




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
U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT SYSTEM

IN TRANSITION

By COLONEL CHARLES O. COFFMAN, USA

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U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

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AUTHOR: Charles O. Coffman, Colonel, U.S. Army

The Army is in the process of redesigning its force structure with the objective of increasing overall combat capability. This will result in significant manning decrements in personnel service support areas, especially at division level. This action, part of the overall Army of Excellence(AOE) initiative, is to give priority to combat capability and accept greater risk in support functions.

Outlines the challenge to the Army Personnel Community which is to redesign the personnel support system, staying within manning constraints, and to ensure that the capability to accomplish critical functions in a responsive manner in wartime is maintained. Examines the methodology being used to meet the challenge to include addressing manpower constraints, organizational structure options, functional review, systems integration, and doctrine. Concludes that effort is being managed effectively but expectations for manpower savings may be too high. Addresses potential degradation of personnel retention and readiness if personnel support manpower capability is eliminated before improved systems are in being.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Charles O. Coffman recently completed a tour as the Director, Adjutant General School, Soldier Support Center, Fort Harrison, Indiana. As an Adjutant General Corps officer, he has served several years at the field operating level of the Army's personnel service support system to include command of a replacement company in Vietnam and a personnel service company at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Other key assignments include two years as a division adjutant general and three years in a corps personnel and administration battalion. He has service overseas in Germany, Vietnam, and Turkey. Colonel Coffman is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Air War College, class of 1985.

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CHAPTER I

THE CHALLENGE

The Army is in the process of redesigning its force structure with the objective of increasing overall combat capability. This will result in significant manning decrements in combat service support areas, especially at division level. In some cases, the support functions and capabilities are being moved to corps or to the echelons above corps level. However, in the functional category of personnel service support, much of the current capability(manning) is being eliminated from the theater, and the active force structure. This concept, part of the overall Army of Excellence(AOE) initiative, is to give priority to increasing overall combat capability and accepting greater risk in support functions.

The challenge to the Army Personnel Community* is a two part problem. First, to redesign the personnel service support system and stay within manning constraints and, second, to ensure that the capability to accomplish critical functions in a responsive manner in wartime is maintained. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army(DCSPER, HQDA) recently addressed the first part of the problem in a letter in

* See Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

which he stated, "The Army of Excellence force design presents the personnel community with an extraordinary challenge. To support the Army's plan to increase combat power we must reduce the cost of doing business."(1-1) The author believes it is significant that the second part of the problem was not addressed.

The concern of this author is that in meeting the objective of "reducing the cost of doing business" the Army may be betting too much on automation to solve the problem. The result could be an inability to satisfactorily accomplish on or near the battlefield critical functions such as strength accounting, replacement operations, casualty reporting, and postal operations.

This challenge now facing the personnel community has evolved over the last several years as the Army has begun fielding new, modern, equipment which is driving doctrine and force structure changes. This resulted in the J series Table of Organization and Equipment(TOE), Army 86 design, with implementation begun in the late Fiscal Year(FY) 1982 -- early 1983 timeframe. However, the Army recognized significant force structure, manning, and deployability problems under the overall umbrella of force modernization. Consequently, Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) was tasked to conduct a study entitled, "The Army of Excellence Study." The purpose of the study is stated below:

In essence, the AOE Study was undertaken because the sum of the Army's required parts exceeded the resources available to structure the Army. Each component of the evolving Army structure was a sound, flexible organization; but when all of the personnel and material requirements for them were totaled, the requirements exceeded the Army's ability to meet them. The attempt to man, equip, train, and field the force would have exhausted available resources long before the desired organizations could be fielded. The AOE represents a means to provide a combat effective, responsive, and balanced total force that is realistically attainable with available resources.(2:1-3)

To date, the results of the AOE Study include the light division structure, significant design modifications to the heavy division, and organizational modifications planned for the corps and echelons above corps.

The impact on the personnel service support function is a reduction of approximately 3,000 spaces in the TOE structure. Hence, the DCSPER'S imperative, " We must reduce the cost of doing business."

This paper will examine the methodology being used to meet this challenge to include addressing manpower constraints, organizational structure options, the functional review, systems integration, and doctrine with the intent of presenting positive recommendations for improving the final product.

CHAPTER II

THE METHODOLOGY

The methodology being used by the Army to meet the challenge is innovative and encouraging. It appears to be a true Army Personnel Community effort with significant involvement from all concerned.

This is in stark contrast to the essentially TRADOC only effort which began about five years ago and resulted in the design and fielding at the beginning of FY1983 of a newly structured J series TOE for the division adjutant general company. This new organization was significantly smaller than the H series TOE structure it replaced and there was no adjustment in mission or supporting doctrine. Basically, a manpower reduction decision had been made and was implemented with no current work savings possible. The apparent concept of operations was that field commanders would have to decide whether or not to resource the mission requirements out of Table of Distribution(TDA) or Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM) assets until automation designs in the test stage could provide the work savings sometime in the future.

The Army plan to restructure the 7th Infantry Division into a 10,000 man light force at the beginning of FY1985 with concurrent reduction in TOE personnel support

strength from 282 to 120 triggered action in January and February 1984 to attempt to expedite the restructuring of the personnel service support system. This action was directed by instructions from the HQDA, DCSPER, (3:1-3) which gave the Soldier Support Center(SSC) the lead in coordinating the redesign effort based on a management action plan prepared by that agency.(4:1-7) The initial thrust of the effort was to reduce workload through elimination or redesign of functions and expediting the fielding of new hardware with supporting software based on concepts from a High Technology Personnel System (HTPS) being tested at Fort Lewis, Washington. It soon became evident, however, that these actions could not be completed in a 6-9 month period. Subsequently, action was taken to defer the manpower reductions in the 7th Infantry Division and other divisions incrementally through FY1987.

