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INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A NEED FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS

by

Teresa Lynn Dillon

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Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Defense Intelligence College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence
June 1985

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
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APPROVAL SHEET

Title of Thesis: INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A NEED FOR IMPROVED
RELATIONS

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Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence,
June 1985

Thesis and Abstract Approved:





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ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A NEED FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS

Teresa Lynn Dillon, Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence, June 1985

Thesis Committee Chairman: Norbert H. Marsh

The ~~thesis~~ ^{idea} of this ~~study~~ ^{system} is that the United States should pursue a foreign policy more closely aligned with India, rather than with Pakistan, because the strategic importance of India to U.S. geopolitical interests in South Asia outweighs that of Pakistan. Methodology used to support this thesis was extracted from that developed by Dr. Ray S. Cline in his book World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980). Upon application of his "perceived power weights" (i.e., critical mass, economic capability, military capability, and national strategy and will) to both countries, India emerges as the stronger nation-state.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Historical Setting

Two seemingly unrelated events which occurred in the latter part of 1979 - the sudden collapse of Iran's Pahlavi dynasty and the decisive Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - soon proved closely related to an urgent need for a revised American foreign policy strategy for the 1980s in Southwest Asia. In the course of four short months, the United States had not only lost Tehran's pro-Western friendship but also any substantial bargaining influence in Kabul. U.S. decision-makers have since acknowledged these two ominous events as catalysts in an ultimate shift in the U.S.-Soviet balance of power in this region of the world which demanded immediate reassessment of U.S. security considerations worldwide.¹

In retrospect, it is obvious that U.S. global interests were being seriously challenged by the autumn of 1979. Despite the Carter administration's publicly-announced

¹Shafqat Ali Shah, "Southwest Asia: Can the U.S. Learn from Past Mistakes?" Strategic Review, IX:28, Winter, 1981.

desire to believe Soviet rhetoric, renewed distrust of the Soviet Union had already surfaced with the lack of substantial progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); this distrust was magnified when the Soviets crossed the Oxus river. In Europe, increased U.S. impatience with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) reluctance to boost national defense budgets against the Warsaw Pact threat strained the very fiber of the alliance; the U.S. could not conceive that NATO did not view the threat in a similar manner. Meanwhile, in other locations throughout the world, stepped-up politicization by Third World countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) further complicated U.S. foreign policy. The long-range effect of turbulence in Iran and Afghanistan on other countries was difficult to predict.

Today, with a regained assertiveness in foreign policy as demonstrated by the Reagan administration (e.g., military response in Grenada and threatened military action in Nicaragua), the U.S. appears to be willing to face some of the more difficult security concerns around the world. Growing along with this renewed global outlook is a maturing realization that Third World crises, in particular, are no longer isolated incidents and will inevitably involve the major world powers to some extent. Because a new era of U.S. global security consciousness seems to be emerging, albeit painfully in the face of worldwide terrorism, India was chosen as an example of a country which might merit review by the

U.S. foreign policy community. It is proposed that a "tilt"² toward India may be more geopolitically advantageous to U.S. foreign policy than current policies supporting Pakistan.

Definition of the Problem

With the recent assassination of India's Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and with the imminent national referendum vote scheduled for December 19th by Pakistan's President, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, the importance and validity of such an assessment is perhaps appropriate. The basic issue to be addressed questions whether the U.S. has really understood the consequences of previous foreign policy decisions in South Asia which have disturbed India and whether those decisions have gained or lost overall credibility for future U.S. interests in this troubled region.

Set in the context of South Asia (i.e., India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), the thesis contrasts India with Pakistan because, in order to discuss India, one must necessarily discuss India's biggest and traditional threat - Pakistan. Additionally, the inescapable fact that both the

²The use of the term "tilt" in reference to South Asia was originally coined by the columnist Jack Anderson after the December 1971 war between India and Pakistan. It was used to describe U.S. preference towards Pakistan in the conflict.

Soviets and the Chinese have had and continue to have great influence over events in South Asia is assumed throughout the study.

What follows is a short estimate of the strategic situation encountered in South Asia today and recommended policy considerations for U.S. decision-makers. Research was initiated on this topic approximately three years ago at the Defense Intelligence College and concentrates on contemporary problems addressed in South Asian-related books, journals, and newspaper and wire services. The perceived power of India will be emphasized vis-a-vis Pakistan in terms of critical mass, economic and military capability, and overall national strategy and will. The methodology employed in this thesis to support proposed U.S. foreign policy realignment with India is extracted from that developed by Dr. Ray S. Cline over a period of years and from his teachings at the Defense Intelligence College.³

³Ray S. Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 1-227. Dr. Cline, since 1974, has held the Executive Directorship of the World Power Studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. Former Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department, Dr. Cline has authored many books and teaches a course on the problems of intelligence at the Defense Intelligence College. He is also the founder and president of the National Intelligence Study Center and of the Coalition for Asian Peace and Security.

Chapter 2

A SUMMARY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA

Historically, official U.S. foreign policy in this region has been characterized by marked uncertainty. Mr. Robert Scalapino, long-time Asian scholar and editor of Asian Survey, laments:

The United States has always confronted India with ambivalence, desiring that nation - as "the world's largest democracy"-to succeed, and at times giving significant aid, but finding certain Indian policies anathema and over time coming to regard South Asia as a region of secondary importance to American national interests.¹

Traditional American response to Indian problems has been to intervene with limited diplomatic, military, or economic assistance only if regional crises complicated international interests. One such example of this occurred during the painful birth of Bangladesh in 1971, resulting in a new nation separate from Pakistan. A very rare U.S. naval show-of-force in South Asia ensued in the Bay of Bengal when President Nixon dispatched a task group centered around the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise. Its alleged mission, to evacuate "U.S. nationals in East Pakistan if necessary - was so transparently inadequate, or even false, as

¹Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia at the End of the 1970s," Foreign Affairs, 58:697, Annual Issue, 1979.

to confirm the worst fears in India of United States hostile intentions."²

With the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in 1979 and with the resultant Soviet force still remaining in-country, perhaps a long-term and more receptive foreign policy for South Asia which pivots around India could now be submitted for review. Continuing Indian distrust of U.S. intentions is logical if examined in light of policies set forth in previous administrations.

The Eisenhower years brought Pakistan to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy and made her the keystone of the American defense system in South Asia in the mid-1950s.

As a step toward integration with the Western defense system, Pakistan, on 2 April 1954, signed an agreement with Turkey which envisaged cooperation in different spheres, including the important field of defense. This was followed by a United States-Pakistani Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (19 May). Pakistan joined SEATO on 8 September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact (later named CENTO) on 23 September 1955. In the last named she had the Muslim states of Turkey and Iran as fellow members, besides the United Kingdom. The United States did not join the pact formally but worked for its formation . . .³

During the short-lived Kennedy administration, the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border conflict occurred coincident

²Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and the New Order in Asia," Current History, 63:195, November, 1972.

³S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), p. 153.

with the Cuban missile crisis. However, in the midst of perilously dangerous confrontations with the Soviets, the U.S. did find time to quickly supply India with arms she had requested while trying to assure Pakistan that the arms were for defensive purposes only against China.⁴

The absolute nadir of relations between the U.S. and South Asia occurred in 1971 with the Nixon-Kissinger "tilt" toward Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis. Apparently, much was mishandled and misinterpreted due to U.S. secretive efforts to open doors in China. Palmer emphasizes:

The greatest loser among the major powers seemed to be the United States. By its relative neglect of South Asia, its failure to understand the nature of the forces at work in that part of the world, its "tilt toward Pakistan," its recurrent criticisms of Indian policies and its anti-Indian moves, and its failure to speak out officially against the brutalities of Pakistani troops in East Pakistan and to support the cause of Bangladesh, it alienated India and the new nation of Bangladesh. Because of its limited support, it did not even win widespread support in Pakistan . . . the secret negotiations ongoing in 1971 between the U.S. and China which ultimately resulted in Nixon's historic visit to Peking, was interpreted by the Indian government as a potentially suspicious plan by the superpowers "to divide the world into spheres of influence and to decide the fate of other countries on the basis of real-politik."⁵

Four years later, after a brief period of somewhat improved relations with India, President Ford damaged U.S.-

⁴Burke, op. cit., pp. 174-176.

⁵Palmer, op. cit., pp. 194-196.

Indian relations by making a few unofficial, critical remarks at a press conference concerning India's handling of her Declaration of Emergency. Mrs. Gandhi reacted sharply to these remarks and to extensive criticism from the Indian opposition group "Indians for Democracy," accusing both as meddling in internal affairs. The underlying cause for this increase in mutual irritation, however, was probably based on India's entrance into the nuclear club. The U.S. State Department failed to consult India during this time period on both U.S. relaxation of arms embargo regulations in order to supply Pakistan with military aid and on the U.S. decision to augment naval facilities on Diego Garcia . . . just a short flight time from India's shores.⁶ Even so, with India's nuclear detonation in 1974, the Pakistanis probably noted the new signs of U.S. acceptance of a new order of power in the region with India occupying the dominant position.

