Open Funds" exist to benefit West Bank Arabs. Among them are: -- Steadfastness Front Fund -- Jerusalem Scholarship Program -- Jerusalem Foundation -- Fellowship for Jewish and Arab Students in Israel	
11 Jun 1982	Dh20 million to PLO (about \$5.4 million)	Dubai
16 Jun 1982	PM Begin claims Saudis have given \$400 million. Israeli report His guest claims the Saudi have given billions.	
1 Jul 1982	\$70 billion. Israeli estimate of PLO funds.	All sources
12 Jul 1982	\$10 billion in aid for the military.	Arab states

APPENDIX F

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>WHO VISITED</u>	<u>WHERE</u>
4 Dec 1978	Arafat	Bulgaria Ambassador	Beirut
5 Dec 1978	PNC Chairman	Bulgaria Ambassador	Beirut
14 Dec 1978	PLO Representative	Diplomatic status accorded	Austria
21 Dec 1978	" "	" " "	France
15 Nov 1978	Habash	Official visit	Moscow
13 Apr 1979	Qaddumi	Bulgaria Ambassador	Bulgaria
13 Apr 1979	Qaddumi	Yugoslav Ambassador	Bulgaria
27 Mar 1979	Qaddumi	Cuban Ambassador	Beirut
16 Apr 1979	PNC Chairman	Official visit	CSSR
21 Mar 1979	Qaddumi	France Ambassador	Beirut
10 Jul 1979	Arafat	Kreisky/Brand	Vienna
6 Jul 1979	Arafat	Official visit	Bulgaria
15 May 1979	Arafat	PRC Ambassador	Beirut
1 Jun 1979	Qaddumi	PRC Ambassador	Beirut
5 Jun 1979	Abu Mayzar	Cuba Foreign Minister	--
24 Jul 1979	Arafat	Cuba Party Delegation	--
24 May 1979	Arafat	CSSR President Husak	Damascus
31 Oct 1979	Arafat	PRC Vice Foreign Minister	--
28 Sep 1979	Arafat	GDR delegation	--
19 Oct 1979	Arafat envoy	Latin America	Latin America
1 Aug 1979	PLO official	Sandinista leaders	Beirut
17 Aug 1979	Arafat	Ceausescu (Romania)	Damascus
17 Sep 1979	Arafat	Diplomatic status accorded	Spain
28 Sep 1979	Abu Mayzar	Spain Ambassador	Damascus
31 Aug 1979	Arafat	USSR Charge	--
24 Sep 1979	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	--
31 Aug 1979	Abu Mayzar	Vietnam envoy	--
31 Aug 1979	Abu Mayzar	India envoy	--
31 Aug 1979	Fatah official	--	Moscow
11 Sep 1979	Fatah official	USSR Regional Party Sec.	--
21 Sep 1979	Abu Jihad	Yugoslav Ambassador	Beirut
11 Dec 1979	Arafat	Bulgaria Party Delegation	--
28 Nov 1979	PLO Delegation	PRC	PRC
7 Nov 1979	Arafat	Cuba Ambassador	Beirut
15 Nov 1979	Qaddumi	Diplomatic status accorded	Italy
28 Nov 1979	al-Fahum	Polish delegation	--
5 Nov 1979	Arafat	Press Conf.	Portugal
8 Jan 1980	Qaddumi	Tindemans (Belgium)	--
7 Jan 1980	Arafat	Former Belgium PM	--
15 Jan 1980	Qaddumi	Hungary	Hungary
15 Jan 1980	Qaddumi	Bulgaria	Bulgaria
15 Jan 1980	Fatah official	Cuba Ambassador	Beirut
18 Jan 1980	Arafat	Spain Ambassador	Beirut

