

October 1973. However, Portugal would probably be more willing than Spain to provide support for U.S. intervention in most out-of-area contingencies.

U.S.-Portuguese relations have become more complicated ten years after the "Revolution of Flowers" of 1974. Portugal's defense modernization program has been slowed by the task of constitutional reform as well as by the repercussions of the rapid Portuguese withdrawal from overseas possessions in the mid-1970s. The Council of the Revolution, through which the Portuguese military had exercised a major political role since 1974, was dissolved only in August 1982 after the new Constitution was adopted by two-thirds of the Portuguese Parliament. The fragile Portuguese democratic political system has thus confronted formidable constraints which have limited its defense spending.

In April 1983, Portuguese voters turned out the governing Social Democratic/Christian Democratic coalition. The Socialist Party under Mario Soares gained a plurality, and formed a new governing coalition with the Social Democratic Party. With the ouster of the more Atlanticist Christian Democrats and the dominance of the more Europeanist Socialists in the ruling coalition has come a different emphasis for Portuguese defense policy. The Soares Government places a greater emphasis on European defense cooperation. This is in keeping with a conceptualization of Western Europe as an intermediary or

"broker" between the two superpowers. Moreover, the Atlanticist junior partners of the coalition, the Social Democrats, do retain significant influence, chiefly through the person of Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Carlos Mota Pinta. Thus, Portugal is likely to continue to emphasize its SLOC control and ASW roles and to seek assistance from the United States for the requisite modernization of Portuguese naval and air forces.

Moreover, Portugal will undoubtedly remain opposed to the establishment of a fourth NATO (Iberian) command which, it is feared, would provide Spain a dominant voice in military affairs on the Peninsula and overshadow Portuguese concerns. Hence, further Spanish integration into the military command structure of NATO may prove contentious with regard to Portugal. Meanwhile, as in the new 1983 bilateral agreement providing for U.S. access to Lajes, the Portuguese are likely to be cautious in making available facilities in support of out-of-area contingencies. Left-wing socialists of a National-Bilateral bent, and pressure on the left flank from the potent Portuguese Communist Party (which favors unilateral disarmament) will serve only to reinforce this trend.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Thus it is apparent that parallel schools of thought with regard to national defense and foreign policy exist in Spain and Portugal: Atlanticists, Europeanists,

National-Bilaterals, and Unilateralists. However, the influence of the respective schools varies between the two countries. In Spain, the Socialist Government has a Europeanist/National-Bilateralist orientation, while in Portugal, a Europeanist/Atlanticist alignment is evident in the Socialist-Social Democratic coalition government.

Therefore, Spain tentatively continues its commitment to NATO, while linking further integration to progress in other areas, such as Spanish membership in the EEC and the status of Gibraltar. Portugal, on the other hand, remains a staunch member of the Atlantic Alliance, preferring a strong alignment with the dominant naval power--the United States--while pursuing further integration with Europe. This means in concrete terms that Portugal maintains a more active interest in military modernization and integration within NATO than does Spain, which will resist such options as modernization and redeployment of Spanish forces to the Central Front.

Portugal will continue to provide the critical Lajes base to the United States, and might not be adverse to expanding U.S. access to Portuguese facilities in return for aid in military modernization (while continuing to insist on case-by-case approval of the use of such facilities for out-of-area contingencies). As Spanish contributions of an active nature seem problematic, contributions of a passive nature -- regarding access to Spanish facilities -- which capitalize upon Spanish geography rather than its forces,

must be pursued. However, the present governments of Spain and Portugal will oppose basing U.S. nuclear forces, just as they will remain noncommittal with regard to the INF deployment set forth in the NATO decision of December 1979. Thus, while national sensitivities must be considered, under current circumstances, the United States will be best served by an Iberian contribution of facilities as a redoubt for resupply of the Central Front.

