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IMPROVING NATO'S MILITARY POSTURE

BY

COLONEL ALFRED M. DIAZ

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

IMPROVING NATO'S MILITARY POSTURE
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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22 April 1985

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This paper represents a study of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military strategy, concepts, and forces. It is written at a time when the future of NATO is in serious question. There are those on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean who believe that the United States (US) should withdraw from NATO, leaving the defense and political future of Western Europe to the Europeans. However, the current political leaders of the US and Western Europe continue to believe in NATO as the essential shield which has and will continue to protect Western Europe against Soviet/Warsaw Pact aggression.

There is a general consensus among NATO nations, formulated in 1967, that NATO should follow a strategy of flexible response, including forward deployment of ground forces, to deter aggression and provide the security necessary for Europe to remain free and democratic. Since 1967, the forward conventional forces have been strengthened and modernized without much controversy. The most significant and controversial force modification by NATO has been the on-going introduction of theater nuclear weapons with greater range. However, there are legitimate differences of opinion among and within NATO nations regarding concepts and forces.

One serious difference of opinion concerns the desirability of a forward wall of defensive firepower which has been likened to a Maginot Line without fortifications. Another issue is whether NATO has responded well enough to the massive buildup of Warsaw Pact forces during the past 15 years. Also at issue is NATO's tendency to distinguish between forces with and without nuclear capabilities. Another question is whether NATO should increase its mechanized/armored forces rather than relying on a proliferation of massive numbers of antitank weapons.

Are there other weaknesses in NATO which should be corrected? Are NATO's forces adequately prepared to defend themselves against chemical weapons? Are NATO's command and control capabilities sound? Can NATO move large quantities of personnel, weapons, ammunition, and essential supplies quickly across the Atlantic Ocean and within the theater of operations? Are NATO forces well trained? What about economic and political factors? How does NATO compare with the Warsaw Pact in all these areas? This study, which is based on an unclassified literature search, will assess the foregoing factors and make recommendations which would strengthen NATO's military posture.

CHAPTER II

CURRENT NATO MILITARY STRATEGY

CONVENTIONAL VS. NUCLEAR EMPHASIS

The current NATO strategy, that of flexible response, was adopted in 1967 after the French withdrew their forces from NATO control.¹ This strategy is based on a triad consisting of US strategic nuclear forces, NATO's theater nuclear missiles, and conventional forces.² In the early days of NATO, the Western Europeans accepted the strategy of a conventional defense. The US began favoring "more bang for the buck," with tactical nuclear weapons and force modernization as a substitute for manpower. In 1961, the US persuaded the Europeans to reduce NATO's force objective to 28-1/3 divisions, as compared with the goal of 96 divisions which had been set at Lisbon in 1952. The Western Europeans adopted that strategy and still tend to believe that NATO should keep its conventional forces small and respond to any serious aggression with nuclear weapons. Ever since the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity, the US has favored strengthening NATO's conventional forces to delay the use of tactical nuclear weapons and hopefully to preclude escalation to the use of nuclear weapons against its homeland. In 1967, the Western Europeans agreed to a strategy calling for a "stalwart defense," with a "nuclear pause" replacing the earlier "nuclear trip wire

and automatic nuclear response." At the core of NATO strategy there remains a serious difference of opinion regarding "by whom, when, and how nuclear weapons are to be used and employed" in the defense of Western Europe.³

INTERPRETATIONS OF STALWART DEFENSE

The prevailing view in Western Europe is that stalwart defense is not a "true conventional war-fighting capability."⁴ According to the Western Europeans, conventional forces should be used to test enemy intentions.⁵ If Warsaw Pact aggression is exploratory or ambiguous, the response should be conventional. A serious attack should be countered with an immediate nuclear response.⁶

Many West Germans interpret stalwart forward defense differently. They have traditionally insisted that NATO should be prepared to defend every square foot of West German territory, even if it subverts good military sense to do so.⁷ Other West Germans favor a strong conventional defense because they fear the collateral damage to their homeland that would accompany the use of tactical nuclear weapons.⁸

