


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
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CREOLE - LENINISM: GRENADA A CASE STUDY

by

Alan B. McKenzie

December 1984

Thesis Advisors:

J. Valenta

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

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Chapter three traces the Soviet, Cuban and other communist bloc assistance, to Grenada with an examination of Grenadian foreign policy during the Bishop regime.

Chapter four reviews the assassination of Maurice Bishop with contrasting parallels of Soviet decisionmaking in Angola and Afghanistan.

Chapter five concludes that the attempt to subvert and replace the populist Bishop with Moscow trained Coard, was orchestrated and sponsored by the Soviet Union,

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Creole - Leninism: Grenada a Case Study

by

Alan Bruce McKenzie
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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
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MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the socialist transformation and subsequent militarization and violent political polarization of Grenada in view of the primary source documents that were recovered by the joint Caribbean task force in October 1983.

Chapter one presents a brief history and the rise to power of Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement. Chapter two demonstrates the strategic significance of the Caribbean basin to both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Chapter three traces the Soviet, Cuban and other communist bloc assistance, to Grenada with an examination of Grenadian foreign policy during the Bishop regime.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the early morning of October 25, 1983, elements of a combined U.S. Caribbean Task Force landed at Pearls and Point Salines Airport in Grenada to restore order to a small but ravaged island. At the cessation of hostilities 21 Americans, 24 Cubans, and 45 Grenadians had been killed in action. By early November approximately 800 Cubans, 49 Soviets, 15 North Koreans, 17 Libyans, 10 East Germans, and 3 Bulgarians had been airlifted out of war torn Grenada by the International Red Cross.

How did this tiny, nutmeg producing island in the Caribbean slip into tyranny and spin into an East-West security issue?

Was the radical, socialist transformation of the New Jewel Movement part of a regional effort to coordinate the global shift in the "correlation of forces"?

Was the militarization and violent political polarization of Grenada precipitated and orchestrated by a Soviet sponsored political coup?

This paper, with a brief history of the New Jewel Movement, is an attempt to assess these questions in light of the documents recovered by the Joint Caribbean Task Force and an analysis of the Soviet decisionmaking process.

A. HISTORY OF THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT

Grenada is the southernmost island of the Windward Group and encompasses approximately 133 square miles. The

population of about 110,000 is composed primarily of descendants of African slaves and, to a lesser degree, indentured laborers from the East Indies. A Creole dialect of English and French patois is spoken by the inhabitants.

Grenada was discovered by Columbus in 1498, settled by the French in the 17th century, and ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Grenada remained under British rule until independence in March 1974, retaining the Governor General and Commonwealth status. A summary of significant chronological events appears in Table I.

The Grenadian economy is based upon agriculture and tourism. Primary agriculture exports are bananas, cocoa, and nutmeg. The economy is severely depressed with unemployment exceeding 30 percent. External economic support continues to be the key factor in the Grenadian economy.

The New Jewel Movement (NJM) was formed by two lawyers, Maurice Bishop and Kenrick Radix, and JEWEL (Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education and Liberation) led by Unison Whiteman, Lelayn Strachan, Sebastian Thomas and Teddy Victor. Table II lists the composition of leadership in the New Jewel Movement and the primary cabinet positions in the Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG).

B. THE MARCH REVOLUTION

After Grenadian independence on February 7, 1974, a coalition between the NJM and other opposition parties mounted a serious challenge to long-term Prime Minister Sir

TABLE I.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

DATE	EVENT
1498	Island named Concepcion by Christopher Columbus during his third voyage to the New World.
1783	The French cede Grenada to Britain. Imported slaves and local Carob Indians work large sugar-cane plantations.
1974	Grenada gains independence from Great Britain, becoming the smallest independent nation in the Western Hemisphere. Eric Gairy, with strong union support, is elected Prime Minister.
MAR-79	Bloodless coup by the Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement topples the Gairy Government. Maurice Bishop becomes Prime Minister.
JUN-80	Queens Park assassination attempt against Maurice Bishop fails.
MAR-83	President Reagan in a televised speech, charges that Point Salines Airport complex is a U.S. security threat.
MAY-83	During an "unofficial" visit to Washington D.C., Bishop meets with National Security Advisor Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam in an effort to improve relations between the two countries.
SEP-83	Central Committee proposes joint leadership between Bishop and Coard in a calculated attempt to oust Bishop.

TABLE I. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (continued)

DATE	EVENT
OCT 13	Bishop placed under "House Arrest".
OCT 19	Thousands of supporters free Bishop from House Arrest and march to Fort Rupport. Bishop, three cabinet members and two labor leaders are taken into an inner courtyard by attacking Army troops, shot through the head and their bodies burned.
OCT 20	President Reagan orders the diversion to Grenada of a naval task force originally headed for Lebanon.
OCT 25	Grenada is invaded by a U.S. Joint Caribbean Task Force comprised of troops from six Caribbean nations.

TABLE II.

NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP

A. BISHOP FACTION

Maurice Bishop . . Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Interior, Health Information, and Carriacou Affairs. Central Committee Chairman and Politburo member. Executed by the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) on 19 OCT 83.

Unison Whiteman . Politburo member, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Civil Aviation. Executed by RMC on 19 OCT 83.

TABLE II. (continued)

NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP

Geroge Louison . . Politburo member and Minister of Agriculture, Rural Development and Co-operative.

Fitzroy Bain . . Union leader executed by the RMC on 19 OCT 83.

Vincent Noel . . Politburo member.

Henrick Radix . . Politburo member, Minister of Legal Affairs, Agro-Industries and Fisheries.

Norris Bain . . Housing Minister, executed by RMC on 19 OCT 83.

Jacqueline Creft . Minister of Education, Youth and Social Affairs and Bishop's live in companion. Executed by RMC on 19 OCT 83.

B. COARD FACTION

Bernard Coard . . Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Trade, Finance, Industry and Planning.

Phyllis Coard . . Wife of Bernard Coard and Head of National Women's Organization.

Leon Cornwall . . Ambassador to Cuba.

Liam James . . Politburo member and party supervisor of the Armed Forces.

Ewart Layne . . Politburo member and Minister of Interior.

Sewlwyn Strachan . Politburo member.

Lyden Rhamdhany . Minister of Tourism.

Hudson Austin . . Politburo member, Minister of Defense, Communication and Public Works. Headed RMC following coup of OCT 83.

C. GOVERNOR GENERAL

Sir Paul Scoon . . Represented the island's connection to the British commonwealth, largely ignored by the New Jewel Movement.

Eric Gairy and they subsequently received 48% of the vote in the 1976 elections. The eccentric Gairy, however, was still a hero to peasantry and popular in a land where class and color conflicts manifested themselves in emotional elections that pitted the Black Messiah (Gairy) against the anti-Gairy brownskin professionals. On November 18, 1973, Bishop and five other NJM leaders were badly beaten by Gairy's personal armed security guards (Mongoose gang) and thrown into prison. Two months later on "Bloody Monday", Gairy's "Mongoose Gang", shot and killed Rupert Bishop, Maurice Bishop's father, during street demonstrations. On March 13, 1979, while Gairy was attending a United Nations session in New York, the NJM, with the aid of a team of black Cuban commandos from Cuban intelligence services' (DGI) Directorate of Special Operations, successfully carried out a coup d'etat [Ref. 1].

Forty armed men seized a key army barracks and the island's only radio station, where they began broadcasting appeals to the citizenry to rise up. Within twelve hours, Gairy's regime had been toppled. Maurice Bishop was named Prime Minister of the new Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG). On March 25, Bishop announced suspension of the 1974 constitution, and indicated that it would be replaced pending revision with a series of "People's Laws".

Bishop epitomized the spontaneous, handsome, charismatic leader. His political base of nationalistic

Venezuela. Castro's Cuba was already providing substantial aid for the Point Salines airport project, in the form of materials, engineers and construction workers. Table III depicts the proportionate funding of the airport. Layne Dredging of Miami (American firm) was contracted to do the airport dredging and the British firm of Plessey was contracted to install the runway lighting and airport navigation systems [Ref. 18].

The Reagan administration maintained that a 9,000 foot runway was not needed for tourism and was but a ruse for a Soviet and Cuban joint use military facility. The proposed dual capability of the controversial airport construction project is supported by Bishop in 1980;

"Suppose there's a war next door in Trinidad, where the forces of Fascism are about to take control and the Trinidadians need assistance. Why should we oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist them?" [Ref.19].

Specific reference to the contemplated use of the Point Salines facility is contained in a March 1980 entry in the diary of Liam James, " . . . the airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military." [Ref. 20]. In spite of protestations to the contrary, Bernard Coard in May 1980 signed an agreement with the Soviet Union, which granted Soviet TU-95, "Bear" long range reconnaissance aircraft, landing rights in Grenada [Ref. 21].

Grenada's "strategic aim is to further develop relations with the socialist countries. . . we want to follow our own way, the way of close relations with the socialist community, the Soviet Union in particular [Ref. 14]. The Soviet assistance consisted of \$1.4 million dollars to purchase steel and flour, 2,000 tons of steel, a naval port facility at Tyrrel Bay and \$7.7 million dollars to finance construction of a ground communications station as part of the Soviet Intersputnik Satellite System [Ref. 15].

Other communist bloc countries offered to buy nutmeg and other Grenadian exports at "stable" prices, provide trade credits, technical and military training, plus scholarships for Grenadian students [Ref. 16].

In December 1979, 84 pieces of Soviet heavy construction equipment, 4,000 tons of cement, and 1,500 tons of steel, together with a 250 man Cuban construction brigade, arrived in Grenada to begin construction on the 9,000 foot runway, located at Point Salines, a peninsula on the southwest coast of the island [Ref. 17]. The Bishop government first approached the United States, Britain and Canada to assist with the proposed airport financing. The United States refused the request and others quickly followed suit.

In April 1981, Grenada sought \$30 million in economic assistance from the European Common Market. After Grenada received limited funds from the EEC, they obtained additional economic assistance from Lybia, Algeria, Syria, and

contribution to the Caribbean Development Bank, conditional on Grenada's exclusion.

With U.S. economic assistance highly unlikely, Grenada relied on the "fraternal" assistance of the socialist community, Cuba and the Soviet Union in particular. Cuba's presence was by far the most visible. In addition to large numbers of military and airport construction workers, Cuba provided doctors, teachers, and dentists. Radio Free Grenada received a 75 kilowatt radio transmitter from Havana and with East German assistance installed 450 tons of telephone and electronic equipment [Ref. 13]. Libya's Muammar Qaddafi gave the Bishop regime three Soviet patrol boats. North Korea provided personnel to construct an irrigation system. Venezuela donated housing material and 10,000 barrels of fuel.