SECTION 3

CHINESE PERSEPCTIVES

The People's Republic of China (PRC) assesses questions of defense and national security very broadly and in a long-term strategic context. Perceived threats to Chinese security are both internal and external, and are not confined to the military realm. It is important to evaluate Chinese perspectives on security and strategy at three levels: what the PRC says publicly for the record, what it says privately to privileged foreign visitors or to elite domestic audiences, and what it actually does.

At all three levels, the process is closely controlled and directed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the past five years the Party organization has undergone extensive reform and restructuring. In 1982 the Party established an Advisory Commission from which elderly Party veterans can continue to exert influence while younger individuals direct the daily operations of the Party, government and military apparatus. The Party Congress in September 1982 made some progress in this direction, lowering the average age of the Party Secretariat and the Central Committee membership. However, senior policy-making bodies -- the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the Military

Commission, and the Discipline Inspection Commission -- remain under the direction of the Party's aging old guard. The state administrative machinery under Premier Zhao Ziyang is streamlining operations and promoting younger, more qualified personnel. But change has been much less perceptible among the military/strategic elite. Under a new state constitution, the Sixth National People's Congress (NPC) in June 1983 elected chairmen and vice-chairmen of the PRC, the NPC, and the Central Military Commission. Those chosen were all members of the old guard.

Most major security issues tend to have both a domestic and foreign policy component with Chinese leaders perceiving a close interrelationship between the two. In Party power struggles, external issues are normally of secondary importance but can be used to discredit opponents or, as apparently occurred with Deng Xiaoping, to bolster a leader's prestige and Party standing. During the last ten years of Mao's life, there were marked differences in global outlook within the Party elite and sharp fluctuations in Chinese foreign and security policy. Since Mao's death in 1976 and the ouster of the Gang of Four, Chinese foreign policy has followed a far steadier course. While leadership differences in strategic outlook and foreign policy appear to persist, they are not as striking or disruptive as before and are held in check by Party

elders, who may disagree on policy but agree on the need for unity and stability.

The economy has placed sharp restraints on plans to update China's obsolescent military forces as part of the "four modernizations" (agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense). Defense spending was reduced in 1980 and again in 1981, despite misgivings of some military professionals. Beginning in late 1982, renewed emphasis has been given to defense modernization, with indications that Beijing will look to foreign sources for prototypes, technology and perhaps joint investment, but insofar as possible will try to develop an indigenous production capability of military weapons and material.

While political stability and national unity have been prominent security concerns of the Party leadership, this theme has also been used to serve partisan political interests: by Mao loyalists and many in the military elite to defend Mao and Cultural Revolution policies and at the same time to attempt to retain their political power; and by Deng and his supporters to call for the reconstruction and revitalization of the Party apparatus and, in the process, to enhance and consolidate their political power. Military policy has clearly been an issue in the contest for power. Even though Deng and his group are increasingly in control and Deng personally heads the Party's Military Commission, there apparently has been some resistance to Deng's reform program from elements within the military elite. To ensure

military support at critical junctures, Deng appears to have deferred to military interests on several key issues, such as the forced retirement of overage PLA commanders and cadres.

China's military capability, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is large, unwieldy and outdated. It is deployed to guard against both external attack (primarily along its northern border with the U.S.S.R. and Mongolia and its southern border with Vietnam) and internal uprisings or other domestic security threats. The attack on Vietnam in 1979 revealed deficiencies in PLA capabilities. The Party continues to endorse the validity of Mao's strategy of people's war, albeit updated to reflect conditions of modern war, while quietly embarking on a program to upgrade the professional and technical levels of PLA personnel. At this juncture, China may well be relying both upon its considerable conventional defensive capability and limited nuclear capability, together with the maintenance of amicable relations with the United States, to deter a possible Soviet attack.

However, there are clearly divisions within the military-strategic elite, and China's military doctrine and strategy may be at issue. Other probable issues under debate include the declining prestige and career attractiveness of the PLA, persisting civilian-military tensions, differences on the role of ideology and on the impact of pragmatic policies both within the PLA and

throughout society. These differences seemed to be resolved, or papered over, at the Sixth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in June 1981. The compromise, or consensus, forged at that gathering seemed to remain in effect during both the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982 and subsequent NPC sessions in 1982 and 1983, and a CCP Central Committee plenum in October 1983.