The US view has changed with the realization that the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity. American planners want to avoid the possibility of a nuclear attack against the US which might follow the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. In

recent years, the US has been planning for the option of fighting a major nonnuclear war in Europe.⁹

TOWARD A MORE FLEXIBLE FORWARD DEFENSE

The ways and means of winning a conventional war in Europe are receiving increasing attention. The forward defense presently planned calls for an unbroken wall of fires in close proximity to the East-West borders from the Baltic coast to Austria, forming "a sort of Maginot Line without benefit of fortification."¹⁰ NATO's maneuver elements are initially assigned defensive sectors in static positions too close to the borders. Covering forces are not granted sufficient depth to force Warsaw Pact forces to reveal their main avenues of advance.¹¹ To preclude losing any West German territory, NATO has left itself with insufficient reserves, particularly the armored forces needed to counter a Warsaw Pact breakthrough. The only way to avoid a disaster might be the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Even the West Germans are beginning to recognize the need for a change in concepts. West Germany's foremost military affairs commentator, Adelbert Weinstein, has written: "The doubts increase as to whether the forward defense is the answer to the threat from the East."¹²

One possible change in concepts is to recognize that it does not make military sense to defend every square foot of NATO

territory. There are 150 kilometers of West German territory from the nearest border crossing points to the Rhine River. The covering force area could be deepened to vary from 20 to 60 kilometers, making it more difficult for enemy forces to determine when they have reached a main battle area. This would permit more accurate identification of the enemy's main avenues of advance. NATO forces could maneuver to more advantageous positions from which they could draw the enemy into killing zones or surprise the enemy with effective counterattacks. The US Army's most recent version of its Field Manual 100-5, Operations, reflects less emphasis on the often-criticized Douhet (firepower) approach to war, but it is not completely consistent with current NATO strategy. Some observers believe it is time for NATO as a whole to embrace the Guderian (maneuver) approach to war, which has been advocated by some of NATO's European members.¹³

Another possible change in approach is to rationalize and deemphasize the potential use of nuclear weapons. It makes little sense to distinguish among categories of nuclear weapons with overlapping missions, and among nuclear-equipped and nonnuclear NATO forces. If nuclear weapons are to be part of the ground defense capability, they should be integrated into ground force battlefield capabilities.¹⁴ If nuclear weapons are not to be used, the increasing urbanization of Europe might be used for tactical advantage. Suburban areas and towns could be integrated

into the conventional defense as part of the terrain.¹⁵ In addition, greater use could be made of fortified battle positions and barriers in and around towns, hamlets, and villages, particularly by the covering force.¹⁶

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CHAPTER III

MILITARY ASSESSMENT: NATO VS. WARSAW PACT FORCES

There are many factors which must be analyzed to assess the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance. Among these are numbers of personnel and equipment, deployment of forces, training levels, technology, logistics, differences in doctrine, and reinforcement potential. Such a comparison over time leads to the conclusion that the military balance has been changing in favor of the Warsaw Pact.¹

FORCE DEPLOYMENT

Immediately Available Ground Forces

As of 1984, NATO had 43-8/9 division equivalents (16-2/3 tank, 22-5/9 mech, and 4-2/3 other) manned and deployed in Europe. NATO's 43-8/9 division equivalents were opposed by 73 Warsaw Pact division equivalents (27-2/3 tank, 34 mech, and 11-2/3 other), including 38-1/9 Soviet divisions (15 tank, 18 mech, and 5-1/9 other). When making a comparison of strengths, it is useful to further compare the divisional equivalent strengths immediately available without mobilization in two geographic areas; Northern-Central Europe on one hand, and Southern Europe on the other.²

Northern-Central Front. As of 1984, NATO had 27-8/9 immediately available division equivalents (14-2/3 tank, 9-5/9 mech, and 3-2/3 other), including 6 US division equivalents (2-1/3 armd, 2-1/3 mech, and 1-1/3 other). NATO forces were opposed by 60-5/9 Warsaw Pact division equivalents (23 tank, 30 mech, and 7-5/9 other), including 38-1/9 Soviet division equivalents (15 tank, 18 mech, and 5-1/9 other).³