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>WHO VISITED</u>	<u>WHERE</u>
Dec 1979	PNC Chairman	Vasiliy Kuznetsov (USSR)	--
Jan 1980	Arafat	Gromyko	Damascus
Feb 1980	PFLP delegation	Babrak Karmal	Afghanistan
Feb 1980	Arafat	Kreisky (Austria)	Saudi Arabia
Mar 1980	PLO representative	Diplomatic status accorded	EEC (Paris)
Feb 1980	PLO official	France Ambassador	Beirut
Mar 1980	Arafat -Invitation-	Giscard	France
Mar 1980	Arafat	India Ambassador	--
Mar 1980	Arafat	India	India
Feb 1980	Arafat -Invitation-	Visit	Japan
Feb 1980	Abu Mayzar	Netherlands Ministry Official	--
Mar 1980	Arafat	UN Assistant Sec. General	Beirut
Feb 1980	Habash	Visit	USSR
Feb 1980	Arafat	USSR envoy	Beirut
Feb 1980	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	Beirut
Feb 1980	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	Beirut
Mar 1980	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	Beirut
Mar 1980	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	Beirut
Feb 1980	Qaddumi	Yugoslav envoy	Lebanon
Apr 1980	Arafat	Zhivkov (Bulgaria)	Damascus
Apr 1980	Arafat	Cuba Foreign Minister	Beirut
May 1980	PLO spokesman	CSSR Ambassador	Damascus
Apr 1980	PLO office to open	Helsinki	Finland
Apr 1980	PLO delegation	Visit	India
May 1980	Arafat	PM Suarez (Spain)	Riyadh
Apr 1980	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	--
Jun 1980	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	Beirut
Sep 1980	Arafat	Hua Guofeng	China
Sep 1980	Qaddumi	Official visit	GDR
Aug 1980	Hawatmeh	Press Conference	GDR
Sep 1980	Hawatmeh	Press Conference	Hungary
Aug 1980	Abu Mayzar	Visit	Hungary
Sep 1980	Abu Mayzar	USSR Ambassador	--
Sep 1980	Abu Mayzar	Hungary Ambassador	--
Jul 1980	Arafat	Soviet leaders	Moscow
Sep 1980	Arafat	USSR Party Official	Baku
Sep 1980	PLO	Observer status accorded	IMF/World Bank
Dec 1980	Arafat	Visit	GDR
Nov 1980	Arafat	India Foreign Minister	--
Dec 1980	Arafat	Kuznetsov (USSR)	Damascus
Oct 1980	Arafat	Official visit	Yugoslavia
Nov 1980	Arafat	48 Hour Visit	Moscow
Dec 1980	Arafat	Soviet Delegation	--
Dec 1980	Palestinian Deleg.	--	Moscow
Apr 1981	PFLP Delegation	Afghan leaders	Kabul
May 1981	Qaddumi	Official visit	Bulgaria
May 1981	Arafat	USSR envoy	Beirut
May 1981	Arafat	PRC envoy	Beirut
May 1981	Arafat	North Korea envoy	Beirut
May 1981	Arafat	Ceausescu (Romania)	Romania

UNDERSTANDING THE PLO (PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION)(U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>WHO VISITED</u>	<u>WHERE</u>
2 Jun 1981	Arafat	USSR envoy	Beirut
10 Jun 1981	Arafat	USSR envoy	Beirut
23 Jul 1981	Arafat	France Ambassador	--
31 Aug 1981	Arafat	Chesson (France)	Lebanon
8 Jul 1981	Qaddumi	Interview	Paris
1 Jul 1981	PLO envoy	Nicaragua envoy	Moscow
21 Aug 1981	Arafat	Non-Aligned Delegation	--
1 Jul 1981	Qaddumi	Visit	Moscow
20 Jul 1981	Arafat	USSR envoy	--
29 Jul 1981	PLO embassy	USSR diplomatic upgrade	Moscow
10 Aug 1981	PLO Delegation	Visit	Moscow
10 Sep 1981	Arafat	USSR envoy	Lebanon
30 Sep 1981	PLO Representative	Vietnam Delegation	Beirut
10 Jul 1981	Arafat	Talks	Yugoslavia
9 Dec 1981	Arafat	Kreisky (Austria)	Abu Dhabi
14 Oct 1981	Arafat	Visit	China
9 Oct 1981	Qaddumi	Visit	Cuba
21 Oct 1981	Arafat	Cuba Delegation	Syria
17 Dec 1981	Fatah Official	Cuba Charge	--
17 Nov 1981	Arafat	GDR Ambassador	Beirut
20 Nov 1981	al-Wazir	GDR Pres. Honeker	--
16 Dec 1981	Arafat	Visit	Greece
23 Dec 1981	PLO	First Ambassador in Eur.	Greece
16 Oct 1981	Arafat	3-Day State Visit	North Korea
14 Oct 1981	Qaddumi	Visit	Mexico
14 Oct 1981	Qaddumi	Visit	Cuba
17 Dec 1981	Arafat	Visit	Romania
10 Dec 1981	Arafat	US Congressman	Abu Dhabi
2 Oct 1981	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	Beirut
27 Oct 1981	Arafat	Diplomatic status accorded	USSR
28 Dec 1981	Arafat	USSR Charge	Beirut
16 Oct 1981	Arafat	Visit	Vietnam
11 Mar 1982	PLO Official	African Delegation	--
10 Mar 1982	PLO Official	CSSR Delegation	--
9 Mar 1982	Arafat	2-Day Visit	GDR
2 Feb 1982	Arafat	Visit	Hungary
4 Jan 1982	Arafat	USSR Charge	Lebanon
4 Mar 1982	al-Fahum	USSR Deputy Minister	--
27 Jan 1982	Arafat	USSR Delegation	--
12 Apr 1982	Arafat	Angola Deputy Minister	Kuwait
7 Apr 1982	Fatah Official	Canada Delegation	--
9 Jun 1982	Arafat	Cuba Ambassador	--
24 Jun 1982	--	Cuba Foreign Minister	--
30 Apr 1982	Arafat	Cuba Delegation	--
21 May 1982	Arafat	GDR Delegation	--
26 May 1982	Arafat	3-Day Visit	India
26 May 1982	Arafat	Visit	Pakistan
15 Jun 1982	PLO Representative	Socialist Ambassador	--
7 Apr 1982	PLO	Diplomatic status accorded	Sri Lanka
21 Jun 1982	PLO	USSR	Damascus

