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
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**THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION
IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS**

by

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Special Seminar Paper submitted to the Faculty of the
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The problem of formulating a just and peaceful settlement in the Middle East is, according to the late Leonid Brezhnev, one of the most important issues to be solved before lasting peace and international security can be assured in the world.¹ Soviet involvement in the Middle East, which began in earnest in the mid-1950s, has been primarily reactionary in nature--intended to "minimize" western (primarily US) influence over the Middle Eastern States. The rapid decolonization of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East following World War II left a power vacuum in what would become known as the Third World.² After the Suez crisis, the British and French withdrew from active political participation in the area, and the mantle of leadership in this respect fell on the US--the main challenge to Soviet prominence.³ Impoverished and militarily weak, the newly independent nations presented opportunities for the USSR to seek influence

in areas once considered beyond reach. Soviet penetration into the Middle East could make possible the establishment of the supplier-client relationship so common in Soviet relations with Third World regimes.⁴

Joseph Stalin's death coincided with the development of a Middle Eastern power vacuum. The subsequent destalinization of the Soviet Union led to significant changes in Moscow's foreign policy initiatives.⁵ Among the many changes in Soviet foreign policy was a new outlook toward and approach to developing nations. This amounted to a restoration of Lenin's vision of uniting the nationalist aspirations of the Third World with Moscow's anti-western objectives.⁶ Moscow's new perspective would ultimately lead to Soviet hegemony and peace on its own terms.

After defining the significance of the Middle East in Soviet foreign policy and reviewing current Soviet initiatives in the region, this paper examines major post-World War II trends and events that have brought Moscow's involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process to its current juncture. The events analyzed in this paper ended with the August 11, 1985, adjournment of the Casablanca conference.

Soviet Middle East Philosophy

The Soviet Union, as a global superpower, has foreign policy considerations which transcend regional conflicts.

The first priority in Moscow's foreign policy is to ensure immunity of the homeland from attack.⁷ In executing a global foreign policy, any power must categorize and rank order specific foreign policy objectives. George Breslauer, in an article entitled "The Dynamics of Soviet Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Lessons of the Brezhnev Era," divided Soviet foreign policy interests into four categories: superpower, continental power, global power, and leader of the world communist movement--in order of importance.⁸ The priorities assigned to these roles drive Soviet foreign policy and, by extension, Moscow's role in the Middle East.

In support of her role as a superpower and to maintain her first foreign policy priority, the Soviet Union must--by its definition--outpace the US in strategic warfighting capability.⁹ Under Brezhnev, the Soviets rejected Krushchev's doctrine of "minimum deterrence," and ultimately sought strategic superiority to meet and support foreign policy and warfighting objectives.¹⁰

The second category is that of a continental power. The siege mentality of the Soviet Union forces it to maintain the East European buffer states, a deterrent posture against NATO, and forces capable of Chinese containment.¹¹ These three objectives receive the bulk of the Soviet political, military, and manpower effort. Clearly, maintaining secure borders ranks second only to

protection from and the capability to fight a strategic confrontation.

The third foreign policy category--global power--contains Soviet Middle East efforts. Evidence indicates that the Middle East--its strategic location, US diplomatic efforts, and potential for military confrontation--ranks as most important in the category.¹² As third world conflicts have a tendency to do, a temporary situation at a different location may overtake the Middle East's position; however, on a day-to-day basis, the Middle East ranks highest.

Even though fourth on the list, the Soviets strive to remain the ideological and organizational center of the world communist movement.¹³ Although there are communist movements in the Middle East, the dominance of Islam has precluded extended success. In fact, Arab leaders who have been supported by the USSR, while only too glad to take Soviet aid, have insisted on following their own separate policies.¹⁴ As Syria's President Hafez al-Assad has continually demonstrated, the Syrian-Soviet relationship is not one of social brotherhood but one of political-military convenience. Although Syrian regional stature, influence, military capability, and stability are based on Soviet support, Assad's Islamic constituency would not tolerate an atheistic social environment. Even

the current Ba'athist secularism has been receiving its share of criticism.

Soviet Involvement: Peace Proposals vs. Non-resolution

The Soviet tactics to weaken and ultimately eliminate Western influence from the Middle East, while promoting Soviet influence, have taken several forms.¹⁵ The most common (and successful) form of Soviet influence is a military-client relationship which is primarily responsible for Syria's rise to prominence and power. A secondary relationship between Moscow and its Middle Eastern clients is economic in nature.¹⁶ Finally, another common Soviet tactic is "treaties of friendship and cooperation," umbrella treaties that include a full spectrum of relations.

In an effort to establish an international reputation as a peace broker in the Middle East, the Soviets began to publicize their concepts of the constraints necessary for a just and lasting peace. Since 1973, Soviet peace proposals have comprised three basic concepts: (1) Israeli withdrawal from all territory captured in the 1967 war; (2) the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza; and (3) the acknowledgement of the right to exist of all states in the region, including Israel.¹⁷ With various modifications to make their proposals more acceptable to their Arab allies, Moscow has

remained consistent in its proposals and its mode of solution--a comprehensive conference.

Thus, the Soviet paradox arises. In an effort to maintain the perception of working toward peace in the Middle East, Moscow puts forth peace proposals to demonstrate its intent; however, a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Middle East would not enhance Soviet interests. With peace in the region, the Soviets would lose their main platform for relations with the Arab states--military supply. Peaceful relations would reduce the need for continuing arms shipments. Secondly, as is not the case with the Soviets, the US has a fraternal relationship with Israel and economic relations with moderate Arab regimes. Consequently, the US will maintain a higher level of influence at the expense of the Soviets. Therefore, Moscow will not wish to see a permanent peace come to the Middle East because it would lessen the Soviet political position in that region.

CHAPTER 2

Current Soviet Initiatives

Rapprochement With Israel

Probably the most significant unilateral Soviet initiative for peace in the Middle East has been the recently publicized secret talks with Israel concerning promises of security in return for withdrawal from territory occupied in the Six Day War.¹⁸ The Soviets, along with their Middle East protege, Syria, do not like to be excluded from the Middle East peace process. The American-supported Israeli piecemeal process of negotiation with Arab countries has effectively alienated both Moscow and Damascus from the peace process.¹⁹ In addition, the individual negotiations by Israel increase the visibility of Washington's role while diminishing perceptions of Moscow's participation in that same process. Indeed, the primary Soviet goal in the Middle East peace process is to diminish, as much as possible, US involvement.²⁰

Moscow's overture to Jerusalem could lead to one of

two possible diplomatic relationships within the Middle East, both of which would benefit the USSR. On one hand, the Soviet-Israeli and the separate US-Jordanian-Israeli negotiations could thaw the ice and widen into diplomatic efforts which transcend the Arab blocs,²¹ resulting in a US-Soviet cochairmanship of a comprehensive peace initiative. On the other hand, direct Israeli negotiation with the Soviets may stymie negotiation with the moderate Arabs.²² In either case, Soviet goals will have been achieved: Moscow's involvement as a coarbitor would legitimize its participation in the peace process, and destruction of a US initiative would impede American credibility.

