

AD-A165 951

DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Unclassified

2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS

3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT

Cleared for public distribution,
7 March 1986

5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

Defense Intelligence College

6b. OFFICE SYMBOL
(If applicable)

DIC-2

7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION

7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

Washington, D.C. 20301-6111

8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

8b. OFFICE SYMBOL
(If applicable)

9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS

PROGRAM
ELEMENT NO.

PROJECT
NO.

TASK
NO.

WORK UNIT
ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)

The Red Army Faction: Four Generations of Terror

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Captain Charles N. Bay, USA

13a. TYPE OF REPORT

Special Seminar Paper

13b. TIME COVERED

FROM TO

14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)

860204

15. PAGE COUNT

43

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES

FIELD

GROUP

SUB-GROUP

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

West Germany, Red Army Faction, Terrorism

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

The year 1985 began with the reemergence of one of the most notorious and violent terrorist organizations in Europe, the Red Army Faction (RAF) of West Germany. The RAF, whose demise has been pronounced on numerous occasions by West German authorities, has been the primary terrorist threat within that country since the late 1960's. From its inception to date, the RAF has gone through a series of generational changes that have produced its present day offspring which, although smaller and less experienced than its predecessors, is no less fervent and far more violent.

DTIC FILE COPY

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT

☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS

21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Unclassified

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL

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22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)

202-373-3309

22c. OFFICE SYMBOL

DIC-2

APPROVAL SHEET

TITLE OF SEMINAR: SEMINAR ON TERRORISM (SC702)

TITLE OF PAPER: THE RED ARMY FACTION: FOUR GENERATIONS OF
TERROR

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"The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not reflect the official policy or posi-
tion of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Govern-
ment."

Date: 4 Feb 1986

CLEARED
FOR OPEN PUBLICATION

MAR 07 1986 21

DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND SECURITY REVIEW AND CLEARANCE
BY: [illegible]

866

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THE RED ARMY FACTION: FOUR GENERATIONS OF TERROR

by

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Special Seminar Paper submitted to the Faculty of the
Defense Intelligence College in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Science of Strategic Intelligence
January 1986

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The year 1985 began with the reemergence of one of the most notorious and violent terrorist organizations in Europe, the Red Army Faction (RAF) of West Germany. The RAF, whose demise has been pronounced on numerous occasions by West German authorities, has been the primary terrorist threat within that country since the late 1960's. From its inception to date, the RAF has gone through a series of generational changes that have produced its present day offspring which, although smaller and less experienced than its predecessors, is no less fervent and far more violent.

The RAF is an outgrowth of the student unrest in West Germany during the 1960's, which reached its apex during the 1968 student revolts. The group's primary objective has been to bring about the collapse of West Germany's democratic government. The group survived despite the arrest and subsequent death of its founders in the early 1970's. The pinnacle of the RAF's activities was achieved in 1977, but this peak in activity ended with the arrest of several members in the latter part of that year. The RAF again came to life in the early 1980's but this new surge of activity was short-lived, again due to the arrest of its primary leadership. The latest generation of the group, which has only recently become active, has proven itself to be just as dangerous a threat to West German stability as its forefathers.

The year 1985 also ushered in a new chapter in European terrorism. Until this year, cooperation between terrorist groups in Europe had been limited, but now direct links have



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been forged. The RAF has now joined forces with two other major terrorist organizations, France's Direct Action (AD) and Belgium's Fighting Communist Cells (CCC). The stated goal of this alliance is the elimination of NATO and, more specifically, the removal of U.S. forces from Europe. In addition, these groups have links with terrorist groups in Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the Middle East. Fueled by the deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles, these groups have been able to gain support from the European peace movement.

Previous generations of the RAF were unable to attract any real support from the West German people. This was due primarily to the fact that their early objectives were neither understandable nor necessarily desired by the German people. Now, however, by focusing its attention on the United States and its nuclear arsenal in Europe, it appears that the present generation of the RAF may have an opportunity to enjoy far more success than any of its preceding generations.

At this time the RAF is a much smaller and less organized group than any of its predecessors. Many European authorities believe this is the reason behind their latest attempt at cooperation with other European terrorist groups.(1) This new terrorist alliance poses a formidable threat to the stability of NATO. It remains to be seen, however, if this latest generation of the RAF can avoid the mistakes of its forefathers and achieve its objectives of bringing about the fall of the West German government and an end to the U.S. presence in Europe.

II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND

West Germany, as were many western countries, was subjected to student revolts and radical movements during the 1960's. This anti-establishment activity eventually gave birth to terrorist organizations throughout Europe. The oldest and most dangerous of these groups within West Germany, the RAF, has been active since 1968.(2)

After many years of Christian Democratic control, the West German government was headed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) during the late 1960's. The SPD made a concerted effort to appeal to elements of the anti-establishment movement which proved to be quite successful. The SPD was able to attract over 100,000 young voters to its cause. Because of this, the so-called 'New Left' all but disappeared within West Germany.(3) But SPD efforts to achieve reforms within the country were soon halted due to economic limitations. Additionally, the result of the government's attempts to achieve better East-West relations, as had been promised, were less successful than anticipated. By 1974, when Helmut-Schmidt succeeded Willie Brandt as Chancellor, the optimism of the early 1970's had been lost.