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>WHO VISITED</u>	<u>WHERE</u>
16 Jul 1982	PLO Representative	Party Official	Angola
21 Sep 1982	Arafat	China Ambassador	Damascus
31 Aug 1982	al-Fahum	Flavio Bravo (Cuba)	--
4 Aug 1982	Arafat	France Legislators	--
3 Sep 1982	Arafat	Officials	Greece
20 Aug 1982	Arafat	Italy Ambassador	--
22 Sep 1982	al-Fahum	Japan Delegation	--
23 Jul 1982	Arafat	Romania envoy	--
23 Jul 1982	Arafat	GDR envoy	--
9 Aug 1982	Salah Khalaf	Visit	USSR
27 Oct 1982	Arafat	Visit	Algeria
28 Dec 1982	Arafat	Kreisky (Austria)	Majorca
15 Dec 1982	PLO	Diplomatic status accorded	Bolivia
7 Dec 1982	Qaddumi	China envot	United Nations
2 Nov 1982	Arafat	Visits	East Bloc
12 Nov 1982	Qaddumi	France Foreign Minister	--
23 Dec 1982	Arafat	Colombo (Italy)	--
15 Oct 1982	Arafat	King Hassan	Morocco
7 Dec 1982	PLO Office opened	Netherlands	Amsterdam
18 Nov 1982	Arafat	Brezhnev funeral	Moscow
29 Nov 1982	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	Damascus
7 Dec 1982	Qaddumi	USSR envoy	United Nations
22 Dec 1982	PLO Official	USSR consultations	Jordan
7 Jan 1982	Arafat	Andropov	Moscow
21 Jan 1983	Arafat	Pakistan Ambassador	Tunis
21 Jan 1983	Arafat	India Foreign Minister	Tunis
21 Jan 1983	Arafat	UK Undersecretary	Tunis
21 Jan 1983	Qaddumi	Romania Ambassador	Damascus
21 Jan 1983	Qaddumi	Hungary Ambassador	Damascus
4 Feb 1983	Hawatmeh	CSSR Visit	CSSR
11 Feb 1983	Fatah Delegation	Annual Visit	USSR
28 Feb 1983	Arafat	USSR Ambassador	Tunis
7 Mar 1983	Arafat	USSR Charge	Tunis
11 Mar 1983	Habash	Visit	CSSR
22 Mar 1983	Arafat	USSR Deputy Foreign Minister	Tunis

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
Warsaw Pact (including USSR)	16	28	18	16
USSR only	3	17	10	9
Western Europe (including NATO)	8	7	5	8
Other	9	7	12	9
Cuba only	4	1	4	4
China (PRC) only	4	1	2	2
TOTAL-	44	61	51	48

