The Rise and Fall of Detente: Causes and Consequences.
Abstract
First, was the decay of detente inevitable? Did detente collapse because the two elites held opposing assumptions about the goals of the relationship from the outset? If so, to what extent were these conflicting notions merely avoidable exaggerations and mistakes--illusions and misunderstandings, as is often suggested? To what extent, on the other hand, were the contrasts in perspective the inescapable product of incompatibilities of national interest? Second, to what extent do the changes introduced into the relationship since the end of the last decade in deep represent a sharp break with what went before? What aspects of the post-detente era are completely different from those of the late 1970s, suggesting the passing of a watershed, and what aspects are merely the culmination of a long, incremental process of erosion? Third, what, if anything, remains today from the wreckage? What features introduced into the relationship in the early 1970s have endured into the post-detente era? Finally, what shall we consider normal for this relationship--the atmosphere of 1972, or that of 1984? If the answer is 'neither', then we must ask what mix of attributes is normal, and thus what features of the post-detente era must be expected to last indefinitely, and what features might, in principle, be changed for the better.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1985
- Accession Number
- ADA161171
Entities
People
- Harry Gelman