By the 1976 U.S. presidential election, two events - the impact of Watergate and the U.S. forced withdrawal from Southeast Asia - were shifting governmental priorities back to domestic problems. Only the Democratic party platform mentioned India, so most Indians welcomed the presidential victory of Mr. Carter, although his mother's previous Peace

⁶Raj Baldev Nayar, American Geopolitics and India (Columbia, Missouri: South Asia Books, 1976), pp. 131-156.

Corps experience in India was probably a special interest appeal. In 1977, Indian general elections removed Mrs. Gandhi from power temporarily and brought Morarji Desai in to head up the Janata coalition, thus marking the beginning of more friendly, official exchanges between the U.S. and India. Former Undersecretary of State for South Asian affairs, Warren Christopher, and President Carter both paid visits to New Delhi in 1977, and several members of the House Committee on International Relations traveled to India. Prime Minister Desai visited the U.S., in turn, in 1978.⁷

The growth of goodwill declined sharply, however, with a major disagreement over the U.S. delivery of nuclear fuel to the Indian power station located outside Bombay. The Carter administration passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, requiring the suspension of continuing fuel supplies unless India agreed to open up her nuclear facilities to international inspections and comply with all stated safeguards. Enraged, India lashed out at the Janus profile of U.S. policy which was, at the same time, endorsing French sale of light water reactors to the Chinese.⁸

⁷John W. Mellor, India: A Rising Middle Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 116-119.

⁸A.G. Noorani, "Indo-U.S. Nuclear Relations," Asian Survey, XXI:412-416, April, 1981.

Pakistan, during this same time period, had deposed of Bhutto in a military coup in 1977, and Zia ul-Haq headed a new military regime. The Carter administration:

. . . clearly flinched from any large-scale commitment to Pakistan for fear of repercussions to Indo-American relations. Indeed, the administration had continued the by-now traditional U.S. policy of letting its relations with Pakistan be determined by the India factor. Washington chose to overlook the fact that New Delhi had forged close defense and political ties with Moscow . . .

What Washington possibly didn't foresee at the time was that, because the U.S. and India could not agree on the nuclear fuel issue, this discordance contaminated other exchanges and consequently made it very attractive for India to turn to Moscow for arms and military sales.

Since the late 1970s, the fall of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and changes in both American and Indian heads of government have all contributed to a cautious reversal in U.S. policy toward India. Most important were the first two events; they clearly bolstered Pakistan to the status of a buffer state against further Soviet encroachment in the area and provided the U.S. with rationale for arming Pakistan again. Based on mutual need and interests,¹⁰ current policies find the U.S. once again

⁹Shah, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁰Pakistan Affairs, "Pakistan Signs Agreement for Purchase of F-16," December 16, 1981.

"tilting" toward Pakistan by supplying her with highly sophisticated weaponry such as the F-16 aircraft.

India, meanwhile, is still being supplied with arms from the Soviet Union. India had signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in August, 1971. "The courting of India by the Kremlin leadership began in earnest following Pakistan's alignment with the U.S. . . . [and India probably thought] a U.S.-China-Pakistan axis was in the making."¹¹ (The best compilation of official reactions by Indian political parties, eminent Indian personalities, Indian press, foreign press, and Indian correspondents abroad to the Indo-Soviet relation is available in the source document noted below).¹²

More recently, in December 1984, it was reported that the Soviets offered new Mig-29/Fulcrums to India, some equipped with the new AA-X-10 medium-range air-to-air missile, and will replace the Indian transport inventory of An-12/Cub with newer Il-76/Candid at a cost of \$700 million.¹³

¹¹Lawrence Ziring, "Indo-Pakistani Relations: Time for a Fresh Start," Asian Affairs, 8:206, March/April, 1981.

¹²Dr. N.M. Ghatate, ed., Indo-Soviet Treaty (New Delhi: Saraswati Printing Press, 1972), pp. 1-300.

¹³"Update," Flight International, December 1, 1984, pp. 1474-1476.

To date, it does not appear as if the Soviets will relinquish their role of modernizing India's military inventory. In American efforts to shore up Pakistan's defense militarily to serve as a political buffer against further Soviet political encroachment in the area, the U.S. instead may be satisfying only short-term goals without considering the long-term consequences of stepped-up Soviet reaction. Since the F-16s have not been successful in countering flight violations by Afghan bombers on the refugee camps in northern Pakistan, Pakistan is now requesting the acquisition of Grumman Hawkeye E2C early warning and airborne command post aircraft.¹⁴ Overall, the U.S. may be unintentionally encouraging an Indo-Pakistani arms race at a time when both governments are undergoing very challenging tests of internal strength and cohesion.

In January 1980, Mrs. Gandhi returned to power with a surprising electoral majority for her Congress (I) government. A year later, a change in U.S. leadership occurred with the election of President Reagan. President Reagan was reelected in the fall of 1984, but Mrs. Gandhi was unexpectedly assassinated. Her son, Rajiv, is busy attempting to establish firm political credibility in India and has not, to date, significantly altered any foreign policy his mother established.

¹⁴The Washington Post, "Pakistan May Buy Hawkeye," October 13, 1984.

With the possibility of a fresh start in political relations with a new Indian leader, perhaps the

. . . U.S. can best serve India and the world by assuring Mrs. Gandhi's successors that we are committed to support of their quest for security amid the dangers of neighboring dictatorships and internal religious fragmentation. Such assurances would go a long way toward overcoming Indian leaders' suspicion and resentment of the United States, dating back to the Nixon administration's secret "tilt" toward Pakistan in its 1971 war with India.¹⁵

¹⁵The Washington Post, "U.S. Should Offer Assurances to India," editorial, November 10, 1984.

Chapter 3

PERCEIVED POWER - CRITICAL MASS

$$P_p = (\underline{C}+E+M) \times (S+W)$$

Population

As defined by Dr. Cline, critical mass is:

. . . fundamentally based on the amount of territory under a state's control and the number of people supported economically by that territory. While it is hard to quantify, there does seem to be a kind of critical mass - a reflection of population and area - that a nation must ordinarily possess to make itself felt in world affairs.¹

South Asia (see Appendix A) has been labeled a demographic nightmare because its estimated population already exceeds that of one-fifth of mankind. Government programs to reduce birth rates have been largely unsuccessful, causing serious concern that the rate of natural increase in this region of the world, barring widespread natural catastrophes or a holocaust, will undoubtedly exceed economic capabilities to sustain it. The rate of population increase for South Asia runs 2-3% annually, as compared with a world rate of 2%, and it ranks lowest in the world for per capita gross national product.²

¹Cline, op. cit., p. 35.

²Thomas E. Dow, Jr. "Population Pressures in India and Pakistan," Current History 63:214, November, 1972.

India alone added the combined population of the U.S. and Mexico to her base total between 1950 and 1978. If the trend continues, the steep linear incline on Chart 1 indicates that by the year 2000, total population should approximate 1,059.8 million. Other selected data indicate the following:

- * 807 million total population (by the year 2000, estimated total should reach 1,059.8 million)
- * second most populous country in the world
- * life expectancy is 47 years
- * annual growth rate is 2.5-3% or more
- * 20% urban/80% rural
- * eight cities with more than 1 million inhabitants (Calcutta is the world's most crowded metropolis)
- * births per fertile woman average 5.7


India was the first country to enact a government-sponsored national family planning program in an attempt to curb population growth in her First Five Year Plan (1951-1956).³ Reduced family size in a very poor country means reduced security in older age and fewer hands to contribute to food production however, so this program has not really provided incentives for successful compliance. Mrs. Gandhi appointed her son, Sanjay, to direct a portion of the program which resulted in an almost compulsory mass sterilization effort by 1977 . . . his forced technique instigating mass discontent.

Efforts to increase the overall standard of living have

³Ibid., p. 215.

POPULATION GROWTH FOR INDIA

CHART 1



Source: Area Handbook for India, p. 96 and U.S. Department of Commerce

brought limited success also. Some health conditions have improved, although sanitation (especially in the cities) remains poor. Extensive undernutrition through poorly-balanced diets continues. Control of epidemics, especially malaria, cholera, and smallpox, has improved but life expectancy remains pitifully low.⁴ Until sanitary conditions improve significantly for the majority of the population, any gains made in disease control probably won't lower the mortality rate.

Pakistan has also experienced a tremendous growth in population since 1950. The Pakistani government has tried to curb growth through tailored programs like India has done, commencing with budgetary allocations during their First Five Year Plan (1955-1960). However, because of deep-seated resistance to family planning by the Muslim population and because of poorly-administered techniques, the entire program declined in acceptance after 1970.⁵ Due to a GNP per capita of \$335 and a high incidence of disease and poor nutrition, the Pakistani standard of living remains low. Other selected data include the following:

⁴Thomas D. Anderson, "The Demographic Conundrum in South Asia," Current History, 76:446, April, 1979.