APPENDIX G

DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

PLO Regional Offices 1973-74

1. Lebanon
2. Syria
3. Kuwait
4. Egypt
5. Algeria
6. Libya

PLO Regional Offices 1976-77

1. Lebanon
2. Syria
3. Kuwait
4. Egypt
5. Algeria
6. Libya
7. USA
8. USSR
9. PRC
10. France
11. Brazil
12. Hungary

PLO Regional Offices 1977-78

1. Lebanon
2. Syria
3. Kuwait
4. Egypt
5. Algeria
6. Libya
7. USA
8. USSR
9. PRC
10. France
11. Brazil
12. Hungary
13. Japan
14. Austria

PLO Regional Offices 1980-81

1. Lebanon
2. Syria
3. Kuwait
4. Egypt
5. Algeria
6. Libya
7. USA
8. USSR
9. PRC
10. France
11. Brazil
12. Hungary
13. Japan
14. Austria
15. Cyprus
16. Qatar
17. Saudi Arabia
18. Iran
19. Abu Dhabi
20. South Yemen
21. Ethiopia
22. Jordan
23. Turkey
24. Greece
25. Mali
26. GDR
27. FRG
28. Tanzania
29. Pakistan
30. Sudan
31. United Kingdom
32. Luxembourg
33. Kenya
34. Mozambique

PLO Regional Offices 1981-82

1. Lebanon
2. Syria
3. Kuwait
4. Egypt
5. Algeria
6. Libya
7. USA
8. USSR
9. PRC
10. France
11. Brazil
12. Hungary
13. Japan
14. Austria
15. Cyprus
16. Qatar
17. Saudi Arabia
18. Iran
19. Abu Dhabi
20. South Yemen
21. Ethiopia
22. Jordan
23. Turkey
24. Greece
25. GDR
26. FRG
27. Tanzania
28. Pakistan
29. Sudan
30. United Kingdom
31. Luxembourg
32. Kenya
33. Mozambique
34. Belgium
35. Ireland
36. Switzerland

PLO Regional Offices 1982-83

1. Lebanon
2. Syria
3. Kuwait
4. Italy
5. Algeria
6. Libya
7. USA
8. USSR
9. PRC
10. France
11. Brazil
12. Hungary
13. Japan
14. Austria
15. Cyprus
16. Qatar
17. Saudi Arabia
18. Iran
19. Abu Dhabi
20. South Yemen
21. Ethiopia
22. Jordan
23. Turkey
24. Greece
25. GDR
26. FRG
27. Tanzania
28. Pakistan
29. Sudan
30. United Kingdom
31. Kenya
32. Mozambique
33. Belgium
34. Ireland
35. Switzerland

Diplomatic Recognition. (Recognition ranges in various degrees from full diplomatic status to accreditation through an Information/Cultural office).

1. Abu Dhabi	42. Malaysia	<u>Regional Distribution</u>	
2. Afghanistan	43. Mali	Western Europe	14
3. Algeria	44. Malta	Sub-Sahara Africa	17
4. Angola	45. Mauritania	Western Hemi-	
5. Austria	46. Mexico	sphere	11
6. Bahrain	47. Morocco	Eastern Europe	7
7. Bangladesh	48. Mozambique	East and South	
8. Belgium	49. Nicaragua	Asia	12
9. Bolivia	50. Nigeria	Middle East	20
10. Brazil	51. North Korea	Total	81
11. Cambodia	52. North Yemen		
12. Canada	53. Pakistan		
13. China (PRC)	54. Panama		
14. Congo	55. Patan		
15. Cuba	56. Peru		
16. Cyprus	57. Poland		
17. Czechoslovakia	58. Qatar		
18. Djibouti	59. Romania		
19. East Germany	60. Saudi Arabia		
20. Egypt	61. Senegal		
21. Ethiopia	62. Somalia		
22. France	63. South Yemen		
23. Gambia	64. Spain		
24. Greece	65. Sri Lanka		
25. Grenada	66. Sudan		
26. Guinea	67. Sweden		
27. Guinea Bissau	68. Switzerland		
28. Hungary	69. Syria		
29. India	70. Tanzania		
30. Iran	71. Tunisia		
31. Iraq	72. Turkey		
32. Ireland	73. United Arab Emirates		
33. Italy	74. Uganda		
34. Japan	75. United Kingdom		
35. Jordan	76. United States		
36. Kenya	77. USSR		
37. Kuwait	78. Venezuela		
38. Laos	79. Vietnam		
39. Lebanon	80. West Germany		
40. Libya	81. Yugoslavia		
41. Luxembourg			