China's global outlook and strategy are based on theoretical formulations propounded by Mao Zedong and subsequently expanded or refined by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others. These formulations are rooted both in Marxism-Leninism and in Chinese historical and philosophical traditions. The Chinese world view has evolved markedly over the years and has provided a rationalization and justification for sharp changes in Chinese policies. Mao initially posited a two-camp theory, declaring in 1949 that China would lean to one side, that of the Soviet Union, and that there was no alternative to joining either the Soviet or U.S. bloc.

By the mid-1950s China's world perspective showed signs of change, with Mao elevating the role of Third World countries by establishing an "intermediate zone" with which China's interest became increasingly identified. In the 1960s as the Sino-Soviet split deepened, Mao spoke of two "intermediate zones" between the U.S. and Soviet camps. Then in the 1970s the Chinese global outlook was reordered and synthesized in Mao's "three world" view in which the

U.S. and USSR were lumped together as the two superpowers to comprise the "first world"; the developed industrial countries of Western Europe and Japan were the "second world"; and the rest of the world, essentially poorer, less developed countries comprised the "third world", a category in which China placed itself. Zhou elaborated on Soviet strategy while Deng postulated a united front strategy which could serve to postpone or even avert a global conflict.

China's world view is strongly influenced by external determinants, especially the actions of the superpowers; is increasingly based more on national security interests than on ideological considerations; and, not surprisingly, is highly Sino-centric, i.e., according a larger role to China than an objective evaluation of its present strength, wealth, and international influence and involvement would warrant. Thus, global assessments of China's leaders have served to reinforce and rationalize policies and actions that are deemed best to serve China's interests.

Although these are seldom if ever publicly stated, the following appear to be the core elements of China's national strategy: maintain China's independence and sovereignty, relying primarily on indigenous resources; combine with others with parallel interests to combat a common threat, that is Soviet expansionism; augment China's conventional and strategic capabilities with a latent "strategic relationship" with the United States to deter Soviet attack; avoid at all costs a multi-front, multi-enemy

war; do not initiate military action unless China can control the scope of the conflict; recover territorial claims and unify China as circumstances permit; and gain stable foreign trade partners and access to modern technology.

In the context of the strategic triangle (U.S., USSR, and PRC), China has altered both its strategic views and tactics over the years and has maneuvered skillfully to advance its own interests. US-China rapprochement was based on the perception of a common Soviet threat to security. Normalization of relations in late 1978 permitted China to use this "American card" several months later and attack Vietnam without incurring a retaliatory response from Hanoi's Soviet ally. But concerned that the price of detente with the United States could be the permanent loss of Taiwan, Beijing has stiffened its position with respect to U.S. policies toward Taiwan. It has proclaimed an independent foreign policy, oriented toward the Third World, and pursued a strategy of equidistance between Moscow and Washington. Chinese actions have included a dampening of anti-Soviet polemics, increasing criticism of U.S. "hegemonism," and the holding of bilateral discussions with the Soviets at the vice-foreign minister level. This may also represent a reaction both to Soviet overtures to China and to perceived U.S. shortcomings in its relations with China, especially with respect to Taiwan. It seems unlikely that Beijing anticipates or would welcome a full

normalization of relations with the USSR, but it apparently does favor a measured reduction in tensions. It also may be trying to position itself within the triangle in the hopes of gaining concessions from either the United States or the Soviet Union or both.

Even though China now refuses to join with the United States in warnings about Soviet expansionism, its concern over the Soviet threat to its security remains a significant element in Beijing's view of the US-PRC relationship. There has been a significant upturn in that relationship since the fall of 1983. An exchange of visits in 1984 between Premier Zhao and President Reagan underscored the mutual benefits of this relationship and led to agreements concerning nuclear energy cooperation, Chinese access to advanced technology and some weapons systems, and various trade and investment issues.