A second approach is the disruption of the 1985 comprehensive Arab summit in Casablanca through pressure and intimidation of Arab League members by Syria. The assassination of a Jordanian diplomat in Ankara, Turkey, in late July of this year, was a Syrian response to calls for an Arab summit conference.²³ In trying to disrupt the conference, the Syrians serve Soviet interests as well as their own. In light of the fact that one of the proposed changes in summit procedure is doing away with the unanimous vote to implement policy,²⁴ the interests of the radical Arab bloc could certainly be threatened. The Soviet aligned "radical" Arab countries attending the conference include Iraq (currently undergoing rapproche-

ment with Egypt and Jordan), Libya (albeit a low level delegation), as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).²⁵ In a direct comment on the conference, the Syrian daily newspaper Tishrin stated that "Syria will not deal with the summit nor with its results....Syria and the Arab masses will know how to punish the traitors."²⁶

The Syrian-Palestinian Dilemma

Further efforts by Syria to disrupt the Arab summit are highlighted by the efforts of Yassir Arafat and the PLO to be an integral force within the Arab League. This issue brings to light the diametrically opposed positions of the two Soviet allies. The Soviets have been consistent in their support for Palestinian autonomy and an independent homeland on the West Bank.²⁷ Because the Palestinians are a nation and not a state, they have lacked the classic governmental process of raising an army, guaranteeing territorial security, and conducting formal diplomatic activities. Consequently, it has been dependent upon the Soviet Union for military and political support. The recent conflict between Syria and the PLO in which the Syrian Army and radical PLO factions nearly annihilated the mainstream PLO has caused a perplexing situation for Soviet diplomatic efforts.

The Arab Summit has put the Soviets, through the Syrians, clearly on the defensive. The conference

could--and probably will--make policy decisions inconsistent with Syrian foreign policy objectives.²⁸ To further aggravate Moscow's position, the United States has supported the summit, calling it a "significant event," and has called on the Arab delegates to support King Hussein's Palestinian-Israeli initiative.²⁹ Moscow must consider whether or not continued support for Syria, which, as moderate Arabs claim, has conducted a program of terror, intimidation, and blackmail against them,³⁰ will alienate the Soviet Union from the peace process. For the Soviets to do otherwise, and support the Arab league, would undercut Syrian efforts to remain the central force in Middle Eastern politics, reveal Moscow as an erstwhile supporter, and further justify distrust of Soviet intentions by the Arab nations. As has been stated repeatedly in the Soviet press, the policy of "seeking to strengthen the solidarity of the Arab peoples" would be undermined.³¹

CHAPTER 3

Historical Development of Soviet Middle East Policy

Post World War II to the Six Day War

Soviet engagement in the Middle East must be related to American post-World War II efforts to create a pro-western security system--namely the Baghdad Pact--in the Northern Tier of the Middle East.³² An article in Pravda explained Moscow's Middle Eastern policy view:

It would not be out of place to recall that the Middle East is in proximity to the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist Community. The Soviet Union is far from indifferent to the direction events will take in the region.³³

The involvement of states contiguous to the Soviet Union in the Baghdad Pact led Moscow to hurdle the Northern Tier and attempt to influence events in states more directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Moscow's decision to develop alliances with Arabs in need of superpower support was facilitated by the departure of the colonial powers, Britain, and France.

British and French political maneuvering throughout the twentieth century (Sykes-Picot, Balfour, Suez) had left the Arabs with a sense of betrayal and distrust of the West. The departure of Britain and France developed what many American scholars termed a "power vacuum."³⁴ US policy makers, perceiving such a vacuum, feared Soviet aggression or--more importantly--Soviet-Arab military pacts which, through Soviet arms shipments, would alter power relationships favored by the West. This occurred during the mid-1950s, just after the US had experienced Soviet-supported North Korean aggression for three bitter years.³⁵ The stage for Soviet involvement had been set: a 1949 coup brought a radical Arab group to power in Syria, and the 1952 coup by Gamal Abdul Nasser brought Egypt, the most powerful Arab country, into the radical sphere. Both countries became prime candidates for Soviet sponsorship. While Moscow seemed to have little choice among the various Arab states, it appeared to show a preference for Syria, partly because of its strategic location which outflanked the Baghdad Pact, and partly because the Syrian communist party and associated front organizations had been established and were gaining strength.³⁶

The watershed year for Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern affairs was 1956. The following is a short

chronology of important events directly affecting Soviet involvement.³⁷

1. June 13--Britain declares an end to its 74 year occupation of the Suez Canal and withdraws from Egypt.
2. June--The US and Britain withdraw from financial support of the Aswan Dam Project.
3. June 27--Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal and institutes martial law in retaliation for US-Britain withdrawal of Aswan financing.
4. September 14--Egypt takes complete control of the Suez Canal.
5. October 8--Egypt, in association with the Soviet Union, rejects Western proposals for international supervision of the Suez Canal.
6. October 30--Britain and France, acting in concert with Israel, invade Egypt to regain control of the Suez Canal.
7. November 1--Egypt breaks off diplomatic relations with Britain and France.
8. November 5--The Soviet Union warns that it is prepared to intercede on behalf of Egypt to restore Middle East peace. Moscow further calls for joint Soviet-US action against the aggressors. The U.S. immediately rejects the plan.
9. November 10--The Soviet Union calls for the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops from Egypt and warns that Soviet troops will join Egyptian forces. The US states it will oppose any such move.
10. December 22--The last British and French troops withdraw from Egypt.
11. December 26--US Secretary of State J.F. Dulles warned that the US must prevent Soviet expansion in the Middle East. On the same day the Syrian ambassador said Syria would welcome American protection from the Soviets.

The string of events during 1956 provided the Soviets with the perfect opportunity to enter the Middle Eastern political morass. The Western powers, conveniently for

the Soviets, cornered the Egyptians into an unacceptable political situation regarding the Suez Canal and the Aswan Dam project. This permitted Moscow to enter the arena on the side of the "down trodden" and to portray itself as the antithesis of the "colonial-imperialist" Western powers. Although the Soviets were too involved with the Hungarian situation in 1956 to have actually intervened militarily in the Middle East,³⁸ Moscow nevertheless gained a great deal of prestige among Arabs through its rigorous diplomatic intervention.³⁹ Most of the Arab states believed that it was Moscow's stern warning of military intervention which brought about the cease fire.⁴⁰ Former Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and the head of the Soviet International Department, Boris Ponomarev, summed-up Moscow's entry into the Middle East as follows:

The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries went to the assistance of the Arab peoples when it became evident that there was mounting hostility toward them from the imperialist world.⁴¹

There is evidence to suggest that increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East resulted in the United State's obsession with containment of the spread of communism.⁴² Among the Soviet-Arab relations fueling America's obsession were the 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement, 1956 Soviet-Syrian and Soviet-Yemeni arms agreements, and the establishment of Soviet embassies in

Tripoli and Tunis.⁴³ From this time on, the Middle East became a major target area for the Soviet Union.⁴⁴ These events led to the "Eisenhower Doctrine" of January 5, 1957 which called for US military and economic assistance to any nation resisting communism.⁴⁵ Liberally applied, the US invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine the following year when US troops intervened in Lebanon during that country's civil strife. In response, the Soviet Union threatened the United States with war.⁴⁶ Moscow's threats on behalf of the Arabs were intended, not for implementation, but as propaganda to demonstrate Soviet solidarity with the Arab cause.⁴⁷ President Nasser, in Moscow during the American intervention in Lebanon, appealed for Soviet armed intervention, but soon realized diplomatic pressure would be the extent of Soviet involvement.