⁵Dow, Jr., op. cit., p. 217.

- * 80 million in 1978 (by the year 2000, estimated total should reach 146.9 million)
- * life expectancy is 50 years
- * annual growth rate is 3.5%
- * 26% urban/74% rural
- * two cities with more than one million inhabitants
- * births per fertile woman average 7.2

Overall, according to the population ranking, India, although the second most populous country in the world, received only half the perceived power weights of those that the U.S. and USSR received because the "inert, impoverished masses are [perceived to be] a handicap rather than an advantage."⁶

Pakistan ranked ninth in this category for a perceived power weight of 20 out of 50 possible points.⁷ Because British India was divided along religious lines, the most significant effect on Pakistan's population structure occurred after independence in 1947. More Muslims fled from India to Pakistan than Hindus fled from Pakistan to India, artificially swelling the Pakistani population. Additionally, Pakistan has served as a home for refugees both from Bangladesh and, more currently, Afghanistan. Population per square mile of cultivated land in 1,467. The government does not encourage routine emigration, but does favor the emigration of Pakistani

⁶Cline, op. cit., p. 40.

⁷Cline, op. cit., p. 37.

skilled workers and professionals to the Middle East for foreign exchange purposes. This is resulting in a "brain drain," however, that may have long-term consequences.⁸

Territory

In terms of land mass, India is the seventh largest country in the world with some 1,266,600 square miles of territory. The Indian subcontinent is a distinct entity by virtue of its geographical isolation from the rest of Asia by the massive Himalayan mountain chain, deserts, and seas. Characterized by diversity and extremes in temperature, rainfall, and soil fertility, India is primarily agrarian. The most heavily settled areas are located in the fertile Indo-Gangetic Plain, in the southwest, and along the southeastern coasts.


The cities (see Chart 2) are located primarily at ports and inland junctions of rivers and overland trade corridors.

The Indian railway system is the largest in Asia, employing the largest number of people on a regular basis. Inland waterways are the next most important mode of transportation, as the majority of highways are parallel to the railways and are usable only in dry weather. In spite of a 3,500 mile coastline jutting out into the Indian Ocean, India has few deep

⁸Anderson, op. cit., p. 447.

MAJOR RAILWAYS, ROADS, PORTS, AND AIRPORTS OF INDIA

CHART 2



Source: Area Handbook for India, p. 83.

harboring ports. The best ones are located on the western coast, with Bombay being one of the largest in the world. Five international airports and some 85 smaller airfields serve India's air transportation needs.⁹ Overall, India received a perceived power weight of 27 out of 50 possible points, but 10 of those points were awarded as "bonus" points because of its strategic location.¹⁰

Pakistan comprises an area of about 342,760 square miles. East Pakistan, separated from the West Wing by 1,000 miles, became the independent state of Bangladesh in 1971. The Himalayan mountains in the north have traditionally served as a barrier to movement into Pakistan; more than one-half of the peaks exceed 15,000 feet in elevation. Further south lies an extremely unstable seismic area which has experienced several severe earthquakes. The southernmost slice of Pakistan abuts the Arabian Sea along a stretch of some 550 miles. Climate is changeable, although most of Pakistan lies in the warm temperate zone. Rainfall on the whole is low, so approximately 80% of the cultivated land in Pakistan depends on some sort of irrigation. (See Chart 3).


The Pakistani railway, one of the chief means of

⁹Richard F. Nyrop et al., Area Handbook for India (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1975), pp. 38-67.

¹⁰Cline, op. cit., p. 41 and 43.

PAKISTAN

CHART 3



Source: Asia Yearbook, p. 215.

mechanized transport, has fallen into disuse and has been supplanted by road transport. Only one-third of the roads are paved or improved, however, so animal-drawn transport remains important in the rural areas. With the secession of East Pakistan, both the maritime and the air transport systems were affected in Pakistan. Two of three ports were lost, along with a sizeable portion of coastal and international shipping.

Karachi, Pakistan's only seaport, serves as the port of entry for seaborne trade not only for all of the country but also for most of the goods in transit to Afghanistan. The port is considered adequate, but is desperately in need of additional docking space, especially for petroleum tankers. Air transport is provided by a government-owned and operated airline.¹¹ Pakistan ranked 32nd in perceived power weights for territory, receiving five out of a possible 50 points.¹²

Overall, although Pakistan's population is growing at a faster rate than that of India, the sheer numbers involved in India make her problems more severe in the short-term. Since she suffers from a dire lack of cultivated land to feed her burgeoning population, it has been estimated that within only three decades, India's man/land ratio will simply be

¹¹Richard F. Nyrop et al., Area Handbook for Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1975), pp. 23-48.

¹²Cline, op. cit., p. 41.

overwhelming.¹³ A weather-dependent and unevenly developed agricultural base simply cannot sustain the huge numbers involved. Based on the category of critical mass alone, India is heading toward an implosive situation within a few decades which will demand immediate world attention. The problem of feeding and controlling such a large population base will be one of concern to all international trading partners if traditional food crops cannot keep pace with world population.

Another problem confronting both India and Pakistan is that of border disputes. Serious disagreements between the two countries over their 1,600 mile border have led to several wars and skirmishes. The possibility of an outbreak of war between them over this issue is very high, with disputed Kashmir remaining the key even today to future Indo-Pakistan talks.¹⁴

The disputed area in Kashmir (see Chart 4) consists of an Indo-Pakistani common border of 750 miles which was established in 1949. Total disputed area covers some 1,500 square miles. Today, skirmishes continue as both Indian and Pakistani troops remain stationed in this area alongside the Chinese border and continue to probe the line of demarcation. Real danger lies in the possibility of spillover into Chinese


¹³Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹⁴Burke, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-189.

territory, thus involving a third nation which could significantly complicate the regional balance of power.

DISPUTED AREA OF KASHMIR

CHART 4



Source: The Washington Post, October 11, 1984.

Chapter 4

PERCEIVED POWER - ECONOMIC CAPABILITY

$$P_p = (C + \underline{E} + M) \times (S + W)$$

Economic capability, according to Dr. Cline, is defined as:

. . . what the people of a country have actually accomplished, or could presumably accomplish in short order, with their material and spiritual wealth . . .¹

This category takes into account gross national product (GNP), energy, critical minerals, industrial strength, food production, and foreign trade. India ranked 15th in economic capability, receiving 11 points out of 200 maximum points.²

Although India, as mentioned previously, is the second most populous country in the world and the seventh largest in area, she ranks near the bottom in terms of income per capita. (See Chart 5).

Once a legendary world trader, India's trade deficit ran at \$5-6 billion in 1984. The U.S. is India's largest trading partner and normally accounts for 18 percent of India's total exports and over 13 percent of Indian imports.³

¹Cline, op. cit., p. 53.

²Ibid., p. 83.

³W. Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 43-68.

CHART 5

INDIA - KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS

All values in U.S.\$ million unless otherwise indicated. Indian fiscal year is April 1 to March 31.

Exchange rate^{a/}: U.S.\$ 1.00 = Rs.11.50

	1982-83	1983-84	Percent Change	Estimated 1984-85
	A	B	B/A	C
INCOME, PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT				
GNP at Current Prices (\$ billion)	142.96	165.12	15.5	178.30
GNP at Constant (1970-71) Prices (\$ billion)	52.02	56.44	8.5	58.10
Per Capita GNP, Current Prices (\$)	201.64	228.07	13.1	241.30
Industrial Production Index (1970=100)	173.8	183.2	5.4	196.00
Agricultural Production Index (1967/68-69/70=100)	137.0	154.8	13.0	156.30
Labor Force (million)	272.5	278.0	2.0	284.00
Number of Persons Registered at Employment Exchanges (million)	20.1	22.6	12.4	25.3
MONEY AND PRICES				
Money Supply with Public ^{b/} (\$ billion)	63.36	74.41	17.4	87.00
Prime Lending Rate (State Bank of India) (percent)	16.5	16.5	-	16.5
Wholesale Price Index (1970-71=100)	288.3	315.0	9.3	335.50
Consumer Price Index (1960-100)	486.0	547.0	12.6	591.00
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND TRADE				
SDRs, and Foreign Exchange Reserves, gross	4,965	5,847	17.8	6,000
External Debt	21,900	25,330	15.7	27,600
Annual Debt Service	1,299	1,732	33.3	1,966
Overall Balance	-1,476	-483	67.3	-60
Balance of Trade	-5,726	-5,613	2.0	-5,500
Indian Exports, FOB	9,155	9,394	2.6	9,600
U.S. Share ^{d/}	1,404	2,191	56.1	2,600
Indian Imports, CIF	14,881	15,007	0.8	15,100
U.S. Share ^{d/}	1,582	1,813	14.6	1,600

Major imports from U.S. (1983): machinery and transport equipment, 682; wheat 576; chemicals and fertilizers 159. Major exports to U.S. (1983): crude petroleum, 818; precious and semi-precious stones and pearls, 483; wearing apparel, 221; fruits and nuts, 75.

a/ Foreign trade rupee data converted into dollars at Rs.9.65 for 1982-83, Rs.10.30 for 1983-84 and Rs.11.50 for 1984-85.

b/ Includes time deposits.

c/ Current and capital accounts balance.

d/ Calendar year figures (1982, 1983, 1984).