It was during this period that three important movements within West Germany were born. These were the broad-based ecological movement, the women's movement and the peace movement.(4) Elements of these three movements were able to coalesce into a new political party known as the Greens. Initially, this party was heavily dominated by communists, but since entering the Bonn Parliament in 1982, non-communist ele-

ments of the party have increased significantly.(5) Concurrently, the Greens have shifted their emphasis from ecological and anti-nuclear issues to arms control.(6) Nevertheless, the Greens still remain a Parliamentary minority party.

The third significant party within West Germany is the conservative Free Democratic Party (FDP), whose platform is essentially the opposite of that of the Greens. Like the Greens, the FDP is also a minority element within the Parliament. Because of their similar stature within the government, the FDP and the Greens compete with one another for political power.(7)

During the 1960's, the Extra Political Opposition (APO), was formed by elements of the 'New Left'. This party was formed because its members felt none of the political parties in the Parliament or the country represented their needs. This party was made up of students who generally came from middle and upper class families. For this reason they were unable to involve all levels of German society in their efforts. The APO was politically ineffective and disbanded when the Brandt coalition came into power in 1969. The majority of the members of this party joined the Brandt coalition, while the more radical members looked for another outlet to advance their cause. They found it in the use of violence as a political instrument. These more radical members of the defunct APO were the founders of the left-wing terrorist organizations in West Germany.

Contrary to the APO, the Greens have been able to get all levels of society involved with their party.(8) The

Greens are also considered the representative arm within the government for the ecological, women's and peace movements of West Germany. The Greens have succeeded in this area where the APO failed because of their ability to bring people of all ages, professions and backgrounds either into their party or enlist them as supporters.(9)

The students of the 1960's are now members of the German middle class of the 1980's. They still have many of the same social concerns they had during the revolts, but now their concern focuses on political solutions to everyday problems. This willingness to work within the political system makes political compromise between the SPD and the Greens possible.(10) One effect has been the development of a sense of a new beginning within the country, similar to that which accompanied the SPD's efforts in the late 1960's and early 1970's. As long as these hopes for a better future remain and are not being completely frustrated politically, it will be harder for terrorist groups like the RAF to gain popular support for its armed struggle against the present government.(11)

Perhaps in the arms control movement of the 1980's, the RAF has found an emotional subject on which to build its call for change. Not since the anti-Vietnam movement of the 1960's have the radical left elements in Europe had such a rallying cry. It remains to be seen whether the West German government can find political answers to the arms control issues that the German people will accept. A failure by the government to do so could allow these elements of the left to rally the German populace to their cause.

III. THE FIRST GENERATION (1968-1972)

The RAF was formed in 1968, not because of the shortcomings of German society, but because of her political stability and economic success.(12) The German system of government guarantees a centrist coalitional government based on what the majority of the voters want.(13) Constitutionally based, this system was established to prevent someone with radical political views from obtaining control of the government. Thus, people with extreme political ideologies have virtually no influence within the government. Because of this, they must seek alternative means to express themselves.

This search for recognition led to the formation of terrorist organizations within the FRG, the most famous being the RAF. The RAF was originally known as the Baader-Meinhof gang, named after two of its most infamous founders, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. First given this name by the West German press, the RAF has its roots in the student anti-establishment movement of the 1960's. In 1968, this movement came to a head when a student revolt, that started in Berlin, spread throughout the country. The catalyst for this revolt was student outrage over U.S. participation in the Vietnam war.(14)

On April 2, 1968, Baader and Gundurn Ensslin took part in an arson attack on a Frankfurt department store. This attack and the subsequent arrest of Baader and Ensslin brought together the original leadership of the RAF. Horst Mahler, Baader's defense attorney became the third key member. The fourth was Meinhof, a columnist for the left-wing journal

Konkret, who had written an article defending the arson attack.

Baader and Ensslin were sentenced to three years imprisonment. Baader, however, escaped while out on bail, but he was rearrested in 1970. Three weeks later he escaped with the assistance of Mahler and Meinhof. In the escape attempt a bystander was wounded.(15) Forced to go underground to survive, the Baader-Meinhof gang began building its base of support. Their activities centered on recruitment and development of an infrastructure.(16) During this period, the gang supported itself through bank robberies which netted them DM 1.7 million. Also during this period, Baader, Mahler, Meinhof and Ensslin went to the Middle East for terrorist training. This fulfilled one of Meinhof's goals of learning "...from the revolutionary movements of the world."(17) The gang emerged in early 1971, prepared to launch its 'revolutionary struggle'.(18)

The RAF's early targets included U.S. property, Israeli airlines, German government buildings and U.S. targets in Germany.(19) Their hostility was towards U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Israeli reluctance to solve the Palestinian problem and Germany's democratic government.(20) The violence eventually escalated to a level involving the loss of human lives, something that, at least initially, the gang had tried to avoid. The gang had a number of supporters throughout Europe. These sympathizers were willing to provide a wide range of logistical necessities to include transportation, medical aid, communications equipment and safe housing.

In 1972, the RAF mounted a series of 15 coordinated bomb attacks which killed one U.S. officer and seriously injured 38 other people.(21) This was accomplished despite the fact that a dozen key members had been arrested earlier. For the first time, the RAF also singled out a specific individual for attack. Mahler's justification for the attack on a judge was that the revolutionary forces held government officials responsible for actions "hostile to the people." (22)

Prior to this attack most of the gang's activities had been for logistical and propaganda purposes. The RAF, as the gang began calling itself because of its revolutionary sounding value as well as to signify support for the ill-fated Japanese Red Army, had begun its revolution. In the days that followed, several more bombs were detonated throughout Germany, killing three American soldiers and injuring dozens more, soldiers and civilians alike.