APPENDIX H

SESSIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

<u>PNC #</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1	28 May 1964	Jerusalem	- PLO formed. - 360 delegates attend. - Ahmed Shukairy, chairman. - Hikmet el Masri - Vice President. - Nikola el Durr - Vice President. - Abdul Rahman el Siksek - Secretary General.
2	31 May - 2 June 1965	Cairo	- PLA established. - Nasser gave opening address. - PLO headquarters in Jerusalem. - Organized PLO institutions
3	20 May - 24 May 1966	Gaza	- Abd al-Munim Husni (Gaza Governor General of UAR spoke on behalf of Nasser). - PLA troops currently training in PRC, Cairo, Damascus, and Iraq. - PRC openly supplying arms and training. - Shukairy recently met with Soviet Premier Kosygin.
4	10 July - 16 July 1968	Cairo	- Session delayed by one year because of June 1967 War. - Kamal ad-din-Rifat (UAR Labor Minister) spoke on behalf of Nasser. - PNC to meet every six months. - PNC Charter amended/re-written. - 11-member Executive Committee elected.
5	1 February - 4 February 1969	Cairo	- Nasser gave opening address. - PFLP, PLA refuse to attend. - 84 delegates attend. - Abd al-Majid Shuman - chairman of Palestine National Fund. - Hayha Hammudah - PNC chairman. - Executive Committee elected: Yusuf al Barzi Ahmad ash-Shihabi Yasir Amrah Muhammad Yusuf an-Najjar (Abu Yusuf) General Secretary

<u>PNC #</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Comments</u>
		Yasir Arafat Khalid al-Hasan Hamid Abu Sittatt Ibrahim Bakr Faruq Qaddumi Abd al-Majid Shuman Kamal Nasir	Chairman, Military Affairs Political Affairs Occupied Homeland Affairs Deputy Chairman Popular Organizations Financial Affairs Guidance and Information
6	2 September- 1969	Cairo	- Arafat unanimously re-elected EC chairman. - EC membership increased from 12 to 15.
7	June 1970	Cairo	
Extra	27 August - 28 August 1970	Widhat ref- ugee camp,	- Purposes: 1) devise ways of opposing US Roger's Plan and 2) defeat plots against the Resistance in Jordan. - 115 delegates attend. - First time all guerrilla groups plus independent Palestinian represented. - Foreign delegations present: Egypt PDRY Iraq Syria Algeria Sudan American Black Panthers
8	27 February - 5 March 1971	Cairo	- Nasser gave opening address. - 115 delegates attend. - New organizational structure: - <u>PLO</u> to embrace all Palestinian revolutionary forces. - 150 members in PNC to establish strategy for political, military, information, and financial action. - <u>Military Command</u> - To command all Palestinian strugglers. - <u>Central Committee</u> . - <u>Political Bureau</u> . - "Bodies, establishments, and offices."
9	7 July - 13 July 1971	Cairo	- Arafat became: Commander-in-chief of PLO, Revolution, PLA, and Fatah. Re-elected chairman of EC. - DFLP attends. - Central Committee dissolved and powers transferred to EC.