Sources: GOI Central Statistical Organization, Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, GOI Economic Survey, U.S. Department of Commerce, World Bank.

The Indian economy is a mix between a large private sector, which contributes up to 75% of the national income, and a smaller government sector. The private sector consists of a large agricultural and a small industrial base. The growing government sector is the one which, in reality, owns or controls most of the country's strategic resources and infrastructure.

Farming continues to provide a precarious way of life for three-quarters of India's population. Natural disasters and dependency on the monsoon rains have a great effect on any long-term agricultural planning. India's large water reserves are diverted to place more land under irrigation to counterbalance the effect of irregular rainfall. No land remains to be cultivated, so additional crop production must come from success with "miracle seed" programs, better fertilizers, and the increased use of pesticides.

India has two and one-half times the land acreage of Pakistan. Land reform programs, aimed at reducing the size of large landholders and alleviating the growth of rural poverty, have met with limited success. Crash programs and emergency funds are set up on an ad hoc basis to handle a constant stream of problems. These include lack of adequate farm-to-market transportation networks, lack of electrical power production for irrigation pumps, lack of equity in credit arrangements between small farmers and landowners, and an unchecked cattle

population which is allowed to roam at will.⁴

Main food crops are wheat (in the north), rice (in the south), oilseeds, sugar cane, tea, and jute. Fishing resources are extensive but underutilized. Forested areas are unevenly distributed, and sizeable portions are inaccessible by either rail or road. The timber industry is not mechanized.

In industry, partly due to the government's socialistic approach and partly due to the necessity of heavy government technical financing, the central government has been the prime overseer in this sector's growth. By the mid-1970s, India had become almost self-sufficient in transport, power, many intermediate goods, construction materials, and heavy machine production and design. The major exception continues to be the petroleum industry, which operates both onshore and offshore exploration fields.⁵ India News⁶ predicted indigenous production will only meet roughly two-thirds of India's needs this year; 80% of India's export earnings in 1983 were used to import crude oil and petroleum products. Coal, consequently, remains the most important mineral commodity.

⁴Nayar, op. cit., pp. 79-101.

⁵Nyrop et al., Area Handbook for India, pp. 38-64.

⁶India News, "India and Pakistan to Establish Joint Commission," February 8, 1982.

Electricity output suffers from a poor generation-distribution balance, but it is gradually reaching more remote villages. Nuclear energy has played a role in India's economy since 1969, but as has been discovered in other countries, operation of nuclear units has not lived up to expectations in cost, efficiency, or dependability. India has the world's largest reserves of thorium, as well as some plutonium, and some political factions advocate the production of nuclear weapons as part of a national nuclear energy development program.⁷

Strategic major industries include iron and steel, aluminum, manganese, and copper. Although well-endowed with iron ore, India was beset with managerial and technical problems in the early 1970s which resulted in a serious shortage of steel. Inadequate reserves of silver, lead, and zinc continue. A highly developed textile industry allows for a large, exportable surplus of cotton, but India has, by far, the lowest index of automation in this industry.

Jute, once the country's largest foreign exchange earner, has suffered from the political consequences of losing jute-bearing lands to independent Bangladesh. Chemical and allied industries have progressed, but target quotas often are not met. Self-sufficiency is approaching reality in the

⁷Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 104.

engineering industries due to realignment of high governmental priorities. Small-scale industry is dominated primarily by the highly successful handicraft trade.⁸

Productive efficiency has not kept pace with the large growth in industrial production, particularly in steel, textiles, fertilizers, and some heavy machine industries. This has been due to droughts, wars with China and Pakistan, the refugee tide from Bangladesh, poor management, outdated equipment, and some serious labor problems. The first major test of strength for Indira Gandhi after she returned to office in 1980⁹ occurred when eight national labor federations affiliated with opposition parties succeeded in leading a 24-hour walk-out strike to protest "antiwar policies." Demonstrating a capability to challenge the government nation-wide, laborers demanded unemployment benefits, repeal of laws banning strikes in certain industries, and the end to police powers which can detain people without trial for up to one year.

Internal trade statistics are scanty and contradictory, and they don't include black market activity, gold smuggling, or general widespread economic corruption. Because India is

⁸Nyrop et al., Area Handbook for India, pp. 58-58.

⁹Fay Willey with R. Ramanujam and Carol Honsa, "India: A Bloody General Strike," Newsweek, February 1, 1982, p. 49.

not richly endowed with the strategic resources sufficient for self-reliance, she must import knowledge, sophisticated equipment, and raw materials from abroad. She no longer has large, stockpiled foreign exchange reserves or adequate amounts of foreign aid.

India is currently the third largest debtor to the West, owing \$17.3 billion. At present, a highly asymmetrical relationship exists between India and the U.S. America is India's principal trading partner, accepting 13% of all Indian exports and furnishing about 18% of all Indian imports, but from the U.S. side, trade with India only constitutes 0.53% of the total. This is down from 1.2% even ten years ago. The USSR provides the largest market for India's exports, however there is an alarming imbalance of trade growing between the USSR and India. As the Soviets look more to India for cheap agricultural raw materials and products, the Indians are finding less attractive that which the Soviets can provide them. Consequently, their economies are becoming less mutually beneficial, as the USSR cannot provide the advanced technology that India needs.¹⁰

Long-standing disagreements in the economic realm between the U.S. and India spill over into the area of foreign

¹⁰"For a Few Rupees More," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 23, 1983, pp. 80-82.

investment. U.S. firms such as IBM, Coca-Cola, and some drug manufacturers have contended that Indian socialistic practices were discriminatory and designed to protect Indian industry from foreign competition. In light of the recent Union Carbide tragedy in Bhopal, however, U.S. multinationals will probably suffer from adverse publicity and legal nightmares for quite some time. An industrial accident such as this one could have effects not only in the economic realm but also in the political realm for decades.¹¹

Bilateral aid remains a thorny issue between the U.S. and India. Since the first wheat loan in 1951 to suspension of aid in 1971, the U.S. portion of economic aid exceeded \$10 billion and amounted to 57% of all foreign aid utilized by India. Indian distrust of U.S. intentions, however, allowed the Soviets to partially fill the economic gap. In 1977, OPEC repercussions led to resumption of U.S. developmental assistance to India totaling \$60 million, and India continues to qualify for aid as part of our foreign policy strategy linked to the New International Economic Order.¹²

Since independence in 1947, India has produced mixed

¹¹James B. Stewart and David B. Hilder, "Union Carbide Could Face Staggering Gas-Leak Damage Claims, Experts Say," The Wall Street Journal, December 6, 1984.

¹²"Foreign Aid: A Matter of Disguises," The Economist, December 12, 1981, pp. 24-26.

results in the economic sphere. Mrs. Gandhi's establishment of the "20-point program" in January 1982 placed higher priority on improving the quality of life, fighting inflation, increasing food production, and reinvigorating the economy.¹³ Today, serious shortages persist of steel, coal, cement and power supplies; some 40% of the population remains in poverty; unemployment is rising; and the gap is widening between the rich and the poor; however, as India embarks on her Seventh Five-Year Plan in April 1985, the U.S. Commerce Department predicts new opportunities for trade and investment in India which should spur greater Indian domestic economic programs.¹⁴

Because the World Bank curtailed its assistance to India in 1980 because "other countries need it more,"¹⁵ it has made other countries who arrange low- or no-interest loans, such as the Soviet Union, more attractive as borrowers. Following Brezhnev's 1982 visit to New Delhi, the Indo-Soviet Joint Economic Commission investigated plans for increased

¹³"India's Gandhi Tells Why She Is Sour on U.S.," U.S. News and World Report, February 15, 1982, pp. 26-28.

¹⁴"India," Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, 85-21, pp. 2-17.

¹⁵U.S. News and World Report, February 15, 1982, p. 27.

Soviet assistance in India's public sector (steel, fertilizers, power supplies) and reportedly was considering combining the two countries' FYPs to maximize production. Feeding one billion people in 2000, however, will continue to be India's principal economic problem and one that should be carefully evaluated by any trading partner.¹⁶

Pakistan's economy, like India's, is mixed. It ranked 49th in perceived power weights in economic capability, receiving two points out of 200 maximum points. In this category, however, the highest ranked country, however, only received 146 out of 200 maximum points.¹⁷

Agriculture accounts for roughly 40% of the GDP and absorbs 60% of the work force. Industry accounts for a smaller 25% of the GDP. Cotton and cotton products account for 40% of Pakistan's exports; imports consist chiefly of consumer and capital goods. Overseas employment of Pakistanis is the country's largest single source of foreign exchange, but the absorption of some three million Afghan refugees is draining the domestic economy. See Chart 6.

