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
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
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 This report examines key recent developments and trends in Western Europe, with an emphasis on the past two years, as a backdrop to an analysis of present and prospective Soviet relations with the West. It identifies five possible Soviet policy options toward Western Europe in the near and the medium term: (1) continuation of the kind of wedge-driving policy it used during much of 1983; (2) a differentiated policy of better relations with the United States, and cool relations with Western Europe; (3) a policy of defiance toward the West; (4) pursuit of a broad-based neo-detente relationship with both Western Europe and the United States; and (5) a purposefully confrontational policy toward the West. The author suggests that three considerations will be central to the USSR in determining which policy it pursues: (1) the possibility of gaining new concessions from the United States through the continued pursuit of its present policy course; (2) the degree of continued Atlantic Alliance unity over defense and arms control policies; and (3) the electoral prospects of antinuclear opposition parties in Western Europe in the late 1980s. In any case, the Soviet Union will not abandon its fundamental objectives in Europe. *Key words: ...*

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Soviet-West European Relations

Recent Trends and Near-Term Prospects

Alan Platt

March 1986

A Project AIR FORCE report
prepared for the
United States Air Force

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PREFACE

This report examines key recent developments and trends in Western Europe—with an emphasis on the past two years—as a backdrop to an analysis of present and prospective Soviet relations with the West. Various possible Soviet policy options toward Western Europe are discussed in the context of both the near and the medium term. The concluding section focuses on the most likely course of future Soviet foreign policy toward the West and discusses some important considerations that will determine the direction of that policy.

This study is part of a larger Rand project on "The Future of Soviet Policy toward Western Europe," undertaken for the National Security Strategies Program of Project AIR FORCE. It largely reflects information available as of August 1985.

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SUMMARY

Western Europe, where the Soviet Union has critical interests at stake, has traditionally been a dominant concern of that superpower. **Throughout the postwar period, there has been a fundamental continuity in what the Soviet Union has sought in Western Europe—the transformation of the status quo in favor of Soviet interests.** In trying to bring about this long-term objective, the Soviets have sought to:

- Maintain a Soviet military advantage in the European theater
- Ensure continued East European responsiveness to Soviet interests
- Secure widespread acknowledgment of the Soviet Union as a superpower co-equal with the United States
- Expand Soviet access to Western technology and credits
- Loosen American political and military ties with Western Europe
- Transform West European political systems from within by aiding “progressive” elements

In the pursuit of these goals, the Soviet Union has pragmatically adopted over time a variety of tactics to further its interests. During most of the 1970s, the Soviet Union pursued these objectives in Europe in the context of its overall policies toward the West, with the United States and Western Europe taken together. **In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, as U.S.-Soviet relations waned, Soviet thinking began to change with respect to the utility of placing a greater degree of emphasis on their dealings with the countries of Western Europe.** Sensing substantial European interest in retaining certain vestiges of détente and perceiving America to be at odds with much of Europe on this, **the Soviet Union increasingly began to pursue its objectives in Western Europe in the context of a policy of “differentiated détente”.** The focus of this Soviet policy was thus Western Europe, rather than the United States, and in the early years of the 1980s, the emphasis was on maintaining and expanding bilateral commercial, political, and cultural ties with those governments in Western Europe ready for cooperation. Arms control negotiations were continued with the United States, but without much hope for a more full-blown relationship.

By the end of 1982, this early 1980s Soviet policy of differentiated détente had grown into a two-track Soviet strategy for managing East-West relations. On one track were relations with the United States, which consisted largely of arms control talks. The Soviet Union seemed to write off the United States as a near-term partner across a range of economic, political, and cultural activities. On the second track were Soviet relations with the countries of Western Europe, which were viewed by Moscow as a channel through which differences between the United States and its NATO allies could be widened and exploited.

By the winter of 1982-83, the Soviets seemed less interested in exploring the possibility of finding arms control compromises with the United States concerning intermediate-range forces (INF), for example, and more interested in pursuing the second track of its policy—preventing the deployment of these forces through the manipulation of disagreements within the Atlantic Alliance. In part, this emphasis in Soviet policy may have reflected a Soviet perception that U.S. concessions acceptable to the USSR were unlikely to be forthcoming at Geneva. In part, too, this thrust in Soviet policy was attributable to Soviet perceptions about the centrifugal tendencies and growing strength of both the European peace movement and the antinuclear opposition parties in the five countries due to receive medium-range missiles. Moreover, such an approach offered the Soviet Union the near-term prospect of possibly killing or deferring the deployments without any commensurate Soviet concessions and the longer-term prospect of inflicting lasting damage upon American security relations with its European allies.

There were, in essence, two parts to this Soviet effort to prevent the deployment of new NATO INF missiles in Europe. One part was “a campaign from above,” which consisted of a major propaganda and political effort to convince the elites in Western Europe not to go ahead with the planned NATO deployments. The second part of the Soviet effort was “a campaign from below,” which was characterized by concerted “active measures” that would exploit popular fears in Western Europe in order to create mass opposition and prevent the force deployments. The focus of these two “campaigns” was West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, all of which had major national elections during the first half of 1983. In all three countries, however, the Soviets’ efforts failed. All three nations elected governments that were firmly committed to going ahead with INF deployments on schedule.

Partly out of pique over this failure, partly because the Soviets did not wish to aid Ronald Reagan’s reelection chances, partly because of internal problems associated with the Soviet leadership succession, and

partly because of residual hopes to intimidate European parliaments into renouncing the NATO 1979 dual-track decision, the Soviet Union walked out of nuclear arms control talks with the United States in November 1983. During the ensuing period **from the fall of 1983 through the fall of 1984, the Soviet Union abandoned the two-track policy of differentiated détente and incrementally moved to a policy of defiance toward both Western Europe and the United States.** During this period, not only were there no nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States, but also there was a gradual, perceptible hardening in Moscow's policies and attitudes toward Western Europe across a range of issues. This hardening was manifested in an isolationist, siege mentality that was eventually reflected in unusually harsh Soviet propaganda attacks on Western leaders, especially President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl; the Soviet-orchestrated boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics; and a new degree of emphasis in Moscow on military matters, political threats, and self-reliance. This policy stance, which by the late spring of 1984 had become as harsh toward Western Europe as the United States, was clearly intended to promote a war-scare hysteria and to increase popular pressures on Western governments to modify their arms control and defense policies.