Through the remainder of the 1950s and into the 1960s, the Soviets had enjoyed cyclic success in their attempts to establish relations with the new Arab regimes that were coming into existence. Not all of the new regimes were politically in tune with Nasser who was the major power in the region. Moscow's refusal to intervene militarily in Lebanon told Nasser just how far Soviet support extended and what could be expected in the future.⁴⁸ In 1958, in an attempt to reduce Soviet influence in Arab affairs, Nasser used the occasion of Moscow's support of Iraq's new regime to denounce the Soviets for

interference in Arab affairs and to accuse foreign communist agents of attempting to divide the Arab world.⁴⁹ In 1959, the Soviet split with China was beginning and, in an attempt to reassert its world socialist leadership, Moscow promulgated a more rigid ideology which Arab regimes identified as atheistic and, therefore, anathema to Islam.⁵⁰ Although the Ba'athist regimes were secular in nature, the religious fiber of their society was Islamic. While Syrian communist groups flourished in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, the turn of the decade brought persecution to these groups, and state relations with Moscow reverted to those of military supply and demand.⁵¹

In 1957, the Soviets made their first attempt to enter the Arab-Israeli peace process as a coequal of the great powers, thereby establishing itself as a necessary cog in the diplomatic machinery. Moscow published a memorandum, Basic Principles of a Declaration of the Governments of the USSR, USA, France, and United Kingdom on Peace and Security in the Middle East and Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Countries of That Area,⁵² which suggested that the four great powers execute their affairs in the Middle East based on the following principles:

1. The preservation of peace and security in the Middle Eastern countries and respect for their sovereignty and independence.

2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries and respect for their sovereignty and independence.

3. Reunification of all attempts to draw these countries into military blocs involving the Great Powers.

4. The dismantling of foreign bases and the evacuation of foreign troops from the countries of the Middle East.

5. Assistance for the economic development of the Middle Eastern countries without political or military strings that would be incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries.⁵³

This Soviet initiative was met with a "negative attitude"⁵⁴ by the Western powers because acceptance of such proposals would be an acceptance of the Soviets into the peace progress. Soviet participation in a peace process would heighten Moscow's prestige as well as legitimize Soviet involvement.

Soviet-Palestinian Relations

From the early 1960s to the Six Day War, the Soviet Union had an icy relationship with the Palestinians. In 1964, the Palestinian National Congress founded the PLO.⁵⁵ The first PLO chairman was Ahmed Shuqairy, whose professed goal in life was to drive the Israelis into the sea.⁵⁶ This pledge made Soviet Palestinian relations acrimonious in light of Moscow's recognition of Israel and its pledge for the security of all states. As Syria's Ambassador to Moscow, Shuqairy supported the USSR over the US in order to utilize those relations in favor of the

Palestinians.⁵⁷ Between 1963 and 1965, Shuqairy requested military assistance for the Palestinians, aid for the refugees, recognition of the PLO, and permission for the Palestinians to open an office in Moscow.⁵⁸ The Soviet reply was that "the Soviet Union did not agree to the liberation of Palestine and did not want to recognize the Liberation Organization."⁵⁹ In addition, Moscow preferred relations on a state-by-state basis and had a deep suspicion of the political and social make-up of the fedayeen.⁶⁰

Prior to the Six Day War, the Soviets provided clandestine economic and military aid to the Palestinians in an effort to satisfy the Neo-Ba'athist group ruling Syria.⁶¹ Meanwhile, Moscow tried to convince Israel that the Palestinians were a creation of Western intelligence. The Soviets maintained a marked distaste for Shuqairy's leadership and, during his 1967 struggle with al-Fatah, Moscow supported the latter group. With this new Palestinian leadership, however, overt Soviet support became more common and, in January, 1969, Soviet commentators began to speak of the "lawful and just struggle" of the Palestinians and of their "self-defense" against Israel's aggression.⁶² The reason for the turnabout was twofold: first, by developing leverage over the fedayeen through economic and military aid, Moscow could reduce efforts to undermine local Arab governments; second, political shocks

created by Palestinian policy could allow Chinese or Western encroachment on Soviet hegemony.⁶³ In 1969, Politburo member Alexandr Schelepin proclaimed:

We consider the struggle of the Palestinian patriots for the liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression as a just anti-imperialist struggle and we support it.⁶⁴

The emerging relationship between the Soviets and the PLO began, at the end of 1968, to manifest itself in the form of military aid. During the initial stages of the new Soviet-Palestinian relationship, Moscow agreed to supply the Palestinians with weapons and equipment indirectly through East European countries.⁶⁵ To remain somewhat informal in its relations with the Palestinians, the Soviets continued to deny the requests of the PLO to open an office in Moscow; however, in 1973 the Soviets acquiesced and began more formal relations with the PLO.⁶⁶ This move, obvious in its response to the Egyptian expulsion of Soviet technicians, gave the Soviets another option to manipulate peace on their terms.

With the formal establishment of the PLO in its camp, Moscow had also sought to make its new ally more amenable to a peaceful Arab-Israeli settlement. The Soviets have been free in their criticism of the fedayeen for their insistence that a solution to the Middle East problem can be found only through military means.⁶⁷ Moscow itself describes such views as "unrealistic" and as ones which

generally "fail to take account of the strategic tasks of the Arab peoples in the anti-imperialist struggle" and are, therefore, wrong both strategically and tactically.⁶⁸ In 1973, Moscow insisted that a peaceful resolution must be based on UN Resolution 242, and warned that the Palestinians "cannot make headway without the support of the freedom loving peoples of the world, especially the socialist countries."⁶⁹ Moscow has continually stressed to the Palestinians that a just settlement requires the backing of a superpower, and that acceptance of Resolution 242 would provide the backing of the UN General Assembly.