Late in calendar year 1984, the DCSPER, HQDA, established a DCSPER Army of Excellence Task Force to lead in the development and execution of an Army-wide plan to reduce the manpower costs associated with personnel and administrative operations. The mission of the task force is as follows:

- a. Guide the DCSPER Staff in a top-to-bottom review of policies, procedures, and publications to reduce the cost of business in the field.
- b. Develop and execute a plan to align personnel and administration functions, work centers, and procedures in support of the TOE force and in accordance with The Army of Excellence doctrine and structure.

c. Close the gap between peacetime policies, procedures, systems and Army of Excellence doctrine and structure.

d. Oversee the execution of change to ensure work reducing techniques are delivered once they have been approved.

e. Operate a central clearing house to receive, task, and account for work saving suggestions from the field.

f. Validate and record the manpower cost of redesigned procedures on the ground; maintain a formal record of work reduction.

g. Develop a plan for the DCSPER to institutionalize the work of the Task Force for the long haul (i.e., post 1986). (5:1)

The task force which is organized into three panels is being lead by the Forces Command(FORSCOM) Adjutant General who is directly responsible to the DCSPER, HQDA. The three panels are: functional, headed by the task force director at FORSCOM; systems integration, headed by the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System - Three(SIDPERS 3) project manager within the DCSPER, HQDA staff; and doctrine and structure, headed by the Director, Combat Developments, at the Soldier Support Center.

Design constraints placed on the task force include:

a. Change will be evolutionary. The objective is to start with the current procedures and automated systems and move forward in an incremental fashion.

b. The primary recommendations of the Task Force will be achievable within two years from the standpoint of practicality (i.e., near and mid-term).

c. The SIDPERS data base as it exists today will be used as the basis for all automation initiatives.

d. The principal hardware and software for automation initiatives will be the TACCS and SIDPERS-2.75.(5:3)

In addition to the task force, An Army of Excellence Board of Directors was established by the DCSPER, HQDA, to coordinate staff and major command issues, doctrinal

matters, and training considerations. The board's purpose appears to be to focus major issues for decision by DCSPER, HQDA, convened general officer in-process reviews. The co-chairmen of the board are the Director, Combat Developments, Soldier Support Center and the Adjutant General, FORSCOM(Also the task force director). The membership of this board is listed at Appendix A.(6:2)

A significant point is that the task force's focus is primarily on the Military Personnel Office (MILPO) and its functions, as a total system.(6:3-4) The logical flow of the effort should be to determine what functions can be redesigned, eliminated, or otherwise modified to achieve work reduction. Then, determine how automation will further reduce manpower requirements to accomplish the redesigned functions.

Three separate and distinct matters complicate the effort. First, some manpower reductions are effective at the beginning of FY86 which doesn't leave sufficient time for automation to help in a thorough and accurate manner. Second, where the function must be retained, regardless of modification or redesign, a decision must be made as to whether it should be resourced in TOE as a wartime function or in TDA as a peacetime only function. Third, although primary, the MILPO isn't the only personnel support element which must be factored into the overall manpower constraint problem. Resourcing of replacement and postal units must

also be considered.

The major review effort is to be completed by 30 June 1985, with refinement and execution through early FY87.

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE

Current Doctrine

Current personnel and administration doctrine separates functions into those considered primary or secondary during wartime as shown below:

PRIMARY

Strength Accounting
Replacement Operations
Casualty Reporting

SECONDARY

Postal Operations
awards
Promotions/Reductions
Classification/Reclassification
Morale Support Activities
Administrative Services

This separation is of some but not essential value in our effort to introduce new concepts. It means that, "...during periods of high-intensity conflict, personnel and administration organizations may perform these primary functions to the exclusion of all others."(7:1-1) However, if the commander's priorities change or the combat situation permits, all functions are expected to be performed.

How all of these essential functions are to be accomplished is an important question. At corps and division-level, current doctrine states, "...Automatic Data Processing (ADP) and communications systems (should be used) as much as possible, dependent upon the battlefield

situation. If electronic means are not available, comprehensive and streamlined manual procedures must be used."(8:7-0) At the echelons above corps level, the doctrine states that,"Since these functions (primary) are both critical and time sensitive, they must receive the highest priority for ADP and telecommunications."(9:1-1)

What this says is that today there is no doctrine to support dedicated ADP and communications systems support for the personnel support mission at any level of command. Providing the systems are operational in a combat environment, priority of use is a matter to fight over on a daily basis. This necessitates maintaining the trained manpower to crunch numbers manually, yet quickly and accurately, and the capability to transmit data by courier.

Options

Under the AOE Study, manpower requirements for organizations responsible for personnel service support are considerably reduced (See Chapter IV). The means by which these reductions are achieved offer several options and combinations thereof. Functions and organizations are the obvious key.

Eliminating, redesigning, or relocating functions has and still is being worked very hard. As indicated in Chapter II, it is the primary focus for work savings by the DCSPER Task Force.

There has been, however, little gained through elimination of functions which indicates that there is not much wrong functionally with the Army's personnel support system. It does what is necessary to support departmental-level personnel managers, field commanders, and individual soldiers.

Redesign of functions addresses eliminating non-essential procedures and determining where work savings may be gained through automation.