The Soviet economic and military assistance emanated from three high level meetings. In March 1980, Admiral of the Fleet Sergi Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy and Deputy Minister of Defense, visited Bishop in Grenada. Two months later, in late May 1980, Deputy Grenadian Prime Minister Bernard Coard visited Moscow. In July 1982 Prime Minister Bishop visited Moscow and announced that he had concluded "substantial economic and political agreements with the Soviet Union to cut his countrys dependence on the West." At a press conference held after his arrival in Moscow in July 1982, Bishop said that

III. FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE

A. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Grenada's alignment with the East became apparent when Grenada followed Cuba's example and voted against the United Nation's resolution calling for withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan after the Soviet Union's invasion in December 1979. Defending the Soviet action Prime Minister Bishop said;

"We certainly support fully the right of Afghanistan to call on any country, including the Soviet Union . . . in circumstances such as these, where external aggression is being faced." [Ref. 12].

Newspapers ("Torchlight" and "Gleaner") were closed and political opposition labeled as counter-revolutionary jailed. This preoccupation with counter-revolutionary activity was somewhat confirmed by the Queen's Park bombing incident in May 1980. Three people were killed and one hundred injured when a bomb was detonated at a government sponsored mass rally.

Both Presidents Carter and Reagan were quick to impose economic restrictions on Grenada in an attempt to isolate the Grenadian and Cuban influence in the English speaking Caribbean. The National Security Council considered a Naval Blockade and President Carter refused to accept the diplomatic credentials of Dessima Williams, Grenada's Envoy to Washington. President Reagan unsuccessfully opposed IMF assistance to Grenada but restricted a four million dollar

Arabian Gulf since March 1984. Tanker traffic was brought to a virtual standstill in May with only a fraction of normal traffic in July and August [Ref. 11]. The low traffic levels currently experienced in the Gulf are not the result of coordinated governmental action but rather the combined effect of threatened Seamen Union action and an unprecedented increase in hull risk insurance rates from .25% (immediately outside the war zone) to 7.5% in the Gulf (Kharg Island) [Ref. 11].

An increased security threat in the Caribbean Basin would require diversion of vital U.S. Naval assets, create economic instability and undermine regional alliances. The U.S. preoccupation with its southern flank would allow the Soviet Union greater flexibility for political and military expansion in such areas as Eastern Europe, Africa, the Mideast and Southwest Asia.

The Caribbean



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Figure 2.

OSA I/II - 400 NM Effective Radius

had been equipped (or staged from Cuba) with a relatively small number of Soviet made Fast Attack Missile boats of the OSAI/II or Komar Class, the threat of serious interdiction would have been enormous. The OSA class missile patrol craft carries four SS-N-2 surface to surface missiles with an effective range of 25 nautical miles (see Figure 2). The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the strategic importance of the Caribbean Basin and Grenada:

"If Cuban fighters were to stage out of Central American (i.e., Nicaragua) or Caribbean airfields (i.e., Grenada) and those in Cuba, they could strike all of Central America, the Caribbean Islands, parts of southeastern United States (highly unlikely), and oil fields located in Mexico (Veracruz) and Venezuela" [Ref. 10].

F. PARALYSIS OF FEAR

The Caribbean Basin, with its encircling geography, shallow waters and multitude of natural "choke" points (restricted passage due to water depth), is particularly vulnerable to the psychological warfare recently evidenced in both the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. In an attempt to discredit the moderate states of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, radical elements, with or without government sponsorship, have instilled a psychology of fear into religious Muslims participating in the annual Hegira. Unexplained explosions on eighteen ships precipitated a multinational effort to "sweep" portions of the Red Sea in an attempt to locate any mines. The result of this activity has been inconclusive as to the determination of the presence or origin of any mines.

Twelve tankers have been struck by missiles in the




Figure 1. Caribbean Triangle

tension, another fleet approximately the size of the Sixth Fleet would be required to secure our southern flank. This is both economically and politically not feasible. Thus in the event of even a temporary closure of the Panama Canal by either Soviet (highly unlikely), surrogate or terrorist forces (not beyond the realm of possibility), one sixth of U.S. oceanborne trade could be made hostage to even a relatively weak power.

E. CARIBBEAN TRIANGLE

The Caribbean is to the United States as the Mediterranean is to Europe. The geopolitical significance of Grenada is portrayed in Figure 1 by triangulating Havana, Nicaragua, and Grenada. Such a triangle visually depicts the potential interdiction that could be exacted on the trade routes and vital sea lanes by hostile air or sea forces launched from peripheral footholds in the Caribbean.

Cuba, although a formidable military presence, cannot, even with massive Soviet assistance (\$5-7 billion annually), project its political and military will into Latin American or Africa without the cooperation of other nations. During the height of the Angola operations, Soviet IL-62 (Aeroflot) commercial transports carried Cuban units to Angola with refueling stops in Guyana. If the Point Salines Airport had been operational, both Cuban and Soviet troop transports could have made the trip to Angola non-stop. Lastly, a major naval task force is not required to impair the Canal or seriously impair the sea lanes of the Caribbean. If Grenada

oceanborne trade for 1980 was 770,022,000 tons. One sixth of all U.S. ocean trade for 1980 transited the Panama Canal. Total Canal traffic for all nations in 1980 was 183,200,000 tons [Ref. 7]. Sixty-two percent of all Panama Canal traffic in 1980 carried cargo to or from the United States. Although termed obsolete by some "myopic" defense planners, the Panama Canal remains the key to the projection of U.S. Naval sea power into three oceans with only a two fleet Navy.

Alfred Thayer Mahan noted in 1890, "the influence of the government will be felt in its most legitimate manner in maintaining an armed navy, of a size commensurate with the growth of its shipping and the importance of the interests connected with it" [Ref. 8]. Few defense planners today view the protection of merchant shipping as the primary navy role as did Mahan, but the safeguarding of the merchant sea lanes is still a primary mission of the United States Navy.

The Soviets view sea power in the broadest terms, with the merchant marine as an integral part of the power equation combined with combatant ships, aircraft, and rocket forces [Ref. 9]. Taken from a Soviet perspective it is not unreasonable to suppose that they would view United States merchant interests as a vital pressure point to be tested in an economic and political struggle.

In order to provide adequate protection for merchant shipping and sea lanes of communication during times of high

be moved aboard Military Sealift Command vessels and merchant ships of the National Defense Reserve Fleet and NATO countries. The embarkation point for three of the U.S. Army divisions; the 3rd armored, 1st mechanized, and 5th infantry is Beaumont, Texas, on the Gulf of Mexico. Three other divisions; the 7th, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, based in Hawaii, California, and Washington, would normally be moved by sea through the Panama Canal, then eastward south of Cuba [Ref. 5].

The strategic significance of the Caribbean Basin is highlighted by critical links in the network of American listening posts monitoring ship and submarine activities in the Atlantic Ocean and approaches to the Caribbean, as well as other vital communications, tracking and navigational facilities and monitoring stations for Cape Kennedy and the U.S. space program. The Navy's Atlantic underseas test and evaluation center in the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands is critical to the development of U.S. anti-submarine capabilities.

D. SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION

The United States has thirty-four oceanbourne trade routes designated as "essential for the promotion, development, expansion, and maintenance of the foreign commerce of the United States" [Ref. 6]. Nine of these essential trade routes transit the Panama Canal. In 1980, 114,148,000 tons of cargo bound to or from United States ports travelled via the Canal on these routes. Total U.S.

Bahamas process a substantial amount of strategic imports. The Eastern Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico are the funnel through which flows 70 percent of imported Middle Eastern and Latin American petroleum products and 50 percent of all U.S. trade. Oil from Alaska and Ecuador passes through the trans-Panamanian pipeline, augmenting the tanker routes through the Canal. The aggregate significance of the Caribbean for American oil imports approximates the Persian Gulf [Ref. 4]. The South American Sealines of Communications (SLOC) also carry nearly two-thirds of western European petroleum imports as well as 20% to 85% of various strategic minerals imported by the U.S. from South Africa.

The Caribbean Basin itself is a principal source of U.S. raw material imports. After Canada, Mexico is the second most important supplier of critical raw materials to the United States, and the principal supplier of silver, zinc, gypsum, antimony, mercury, bismuth, selenium, barium, rhenium, and lead. Over 50 percent of U.S. bauxite imports have traditionally come from Suriname, Guyana, Haiti, and Jamaica. Substantial quantities of iron ore originate in Brazil and Venezuela.

C. NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING

In the event of war, the NATO "swing strategy" calls for the airlift of three reinforcing U.S. divisions to Europe, where some equipment has already been prepositioned. Other equipment and five or more additional divisions would

II. CARIBBEAN STRATEGY

A. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Destabilization of United States interests in the Western Hemisphere in general, and the Caribbean Basin in particular is one of the long-term strategic objectives of the Soviet Union. By carefully using trusted regional surrogates, the Soviets are able to exploit opportunities to expand its influence among traditionally non-western third world countries. The small island states of the Caribbean are suffering from severe economic and social repression and are extremely vulnerable to such destabilizing influences [Ref. 3]. In a politically volatile Caribbean Basin, Grenada represents an important Soviet strategic opportunity to contribute to regional instability and to penetrate the unprotected but vital U.S. southern flank.

B. STRATEGIC RESOURCES

The geopolitical area of the Caribbean encompasses strategically located islands and adjacent littoral states. Any hostile presence (military or terrorist) in this area would constitute an interdiction capability threatening major Atlantic-Pacific and north-south maritime routes. The Caribbean Islands serve as both major transshipment points of Middle Eastern oil and as principal refining centers. Transshipment installations and refineries in St. Croix, Aruba, Curacao, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and the

populism enjoyed a broad spectrum of appeal. At ease with the population, he stressed youth, education, and the rights of women and peasants. Bishop's speeches contained little of the dialectical rhetoric or class analysis usually associated with Marxism-Leninism. On the contrary, Bishop took inspiration from the traditions of Caribbean populism, stressing social justice, nationalism and grassroots participation.

"People of Grenada, this revolution is for work, for food, for decent housing and health services, and for a bright future for our children and great-grandchildren." [Ref. 2].

Bernard Coard, had studied economics at Brandeis and Sussex Universities, was an avowed Marxist-Leninist. Recognizing the political importance of controlling party apparatus, Coard expanded his political power base by controlling the semi-secret group, Organization for Educational Advancement and Research and cultivating militant officers of the PRA (Peoples Revolutionary Army). Three of these officers, also members of the Central Committee, Leon Cornwall, Ewart Layne, and Liam James shared Coard's dedication for orthodox communism. This symbiotic relationship formed a cadre which would later play key leadership roles in the Coard bid for power and the subsequent death of Bishop.