Southern Front. As of 1984, NATO had 16 immediately available division equivalents (2 tank, 13 mech, and 1 other), including Italian, Greek, and Turkish ground forces. They were opposed by 12-4/9 Warsaw Pact division equivalents (4-2/3 tank, 4 mech, and 3-7/9 other), of which 6-1/3 were Soviet (2 tank, 3 mech, and 1-1/3 other). However, it should be noted that NATO's forward forces in the Southern Command are dispersed in three geographic areas (Northeast Italy, the Greek-Turkish Thrace, and the Turkish Caucasus), with insignificant capability of moving forces from one area to another.⁴

Reinforcing Division Equivalents

In assessing the military balance, reinforcing division equivalents are an important factor, particularly for the Warsaw Pact because the bulk of its reinforcements are in Europe where they can be integrated into combat formations during the first two or three weeks of a buildup. NATO does not have the capability to match such a rapid buildup because many of its

reinforcing divisions are located in the US. Considering all categories of readiness, the Warsaw Pact can reinforce with 107-1/9 division equivalents (75 Soviet divisions based in the Western and Central Military Districts of the Soviet Union, and 32-1/9 provided by its Warsaw Pact allies). After mobilizing all its first-line reserves, NATO can conceivably reinforce with 108-8/9 division equivalents. However, 30-1/3 of those divisions are located in the US and must be transported to Europe.⁵

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

Strategic Assets

NATO's strategic nuclear forces are composed of a triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers (principally US B-52s). The US provides most of the strategic forces although the United Kingdom (UK) has some SLBMs. Although the US has more warheads, the Soviet Union has more delivery vehicles. The greater number of US warheads is diminishing as an advantage because the Soviets are deploying increasing numbers of independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and mounting them on missiles with greater throw weights. The Soviet Union also has more SLBMs, but the US has a significant advantage in SLBM warheads. In strategic bombers, the US has a preponderant advantage.⁶

Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF)

The Warsaw Pact currently has a significant advantage over NATO in TNF, gained through its continuing deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles with MIRVs. It was estimated in 1984 that they had 378 SS-20s.⁷ The SS-20 has a greater range (5000 km), greater accuracy, and better mobility than earlier Soviet TNF missiles. In addition, each missile may have three MIRVs. The SS-20 is significantly more potent than the Pershing 1A (1 warhead, 160-740 km).⁸ NATO needed a response to this challenge.⁹ In December 1979, NATO leaders agreed to the deployment in Europe of 572 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and extended-range Pershing II missiles.¹⁰ The deployment of the first of the new NATO missiles in late 1983 led to the walkout of the Soviet Union from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva.¹¹

Conventional Power

The relative combat power of the Warsaw Pact forces opposing NATO has increased markedly over the past ten to fifteen years. For example, Warsaw Pact tank superiority increased from 2:1 to 3:1, and artillery tube ratios changed from 1.5:1 to 4:1. The quality of Warsaw Pact equipment has also improved.¹² Mobility has been emphasized by the Warsaw Pact. This is evidenced by the fact that all Soviet infantry units are now completely mechanized

or motorized.¹³ Warsaw Pact combat doctrine emphasizes rapid and continuous forward movement. The Soviets have taken into consideration the many formidable rivers in Europe, running toward the north, potentially blocking their advance. Hence they have developed not only cross-country mobility, but also extremely sophisticated river-crossing capabilities such as new types of bridging.¹⁴

Estimates by force planners indicate that there should be at least three more heavy armored divisions assigned to NATO, stationed in Europe as a mobile reserve.¹⁵ The ability of the US to move its intended reinforcements from the Continental US (CONUS) to Europe fast enough to do any good was brought into question by exercises such as Nifty Nugget.¹⁶