<u>PNC #</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Comments</u>																										
			- Dr. Yusuf Sayigh - President of Palestine National Fund. - Khalid al-Fahum elected PNC Chairman. - New EC elected:																										
			<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Yasir Arafat</td> <td>Fatah</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Faruq Qaddumi</td> <td>Fatah</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Khalid al-Hasan</td> <td>Fatah</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Abu Yusuf</td> <td>Fatah</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Zuhayr Muhsin</td> <td>Saiqa</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sami 'Attari</td> <td>Saiqa</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Taysir Qubba'ah</td> <td>PFLP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Salih Ra'fat</td> <td>DFLP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ahmad al-Mar'ashli</td> <td>ALF</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah</td> <td>Independent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Hamid Abu Sittah</td> <td>Independent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Kamal Nasir</td> <td>Independent</td> </tr> </table>	Yasir Arafat	Fatah	Faruq Qaddumi	Fatah	Khalid al-Hasan	Fatah	Abu Yusuf	Fatah	Zuhayr Muhsin	Saiqa	Sami 'Attari	Saiqa	Taysir Qubba'ah	PFLP	Salih Ra'fat	DFLP	Ahmad al-Mar'ashli	ALF	Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah	Independent	Hamid Abu Sittah	Independent	Kamal Nasir	Independent		
Yasir Arafat	Fatah																												
Faruq Qaddumi	Fatah																												
Khalid al-Hasan	Fatah																												
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Ahmad al-Mar'ashli	ALF																												
Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah	Independent																												
Hamid Abu Sittah	Independent																												
Kamal Nasir	Independent																												
10	6 April - 12 April 1972	Cairo	- Khalid al-Fahum - Re-elected PNC Chairman. - Detailed plan adopted for integrating and unifying all Palestinian groups, unions, etc. - New EC elected:																										
			<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Yasir Arafat</td> <td>Fatah</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Faruq Qaddumi</td> <td>Fatah</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Khalid al-Hasan</td> <td>Fatah</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Abu Yusuf</td> <td>Fatah</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Zuhayr Muhsin</td> <td>Saiqa</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sami 'Attari</td> <td>Saiqa</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Taysir Qubba'ah</td> <td>PFLP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Salih Ra'fat</td> <td>DFLP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ahmad al-Mar'ashli</td> <td>ALF</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah</td> <td>Independent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Hamid Abu Sittah</td> <td>Independent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Kamal Nasir</td> <td>Independent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Salah Muhammad Salah</td> <td>Popular Organization Representative</td> </tr> </table>	Yasir Arafat	Fatah	Faruq Qaddumi	Fatah	Khalid al-Hasan	Fatah	Abu Yusuf	Fatah	Zuhayr Muhsin	Saiqa	Sami 'Attari	Saiqa	Taysir Qubba'ah	PFLP	Salih Ra'fat	DFLP	Ahmad al-Mar'ashli	ALF	Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah	Independent	Hamid Abu Sittah	Independent	Kamal Nasir	Independent	Salah Muhammad Salah	Popular Organization Representative
Yasir Arafat	Fatah																												
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Khalid al-Hasan	Fatah																												
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Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah	Independent																												
Hamid Abu Sittah	Independent																												
Kamal Nasir	Independent																												
Salah Muhammad Salah	Popular Organization Representative																												
11	3 January - 12 January 1973	Cairo	- PNC delegates increased from 151 to 175. - 148 delegates attend. (18 were detained by Jordan). - Central Council formed: - 19 to 21 members. - Chosen by EC. - Connecting link between EC and PNC. - Khalid al-Fahum - Chairman (He also continues as PNC Chairman).																										

<u>PNC #</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Comments</u>
			- New EC elected:
			Yasir Arafat Fatah
			Abu Yusuf Fatah
			Zuhayr Muhsin Saiqa
			Ahmad al-Yamani PFLP
			Adib 'Abd Rabbuh DFLP
			Dr. 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali AOLP
			Kamal Nasir Independent
			Hamid Abu Sittah Independent
			Dr. Yusuf Sayigh Independent
			Zuhdi an-Nashashibi Independent
12	1 June - 9 June 1974	Cairo	- Eight new PNC delegates - Palestinians deported by Israel from West Bank. - Disagreement on size/composition of EC - New EC elected:
			Yasir Arafat Fatah
			Faruq Qaddumi Fatah
			Dr. 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali ALF
			Ahmad al-Yamani (Abu Mahir) PFLP
			Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh DFLP
			Zuhayr Muhsin Saiqa
			Talal Naji PFLP-GC
			Muhammad Zuhdi an-Nash-ashibi Independent
			'Abd al-aziz al-Wajih Independent
			Hamid Abu Sittah Independent
			Iliya Khuri Independent
			'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar West Bank Deportee
			al-Jawwad Salih West Bank Deportee
			(New Palestine National Fund Chairman) Walid Qamhawi West Bank Deportee
13	12 March - 20 March 1977	Cairo	- PNC delegates increased from 187 to 290. - Arafat declared a plan to establish a Palestinian state on any liberated part of Palestine.