TABLE III.
Point Salines Airport Funding Sources

Iraqi Fund for External Development	5.0	*
Grenada	14.2	
OPEC Fund	2.0	
Cuba	33.6	
European Economic Community	2.2	
Venezuela	0.5	
Algeria	1.0	
Syria	2.0	
Libya	4.0	
Other	6.5	
Total	71.0	

NOTES * \$14.1 IMF Loan

All figures U.S. Million Dollars

Source: Caribbean Monthly Bulletin,
University of Puerto Rico,
Vol. 16, number 3, March 1983

B. FORTRESS GRENADA

Three days after the successful coup d'etat by Bishop and the NJM, the Cuban ship Matanzas arrived in Grenada with a large cargo of Soviet made weapons and ammunition [Ref. 17]. Coordinated intelligence by Havana and the NJM was required to account for the normal seven day voyage of the Matanzas [Ref. 22]. One month later Torres Rizo, a senior Cuban Intelligence Officer (Americas Department), was assigned to Grenada as Cuban Charge d'affaires. On October 10, 1979, Torres Rizo was promoted to full Ambassador.

The quantity of stockpiled weapons that were recovered by the joint Caribbean Task Force (Table IV), far exceeded the legitimate security requirements of Grenada.

Documents recovered by the joint Caribbean Task Force indicate that in the intervening three years Grenada signed seven major arms agreements: three with the Soviet Union, one each with Cuba, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. All Soviet arms transfer agreements stipulated:

"The government of Grenada and the government of the USSR shall take all the necessary measures to ensure keeping in secret the terms and conditions of the deliveries, all correspondence and information connected with the implementation of the present agreement." [Ref. 23].

All shipments were free and to be delivered at the port of the Republic of Cuba [Ref. 23].

TABLE IV.
WEAPONS RECOVERED IN GRENADA

PERSONAL WEAPONS TYPE/DESCRIPTION	COUNTRY OF MANUFACTURE	QUANTITY
AK-47 Assault Rifle 7.62mm	USSR	1626
Model 52 SLR Rifle 7.62mm	Czech.	1120
Lee-Enfield Rifle .303 cal.	UK	58
Simonov (SKS) SLR Rifle	USSR	4074
Bren Light-Machine Gun	UK	2
Lee-Enfield MK III Rifle .303 cal.	India	3
M-16 Rifle 5.56mm	USA	6
M1891/30 Mosin-Nagant Rifle 7.72mm	USSR	2432
M3A1 Sub-Machine Gun .45 cal.	USA	32
Miscellaneous side arms	--	300
Rifles .22 cal.	--	31
Shotguns	--	<u>300</u>
	TOTAL	9993

CREW SERVED WEAPONS

PKM Light Machine Gun 7.62mm	USSR	9
SPG-9 Recoilless Anti-Tank 73mm	USSR	8
DSH K-38 Heavy Machine Gun 12.7mm	USSR	1
ZU-23 Twin Towed AAA Gun 23mm	USSR	12
Mortar 82mm	USSR	10
Type 52 Recoilless Rifle 75mm	China	3

TABLE IV. (Continued)

MISCELLANEOUS WEAPONS

RPG-7 Portable Rocket Launcher 85mm	USSR	6
RPG-2 Portable Rocket Launcher 82mm	USSR	46
Riot Guns (Tear Gas Discharge)	--	8
Flare Guns	--	8
BTR-60PB Armored Personnel Carriers	USSR	10
BRDM-2 Amphibious Scout Cars	USSR	2

AMMUNITION

7.62 small arms	5,516,600
73mm Recoilless Rifle	162
82mm Rocket Launcher	8,962
14.5mm Machine Gun	2,320
12.7mm Machine Gun	29,120
Dynamite	1,200
Flares	24,768
82mm Mortar	86,332
57mm Rocket Propelled Grenades	366
75mm Recoilless Rifle	940
Grenades	1,824

SOURCE: "Grenada: October 25 to November 2, 1983", Department of Defense Publication.

The Soviet arms transfer agreements dated October 27, 1980, February 9, 1981, and July 27, 1982, provided for a wide range of light infantry weapons including fifty BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers. A fourth agreement signed in 1983 appears to call for still more "special and other equipment valued at 5,400,000 roubles" and included two patrol gunboats, more ammunition, and some 300 complete uniforms, presumably for 1,500 more men, bringing the total Soviet provision for Grenadian armed forces to 7,800 men. See appendix A for copies of the 27 Oct 1980 Soviet Arms Agreement and appendix B for the subsequent Protocol agreement of 9 Feb. 1981.

The Cuban Protocol Agreement (undated) established a Cuban Military Mission on Grenada, to organize the Peoples Revolutionary Army (PRA) and provide combat training, both in Cuba and in Grenada. At the time of the Bishop assassination (19 October 1983), approximately 400 Grenadians were studying in Cuba [Ref. 24]. The North Korean arms transfer agreement dated 14 April 1983, was the single largest agreement (\$12,000,000) providing 6,000 more uniforms, 1,000-7.62mm automatic rifles, heavy machine guns, RPG-7 launchers, ammunition, and gas masks.

An undated note on the stationery of Grenada in Havana stated "the Government of Czechoslovakia has agreed to provide to the Government of Grenada free of cost the

following items listed below." The list includes 3,000-7.62mm automatic rifles with 1 million rounds of ammunition [Ref. 25].

The large quantity of promised weapons, equipment and training would outfit an Army of six Battallions by 1986 (four active, two reserve) [Ref. 26]. The PRA would have in excess of 10,800 men under arms, second only to Cuba in the Caribbean.

Integrated with the political infrastructure, the armed forces were a principle element in the PRG. They enforced domestic and party discipline, provided a means for political indoctrination, repression of dissent, and mass mobilization. With massive Soviet and Cuban military assistance the New Jewel Movement was prepared to defend the Bishop regime against any opposition and would provide the subversive projection of power into the English speaking caribbean.

The security concerns of the adjacent East Caribbean States (ECS) are portrayed in Table V. Neighboring East Caribbean States are dwarfed in comparison to Grenada (1,700-Jamaica, 1,950-Trinidad and Tobago), some smaller states (Barbados and St. Vincent) have no uniformed Army at all but merely a constabulary force [Ref. 27].

TABLE V.

LATIN AMERICAN FORCES (1981)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u> <u>(X 1000)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(1981 \$M)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>FORCES</u>	<u>FORCE PER</u> <u>POPULATION</u>
Trinidad/ Tobago	1,200	6.9	800	.07%
Haiti	6,130	1.6	6,800	.11%
Costa Rica	2,450	2.6	7,000	.29%
Jamaica	2,300	2.8	9,220	.40%
Panama	2,050	0.4	9,500	.46%
Guyana	890	0.5	7,000	.79%
Cuba	10,000	16,000 ¹	153,000	1.53%
Grenada	115	0.2	10,800	9.39%

- NOTES: 1. The Cuban economy is heavily subsidized through Soviet aid. (est. \$3.0 Billion in 1981)
2. Bahamas, Barbados, St. Vincent, Belize and Bermuda maintain small para-military units only.

SOURCE: Strategic Balance 1983-1984

C. GRENADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Grenada's perception of continued Soviet military and economic assistance was conditional upon the NJM maintaining the "correct" revolutionary and anti-American posture. This awareness of conditional Soviet support was acknowledged by W. Richard Jacobs of the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow:

"The Soviets have been burnt quite often in the past by giving support to Governments which have either squandered that support, or turned around and become agents of imperialism, or lost power. One is reminded of Egypt, Somalia, Ghana and Peru." [Ref. 28].

"Our revolution has to be viewed as a world wide process with its original roots in the Great October Revolution. . . . We have to establish ourselves as the authority on events at least in the English speaking Caribbean, and be the sponsor of revolutionary activity and progressive developments in this region at least. . . . Of all the regional possibilities, the most likely candidate for special attention is Suriname. . . . Another candidate is Belize. I think that we can do some more work in that country." [Ref. 28].

The coordinated alignment of Grenadian Foreign Policy with Soviet objectives is further outlined in a confidential message from the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow dated 11 July 1983 [Ref. 28]:

"From the point of view of our relations with the USSR, our international activity is important from the following perspectives:

1. The consistency of our political line.
2. The influence of Grenada in the international community.
3. The degree of support offered to the positions taken by the USSR.

Our performance is assessed at the following levels:

1. The United Nations and its agencies-UNESCO,UNCTAD
2. Organization of American States
3. Non-aligned movement
4. Missions in various countries (Embassies)"

The general hypothesis selected to test this surrogate relationship is whether a distinct hostile shift in Grenadian Foreign Policy is evidenced from the economic assistance and major Soviet arms transfers to Grenada. The unit of analysis selected was Grenadian radio broadcasts as printed in FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service). The presence or absence of Grenadian hostility towards the United States was determined by identifying FBIS broadcasts containing the anti-American code words listed in Table VI.

TABLE VI.

Content Analysis Flag Words

U.S. IMPERIALISM	FASCISM
U.S. WARLORDS	ADVENTURISM
U.S. AGRESSION	U.S. PRESSURE
U.S. THREAT	INTERVENTION
IMPERIALISTS	BLAMES U.S.

All Grenadian radio broadcasts from April 1979 through September 1983 inclusive, were screened (see Table VII). In an effort to reduce distortion, months where the total broadcast count was less than five are noted by an asterisk. Intercoder reliability was determined by presenting a random sample of twenty five Grenadian FBIS, broadcasts to two independent evaluators. The evaluators screened and categorized each broadcast as positive, negative or neutral with respect to the presence or absence of Grenadian hostility toward the United States.

TABLE VII.