The Soviet ground forces committed to the Warsaw Pact maintain a high level of readiness and training. The Soviet Army is a modern, well-equipped, and presumably effective fighting force, capable of operating efficiently in both small unit and large-scale operations. Of particular concern to NATO planners is the Soviet Army's increasing ability to launch an attack more rapidly than in the past and its confirmed ability to sustain such an attack logistically.¹⁷

Largely in response to Warsaw Pact force modernization, NATO ground forces in Europe have continued to be modernized in the past few years.¹⁸ NATO's rate of modernization has been much

slower, causing it to lose much of its technological lead and qualitative superiority.¹⁹ The use of Soviet-designed equipment throughout the Warsaw Pact provides a significant advantage in terms of standardization.²⁰ Rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) efforts by NATO have been less successful due primarily to disagreements regarding requirements.^{21, 22}

Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces have excellent capabilities and training in the use of and defense against chemical warfare. The Soviets also have an extensive and growing arsenal of chemical weapons.²³ There are some doubts about the reliability and value of some of the forces of Soviet satellite nations,²⁴ but it is believed that Warsaw Pact forces have been trained for and would cooperate in a "lightning war" against NATO.²⁵

Training of NATO forces by their individual nations is often excellent. But a glaring weakness in NATO is the need for more and better combined training. Electronic warfare (EW) training leads the list according to an unidentified NATO official, but other areas are not far behind.²⁶ Additional training exercises involving combined logistics operations and host nation support across international boundaries, would certainly be helpful.²⁷

Chemical Warfare

The Warsaw Pact has a significant advantage in chemical warfare capabilities. It is believed by some experts that, in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, the Soviets would have strong incentives "to use chemical weapons because of the large difference in existing capabilities." The US and NATO do not have an effective chemical warfare retaliatory capability.²⁸ "The existing US stockpile of offensive chemical munitions has deteriorated to the point where it is virtually useless." More modern binary chemical weapons have been developed and tested.²⁹ It is imperative for the US to begin producing binary chemical weapons as rapidly as possible.

Tactical Air Power

If NATO forces are to be able to maneuver successfully, they will need significantly better air cover than is currently available. NATO has fewer aircraft than the Warsaw Pact, but NATO aircraft tend to be multipurpose with better performance over their full mission profiles, greater range and payload, as well as ground attack capabilities. Warsaw Pact aircraft have tended to be air defense fighters, but they are being replaced by multirole fighters.³⁰

As of 1984, in northern-central Europe, the Warsaw Pact had nearly 4,400 ground-based fighter aircraft (over half of them interceptors), while NATO had 2,228 (over two-thirds of which

were fighter/ground attack aircraft). In the southern sector, the Warsaw Pact had approximately 2,671 ground-based fighters (nearly two-thirds interceptors), as opposed to 815 NATO aircraft (two-thirds fighter/ground attack).³¹ NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Nimrod airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft have given it an airborne control and communications system with significant advantages.³²

Soviet Frontal Aviation has become a major strike force since the late 1960s.³³ Soviet doctrine call for achieving air superiority in the interest of ground forces,³⁴ principally by destroying enemy air power through massive attacks against airfields.³⁵ One serious concern is that use of persistent chemical agents against NATO airfields could seriously impair the ability of NATO aircrews to refuel and rearm aircraft, causing a disastrous reduction in sortie rates. According to GEN David C. Jones, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), US defense against chemical weapons is marginal to limited, due to insufficient protective clothing, protective shelters, and decontamination equipment, as well as inadequate area warning systems.³⁶

NATO's only current hope for stopping a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact, giving time for NATO ground forces to deploy, would be the use of airpower. This can only be done if NATO's air forces are strong enough to ensure air superiority.³⁷

Both sides are improving the capabilities of their aircraft inventories. The Soviets have several new fighters they are introducing while the US has no completely new ones in development. The US Air Force (USAF) has 34.5 fighter wings but it needs 54 fighter wings to match its global commitments. Air superiority is one contest the US and NATO must not lose.³⁸