Relocation or realignment of functions requires determining where a particular function, which has previously been determined to be essential, can best be performed; i.e., division, corps, echelons above corps level, or a garrison MILPO (Outside of the TOE force structure).

The organizational design options should first of all be based on decisions about functions. The question to be asked is, "What type of organization is needed to accomplish which functions where?" One possible option available is to place the unit in the reserve components, provided the functions performed by the supporting unit are not presently required because the supported combat unit is not presently deployed.

Army of Excellence Design Concept

Under the AOE concept the division Adjutant General (AG) Company is eliminated. In its place, there is assigned

to the division headquarters a staff element called the G1/AG Section which provides essential personnel support for the division which, in reality, is little more than the three primary functions addressed at the beginning of this chapter plus an administrative services section and a two-man finance support liaison element. The size of the G1/AG Section varies according to the size of the supported division or separate brigade. Other personnel functions previously performed by the AG Company are split between a corps-level direct support personnel service company (DSPSC) and a garrison MILPO.(10:5)

The DCSPER Task Force is proposing a concept which should lead to a standardized work center alignment based on a functional analysis which asks whether or not a function is required upon deployment and, if so, is it a primary or secondary support function. Answering the deployability question leads to allocation of resources in the TOE or TDA. Basically, primary functions required upon deployment will be accomplished within the G1/AG Section of the division, secondary functions required upon deployment will be accomplished within the PSC, and functions not required upon deployment will be accomplished within the TDA.(11:2-1)

Doctrinally, the division will not initially deploy with its supporting DSPSC. The DSPSC should normally deploy as a subordinate unit of a corps personnel and administration battalion.(10:6) However, on a day-to-day

peacetime basis, it probably will be placed under the operational control of the division and respond directly to the division G1/AG.

Following the design of the DSPSC as a corps "plug" for divisions, it became apparent that there would have to be DSPSCs of varying sizes to conform to the support requirements of the different type and size divisions. Analysis of the present corps-level PSCs organic to the personnel and administration battalions which are considered general support units reveals that they are typed (sized) by letter designation based on the number of troops supported. Therefore, the direct support designation for PSCs will probably not be used except when a unit is actually employed in direct support. This will facilitate a more logical design of PSCs where force support ratios will govern the design and assignment of a PSC in support of a specific size combat force.(12)

The next functional elements to be examined from a location and resourcing perspective are replacement and postal operations.

The problem with replacement operations is that division support has not previously been standardized. In some divisions a replacement detachment augmentation was organic to the AG Company TOE. Others had no organic support with no obvious logic to explain the situation (The assumption being that a corps-level replacement regulating

detachment or a reserve components unit would provide support upon deployment). The AOE concept resources a small replacement element as part of the G1/AG Section of the division headquarters.

Postal operations is a different problem. Divisions stationed overseas have always had an organic postal section as part of the AG Company or had a postal detachment in direct support. CONUS-based divisions do not have organic or direct postal support because Congress directed that such support must be provided by the United States Postal Service (USPS).(13) These divisions are supported upon deployment by reserve component units. FORSCOM, however, has been able to retain two postal units in the active force structure in support of exercises and contingency plans.

There has already been a 428 space reduction in the postal force to be effective in FY1988. This reduction was based on a unilateral action taken within USAREUR to modify current TOE documents and hire civilians to accomplish the finance and claims service functions in Europe. This was not an AOE or doctrinal initiative. It was in response to a requirement to assist in meeting theater-wide troop strength ceilings mandated by Congress.(14)

There is a possibility of saving more spaces from within the postal force by converting some postal detachments (which are the same as companies with organic overhead to include commanders, first sergeants, etc.) into

platoons which would then be attached to another organization for administration.

Above division level, concepts are, as expected, still evolving. A corps-level personnel and administration brigade, depending upon the size of the corps force, is a possibility. This would be logical if all the PSCs, postal and replacement units (of whatever description) were controlled by personnel and administration battalions with area support missions, rather than supporting non-divisional units only, as is the case today.(8:4-0)

Another important issue being dealt with in the design concept is how many and what type units will be part of the reserve components, and will this allocation of units adequately support deployment priorities.

Automation

The above as an overview of an evolving design concept for division-level personnel support operations and a brief review of other major issues being worked is good as far as it goes. It is accepted that all organizations will be resourced significantly short of what will be needed to accomplish the mission the same way it is today.

The concept of operations which follows changes the way we "do business" through automation which will make up the manpower shortfall:

Maximum use is made of computers and electronic communications at every level of command. Computers at each level of command interface with existing communications nets through the use of appropriate

modums.

(a) Commanders at theater and corps have large mainframe computers (VIABLE network and ITASC mainframes) upon which reside the entire personnel record or any portion thereof, of every soldier in the command. SIDPERS and other application software provide those commanders with reports on the personnel status of their forces.

(b) Commanders of divisions, brigades, battalions and other organizations of equivalent size have at their disposal the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) which serves the dual purposes of receiving and transmitting by-name personnel information up and down the chain of command and accumulating, computing, and transmitting numerical strength data for command and control purposes. Application software is available for the TACCS to both input SIDPERS personnel transactions and generate desired personnel reports.

(c) Commanders at the company/battery/troop level are provided the Unit Level Computer System (ULC). The primary purpose of the ULC is to transmit numerical strength reports and free text messages to the next higher headquarters; however, the ULC also has the capability of automating numerous company level administrative functions and software is designed for that purpose as well.