FBIS SUMMARY

DATE		TOTAL BROADCASTS	HOSTILE BROADCASTS	PERCENT HOSTILE
APR 79		18	1	5.6%
MAY 79		10	1	10.0%
JUN 79		5	1	20.0%
JUL 79		10	0	0.0%
AUG 79		6	2	33.3%
SEP 79	Event A	5	2	40.0%
OCT 79		12	4	33.3%
NOV 79		15	3	20.0%
DEC 79		9	1	11.1%
JAN 80		10	1	10.0%
FEB 80		7	0	0.0%
MAR 80		19	4	21.1%
APR 80	*	1	0	0.0%
MAY 80		6	1	16.7%
JUN 80	Event B	19	7	36.8%
JUL 80		10	1	10.0%
AUG 80		5	1	20.0%
SEP 80		5	1	20.0%
OCT 80	Event C	8	2	25.0%
NOV 80		12	1	8.3%
DEC 80		9	1	11.1%
JAN 81		8	1	12.5%
FEB 81	Event D	12	2	16.7%
MAR 81		29	5	17.2%
APR 81		26	2	7.7%
MAY 81	Event E	10	3	30.0%
JUN 81		11	2	18.2%
JUL 81		26	10	38.5%
AUG 81	Event F	17	10	58.8%
SEP 81		17	4	23.5%
OCT 81		24	3	12.5%
NOV 81		16	5	31.3%
DEC 81		14	5	35.7%
JAN 82		12	5	41.7%
FEB 82		6	1	16.7%
MAR 82		8	3	37.5%
APR 82	Event G	10	7	70.0%
MAY 82		8	5	62.5%
JUN 82		5	2	40.0%
JUL 82	Event H	6	1	16.7%
AUG 82		9	2	22.2%
SEP 82		6	0	0.0%
OCT 82	*	4	1	25.0%
NOV 82		15	2	13.3%
DEC 82		6	0	0.0%

TABLE VII. (Continued)

JAN 83		21	3	14.3%
FEB 83		13	4	30.8%
MAR 83	Event I	40	21	52.5%
APR 83		35	17	48.6%
MAY 83	Event J	12	6	50.0%
JUN 83		32	2	6.3%
JUL 83		29	2	6.9%
AUG 83		15	2	13.3%
SEP 83		20	3	15.0%

* Less than five total Grenadian FBIS broadcasts per month

SOURCE: CANA (Bridgetown), transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Latin America, Washington, D.C..

FIGURE 3.

INTERCODER RELIABILITY CHECK

(# of Broadcasts) X (# of Evaluators) - (# of Disagreements)

(# of Broadcasts) X (# of Evaluators)

$$\frac{(25 \times 2) - (2)}{(25 \times 2)} = \frac{48}{50} = 96.0\%$$

The resulting intercoder reliability of 96 % as demonstrated in Figure 3 was well within the required limits of analysis. Reliability of the content analysis is somewhat tempered by the population size of available broadcasts per month. The New Jewel movement's paranoid concern for CIA sponsored counter-revolutionary activity is an intervening factor that is constant throughout the temporal domain from July 1979 to September 1983.

Figure 4 depicts the intensity of Grenadian hostility towards the United States during the Bishop regime. Interpretation of figure 4 is facilitated by factoring the significant events contained in Table VIII. The anti-American hostility depicted by event spikes A through J in Figure 4 appear to be reactions to United States foreign policy initiatives and not the result of coordinated Soviet military and economic assistance. On the contrary it appears that there was a slight decrease, (8.4% post-event), in anti-American rhetoric following each covert, Soviet arms transfer (event spikes C,D,& H) to Grenada.

Event spikes F and G are the highest intensity (most anti-American), and reflect the same common denominator, that is, U.S. naval amphibious exercises in the Caribbean. Event I depicts the highest sustained hostility lasting three months. The catalyst for this low point in U.S.-Grenadian relations was President Reagan's televised speech on March 30, 1983, charging that the Point Salines Airport complex was a security threat to U.S. interests.

MONTHS (APRIL 79 TO SEP 83)

FIGURE 4. CONTENT ANALYSIS

TABLE VIII.
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

EVENT	DATE	SIGNIFICANCE
A.	SEP 79	Sixth non-aligned summit conference.
B.	19 JUN 80	Queens Park Bombing assassination attempt on the life of Maurice Bishop. (unsuccessful)
C.	27 OCT 80	Soviet covert arms transfer # 1.
D.	9 FEB 81	Soviet covert arms transfer # 2.
E.	MAY 81	U.S. sponsored IMF loan refusal.
F.	AUG 81	U.S. Naval exercise "Amberdene" with amphibious assault landings on the Vieques Islands Puerto Rico.
G.	APR 82	President Reagan's OAS address, posing the Bishop regime as a threat to caribbean regional security.
	APR 82	Grenada excluded from regional economic assistance under U.S. aid proposal C.B.I. (Caribbean Base Initiative).
	MAY 82	U.S. Naval exercise "Ocean Venture" (28 APR - 16 MAY), with amphibious assault landings on Vieques Islands, Puerto Rico.
H.	27 JUL 82	Soviet covert arms transfer # 3.
I.	MAR 83	Reagan televised speech charging the Point Salines Airport project a threat to regional stability and the national security of the United States.
J.	31 May 83	Bishop meets with National Security Advisor Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Dam in Washington, in an attempt to establish a dialogue with the Reagan Administration.

Bishop's opponents attempted to manipulate a solution that Bishop would not summarily reject and thereby prevent his large following from inciting rebellious action. Boycotting the General Assembly Meeting of September 25, 1983, Bishop was informed of the full party membership approval of the joint leadership [Ref. 43].

Similar to the factional disarray in the Khlaq party in Kabul, threatening party disintegration was evidenced by the first plenary session of the NJM Central Committee, held 13-19 July, 1983:

"Over the year under review our Party has demonstrated many weaknesses--ideologically, politically, and organizationally. At the same time, the emergence of deep petty bourgeois manifestations and influence in the Party has led to two ideological trends [one Marxist-Leninist and the other not]." [Ref. 44].

Confronted with an unstable leadership, western overtures, ouster of the Cuban ambassador from Central Committee meetings and apparent party disintegration, the Soviets "invited" Bishop to visit Moscow in September 1983, unlike Amin, Bishop naively accepted.

With Bishop, a man Coard viewed ideologically complacent and untutored in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, absent from the country, Coard acted quickly to consolidate his already rising power in the Central Committee. This assertive, behind the scene role set the stage for the confrontation upon Bishop's return on 8 October 1983.

The two factions were again joined in confrontation at the meeting of the Central Committee on 12 October 1983.

Bernard and Phyllis Coard were intensely disliked by the people of Grenada. Conscious of the unpopularity of Bernard Coard, Lorainne Lewis in a full meeting of the Central Committee asked:

"...how would we bring the question of joint leadership to the masses since there are many people who would not like to see Cde. Coard as leader?" [Ref. 43].

The question was answered by Coard supporter Liam James:

"...joint leadership is an internal party matter and is not to be brought to the masses. . . the key to defeating rumour mongering is the proletarian acceptance, attitude and disposition of the two comrades [Ref. 43].

Table VIII contains the voting results on the joint leadership proposal that were recorded in the Central Committee on September 16, 1983 [Ref. 42].

TABLE VIII.

RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
SEPTEMBER 16, 1983

Proposal	For	Against	Abstain
Joint Leadership	9	1	3
How to Inform the Membership:			
(A) Inform the members only through the minutes	10	1	2
(B) Inform all the members in one meeting	11	0	2
Informing the masses	0	9	3

However, in the following session on September 17th, Liam James, with coordinated support from Ewart Layne, Leon Cornwall, and Phyllis Coard, submitted a proposal for restructuring the party leadership [Ref. 42]. The comprehensive proposal by James and its almost immediate acceptance (9 to 1) by the majority of the Central Committee suggested prior coordination, spearheaded by the Coard faction. James claimed that the fundamental party problem was the leadership of Bishop and proposed a model of "joint" leadership in which Bishop would remain Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief but Coard would become the defacto party chief [Ref. 42]. Other shifts in portfolios of the NJM leadership were also approved, removing Bishop supporters from key positions. By adopting the restructuring proposal (Louison voted No, Austin abstained), Coard now controlled the chief policymaking element of the party, the politburo, and therefore the government as well as the chief administrative organ of the party, the Organizing Committee. By controlling these two entities, Coard controlled two of the three chief organs reporting to the Central Committee (the third was the armed forces, where he had already cultivated deep ideological loyalties), this left Bishop as chairman of the Central Committee without any real power or political constituency.

Bishop would be retained as Prime Minister (for an interim period) because of his depth of popular support and personal identification with the populace. Unlike Bishop,

This well-orchestrated scheme surfaced in September 1982, during a plenary meeting of the Central Committee. Coard, disillusioned with Bishop's "spontaneity" of leadership, piecemeal approach to "democratic centralism" and lack of "ideological clarity", resigned from the party's Central Committee. The erosion of Bishop's support in the Central Committee was evidenced by the majority of the Committee criticizing Bishop's "weak leadership" [Ref. 41].

In response to these criticisms, another extraordinary Central Committee meeting was held September 14-16, 1983. The session began with recriminations in general but turned with orchestrated precision on Bishop by the Coard power faction:

"[Failure] to build the party into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard in a country that is dominantly petit bourgeois... We have to develop an army with more complicated means. Tighten our relations with the World Socialist Movement, especially Cuba, S.U. [Soviet Union], G.D.R. [East Germany]..." (Lt. Col. Ewart Layne, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Interior)" [Ref. 42].

"All programmes of the Revolution are in a very weak condition, while propaganda work is still very bad. The mass organizations are showing less participation in the political work... If this is allowed to continue the party will disintegrate in a matter of 5 to 6 months... The Comrade Leader [Bishop] has not taken responsibility, not given the necessary guidance, ... is disorganized very often, avoids responsibilities for critical areas of work..." [Phyllis Coard] [Ref. 42].

Bishop joined in the self-criticism, at the risk of being publicly accused of being petit bourgeois, but attempted to deflect responsibility toward the "collective leadership" of the Central Committee [Ref. 42].

uncoordinated and unannounced Washington meeting was expressed by Soviet Minister Kazimirov, Director of the First Latin America Department, in a Moscow communique:

"Kazimirov told me that he first heard of the visit in the newspapers and that he first heard that the PM had a meeting with Clark when the Canadian Ambassador, who was on a visit to his office, mentioned it to him. . . Basically, he wanted to know what was the nature of the meeting with Clark." [Ref. 28].

Analogous to Amin demanding that the Soviet ambassador Puzanov be recalled by Moscow, Bishop demanded that Cuban Ambassador Torres Rizo not participate in further meetings of the Central Committee [Ref. 39].

D. THE BISHOP COUP

The Soviet objective was to initiate a political coup in Grenada, like Afghanistan in 1979, and replace the populist Bishop with a subservient, doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist. They perceived Bishop like Amin as leading a deterioration of the party into a Social Democratic party as opposed to Leninist principles championed by Bernard Coard [Ref. 40]. Coard had attended school in the Soviet Union and had a clear "ideological" path for the transformation of Grenadian society. The Soviets probably preferred Coard to Bishop as early as May 1980, when Coard visited Moscow. Like the initial attempts in both Angola and Kabul, the initial stage of a change in political leadership of Grenada called for the formation of Bishop-Coard coalition. This power sharing coalition was designed to slowly erode and dilute both the Bishop power base and his large popularity.

internal change in the Kabul regime, the Soviets quickly and without reservation, opted for military intervention.

Seven days after the failed, but close, assassination attempt on Amin, 10,000 Soviet airborne units of the 105th Airborne Guards Division were airlifted into Kabul [Ref. 34]. Within hours a special Soviet assault unit, surrounded Amin and his supporters where Amin was subsequently killed [Ref. 34].