Even up to the present, the Soviets have maintained the necessity of invoking Resolution 242 in an Arab-Israeli settlement. The essence of this resolution is the call for Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders. Central to the Soviet Union's position is the principle of inadmissibility of seizing the lands of others through aggression. According to this position, Arab-Palestinian lands occupied by Israel in 1967 must be restored to their owners.⁷⁰ The chief concern of Moscow and the Palestinians is the de facto annexation of the West Bank by Israel in order to recreate Eretz Israel.⁷¹ Chief among Soviet proposals--which came from the Brezhnev Doctrine--published only days after the Fez resolutions--is that Palestinian refugees must be given the chance to return to

their homeland or to obtain appropriate compensation for the property they had to leave.⁷²

Because of the ever-changing power relationships in the Middle East, Moscow has come to see the Palestinian issue as an opportunity to manipulate and influence future developments, embarrass the US and conservative Arab regimes, and help recapture for the Soviet Union its image as the sole "reliable" friend and supporter of the Arabs and as a dynamic force in the Middle East.⁷³ Through the late 1970s, the Soviets continued to trumpet the Palestinian plight--especially during Operation Litani in 1978, when Israel invaded Lebanon as far as the Litani River to move the PLO away from its northern frontier. Problems in the Soviet-Arab-Palestinian alliance came to a head in 1982 when the Israelis launched Operation Peace for Galilee in which they executed a lightning fast drive to Beirut, routing the PLO in the process. In 1983 the PLO was again embattled when it was besieged in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli by radical PLO forces. Much to Moscow's chagrin, these radical forces were backed by Syria. Thus began a new problem for the Soviets, who found themselves supporting competing Arab groups, each bent on annihilation of the other. Sporadic fighting against the PLO has continued, with Christian and Amal forces joining the fight. Moscow's continuing support for Syria has embittered and alienated Yassir Arafat and his

followers. Thus the 1985 Soviet dilemma: whether to support a semi-comprehensive Arab Summit and, thereby, support the PLO, or to side with Syria in its attempt to intimidate, blackmail, and terrorize moderate Arab attendees. Available information indicates that the Soviets support Syria since the radical Arab bloc (Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria, Lebanon--now an unwilling Syrian dupe) has boycotted the Casablanca conference.⁷⁴ Moscow is, once again, demonstrating that peace will not be achieved in the Middle East and that there will not be Arab unanimity unless the superpowers--especially the USSR--are involved in the process.

Six Day War to the Present

The political events of 1967 caused a large-scale multifront war which threatened intervention by the superpowers. Egypt's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba resulted in a stern warning by the US and increased readiness of the US Sixth Fleet. In retaliation to the alert status of the US Navy, the Soviet Union warned that it would resist any aggression in the Middle East.⁷⁵ When hostilities broke out on the Gaza strip between Israel and Egypt, Israel resorted to an appeal to the Soviet Union to stop the hostilities.

Immediately prior to the Six Day War, Moscow cultivated "very strong and progressive" relations with the new

Syrian government.⁷⁶ During this period, the Syrian communist party successfully penetrated the governmental apparatus. Moscow displayed a great deal of alarm with the growing political instability of the new regime and the US Sixth Fleet naval maneuvers. The Leninist doctrine of "hostile capitalist encirclement" led to fear in Moscow that another blow to the Damascus regime would topple it.⁷⁷ Moscow responded with a propaganda effort designed to shift the political focus to "Israeli aggression" and the threat that an Israeli invasion of Syria was imminent.⁷⁸

A second source of consternation to the Soviets was the lack of support by Nasser. Failure to mass Egyptian troops on the Israeli border to demonstrate Arab solidarity brought "virulent" criticism--mainly from Moscow--down on Nasser.⁷⁹ Upon the May 14 return of an Egyptian delegation from Moscow, the Egyptian forces were immediately placed on alert. Almost certainly the Soviets told the Egyptian delegation to "toe the line" and follow policy. During the Egyptian mobilization, the Soviet press provided encouragement with headlines such as "Ready to Rebuff Aggression," "Standing Shoulder to Shoulder Against Any Surprise," "Nasser Ready to Act Against Israel if Syria is Attacked."⁸⁰ Through this media blitz, the Soviets had heightened the perception of a progressive

Arab coalition. However, the Six Day War proved otherwise.

The year 1969 opened with a surprising peace initiative by Nasser. In an exclusive interview with Newsweek, the Egyptian president revealed a five-point peace plan which would closely coincide with future Soviet proposals.⁸¹ The points of the plan were: (1) A declaration of non-belligerence; (2) The recognition and right of each country (including Israel) to live in peace; (3) The territorial integrity of all states (including Israel) within recognized and secure borders; (4) Freedom of navigation of international waterways; (5) A just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.⁸² Nasser's five proposals bore a remarkable resemblance to the basic Soviet tenets for peace, the first of which was the "total withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied lands." This point coincided with Nasser's third point which called for the territorial integrity of all states within recognized borders. Borders recognized by the Soviet-Arab coalition meant the pre-June 1967 borders. Moscow's second tenet, termination of a state of war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, coincided with Nasser's first point, the declaration of non-belligerence. Finally, Moscow's third tenet, which dealt with securing the inalienable rights of the Arab people in Palestine,⁸³ equated to Nasser's fifth point, which called for a

just solution to the Palestinian problem. The similarity of these proposals was more than coincidental. It appears that Nasser was probably used as a mouthpiece for Moscow to test the regional and international reaction to potential guidelines for solution. This plan was rejected outright by Israel, which called it a "plan for liquidating Israel in two stages."⁸⁴

In April, 1969, in response to Israel's outright rejection of the "Nasser Initiative," the failure of the UN to implement Resolution 242, and the fact that Israel still occupied the Sinai, Nasser began the War of Attrition. Nasser's strategy was based on causing unacceptable losses to Israeli occupying forces.⁸⁵ To counter the Egyptian attack, the Israelis employed their superior air force. Israeli aircraft silenced Egyptian guns and, by January, 1970, were flying bombing missions over Egyptian territory with impunity while the ground forces were conducting deep thrusts into Egypt's heartland.⁸⁶ To counter his humiliation, Nasser went to Moscow to request Soviet intervention. This time, after exacting a high price,⁸⁷ the Soviets intervened with manned SAM batteries and Soviet piloted aircraft. During this period, with 10,000-15,000 Soviet ground and air force personnel in Egypt, the Middle East and the world braced for a possible superpower confrontation.

Because of the US involvement in Vietnam, pressure on the Nixon Administration not to intervene by sending American troops to the Middle East was severe. In return, Israel stated publicly that it did not require American troops, only materiel.⁸⁸ After a warning by President Nixon of the possibility of a superpower confrontation, the Soviets agreed to a ninety-day cease fire, and the Israelis agreed to cease their air raids.⁸⁹ Even when the Soviets were participating in the war, the Israelis continued to conduct effective raids and on one occasion shot down five MiG's in one day.⁹⁰ Amid continuing Israeli success and a new Soviet peace initiative,⁹¹ Nasser had come to recognize the limitations of Soviet power. Nasser's death in 1970 and Anwar Sadat's succession to the presidency developed further signs of a drift from Moscow's shadow.⁹² The drift was halted temporarily in August, 1971, when Cairo signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow. In less than one year, however a stunned Soviet Union pulled its "technicians" out of Egypt on the orders of President Sadat.⁹³ Thus began a humiliating retreat for the Soviets as Sadat looked to the West for superpower support.