Command and Control

During its early years, NATO used postal telegraph (PTT) systems in Europe for its command and control communications. Beginning in 1966, NATO began planning a crisis management/ command and control communication system which links all NATO capitals with NATO's three major commanders. In 1970, a satellite communications system was added.³⁹ However, NATO still has serious command, control, and communications (C³) interoperability problems at tactical levels.⁴⁰

The Soviet Union is very concerned about C³, which are essential for top-down control and coordination of major high-speed offensives and joint air, land, and sea operations.⁴¹ Significant aspects of Soviet C³ systems include their comprehensiveness and diversity, seeking to insure survivability under all combat conditions. The Soviets achieve survivability through dispersal, hardness, concealment, mobility, and sheerly large numbers. There are indications of significant Soviet

achievements in some areas of C³. Adm. James L. Holloway, III, has stated:

"When you compare our navies, I do think the Soviets have an advantage over the US Navy in that they have more and better communications systems than we do. . . . I give them a clear advantage in secure communications."

Former Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf once stated, "The Soviets have the best command and control one can imagine."⁴²

C³ satellites are receiving increased emphasis in the Soviet Union.⁴³ The Soviets have made extensive use of satellites for communications at several levels of their command structure. Other satellites are used for reconnaissance (to include photographic, active radar, and electronic "ferreting"). The Soviets also have a Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS) and antisatellite (ASAT) systems. The threat of a Soviet ASAT attack against US satellites led the US to begin developing its own ASAT.⁴⁴ The US has successfully tested an ASAT missile launched from an F-15 aircraft at an imaginary target.⁴⁵

GEN Alexander C. Haig, as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stated, "C³ is . . . by far NATO's most grievous deficiency." Yet there is ample evidence that the Soviets consider C³ activities and facilities as primary time-urgent targets for Soviet attack.⁴⁶ It is imperative for NATO to improve the capabilities and survivability of its C³ systems.

Warsaw Pact Logistics

The Soviet logistic system has been improved greatly in recent years. It uses a combination of rail, road, and pipeline transportation systems,⁴⁷ over relatively short interior lines of communication.⁴⁸ Some Warsaw Pact forces may have shortages, but standardization makes rapid restockage possible.⁴⁹ The former NATO superiority in forward-area logistics is probably gone.⁵⁰ The Warsaw Pact's ability to launch a surprise attack and to sustain it logistically has been confirmed.⁵¹

NATO Logistics

The US JCS defines logistics as "the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces."⁵² Within NATO, logistical support is considered a national responsibility.⁵³ This inflexible logistic system has inadequate central coordination. Since NATO can no longer use French territory, it has many lines of communication running from north to south in what might become combat areas. Forces from some NATO countries are woefully short of supplies needed for sustained combat.⁵⁴ A major, unresolved problem for NATO is the lack of adequate stockpiles and storage sites for equipment, ammunition, and other war reserve stocks. NATO's agreed objective is for each nation to maintain stocks sufficient to support its forces "until resupply becomes effective."⁵⁵

Major deficiencies in US logistical planning and readiness to support NATO were revealed by command post exercises such as Nifty Nugget. During Nifty Nugget, nothing worked according to plan. Three US divisions, which were supposed to fly to Europe immediately to pick up prepositioned equipment and supplies with which to fight, took twice as long as they should have before moving into combat. Later in the simulation, US forces ran out of ammunition and supplies. About 600,000 of them died or were captured by Warsaw Pact forces.⁵⁶ It would have certainly been more advantageous from a military standpoint to have had three additional heavy divisions stationed in Europe.⁵⁷ In addition, according to US force planners, "risks are being accepted in the logistical force structure."⁵⁸

The US also has serious logistical problems to solve within the theater of operations. Of significant concern is the inadequate number of active force transportation units deployed in Europe. US forces will have to rely heavily on host nation support (civilian truckers) to move personnel, supplies, and ammunition from the seaports and airports in the communications zone (COMMZ) to the combat zone.⁵⁹ Of even greater concern is the limited number of conventional ammunition companies on active duty. Out of 50 conventional ammunition companies in the active and reserve components, 26 of them are in the US Army Reserve (USAR).⁶⁰