(d) Radio communications is the preferred method of data transmission; however, it is recognized that other methods will frequently be required, particularly at lower command levels. TACCS and ULC are capable of wire/cable connection and all computers are equipped to download data to portable magnetic media for courier transmission. (10:7-8)

There are two basic problems with this concept: one, the time required to get such complex systems fielded and working correctly and two, the questionable survivability of computers on the battlefield. Although redundancy of equipment and data bases is assumed in the concept, the only valid back-up system is a manpower intensive manual one. The first problem will be addressed further in Chapter VI, Systems Integration.

CHAPTER IV

MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS

The presently programmed TOE force indicates an approximate 18 percent reduction in personnel support spaces through FY1988. In addition, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, has proposed a plan to further reduce TOE strength.(15) Current, programmed, and planned manning is illustrated below:

CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	PROGRAMMED FY1986	PROGRAMMED FY1988	PLANNED FY1988
10616	10217	8752	7473

The Divisional Force

The AOE Study results mandated the elimination of approximately 2,500 personnel service support function manpower authorizations within the active component divisional force. Initially, these reductions were to be effective at the beginning of FY1985. However, this was later changed to FY1988 with a much smaller cut effective the beginning of FY1986.(16) The basis for the smaller cut was approval of a two year augmentation as follows: FORSCOM two-brigade divisions were given 40 additional spaces; FORSCOM three-brigade divisions were given 67 spaces; USAREUR divisions were given 81 spaces(Implemented in the TDA structure); and WESTCOM authorized a 91 space TDA augmentation for the 25th Infantry Division.(14) The

current programmed force totals for the divisional forces are as follows:

CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	FY1986	FY1988
3673	3903	2842

At Appendix B is an illustration of by-division force totals. The Adjutant General (AG) Company leaves the division structure at the end of FY1985 (with the exception of the 82d Airborne and 101st Air Assault divisions which retain the AG Company until FY1988, and the 2d Infantry Division which is not yet programmed for conversion) to be replaced by a G1/AG Section in the division headquarters company and a personnel service company (PSC) which is not considered a part of the divisional force structure. Therefore, in looking only at the division increment of the total division force equivalent, the change in the above summary data would be quite dramatic: a drop from 3673 to 1012 spaces (776 in 17 G1/AG Sections and the 236 spaces remaining in the 2d AG Company). The difference between the present, FY1985, and FY1988 authorizations is 2661 spaces or a savings of 72 percent, while adding two divisions to the force structure. However, to keep the manpower situation in direct relationship to mission requirements, the summary data above and that at Appendix B shows the total number of spaces allocated to providing personnel service support to the division, resulting in a 831 space, or 23 percent,

savings. The methodology is as follows:

Current Authorizations = Adjutant General Company minus the band section, which becomes a separate company.

Programmed FY1986 = G1/AG Section of the division headquarters plus the non-divisional supporting PSC, plus an augmentation authorized during FY1986 and 1987.

PROGRAMMED FY1988 = G1/AG Section plus the supporting PSC, minus the augmentation.

A three-brigade FORSCOM based heavy division (the 4th Infantry Division) makes a good example:

CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS	EXPLANATION
250	4th AG Company H Series TOE of 291 <u>minus</u> 41 space band section.
PROGRAMMED FY1986	
48	G1/AG Section in division headquarters company of 48 spaces.
199	PSC of 132 spaces <u>plus</u> 67 space augmentation authorized through FY1987.
247	Total
PROGRAMMED FY1988	
48	Same as for FY1986.
115	PSC of 115 spaces <u>minus</u> the 67 space augmentation.
163	Total

The numerical data in this chapter and at Annex B pertaining to the divisional force is as accurate as it is possible to obtain as of this writing. The basic source was the HQDA,

DCSPER, Personnel Management Authorization Document(PMAD), Dec 1984. However, based on anticipating some structural decisions, a few common sense changes were made to the PMAD data, as follows. Although not in the programmed force structure today, the 6th Division is expected to be activated in FY1987.(14) Although there is presently an issue to be resolved on whether a two-man finance support element should be resourced in the G1/AG Section or the PSC, data herein includes it in the PSC. All but the four light divisions have a small replacement element resourced as part of the G1/AG Section; therefore, seven spaces were added to the light divisions. The total personnel support manning for the light and heavy divisions is 127 and 163, respectively, which includes the G1/AG Section and the PSC. The light division has a G1/AG Section of 36 spaces and a PSC of 91 spaces. The heavy division has a G1/AG Section of 48 spaces and a PSC of 115 spaces.*

The Corps and Echelons above Corps Force

In addition to the spaces initially eliminated at division level by the AOE Study, another 1279 space reduction has been mandated from the active component personnel support function at corps and the echelons above corps level. Therefore, the action taken to eliminate the

* Specific numbers are subject to change. Numerical data is included in this paper in an attempt to obtain an imperfect "snap-shot" view of the proverbial moving train.

AG Company and move approximately 70 percent of the manpower supporting the divisions to the corps level only solves part of the problem.

The entire TOE unit structure is being examined in an effort to best determine where to cut spaces, redesign units, and move units to the reserve components. The approximate presently programmed units and strength being studied is at Annex C.(17)

The TDA Structure and Cost

By FY1988 there will have been an approximate 3,000 space or 30 percent reduction in personnel and administration support to the TOE force. Increased capability and other efficiencies based on eliminating, redesigning, and automating functions will make some portion of this reduction possible. The remainder will have to be absorbed in the TDA support structure. This unknown cost will be very difficult to "sell" to the Army. However, the DCSPER Task Force is already facing the issue.