At the time of Nasser's death, the most serious problem Moscow had to deal with was a reemergence of Washington's influence in the Middle East peace process.⁹⁴ The perceived evenhandedness of US Middle East policy,

combined with the failure of Soviet peace and military efforts, caused the Arab states to look to the US with new hope. The US had proposed the Rogers Plan, negotiated the 1970 cease fire, supported Jordan in its civil war, and negotiated Sinai I. The new US initiative left the Soviets reeling with a legacy of failed diplomatic and military intervention. At this point the only thread between the Arab bloc and Moscow was military support. Thus, as the Yom Kippur War approached, Nasser, the linchpin of Soviet Arab policy, was gone, and the Arab bloc was in disarray.⁹⁵

The 1973 Yom Kippur War saw a familiar approach to a Middle East conflict by the Soviets: first cautious support; then, a measure of restraint on the Arabs; and finally, a threat of intervention.⁹⁶ The Soviets were told of the Arab decision to initiate hostilities only two days prior to the event. Moscow responded with approval as long as the only goal of the war was the recovery of occupied territory.⁹⁷ The unprecedented level of Soviet involvement must be attributed to the USSR's determination to maintain influence with the Arab bloc, while also making a statement concerning its accumulated military capability and its determination to demonstrate its global power.⁹⁸

In approaching Soviet Middle East policy as a subset of total foreign policy, the massive arms shipments and

support of yet another war against Israel struck a serious blow to detente. The June 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev Summit in Washington set forth three principles of international behavior (all of which had a bearing on the Middle East) intended to enhance the sagging policy of detente. The three principles were: (1) to prevent conflicts that would increase international tension; (2) avoid military confrontation; (3) restrain from threat or use of force against the others allies.⁹⁹

Moscow's interpretation of the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit had several consequences on US-Soviet relations. First, the massive arms shipments to Cairo and Damascus supported the Arab plan for war which increased international tension through heightening the possibility of a super-power confrontation. Second, continued arms shipments and Soviet airborne troop alerts (to which the US responded with a nuclear alert) took both superpowers to the brink of confrontation. Finally, through military support of the Arab states, Moscow consented in the use of force against an ally of the US. This failure by Moscow to enforce its negotiated agreements honestly and effectively eliminated any perception of sincere Soviet intentions toward creating peaceful conditions in the Middle East.

Once again the Arab front, with Soviet military support, failed to achieve its battlefield objective against Israel. With the Egyptian Third Army surrounded

and Syria having lost 10 more miles of the Golan Heights, Soviet President Kosygin traveled to Cairo to press Sadat for a cease fire in the interest of the Arab armies.¹⁰⁰ Sadat finally agreed and, upon Kosygin's return, Moscow invited Henry Kissinger to negotiate an end to hostilities. The Moscow talks resulted in US-USSR sponsorship of UN Resolution 338 which, among other things, called for a cease fire within 12 hours. Although a Soviet initiative, the cease fire did not last, and when hostilities resumed, Moscow threatened unilateral intervention. Washington responded that Soviet intervention would not be tolerated.¹⁰¹ A second alert to Soviet airborne troops prompted Washington to issue a worldwide stage three nuclear alert. The American overreaction, as Moscow called it, led to the Soviets rescinding their military alert.

While Soviet-American relations had clearly suffered as a result of the Yom Kippur War, Arab unity was at an all-time high.¹⁰² Yet despite close ties to Moscow, various Arab regimes (such as Iraq) rejected the Soviet-supported cease fire (to which Iraq stated "it was against the will of the Arab masses.")¹⁰³ Most of the Arab bloc had rejected the Soviet supported Resolution 242 and now it had rejected Resolution 338. Moscow's diplomatic and peace making efforts were reaching its nadir mainly because the only effective support the Soviets could

provide, military hardware, had failed to produce the intended results.

The death knell to Soviet-Egyptian relations came with the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the US as part of Kissinger's efforts to establish a cease fire.¹⁰⁴ The Moscow leadership was so concerned about the Egyptian-US rapprochement that it turned its attention to improving relations with the PLO and Syria.¹⁰⁵ Henry Kissinger's successes in negotiating the Sinai I and II disengagement agreements further isolated the Soviets from the peace process. Since the total break with Egypt, the Soviet role in the Middle East has been reduced to reacting to American diplomatic initiatives.¹⁰⁶ Undaunted, the Soviets relegated themselves to criticize every unilateral Egyptian peace initiative, attempting to isolate her from the rest of the Arab world.

The Soviet leadership was clearly discouraged by the Sinai II disengagement agreement in 1975 because it heralded further erosion of the Soviet Middle East position.¹⁰⁷ To counter the increasing success of US peace making efforts, Moscow attempted to isolate Egypt while drawing closer to Syria, which was still counting on Soviet support to enhance her status in the Middle East. During this period, and up to the US-Soviet joint communique on the resumption of the Geneva conference, the

Soviets continued to rally around the only forum that would return them to the center of the Middle East peace process--a call for the resumption of the Geneva conference. When the US and Israel rejected PLO participation in that forum, Moscow roundly criticized both¹⁰⁸ as obstructionists to a just and lasting Middle East peace. Writing in International Affairs-Moscow, Soviet commentator A. Ustyugov emphasized the need for a comprehensive forum:

Any attempt to depart from such comprehensive settlement and replace it with partial separatist solutions can only complicate the situation in the Middle East and delay the achievement of a genuine settlement.¹⁰⁹

Further, according to Pavel Demchenko, the most important reason, from the Soviet perspective, is that "separate peace with Egypt would make it easier for Israel to remain in territories occupied in 1967 and would make the position of the Palestinian people even more difficult."¹¹⁰

The most important Soviet peace effort in the 1970s was the joint effort with the US to reconvene the Geneva conference. A successful conference would have re-established Moscow's place as a peacemaker in the Middle East. For reasons articulated below, the conference did not convene and President Sadat began his individual effort--through what became known as the Camp David process--to

establish relations with Israel and ultimately regain the Sinai.

The last part of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s saw the Soviets reassert their influence in the Middle East through methods other than calls for a comprehensive conference. This method, commonly known as "treaties of friendship and cooperation," covered a full spectrum of support including economic, military, and political sponsorship.¹¹¹ To enhance the treaties of friendship and cooperation, Moscow developed a strategy of organizing "anti-imperialist" blocs to exert pressure on Israel and the Arab states under negotiation with Israel.¹¹² Moscow's visible engagement has been military in nature specifically, rebuilding Syria's military after engagements with Israel.¹¹³ Even though most Arab regimes are politically non-reliable, the Soviets will continue to support Arab states in their march toward expelling Western influence.