The "Machiavelli" solution as to the unreliability of Amin was accompanied by Moscow placing a servient Karmal to head a compliant Kabul government.

The Soviets, fully aware of the geopolitical significance of Grenada, were initially content to allow Castro's Cuba to be their surrogate and regional power broker [Ref. 38]. Moscow's reluctance in being directly involved is evidenced by the fact that the Soviet resident embassy was not established in Grenada until September 1982 and all diplomatic business and arms transfer agreements were conducted in secrecy in Havana [Ref. 35].

C. RAPPROCHEMENT

The Soviet Threat analysis of the populist Bishop in the fall of 1983 closely parallels the Amin regime of 1979. Bishop's visit to Washington, D.C. in June 1983 coupled with his attempt to establish a "new" dialogue with neighboring Caribbean states were reminiscent of Amin's appeal to Pakistan and China. The Soviet concern for Bishop's

Taraki and Karmal [Ref. 34]. " Upon Taraki's return to Kabul, the Soviets appear to have organized and/or supported an anti-Amin coup on September 14-15, their objective being to establish a Khalq-Parcham coalition government led by Amin opposition Taraki and Karmal. At this time there was a reported attempt, with some yet unexplained involvement of Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, to assassinate Amin" [Ref. 34]. The attempted coup failed, however, and resulted in the death of Taraki, and Karmal fleeing to Czechoslovakia.

Amin, suspecting Puzanov's complicity in the assassination attempt, demanded that Moscow recall their ambassador. This incident coupled with Amin's refusal to visit Moscow in November and a flurry of overtures by Amin to Pakistan's Zia, convinced the Soviets of the volatile and unstable nature of the Amin regime.

Undaunted by previous failures, the Soviets sponsored yet another covert attempt on Amin's life. General Victor Paputin was assigned to Kabul in late November on the pretext of monitoring counter insurgency elements but in actuality was coordinating Taraki and Karmal supporters in yet another assassination attempt. On December 19, 1979, with the assistance of the Soviet secret police and under the direction of General Paputin, an unidentified assailant killed Amin's nephew, Assadullah and wounded Amin [Ref. 34].

Faced with an independent, unreliable and possibly traitorous Amin, courting Pakistani and probably Chinese assistance, and the twice failed attempts to produce an

ly assist the Cuban intervention in Angola was in part a direct result of a power vacuum left by the United States.

The domestic constraints on a waning U.S. role in Angola was evidenced by congressional cuts in military assistance, Watergate and post-Vietnam paralysis. In addition, when confronted with a choice of continued use of the Azores or aid to the FNLA, Washington acceded to the dictatorial pressures of Lisbon and reduced FNLA aid to a trickle [Ref. 32]. This vacuum was interpreted by the Soviets as a favorable shift of the "correlation of forces" to their distinct advantage.

The almost feverish preoccupation of the United States with the hostage crisis in Iran in November 1979 and the dedicated Naval presence in the Persian Gulf, provided the Soviets the necessary distraction to attempt to alter the political composition of Kabul. This same preoccupation of American political and military forces was present in Vietnam in 1968 and Suez in 1956. Both distractions were synonymous with Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) [Ref. 37].

Confronted with the increasing unpredictability of Hafizullah Amin as evidenced by Amin's refusal to implement Soviet suggestions of widening his base of political support, and the factional dispute within the Khalq, the Soviets orchestrated an anti-Amin coalition in Moscow on September 13, 1979 with promises of assistance to both

the mutual support of Navimibi (UNITA) and Roberto (FNLA) by both Washington and Peking. Lastly, the South African armed incursion into southern Angola in August 1975, placed the MPLA on the defensive and threatened to unfavorably alter the outcome in Angola.

Based on the combined support of the UNITA/FNLA coalition by both the U.S. and China, and the incursion by South Africa into southern Angola coupled with the ouster of the Gonclaves government in Lisbon, the Soviets abandoned any hope of a political solution in their favor.

Four years later the Soviets were presented with similar threat factors in Afghanistan [Ref. 34]. An unpredictable personality, Hafizullah Amin, U.S., China support for the Muslim rebels, internal factional dispute among the Marxist oriented Khalq regime, and the real prospect of Kabul losing the war with the muslim rebels in spite of massive Soviet military assistance.

Faced with the possibility of a pro-Maoist or pro-western regime in Kabul coupled with the Soviet concern of Islamic fundamentalism spreading into Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan, the Soviets attempted to significantly change the political makeup of the Kabul regime, i.e. a political coup.

Prior to escalating either politically or militarily in either Angola or Afghanistan, the Soviets assessed the correlation of political and military forces, in particular the perceived U.S. response. The politburo decision to direct-

third world allies [Ref. 36]. Both in Angola and Grenada, and to a lesser degree Afghanistan, the Soviet Union attempted to regain lost momentum (Chile, Egypt and Portugal) as the world leader of revolutionary movements. A small political investment in Grenada would provide huge rewards of influence in competition for non-aligned and third world allegiance.

B. THE AMIN COUP

The second major factor in the Soviet decisionmaking equation is the perceived threat to the Soviet investment. Both in Afghanistan and Angola, military intervention was precipitated by failed Soviet attempts at a political change. The Soviet investment in Angola was in a precarious position in the fall of 1975. A factional struggle in the Marxist oriented MPLA in the previous year resulted in the Soviets temporarily withdrawing their support for Neto in favor of Chipinda. This temporary suspension of military assistance and financial aid was used as leverage in attempt to form a coalition of the three divided MPLA factions. The Soviet preference for a political coalition among the MPLA was based not only on a united front to counter the Portuguese, Chinese and U.S. supported factions (FNLA and UNITA), but also an effort to prevent a single populist leader (Neto), from assuming unchallenged control of the movement [Ref. 32].

The second major threat to Soviet interests was the apparent U.S.-Chinese "collusion" precedent established by

government, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and assassinated Amin.

A parallel Soviet objective was to counter the large American Naval presence in the Persian Gulf and attempt to isolate both Pakistan and China. Likewise, if the Soviets could successfully install a client state in Grenada, the United States would be forced to become preoccupied with its historically vulnerable southern flank, thereby allowing the Soviets a free hand in both Poland and Afghanistan [Ref. 34].

Another but equally important objective of the Soviets is the "springboard" theory. A reliable, "progressive" government in Luanda, would serve not only as a naval facility on the Atlantic, but a "springboard" to all of sub-saharan Africa. A Soviet presence was necessary to check expanding Chinese influence and prevent the possibility of a rapprochement with the government of South Africa. A strong Soviet presence in Afghanistan would bring increased pressure on northern Iran and more importantly act as a buffer against the spreading of Islamic fundamentalism into the southern regions of the Soviet Union. The Grenada stepstone is an incident of geography. All of the littoral islands of the eastern Caribbean, Suriname, Guyana, oil rich Venezuela and all of Central America would feel the Soviet/Cuban influence with Grenada serving as a Soviet client [Ref. 35]. Lastly, the Soviets wanted to demonstrate regional confidence in their ability to project and support

political coup to replace Bishop with Bernard Coard. When this attempt failed the Soviet ambassador ordered the Bishop assassination [Ref. 30].

The Soviet aversion to strong, populist, charismatic leaders, such as Tito Amin, Sadat and even Castro, is supported by the belief that such "personalities" are ideologically weak and politically unreliable [Ref. 31]. On the contrary, the Soviets prefer to deal with a "collective" leadership of rival, and competing factions. Both Angola and Afghanistan serve as recent evidence of Soviet manipulation of political factions, not for ideological purity, but to ensure a compliant surrogate.

Soviet objectives in Angola and Afghanistan, although not identical, in many respects are parallel those existing in Grenada in September 1983. In Angola in 1975, the Soviet support of the Marxist oriented MPLA, was an attempt to counter American and Chinese influence in sub-saharan Africa [Ref. 32]. In Kabul, the Moscow groomed regime of President Amin was seeking a "dialogue" with the West through Pakistan's Zia [Ref. 33]. Confronted with the unreliable Amin, factional disarray in the communist Khalq Party, and Amin's demand that the Soviet Ambassador be recalled for intelligence activities, the Soviets attempted two political coups, both of which were unsuccessful. Aware of the American preoccupation with the Iran hostage crisis, and calculating the potential impact of a hostile Kabul

IV. THE "AFGHAN" SOLUTION

A. THE LEADERSHIP DILEMMA

The factors that led to the disintegration of the New Jewel Movement are rooted in the history of the party and especially in the interplay between its two dominant leaders, Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard. The personal rivalry between these two men preceded the rise of the NJM to power, and, while this dynamic had surfaced early in the movement, the extent of their differences over policy questions, coupled with the intensity of Coard's personal ambitions, and the covert efforts he had taken to develop an independent, Marxist power base (a party within a party), are the factors which precipitated the purging of Bishop and the subsequent invasion by United States and Caribbean forces on 26 October 1983.

The threat analysis and subsequent events in Grenada in the fall of 1983 are remarkably similar to the events in Afghanistan in 1979. In Grenada the Soviets were confronted with a strong populist leader, independent overtures to re-open a dialogue with both the East Caribbean Nations and the United States, party disintegration and the ouster of Cuban Ambassador, Torres Rizo from meetings of the Central Committee. These serious digressions from "Democratic Centralism" by Bishop coupled with the American pre-occupation with Lebanon, precipitated the Soviet sponsored

Event J is of particular significance in that it reflects a dramatic and sustained decrease (35.2 %) in anti-American rhetoric following Marice Bishop's visit with U.S. National Security Advisor Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam in Washington, D.C., on May 31, 1983. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 27, 1983, Mr. Dam revealed the substance of the Bishop-Clark meeting:

"We said to him that we, too, wanted better relations, but there were naturally some questions in view of what was going on on the island and the concerted attack on the U.S. Government publicly as to whether that was really the case, but if he was willing to lower the rhetoric of his attacks on the United States we were prepared to work toward better relations. [Ref. 29].

In subsequent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 2, 1983, Mr Dam testified:

"It was a friendly meeting, a little formal, obviously under the circumstances, but a friendly, candid meeting. I can only say in retrospect, I am afraid that the meeting and perhaps his attempts to move in the directions he suggested are what led to his downfall and his eventual murder."

In summary, it appears from the results of the content analysis that Grenadian foreign policy vis-a-vis the United States was reactive in nature and motivated of regional economic and security interests and not the direct result of Soviet economic and military assistance. Lastly, the sustained decrease in anti-American rhetoric following the Bisfop-Clark meeting in Washington was a bona fide attempt to moderate the anti-American conduct in an effort to establish a dialogue with the Reagan Administration.