During this period the police began to take the RAF far more seriously, primarily due to the attacks on two police headquarters. The public at the same time was becoming quite nervous about RAF activities, exactly the effect that the RAF was seeking. The RAF planned to continue its offensive on June 2nd of that year, but was unable to do so because Baader was captured by German authorities the previous day.

June 2nd had been chosen as the date to launch the offensive because of its significance to the left-wing elements in Germany. It was the anniversary of the death of Benno Ohnesorg, a student killed by a police bullet during a

student demonstration in 1967. However, June 1st proved to be of even greater significance to the RAF because it marked the beginning of the end of the group's first generation. Within the next two weeks, both Ensslin and Meinhof joined Baader behind bars.

The arrests of the RAF's guiding elite seriously weakened the organization which quickly went into hibernation to rebuild. The arrests occurred within one month after the police and security forces had launched an all-out effort to stop the RAF. The government's success demonstrated to the German public that the government was capable of dealing with this threat to their society. The first generation of the RAF failed in its effort to discredit the German government and ultimately its activities brought about increased support for the democratic institutions that they wished to overthrow.

IV. THE SECOND GENERATION (1973-1976)

The second generation of the RAF started off with more of a whimper than with the bang of its predecessor. In February 1973, Mahler was arrested and convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 12 years in prison. By this time all but one of the original RAF members were behind bars. The German authorities proudly announced the defeat of the RAF.

These arrests, however, did not put an end to the RAF's agitation of the German state. Their lawyers used every conceivable loophole to aid their clients and to embarrass the government. The lawyers smuggled letters, plans and even

weapons into and out of jail.(23) The actions of the lawyers caused the German government to tighten its laws concerning lawyer-client relationships. These measures drew criticism from many sides and had little real effect on the activities of the RAF's leadership in prison. It should also be noted that, despite the criticism the government received because of its actions, the majority of the German people supported their efforts.

In September of 1974, the RAF tried a new tactic to obtain publicity for its cause: hunger strikes by the some of the leadership in prison. On November 9th of that same year, Holger Meins, one of the original members of the RAF, died in prison of starvation as a result of his participation in the hunger strikes. Two days later, the second generation of the RAF conducted their first operation. The group went to the home of the President of the Supreme Court, Gunter von Drenkmann, bearing a gift of flowers for his birthday. When he answered the door, they shot him to death. This attack typified the new era in RAF operations, the selection of public figures for cold blooded murder.

In February of 1975, the RAF pulled a stunning coup in Berlin. They kidnapped a mayoral candidate, Peter Lorenz, and successfully bargained his life for the freedom of five of their incarcerated members. This established a precedent that was to have grave consequences for the German government. As was to be expected, it led to other kidnappings of prominent German citizens. In April of that year, six RAF terrorists seized the German embassy in Stockholm, Sweden,

taking a dozen hostages including the German Ambassador.(24) The kidnapping of Lorenz had created a very tense situation within the German government, and Chancellor Schmidt was determined not to be humiliated again.(25) Schmidt stood firm behind the Swedish government's refusal to give in to the kidnapper's demands. The situation escalated when two of the hostages were murdered, but both the Swedish and German governments stood their ground. A rescue attempt was undertaken and when the Swedish commandos stormed the embassy, the terrorists attempted to kill the remaining hostages. In their haste a bomb was detonated, killing two of the terrorists and injuring all of the hostages. The remaining four terrorists were returned to Germany to stand trial. The refusal of the German government to negotiate with the RAF broke the precedent that had been established in the Lorenz kidnapping.

In December 1975, two members of the RAF were involved in the kidnapping of OPEC ministers in Vienna that was orchestrated by the famed international terrorist, Carlos. In 1976, two more members led the highjacking of a French aircraft which was taken to Entebbe. They died, along with their Palestinian comrades, in the successful Israeli rescue attempt. Siegfried Haag, the new leader of the RAF, was arrested in November 1976. Haag, a lawyer turned terrorist who at one time was Baader's attorney, had gone underground to lead the RAF in its newest activities. He had been successful in recruiting some 30 new members and was responsible for the planning of the Stockholm kidnapping attempt. His ar-

rest, along with the capture or death of RAF members at Entebbe and Stockholm, brought an end to the second generation of the RAF. This generation failed for many of the same reasons as its predecessor. It was unable to establish a broad base of support among the German people and it alienated many of its supporters because of the group's use of brutal violence.

V. THE THIRD GENERATION (1977-1983)

By 1977, most of the original members of the first two generations of the RAF were either dead or in prison. A new generation replaced the founders and "a rash of brutality swept the countryside." (26) The earlier generations were viewed as martyrs by this newer generation, who used this view as a motivation for their actions.

The third generation of the RAF was far more violent than either of its predecessors, but again this did not work to their advantage because it alienated many of the remaining supporters of the group. This led to the defection of many of the group's members and supporters to less radical movements. This generation also used a wider range of tactics and had a better logistical system than the first two generations. Despite a fairly widespread base of support initially, especially abroad, the group's success only lasted about one year. Again, this was due to a series of arrests and defections that occurred in 1977 and 1978 which depleted the group's membership.