NATO Airlift and Sealift

Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, GEN Charles A. Gabriel has stated, "The best combat forces are of little value if they can't be brought to the battle in time."⁶¹ With long lines of communication across the Atlantic Ocean, planning for rapid reinforcement and continuing resupply is absolutely essential for NATO.⁶² Although 90 percent of NATO's ground forces, 80 percent of its air forces, and 75 percent of its naval forces would come from European nations, more than 90 percent of NATO's out-of-theater ground and air reinforcements would arrive from the US.⁶³

Rapid reinforcement is a significant part of the US commitment to NATO. Prepositioned Organizational Materiel Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS) is intended to reduce the transportation load, but it does not reduce the importance of airlift and sealift to US reinforcement of NATO.⁶⁴ Prestockage is not very efficient, and it is expensive.⁶⁵ Should NATO require reinforcement, both air and ground forces will have to be moved to Europe. To do this rapidly, US military airlift will have to be augmented by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).⁶⁶ European air and maritime assets will also be required. "Only with this combination of US and allied assets can NATO move large numbers of troops and equipment into the European theater rapidly."⁶⁷

US airlift planning is heavily dependent upon the CRAF. A program to upgrade the cargo-carrying capacity of the CRAF's 747s and DC-10s through modification, was not successful. As of March 1983, only one aircraft had been modified. This raised serious doubts about too much dependence on CRAF, which some critics contend is merely a subsidy for the US airline industry.⁶⁸

In 1982, a Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) confirmed the need for increased airlift capabilities,⁶⁹ concluding that the US had a shortfall of 25 million ton-miles per day.⁷⁰ The JCS determined a need for 632 long-range and 450 short-range transports (compared with 304 and 218 available).⁷¹ A proposed transport aircraft, the C-17, has been mired in US congressional politics.⁷² The C-17 is essential to add both long-range and intratheater airlift.⁷³ Even with the C-17, which was scheduled for development beginning in FY1985, the US will have a shortfall of 16 million ton-miles per day at the end of FY1989, according to US Army Chief of Staff GEN John A. Wickham, Jr.⁷⁴

After NATO's initial air and ground reinforcements reach Europe, a more significant transportation problem will continue. The successful employment and sustainability of ground combat power (as well as air power) is transportation dependent. And only sealift is capable of moving the outsize cargo and massive tonnages required for additional reinforcements and to sustain

combat operations. Merchant-type vessels will be needed to move about 95 percent of all dry cargo and 99 percent of fuel shipments. Fuel shipments will probably outweigh all categories of dry cargo combined, whether delivered by sea or by air.⁷⁵ A strengthened US-flag merchant marine is essential for the US to meet its wartime commitments to NATO. Foreign-flag ships, even those owned by US interests, are not considered a reliable alternative to a strong US merchant marine.⁷⁶

Warsaw Pact Airlift and Sealift

Airlift and sealift are less critical to the Warsaw Pact because it has relatively short interior lines of communication.⁷⁷ However, the Soviet Union has the proven capability to airlift equipment and supplies in an emergency when it is unopposed by hostile forces.⁷⁸ The Soviets have used airlift extensively to support their operations in Afghanistan.⁷⁹

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER IV

NON-MILITARY ASSESSMENT—NATO VS. SOVIET/WARSAW PACT

LITICAL FACTORS

NATO

Of serious concern to some observers is the possibility that Western Europe is being Finlandized (burdened by concessions it must make to Soviet demands to preclude retaliation). Among the indications of Finlandization that these observers have pointed out are: the opposition in some countries to the deployment of new US TNF missiles, the granting of trade credits to the Soviet Union, and the reluctance among Europeans to adequately punish the Soviets for invading Afghanistan.¹ To the foregoing might be added the agreements to buy natural gas from a Soviet pipeline and inadequate responses to the downing of unarmed Korean Air Lines passenger aircraft.