Pakistan's economy has doubled in growth since independence, but major problems persist which are much akin to

¹⁶"Is India Pulling Away from Russia?" U.S. News and World Report, February 15, 1982, p. 25.

¹⁷Cline, op. cit., p. 84.

PAKISTAN KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS
1962 year-end figures Fiscal Year: 1973
July 1 through June 30

CHART 6

	PFY 82 (ACTUAL)	PFY 83 (REV)	PFY 84 (PROV)	PERCENT CHANGE OVER PFY 83
Gross National Product				
(GNP) (million rupees)	317,471	368,190	416,198	13.0
Population (millions)	86.4	89.1	91.9	3.1
GNP Per Capita (rupees)	3,673	4,132	4,530	9.7
Exchange Rate (year average) (U.S. \$1=) (rupees)	10.55	12.75	13.46	-6.1
Annual Real Growth Rates (percent) (PFY 1959-60 factor cost)				
-- Gross National Product	6.3	7.6	4.6	--
-- Gross Domestic Product	6.6	6.1	4.4	--
-- Agriculture	3.9	3.7	-4.6	--
-- Manufacturing	13.0	8.6	7.7	--
-- Services (1)	6.1	6.4	8.3	--
Sectoral Share in GDP (percent)				
-- Agriculture	27.9	27.3	24.4	--
-- Manufacturing	19.3	19.8	21.4	--
-- Services (1)	52.8	52.8	54.1	--
Expenditure and Savings Ratios				
Consumption/GNP	65.3	82.6	83.3	--
Gross Domestic Investment/GNP	15.0	14.8	15.0	--
Gross Domestic Savings/GDP	6.0	6.1	6.9	--
Gross Domestic Savings/Gross Domestic Investment	40.0	36.8	41.5	--
Gross National Savings/GNP	14.0	16.2	16.0	--
Public Finance (billion rupees)				
Revenue	51.9	65.7	73.2	22.2
Autonomous Bodies Net	1.9	2.7	2.6	-3.8
Expenditure	71.0	88.7	101.1	13.9
-- Current	46.4	58.8	71.9	22.3
-- Development	24.6	29.8	29.1	-2.3
Overall Deficit	-17.2	-20.3	-25.1	24.1
Financing	17.2	20.3	25.1	23.6
-- External (Net)	5.3	8.4	5.7	-32.1
-- Domestic Nonbank	6.3	6.5	12.7	95.3
-- Banking System	5.5	5.4	6.7	24.1
Price Indices (PFY 76=100)				
-- Consumer (year-end)	175.8	183.7	199.0	8.4
-- Wholesale (year-end)	176.2	182.3	201.4	10.5
Balance of Payments (million dollars)				
Trade Balance	3,450	-2,989	-3,334	11.5
-- Exports, f.o.b.	2,319	2,627	2,668	1.6
-- (To United States)	(167)	(158)	(235)	48.7
-- Imports, f.o.b.	-5,769	-5,616	-6,002	6.9
-- (From United States)	(508)	(562)	(684)	21.7
Invisibles (Net)	1,840	2,435	2,306	-5.3
of which: remittances	2,224	2,886	2,737	-5.1
Current Account Balance	1,610	-554	-1,028	85.6
Gross Aid Disbursements	1,092	1,301	1,234	-5.1
Overall Balance	-580	722	-146	-120.2
Change in Reserves	-235	1,111	-113	-110.2
Total Reserves (end June)	733	1,844	1,731	-5.9
-- (in weeks of imports)	(7)	(17)	(16)	
Debt Service Ratio	14.4	14.2	13.7	

(1) Includes public administration and defense. Excluding these items for PFY 82, 83 and 84 respectively, growth in services was 7.3 percent, 6.5 percent, and 6.7 percent and services share in GDP was 45.5 percent, 45.1 percent, and 45.4 percent.

Sources: Government of Pakistan's Pakistan Economic Survey, 1962-83 and 1983-84, and Monthly Economic Statistics and Embassy estimates

those of India: high rates of underemployment; an exploding population; and heavy dependence on foreign aid.¹⁸

Pakistan is the tenth leading debtor to the West, owing \$8.8 billion, approximately one-half that of India. President Zia has hailed the private sector as the cornerstone of his economic policy and has de-nationalized many industries. He is encouraging foreign investment from the U.S., Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and Holland in the ongoing exploration for oil. Some 75% of Pakistan's energy needs must be imported at present.¹⁹

Pakistan is one of the poorer countries in the world and has an uneven economy. Per capita GNP is less than U.S. \$400 and is based primarily on agriculture. (See Chart 6). Primary summer crops include rice, cotton, and sugarcane and the primary winter crop is wheat, with wheat alone constituting over 20% of all agricultural income.

Currently in the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88), Pakistan is seeking to modernize and better manage her primary asset, the farming industry. After partition from India in 1947, Pakistan was left with virutally no industrial facilities. Today, the cotton textile business constitutes

¹⁸Nyrop et al., Area Handbook for Pakistan, pp. 64-83.

¹⁹Pakistan Affairs, "Pakistan's Growth Doubles Since Independence," January 1, 1982.

"the largest industry and largest single employer."²⁰

The U.S. suspended developmental assistance to Pakistan in 1979, as required by the Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, after discovering Pakistan's surreptitious goal of developing a military nuclear capability. With the collapse of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan however, U.S. policy has done an about-face. In June 1981, the State Department requested authorization for \$100 million under the Economic Support Fund for FY 82, labeling Pakistan a "front-line state."²¹

As the World Bank "tilted" toward Pakistan, and with U.S. encouragement, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to an extended fund facility to assist Pakistan in structural economic adjustments. It gave Pakistan a favored nation status in Western financial circles. The three top trading partners today are Japan, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia.

Unlike in the case of India, the U.S. has a \$3.2 billion economic and military assistance agreement with Pakistan which remains in effect until 1987. Notwithstanding Pakistan's plan to reinvest 25% of its budget on defense, the

²⁰"Pakistan," Foreign Economic Trends and the Implications for the United States, 85-13, p. 6.

²¹Jane A. Coon, Department of State Bulletin, May, 1981, p. 68.

U.S. grant in FMS guaranteed credits include "40 F-16 aircraft, 100 M48A5 tanks, over 100 artillery pieces, and 22 armored recovery vehicles."²²

The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) led an investment mission to Pakistan in April 1983 to investigate venture projects for U.S. companies. Several proposals have been agreed upon and some operations have already begun. As Pakistan's second largest market in 1984, the U.S. continues to buy Pakistani textiles, leather products, and clothing as part of a bilateral agreement. U.S. investment in Pakistan is now estimated to be approximately \$400 million.²³ Pakistan, vis-a-vis India, is currently enjoying favored status in Western economic assistance circles due to political, security, and economic considerations.

²²Foreign Economic Trends and the Implications for the United States, op. cit., p. 13.

²³Ibid., p. 3.

Chapter 5

PERCEIVED POWER - MILITARY CAPABILITY

$$P_p = (C+E+\underline{M}) \times (S+W)$$

Dr. Cline, when addressing the perceived power weights for military capability, divides this category into both strategic and conventional force balances. India ranked tenth, receiving eight points out of a possible 200 maximum score.¹

The Indian subcontinent has been invaded at least one hundred times since 1500 A.D. Military conflict in South Asia is not an unusual occurrence; it is a way of life. The two, primary modern-day contenders in this region, India and Pakistan, have fought each other three times since independence. Prospects for peace are doubtful, as each regards the other as the major threat to its security. Current weapon inventories for both countries are given in Charts 7 and 8; the data are extracted from The Military Balance: 1983-84, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.²

In reference to military estimates, India is the more difficult to analyze of the two countries. Central to the

¹Cline, op. cit., p. 138.

²See Survival annotation in the bibliography.