In the end, this policy course failed as the countries of the West stood united; went forward with their respective defense modernization programs; and proceeded, with the exception of the Netherlands, to deploy medium-range missiles on schedule. By the summer of 1984—ironically, at the same time that Soviet pressures on the East Europeans to curtail contacts with Bonn were still growing—the **Soviet Union gave the first signs of realization that a policy of uniform defiance toward Western Europe and the United States was not going to achieve its intended objectives.** Fragmentary hints of a future new Soviet approach toward the West began to emerge. This new, less inward-looking approach took concrete shape soon after the 1984 American elections as the Soviets agreed to new "umbrella" talks in Geneva on limiting long-range, medium-range, and space weapons and Soviet politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev paid a mid-December 1984 visit to London.

Within a three-month period following the widely acclaimed Gorbachev visit to Britain, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Rome and Madrid, politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitsky led a high-level delegation to Washington, and German Foreign Minister Genscher paid a surprise visit to Moscow. On the occasion of all of these visits, the Soviets simultaneously sought to pursue possible avenues for cooperation and to criticize America's Strategic Defense Initiative

(SDI), arguing that it was likely to lead to a new destabilizing spiral in the arms race. Soviet attention seemed to have shifted away from the INF deployments, although they continued to be a cause for sporadic Soviet criticism, to America's strategic defense programs. **From the Soviet point of view, America's SDI seemed to be not only of growing military concern but of increasing political saliency and vulnerability in the West.**

In the summer of 1985, what can be said about the probable course of near-term Soviet relations with Western Europe? **Most likely, the Soviets will pursue the kind of differentiated détente policy toward the West that they pursued during most of 1983, before they opted for a policy of defiance.** This differentiated détente policy would, in essence, have two tracks, as was the case earlier. On one track would be relations with the United States. Here, arms control talks would go forward with rhetorical support for a revived détente relationship but with little prospect for success except on Soviet terms. For concrete progress to be achieved in arms control, there would have to be, from Moscow's vantage point, new flexibility on the American side on "space strike weapons," testing of antisatellite weapons, nuclear weapons testing, and the deployment of intermediate-range and strategic nuclear weapons.

Moreover, even in the absence of substantial concessions from the United States on these issues, it seems likely that Moscow will continue in the near term to prospect in talks with the United States, hoping to gain new arms control or trade concessions from American officials. This approach would have the added advantage of buying time for the new Gorbachev regime to consolidate its position and at the same time allow the Soviet Union to pursue most effectively the second track of its differentiated détente policy—that of widening differences between the United States and its European allies.

In the summer of 1985, there is growing evidence that the Soviet Union in the service of a wedge-driving effort has launched a peace offensive in Europe centered around criticism of America's strategic defense effort. Indeed, both the Soviet Union and the United States seem to be prospecting in and posturing about arms control discussions and at the same time trying to convince West European parliaments and publics that it is serious about those arms control negotiations. Curiously, it seems that each superpower is more confident about its efforts to positively influence European opinion about its intentions than about the possibilities of achieving concrete progress in the Geneva talks themselves.

In the absence of significant progress at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in November, this wedge-driving, differentiated détente

policy will probably continue to be Soviet policy through at least the next Soviet party congress, expected in February 1986. **What might future Soviet policy toward Western Europe be? There would seem to be at least five paths that the Soviet Union might follow**—each with precedents in the recent past—although differences in near-term Soviet policy may in practice be only a matter of emphasis and Soviet foreign policy choices may be constrained due to preoccupation with internal matters. **One policy alternative would be to continue to pursue the kind of wedge-driving policy that characterized Soviet policy during most of 1983, for example, and that has as its hallmark a sharp differentiation in policy toward Western Europe and the United States.** With the United States, political and economic relations would be limited. And although arms control talks would go forward, no progress would be likely, except on Soviet terms. On the other hand, bilateral Soviet-West European relations would go forward and there may well be a renewed Soviet peace offensive aimed at West European governments and publics. Such a Soviet effort would likely focus on preventing “the militarization of space,” stopping all nuclear testing, achieving a nuclear freeze, gaining a no-first use of nuclear weapons pledge, and instituting a moratorium on INF deployments.

A second policy alternative would be the converse of the first option, i.e., a differentiated Soviet policy that envisaged better relations with the United States and cool Soviet relations with Western Europe. With the United States, the Soviets would pursue arms control agreements with new vigor and flexibility. Such a positive Soviet policy toward the United States would likely go beyond arms control to entail expanded trade relations and freer emigration policies. Concerning Europe, this policy alternative would envisage the purposeful continuation of limited political and economic relations. Under this alternative, a variant of which was pursued by Moscow during much of the 1960s, the Soviet Union might tighten the screws on its East European allies and prevent forward movement in their ties with the West.

A third policy alternative would be for the Soviet Union to adopt the kind of policy of defiance toward the West that it implemented during the fall 1983-late 1984 period. This policy would likely be characterized by: strained political relations between the Soviet Union and the governments of Western Europe, a virtual frozen silence in U.S.-Soviet political relations, and no nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States. Such a policy of defiance would be directed at both the governments and publics of the West and would be inspired by the thought of intimidating the U.S.—both

directly and indirectly through West European pressure—into pursuing policies more favorable to Soviet interests.

A fourth policy alternative would involve an active Soviet effort to pursue a broad-based neo-détente relationship with both Western Europe and the United States. Such a Soviet policy course, hoping to go beyond the détente era of the early 1970s, would likely entail new Soviet flexibility concerning political, cultural, human rights, and most importantly, arms control. This policy option would inevitably mean that the Soviet Union would have to modify its thinking about a number of current arms control issues of contention, including the need for strategic defense and more stringent verification measures.

A fifth policy alternative would be a purposefully confrontational policy toward the West, the opposite of the neo-détente alternative. Under this option, resembling the Soviet policy course during most of the 1950s, East-West areas of difference would be directly addressed, not swept under the rug. Contentious issues such as Berlin might be brought to the fore. Aggressiveness and interventionism would be the hallmarks of this fifth Soviet policy alternative.