Particularly in France, Italy, and Spain, the Eurocommunist parties are a political force which could weaken those nations' resolve to oppose Soviet influence. The Eurocommunist parties tend to support the Soviet Union on most international issues, in particular East-West relations concerning Western Europe. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has suggested even a neutral, socialist Europe tied to neither superpower.²

The most bitter interally disputes have been over ambivalent

or contradictory interests outside the NATO area, involving issues such as decolonization, Middle East wars, Africa, Indochina, and the role and influence of industrialized nations in developing nations. Europeans tend to see the Third World differently than do Americans. The US has for years advocated a global economy open to US goods and capital, whereas Europe is filled with former colonial powers that still control or are dependent upon raw materials from their former colonies.³

Western Europe has not been Atlanticized, Finlandized, or Balkanized. A politically integrated, federalist Europe, that works with while challenging US interests, is coming closer to reality. A more integrated Western Europe is generally regarded as favorable to the US and to the NATO alliance.⁴

Warsaw Pact

During the 1960's and early 1970's, according to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, there was a "change in the correlation of forces in the world in socialism's favor." But despite its increasing military power, the Soviet Union is weaker politically, both at home and abroad, than it was in the early 1970's.⁵ The Soviet Union is plagued from within not only by bureaucratic inefficiency, but also by pervasive fraud, manipulation, deceit, and thievery. George Feifer has called it "the collapse of civic morale."⁶ The situation was such that

Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov, who died in February 1984, devoted much of his short tenure in office to purging the most incompetent and corrupt officials he inherited. He fired or forcibly retired approximately 20 percent of the provincial party secretaries. Andropov's successor, Konstantin Chernenko, was regarded as someone who might reinstate some of the former officials. He was regarded also as being too old and frail to "implement serious political, economic or social solutions to problems."⁷ Chernenko died on 10 March 1985.⁸ He was succeeded, less than four hours after his death was announced, by Mikhail Gorbachev, age 54, a smart, tough, younger man.⁹ It is anticipated that Gorbachev will make modifications as time goes on, but it is highly unlikely that he will change the basic system in the Soviet Union.¹⁰

Until 1983, the most visible signs of the Soviet Union's recently growing international difficulties were the reactions to its invasion of Afghanistan and its threatening military buildup on the Polish border in the early 1980s to encourage suppression of the Solidarity Movement. The Third World, for example, almost unanimously condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the United Nations General Assembly.¹¹ The international reaction to the Soviet downing of an unarmed Korean airliner in 1983 was one of almost universal revulsion and outrage. The Soviet Union now faces a world in which all the other of Henry Kissinger's five

power centers of the future (the US, USSR, Western Europe, Japan, and China) are opposed to it although for different motives and objectives.¹²

The Soviet Union's relations with several of its Warsaw Pact allies are clearly a very significant problem. The satellite nations tend to dislike and fear the Soviet Union. They recall the invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the threat to invade Poland in the early 1980s.¹³ This is one of the Soviet Union's most serious problems.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

NATO

The energy crisis has caused international tensions that have affected NATO. For example, Turkey, which has the largest NATO army in Europe, has developed severe energy-related economic problems. A sudden drop in demand for Turkish goods, coupled with fewer jobs for Turkish laborers who used to work abroad, have made it difficult for Turkey to pay for its oil imports. Turkey has experienced over 20 percent unemployment, 60 percent inflation, and 50 percent industrial idleness in recent years.¹⁴

The Soviet Union has been able to exploit the economic problems of some NATO nations, most of which are energy related. Turkey and Greece have been particular targets of Soviet economic diplomacy. The Soviets have increased their economic aid to

Turkey dramatically. The number of Warsaw Pact economic technicians working in Turkey has been higher than 1,500. There have been similar increases in economic cooperation by the Soviets with Greece.¹⁵

There appears to be a clear need to keep the US economy invigorated as a way of maintaining respect for US economic leadership among Western Europeans. US leaders must convince the American public that foreign economic aid can benefit the domestic economy, as well as having a beneficial impact on national security.¹⁶