<u>PNC #</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Comments</u>										
			- The following committees met and reported: - Political - Occupied Homeland - Financial Affairs - Palestine National Unity - Popular Organizations - Social Affairs and Labor - Legislative - Information and Educational Affairs - New EC elected:										
			<table><tr><td>Yasir Arafat</td><td>Fatah</td></tr><tr><td>Faruq Qaddumi</td><td>Fatah</td></tr><tr><td>Zuhayr Muhsin</td><td>Saiqa</td></tr><tr><td>Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh</td><td>DFLP</td></tr><tr><td>'Abd ar-Rahim Ahmad</td><td>Arab Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td></tr></table>	Yasir Arafat	Fatah	Faruq Qaddumi	Fatah	Zuhayr Muhsin	Saiqa	Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh	DFLP	'Abd ar-Rahim Ahmad	Arab Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Yasir Arafat	Fatah												
Faruq Qaddumi	Fatah												
Zuhayr Muhsin	Saiqa												
Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh	DFLP												
'Abd ar-Rahim Ahmad	Arab Front for the Liberation of Palestine												
(Chairman-Palestine National Fund)			Talal Naji										
(Director-Palestine Research Center)			Walid Qamhawi										
(Chief-Land Establishment for Studies in Damascus)			Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani										
			Habib Qahwaji										
			Muhammad Zuhdi an-Nash-ashibi										
			'Abd al-Jawad Salim										
			'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar										
			Alfred Tubasi										
			Hamid Abu Sittah										
			Ahmad Majdi Abu Ramadan										
			- PFLP and ALF agree to work with PLO and EC.										
14	15 January - 22 January 1979	Damascus	- Session was not held in Cairo because of Camp David "capitulation." - President Assad gave opening address. - No new EC elected. Current EC may serve for another year. (They were elected in 1977 to a three-year term).										
15	11 April - 16 April 1981	Damascus	- President Assad gave opening address. - 92 foreign delegations attend from Arab and friendly states.										

<u>PNC #</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Comments</u>
			- Occupied Jerusalem declared to be the capital of Palestine. - Issam Sartawi resigned (16 April). He was not given the opportunity to address the PNC. - New EC elected:
			Yasir Arafat Faruq Qaddumi Mahmud 'Abbas 'Abd ar-Rahim Ahmad ALF Talal Naji PFLP-GC Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh DFLP Ahmad al-Yamani PFLP Muhammad Khalifah Saiqa Hamid Abu Sittah Independent Muhammad Zuhdi an-Nash-ashibi Independent 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar Independent Dr. Ahmed Sidqi ad-Dajani Independent (Head of PLO Office, Cairo) Jamal as-Saurani Independent (Chairman-Palestine National Fund) Dr. Hanna Basir Independent Dr. Salah ad-Dabbagh Independent
			- PLF and PPSF not represented o .
16	14 February - 22 February 1983	Algiers	- First PNC session since 1982 evacuation from Beirut. - Khalid al-Fahum: Borders of the Palestinian state to be West Bank and Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as capital. - Issam Sartawi resigned (20 Feb). His resignation was rejected (21 Feb). - New EC elected:
			Yasir Arafat Fatah Faruq Qaddumi Fatah Muhammad 'Abbas Fatah Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh DFLP Ahmad al-Yamani PFLP Muhammad Khalifah Saiqa Talal Naji PFLP-GC 'Abd ar-Rahim Ahmad ALF 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar Independent Hanna Nasir Independent Muhammad an-Nash-ashibi Independent

<u>PNC #</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Comments</u>
		Jamal Surani	Independent
		Hamid Abu Sittah	Independent
		Ahmad Sidqi ad-Dajjani	Independent
		- Khalid al-Fahum - Speaker of the PNC.	
		- Salim az-Za'Nun - 1st Deputy Speaker.	
		- Mahmud Tayim - 2nd Deputy Speaker.	
		- Mahmud as-Sabih - PNC Secretary.	

301. Facts on File, 25 July 1979, p. 565.
302. Facts on File, 23 October 1981, p. 769.
303. Facts on File, 31 December 1981, pp. 967-968.
304. FBIS, 7 April 1982.
305. Facts on File, 17 September 1982, p. 674.
306. FBIS, 15 December 1982.
307. Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, Egypt, Algeria, Libya.
308. USA, USSR, PRC, France, Brazil, Hungary.
309. See Appendix D.
310. The Middle East and North Africa 1981-82, p. 87.
311. The Middle East and North Africa 1982-83, p. 91.
312. Interview with Harold Saunders, Middle East, June 1981, p. 37.
313. Ibid., p. 36.
314. FBIS, 25 July 1980.
315. FBIS, 9 February 1982.
316. Perera, Judith, "An End to Armed Propoganda?," Middle East, Sep. 1983, pp. 18-20.