What will determine which alternative policy the Soviet Union will adopt toward the West in the near term? It seems likely that Soviet perceptions of the emerging evidence regarding at least three considerations will be of central significance:

- The possibility of gaining new concessions from the United States through the continued pursuit of its present policy course
- The degree of continued Atlantic Alliance unity over defense and arms control policies
- The electoral prospects of antinuclear opposition parties in Western Europe in the late 1980s

Regardless of which of these policy lines the Soviet Union adopts, it is safe to assume that the Soviet Union will not abandon its fundamental objectives in Europe—the transformation of the status quo in Europe in favor of Soviet interests and the ultimate creation of a pan-European security arrangement including the Soviet Union and excluding the United States. Soviet tactics to achieve these objectives, however, can and do change, depending on pragmatic judgments at any given time. Accordingly, it is in the West's interests to understand the forces that affect these judgments and to act in ways to try to induce the Soviet Union to pursue policies that will be relatively more constructive from a Western point of view.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1985, there is hope but also uncertainties associated with future Soviet policy toward Western Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet General Secretary, is a member of a younger generation of Soviet leaders whose public statements have frequently emphasized domestic priorities. Mr. Gorbachev personally has been dropping hints that Russia may now be considering an "alternative foreign policy"—an attempt to detach Western Europe and Japan from the United States. At the same time, a changing politburo is issuing statements professing support of détente with the United States. And American-Soviet arms control talks are under way in Geneva concerning strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons and weapons in space. Other talks are going forward with respect to such regional issues as the Middle East as well as expanded Soviet commercial and cultural relations with the West. And Soviet officials—from General Secretary Gorbachev to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to former Foreign Minister and now President Gromyko—have recently visited several countries in Western Europe to discuss issues of common concern.

What do these developments and activities portend for future Soviet policy toward Western Europe? It is, of course, impossible to say definitively, particularly given short-term political and economic uncertainties in the Soviet Union. It is safe to say, though, that Soviet relations with Western Europe in the short term are likely to reflect a good deal of continuity with the past. Accordingly, one important way to discern possible future directions in Soviet policy toward the West is to examine recent Soviet relations with Western Europe. This study is intended to do just that. Its purpose is to review developments in Soviet relations with the West in 1983-84 as a background to analyzing possible alternative Soviet policies toward Western Europe in 1985-86 and beyond.

First, key recent events and trends in East-West relations are examined, with the emphasis on developments in the last two years.

Second, the report examines several alternative policy options available to the Soviet Union in the near and medium term. These are presented as idealized, distinct variants, suggesting the range of Soviet choices. In reality, differences among these alternatives may be a matter of emphasis, and the range of options available to the Soviet leadership in the short term may be far more limited because of

preoccupation with internal issues than this discussion suggests. This is particularly likely to be so at this time given the generally reactive character of Soviet foreign policy and recent leadership changes in the Soviet Union.

Finally, the report draws conclusions about where Soviet policy seems to be heading over the near term in light of the salient trends in recent Soviet policy and emerging trends in the most important European states.

Two explanatory notes about the ensuing analysis. First, for simplicity's sake, "Western Europe" is sometimes referred to in a collective sense. Of course, on most of the issues discussed there are differences among the various countries of Western Europe as well as within them. These differences, while alluded to in this paper, are not examined here in great detail. Second, for the sake of analytical discussion, artificial time-lines are often used, e.g., since December 1983 or fall 1983-fall 1984. In reality, developments under discussion have typically been gradual and evolutionary.

II. THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE

With Europe's central political, military, and economic importance, it is not surprising that in the postwar period the Soviet Union has pursued a multipronged policy toward Western Europe. This policy has typically been designed to achieve simultaneously six objectives:

- To maintain a Soviet military advantage in the European theater, so that the West Europeans continue to feel militarily vulnerable vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
- To ensure continued East European responsiveness to Soviet interests.
- To gain wide acknowledgment for the Soviet Union of co-equal superpower status with the United States.
- To expand Soviet access to Western technology and credits.
- To loosen American political and military ties with Western Europe.
- To transform the pluralistic systems of Western Europe from within by aiding "progressive" forces in these countries.¹

During the first half of the 1970s, the Soviet Union pursued these objectives in Europe in the context of its overall policies toward the West, with the United States and Western Europe taken together. Negotiations to clarify the status of West Berlin, to sanctify the postwar division of Europe, to expand investment and trade with the West, and to establish controls on conventional forces in Central Europe were all pursued by the Soviets in an overall East-West context. This is not to suggest that any of these or other initiatives reflected Soviet abandonment of the above-noted objectives in Western Europe. Rather, the Soviets, at the time, seemed pragmatically to judge that these objectives in Europe, including the loosening of European political and military ties with the United States, could best be achieved against a background of Soviet dealings with the United States.

Implicit in this approach was Soviet recognition of the fact that it would be hard to further Soviet objectives in Western Europe without at least some *modus vivendi* with the United States. America appeared too central to the issues involved—or at least was seen to be by the

¹For a more detailed discussion of these postwar Soviet objectives, see Hannes Adomeit, "Capitalist Contradictions and Soviet Policy," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1984, pp. 7-16.

governments of Western Europe—for the Soviet Union to seek to attain its European objectives in any significant measure without substantial American involvement. Put another way, for most of this period, dealing bilaterally with the governments of Western Europe on these and other issues was seen by the Soviet Union as either impossible or likely to be unproductive in terms of furthering its objectives in Europe.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, as U.S.-Soviet relations waned, Soviet thinking began to change with respect to the wisdom and efficacy of dealing directly with Western Europe. Sensing substantial European interest in retaining certain benefits of East-West détente and perceiving America, especially since 1980, to be at odds with much of Europe on East-West détente, the Soviet Union increasingly began to pursue its objectives in Western Europe in the context of a policy of "differentiated détente." The focus of this differentiated Soviet policy was Western Europe, rather than the United States, and in the early 1980s the emphasis was on maintaining and expanding bilateral commercial, political, and cultural ties with those governments of Western Europe that seemed ready for cooperation.

While important in their own right, these ties were valuable from the Soviet point of view as a way of "de-demonizing" the Soviet Union in European eyes and of driving a wedge between European and American interests across a range of political, military, and economic issues. Out of this expanding relationship, Moscow hoped that the Soviet Union would establish the basis for long-standing bilateral Soviet-European ties and at the same time erase the menacing image many Europeans had held of the Soviet Union during the postwar period. Further, it was hoped that in European eyes the United States would gradually replace the Soviet Union in this menacing role and in so doing would accelerate the loosening of American-European political and military ties.