On 7 April 1977, the Chief Federal Prosecutor, Siegfried

Buback, was murdered by two motorcyclists. This was the first in a series of violent attacks that marked a year of unmatched RAF activity. In July of that year, the well-guarded house of the Chairman of the Dresdner bank, Jurgen Ponto, was the scene of another cold blooded murder. Suzanne Albrecht, a friend of the Ponto family as well as Ponto's god-daughter and a member of the RAF, came to his door bearing flowers. When he answered the door, there was a struggle and Ponto was killed. In all likelihood this attack was a failed kidnapping attempt.(27)

Later that year in September, Hans Martin Schleyer, head of the West German Industries Federation, was kidnapped. During the kidnapping attempt, the RAF killed Schleyer's driver and his three member police escort. Pictures of the bodies and grieving families were shown on television, further alienating the RAF from the German people. In return for the release of Schleyer, the RAF demanded that several of their comrades in prison be set free, including Baader and Ensslin. The government refused to give in to their demands and subsequently Schleyer was murdered. Baader and Ensslin, distraught over the failure to gain their release, committed suicide as Meinhof had done a year earlier.

The cold blooded killings in 1977 alienated most RAF supporters and, by the end of that same year, the group was forced to turn inward to survive. It appeared that the RAF had become more interested in obtaining publicity than in its original cause. The student support that they had once enjoyed moved towards new organizations dedicated to the destruc-

tion of capitalism but without killing if possible. This approach was similar to that of the original RAF. In addition to the lack of external support, the group was again rocked by the arrest of several of its members which brought an immediate decrease in RAF operations.

Despite its weakened status in the late 1970's, the RAF had a great deal of money due to several successful kidnapping operations. In June of 1980, the RAF merged with the "Movement of the 2nd of June" (2JM). The combined group retained the structure and name of the RAF. In June of 1980, an attempt was made on the life of a Federal Prosecutor, Kurt Rebmann. The attempt failed, but it demonstrated to the West German authorities that the RAF was still a threat to the Republic.

In 1981, the forerunner of the group's present day approach was unveiled. The RAF began attacks upon the U.S. military presence in West Germany. This included an attempt on the life of General Kroesen, U.S. Army Commander in Europe, in September of that year. By 1982, it appears that the RAF was running short of funds and had to resort to bank robbery, which is considered a high risk operation.(28) The group did have some limited success, but was again stymied by the arrest of three of its leaders during 1982 and 1983. In November of 1982, a successful bank robbery in the city of Bochum netted the gang \$50,000. This was the last known act of the third generation of the RAF. This generation, like its predecessors, failed because of their inability to present a coherent ideology and avoid the use of brutal violence.

VI. THE FOURTH GENERATION (1984-PRESENT)

By 1984, the RAF had been reduced to about twenty hard-core members. The group suffered from a lack of experienced leadership and true ideological direction. In addition, their outside support was at its lowest point since the group's inception. The inability to put forth a coherent ideology which appealed to the German people had led to the demise of the three previous generations. Further, the call to the "anti-imperialist struggle" had seemingly lost its appeal.(29) The majority of the German people either believed that the government was meeting their needs or believed that there were less violent methods available for expressing themselves. In order to continue their armed campaign, the RAF needed a cause around which the masses could rally. It is for this reason that the RAF has now aligned itself with the European anti-nuclear peace movement.

The peace movement seems to fit in well with the RAF's longstanding policy of fighting "U.S. imperialism." By latching on to this movement, one so important to the German people, the RAF hopes to be able to use the emotionalism of the issue to reestablish its base of support. In order to succeed, the RAF must not succumb to the errors of its past.

On March 26, 1984, the RAF reemerged in a successful bank robbery that netted the group close to \$80,000. This action signaled the West German authorities that the terrorist organization which they had defeated three times previously was back. Despite a lack of experienced leadership, a new effort to carry on the fight against the German govern-

ment and perceived U.S. imperialism had begun. In July of last year, the police arrested six hardcore members of the RAF. During the arrest, the police uncovered detailed plans that outlined three steps that the RAF planned to take in its new effort. These were:

1. Bombing attacks against key NATO installations, both U.S. and German.

2. A hunger strike by members currently imprisoned so that they would all be moved to the same prison.

3. Assassination of Key members of the West German establishment.(30)

These plans also disclosed that detailed reconnaissance of the targeted installations had been completed.

In November 1984, five members of the RAF held up a weapons store and took 25 pistols, two rifles and several boxes of ammunition.(31) On December 4th of that same year, a coordinated hunger strike by 32 RAF prisoners marked the beginning of the new offensive.(32) Over thirty bombings and fires, causing an estimated \$6.5 million worth of damage, were credited to the RAF. The attacks included an attempted bombing of a NATO training school which failed, arson of a Frankfurt warehouse and several bombings of German, French and U.S. property.(33) The RAF began 1985 with the assassination of a prominent German business executive, Ernst Zimmerman. The killing was carried out with ease and precision. The RAF perpetrators escaped without a trace.(34)

