Marriage and Money.
Abstract
Much of the economic and game theoretic literature focuses on the questions of existence and characterization of equilibrium points or core points. Of equal interest are schemes which actually calculate such values. Indeed, predicting the behavior of economic markets becomes a lot easier in the presence of such algorithms. In this paper, we tackle this issue for the 'marriage problem' with transferable utility. Such matching problems are useful models of, for example, the market in which jobs are to be matched to prospective employees. Gale and Shapley (1962) were the first to formally pose a 'marriage problem'. Their setup was as follows. Consider a system with two types of agents, hereafter called men and women. Each man has a preference ordering over the women; likewise, each woman ranks the men. The objective is to find a 'stable' matching; i.e., one in which no unmarried couple will willingly leave their spouses and run off together. To solve the problem, they presented the well-known 'Gale-Shapley' algorithm. This is a mathematical algorithm document.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1985
- Accession Number
- ADA161043
Entities
People
- Thomas Quint
Organizations
- Stanford University