Despite the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the imposition of martial law in Poland, and the growing Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe, this differentiated Soviet approach to the West did not fall on completely deaf ears in Western Europe in the early 1980s. Indeed, many West Europeans inside and outside government circles felt that Europe had profited and could continue to profit from détente—"by an increased feeling of security from the danger of war, by the profits of East-West trade, and by cultural exchange between East and West."² Additionally, many West Europeans felt that limited

²William Griffith, "The Soviets and Western Europe: An Overview," in Herbert Ellison, *Soviet Policy toward Western Europe*, University of Washington Press, Seattle,

East-West détente afforded Western Europe a desirable degree of autonomy from an inconsistent and potentially threatening United States.

Finally, there were a considerable number of people in Western Europe who took a fairly relaxed view of the immediacy or the magnitude of the Soviet threat and were relatively optimistic about the possibility for eventual systematic transformation in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Believing that détente was not fully pursued by the United States in the 1970s, holders of this viewpoint believed that Western Europe should try to create new interdependencies with the Soviets that would make it unattractive for the Soviet Union to disrupt a growing economic, political, and cultural relationship with the West. New interdependencies, it was believed, would bring with them over time real possibilities for the development of more pluralistic societies in the East, the basis for a lasting peace in Europe. Such views gave the Soviet leadership further encouragement in its efforts to construct and consolidate a network of ties directly with the countries of Western Europe.

From the point of view of Soviet policy, the nature of this expanding network of Soviet-European linkages in 1981-82 was varied and widespread. In the economic area, the emphasis in Soviet policy was on energy and high-technology projects. Among the most important and highly visible of the Soviet efforts was, of course, the Urengoi natural-gas pipeline. In part, this project was pursued by the Soviets for purely economic reasons, i.e., they wanted to secure a future source of hard-currency earnings and to channel Western capital and technology into Soviet energy programs. More importantly, however, this project was motivated by political considerations. In the view of Soviet commentator Genrikh Trofimenko, for example, the pipeline was not intended to "serve purely selfish [i.e., Soviet economic] interests," but was also "a symbol for freeing Western Europe in one way or another from subordination to U.S. economic policy."³

Bilateral Soviet-European cooperative efforts in the early 1980s were notable not only in the energy area but across a range of other activities as well. In the commercial sphere, for example, the Soviet Union sought and concluded a wide range of new bilateral agreements, significantly increasing the Soviet share of European markets ranging from cut lumber to Lada cars. In quite a different area, in June 1982 a Frenchman, the first non-American, Western astronaut, was launched into earth orbit with two Soviet cosmonauts. He stayed in space for

1984, p. 21. See also David Andelman, "Struggle Over Western Europe," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1982-83, pp. 37-51.

³Quoted in John Van Oudenaren, *The Urengoi Pipeline: Prospects for Soviet Leverage*, The Rand Corporation, R-3207, December 1984, p. 11.

nine days, docking his space capsule with a Soviet space station, and making an important mark in European-Soviet space cooperation. In addition, a host of new, expanded cultural programs was set up between the Soviet Union and various European countries. The overall, long-term impact of these and other early 1980s Soviet initiatives cannot yet be evaluated. There is little question, though, that they signalled a new focus in Soviet dealings with the West, reflecting at least a temporary change in Moscow's thinking about how best to accomplish its goals in Western Europe.

III. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE, WINTER 1982-FALL 1983

By January 1983, this budding, early-1980s Soviet policy of differentiated détente had matured into what Arnold Horelick has termed "a full-blown two-track Soviet strategy for managing East-West relations."¹ On one track was Soviet policy toward the United States; on the other, Soviet policy toward the West more generally. These two tracks were being pursued simultaneously and were viewed by Moscow as complementary rather than conflicting in terms of furthering Soviet objectives in Europe.

On the track concerning the United States, by late 1982 the focus of Soviet policy was almost exclusively on arms control. Ideally, the Soviets would have liked to expand and transform the character of the Soviet-American relationship in the 1980s into a multifaceted web of interrelationships—economic, political, cultural—building on those links begun in the early 1970s. Such a broad-based web of interrelationships, if properly set up from Moscow's point of view, would have served Soviet interests on a number of issues, including arms control, technology transfer, East-West trade, and third world interests, among others. However, given widespread American disillusionment with the kind of one-sided détente relationship that in the U.S. view characterized American-Soviet relations in the early 1970s, this was not a realistic possibility for the Soviet leadership to try to develop. In fact, by the winter of 1982-83, the Soviet Union seemed to write off the United States as a near-term partner across a range of economic, political, and cultural activities. This was not the case, though, in the area of arms control, an area in which Europeans were not yet in a position to negotiate directly in any case. Here, the Soviet Union seemed anxious to do business with the United States and accepted the initiation of talks on limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in late November 1981 following President Reagan's zero-option proposal and talks on reducing strategic arms (START) which began in June 1982, soon after President Reagan's speech on strategic arms control delivered at Eureka College.

At the same time that the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of arms control without détente toward the United States, it was also

¹"Moscow's Response to the Reagan Administration Focus on INF," an unpublished discussion paper for the May 31, 1983, meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on the Soviet Union, p. 11.

pursuing another policy track. This track was aimed at "exploiting and widening differences between the United States and its NATO allies that are rooted in their varying geographic circumstances, political traditions, historical experiences, and economic and security interests vis-à-vis the East."² By the winter of 1982-83, the focus of this aspect of Soviet policy was on preventing the deployment of NATO intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. As in the past, Soviet policy was aimed, among other things, at opportunistically exploiting differences within the Atlantic Alliance in order to weaken European political and military links with the United States while simultaneously undercutting popular support for national defense programs in Western Europe. What distinguished Soviet policy toward the West during the period beginning in the winter of 1982 was thus not its underlying objective so much as the intensity with which it focused on the NATO intermediate-range nuclear force deployments.

It is true that virtually since December 1979, when NATO had pronounced its dual-track decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe in the absence of a new arms control agreement, the Soviet Union had given high priority to heading off the deployment of these medium-range forces. In 1981-82, at the same time that the Soviet Union was working to develop a range of bilateral links with the countries of Western Europe, the USSR also was seeking to prevent NATO INF deployments through a new arms control agreement with the United States. As Alexander Haig has noted in talking about this period during which he was Secretary of State, concerning both the INF and START negotiations, "the Soviets were eager for an arms control (agreement) with the United States. Dobrynin never failed to mention it. The Soviets were willing to talk on almost any basis."³

By the time that the winter of 1982 arrived, however, the Soviet Union, while continuing to participate in the Geneva negotiations, seemed to have given up serious hope for an agreement on terms acceptable to Moscow. For by the end of 1982, the central features of the Soviet negotiating posture at the INF talks seemed set in concrete—no NATO intermediate-range forces on any terms,⁴ and a

²Ibid., p. 12.