Bishop recanted his agreement on power-sharing with Coard and challenged the restructuring decision of the Central Committee. Charged with showing "contempt for the Leninist principle of democratic centralism" James and Layne led an acrimonious attack on Bishop:

"We have to be coldblooded and cast all emotions aside, we have to be determined. M.B. [Maurice Bishop] is mainly responsible for the crisis in the party... There have been threats on the lives of C.C. [Central Committee] comrades as a result of the crisis... B and P [Bernard and Phyllis Coard] and other comrades who took the Leninist position." [Ref. 45].

Sewlywn Strachan continued the attack on Bishop with an apocalyptic warning:

"The situation demands Bolshevik staunchism. The leadership of the A.F.(Armed Forces) shares this view. . . . We have to learn from other fraternal parties. . . . We must be comm. (communist) in practice because only comm. can rescue the sit. (situation). Comm. without belly better hop the next plane." [Ref. 45].

The Central Committee adopted a decision to:

- (1) Place Bishop under indefinite house arrest.
- (2) Disarm Bishop ("for his own safety") and disconnect all phone service.
- (3) Louison, Bishop's staunchest supporter and closest ally was also "confined for supporting Bishop and spreading rumors that Coard wanted to kill Bishop [Ref. 45].

Sensing an armed confrontation, Louison cautioned Bernard Coard that the situation of Bishop's popularity could develop into a civil war and "that the party had a

responsibility to ensure that no violence took place in the country." Contemptuously Coard responded:

"They could stay in the streets for weeks, after a while they are bound to get tired and hungry and want peace. . . . Williams did it in 1970 and survived, Gairy did it in '73 to us in St. George's and it could be done again [Ref. 46].

E. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION

Louison realized that Bishop was becoming a victim of a political coup, and that Bishop's only remaining hope of surviving the power struggle (and possibly his life) was to mobilize the populace in a mass demonstration in support of Bishop. There were deep divisions of loyalty concerning the ousted and arrested Bishop, in the lower echelons of the Army, labor leaders, and government ministries [Ref. 46]. Strachan's announcement on October 12th that Bernard Coard had succeeded Bishop as Prime Minister (evidence in dispute as to whether Coard authorized or approved such an announcement), appeared to serve as the catalyst to trigger the Bishop populace into the streets and spontaneous action. On October 19th (Bloody Wednesday), a crowd in excess of 10,000 Bishop supporters, led by Unison Whiteman, "liberated" Bishop from house arrest and proceeded via the marketplace to Fort Ruppert [Ref. 47].

F. THE DEATH OF BISHOP AND THE REVOLUTION

Confronted with a failed political coup, and the real possibility of a legitimate counter-revolution, Soviet Ambassador Sazhnev opted for the same solution as Puznanov

in Kabul and ordered the immediate elimination of Bishop and the formation of a compliant regime headed by Bernard Coard. A few hours after Bishop and his supporters disarmed the garrison at Fort Ruppert, without bloodshed, PRA troops, under the alleged control of Coard, James and Layne, arrived at Fort Ruppert with two BTR-60P armored personnel carriers (APC's), and indiscriminately and without warning fired into the crowd. [Ref. 47]. Eyewitness accounts state that the APC's were driven by black, spanish speaking military. Maurice Bishop, three cabinet members and two union leaders, were taken into an inner courtyard at Fort Ruppert and shot through the head [Ref. 47]. Following the execution, at Fort Ruppert, a predetermined white flare was fired , signaling the executions ordered by Colonel Layne and the Central Committee had been implemented. Ewart Layne was heard chanting "Central Committee orders given, Central Committee orders obeyed." [Ref. 46].

The death of Bishop was anti-climatic, it was the spontaneous, and truly revolutionary crowd, which freed Bishop from house arrest, that transformed the leadership issue into one of survival. The "Afghan" solution had accelerated out of control and once again the Soviets when faced with the failure of the political coup, resorted to "Machiavelli" force and attempted to impose a leninist, doctrinaire regime.

Once Maurice Bishop was murdered however, the New Jewel Movement lost its only claim to legitimacy and self destroyed.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper is an attempt to examine the militarization and violent political polarization of the New Jewel Movement in light of the recovered Grenada documents.

The geopolitical significance of the tiny island of Grenada is an incident of geography. The resulting Caribbean triangle was a political reality that concerned both neighboring non-socialist countries and the Reagan Administration. The Soviets, although proceeding initially with caution, rapidly infused the island with large stockpiles of "fraternal" assistance in an attempt to favorably alter the regional "correlation of forces".

The Soviet objectives in Grenada were threefold:

- 1) to undermine regional security in the Caribbean basin thereby jeopardizing vital U.S. economic and political interests.
- 2) to increase the power projection capabilities of Soviet and surrogate forces.
- 3) to maintain a credible position as the international leader of revolutionary forces by providing economic, military and ideological assistance to emerging movements on the "progressive" path to socialism.

The Soviets, confronted with a Castro like populist leader, untutored in Democratic Centralism, attempting a

rapprochement with the West, and faced with the rapid disintegration of party apparatus combined with the untimely ouster of the Cuban Ambassador from future meetings of the policy making Central Committee, unhesitatingly and with historical consistency, sponsored the Coard faction's attempt to replace Bishop under the guise of a "joint" leadership proposal. The Soviet modeled coup was designed to erode Bishop's power base within the Central Committee while preserving "eyewash for the masses". This contemptuous and tragic miscalculation precipitated Bishop's release from house arrest by a spontaneous populace.

Reminiscent of the failed coups in both Angola and Afghanistan, coupled with their inability to project power into the region, the Soviets opted for the "Machiavelli" solution. The execution of Maurice Bishop, three cabinet members and two labor union leaders, all members of the original group of 73, indicates a thermidor reaction and not merely a factional dispute of two competing personalities.

The massive militarization, secret police apparatus, and the ideological rigidity of the Coard power faction were an anathema to the grassroots traditions of Caribbean populism. The Soviet importation of a doctrinaire, Leninist regime on the Creole population of Grenada was a cultural contradiction and therefore doomed to failure.

Woodrow Wilson Fellow, Jiri Valenta's sociological analysis acutely summarizes the policy questions confronting

the United States in the post-Grenada, Caribbean basin.

"... the main problems of the Caribbean basin are miserable living conditions, hunger and unemployment which, in turn, invite violence and revolution. If unresolved, the socio-economic problems in the Central American isthmus , exacerbated by current U.S. economic difficulties, might engulf the United States in a conflict of overwhelming dimensions. For the Soviets and Cubans the continuation of these socio-economic problems will provide additional opportunities for their own self-serving roles in the Caribbean basin. It would be a tragedy and a failure for Western democracies to allow the Soviets to champion the cause of political and economic justice, while, in the long run, furthering the political, military, and social objectives of totalitarianism. Successful containment of Soviet initiatives in the Caribbean Basin depends on the more equitable distribution of wealth and burdens among the nations of the regions. What is required is a balanced approach to the problems which can prevent the widening of the conflict in the basin and its exploitation by the Soviet Union and Cuba." [Ref. 47].

NOTES ON DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

As of April 1984 the U.S. Department of State has released to the public, four series of documents (cited in the List of References as Grenada Documents) recovered during combat operations in Grenada. All documents quoted or referenced in this thesis are unclassified. Specifically, the enclosed appendixes, contrary to the Grenadian "Top Secret" stamp, are not classified and are available to the public.

Readers wishing to obtain copies of the enclosed appendix or other Grenadian documents should direct their inquiries to:

Department of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs,
Washington, D.C. 20520

APPENDIX A

Soviet/Grenada Arms Transfer Agreement, 10/27/80

Top secret

A G R E E M E N T

between the Government of Grenada and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on deliveries from the Union of SSR
to Grenada of special and other equipment

The Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics,

guided by aspirations for developing and strengthening
friendly relations between both countries on the principles of
equality, mutual respect of sovereignty and non-interference into
internal affairs,

proceeding from the desire to promote strengthening the
independence of Grenada

and in connection with the request of the Government of
Grenada

have agreed upon the following:

Article 1

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
shall ensure in 1980-1981 free of charge the delivery to the
Government of Grenada of special and other equipment in nomenclature
and quantity according to the Annex to the present Agreement
to the amount of 4,400,000 Roubles.

Article 2

The delivery of the equipment listed in the Annex to the present Agreement shall be effected by the Soviet Party by sea, at the port of the Republic of Cuba.

The order of the further delivery of the above equipment from the Republic of Cuba shall be agreed upon between the Grenadian and Cuban Parties.

Article 3

The Government of the Union of SSR at the request of the Government of Grenada shall ensure rendering technical assistance in mastering of the equipment delivered under the present Agreement by receiving Grenadian servicemen for training in the USSR.

The Grenadian servicemen shall be deputed for training in the USSR without their families.

The expenses connected with the Grenadian servicemen's training, upkeep, meals, and equipment in the Soviet military educational establishments as well as with their travel fare from Grenada to the USSR and back shall be borne by the Soviet Party.

Article 4

The Government of the Union of SSR shall ensure free of charge the transfer to the Government of Grenada of necessary technical descriptions, instructions and manuals in standard composition on operation of the special equipment delivered under the present Agreement.

Top secret

ANNEX

to Agreement of October "27", 1980

L I S T

of special materiel to be delivered
to Grenada from the Soviet Union in
1980-1981 /free of charge/

Description	Unit of measure	Quantity	Years of delivery	
			1980	1981
<u>Artillery and small arms armament</u>				
82-mm mortars, used reconditioned	piece	12	-	12
RPG-7V antitank hand grenade-launchers	piece	24	24	-
Group sets of spare parts /1:9/ to RPG-7V grenade-launchers	set	3	3	-
7,62-mm PKM machine-guns	piece	54	-	54
Group set of spare parts /1:50/ to PKM machine-guns	set	1	-	1
7,62-mm AK submachine- guns, used reconditioned	piece	1000	1000	-
7,62-mm carbines, model 1944, used reconditioned	piece	1500	500	-
<u>Antiaircraft armament</u>				
23-mm ZU-23 antiaircraft mounts	piece	18	6	12
Group sets of spare parts /1:6/ to ZU-23 mounts	set	3	1	2

Description	Unit of measure	Quantity	Years of delivery	
			1980	1981
with B-2 bullet with steel cartridge case	thous. pieces	27,0	-	27,0
with T-46 bullet	thous. pieces	97,2	-	97,2
7,62-mm cartridges, model 1943, without clips:				
with steel-core bullet	thous. pieces	600,0	200,0	400,0
with tracer bullet	thous. pieces	300,0	100,0	200,0
<u>dummy</u> <u>logistic equipment</u>	thous. pieces	75,0	-	75,0
Soldiers' camp tents for 10 men	piece	20	-	20

Spare parts, auxiliary and
training equipment on speci-
fications of the Soviet Party
to the amount of up to
400000 Roubles

Статья 2

Поставка перечисленного в Приложении к настоящему Соглашению имущества будет произведена Советской Стороной морем в порт Республики Куба. Порядок дальнейшей доставки указанного имущества из Республики Куба к месту назначения в Гренаде будет согласован между Кубинской и Гренадской Сторонами.

