Managing the Current Transition in Strategic Nuclear Affairs,
Abstract
The strategic planning environment as a whole is now in the early stages of a transition of major proportions. Now this is by no means a new or unique phenomenon: The most cursory review of the strategic past reveals a kind of historical periodicity. The changes occurring as events unfold certainly are not discrete, spontaneous, and necessarily very distinguishable at the time. At every stage of the game, moreover, there are significant mismatches and disconnections among our strategic posture, war plans, strategies, defense arrangements with allies, and the like. Nonetheless, it is possible to look back and identify certain trends and themes that make it possible to treat different strategic epochs as specific entities. There has been a steady convergence in our thinking about operational employment strategy. Concepts of strategic flexibility, first articulated officially in the very early 1960s, have been steadily if not swiftly fleshed out over time. Substantial consensus has emerged on both sides of the Atlantic that U.S. nuclear forces can play only a rather limited role in the deterrence of potential adversary aggression that is less than all-out. Strategic budgets have stabilized as a share of the DoD budget as a whole. The strategic force structure has, in many ways, stabilized as well.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1985
- Accession Number
- ADA158356
Entities
People
- K. N. Lewis
Organizations
- RAND Corporation