- 276. An-Nahar Arab Report, 12 July 1982, pp. 1-3.
- 277. Facts on File, 20 February 1981, p. 108.
- 278. FBIS, 2 February 1979.
- 279. FBIS, 3 November 1980.
- 280. FBIS, 27 May 1980.
- 281. Laffin, p. 149.
- 282. Rubenberg, Cheryl, The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Institutional Infrastructure (Belmont, Mass.: The Institute of Arab Studies, Inc., 1983), pp. 51-52.
- 283. Ibid., p. 20.
- 284. Ibid., p. 54.
- 285. Laffin, p. 149.
- 286. The Link, XV, 3, 1982, p. 6.
- 287. FBIS, 19 March 1980.
- 288. FBIS, 27 July 1981.
- 289. The PLO has also had contact with US government officials such as Andrew Young and several Congressmen.
- 290. Facts on File, 19 October 1974, p. 845.
- 291. Facts on File, 16 November 1974, p. 935.
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139. Hussain, p. 20.
140. O'Ballance, p. 28.
141. Ibid., p. 31.
142. Hussain, p. 22.
143. O'Ballance, p. 50. Fatah strength:

At time of Karamah	600
Just after Karamah	12,000
End 1968	20,000

Iyad, p. 60.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Average # of Operations</u>
1967	12 per month
1968	52 per month
1969	199 per month
1970	279 per month (up until Black September)

144. Laffin, pp. 33-34.
145. Ibid., pp. 177-178.
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121. FBIS, 5 March 1982.
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123. FBIS, 4 October.
124. Amos, p. 92.
125. Ibid., p. 94; FBIS, 27 July 1981.
126. Amos, p. 95.
127. Iyad, p. 42.
128. O'Ballance, p. 23.
129. Hussain, p. 25.
130. Amos, p. 180.
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132. Hussain, p. 26.

82. Iyad, p. 33.
83. Ibid., p. 35.
84. Hussain, p. 30.
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89. Laffin, p. 16.
90. Iyad, p. 67.
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92. Ibid., p. 98.
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97. Hussain, pp. 30-31.
98. Amos, p. 64.
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100. An-Nahar Arab Report, 29 May 1978, p. 4; 5 June 1978, p. 4.
101. An-Nahar Arab Report, 13 June 1983, pp. 2-3.
102. Hussain, pp. 32-33.
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60. An-Nahar Arab Report, 20 September 1982. A poll of West Bank Arabs for Time revealed:
- | | |
|-------|--|
| 0.2% | Backed puppet villages led by Mustafa Dudeen |
| 98.2% | Wanted an independent Palestinian state. |
| 86.0% | Wanted an independent Palestinian state run by Arafat and the PLO. |
61. An Nahar Arab Report, 29 May 1978, p. 4.
62. An-Nahar Arab Report, 5 June 1978, p. 4; 12 June 1978.
63. Facts on File 17 June 1983, p. 446.
64. Kazziha, p. 18.
65. Ibid., p. 18.
66. Ibid., p. 17.
67. Ibid., p. 25.
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69. Ibid., p. 28.
70. Ibid., p. 44.
71. Ibid., p. 71.
72. Ibid., p. 77.
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75. Kazziha, p. 26.
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40. Much of this section is drawn from: Rubenberg, Cheryl, The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Institutional Infrastructure (Belmont, Mass.: The Institute of Arab Studies, Inc., 1983).
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49. Ibid., p. 24.
50. Ibid., p. 44.
51. Ibid., p. 155.
52. Ibid., p. 179.
53. Ibid., p. 186.
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38. The data in this section comes from the following sources: FBIS, The Middle East, January 1980, Palestine, vol. 9, no. 3, 1-15 March 1983, Laffin, Hussain, Iyad, O'Ballance, Arab World Weekly, and An-Nahar Arab Report.

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5. Kiernan, Thomas, Arafat, the Man and the Myth, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1976), p. 218. The term Fatah is derived from a reversal of the Arabic words Harakat Tahrir Filastin (Palestine Liberation Movement). These initials pronounced in this order, HTF, is the Arabic word meaning "death." The reversal of these initials produces the Arabic word meaning "conquest" or "victory."
6. To mask their true identity and for security reasons Fatah leaders have taken code names: Arafat - Abu Ammar, Khalid al-Hassan - Abu Said, Khalil al-Wazir - Abu Jihad, Salah Khalef - Abu Iyad, Faruq Qaddumi - Abu Lutuf, Mohammad Yusef - Abu Yusef.
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