CHART 7

INDIA

Population: 723,500,000
 Military service: voluntary
 Total armed forces: 1,120,000
 Est. GNP 1980: Rs. 1,281,9 bn (\$162,416 bn) 1981: 2
 1,423.5 bn (\$160,635 bn)
 Est. def. exp. 1982: 3 Rs. 53,500 bn (\$5,556 bn)
 GNP growth: 4.8% (1981); 2.0% (1982)
 Inflation: 12.7% (1981); 8% (1982)
 \$1 = rupees 7.8927 (1980), 6.8677 (1981), 9.6285 (1982)

Navy: 47,000 incl. naval air force
 2 Sov. F-class submarines
 1 B: Majestic aircraft carrier (capacity 16 attack) 4 ASW ac
 1 B: Fr. cruise (frig)
 2 Sov. Kashin-class destroyers with 4 Styx SSN-2 + 2 SA-N-1 SAM + Ka-25 hel
 21 frigates: 6 Leander with 2 + 4 Seacat SAM + hel 1 B: Whitby with 3 Styx SSN 10 Sov. Petya I 3 B: Leopard (frig)
 3 Sov. Nenuchka corvettes with 4 SS-N-2 SSN 1 SA-N-4 SAM
 8 Sov. Osa-I (6 FACM; 2 FAC) 8 Osa-II with 4 Styx SSN
 1 Abhay 6 SDB-2 large patrol craft
 6 Sov. Narya ocean 4 B: Ton coastals 4 B: Nam inshore minesweepers
 6 Sov. Polnochy LCT 4 LCU
 (On order: 4 Type 1500 submarines 3 Kashin-class destroyers 6 Godavari (modified Leander) GW frigates 2 Nenuchka corvettes 6 Polnochy LCT)

Bases: Western Fleet: Bombay Goa Southern Fleet: Cochin Eastern Fleet: Visakhapatnam Port: Bhat

NAVAL AIR FORCE (2,000): 36 combat ac 26 combat hel
 2 attack sqns with 15 Sea Hawk, 8 Sea Harrier FRS Mk-51 (2 trig) (10 ac in carrier)
 1 ASW sqn with 5 Alize 1050 (4 in carrier)
 2 min sqns with 5 Super Constellation 3 H-36 May
 5 ASW hel sqns with 10 Sea King 5 Ka-25 Hormone (on Kashin) 11 Alouette III
 1 sea/haizon hel sqn with 10 Alouette II
 3 trig/comms sqns with 7 HJT-16 Kiran 4 Vampire T-55 10 Islander (some recce) 1 Devon 2 Sea Hawk ac 4 Hughes 300 hel
 (On order: 3 H-36 am ac, AM-39 Exocet ASM)

Army: 880,000
 8 corps HQ
 2 arm'd divs
 1 mech div
 18 inf divs
 10 mountain divs
 5 indep arm'd bdes
 7 indep inf bdes
 1 para bde
 17 indep arty bdes incl about 20 AA regts
 AFV: 800 T-54-55 200 T-72 1,100 Vijayanta wret 100 BMP-1 mcv 400 BTR-50-60-152 OT-62A-64A APC
 Arty: Yug M-48 76mm 25-pdr (retiring) 300 M-1944 100mm 105mm 550 M-46 130mm (some sp) 5.5-in (retiring) S-23 180mm guns 75-24 mountain 105mm (incl M-56 pack, Abbot sp) how 81mm 500 120mm 20 160mm mortar
 ATK: M-18 57mm Carl Gustav 84mm M-40 106mm RCL 57mm atk guns SS-11-B1 Harpoon Milan ATGW
 AD: 20mm 40mm L/60mm L/70mm 500 3.7-in towed ZSU-23-4 sp AA guns SA-6 SA-7 SA-9 40 Tigercat SAM
 (On order: BMP mcv Segger Milan ATGW launchers 3,700 mals)

RESERVES: 200,000 Territorial Army 50,000

Air Force: 113,000 727 combat aircraft
 3 flt bdr sqns with 35 Canberra BII, 56 B-112 (to be replaced by Jaguar) and MiG-25
 11 FGA sqns 3 with 40 Su 7BM KUL 1 with 10 Hunter F-56 56A (to be replaced by Jaguar) 1 with 40 Jaguar GR.1 6 T-72 2 with 50 HF 24 Maribou being replaced by Ajeet 3 with 90 MiG-23BN Flogger F
 20 ac sqns 14 with 30C MiG-21 F PFMA/MF bis L 2 with 40 MiG-23MF Flogger G 4 with 10C Ajeet (mod Gnat)
 2 recce sqns with 8 Canberra PR-57 (being replaced); 8 MiG-25
 4 hel sqns with some 60 Cheetah (Lama)
 3 trig and conversion sqns with 12 Canberra T-4 -13 -67 30 Hunter F-56T-66 40 MiG-21U
 10 tpt sqns 5 with 80 An-32 2 with 30 An-12 2 with 20 DHC-3 1 with 16 DHC-4 2 Boeing 737-248 (leased)
 1 comms sqn with 16 HS-748M
 2 liaison flts with 16 HS-748 5 An-32
 5 tpt hel sqns with 60 Mi-8
 3 liaison hel sqns with 100 Chetak (Alouette III) some with 4 SS-11 ATGW
Trainers: incl Jaguar 13 MiG-23UM Flogger C 65 HT-2 85 Kiran 1/1A 15 Marut Mk 1T some MPT-32 (replacing HT-2) 44 TS-4 Iskra 27 HS-748 ac Chetak hel
ASM: AA-2 Atoll R-550 Magic
ASB: AS-30
 30 SAM sqns with 180 SA-2-3
 (On order: 115 Mirage 2000 (75 to be locally assembled) 115 Jaguar (to be locally assembled) 48 MiG-23MF Flogger G MiG-21bis 40 Ajeet flts 10 HS-748 tps 40 Iskra 80 Kiran Mk 2 140 HPT-32 171 Hawk trig ac; Mi-8 Mi-24 45 Chetak hel)

Para-Military Forces: Border Security Force 85,000 175,000 in other organizations Coastguard 2,000 2 ex-Brit Type 14 frigates 2 mcv 5 Polucha large patrol craft 5 Defender ac 4 Chetak hel
 (On order: 3 offshore 9 inshore patrol vessels 9 ft tpt ac 6 hel)

Source: The Military Balance, 1983-84.

CHART 8

PAKISTAN

Population: 89,500,000 (Afghan refugees not included)
 Military service: voluntary
 Total armed forces: 78,600
 Est' GDF: 279,000 bn (\$26,245 bn, 1981-2)
 327,000 bn (\$1.0 bn)
 Est' def exp: 1981-2: Rs 19,593 bn (\$1.857 bn, 1982-3)
 22,878 bn (\$1.801 bn)
 GNP growth: 6.6% (1981), 6.6% (1982)
 Inflation: 12.5% (1981), 11.5% (1982)
 \$1 = Rupees 9.900 (1980-1), 10.551 (1981-2), 12.700 (1982-3)

Navy: 11,000
 11 subs, 2 Agosta, 4 Daphne, 5 SA-404 midget
 7 destroyers, 1 B. County, with 1 Sea Slug 2, 4 Seacat
 SAM, 1 helo, 5 US Gearing with 1, 8 ASROC Asw, 1 B.
 Battis
 4 Ch. Hainan FACI, 1 Towel patrol craft
 4 Ch. Hoku FACI, 12 msts
 12 Ch. Shenghai-II FACI
 12 Ch. Muchen hydrofoil FACI
 19 coastal patrol craft, 1 Spear, 18 MC-55 Type
 3 US Adjutant and MSC-288 coastal ACM
 1 US Mission underway replenishment tanker
 1 B. Dido cruiser (cadet trg/AA ship, non-operational)
 NAVAL AIR: 3 combat ac, 6 combat helo
 1 ASW/MA sqn with 3 Atlantic with Exocet Asw
 2 ASW/SAR helo sqns with 6 Sea King asw with AM-39, 4
 Alouette III
 ACFT: AM-39 Exocet
 Base: Karachi
 reserves: 5,000

Army: 450,000
 7 corps HQ, 1 Territorial command
 2 armd divs
 16 inf divs
 4 indep armd bdes
 5 indep inf bdes
 7 arty bdes
 2 AA arty bdes
 6 armd recce regts
 6 SAM bty with 6 Crotale (each 4 msts)
 1 Special Services Group
 370 M-47-48 (incl AS) 51 T-54-55 900 Type-59 mbt: 500
 M-113, 50 UR-416 APC, some 1,000 25-pdr (88mm)
 100mm, 130mm, 5.5-in (140mm), and 155mm guns and
 75mm pack, 105mm incl pack, 12 M-7 sp, 155mm
 towed, M-109 sp, 203mm how, 122mm wtl, 107mm
 120mm mor, 75mm, 89mm, 3.5-in RL, Type 52 75mm
 106mm RCL, Cobra, 200 TOW ATGW, 14.5mm, 37mm,
 40mm, 57mm AA guns, 6 Crotale SAM
 Army Aviation:
 1 liaison sqn with 45 Supporter II ac, 4 helo sqns
 indep army observation flts, 45 O-1E, Cessna 421, Tur-
 bo Commander, Queen Air ac, some Bell AH-1S, 16
 Mi-8, 35 Puma, 23 Alouette III, 13 Bell 47G helo
 (On order: M-113 APC, 75 M-189 towed 155mm, 100
 M-108A2 sp 155mm, 40 M-110 sp 203mm how, TOW
 ATGW launchers (incl 24 M-801 Improved TOW sp 1,000
 msts), some 10 AH-1S helo, 144 RBS-70 SAM launchers,
 400 msts)
 reserves: 500,000