Militarily and strategically, there is much less ambivalence in the Chinese position, in the face of what the PRC views as almost a complete reversal and worsening in the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region since the late 1960s. China must now contend with a strong Soviet land-based threat bolstered by an overwhelming strategic superiority and a growing naval presence in the region, which now has access to major Vietnamese ports. The total deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations -- from ally to foe within four years -- has particularly worsened the military balance in Southeast Asia from the Chinese vantage

point. The Chinese see the Soviet geopolitical and strategic gains in Asia and the Pacific as serving Moscow's global strategy, although they also calculate that the Soviets are overextended and facing economic difficulties, so that the immediate Soviet threat to Chinese security has diminished.

Perhaps for this reason, China purports to view the nuclear equation primarily in global rather than regional terms, and as an element in the rivalry of the two superpowers. In discussions with Western strategists, Chinese leaders have referred to the edge gained by the Soviet Union in the Eurasian theater nuclear balance by the deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. Consistent with their strategic projection of a superpower confrontation in Europe, not Asia, Chinese leaders initially viewed with approval both the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe, and the development of British and French national nuclear forces. For the public record, however, Beijing expresses extreme skepticism that U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks actually will slow the nuclear arms race and now opposes both the US missile deployments in Europe and the Soviet missile deployments in both Europe and Soviet Asia. Indeed, Chinese authorities have gone so far as to suggest that both sides sought to make disarmament serve the purpose of achieving military superiority and carried out bilateral talks merely to work out "rules of the game" and reduce costs.

This "evenhanded" Chinese treatment accords with Beijing's "independent" foreign policy line and tactical equidistancing of itself from the Soviet Union and the United States, but it does not accord with Beijing's actual assessment of the strategic situation or the implications for its security. On several occasions, China has expressed "grave concern" over the buildup of Soviet strategic forces in Asia and indications that the Soviets might redeploy to Asia those SS-20s removed from the European theater under an INF agreement. And in early February 1983, for the first time and without further elaboration, it listed arms control among the areas in which China and the United States shared similar views. These statements stand in sharp contrast to the aforementioned Chinese critique of both U.S. and Soviet disarmament proposals and strategic policies.

China's actual military deployments and strategy are clearly geared to possible Soviet attack. Its deterrence strategy consists of a small, developing nuclear weapons capability buttressed by a massive, albeit obsolescent, conventional military force, and an implied "strategic relationship" with the United States. Both its conventional and strategic forces are deployed preponderantly against the Soviet threat. Despite Cultural Revolution disruptions and the resource constraints imposed by the "economic readjustment" policy inaugurated in 1979, China successfully tested two liquid-fueled ICBMs in 1980, is reportedly developing a solid-fueled ICBM, and successfully launched an

SLBM in October 1982. Since early 1983 there have been indications of a Chinese decision to give higher priority to defense modernization ("to cope with international developments" according to Premier Zhao); and in a lengthy article on the subject, the Defense Minister implied that strategic weapons programs would get special attention.

China apparently values its nuclear capability both for the international status it conveys and for its limited deterrent effect, even though Beijing recognizes the vast and growing imbalance in Chinese and Soviet nuclear forces. As additional insurance, however, the Chinese, in normalizing relations with the United States, sought a relationship which would give the Soviets pause before attacking China. Recently, at Chinese insistence, the "strategic relationship" has gone underground; and the Soviet threat was not mentioned in the joint U.S.-Chinese communique in August 1982. However, the Chinese clearly continue to regard the Sino-American relationship as mutually beneficial in deterrence terms. As a Chinese analyst of Soviet strategy noted in March 1983, the Soviet Union now has to "worry about fighting on two fronts," thus serving as a deterrent to Soviet attack in either Europe or Asia.