The concept addressed in Chapter III which aligns personnel and administration work centers to achieve organizational standardization is the basis for preparing to deal with this issue. That non-deploying functions must be resourced in the TDA is the basis for validating manpower costs and establishing support requirements.

A draft management action plan prepared by the DCSPER Task Force outlines the major actions that must be

accomplished to offset the manpower reductions and standardize operations. A major portion of the plan is devoted to describing how to validate TDA manpower costs in a standard work center environment.(11:4-1, 4-3) The initial phase includes establishing the first increment of manpower requirements and submitting a Program Development Increment Package(PDIP) for civilian authorizations for FY1988 and beyond. Prepared in January 1985, the initial PDIP based on analysis of the FORSCOM CONUS-based divisions shows a manpower support shortfall beginning in FY1986 and extending through FY1987-1991 of 1514 spaces.(18:3) Functional redesign and new automation brought on-line during the period may generate manpower savings that will reduce this shortfall. However, because this initial PDIP doesn't address support for the considerable non-divisional TOE force within FORSCOM, additional manpower savings are doubtful in the foreseeable future.

CHAPTER V

THE FUNCTIONAL REVIEW

The DCSPER Task Force Director who is also the director of the functions redesign effort has scheduled 26 functional workshops to be hosted by FORSCOM headquarters between December 1984 and the end of June 1985. The results of the first three workshops were available for review as of this writing.

Workshop participants include officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer members of the FORSCOM Personnel Management and Assistance Team (PERMAST) plus representatives from the following agencies or commands: the HQDA proponent for the function being reviewed, automation offices, FORSCOM and TRADOC installations, and the Soldier Support Center.

The purpose of the first two workshops was not to review specific functions but to get control of major issues that required immediate action. The first workshop looked at automation considerations pertaining to the Soldier Data Tag (SDT), a combat module of SIDPERS 3, and the status of TACCS fielding. (19:1-5)

The second workshop's purpose was to establish the initial priority for SIDPERS 2.75 software development. Forty functions were reviewed to determine the potential payoff offered by automation. Following the review, the

functions were prioritized by projected worksavings potential; high, moderate, or low. These priorities are keyed to the projected release(completion) dates of the eight modules(stand-alone functional applications) that are planned for SIDPERS 2.75.(20:1-2)

MODULE	PROJECTED RELEASE DATE	PROCEDURE
1	Mar 1985	Promotions/Evaluation reports
2	Jun 1985	Suspense Actions/Soldier Applications
3	Sep 1985	Reassignment Processing/Flag Actions/Bars to Reenlistment
4	Dec 1985	Eliminations/Postal Directory
5	Mar 1986	Awards/Assignments/Strength Management
6	Jun 1986	Absent Without Leave(AWOL)/Dropped from the Rolls(DFR)
7	Sep 1986	To be Determined
8	Dec 1986	To be Determined

Reassignment processing was addressed in workshop number three, the first one to be devoted to thorough review of a specific function.(21:1-9) The remaining 23 workshops will all deal with specific functions.

The workshop is the first step in a series of procedures being followed to ensure that, based on the results of the workshops, action is taken to get things accomplished, as follows:

- a. Conduct workshop.
- b. Publish a Memorandum for Record on the results of the workshop which includes findings and recommendations (implied tasks).
- c. Brief the AOE Board of Directors.
- d. Publish a Memorandum for Record on the results of the Board of Directors' meeting to include taskings.
- e. Brief the HQDA, DCSPER, on the results of the functional workshop and the Board of Director's meeting.
- f. Publish a numbered letter over the signature of the HQDA, DCSPER, formally tasking specific actions to specific commands or agencies with target dates for completion.
- g. Conduct general officer in-process reviews(IPR) to resolve major issues.(22)

CHAPTER VI

SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

As addressed in Chapter III, the basic automation concepts sound good and should eventually result in significant efficiencies and manpower savings. The problem is one of timing. The personnel services support TOE structure changes are programmed to take place before automation equipment, software, and functional redesign are available to offset the manpower requirements to operate present systems. Additionally, much of the projected manpower savings is based on educated guesses, at best. A brief description of the present and planned systems with supporting hardware is necessary in order to identify the keys to managing the changes coming over the next few years.

The Army's Standard Installation/Division Personnel System(SIDPERS) is in an evolving status at present. It is the system being integrated, and has several numerically designated iterations either in being or planned.

SIDPERS 1 is the series of computer programs or software which has been operating the system for the past several years on IBM 360 series computers, called the Combat Service Support System(CS3), using punch card input and batch processing.

SIDPERS 2 is the present system. The difference between SIDPERS 1 and 2 is relatively minor software changes made to

allow the system to operate on newer equipment, which allows for terminal rather than punch card input. The new equipment includes the Vertical Installation Automation Baseline(VIABLE) network, a regionally based system designed originally to support installation and TDA activities using a combination of interactive and batch processing. The other new equipment running SIDPERS 2 is the Decentralized Automation Service Support System(DAS3) which was developed to replace the CS3 system and support TOE field units at division level in a mobile environment.

Currently, VIABLE has only been fielded in CONUS. The DAS3 fielding plan includes divisions and separate brigades only. Because neither VIABLE nor DAS3 has been completely fielded to date, both SIDPERS 1 and 2 software systems are in use today.