³*Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy*, Macmillan, New York, 1984, p. 228.

⁴In mid-1982, there had seemed to be a brief possibility that Moscow might retreat on this central demand as the so-called "walk-in-the-woods" initiative was informally discussed by Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart at the INF talks, Yuli Kvitsinsky. This initiative would have had both sides reduce their total number of INF deployments. The West was to retain 75 cruise missile launchers with a total of 300 warheads and the Soviets would retain 75 SS-20s in Europe with a total of 225 warheads. As part of the proposed package, NATO would forgo any deployments of Pershing II ballistic missiles and the Soviet Union would drop its insistence on pegging Soviet INF deployments to

reduced SS-20 force only in exchange for a comparable limit on British and French nuclear forces. At the START talks, the Soviet position was comparably intransigent. At both sets of talks, the Soviet position was patently unacceptable to the United States and the Soviet government clearly knew this. Nevertheless, the Soviets persisted in reiterating their positions in private and pressing in public their views concerning the respective negotiations.

In retrospect, by the winter of 1982 the Soviets appear to have become less interested in exploring the possibility of finding arms control compromises and in attempting to prevent the deployment of medium-range forces through a negotiated agreement with the United States, and more determined to prevent these deployments through the manipulation of disagreements within the Atlantic Alliance. Put another way, on INF, there was by early 1983 more of an emphasis in Soviet policy on exploiting differences within the Atlantic Alliance—the second track in its Western policy—than on the first track of probing for a compromise with the United States to achieve a negotiated agreement. In part, this change in emphasis in Soviet policy was attributable to a perception that concessions acceptable to the USSR were unlikely to be obtained from the United States in Geneva. In other part, this change was also attributable to Soviet perceptions about the centrifugal tendencies and growing strength of the peace movement on both sides of the Atlantic; antinuclear church groups, especially in northern Europe; and major opposition parties in the five countries scheduled to receive medium-range missiles—the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium. Thus, such an approach offered the Soviet leadership the near-term prospect of possibly killing or deferring the deployments without any commensurate Soviet concessions and the longer-term prospect of inflicting lasting damage upon U.S. security relations with its European allies.⁵

THE CAMPAIGNS FROM ABOVE AND BELOW

There were, in essence, two parts to this emerging, negative Soviet effort to prevent the deployment of NATO intermediate-range nuclear

the level of British and French nuclear systems. For a detailed discussion of this initiative, which ultimately was rejected by both Moscow and Washington, see Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1984, pp. 116–151.

⁵For more discussion of this evolving Soviet viewpoint, see William Bundy, "1983: A Portentous Year," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World* 1983, pp. 501–503. Also see Pierre Hassner, "The Shifting Foundation," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 48, Fall 1982, pp. 3–20.

forces by disagreements in the Atlantic Alliance. One part was "a campaign from above." This was a major, near-term political and propaganda effort to persuade the governments and elites in Western Europe not to go forward with these deployments, i.e., to reverse the 1979 dual-track decision "from above." The second part of the Soviet effort was a "campaign from below," which was characterized by concerted "active measures" that would exploit European fears and misgivings in order to create a mass opposition able to prevent the deployments and possibly to elect "progressive" forces inclined to stop deployment. There was nothing particularly new about these Soviet campaigns. Similar efforts supporting other Soviet interests had been pursued in the past. They were now pursued with great ardor, and the Soviets clearly hoped that both parts of this campaign together would create an "island of peace" in Europe, an area in which NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces would not be welcome.⁶

During the first half of 1983, national elections were to take place in the three most important European countries scheduled to receive the new intermediate-range nuclear forces—the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. And in each of these countries, the emphasis of Soviet policy was on an effort "from above" and "from below" to prevent the planned NATO deployments. In each of these countries, there was a distinct possibility that the opposition might gain power and cancel or defer the deployments. In each, there was also a definite possibility that the ruling party, if subjected to enough domestic political pressure, might be inclined to change the terms of the initial dual-track decision, e.g., by stretching out the deployment schedule or possibly by reducing the number of missiles to be deployed. In any case, in each of these countries, the Soviet Union made a concerted effort through the INF issue to shape current and future defense policy.

THE STRUGGLE IN GERMANY

Of the three major NATO countries scheduled to begin deployment of medium-range missiles at the end of 1983, the Federal Republic of Germany was the centerpiece for the Soviet Union. From a Soviet point of view, West Germany was not only the most important deployment country—it was the only country to receive Pershing II missiles—but it also was the country in which opposition to the dual-

⁶For a detailed discussion of this two-part Soviet campaign to stop INF deployment, see Alexander Alexiev, *The Soviet Campaign Against INF: Strategy, Tactics, Means*, The Rand Corporation (forthcoming).

track decision was potentially strongest. In October 1981, 250,000 protestors had appeared in Bonn to denounce the dual-track decision. By 1982, there were more than 1.5 million signatures affixed to the Krefeld Appeal, a document drawn up in the town of Krefeld in November 1980 that called for no nuclear missiles in Europe. And perhaps most importantly, there was a serious split within the Social Democratic Party on this issue, with the official position of the party seemingly undecided.

In part because of growing differences in West Germany on the INF issue, the coalition of German Social Democrats and Free Democrats under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, which had governed the country since 1969, fell apart in the fall of 1982. A Christian Democrat-Free Democrat coalition under Chancellor Helmut Kohl acceded to power, with the Social Democrats in opposition. A new national election was set for March 1983; looking toward that election, the Social Democrats held a party congress in November 1982. For both political and personal reasons, Schmidt chose not to serve as the party's candidate for chancellor in the next election and Hans-Jochen Vogel was chosen as Schmidt's successor. At the November party congress, Vogel, along with party chairman Willy Brandt, led the opposition to the planned INF deployments. In the end, despite the opposition of Schmidt, the Vogel position handily prevailed, with only 14 of 400 delegates backing Schmidt in supporting the NATO decision. Clearly the two major political parties in West Germany were now polarized over the INF issue. And these developments presented the Soviet Union with a major target of opportunity to influence the outcome of the upcoming election in favor of the opposition Social Democrats and in so doing, potentially to drive a major wedge between Europe and the United States on defense policy. Given the stakes, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union made a strenuous and in many ways unprecedented effort to exploit the situation.