As for nuclear weapons limitation, China generally has opposed most arms control treaties, agreements and organizations, contending that they represent an effort by the two superpowers to maintain a nuclear monopoly and

constitute an infringement upon national sovereignty and the right of nations to assure their self-defense. Chinese pronouncements on the subject have been of two types: assertions of the defensive nature of the Chinese nuclear weapons program coupled with declarations of no-first-use and of non-use against nonnuclear states; and broad, sweeping disarmament proposals which call for a total ban on nuclear weapons and link disarmament of conventional forces with that of strategic weapons. China has consistently opposed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban of 1963 and subsequent proposals for a comprehensive test ban; and it has similarly refused to endorse the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. Before 1983 the one nuclear arms control convention it had signed was the protocol of a treaty establishing a nuclear free zone in Latin America, a concept which the PRC has long advocated for other parts of the world, including Asia.

Since joining the United Nations in 1971, the PRC has gradually played a more active role in U.S.-sponsored disarmament deliberations, including the Commission on Disarmament talks in Geneva and the two Special Sessions on Disarmament (SSOD) in May-June 1978 and June-July 1982. Thus, while China contended in 1971 that it would never "betray" the nonnuclear nations by joining in nuclear disarmament negotiations sponsored by the two superpowers, its current position represents a tactical evolution from this extreme position. China now asserts that, as a

Security Council member and the only Third World nation possessing nuclear weapons, it will play a responsible role in disarmament parleys which are held under U.N. auspices in order to assure proper reflection of Third World views. Moreover, in October 1983 China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a special agency of the UN.

At SSOD II, PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua presented an arms control proposal which constitutes the official Chinese position in the subject. The three principal elements of the plan are: 1) all nuclear states should reach an agreement not to use nuclear weapons and, pending such an agreement, should unilaterally make pledges of no-first-use and non-use; 2) conventional disarmament should be effected simultaneously with nuclear disarmament and states should undertake not to commit aggression against or militarily occupy any country; and 3) the United States and the Soviet Union should first cease testing, by 50 percent, at which point the PRC "is ready" to join with others in working out similar arms control and reduction measures, eventually providing for the destruction of all nuclear weapons.

Up to 1983, China had not been a party to the various conventions, organizations or arrangements which impose controls and safeguards on nuclear transactions, declaring that these represented infringements upon national sovereignty. China has now modified its position. In joining IAEA, the last of the nuclear weapons powers to do

so, China pledged to accept the rules and statute of that agency and to fulfill the obligations of membership. This will entail a significant degree of scrutiny and safeguards.

China has announced plans for nuclear energy plants to be constructed in cooperation with foreign contractors and suppliers. This will require nuclear energy cooperation agreements with the supplying countries, in accordance with IAEA requirements. During President Reagan's April 1984 visit the US and PRC initialled such an agreement which, when formally approved, will permit private U.S. firms to sell nuclear equipment, materials and technology to China. China remains opposed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it regards as discriminatory, but on joining the IAEA and on numerous occasions since then, China has declared that it "neither stands for nor encourages the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Within its overall security perspectives and strategy, China also must take into account special considerations affecting relations with various nations on its East Asian periphery. On the Korean Peninsula, Beijing competes strenuously with Moscow for Pyongyang's affection and at present enjoys a slight edge. Strategically, it is considered essential to the PRC to have a close relationship with North Korea (DPRK) in order to stave off Soviet inroads into the area, a development that would nearly complete Soviet encirclement of China. However, despite rhetorical support for North Korea's position, China wishes to avoid

renewed hostilities in Korea, which inter alia would put it on the opposite side from the United States and Japan. In consequence, the PRC was probably privately relieved when a few years ago the United States cancelled plans for a partial troop withdrawal from Korea, thus permitting PRC media to wax eloquent in support of Pyongyang, while at the same time alleviating Chinese fears that a power vacuum would be created on the Peninsula which the Soviet Union would seek to exploit. More recently, Chinese leaders hinted at a willingness to work with the United States and Japan toward reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, only to back-off subsequently -- perhaps at Pyongyang's insistence -- and remove itself as a party to any Korean negotiations.