Air Force: 17,600, 250 combat aircraft
 1 F-16 sqn with 11 B-57E (Canberra)
 6 FGA sqns, 1 with 12 Mirage IIIEP, 4 with 62 Mirage SPAS
 1 with 6 Q-5 (3 to form)
 8 interceptor FGA sqns with 144 Ch F-6 (1 converting to
 F-16)
 1 recce sqn with 15 Mirage IIIRF
 1 occu with 6 F-16
 2 trg sqns, 1 with 13 C-130B/E, 1 L-100, 1 with 1 Falcon
 20, 1 F-27-200 (with Navy), 1 Super King Air, 1 Bonanza
 1 SAR helo sqn with 6 MH-43B, 4 Alouette III
 1 utility helo sqn with 4 Super Frelon, 12 Bell 47G
 1 trg sqn with 20 T-33A, 4 MiG-15UTI
 Other trainers incl: 2 Mirage SOPAC, 3 Mirage MDP, 25
 Supporter, 35 T-37C, 45 Ch FT-5 (MiG-17U), 12 C-4E, 24
 Puma, FTB-337
 ASW: Sidewinder: R-530, R-550 Magic
 (On order: 34 F-16, 60 Ch Q-5 FGA)
 reserves: 8,000
 Forces Abroad: 30,000 contract personnel: Saudi Arabia
 (20,000), Jordan, Libya, Oman, UAE
 Para-Military Forces: 109,100 National Guard (22,000),
 Frontier Corps (85,000), Pakistan Rangers (15,000),
 Coast Guard (2,000), Frontier Constabulary (5,100)

Source: The Military Balance, 1983-84.

difficulty is the aforementioned decision by the Reagan administration to sell 40 F-16 jet fighters to Pakistan as part of a \$3.2 billion military-economic-aid package. Gandhi has stated the F-16s will not only threaten India, but are "a generation ahead of anything operating with other air forces in the area."³ The U.S. delivery of F-16s to Pakistan ultimately serves to justify Indian acquisition of more modern fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union.

The current tension between India and Pakistan results not only from a long-standing ethnic and religious animosity over the status of Kashmir and Bangladesh,⁴ but also from an issue of regional pre-eminence, global status, and technological sophistication in military hardware. In 1971, Pakistani aircraft were able to penetrate deep into Indian territory, strike IAF bases, and return to base unscathed before Indian air superiority could be established. Pakistan suffers from losses taken in 1949, 1965, and in 1971.⁵ In an accelerating race for regional dominance, both have sought to upstage the other in hardware acquisitions. When the U.S. and

³Steve Patten, "Behind the Nagging Feud with India," U.S. News and World Report, December 21, 1981, pp. 34-35.

⁴Burke, op. cit., pp. 187-189.

⁵Raju G.C. Thomas, "Aircraft for the Indian Air Force: The Context and Implications of the Jaguar Decision," Orbis 24:88-97, Spring, 1980.

the U.K. imposed an arms embargo on both countries, Pakistan turned to the Chinese and French for help, while India turned to the Soviets. The USSR became India's largest arms source, but India finds it "innocuous that the U.S. insists upon maintaining a balance of power between India and Pakistan...a country only one-eighth the size of India."⁶ (Mrs. Gandhi's statement was derived from a measurement and comparison of territory alone and did not include a comparison of other perceived power weights addressed in this study).

By the mid-1970s, Indian fears were aroused again when Pakistan began seeking arms from the U.S. and began training pilots from Libya and the United Arab Emirates.⁷ This meant, theoretically, that another war could involve an upgraded Pakistani air force perhaps supported by allies from outside South Asia. India reacted by buying Anglo-French fighter/bombers and so the race ensued. Today, Pakistan wants early warning aircraft, and India wants the latest Migs.

India's armed forces are two and one-half times Pakistan's in numbers, and her fleet of about 650 aircraft is three times as large; however, her military capabilities are primarily defensive in nature. With the world's third largest

⁶Patten, op. cit., p. 35.

⁷Leo E. Rose, "Pakistan's Role and Interests in South and Southwest Asia," Asian Affairs 9:np, September/October, 1981.

land army, India is now attempting to expand her naval inventories to project power into the Indian Ocean. The flagship of the Indian navy, the carrier INS "Vikrant," has been modified with a ski-jump to accomodate British Sea Harriers.⁸

The volunteer military has traditionally prided itself on professionalism, loyalty, and non-interference in political matters. Opposition elements have hinted, however, that a military coup is not entirely impossible. Citing that both the Desai and Gandhi governments had increasingly utilized army elements to quell domestic problems, opposition leaders point out that certain elements of the military are not particularly happy to fulfill this role. Mrs. Gandhi continued to believe, regardless of sentiments otherwise, that the armed services should remain subordinate to civilian control. She always reserved decision-making in the defense arena (i.e., when and how to apply military control to domestic unrest) for herself, and her son is expected to do the same. After the Indian Army's attack last June on armed Sikh militants barricaded inside the Golden Temple, the holiest shrine in India, many Indians became even more radicalized by their perception of the misuse of military power. Many will be waiting to see how Rajiv Gandhi handles his first domestic disturbance requiring

⁸Flight International, op. cit., p. 1476.

control of civilians.

India continues to strive for national self-sufficiency in defense production, manufacturing a wide range of military items from aircraft and medium tanks to frigates, but still must rely on foreign military aid to plug the holes in technology. No known military application of nuclear energy exists, but it would not be surprising to see one develop in the near future if India deems it essential to security interests.

Commencing in 1982, India seemingly extended an olive branch to the U.S. and its allies in Asia. Still opposed to the sale of F-16s to Pakistan, India temporarily backed away from a confrontation with the U.S. over nuclear fuel shipments. In late October of 1984, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy met with Indian officials in New Delhi to try to allay Indian fears that Pakistani military power was getting too strong. An alleged leak from an intelligence meeting in Washington supposedly chronicled the absence of two squadrons of Indian Jaguars on satellite photography, and it was postulated that India might launch a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear installation at Kahuta. India saw this event as a public reason for the U.S. Congress to further allocate defense spending for Pakistan and further strengthened Indian suspicions of U.S. intentions in

its Pakistani bond.⁹

The Pakistani armed forces have been in a process of rehabilitation since their defeat at Indian hands in 1971. Today, among Islamic military forces, those of Pakistan are considered topflight, albeit plagued with obsolete equipment. Hardware acquisitions have been solicited from the U.S., the U.K., France, and China. In addition, Pakistan has received some assistance from Libya, Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in exchange for security assistance.¹⁰ Pakistani personnel reportedly fly Libyan planes and guard the royal family of Saudi Arabia.

Overall, Pakistan ranked 28th in perceived power weights in the category of military capability, receiving one point out of a maximum of 200.¹¹ Not taken into account, however, is the suspicion that Pakistan has the capability to employ nuclear weapons if necessary. Although Zia does not admit to a nuclear weapons program, Bhutto did say once publicly that the country was seeking the "Islamic bomb."¹²

⁹William Claiborne, "U.S. Official Holds Talks in India on Aid Row," The Washington Post, October 23, 1984.

¹⁰"Pakistan: An Engaging Dictator Who Wants to Stay That Way," The Economist, December 12, 1981, pp. 31-32.

¹¹Cline, op. cit., p. 138.

¹²Horn, op. cit., p. 171.

With the Reagan administration's new embrace of arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy, Pakistan today is again enjoying favored status vis-a-vis India in the category of arms acquisitions. While the F-16 will upgrade the quality of the Pakistani Air Force, the platform is more of a psychological boost than a true destabilizer in the Pakistani-Indian military comparison because India's total military inventory still is much greater than that of Pakistan's. Conversely, Indian acquisition of Mig aircraft which have not yet been incorporated into Warsaw Pact inventories should also provide a psychological boost to New Delhi.

While the U.S. continues to view Pakistan as the main buffer against further Soviet encroachment in South Asia, Pakistan remains more concerned that India constitutes the main threat in the region and would attack from her position of dominance. Zia believes that India would act militarily to thwart any nuclear weapon program ongoing in Pakistan. India's conventional military inventory is, as mentioned before, two and one-half times that of Pakistan, and it would require considerable effort from Pakistan's domestic arms production capability and from her arms acquisition programs to approach a more equitable balance of conventional military power.

While the F-16 issue has been a focal point in diplomatic debates for several years, it perhaps has been emphasized out of proportion to its worth. More at stake to

future military stability in the region is the possibility of Pakistan achieving nuclear weapons capability. If that were to occur and become common knowledge, then the overall military comparison between the two countries would change significantly.

Also at stake is the nature of the long-term Soviet plan for India. As the U.S. uses Pakistan to contain Soviet goals in Afghanistan, India has become more alienated from the U.S., and in the future, may become more amenable to increased Soviet aid to her country. By aiding Pakistan at the expense of India, the U.S. may unwittingly be encouraging a stronger Indo-Soviet alliance. Based on India's stronger economic and military strength vis-a-vis Pakistan, perhaps it would wise for the U.S. to make some friendlier overtures to India's new head of state.