In early January 1983, the Soviet Union invited Social Democratic Party leader Vogel to visit Moscow in an obvious attempt to enhance his image as an international statesman and hence to influence the German election. Once in the Soviet Union, Vogel was given audiences with the highest officials in the government, including the new General Secretary Yuri Andropov. In his talk with Vogel, Andropov hinted at a variety of inducements, including possible new concessions in arms control, commercial incentives, and potential new approaches to the long-standing problem of divided German families, provided that the Federal Republic opted not to accept intermediate-range nuclear forces on its soil.

Similar themes were voiced during a visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the Federal Republic later that January. On his four-day visit, Gromyko talked about the importance of creating a 90-mile-wide nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and the need for new East-West arms control initiatives. Publicly saying that he had no favorite candidate in the upcoming election, Gromyko indicated that the Soviet Union would be willing to reduce its SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 deployments, if West Germany would be willing to defer INF deployments. Sensing that a positive response would not likely be forthcoming from the Federal Republic if Chancellor Kohl were kept in power, as the polls indicated was probable, Gromyko proceeded to display the Soviet proclivity for counterproductive heavy-handedness and publicly threatened the Federal Republic with dire political and military consequences if INF deployments went ahead on schedule.

Both before and after Vogel's visit to Moscow and Gromyko's visit to Bonn, the Soviet Union made a concerted effort to influence the German election through an intensified propaganda campaign aimed at elite opinion in the Federal Republic. The focus of this campaign was a "peace offensive," which stressed that the United States was to blame for the seeming stalemate in the Geneva talks; that the Soviet Union was a "peace-loving," conciliatory security partner; and that world peace would be in jeopardy if Helmut Kohl were successful in the upcoming election, for the Christian Democrats would lead the Federal Republic to the "nuclear gallows" by going ahead with INF deployments.

As concrete proof of the Soviet Union's sincere interest in furthering peace in Europe, a bevy of arms control proposals and trial balloons were put forward in German newspapers and through German-language broadcasts from Moscow. Coordinated and directed by the fairly new International Information Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, this "peace offensive" effort featured the active involvement of such high-level Soviet officials as Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department; Valentin Falin, former Soviet Ambassador in Bonn; Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the CPSU International Department; and Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute on the USA and Canada. All of the Soviet proposals that they and others publicly and privately advocated, if implemented, had some elements in common: they all would have preserved Soviet superiority in medium-range force deployments,

prevented any Western INF deployments, and seriously strained U.S.-European military and political ties.

Coincident with this Soviet political and propaganda campaign aimed at affecting West German governmental and elite opinion was a "campaign from below." Here, the Soviet Union attempted to stop INF deployments through gaining influence and leverage among politically active groups and movements in the Federal Republic. Encouraged by its perceived success in the late 1970s in stopping the U.S. deployment in Europe of the enhanced radiation warhead (neutron bomb), the Soviet Union employed a variety of both overt and covert measures designed to enhance the role and influence of anti-INF forces within the Federal Republic. This campaign involved the use of several front organizations as agents of influence and disinformation, including the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions; the German Communist Party (DKP); and such DKP-controlled organizations as the German Peace Union, which was a prime sponsor of the Krefeld Appeal, the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation, and others.

In addition, the "campaign from below" involved helping to organize, support, and manipulate the German peace movement so that it would move in a fairly cohesive and effective way in directions congenial to the Soviet Union. The Soviets clearly did not start or control the peace movement or "progressive" elements in the labor or church movement in the Federal Republic. They did, however, make a major attempt to influence its activities, orientation, and effectiveness and hoped to directly benefit from their political efforts. Zagladin implied this in a now-famous April 1983 interview on Hungarian television when he observed that, "we can expect sober forces once again to take the upper hand. Or rather not so much that they will take the upper hand, but that political movements will push them into the forefront. We won't do the pushing; political movements there (in the West) will do it."⁷ And several months later, L. Istyagin, a Soviet commentator, spoke directly to this point when he noted:

To the credit of the basic nucleus of the present antiwar movement, it has been able, surmounting its internal weaknesses and rejecting the diversionary promptings of unbidden "well-wishers" to ascertain the central, truly decisive element at this stage of the struggle to ensure peace and security in Europe. This element, as the absolute

⁷*Pravda*, April 8, 1983.

majority of anti-war organizations acknowledges, is prevention of the deployment in Western Europe of new American nuclear weapons and the conversion of Europe into a nuclear-free zone."

In the end, the Soviets overplayed their hand in the 1983 electoral campaign: their strenuous, overt attempts to influence the German election seemed to be counterproductive. To his ultimate electoral benefit, Chancellor Kohl, nine days before the election, termed Vogel "the candidate of the Soviet Union" and issued a popular, hard-ringing statement, denouncing "the massive and hitherto unprecedented manner in which the Soviet Union is interfering in the election and the internal politics of the Federal Republic of Germany."⁹ In any case, partly because of the INF issue and partly because of domestic economic issues, the Christian Democratic Party under Chancellor Kohl won an overwhelming electoral victory, gaining 244 seats in the 498-member Bundestag. The opposition Social Democrats, in a major setback, won only 193 seats, while the new Green Party won 27 seats. Despite the disruptive efforts of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany in early 1983 was clearly committed to deploying INF forces beginning the following winter.

THE STRUGGLE IN BRITAIN

Their failure during the winter of 1983 to alter West German policy on the INF issue did not deter the Soviets from trying to influence subsequent national elections in both Great Britain and Italy. Britain was seen by Moscow to be second in importance to the Federal Republic of Germany in terms of INF deployments. In the Soviet view, however, cruise missile deployments in Britain were important not only in their own right but also in terms of their effect on other potential deployment countries. For if these deployments were repudiated or even deferred in Britain, there might well be a ripple effect elsewhere, including possibly West Germany.

Early in the spring of 1983, British Prime Minister Thatcher opted to call for new national elections in June, 11 months before the end of the Conservatives' five-year term. Buoyed by favorable public opinion polls, Mrs. Thatcher clearly wanted to reaffirm her mandate prior to the actual arrival in Britain of ground-launched cruise missiles at the end of the year and before the economy worsened. Unlike the situation

⁸Quoted in Alexiev, p. 39. For more details about this Soviet "campaign from below," see Alexiev, pp. 21-39. See also Wynfred Joshua, "Soviet Manipulation of the European Peace Movement," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1983, pp. 9-18.

