Military Cooperation, Political Stability, CENTCOM: The Saudi Conundrum.
Abstract
The political limits on contingency access to military facilities in the Arab world are examined within the context of the Carter Doctrine. Special circumstances allowed overt Egyptian cooperation on facilities access. Congress was unwilling to recognize that more specific assurances on access to Ras Banas were unobtainable. Therefore, appropriations for military construction have not been available. The political stability requirements of the Saudi political structure which result in a fundamental ambivalence in U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship are described. Saudi determination not to adopt policies which might undermine its political stability are an important factor contributing to this ambivalence. The advantages of specific contingency arrangements must be weighed against other U.S. objectives. particularly domestic political stability. The history of the U.S. -Saudi bilateral military relationship shows the limits of cooperation. Tacit Saudi cooperation with U.S. regional military security objectives has been increased by a more nuanced approach by Administration and military leaders. Military sales are a Key part of the overall bilateral relationship. Continual Congressional hostility to the U.S.-Saudi military relationship is a significant obstacle. Greater U.S. political sensitivity and tolerance for ambiguity, particularly by Congress, will be required to achieve our Gulf security objectives.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 15, 1985
- Accession Number
- ADA157569
Entities
People
- R. B. Merrick
Organizations
- United States Army War College