Chapter 6

PERCEIVED POWER - NATIONAL STRATEGY AND WILL

$$P_p = (C+E+M) \times (S+W)$$

Dr. Cline states:

. . . the coherence of national strategy and the strength of national will . . . are the two most critical factors in the formula for measuring power. At the national level strategy (S) is the part of the political decision-making process that conceptualizes and establishes goals and objectives designed to protect and enhance national interests in the international environment. National will (W) is the degree of resolve that can be mobilized among the citizens of a nation in support of governmental decisions about defense and foreign policy. National will is the foundation upon which national strategy is formulated and carried through to success.¹

India ranked twentieth and Pakistan ranked twenty-sixth in perceived power weights for national strategy and will. Because both strategy (S) and will (W) are added together and then multiplied against the previously discussed categories, this last characteristic is the most decisive (and subjective) element.

Both India and Pakistan are experiencing internal strife which affects national unity. A sense of territorial integration in either country has been difficult to achieve due to religious and ethnic differences. A pattern was established which reinforces perceptions of conflict when Hindu India and

¹Cline, op. cit., p. 143.

Muslim Pakistan were separated by the British. India perceives Pakistan as deliberately exploiting cleavages in Indian society, while Pakistan views India as anxious to dominate the whole of the subcontinent via any means possible.

Additionally, Pakistan is still upset about the role India played in the creation of Bangladesh. Burke's studies reflect the importance of the school of thought which emphasizes that the antitheses of Hinduism and Islam may explain the continual strife encountered on the Indian subcontinent.²

Indian society consists of three main races unified by a long-time dominance by aliens, the Hindu religion, and a caste system. A linguistic diversity unparalleled anywhere in the world however, pulls the Indian fabric apart. Mrs. Gandhi's unspoken policy seemed to be to preserve colonialism, thus regarding the Himalayan mountain kingdoms as Indian dependencies. This policy causes problems, as the Indian Northeast undoubtedly remains a large internal security problem.³ If this region were to become independent and subject to foreign pressures, such as from China or even the Soviet Union, the loss of Indian internal security would be significant.

²Burke, op. cit., p. 10.

³Stuart Auerback, "Insurrections Simmer or Seethe within India's Far Northeast," The Washington Post, March 5, 1982.

Full-scale insurrections and intensive counterinsurgencies have provoked conflict between underground movements and the Indian army. Open revolt against government rule has occurred in many locales. The situation in Assam has been particularly critical, considering that that area produces one-third of India's domestic oil. At issue are ethnic and cultural differences as India attempts to integrate these regions.

The most serious internal rioting in India occurred last summer. Army units were sent to the Punjab state after Gandhi's security forces stormed the Golden Temple in Amritsar in June 1984. Intense Hindu-Sikh fighting killed as many people as the sectarian battles of independence in 1947.⁴ This incident may have ultimately led directly to Indira Gandhi's assassination by her Sikh bodyguards, although conflicting reports indicate that many Hindus were protecting their Sikh friends during the fighting and that only the militaristic Sikhs were involved in the skirmishes. Nonetheless, it was not an external Pakistani threat that ended the life of Indira Gandhi, but rather an internal uprising of violence. It remains to be seen how her son, Rajiv, handles the hereditary internal strife.

⁴James P. Sterba, "Frightened for Their Safety, India's Sikhs Contemplate Seeking Sanctuary in the Punjab," The Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1984.

India's foreign policy formally endorses nonalignment, however inconsistencies, such as India's aid to Hanoi, acceptance of the status quo in Afghanistan, and New Delhi's recognition of the Vietnamese-installed regime in Phnom Penh, stand out.⁵ Part of these exist despite objections not just from the U.S., but also from ASEAN states with which India has important ties. Strong disagreements between the U.S. and India, such as the strategy on how to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan, have only served to irritate an already poor relationship. One of the most prickly issues is that of nuclear capabilities; India views the U.S. as punishing India for following an overt route to nuclear power while rewarding Pakistan for following a covert one.

Pakistan's government is also rather shaky at the present time. Zia has canceled several free elections which had been promised since 1977 when he seized power in a military coup, and he has alienated and offended Pakistan's upper and middle classes with his tough Islamic doctrine. He has jailed opponents, closed schools and universities at the first sign of unrest, and imposed censorship on most publications. An executive of a Pakistani manufacturing firm quipped: "He came

⁵Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "India Enters the 1980s," Current History 81:201, May, 1982.

for 90 days. He wants to stay for 90 years."⁶ His December 1984 referendum granted him five more years in power. Whether he will continue martial law remains to be seen.

Pakistan's major internal troubles also stem from the rebellious minorities, such as the Baluchis, and the influx of Afghan refugees in her Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces.⁷ In foreign policy, Pakistan is attempting to stay in the nonaligned bloc so as not to aggravate India to the extent that she would attack. The suspicious methods by which Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities continue to constitute a sore point for the West.⁸ The "quest for the Islamic bomb" conveys unknown intentions for the entire region.

All eleven banned opposition parties, called the Movement for Restoring Democracy, broadcast out of Kabul and ferment the undercurrents of change in Pakistani attitudes as evidenced by a recent poll. Many responded, allegedly, with confusion over why the U.S. is propping up Zia while insisting on Afghanistan's right to choose her own government. Many said that it was time for Zia to step down, but many also felt that

⁶William Claiborne, "Opposition in Pakistan Counts on Vote Boycott," The Washington Post, December 4, 1984.

⁷Anderson, op. cit., p. 132.

⁸John J. Fialka, "How Pakistan Secured U.S. Devices in Canada to Make Atomic Arms," The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 1984.

the opposition was not united enough to pull the job off.⁹

⁹Claiborne, "Opposition in Pakistan," op. cit.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSIONS

Five years ago, Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, said that "by any measuring stick - GNP, population, military strength, industrial base - India is, by far, the largest power in the region. This is a basic and unalterable fact of life in South Asia." The elements discussed in this thesis - critical mass, economic and military capability, and national strategy and will - support the idea that India "weighs" more than Pakistan in a regional ranklisting.

By close examination of the different elements of perceived power, it becomes more clear that in the world's relative division of power, India has more potential to aspire to world power status than Pakistan. The problem arises, however, out of the very nature of "perceptions." These can sometimes conflict with reality.

The final assigned values for both India and Pakistan appear as:

$$\begin{array}{l} (C + E + M) \times (S+W) = P_p \\ \text{India} \quad (52 + 11 + 8) \times (0.5) = 36 \\ \text{Pakistan} \quad (25 + 2 + 1) \times (0.8) = 22 \end{array}$$

The most critical element, as mentioned earlier, is the last coefficient which substantially magnifies the other three. India is assessed to possess greater ability to employ those assets necessary to preserve national identity, however it is surprising that Pakistan ranks as high as it does; it's actually "worth" 60% of India. This is because the ranklisting perception of Pakistan views that country as more important strategically.

The question arises, then, is Pakistan more strategically important than India to U.S. foreign policy interests? It appears that way if current policies are examined in South Asia. It also stems from U.S. desires to prop up Pakistan as a counterweight to Soviet presence in Afghanistan and to the unfriendly presence in Iran. In so doing, however, the U.S. has failed to see Pakistan as the less strong country in another sense - the Indo-Pakistani balance. Pakistan is assigned inflated weights because there is a tendency to view that country vis-a-vis Afghanistan and Iran (not India). India is perceiving some of these artificial weights as reality, and therein lies the problem. It is difficult to assure India that U.S. support of Pakistan has nothing to do with India at all.

This imbalance of perceptions in South Asia is hampering U.S. foreign policy. President Carter used economic leverage and political pressure to restrain both countries;

President Reagan has elected only one to serve as a "front-line" state against further Soviet encroachment in the region. Security guarantees by outside powers, however, will not alleviate or eliminate regional security considerations. Our global strategy approach is overlooking the problem of two governments (and two traditional enemies) attempting to retain and project power.

India could be the most geopolitically advantageous ally to the U.S. in the long-term, but it would take a long time to remove the longstanding Indian distrust of U.S. misunderstandings in the region. Initially, it would benefit the U.S. to alleviate the mounting regional tension between India and Pakistan and support a regional consortium to promote area stability. The U.S. could encourage a final U.N. resolution of the Kashmir question; it could use its influence in the World Bank to appropriate proportionate shares of economic aid; and it could foster relaxation of tension between India and China. It would be wise, especially now, to support India in its struggle for smooth transition of power and to assure Rajiv Gandhi that we care about Indian security not only against regional threats but against superpower interference as well. Above all, one of the pair cannot be allowed to "perceive" that its regional status has fallen to the point where conflict becomes inevitable. Tilting toward Pakistan may satisfy our short-term goals of foreign policy, but identifying too strongly with one country of a matched, unstable pair to

the exclusion of the other, is not wise in the long-term. More support for India and support for a regional alliance are not necessarily incompatible. It could, in effect, be a key strategic move in a longer-term plan to contain further Soviet influence in South Asia. If the U.S. were to initiate and maintain a better dialogue with India, Ghandi may decide it's in his country's best interest to respond favorably and thus dilute Soviet influence by Indian choice.

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
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
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