These attacks revived the fears of the German populace first experienced during the early years of the RAF. Chancellor Kohl pledged an end to the violence, and shortly there-

after he met with France's Prime Minister Mitterrand to insure closer cooperation among their two countries in the fight against terrorism. This new attempt at cooperation was in response to the announcement by the RAF that it was joining forces with France's Direct Action terrorist organization to form a 'Political-Military Front' in Europe.(35) Their announced targets for destruction were NATO military installations and personnel as well as companies with NATO arms contracts.(36)

Authorities in Europe had been gathering evidence tying various European terrorist organizations together for the past year. Evidence gathered has shown that other groups involved in this new alliance include Belgium's CCC, the Italian Front for the Liberation of the Proletariat and the PLO among others.(37) An example of this new cooperation among groups was the use of explosives in separate incidents in France and Germany in 1984. These explosives were stolen from a quarry in Belgium.(38)

Throughout the early spring of 1985, the RAF continued its bombings of NATO installations. Elsewhere in Europe, other members of the newly founded alliance also continued the offensive against NATO installations in their own countries. In August, the RAF, using the identification card of a U.S. airman whom they had murdered, were able to plant a car bomb on Rhein-Main Air Base in Frankfurt. The bomb exploded, killing two and injuring 21 others. This incident was the most serious attack on U.S. personnel in West Germany since 1981.(39) A day after the attack, a two and a half

page letter was released to West German news agencies. In the letter, the RAF and AD claimed responsibility for the bombing. The letter stated that the attack was against NATO and the work of a joint "political-military front in Western Europe." (40)

The recent actions of the RAF and her allied organizations signal a new era of increased violence in Europe. It appears that the RAF has been able to Europeanize its fight against U.S. imperialism directly and the German government indirectly. It remains to be seen whether the RAF can use this new found momentum to further its efforts. If the new generation of the RAF falls prey to the errors of its predecessors or is unable to gain the support of the German people, its recent attempts at reasserting itself will be stymied.

VII. IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES

The ideology of the RAF is a by-product of the student revolts of the 1960's, as the group itself has been. Ulrike Meinhof, initially, was the RAF's primary ideological leader. However, each successive generation has developed its own ideological position. Because of these generational changes, the RAF's ideology has shifted from its original anti-establishment position to its present anti-nuclear stance.

Since its inception, the RAF has tried, unsuccessfully, to find an ideological position that would be supported by the German people. Marxist-oriented, the RAF has been strongly influenced by Third World guerrilla leaders. As

such, they have moved away from both the Soviet and Chinese styles of Marxist-Leninist thought. In 1970, the RAF took its name from the Japanese Red Army (JRA). Despite the fact that the JRA was an ineffective Japanese terrorist group, the RAF wanted to show its affiliation with such a radical organization to demonstrate its belief in armed revolution.

Meinhof's writings established the ideological framework for the RAF's activities. However, by the time of her death, her radical ideas had become so convoluted that few people were actually able to understand them.(41) One of Meinhof's first writings outlined the basic tenets that have since guided the group's activities. These were:

1. Urge the use of violence as the only possible way to change society.
2. Reject all legal means available to change society.
3. Maintain that most people don't know what they want or what is really good for them.
4. Deny being anarchists.
5. Claim to be communists.
6. Applaud Maoism and scorn pluralistic societies.
7. Assert that the fight against American imperialism can take place in West Germany or anywhere else.(42)

This ideology can be summed up as "anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-American, anti-democratic and anti-Federal Republic." (43) In sum, the RAF saw violence as the only tool available to achieve political change.

This rhetoric has evolved into the present day strategy of attacking NATO installations, particularly those belonging to the U.S. The strong anti-American activities of the

RAF in the late 1970's and early 1980's had its roots in this ideology. The original objectives of the RAF remain the same today: the overthrow of the democratic West German government and the removal of the American presence from the Republic. The RAF sees its struggle as a part of a worldwide revolution that will take place to overthrow capitalism. The RAF, however, has never really stated what form of government would be put in place once the present one has been toppled. The failure to do so is another reason for the inability of the RAF to gain greater support among the German people.

The RAF's propensity towards violence, and its inability to find a common cause that the German people could or even wanted to relate to, has been the primary reason behind their failure to gain any popular support. Because of this weakness, the RAF has been forced to latch onto the anti-nuclear peace movement in Europe. In addition, their recent establishment of a European terrorist alliance can be seen as another tactic to obtain a wider following, especially in other parts of the continent.

VIII. MEMBERSHIP

The original members of the RAF were actively involved in or supported the actions of the student revolts of the 1960's. Most of the original members were students themselves with middle or upper class backgrounds. The remainder of the original members were professional people, such as lawyers and journalists.

A majority of the first generation of the RAF were women, who proved to be the more fanatical members of the group. The supporters and sympathizers of the group came largely from middle class backgrounds. Ironically, these supporters, along with the hardcore members of the RAF, hoped to overthrow the democratic system of government which had given them the life-style they all enjoyed.

Today, the composition of the RAF remains very much the same as its predecessors. Publicly, however, the RAF tries to maintain the fiction that its leaders are from the lower strata of German society. This has never been the case.

Andreas Baader, one of the founders of the RAF is an example of a typical member. Raised in a middle class home, he was an only child who grew up quite spoiled. He eventually quit school because he was unable to accept the structure of the classroom.(44) He detested work and lived off his mother's social security check and a small allowance given to him by his lover.(45) For fun, he took up burglary and stealing cars.(46) He was described as being vicious, spoiled and manipulative.