CHAPTER 4

Peace Initiatives and Soviet Responses

After the Six Day War, the attempts mentioned above to organize a Middle East peace process began to take shape. In 1967, a vague Soviet-American-British formula espousing Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory in return for "secure and recognized boundaries" gained UN sponsorship as Resolution 242.¹¹⁴ A second effort was the five-point plan presented by President Nasser. Resolution 242 was rejected by both the Arabs and Israel, while the five-point plan was rejected by Israel. Serious peace negotiations did not resume until 1976 after the Yom Kippur War and the Lebanese Civil War. During this relative hiatus, however, two schools of thought, which Robert O. Freeman termed "Model-1" and "Model-2" prevailed.¹¹⁵

Model-1 called for a return to the armistice situation which prevailed between 1948 and 1967. Model-1 foreswore economic, diplomatic, and cultural exchanges

between the Arabs and Israelis. The difference between Model-1 and the former armistice is the establishment of demilitarized zones in border areas and a pledge by the Arabs and the Israelis not to make war on one another. Model-1 further called for the establishment of a separate Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza. Support for this plan came mainly from the USSR, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. Jordanian acquiescence was with reservation for Amman, the plan would have to include support for an independent Palestinian entity. The main points of contention on all sides was whether a future Palestinian state would be independent or be linked to Jordan and whether it would have to foreswear the destruction of Israel.¹¹⁶

Model-2 again called for the withdrawal of Israel from all of the occupied territories. The difference between this plan and the other is that demilitarized zones would not be established and cultural, economic, and diplomatic ties between the Arabs and Israel would be established. The proponents of Model-2 were found in Israel and the United States. However, the Likud Bloc did not support withdrawal from the occupied territories. As far as the Palestinian question was concerned, most Israelis supported a Jordanian link.¹¹⁷ One influential American supporter of this approach was President Jimmy Carter.

The main difference between the two models was the prevailing political climate. The Soviet-supported Model-1 was aimed at maintaining armed camps, high animosity between parties, and a demilitarized zone because such a situation would require constant superpower influence and thus help to maintain Soviet involvement and its military-client relationship. The American supported Model-2 plan was an attempt at a genuine peace characterized by open borders and peaceful Arab-Israeli interaction. In such a situation, superpower military involvement should not be necessary, and superpower involvement in Arab-Israeli affairs could be reduced.¹¹⁹

In every forum the Soviets have attempted to convene for peace talks on the Middle East, they have insisted on two basic tenets toward that peace. First, it must be a comprehensive peace. There must be complete solidarity between all Arab nations. A separate peace would dampen the pressure on Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in the 1967 war.¹²⁰ Included within the Arab solidarity would be an independently represented Palestinian delegation.¹²¹ Second is US-USSR cochairmanship of a conference like the 1973 Geneva conference. In theory, cochairmanship would bring all the Arab states (from each superpower camp) to the table to produce the comprehensive settlement called for by the first tenet. Even while the Soviets spent the mid-1970s on the Middle Eastern side-

lines, they continued to call for a return to Geneva as the only possible solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow continued to call for a return to Geneva because that would return it to the center of the peace process. In doing so, Moscow would demonstrate that peace cannot come to the Middle East without Soviet participation.

The most significant attempt to create a comprehensive peace in the Middle East came on October 1, 1977, when the Soviets and the United States published a joint statement concerning cochairmanship and resumption of a Geneva-type conference. The statement, which had been negotiated by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, reflected interest in establishing international security, strengthening peace, and developing a comprehensive framework for achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem.¹²² In developing a joint peace conference proposal, both sides, with divergent original positions on peace solutions, made concessions in their demands. Although Soviet concessions soon proved to be worth no more than the paper they were printed on,¹²³ they did prove willing to concede some of their positions for the sake of favorable international publicity like that received by the US. Soviet concessions included: (1) no specific mention of a need to establish a Palestinian state--the Soviets have always espoused an independent Palestinian state; (2) no mention

of the involvement of the PLO--"all Palestinians are naturally members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization";¹²⁴ and (3) establishment of peaceful relations between Arabs and Israelis: Moscow normally espouses secure, demilitarized borders with no cultural, economic, or diplomatic relations.¹²⁵ US concessions included: (1) recognition of the legitimate rights of Palestinians (express recognition of Palestinian involvement in the peace process); (2) ending the step-by-step strategy of peace negotiation (puts the onus on a comprehensive settlement process); and (3) no mention of Resolutions 242 or 338 (even though the Soviets were involved in their establishment, the Arab states had never recognized them as suitable proposals for a peace process).¹²⁶

Within two days of the joint statement, Radio Moscow began reneging on the Soviet concessions. In New Times, a feature article by Oleg Alov repudiated most of the concessions and called for a return to the basic Soviet tenets for peace. In that same article, however, Alov inconsistently pledged Soviet debate on these issues at the Geneva conference while asserting that the joint US-Soviet statement of October 1st "remained in force"¹²⁷ --to again damage Soviet credibility as an honest arbitrator. Close analysis of Moscow's posturing reveals a definite aversion to dropping its status as the champion of Palestinian rights. The Soviet Union's stand on this

issue is clear and immutable: there can be no Middle East settlement without the PLO's participation.¹²⁸

To counter Moscow's backsliding, the US and Israel developed a working paper which established six points for negotiation. The main points of this working paper, which were attacked by the Soviets, were: (1) working groups which, when broken down, did not include a Palestinian group; and (2) the agreed bases for settlement are UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Not directly criticizing the Americans, the Soviets blamed the Israelis for going over the head of the US Administration and appealing to the "instincts of the anti-Soviet lobby."¹²⁹

Another point from the joint statement was a specific convening date of December 7, 1977. Because of position restatement, recrimination, and clashes between the PLO and Israel, the conference was not convened. Instead, the step-by-step process of individual peace negotiation between Israel and Egypt with American mediation was in full swing.

On November 9, 1977, President Sadat announced his historic decision to visit Jerusalem. Many observers believed Sadat's decision was designed at least to postpone, if not to eliminate, the Geneva Conference by establishing a two-way Israeli-Egyptian dialogue.¹³⁰ As it became more obvious that Sadat was going to initiate unilateral peace talks with Israel, Soviet propaganda

attacks against Sadat increased in intensity and accused the Egyptians of defaming the USSR.¹³¹ Moscow appears to have concluded that the Carter Administration genuinely desired peace in the Middle East and that it was determined to resolve the conflict. Consequently, if American diplomatic efforts were successful while the Soviet Union was out of the negotiating process, Moscow's relatively weak position was likely to be undermined even further.

