The Arms Control and Crisis Management Potential of the Proposed International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA)
Abstract
This study investigates the potential contribution of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA) to the verification of compliance with arms control agreements and also to crisis management. The basic characteristics of an ISMA and the theoretical bases for its contribution are outlined, as are the potential practical difficulties it is likely to encounter in principle. An assessment is then given of the limitations of verification capabilities and the resultant problems posed for compliance policy in a representative selection of arms control agreements--those limiting strategic nuclear forces, chemical and biological weapons and, in the inter-war years, naval forces. The conclusion is that there are considerable technical and political limits on verification capabilities and on enforcing compliance with such agreements. These limits have proved significantly larger than anticipated in the arms control literature. They suggest that an ISMA would have difficulty, in practice, in making the contribution to arms control envisaged in theory. A similar conclusion applies to the more demanding task of contributing to crisis management. Keywords include: Arms control, Chemical and biological weapons, Compliance, Crisis management, France, ICBM, Nation Technical Means, Naval forces, Satellite information and technology, Soviet Union, Strategic Nuclear forces, Verification.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1984
- Accession Number
- ADA154979
Entities
People
- R. Ranger