Ulrike Meinhof, another founding member of the RAF, also grew up in middle class surroundings. Her parents were art historians. Her father died when she was very young. Her step-father was a prominent left-wing professor who had a great deal of influence on her political views.(47) She had an outstanding academic record and earned two degrees, one in Sociology and the other in Philosophy.(48) As the editor of the Konkret, she supported left-wing and radical causes

which earned her a great deal of acclaim in the 1960's.(49) Frustrated by writing, she decided to take a more active role in the political movements of this period.(50) This led to her involvement in the escape of Baader in 1970.

The majority of the RAF membership continues to lead the contradictory life that their predecessors did. They want to be affiliated with the poor and down-trodden of German society while at the same time enjoying the affluent and comfortable life that they have grown accustomed to. This has led to an inability to appeal widely across the social strata.

IX. METHODS AND TACTICS

Each successive generation of the RAF has shown a tendency to use extreme violence as a weapon against the German government. This violence has increased in intensity and selectivity. This proclivity for violence has driven away many of the group's original supporters, who want to achieve political change through less violent methods.

The first generation of the RAF was the most idealistic and amateurish in the group's history.(51) Initially, the RAF went underground to train, recruit, plan and arm itself. The first generation was the first terrorist organization in Europe to make use of mobility between urban areas. This technique enhanced decentralization of operations without hindering command and control.(52) The targets of this generation were primarily symbols of the system they wished to destroy. These included government buildings and military installations. This generation of the RAF tried to avoid kil-

ling individuals if at all possible.

The second generation of the RAF was more lethal than the first and perhaps the most professional in the gang's history. During this period the RAF began to use kidnapping as its primary operation. But this generation also used murder, assassination and highjacking. The use of brutal violence brought about the early demise of the second generation. This occurred primarily for two reasons. It drove away supporters who turned to less violent groups and it brought about a swift and effective response from the German authorities.

The third generation appears to have cared little for public support and more for the publicity that its activities brought. The group turned inward, towards its hardcore members, to survive. This generation also began using bank robbery as the primary means of support. During this period, the RAF successfully stole millions of dollars, the majority of which appears to have been spent by 1980. The third generation, unlike the first, was not afraid to use murder as a tool as the group's actions during the bloody year of 1977 demonstrate.

The newest generation appears to be returning to the tactics of the original members. Bombings and arson attacks against key NATO installations are its primary activities. In addition, by joining together with other European terrorist organizations, it has opened the door to a wide range of support available outside the country. This generation has also targeted members of the German establishment to be kill-

ed, although, to date, this has not occurred.(53)

The RAF has used numerous tactics throughout its history; however, its most favored are bomb and arson attacks. Another tactic that sets the RAF apart from other terrorist organizations is that the group's leadership actively participates in each operation. The RAF is not adverse to trying new means if an operation requires it. An example was their use of the RPG-7, an anti-tank weapon, in their attack on General Kroesen in 1981.(54) Evidence was obtained in 1980 that the RAF might be experimenting with the use of biological warfare.(55) Whatever the method, the RAF has shown sufficient willingness and resourcefulness to usually succeed in violent attacks against their West German and NATO targets.

X. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Since its formation in the late 1960's, the RAF has had a hardcore membership of as few as ten and as many as 150. These are the fulltime terrorists who perpetrate the majority of the group's actions. Today, it is estimated that there are around 20 hardcore members within the RAF. These hardcore members are supported by about 150 people who remain outside the organization and work within the framework of German society. At one time, prior to the defections of the 1970's, this group probably numbered as many 2000 people. This support group is essential because it provides the majority of the logistical support needed for the hardcore membership to survive underground.

The present day RAF can broken down into four main

elements:

1. The 20 hardcore terrorists who live underground.
2. The "legal arm" consisting of people who live within German society but perform organizational and support functions.
3. Imprisoned members who try to continue the fight while behind bars.
4. "Illegal militants" who actively support and participate in RAF operations.

The 20 members of the hardcore RAF are responsible for the planning and implementation of attacks. Inge Viett, a longstanding member of the RAF, is the present leader of the group. The size of the hardcore membership has been reduced in recent years due to arrests and defections. All of the members of this element of the RAF are wanted by the authorities for a variety of crimes committed against the state. For this reason, they live underground using disguises, aliases and false identity papers. This element is further subdivided into cells of two to five people. The small size of the cells enhances travel and reduces the chance of attracting attention. It is believed that these cells are divided according to specific functions or capabilities.(56)

The hardcore membership is supported by approximately 150 people known as the "legal arm". The role of the "legal arm" as outlined in an RAF strategy paper is as follows:

1. Build a nationwide support structure for the hardcore membership.
2. Provide safehouses, conspirative apartments and other residences.
3. Develop files on persons and institutions that are potential targets.

4. Attempt to create the proper political atmosphere that will enhance future operations and gain support for the RAF's efforts.(57)

The members of the "legal arm" maintain normal lifestyles within society and provide support to the terrorists on the side. Their value is derived from the fact that they can travel freely throughout the country without arousing suspicion. It is from this element that new recruits for the hardcore membership are found.

The third element, comprised of RAF members in prison, has played an active role whenever possible. Primarily this is achieved through hunger strikes, using the publicity to mobilize supporters and sympathizers. This group is also capable of communicating with the hardcore members through the "legal arm" or the "illegal militants". This allows them to implement a coordinated operation similar to last December's hunger strike which led off the newest round of RAF violence.