Essentially, Sadat's decision to go to Jerusalem had presented the Soviet leadership with both a danger and an opportunity. On the one hand, if Sadat and Begin successfully negotiated a peace settlement, they would have been isolated with only Libya, Iraq, and the rejectionist PLO calling for a comprehensive peace. On the other hand, if an Israeli-Egyptian agreement failed to spread beyond the bilateral agreement, the two consignatories would have been isolated while pushing the rejectionist Arab states to look to Moscow again to develop an alternative for peace.¹³² As it turned out, the bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt did not spread to the other Arab states and, with strong Soviet endorsement, the Tripoli Conference condemned Sadat.¹³³ From November 2 through 5, 1978, the Arab nations again censored Egypt for its participation in the Camp David peace process. The Baghdad Summit, also in 1978, vowed to impose economic and political sanctions on Egypt. The day before, the Soviet

Union and PLO, in a joint communique, assailed Egypt for disrupting Arab solidarity through its separate peace agreement with Israel.¹³⁴

Within a fortnight in early September, 1982, three major peace plans were proposed by three of the four major parties in the Middle East. The first initiative, submitted on September 1, was known as the Reagan Plan. The Reagan initiative's timely publication came on the eve of the Arab League Conference in Fez. It was a clear effort to gain moderate Arab support as it called for an end to Israeli settlement on the West Bank and refused to accept Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. The Soviets, while denouncing the Reagan Plan, also castigated Israel for rejecting the plan so rapidly; Begin had rejected the plan the day after it was published, primarily because of the US call for a halt to the Likud's de facto annexation of the West Bank. The Soviets were concerned that there were several points which would be attractive to the Arabs. Izvestia correspondent Vladimir Kudruvtzev noted that "judging from press reports 'moderate' and 'pro-western' Arab regimes find positive elements in the American initiative."¹³⁵ The main support for the Reagan initiative came from the PLO. Two reasons for PLO support are evident: first, the PLO and Syria were at odds and Syria would shortly begin an extermination campaign against the PLO and secondly, the PLO could see

the Soviets lining up behind Syria at its own expense. A Syrian-backed hardliner who opposes American influence in the region and is ready to interdict any new American peace moves¹³⁶ is Moscow's ideal perception of a PLO leader. The death knell for the Reagan initiative was sounded in 1983, not by Soviet political maneuvering, but by the challenge to Arafat's leadership of the PLO posed by Syria and George Habash (PFLP) and by the US collapse in Lebanon which diminished US prestige in the region.

What caused Moscow to support Yassir Arafat's expulsion from the radical Arab camp was Arafat's attempt to secure a separate peace through rapprochement with Jordan's King Hussein. When the Palestine National Council finally convened in mid-February 1983, it formally refused consideration of the Reagan Plan partly because Arafat's acceptance of American sponsorship. Pravda correspondent Yuri Vladimirov praised the council's decision for "reaffirming the organization's commitment to continue the struggle against imperialism and Zionism."¹³⁷

There is a remarkable coincidence between the Fez Resolution and the Brezhnev Plan. In fact, the Brezhnev Plan was released two days after the Fez Resolution, and it contained some slight changes (enhancements) to previous Soviet resolutions to parallel the Arab pronouncement closely. The three main additions to the Brezhnev proposal concerned the "right of the Arab people

of Palestine to self-determination and an independent state." The Fez Resolution, utilizing the same basic principle, added "indemnification of all Arabs wishing not to return to Palestine." The Brezhnev declaration added "the right of all Palestinians to return to or receive compensation for property left behind." The second precept paralleling the Fez plan was the demand that East Jerusalem be "returned to the Arabs and guaranteed free access to all." This precept was not one of the original Soviet proposals. Finally, the Brezhnev plan included UN monitoring of border security, introducing an entity to maintain the security and guarantee the inviolability of all borders. The similarity between the Brezhnev and Fez proposals can clearly be construed as a political maneuver by the Soviets to provide a proposal the Arabs could not turn down, thus enhancing Moscow's prestige.¹³⁸

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions

Moscow's Middle East peace proposals have been consistent for the past 18 years. The basic Soviet proposals have emphasized: (1) Israel's right to exist and the right of all states to exist in peace; (2) the right of the Palestinians to form a free and independent state on the West Bank and the Gaza strip; (3) Israeli withdrawal from all territory occupied during the Six Day War. All Soviet proposals have been centered around the above tenets.

Almost as consistently as the substance of their proposals, the Soviets have maintained the structure and venue. The overriding goal of Soviet Middle East policy is the interdiction of Western (primarily US) influence. During the majority of the post Yom Kippur War years, Moscow was on the political sideline, relegated to a policy of reaction to American initiatives. A further difficulty the Soviets have encountered centers around the independent nature of the radical Arab states. Since the

Arab states have been characterized by internecine fighting and wars with Israel, Moscow has been able to maintain influence through military support. Internal disputes aside, the radical Arab bloc, with the help of Soviet military hardware and diplomatic initiative, has consistently demonstrated the ability to disrupt Western sponsored peace initiatives. Thus, the main format for Soviet involvement remains military and technical support.

From the Soviet perspective, the most important opportunity for enhancing its prestige (while reducing US status) would be the convention of the Geneva conference with Moscow and Washington acting as cochairmen. The Soviet Union would immediately elevate its prestige from a supporter of the radical Arab bloc to a coarbitor equal in status to that of the United States. Given this new forum, Moscow would be able to press for a peace settlement in the Middle East more suitable to its own policy (Model 1). Since the basis of Soviet relations with the Arab states is military in nature, the development of a lasting (Model 2) peace would reduce or eliminate the need for Soviet involvement. Hence, Moscow would use its new-found status to pursue the former. In addition, Moscow's status would be further elevated if it was able to bring the radical Arab bloc to the table to begin negotiations.

Soviet participation in a comprehensive summit, while elevating its stature as a peacemaker, would give rise to the following paradox: although the Soviets have presented their precepts for the development of peace in the Middle East, it would be against their best interests to engineer a truly lasting peace. Since the ultimate goal of the Soviets is the elimination of Western influence in the Middle East, negotiation of peace would lessen the need for Soviet arms supplies while the United States would continue its fraternal relationship with Israel and its economic relations with the moderate Arab states, thereby maintaining US influence while diluting their own. Thus, a reversal of the ultimate goal would occur.

Finally, as George Breslauer has put forth, the Middle East conflict is a subset of total Soviet foreign objectives.¹³⁹ Protection from nuclear extermination and stabilization of its borders are far and away the most important goals in Moscow's foreign policy. The Middle East peace process is one part of a category which Breslauer terms global power and which he ranks third in importance which within that category, is the first priority.¹⁴⁰ Clearly, as the Soviets have demonstrated in every Arab-Israeli war fought since Moscow began participating in the process, the Middle East has not been so important as to cause a global conflict which would endanger Soviet existence.