SIDPERS 2.5. Two major drawbacks to the SIDPERS 2/DAS3 system in a TOE combat environment are the requirement for a 12 ton trailer and 5 ton tractor combination to move it and the availability of only standard hardcopy outputs to the user. Meanwhile, the civilian sector has moved ahead using micro computer technology. Therefore, the Army has also developed a micro computer system called the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System(TACCS) which will allow for easy transportability and improved support to the user. TACCS is the hardware device which is the basis for the future system(SIDPERS) enhancements described in this

chapter. It has been designed for both logistics and personnel applications(as were CS3 and DAS3) projected for use at battalion through corps level. Eventually, VIABLE will be fielded world-wide and TACCS will interface with it; this will allow for the phased elimination of the marginally transportable DAS3 hardware.

SIDPERS 2.5 will provide a capability to operate portions of the personnel system using an extract of the data base at separate company, battalion, brigade, G1/AG(division), and MILPO levels. The concept calls for the use of a downloaded extract of the data base on TACCS to provide date entry and file inquiry. It will also provide significant rapid deployment capability and be able to operate in a stand-alone mode providing essential personnel accounting, strength accounting, casualty reporting, and personnel management information for commanders. The first TACCS hardware will be delivered to the 24th Infantry Division at Ft. Stewart, GA in May 1985. The SIDPERS 2.5 software package will be acceptance tested at that location in July and August 1985. Initial TACCS fielding to major units is expected to be phased over the following two years.(23:1)

SIDPERS 2.75 will be an interactive system with significantly increased local programming capability using the TACCS hardware. One of the primary purposes of this iteration of the system is to automate labor intensive

personnel functions at the MILPO level. The system will be menu driven and improve accuracy, increase speed, and reduce keystrokes required of operators. Additionally, the process of performing functions will automatically generate many of the SIDPERS transactions required to update the data base. With the SIDPERS 2.75 applications, the system will provide the capability to produce the same forms, reports, and transactions normally associated with a fixed site operation, but anywhere in the field. Current plans are to field the applications as they are developed(See Chapter V) and/or concurrent with TACCS hardware fielding.(24:1)

SIDPERS 3 which will build on SIDPERS 2.75 and become an on-line, real-time system is presently at the analysis and proposal stage. It is based on the philosophy of a centralized data base consisting of a standard core of data elements for all Army personnel, a "corporate" data base serving HQDA as well as being the basis for personnel service support at all echelons. Support for HQDA will be provided by something called the Total Army Personnel Database(TAPDB) which will be the information management system to replace the officer and enlisted master files(OMF/EMF). Additionally, it will include data on reserve components personnel. To support this system, the number, type, and location of TACCS devices will be greatly expanded. Fielding of this system is not expected before the 1989-90 timeframe; therefore, labor savings projections will

not impact on the FY1988 manpower reductions. (25:1-3)

The short range key to the overall systems integration effort is fielding the TACCS device and the software acceptance test for SIDPERS 2.5, the initial system to operate on the micro computer. The next key is the results of the functional review addressed in Chapter V. The ongoing redesign effort based on the review is the basis for the labor saving stand-alone automation applications being developed for SIDPERS 2.75. If all goes as scheduled, SIDPERS 2.75 will be completely fielded and operating at the installation/division level by the end of FY1986.*

* Some personnel systems observers may question why this paper doesn't address other hardware being developed like the Soldier Data Tag(SDT), the Unit Level Computer System(ULC), and the Interim Theater Automatic Data Processing Service Center(ITASC). Although these devices/systems are scheduled for fielding in the next two to four years, their impact on the basic issue of labor savings is either nonexistent or very difficult to project at this time.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As this paper has been an attempt to observe an ongoing effort, the author asked the DCSPER Task Force Director, the FORSCOM Adjutant General, for any conclusions he might have at this point.(22)

A general conclusion was that the Army Personnel Community, as it is presently constituted, is poorly organized to deal with the dynamics involved in adjusting to the Army of Excellence initiatives. A recommendation made was to again consider establishing a three-star personnel command which would add formal structure and responsibility to the various elements of the "community."

TRADOC has the integrating center structure to do the job. And it appears to work quite well for the combat arms(Combined Arms Center) and the logisticians(Logistics Center). However, the agency responsible for "people integration," the Soldier Support Center, can't seem to effectively coordinate major efforts which reach outside of TRADOC. This conclusion and further comments on this point are the author's, and were not discussed with the FORSCOM Adjutant General.

There are two reasons for the ineffectiveness of the Soldier Support Center as a coordinator or manager of major change. One is that it is a two-star command and doesn't

speak with the same authority of the other two integrating centers which are three-star commands. The second, and more probable reason, is that the individual general officer selected to command the Soldier Support Center is never an Adjutant General or Finance Corps officer who would have a personal interest in the personnel systems business. Nor is the commander normally a combat arms officer with professional personnel management experience. Instead, he tends to be a professional training bureaucrat on his last assignment before retirement, not the type individual to anchor the personnel systems development business in a dynamic management of change environment.

That the FORSCOM Adjutant General, a colonel, went to the DCSPER of the Army, a three-star general, in November 1984, and took the leadership of the entire effort involving personnel and administration in the Army away from the Soldier Support Center validates the author's point.

The solution is to convince the Army's senior leadership that the way to get professional proponent leadership commanding the Soldier Support Center is to alternate the position between an Adjutant General and Finance Corps general officer.

