An Examination of the Historical, Social, Economic, and Political Factors of the Marxist Insurgency in Guatemala.
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to present a comprehensive study of the Marxist insurgency in Guatemalan, through and examination of historical, social, economic, and political factors, and to discuss the probability for success of United States foreign policy in support of the Guatemalan government and its counterinsurgency program. The thesis covers violence historically endemic in Guatemala, and the roots of the Marxist insurgency which began in 1960, the Mayas from their earliest known existence, the battle for control of post-independence Guatemala between the Liberals and Conservatives, the analysis of the military governments from 1954 to 1983, the insurgency which was born during an attempted reformist coup d'etat in 1960, and the right-wing military and death squad responses to that insurgency. Chapter VI is a study of the strategic village and rural militia programs the United States backed in South Vietnam similar to the rural control programs employed in Guatemala over the last 20 years. Efforts of the current government to control the insurgency while implementing reforms, and recommendations of President Reagan's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (the Kissinger Commission ), along with an analysis of its findings, and authors recommendations for immediate and long term United States foreign policy actions in Gautemala which will prevent a Marxist overthrow while fostering necessary reforms are discussed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 16, 1985
- Accession Number
- ADA162410
Entities
People
- James D. Bjostad