NOTES

1. A. Ustyugov, "The Egyptian-Israeli Deal: A Dangerous Step," in International Affairs-Moscow, 7 (1979) p. 53.
2. Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 5.
3. Fahim I. Qubain, Crises in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 45.
4. Bruce D. Porter, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
5. Ibid., p. 16.
6. Ibid., p. 16.
7. A. Ustyugov, op. cit., p. 53.
8. George W. Breslauer, "The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Arab Israeli Conflict: Lessons of the Brezhnev Era," in Soviet International Behavior and US Policy Options, ed. Dan Caldwell (Lexington: Lexington Brooks, 1985), p. 132.
9. Ibid., p. 132.
10. In the Soviet concept the term parity does not exist. The Soviets must build a military structure which supports Soviet goals--entering and winning a global nuclear conflict. So by definition, parity does not enter into Soviet military strategy.
11. George W. Breslauer, op. cit., p. 132.
12. Ibid., p. 133.
13. Ibid., p. 133.
14. Ibid., p. 134.
15. Robert O. Freedman, "Moscow and a Middle East Peace Settlement," an unpublished paper, 1985, p. 1.
16. Ibid., p. 3.
17. Ibid., p. 3.

18. Times [Washington], 29 July 1985, p. 1D, col.1. The actual bargaining chips publicized were from the Soviets a promise to allow Jewish emigration to Israel and pressure Syria to ensure border security in the Golan Heights and dampen general Syrian belligerence. The Israelis in return were to withdraw from the Golan Heights. Further, both countries were to re-establish diplomatic relations which the Soviets severed during the 1967 war.
19. Ibid., p. 1D, col. 1.
20. Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970. (New York: Preager Publishers, 1978), p. 334.
21. Times [Washington] op. cit., p. 1D, col. 1.
22. Ibid., p. 1D, col. 1.
23. Post [Washington], 6 August 1985, p. A9, col. 1.
24. Journal [Wall Street], 6 August 1985, p. 22, col. 3.
25. Post [Washington], 3 August 1985, p. A24, col. 1.
26. Ibid., p. A24, col. 1.
27. George W. Breslauer, op. cit., p. 145.
28. Post [Washington], 6 August 1985, p.A9, col. 1.
29. Ibid., p. A9, col. 1.
30. Ibid., p. A9, col. 1.
31. A. Ustyugov, op. cit., p. 58.
32. Charles B. McLane, Soviet-Middle East Relations (London: Central Asian Research Center, 1973), p. 8.
33. A. Ustyugov, op. cit., p. 55.
34. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., p.8.
35. Ibid., p. 8.

36. Harry N. Howard, "The Soviet Union In Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan." in The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post World War II Era, ed. Ivo Lederer and Wayne Vucinich (Palo Alto: Hoover Institution Publications, 1974), p. 135.
37. Congressional Quarterly. "Middle East Chronology 1948-1982." (Fourth Edition), (Washington, D.C.: The Congressional Quarterly, 1982), pp. 204-5.
38. Charles B. McLane. op. cit., p. 8.
39. Ibid., p. 8.
40. Ibid., p. 8.
41. B. Ponamaryev, A. Gromyko, and V. Khvostov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 300.
42. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., p. 8.
43. Ibid., p. 9.
44. Fahim I. Qubain, op. cit., p. 129.
45. Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 204.
46. Fahim I. Qubain, op. cit., p. 129.
47. Ibid., p. 131.
48. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., p. 9.
49. Congressional Quarterly, op. cit. p. 206.
50. Charles B. McLane, op. cit. p. 8.
51. Harry N. Howard, op. cit., p. 138.
52. B. Ponamaryev, et. al., op. cit., p. 320.
53. Ibid., p. 320. This excerpt taken from Pravda, 13, February 1957.
54. Ibid., p. 320.
55. Augustus R. Norton, Moscow and the Palestinians: A New Tool of Soviet Policy in the Middle East (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), p. 15.

56. Ibid., p. 5.
57. Moshe Ma'oz, Soviet and Chinese Relations With the Palestinian Guerilla Organizations (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1974), p. 15.
58. Ibid., p. 15.
59. Ibid., p. 15.
60. Augustus R. Norton, op. cit., p. 7.
61. Ibid., p. 7.
62. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
63. Moshe Ma'oz, op. cit., p. 16.
64. Ibid., p. 20.
65. Ibid., p. 20.
66. Ibid., p. 21.
67. Augustus R. Norton, op. cit., p. 15.
68. Ibid., p. 15.
69. Ibid., p. 15.
70. A. Ustyugov, "A Way to a Just Peace in the Middle East," in International Affairs-Moscow 10 (1984), p. 72.
71. A. Ustyugov, "The Egyptian-Israeli Deal: A Dangerous Step," in International Affairs-Moscow 7 (1979), p. 56.
72. A. Ustyugov, "A Way to a Just Peace in the Middle East," in International Affairs-Moscow 10 (1984), p. 56.
73. Augustus R. Norton, op. cit., p. 19.
74. Post [Washington], 8 August 1985, p. A35, col. 1.
75. Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 211.

76. Ilana Kass, Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Policy Formulation, 1966-1973 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 25.
77. Ibid., p. 26.
78. Ibid., p. 26.
79. Ibid., p. 27.
80. Ibid., p. 27.
81. Congressional Quarterly, op. cit. p. 212.
82. Ibid., p. 212.
83. Robert O. Freeman, op. cit., p. 279.
84. Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 212.
85. Robert O. Freeman, op. cit., p. 30.
86. Ibid., p. 30.
87. The high price was Soviet control of most of the Egyptian army and the airfields Soviet aircraft would be utilizing.
88. Robert O. Freeman, op. cit., p. 31.
89. Ibid., p. 31.
90. Bruce D. Porter, op. cit., p. 25.
91. It was an American sponsored cease fire that the Soviets persuaded Nasser to agree to during consultations in Moscow.
92. Bruce D. Porter, op. cit., p. 25.
93. Ibid., p. 25.
94. Robert O. Freeman, op. cit., p. 27.
95. Ibid., p. 39.
96. Bruce D. Porter, op. cit., p. 27.
97. Robert O. Freedman, "Moscow and the Middle East Peace Settlement," an unpublished paper, 1985, p. 16.

98. Bruce D. Porter, op. cit., p. 113.
99. Ibid., pp. 113-14.
100. Ibid., p. 115. Although lost on the battlefield, Sadat achieved his goal by initiating a peace process in the Middle East in which he ultimately regained lost territory through negotiation.
101. Ibid., p. 116.
102. Robert O. Freeman, op. cit., p. 149. The Yom Kippur War not only involved Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, but also Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, and Morocco. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had also joined in by implementing an oil embargo against the West which would have been strongly endorsed by Moscow.
103. Ibid., p. 148.
104. Ibid., p. 149.
105. Ibid., p. 150.
106. "Try Your Luck in the Snakepit, Mr. Chernenko," The Economist, 25 February 1984, p. 31.
107. Robert O. Freedman, op. cit., p. 207.
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