There is a close correlation between the evolution of Sino-Japanese bilateral relations and China's altered strategic view of Northeast Asia. In both cases China's position has been largely shaped by the perceived Soviet threat. Indeed, China's volte face in its relations with Japan was based on the premise of perceived parallel interests in resisting Soviet expansionist pressures, a premise which has found greater favor in Japan in the wake of Soviet military construction and deployments in Japan's former Northern Territories. Chinese leaders, however, have privately communicated to Tokyo their acceptance of the special U.S.-Japan security relationship.

For several years after the 1978 Sino-Japanese peace treaty, China perceived a greater parallelism of Sino-Japanese interests and a larger regional security role for Japan than Japan seemed willing to accept. China urged Japan to strengthen its self-defense forces, especially its maritime capabilities, make a greater contribution to regional security, and enter into various limited forms of military cooperation with the PRC. Yet, in reality, Beijing is far more interested in the economic and technological benefits of its relations with Tokyo and, in fact, may be having second thoughts about a larger security role for Japan. While publicly proclaiming that close Sino-Japanese ties and cooperation are conducive to peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region, Chinese leaders have begun to issue periodic reminders that Japan should not revert to a militarist role. The current cordiality in relations was marked by an exchange of visits between Hu Yaobang and Nakasone in late 1983 and early 1984.

With respect to Taiwan, both long-term security interests and the issues of sovereignty and national unity figure importantly in PRC policies and strategy. Beijing does not consider that the armed forces in Taiwan constitute a military threat to PRC security, but will not tolerate the possible future use of Taiwan -- the quintessential unsinkable aircraft carrier -- by a foreign power for military purposes. Taiwan reunification has been made a priority issue by the Chinese leadership, whose concern

seems to lie more in insuring acceptance in principle of PRC sovereignty by other nations and on Taiwan than in the actual return of Taiwan to PRC control in the near future. However, China now strongly criticizes the United States, citing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act as violations both of Chinese sovereignty and of joint U.S.-PRC agreements. China has also demanded the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty by 1997 at the latest, while indicating some flexibility in working out administrative arrangements. The two issues are closely related, and an increasingly nationalistic Chinese leadership will presumably hold the United States responsible for any failure in realizing their irredentist aspirations.

A particularly complex situation exists for China in Southeast Asia. China must now contend simultaneously with the hostility of a Soviet-backed militarily strong neighbor in Vietnam, and the reservations of the noncommunist countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), who are apprehensive about China's future aspirations and policies in the region. Since 1979, Beijing has sought to punish Vietnam for its invasion of Kampuchea and for its alliance with the USSR and defiance of China. Chinese efforts to parlay the Vietnamese/Soviet threat to Southeast Asian security into closer relations with the ASEAN nations have had limited differentiated results. While ASEAN as a whole, and Thailand in particular, has

valued the overall restraining effect which Chinese policies have had on Vietnam, the ASEAN nations fear as well that the Chinese attack on Vietnam might lead to Soviet involvement and a wider regional war. In the long run, moreover, the ASEAN nations will be more interested in containing and co-existing with Vietnam than in punishing it, and do not fully share Beijing's concern with a global, strategic Soviet threat.

For its part, China has cooperated with ASEAN on its Kampuchean initiatives and has tried to allay the fears of ASEAN nations concerning Chinese support of the overseas Chinese communities or of communist insurgencies. Nevertheless, China continues to follow an aggressive attrition strategy toward Vietnam, which raises questions as to whether China's future actions and strategy in Southeast Asia actually will contribute to peace and stability in that region.

We conclude from this broad survey that overall the PRC elite consider domestic threats to national security to be primary, closely followed by the external threats posed by the USSR, while a third threat is that posed by U.S. policies toward Taiwan. There are differences within the Party leadership on the priority to be accorded foreign and domestic threats and the appropriate policies that follow therefrom. While these differences in perception are liable to continue under the present leadership, so is their current tendency to compromise their differences and strive

for a consensus. There is no argument in Chinese leadership circles, for example, over China's need for a peaceful environment in order to achieve the necessary conditions for modernization. However, after generational succession occurs within the next decade or so, the possible alternative strategies of the new Chinese elite are wide ranging and include even the development of a policy of genuine detente with the Soviet Union.

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