Статья 3

Правительство Союза ССР по просьбе Правительства Гренады обеспечит оказание технического содействия в освоении эксплуатации поставляемого по настоящему Соглашению имущества путем приема на обучение в СССР гренадских военнослужащих.

Гренадские военнослужащие направляются для обучения в СССР без семей.

Расходы, связанные с обучением, содержанием, питанием и обмундированием гренадских военнослужащих в советских военных учебных заведениях, а также с их проездом из Гренады в СССР и обратно, Советская Сторона принимает на себя.

Статья 4

Правительство Союза ССР обеспечит безвозмездно передачу Правительству Гренады в установленной комплектации необходимых технических описаний, инструкций и наставлений по эксплуатации поставляемого по настоящему Соглашению специального имущества.

Совершенно секретно

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

к Соглашению от "27" октября 1980 года

П Е Р Е Ч Е Н Ь

специального имущества, поставляемого Гренаде
из Советского Союза в 1980-1981 годах
/безвозмездно/

Наименование	Единица измерения	Количество	Годы поставки	
			1980	1981
<u>Стрелково-артиллерийское вооружение</u>				
82-мм минометы, бывшие в эксплуатации, отремонтированные	штука	12	-	12
Ручные противотанковые гранатометы РПГ-7В	штука	24	24	-
Групповые комплекты ЗИПа к гранатометам РПГ-7В /1:9/	комплект	3	3	-
7,62-мм пулеметы ПКМ	штука	54	-	54
Групповой комплект ЗИПа к пулеметам ПКМ /1:50/	комплект	1	-	1
7,62-мм автоматы АК, бывшие в эксплуатации, отремонтированные	штука	2000	2000	-
7,62-мм карабины образца 1944 г., бывшие в эксплуатации, отремонтированные	штука	1500	1500	-
<u>Зенитное вооружение</u>				
23-мм зенитные установки ЗУ-23	штука	13	6	12
Групповые комплекты ЗИПа к установкам ЗУ-23 /1:6/	комплект	3	1	2

Наименование	Единица измерения	Количество	Годы поставки		
			1981	1982	1983
<u>Инженерное вооружение</u>					
Экскаватор универсальный Э-305В	штука	1	-	1	-
Кран КС-4561А	штука	1	1	-	-
Бульдозер ДБ-109	штука	1	1	-	-
Электростанции силовые дизельные ЭСД-30-ВС/230	штука	10	5	5	-
Агрегаты питания дизельные АД-30-Т/230М2	штука	10	5	5	-
Электростанции бензиновые осветительные ЭСБ-2-ВО	штука	15	5	5	5
Индукционные минометскатели ИМП	штука	20	-	20	-
30-мм сигнальные патроны:					
красного огня	тыс. штук	1	1	-	-
зеленого огня	тыс. штук	1	1	-	-
30-мм осветительные патроны	тыс. штук	2	2	-	-
Переносное стрельбищное оборудование ПСО-М	комплект	2	2	-	-
Ротный тактический комплект РТК	комплект	1	1	-	-
<u>Средства связи</u>					
Радиостанции:					
Р-1040М	комплект	5	5	-	-
Р-103М	комплект	15	15	-	-
Р-103М	комплект	15	15	-	-
Р-103М	комплект	15	15	-	-
Р-103, бывшие в эксплуатации, отремонтированные	комплект	5	5	-	-
Р-103М, бывшие в эксплуатации, отремонтированные	комплект	5	5	-	-

Наименование	Единица измерения	Количество	Годы поставки		
			1981	1982	1983
<u>Вооружение и боеприпасы</u>					
7,62-мм автоматы АК, бывшие в эксплуатации, отремонтированные	тыс.штук	1	1	-	-
7,62-мм патроны образца 1943 года без обойм:					
с пулей со стальным сердечником	тыс.штук	1000	1000	-	-
с трассирующей пулей Т-45	тыс.штук	300	300	-	-
9-мм пистолеты ПМ	штука	300	300	-	-
Групповые комплекты ЗИПа к пистолетам ПМ /1:100/	комплект	3	3	-	-
Ремонтный комплект ЗИПа к пистолетам ПМ /1:500/	комплект	1	1	-	-
9-мм патроны к пистолетам ПМ	тыс.штук	36	36	-	-
26-мм сигнальные пистолеты СПШ-2	штука	30	-	30	-
26-мм сигнальные патроны:					
красного огня	тыс.штук	3	-	3	-
зеленого огня	тыс.штук	2	-	3	-
желтого огня	тыс.штук	3	-	3	-
26-мм осветительные патроны	тыс.штук	3	-	3	-
Трубы зенитные командирские ТЭК-2	штука	5	2	3	-
Бинокли Б-3с/с	штука	100	100	-	-
Компасы Адрианова	штука	300	300	-	-
Гранаты Ф-1	тыс.штук	1	1	-	-
Гранаты РГД-5	тыс.штук	1	1	-	-

Совершенно секретно

Приложение
к Протоколу от "9" февраля 1981 года

П Е Р Е Ч Е Н Ь

специального имущества и автомобилей, поставляемых
Гренаде из Советского Союза в 1981-1983 годах

/безвозмездно/

Наименование	Единица измерения	Количество	Годы поставки		
			1981	1982	1983
<u>Бронетанковая техника</u>					
Бронетранспортеры БТР-60ПБ	штука	8	8	-	-
Бронированные разведывательно-дозорные машины БРДМ-2	штука	2	2	-	-
14,5-мм патроны:					
с пулей Б-32	тыс.штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
с пулей БЗТ	тыс.штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
7,62-мм винтовочные патроны без обоям:					
с пулей со стальным сердечником	тыс.штук	30	30	-	-
с пулей Б-32 со стальной гильзой	тыс.штук	5	5	-	-
с пулей Т-46	тыс.штук	15	15	-	-
Двигатели ГАЗ-49Б	штука	4	-	2	2
Двигатели ГАЗ-41	штука	2	-	2	-

Совершенно секретно

ПРОТОКОЛ

к Соглашению между Правительством Гренады
и Правительством СССР от 27 октября
1980 года о поставках из СССР в Гренаду
специального и другого имущества

Правительство Гренады и Правительство Союза Советских Социалистических Республик
договорились о нижеследующем:

Статья 1

Правительство Союза Советских Социалистических Республик обеспечит в 1981-1983 годах безвозмездно поставку Правительству Гренады специального и другого имущества в номенклатуре и количестве согласно Приложению к настоящему Протоколу на сумму 5000000 рублей.

Статья 2

Во всем остальном Стороны будут руководствоваться положениями Соглашения между Правительством Гренады и Правительством СССР от 27 октября 1980 года о поставках из СССР в Гренаду специального и другого имущества.

Статья 3

Настоящий Протокол вступает в силу со дня его подписания.
Приложение является неотъемлемой частью настоящего Протокола.
Совершено в Газане, "9¹" февраля 1981 года в двух подлинных экземплярах, как на русском и английском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.

ПО УПОЛНОМОЧИЮ
ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА
ГРЕНАДЫ

ПО УПОЛНОМОЧИЮ
ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА СОЮЗА
СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

Description	Unit	Total	Years of delivery		
	of measure	quantity	1981	1982	1983
Cotton mattress-cases, 220x77 cm	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Foam plastic mattresses, 185x70x4 cm	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Foam plastic pillows, 80x50x4 cm	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Soldiers' aluminium water flasks	thous. pieces	6,3	3	3,3	-
Covers for soldiers' water flasks	thous. pieces	6,3	3	3,3	-
Soldiers' aluminium pots	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Officers' capes	piece	300	-	300	-
Summer cotton work-suits	thous. pieces	6,3	-	6,3	-
Officers' box-calf leather shoes with leather soles	pair	300	300	-	-
Officers' field bags of artificial leather	piece	300	-	300	-

Spare parts, training equipment
and auxiliary equipment as per
specifications of the Soviet
Party to the amount of up to
3,9 mln.roubles

B.H.R.

[Signature]

Description	Unit of measure	Total quantity	Years of delivery		
			1981	1982	1983
Knitted white undershirts	thous. pieces	12,6	12,6	-	-
Olive-coloured socks without rubbers	thous. paires	25,2	25,2	-	-
Soldiers' tarpaulin waist-belts with brown coating and plain zink-covered buckles	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Soldiers' khaki-coloured tarpau- lin waist-belts with plain zink-covered buckles	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Tarpaulin shoulder-belts with brown coating	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Khaki-coloured cotton knapsacks	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Steel helmets	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
High leather boots with rubber soles	thous. paires	6,3	6,3	-	-
Flanelette blankets	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Coarse calico bed sheets, 214x126 cm	thous. pieces	12,6	12,6	-	-
Coarse calico outer pillow- cases, 60x50 cm	thous. pieces	12,6	12,6	-	-
Inner cotton pillow-cases, 60x50 cm	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-

Description	Unit of measure	Total quantity	Years of delivery		
			1981	1982	1983
DDA-66 disinfection shower installations	set	5	-	-	5
SDP-2 sterilisation and distillation units on trailers	set	2	-	2	-
RDV-100 reservoirs	piece	10	8	2	-
Vacuum flasks:					
of 12 litres	piece	400	194	206	-
of 36 litres	piece	400	200	200	-
B-1 sterilized bandage sets	set	50	-	50	-
Individual bandage packets	thous. pieces	5	-	5	-
USB-56 tents with fittings	piece	25	5	20	-
Camp tents for 10-persons	piece	100	25	75	-
MKT-T camouflage nets	piece	20	20	-	-
<u>Uniform articles and clothing</u>					
Soldiers' field cotton olive-coloured shirts, without belts	thous. pieces	12,6	12,6	-	-
Soldiers' field cotton olive-coloured trousers	thous. pieces	12,6	12,6	-	-
Soldiers' cotton khaki-coloured shelter-halves	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
Soldiers' cotton olive-coloured field caps	thous. pieces	12,6	12,6	-	-
White cotton shorts	thous. pieces	12,6	12,6	-	-