⁹*The New York Times*, February 26, 1983, p. 1.

in West Germany in early 1983, where the ruling party was new to power and the opposition Social Democratic Party was somewhat split on the INF issue, in Britain the Conservatives had been in power for four years, the position of the Thatcher-led government was solidly supportive of the NATO dual-track decision, and the opposition Labour Party was solidly opposed to any NATO INF deployments.

Accordingly, the Soviets, perhaps learning from their mistakes in the German electoral campaign, opted to play a less strident, lower key role in their efforts to help "progressive forces," i.e., the Labour Party, replace the Conservative Thatcher government. In the British electoral campaign, for example, the Soviet Union did not invite Labour opposition leader Michael Foot to visit Moscow as it had invited German Social Democratic leader Vogel earlier in the year. Nor did the Soviet leadership visit Britain during the campaign in an effort to boost the cause of "progressive forces" or openly try to propagandize in favor of Labour. Indeed, during the course of the 1983 British electoral campaign, the Soviet Union publicly kept its distance from the Labour Party, its leaders, and other sympathetic British political leaders, despite its obvious electoral preferences.

What the Soviet Union did do was to give behind-the-scenes encouragement to political movements in Britain which, it was hoped, would push forces favorable to Soviet purposes to the forefront. Most notable of these in the 1983 electoral campaign was the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a long-standing antinuclear movement that worked closely with the Left within Labour. Founded in the late 1950s, the CND advocated unilateral British nuclear disarmament as well as withdrawal from NATO. It had reached the height of its strength in 1960-61, only to lose power over the next several years due to internal squabbling and the atmospheric test ban treaty, among other reasons.

After the 1979 NATO decision was announced, the CND had experienced a Phoenix-like rise that played upon growing fears in Britain about the possibility of nuclear war. Led by Marxist historian E. P. Thompson, Monsignor Bruce Kent, Labour activist Tony Benn, and Communist coal miner Arthur Scargill, the CND published several pamphlets which depicted British and NATO nuclear policy as leading inevitably to nuclear war. In its public efforts, the CND played a key role in organizing a number of mass demonstrations, including one that involved egg-throwing at Defense Minister Michael Heseltine, who on that occasion equated anti-INF CND activists with "communists."¹⁰ In its intellectual efforts, the CND made a major move to persuade the

¹⁰See *The Guardian*, April 24, 1983.

British people of the folly of both the NATO dual-track decision and the British decision to procure Trident. In this, the CND succeeded in gaining new credibility in the public mind by its association with a number of respected British thinkers, including former Army Chief of Staff Lord Carver and former Chief Scientific Advisor Solly Zuckerman, who had personal doubts about the wisdom of these decisions. Finally, in its electoral efforts, the CND initiated, supported, and orchestrated a massive national drive to get voters to elect anti-INF candidates to replace the "pro-nuclear" majority in the Parliament.

Although the CND did succeed in making the INF issue highly visible in the June electoral campaign, it did not succeed in helping to elect an anti-INF majority in the House of Commons. Labour was soundly defeated, with the Conservatives gaining a 140-seat majority over its combined opposition in Parliament. The election represented Labour's worst defeat since 1922 and set Britain on a course to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear forces beginning in December 1983, despite the hopes and efforts of the Soviet Union and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The election campaign, did, however, leave Britain, as it did West Germany, with a highly polarized political situation and an opposition party vehemently anti-INF and antinuclear.¹¹

THE STRUGGLE IN ITALY

While not so critically important as West Germany and Great Britain in terms of INF deployments, Italy, in Soviet eyes, was still of considerable significance. This was so not only because of the planned cruise missile emplacements in Sicily but also because the Federal Republic of Germany had insisted on the principle of nonsingularity, tying its deployment decision to the decision of at least one other European continental power to go ahead with INF deployments. Since the commitment of Belgium and the Netherlands to the dual-track decision was widely seen as fairly weak, Italy was of great importance to Soviet interests, particularly for its possible effect on deployments in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In April 1983, Socialist leader Bettino Craxi forced a new national election in Italy by withdrawing his party's support from the Christian Democrat-led, four-party coalition government. Craxi's decision to force new elections was not motivated as much by the INF issue—the

¹¹For a more detailed discussion of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the 1983 electoral campaign in Britain more generally, see Christopher Bowie and Alan Platt, *British Nuclear Policymaking*, The Rand Corporation, R-3085-AF, January 1984, pp. 63-70.

Socialists (PSI) backed the Christian Democratic Party in supporting the dual-track decision—as by differences over economic issues and his own personal ambition. New national elections were set for June 26–27, 1983.

Despite its interest in seeing the new Italian government repudiate the planned deployment of new NATO missiles, the Soviet Union was not well situated to try to influence Italian policy directly on this issue during the 1983 electoral campaign. The governmental coalition solidly supported the INF deployment decision. Popular, antinuclear opposition in Italy was not nearly so widespread as in West Germany and Great Britain. And the Soviet image in Italy was not particularly positive in the spring of 1983 given a pending, controversial espionage case against an Aeroflot official and allegations of Soviet involvement in the plot to assassinate the Pope.

Nevertheless, with the encouragement of the Soviet Union, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) did try to make the INF issue of central concern to Italian voters in the campaign. Particularly after the Williamsburg Conference in late May 1983, wherein the heads of the seven major Western industrial democracies issued a strong statement regarding their common security interests, PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer tried hard to pressure the governing parties in Italy into modifying their support for NATO INF deployments. The major target of Berlinguer's efforts was the PCI's erstwhile allies, the Socialists, and he repeatedly urged the PSI to use its weight to defer a decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces, pending developments in Geneva. This was also the position that the PCI regularly espoused in its daily newspaper, *L'Unita*, during the campaign, and through its other publication and propaganda efforts.

In this, the Communists were unsuccessful. Despite one veiled hint by Craxi that Italy might support an INF moratorium, the PSI, in essence, remained firm in its support of the NATO decision. INF deployments did not become the kind of divisive political issue in Italy that they had become in West Germany and Great Britain. Widespread public apathy characterized the 1983 Italian electoral campaign.