The fourth and newest element is known as the "illegal militants". This group carries out many of the same functions as the "legal arm" of the RAF. The primary difference between these two elements is that the "illegal militants" are wanted by the West German authorities because of their activities. The individuals of this element are known to actively participate in RAF operations. This element is responsible for the welfare of the members in prison and for political agitation.

In addition to these four elements of the RAF, there are believed to be approximately 2000 sympathizers who support the group's cause. These sympathizers are used to start

demonstrations and gain intelligence information on potential targets. Although not as structured as the other four elements, these sympathizers play a valuable role in the RAF's efforts.

XI. LOGISTICS/TRAINING/FINANCES

Since its inception, the RAF has understood the importance of a sound logistical infrastructure. This support base, initially, was to be built by following the examples set by the guerrilla movements of the world. The first objective was to get weapons and training for group members.(58) Through the years the majority of the support has been provided not by outside sources but internally, through the "legal arm" element.

The RAF's first efforts to obtain this much needed training and logistical support were unsuccessful. In 1970, the leaders of the RAF went to Jordan to train with an element of the PLO. The training was desert-oriented and the group felt it was not receiving the urban guerrilla training that it required. The RAF did receive some training in the use of small arms, explosives and escape and evasion tactics.(59) However, the group was forced to leave Jordan when King Hussein's troops attacked the Palestinian training bases. The RAF returned to Germany, frustrated, but not daunted by the experience.

Upon their return to Germany, the RAF began building its logistical base. They secured apartments, garages, radio equipment and false identity papers. In order to finance

themselves, the group executed several successful bank robberies. These robberies netted the RAF close to DM 2 million. This money was used to fund the pipeline that provided them with weapons and explosives.

Because of their failure to receive the proper urban training in the Middle East, the RAF began to train itself in the necessary tactics. At times, members of the group have returned to the Middle East to receive training.(60) Despite the lack of what would be considered "professional" terrorist training, the group became quite proficient in the use of weapons, particularly homemade bombs.

It has been estimated that it costs \$50,000 a year to support one underground member of the RAF.(61) This sum is required because the cost of living such a life is very expensive. Every time a member of the group is arrested or defects, new safe houses, weapons, identity papers and vehicles must be acquired. Thus, to maintain the RAF today costs over \$1 million a year.

Since 1975, the RAF has collected over DM 4 million from 18 different bank robberies. The group has also acquired over \$12 million dollars from three successful kidnappings during the same period. In addition, the RAF added another \$2 million when it merged with the 2JM in 1980. These figures clearly show that the RAF should have the money necessary to sustain operations for quite some time.

With the January, 1985, announcement of the new terrorist alliance in Europe, another avenue of support has been opened. Previously contact between these groups had been

limited but now their resources can be used jointly. This includes intelligence information, explosives, arms and host country support when traveling outside their own country.

XII. INTRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

Since its inception the RAF has cooperated with a variety of terrorist organizations, both internal and external to the Federal Republic. These groups, both left- and right-wing, have shared a common goal of bringing about a change in the European structure. However, their ultimate objectives have differed. The establishment of an international terrorist alliance signifies an attempt by these organizations to bring their various capabilities together in an all out war against the European status quo.

Within West Germany today, there are no terrorist organizations that could be considered splinter groups of the RAF. There are, however, three left-wing organizations that do have ties with the RAF. The first is the previously discussed 2JM that merged with the RAF in 1980. The second is the Revolutionary Cells, or RZ. The final organization is the Guerilla Diffusa (GD). In addition, the RAF has been known to work with several right-wing groups in Germany. This contact has been limited but useful to both sides.

The 2JM was named in honor of a student, Benno Ohnesorg, a student demonstrator who was killed by police during a student riot on June 2, 1967. The 2JM grew out of the 'New Left' scene in German universities in the early 1970's. Their actions included bank robbery, car theft and obtaining

safehouses for use by the RAF. By 1972, the 2JM was nothing more than a sub-element of the RAF. In 1980, this became official when the Movement's remaining cadre became part of the hardcore RAF.

The second organization, the RZ's, became active in 1973. Although their aim is very similar to that of the RAF, their means are somewhat different. Most of their activities are similar to the arson and bombing attacks of the first generation of the RAF. The RZ's benefited greatly from the defection of RAF supporters in the 1970's when the RAF began its use of intense violence.

The RZ's played second fiddle to the efforts of the RAF in the 1970's; however, the group moved to the forefront during the early 1980's. By 1984, it was considered by West German authorities to be the strongest and most dangerous terrorist group in the country. This came about because of the demise of the third generation of the RAF and the increased use of violence by the RZ's. The RZ's do not lead the underground life of the RAF and frequently criticize the RAF for losing touch with the German people. The RZ's view themselves not as a terrorist organization but as urban guerrillas. The RZ's have also failed to attract any widespread support from the German populace. This has been due in part to their recent increased use of violence which has caused widespread defections from the ranks of its supporters. This has curtailed the RZ's activities and brought about a re-adjustment of their ideology. Authorities believe the group has dwindled in size from about 400 to 50 members. Their new thrust

appears to be in political subversion as opposed to armed conflict.