Description	Unit of measure	Total quantity	Years of delivery		
			1981	1982	1983
R-106M	set	15	15	-	-
R-109M	set	15	15	-	-
R-129, used, reconditionned	set	5	5	-	-
R-130M, used, reconditionned	set	5	5	-	-
TA-57 telephone sets	set	100	-	100	-
P-194M1 switch boards	set	5	-	5	-
M-3M2 mobile signal workshop	set	1	1	-	-
P-274M two-wire field cable	kilometer	150	-	150	-
GB-10-u-1,3 batteries	piece	150	-	150	-
TK-2 reels for military field cable	piece	100	-	100	-
<u>Transport means, special vehicles and workshops</u>					
GAZ-66 vehicles	piece	30	30	-	-
UAZ-469B jeeps	piece	5	5	-	-
UAZ-452-A ambulances	piece	5	5	-	-
TZ-5 refueling vehicles	piece	2	-	2	-
APM-90M automobile light-beacon stations for landing	set	6	3	3	-
MTO-AT technical maintenance workshop	set	1	1	-	-
SR2-A storage-batteries repair and charging station	set	1	1	-	-
<u>Logistic materiel</u>					
PMKh mobile mechanized bakery plant	set	1	1	-	-
PKS-2M mobile kitchen-messes	set	2	2	-	-
KP-125M vehicle-towed field kitchens	pieces	20	20	-	-

Description	Unit of measure	Total quantity	Years of delivery		
			1981	1982	1983
Adrianov compasses	piece	300	300	-	-
F-1 grenades	thous. pieces	1	1	-	-
RGD-5 grenades	thous. pieces	1	1	-	-
<u>Engineering equipment</u>					
E-305V universal excavator	piece	1	-	1	-
KS-4561A crane	piece	1	1	-	-
DZ-109 bulldozer	piece	1	1	-	-
ESP-30-VS/230 diesel power supply stations	piece	10	5	5	-
AD-30-T/230M2 diesel power supply stations	piece	10	5	5	-
ESS-2-VO gasoline lighting power supply stations	piece	15	5	5	5
IMF induction mine detectors	piece	20	-	20	-
30-mm signal cartridges:					
red	thous. pieces	1	1	-	-
green	thous. pieces	1	1	-	-
30-mm illuminating cartridges	thous. pieces	2	2	-	-
PSO-M portable firing range equipment	set	2	2	-	-
RTK company tactical set	set	1	1	-	-
<u>Communication means</u>					
Radiostations:					
R-104 UM	set	5	5	-	-
R-105M	set	15	15	-	-

Description	Unit of measure	Total quantity	Years of delivery		
			1981	1982	1983
GAZ-49B engines	piece	4	-	2	2
GAZ-41 engines	piece	2	-	2	-
<u>Armament and munitions</u>					
7,62-mm AK submachine guns, used, reconditioned	thous. pieces	1	1	-	-
7,62-mm cartridges of 1943 model without clips:					
with steel core bullet	thous. pieces	1000	1000	-	-
with T-45 tracer bullet	thous. pieces	300	300	-	-
9-mm PM pistols	piece	300	300	-	-
Group sets of spare parts /1:100/ to PM pistols	set	3	3	-	-
Repair set of spare parts /1:500/ to PM pistols	set	1	1	-	-
9-mm cartridges to PM pistols	thous. pieces	36	36	-	-
26-mm SPSh-2 signal pistols	piece	30	-	30	-
26-mm signal cartridges:					
red	thous. pieces	3	-	3	-
green	thous. pieces	3	-	3	-
yellow	thous. pieces	3	-	3	-
26-mm illuminating cartridges	thous. pieces	3	-	3	-
T2X-2 commander's periscopes	piece	5	2	3	-
3-3s/s binoculars	piece	100	100	-	-

Top secret

ANNEX

to Protocol of "9" February, 1981

L I S T

of special equipment and vehicles to be
delivered to Grenada from the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics in 1981-1983

/free of charge/

Description	Unit	Total	Years of delivery		
	of measure	quantity	1981	1982	1983
<u>Armour</u>					
BTR-60PB armoured personnel carriers	piece	8	8	-	-
BRDM-2 armoured reconnaissance and patrol vehicles	piece	2	2	-	-
14,5-mm cartridges:					
with B-32 bullet	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
with B2T bullet	thous. pieces	6,3	6,3	-	-
7,62-mm rifle cartridges without clips:					
with steel core bullet	thous. pieces	30	30	-	-
with B-32 bullet and steel case	thous. pieces	5	5	-	-
with T-46 bullet	thous. pieces	15	15	-	-

- 2 -

Article 3

The present Protocol comes into force on the date of its signing.

The Annex is an integral part of the present Protocol.

Done in Havana on February " 9 " , 1981 in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally valid.

FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA

Basil H. Rahagan

FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Signature]

APPENDIX B

Soviet/Grenada Arms Transfer Agreement, 2/9/81

Top secret

P R O T O C O L

to the Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the USSR of October 27, 1980 on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment

The Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

have agreed upon the following:

Article 1

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall ensure free of charge the delivery in 1981-1983 to the Government of Grenada of special and other equipment in nomenclature and quantity according to the Annex to the present Agreement to the amount of 5.000.000 Roubles.

Article 2

In all other respects the Parties will be guided by the provisions of the Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the USSR of October 27, 1980 on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment.

Наименование	Единица измерения	Количество	Годы поставки	
			1980	1981
с пулей Б-32 со стальной гильзой	тыс.штук	27,0	-	27,0
с пулей Т-46	тыс.штук	97,2	-	97,2
7,62-мм патроны образца 1943г. без обоям:				
с пулей со сталь- ным сердечником	тыс.штук	600,0	200,0	400,0
с трассирующей пу- лей	тыс.штук	300,0	100,0	200,0
для холостой стрельбы	тыс.штук	75,0	-	75,0
<u>Имущество тыла</u>				
Палатки лагерные солдат- ские 10-местные	штука	20	-	20

Запасные части, учебное
и вспомогательное имуще-
ство по спецификациям
Советской Стороны
на сумму до 400000 рублей

Наименование	Единица измерения	Количество	Годы поставки		
			1981	1982	1983
телефонные аппараты ТА-57	комплект	100	-	100	-
коммутаторы П-194М1	комплект	5	-	5	-
Подвижная мастерская связи М-3М2	комплект	1	1	-	-
Кабель ползовой П-274М в двухжильном исчислении	километр	150	-	150	-
Батареи ГБ-10-у-1,3	штука	150	-	150	-
Катушки ТК-2 для военно-ползowego кабеля	штука	100	-	100	-
<u>Транспортные средства, специальные автомобили и мастерские</u>					
Автомобили ГАЗ-66	штука	30	30	-	-
Автомобили УАЗ-469Б	штука	5	5	-	-
Санитарные автомобили УАЗ-452-А	штука	5	5	-	-
Топливозаправщики ТЗ-5	штука	2	-	2	-
Автомобильные посадочные светомаячные станции АДМ-90М	комплект	6	3	3	-
Мастерская технического обслуживания МТО-АТ	комплект	1	1	-	-
Станция ремонтно-зарядная аккумуляторная СРЗ-А	комплект	1	1	-	-
<u>Имущество тыла</u>					
Ползвой механизированный хлебозавод ПМУ	комплект	1	1	-	-
Ползвые кухни-столовые ЛКС-2М	комплект	2	2	-	-
Кухни походные автоприцепные КП-126М	штука	20	20	-	-
Дезинфекционно-душевые тановки ДДА-66	комплект	5	-	-	5

Наименование	Единица измерения	Количество	Годы поставки		
			1981	1982	1983
Стерилизационно-дистилляционные установки СДП-2 на автоприцепах	комплект	2	-	2	-
Резервуары РДВ-100	штука	10	8	2	-
Термосы:					
12-литровые	штука	400	194	206	-
36-литровые	штука	400	200	200	-
Комплекты Б-1 /перевязочные стерильные/	комплект	50	-	50	-
Пакеты индивидуальные перевязочные	тыс. штук	5	-	5	-
Палатки УСБ-56 с такелажем	штука	25	5	20	-
Палатки лагерные 10-местные	штука	100	25	75	-
Маскировочные сети ММТ-Т	штука	20	20	-	-
<u>Обмундирование и все имущество</u>					
Рубашки верхние солдатские полевые без пояса оливкового цвета из хлопчатобумажной ткани	тыс. штук	12,6	12,6	-	-
Брюки наыпуск солдатские полевые оливкового цвета из хлопчатобумажной ткани	тыс. штук	12,6	12,6	-	-
Плащ-палатки солдатские защитного цвета из хлопчатобумажной ткани	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Фуражки солдатские полевые оливкового цвета из хлопчатобумажной ткани	тыс. штук	12,6	12,6	-	-
Трусы белого цвета из хлопчатобумажной ткани	тыс. штук	12,6	12,6	-	-

Наименование	Единица измерения	Количество	Годы поставки		
			1981	1982	1983
Майки трикотажные белого цвета	тыс. штук	12,6	12,6	-	-
Носки без резинок оливо- вого цвета	тыс. пар	25,2	25,2	-	-
Ремень поясные солдатские тесемные с покрытием ко- ричневого цвета с пряжками оцинкованными, гладкими	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Ремень поясные солдатские тесемные защитного цвета с пряжками оцинкованными, глад- кими	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Лямки плечевые тесемные с покрытием коричневого цвета	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Мешки вещевые из хлопчатобу- мажной ткани защитного цвета	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Шлемы стальные	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Ботинки с высокими берцами кожаные на резиновой подошве	тыс. пар	6,3	6,3	-	-
Одеяла байковые	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Простыни размером 214x126 см из бязи	тыс. штук	12,6	12,6	-	-
Наволочки подушечные верх- ние размером 60x50 см из бязи	тыс. штук	12,6	12,6	-	-
Наволочки подушечные нижние размером 60x50 см из хлоп- чатобумажной ткани	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Наволочки тюфячные размером 220x77 см из хлопчатобумаж- ной ткани	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Матрацы поролоновые 135x70x4 см	тыс. штук	6,3	6,3	-	-

Наименование	Единица измерения	Количество	Годы поставки		
			1981	1982	1983
Подушки поролоновые размером 50x50x4 см	тыс.штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Фляги алюминиевые солдатские	тыс.штук	6,3	3	3,3	-
Чехлы к солдатским флягам	тыс.штук	6,3	3	3,3	-
Котелки алюминиевые солдатские	тыс.штук	6,3	6,3	-	-
Плащ-накидки офицерские	штука	300	-	300	-
Комбинезоны рабочие летние из хлопчатобумажной ткани	тыс.штук	6,3	-	6,3	-
Полуботинки хромовые офицерские на кожаной подошве	пара	300	300	-	-
Сумки полевые офицерские из искусственной кожи	штука	300	-	300	-

Запасные части, учебное и вспомогательное имущество по спецификациям Советской Стороны на сумму до 0,9 млн. рублей

В.Н.В.

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