Today, thanks to the FORSCOM Adjutant General, the effort to manage change in personnel and administration is moving forward in an effective, coordinated manner. The management "mechanism," as it is being called, is

graphically displayed at Annex D. The procedures being used to get things accomplished(outlined in Chapter V) are working well. The leadership and push, and the integrating force for the total effort, is exclusively resident in the DCSPER Task Force. It is an ad hoc operation which is using the field MILPO expertise of the FORSCOM Personnel Management and Assistance Team(PERMAST) to scrub functions. The authority vested in the task force director is then used to force the policy makers(HQDA, DCSPER) and operators(MILPERCEN) to think, react, and change.

Other conclusions expressed by the FORSCOM Adjutant General are as follows:

- a. The challenge and the target is clear.
- b. A reduction in manpower requirements will be achieved.
- c. How much manpower can be saved is unknown.
- d. There will be a TDA cost for FY1988 and beyond(non deploying tasks).
- e. Controls are in place to ensure changes are invisible to commanders and soldiers.(22)

Recognizing that there will be a TDA cost(addressed in Chapter IV) is key. The visibility of this issue was raised on 25 February 1985 when the DCSPER Task Force Director briefed it to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

The last conclusion(e, above) requires comment. It is extremely important that "controls" ensure that manpower cuts don't take place before the evolving personnel system is ready. Leaving commanders and individual soldiers without satisfactory personnel service support is a result

to be avoided. If this happens, there will be an immediate and significant credibility loss to personnel support professionals. But, more importantly, there will be personnel retention and readiness costs in lost soldier effectiveness.

It has been said that to maintain the morale of soldiers on the battlefield, there are three personal essentials: pay them on time, feed them properly, and get their mail to them promptly. This reference to mail points to a couple of areas of morale concern as action is being planned to cut more personnel support spaces from the battlefield.

Postal operations has long ago been doctrinally relegated to being considered a second priority personnel support function. And postal unit manning has already been reduced for FY1988 with more cuts expected. Another functional area, recreation(formally called morale, welfare, and recreation) is being considered for deletion from the TOE structure. TDA civilians are going to be hired to do the job. It is doubtful, however, that they'll be there in the corps or theater rear area on the battlefield.

As manpower to perform personnel service support functions on the battlefield is reduced an unintended result may be decentralization, pushing the responsibility to take care of our soldiers back down to the likewise inadequately resourced battalion and company commanders.

The dichotomy in the overall issue of people support is illustrated by quoting two recent pronouncements by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. The first, a letter on caring, discusses the 1984 Army Theme, The Year of the Army Family, and the responsibilities inherent in caring for soldiers and their families. Included is a quotation from a former Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, addressing a concern for putting the "personal into personnel." (26:1-3)

The second is from the text of a presentation the Chief of Staff recently made to the United States Senate Armed Services Committee wherein the capability to increase combat battalions within a fixed end strength is explained, "Internal restructuring efforts, along with unit productivity and technological enhancements, have freed up sufficient manpower to form these additional combat battalions, and more will be formed in the years ahead." (27:3-4)

The ultimate issue is cost vs. quality of support, or value received. "Caring" for soldiers and their families is labor intensive. This point will be recognized but may not be resourced. Similarly, the FORSCOM effort to validate manpower costs and establish support requirements in the TDA force will be generally successful. But the level of success experienced in competing for TDA manpower authorizations will determine whether or not the capability will be retained to really care for soldiers and their

families. Failure in this regard, as indicated earlier in this chapter, could have a significant adverse personnel retention and readiness impact.

While researching this paper the author became aware of three Army initiatives that, while outside the scope of this writing, are important and will have an impact. The first, an ongoing automated workstation review being conducted by TRADOC's Combined Arms Center, is attempting to validate battlefield automated systems requirements and to eliminate nonessential redundancy.(28:1-9) The second is an effort by HQDA, DCSPER, to improve control of TDA military manpower by issuing grade and skill floors and ceilings to MACOM's in the Program Budget Guidance(PBG), effective with FY1987. (29:1-8) And the third is a Comptroller of the Army action to standardize installation management and staffing. HQDA, DCSPER, is preparing to issue standardization guidance for functional staffing of the installation-level Deputy Chief of Staff for Community Activities(DPCA).(30:1-3)

APPENDIX A

ARMY OF EXCELLENCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

DCSPER, HQDA:

SIDPERS 3 Project Manager
Chief, Force Management Division, Military
Personnel Management Directorate
Commander, United States Army Manpower Requirements
and Documentation Agency(USAMARDA)
Deputy Director, Personnel, Plans, and Systems
Directorate
Chief, Professional Development Division, Military
Personnel Management Directorate

MILPERCEN

Deputy Director, Personnel Information Systems
Directorate
Deputy Director, Enlisted Personnel Management
Directorate

TRADOC

Director, Soldier Development Directorate, Combat
Developments Division
Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management
Director, Training Requirements Analysis
Directorate
Adjutant General

COMBINED ARMS CENTER

Director C31, Combined Arms Combat Development
Activity.

SOLDIER SUPPORT CENTER

Director, Combat Developments Directorate
Director, Training and Doctrine
Director, Adjutant General School

FORSCOM

Adjutant General (Director, Personnel and
Administration Task Force)

8TH ARMY

Commander, 8th PERSCOM (Provisional)

APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)

ARMY OF EXCELLENCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

UNITED STATES ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEMS SOFTWARE
SUPPORT COMMAND(USAISSSC).