The GD is the newest left-wing organization in West Germany. It first appeared around 1981. The GD is composed largely of young people, some of whom are teenagers. The group is Maoist in orientation, and is made up of former members of other terrorist groups, low level anarchists, punks and homosexuals.(62) Their activities are relatively non-violent. They tend to act as squatters at demonstrations. Their primary theme is the protection of the environment. The GD is closely linked with the RZ's but they have still provided some support to the RAF, especially in fomenting political discontent.

In the summer of 1984, the groundwork for the new European terrorist alliance was laid in meetings of the main participants in Lisbon. It is from these meetings that the latest offensive against NATO has been launched. Although there doesn't appear to be a command and control structure among the groups, authorities believe that the RAF would like to assume the leadership role.

In January of this year, the RAF and the AD formalized this new alliance with a joint communique to European authorities. The communique stated that they had formed a "Political-military Front." Several other European groups are also believed to be a part of this united front. These groups from Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Portugal have joined with the RAF and AD in a war against NATO. Their targets are military installations, personnel and defense industries. By

shifting their targets from domestic revolution to NATO, these groups--that at one time had very little to do with each other--have found a common cause. This will enable these groups to make better use of the various capabilities available to them. Such an alliance poses a very formidable threat to NATO. How NATO responds to this new threat will determine the success or failure of this Euro-terrorist alliance.

The connections the RAF once had with the PLO have all but disappeared. The PLO, which is now in disarray from recent failures and political infighting, has been forced to limit much of its support to other terrorist organizations. The RAF-PLO connection was shaky from the start, when RAF members were forced to flee for their lives when chased from the PLO training camps in Jordan. The RAF and the PLO have only acted together in only one joint operation: the hijacking of a German plane that ended in disaster for both groups. This incident created bad blood between the two organizations. During the 1970's, however, the RAF did send some of its members to the Middle East for training. Additionally, the PLO has provided weapons and explosives for use by the RAF in its operations within West Germany. With the loss of the PLO as a reliable logistical and training source, the RAF will be forced to turn to other sources for support.

Although there is no direct evidence available of Soviet support for the RAF, it can be assumed that there is some interest on the part of the Soviets in the RAF's efforts. Soviet bloc countries have given some support to the RAF.

East Germany provided safehouses for some of the group's members whenever they were fleeing from West German authorities. In addition, the East Germans have provided false identity papers, money, arms, ammunition and training. (63) The Cubans have also provided training to members of the RAF. Because the goals of the RAF are very similar to those of the Soviets, especially the destruction of NATO, an increased Soviet effort--either direct or indirect--can be expected.

XIII. THE FUTURE

Despite its history of continual defeat, the RAF remains the primary terrorist threat in West Germany today. With the formation of the new European terrorist alliance, this threat has become even more formidable. By shifting its support to the anti-nuclear peace movement, the group may have found an emotional subject with which to gain much needed popular support. It remains to be seen whether this support can be utilized by the RAF in its war against NATO.

The RAF's future is dependent on many factors, not the least of which is the group's ability to present a coherent ideology which provides an acceptable alternative to the present form of government in West Germany. To date, the RAF has failed to do so. This failure has led to a group that is perceived by the majority of the German people as one which commits acts of violence for its own sake. This perception has led to the defeat of the preceding three generations of the group. The newest generation of the RAF ap-

appears to have returned to the tactics of the first generation. But the group has shown that it will use murder to accomplish its goals. However, if this latest generation relies too much on violence, it is also doomed.

The success of the terrorist alliance as a whole also will determine the ability of this newest generation of the RAF to survive. If this alliance is able to bring about a European-wide movement, the resulting momentum could be similar to that of the student revolts of the 1960's. The alliance's joint effort against NATO is directly tied to its ability to build a broad based support structure throughout Europe. In order to do so, the alliance must make itself appealing to all members on the political spectrum. The ability to succeed in such a massive undertaking is quite dependent on the response of European authorities and media to their efforts.

Since the 1960's, the authorities within Europe, especially those in Germany, have successfully met the challenge of terrorism in their respective countries. Each time the RAF began to raise the anxiety level among the German people, the authorities have successfully responded. If this success continues, the RAF will have a difficult time expanding itself into the major force that it wishes to become. The future of the RAF is also dependent on the government's ability to meet the needs of its constituents. If the Greens and the SPD can continue to work together, especially in the area of nuclear weapons, the RAF will likely be stifled. But a fail-

ure to cooperate by these two parties on this important issue will open the door for radical groups like the RAF.

Two other factors that will effect RAF success are their relationship with the media and successful cooperation among authorities in Europe. The RAF has not learned the lessons of its PLO mentors on the use of the media. For the most part, the media has depicted the RAF as a monstrous group which uses violence indiscriminately. The RAF must overcome this image and learn to use the media as a means for bringing its message to the German people. With the establishment of an international terrorist alliance, it is now more imperative than ever that cooperation among authorities in Europe be increased. The first step was taken when Kohl and Mitterand announced their pledge to increase cooperation among their two countries in order to defeat this new threat. A failure by the European community to work together to defeat this latest threat could have devastating consequences for the continent.

The future of the latest generation of the RAF and its brainchild the European terrorist alliance, remains to be seen. It is evident, however, that the internal threat to the stability of NATO has never been greater. If the RAF can avoid the errors of its predecessors and the West German government fails to effectively respond to this new challenge, a new era in European instability may be realized.

ENDNOTES

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