Soviet/Warsaw Pact

A Soviet engineer told commentator George Feifer that the Soviet Union has been squandering its tremendous resources ruthlessly, especially its gold and oil, to keep itself going. "A poorer country would have been bankrupted long ago," he told Feifer.¹⁷ In order to finance the continuing buildup of its armed forces, the Soviet Union has had to sacrifice capital formation. The Soviet Union is beset, by most accounts, by increasing economic difficulties.¹⁸ In addition, certain satellite countries, such as Poland, are on the verge of economic collapse.¹⁹ It is obvious that both alliances have serious economic problems.

CHAPTER IV

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCEPTS

1. It is not militarily feasible to defend every square foot of NATO territory. Therefore, NATO should abandon its Maginot Line without fortifications. The forward line of troops should be moved back 20 to 60 km from the border in Northern-Central Europe, depending on the terrain, to give the covering force sufficient room to maneuver and feel out the enemy's main avenues of advance. NATO should further abandon the Douhet (firepower) approach to combat, which the US has favored, and adopt the Guderian (maneuver) approach to combat. It is the best way to successfully counter superior numbers of Warsaw Pact troops without using nuclear weapons.

2. NATO should rationalize and deemphasize its potential use of nuclear weapons. It should concentrate on improving its capabilities for a conventional defense of Western Europe. Nuclear weapons should be integrated with ground force battlefield capabilities, even though those weapons should only be used as a last resort to stop a Warsaw Pact breakthrough that is impossible to stop by conventional means. The distinctions among nuclear systems with overlapping missions should also be abandoned. Nuclear disarmament talks regarding strategic and

theater nuclear weapons should be combined.

3. NATO should plan to make more effective use of urban terrain, barriers, and fortifications in depth in its conventional defense of Western Europe. Fortifications in depth should be concealed in structures within towns, villages, hamlets, and farms, giving the covering force cover and concealment from which to delay the enemy and force him to reveal his main avenues of advance.

FORCE STRUCTURE

1. NATO should increase its number of heavy divisions deployed in Europe by no less than three armored divisions. These three divisions should be held as an operational reserve, to counter any Warsaw Pact breakthroughs or to surprise the enemy with counterattacks.

2. It is imperative for NATO to improve its chemical warfare defensive capabilities, particularly with respect to airbase defense. NATO's airbases and aircrews must be capable of operating in a toxic chemical environment. It is equally imperative for NATO to improve its chemical retaliatory capabilities. The production of binary chemical munitions by the United States should be initiated as rapidly as possible.

3. The USAF should be expanded to include a total of 54 fighter wings, the number needed to fulfill its global

commitments.

4. NATO should improve its C³ facilities, equipment, and training, to make them interoperable, survivable, more reliable, and less vulnerable to electronic countermeasures.

5. It is unwise to continue taking such pronounced risks with the logistics force structure. The US must increase the numbers of its transportation and ammunition handling companies on active duty and deployed in Europe.

6. Each NATO nation should continue to increase its war reserve stocks in the European theater until it achieves a level sufficient to support its forces until sustaining resupply can become effective. Due to the long distance across the Atlantic Ocean, the US should build up to a minimum 60-day war reserve stockage level in Europe.

7. NATO should begin to standardize more of its equipment, or at least to make it interoperable. This is a serious deficiency which must be corrected.

8. NATO should begin to conduct more multinational exercises, to include tests of multinational logistical cooperation, with supplies and vehicles moving across international boundaries.

9. The US Merchant Marine should be expanded to provide the bottoms needed in case of wartime emergency to transport more of the massive tonnages of supplies and equipment needed for the

defense of Western Europe. Foreign flag ships are not an acceptable alternative.

10. Significant shortcomings have been identified in the airlift capabilities which the US needs to be able to meet its commitments to NATO. The US should improve its airlift capabilities, to include building the C-17 air transport, as rapidly as possible.

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