Director, Personnel and Force Accounting Systems

USAREUR

Director, Personnel Services Support Division, Ist
PERSCOM

WESTCOM

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

APPENDIX B
BY-DIVISION FORCE TOTALS

DIVISION (BY-MACOM)	CURRENT	FY1986	FY1988
USAREUR			
1 AD	244	231	150
3 AD	244	231	150
3 ID	244	231	150
8 ID	244	231	150
FORSCOM			
1 ID	233	206	163
1 CAV	233	206	163
2 AD	233	206	163
4 ID	250	247	163
5 ID	233	206	163
6 ID*	000	153	127
7 ID	158	206	127
9 ID	158	206	206
10 ID	030	153	127
24 ID	233	206	163
82 ABN	238	238	157
101 AASLT	232	232	157
WESTCOM			
25 ID	230	278	127
8TH ARMY			
2 ID	236	236	236
TOTALS	3673	3903	2842

* Projected to activate in FY1987.


APPENDIX C

ADJUTANT GENERAL TOE UNIT AND STRENGTH SUMMARY

<u>UNIT SUMMARY</u>	FY1985	FY1988	DELTA
AG Company	17	1	-16
PSC	20	36	+16
Pers-Admin Bn(HQ)	5	3	- 2
DPU	1	1	0
Postal	29	29	0
Repl Det	10	10	0
Band	49	50	+ 1
PERSCOM	1	1	0
	---	---	---
TOTAL	132	131	- 1

<u>STRENGTH SUMMARY</u>	FY1985	FY1988	DELTA
AG COMPANY	3673	276	-3397
PSC	2557	4783	+2226
Pers-Admin Bn(HQ)	223	156	- 67
DPU	150	73	- 77
POSTAL	1148	720	- 428
Repl Det	289	289	0
Band	2248	2248	0
PERSCOM	328	207	- 121
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TOTAL	10616	8752	-1864

THE MECHANISM



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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS

AASLT	Air Assault Division
ABN	Airborne Division
AD	Armored Division
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AG Company	Adjutant General Company
AOE	Army of Excellence. The name of the latest overall effort that examined the restructuring of the Army.
Army Personnel Community	A term found in tasking and instruction documents pertaining to the subject of this paper published by the DCSPER, HQDA. In this document, it refers functionally across major commands to senior officials who are either general personnel policy or personnel systems managers. See Appendix A for a listing of the officials(by-organization) who have been tasked to oversee resolution of the issues presented in this paper.
Army Senior Leadership	Unofficial reference to the Vice and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
BMM	Borrowed Military Manpower
CAC	Combined Arms Center
CAV	Cavalry Division
CONUS	Continential United States
CS3	Combat Service Support System
DAS3	Decentralized Automation Service Support System
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DPCA	Deputy Chief of Staff for Community Activities

DSPSC	Direct Support Personnel Service Company
EMF	Enlisted Master File
Force Design	A Product and a process. As a process, it is the act of allocating resources into the framework of an organization in order to develop a unit capable of accomplishing its assigned missions. As a product, it is the documentation that tells a unit what personnel and equipment it is authorized, and how it should be organized. The product takes the form of a Table of Organization and equipment(TOE).(2:A-1)
Force Structure	The process of integrating force designs into the Army by providing equipment and personnel as identified by applicable TOE.(2:A-1)
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HTPS	High Technology Personnel System
ID	Infantry Division
ITASC	Interim Theater Automatic Data Processing Service Center
MACOM	Major Command
MILPO	Military Personnel Office
MILPERCEN	U.S. Army Military Personnel Center
OMF	Officer Master File
PBG	Program Budget Guidance
PDIP	Program Development Increment Package
PERMAST	Personnel Management and Assistance Team

PMAD	Personnel Management Authorization Document. In the fast-breaking arena of force modernization, decisions are made on new authorizations that are not included in PERSACS(Personnel Structure and Composition System) which is produced only semi-annually. PMAD accounts for these decisions. It is the sole acceptable document for military occupational specialty, specialty code, and grade authorizations used as the basis for determining the Army's accessions, training, and distribution of personnel.(31:21-2)
PSC	Personnel Service Company
Reserve Component	Refers to the Army portion of the reserve component and includes the United States Army Reserve(USAR) and the Army National Guard(ARNG).
SDT	Soldier Data Tag
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SSC	U.S. Army Soldier Support Center
TACCS	Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System
TAPDB	Total Army Personnel Database
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances. Document that tells an organization what personnel and equipment it is authorized and how it should be structured. Refers to Army organizations other than operating forces which are covered by the TOE document.

TOE

Table of Organization and Equipment. Several series of TOE exist and differ based upon the types of organization that they document, and the equipment found in the organization. The following chart describes the different TOE series that currently exist. "ROAD" organization refers to pre-Army 86 designs. "86" organization refers to a product of the Army 86 study. "AOE" organization refers to the Army of Excellence designs. "Old" equipment refers to items such as the M60 tank, M113 series armored personnel carrier, and M16A1 rifle. "New" equipment refers to such equipment as the M1 Abrams tank, the M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon.(2:A-3)

<u>Series</u>	H	C	JT	JO	JFT	JF
<u>Organization</u>	ROAD	ROAD	86	86	AOE	AOE
<u>Equipment</u>	Old	New	Old	New	Old	New
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command					
ULC	Unit Level Computer System					
USAISSSC	U.S. Army Information Systems Software Support Command(formerly Computer Systems Command)					
USAMARDA	U.S. Army Manpower Requirements and Documentation Agency					
USAREUR	U.S. Army Europe					
USPS	United States Postal Service					
VIABLE	Vertical Installation Automation Baseline					
WESTCOM	U.S. Army Western Command					
8th Army	8th U.S. Army					