In the election itself, Socialist leader Craxi emerged as the big winner, becoming Italy's first Socialist prime minister in the postwar period. Both the Christian Democrats and the Communists suffered significant losses at the polls, although they remained Italy's two largest parties. And the emergent multiparty government, led by Craxi, was firm on the INF issue, despite a highly publicized, post-election

letter from Soviet General Secretary Andropov to Craxi urging Italy to reconsider its position on INF deployments.¹²

CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET FAILURE

In their attempt to reverse the 1979 NATO dual-track decision by influencing the publics and political processes in the democracies of Western Europe, the Soviet Union had failed. It had badly miscalculated the possibility of preventing INF deployments through a combination of persuading governments and elites and aiding and using "progressive" political parties and movements in Western Europe. The periodic threats of dire consequences had been ineffective. The three major deployment countries in Europe—the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, and Italy—all had new governments in place by the end of the summer of 1983. Each of these governments was firmly committed to implementing the 1979 NATO decision on schedule. Given the central importance the Soviet Union attached to the goal of preventing the deployments, this situation had to be marked as a major setback for Soviet foreign policy.

Following these developments and after the further events of September 1983, when Korean Air Lines #007 was shot down and the United States severely criticized the Soviets for "this horrifying act," the Soviet leadership again seemed to shift its approach toward the West. No longer would there be a two-track Soviet policy—one aimed at achieving negotiated arms control agreements with the Reagan administration and the other aimed at exploiting differences within Europe and between the United States and Europe in the hope of preventing INF deployments. For the two-track approach had failed on both tracks. Now, at least in the short term, there would be a policy of intimidation toward the West in the hope of preventing the deployments from going forward on schedule in the near term and in the long term solidifying the Soviet position in Europe and disrupting European political and military ties with the United States. The long-term goal of the Soviet Union was to remain the same; its near-term tactics were now to be different, to try to take advantage of an increasingly polarized and potentially intimidated Western Europe.

On September 28, two days after a speech on the importance of arms control delivered by President Reagan at the United Nations, General Secretary Andropov issued a statement which clearly reflected this turn in Soviet thinking. Andropov questioned not the desirability

¹²See *The New York Times*, August 29, 1983, p. 1.

of better relations with the United States, but the possibility of accommodation with Washington. Andropov observed that President Reagan's comments after the KAL incident and at the United Nations "finally dispelled any illusions" that the Soviet Union had about working with the United States on arms control.¹³

In retrospect, Andropov's statement clearly foretold a subsequent general hardening of Soviet tactics, although the shift did not become apparent until December. For the next few months, during the remainder of the fall of 1983, the Soviet Union pursued essentially the same policy course that it had pursued for most of that year, with INF and START talks taking place on schedule and with the Soviet Union simultaneously continuing to make a major, active effort to aid and use "progressive" forces within Western Europe to stop or defer INF deployments. Indeed, aided and encouraged by the Soviet Union, a number of record-size public demonstrations against the missile deployment took place in several European capitals during that "hot autumn."

Meanwhile, on October 26, Andropov issued a statement that hinted at a range of possible concessions in Geneva, concessions that were privately discussed by Yuli Kvitsinsky, the chief Soviet delegate at the INF talks, in the so-called "walk-in-the park" initiative. In Andropov's statement and Kvitsinsky's private conversations with chief U.S. INF negotiator Paul Nitze, the Soviets indicated that they were prepared to freeze SS-20 deployments in Asia once an overall agreement was in force. They also hinted at "additional flexibility" on the matter of medium-range nuclear-capable aircraft, suggesting that the Soviet Union might change its proposal so as not to impinge quite so stringently on conventionally armed NATO aircraft. Most importantly, they raised the prospect of the Soviets' reducing their SS-20s in Europe from 243 to about 140, below the equivalent level (162) of British and French ballistic-missile launchers. Also, Andropov's formulation seemed to suggest that the Soviet government had finally accepted the Reagan administration's notion of counting nuclear warheads rather than only launchers.¹⁴

Nevertheless, Andropov also declared that the arms talks would continue only if the United States "renounced the deployment of its missiles in Europe within the announced deadlines." He thus made it clear that the Soviet leadership would no longer even discuss compromise with the United States once the Soviet Union became certain that the deployments were in fact going to begin in December as scheduled.

¹³*The New York Times*, September 29, 1983, p. 1.

¹⁴Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, pp. 193-206.

This ultimately took place when the German Bundestag voted on November 22 to go ahead with the INF deployments. The next day, the Soviet delegation did walk out of the INF negotiations, and on December 8, 1983, the Soviets refused to set a date to resume START. The Soviets also refused to set a new date for the resumption of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna. A new period in Soviet policy toward Western Europe had begun.

IV. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE, FALL 1983-FALL 1984

The new phase in Soviet policy toward the West was formally ushered in with the Soviet walkout of the INF and START talks in late fall 1983 and their refusal to agree to a date for a resumption of negotiations without a return to the status quo ante. On the day after the walkout from the INF talks, Andropov publicly threatened the West with stringent reprisals, saying that there would be countermeasures in Europe of a "very serious character, specific and effective," analogous to the threat that the new missiles posed to the Soviet Union. Letters spelling out this threat were then sent to Prime Minister Thatcher, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Craxi (although not to President Reagan). In the conclusion of these letters, the Kremlin made it clear that its response to Western INF deployments would be "quick and substantial" and that Soviet bilateral relations with Western Europe would be "seriously affected."¹

Andropov's statement was followed soon thereafter by a December 10, 1983, public statement by then-Soviet General Staff chief Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. Alluding to the recent American-made television film *The Day After*, Ogarkov emphasized that the threat of nuclear war was indeed "real" and that the West's decision to deploy new missiles in Europe significantly increased this threat in Europe. Ogarkov concluded his statement by urging an end to this "nuclear madness," but observing that the Soviet Union would take whatever countermeasures it deemed necessary to protect its security.²

These and other highly threatening statements were typical of this next phase of Soviet policy, which lasted roughly from the fall 1983 walkout from arms control talks until the fall of 1984. Soviet policy toward the West was characterized not only by public threats and the absence of superpower nuclear arms control negotiations but also by a perceptible hardening in Moscow's policies and attitudes across a range of matters regarding the United States and Western Europe. This hardening of policies and attitudes—almost an isolationist, siege mentality—was manifested in unusually harsh Soviet-Western communications, the Soviet-orchestrated boycott of the 1984 Olympics in

¹Walter Laqueur, "U.S.-Soviet Relations," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World* 1983, p. 569. Also, "Russian Sends Cruise Protest to Thatcher," *The Daily Telegraph*, November 29, 1983, p. 1.

²*The New York Times*, December 11, 1983, p. 1.

Los Angeles, and a new degree of emphasis on military matters, political threats, and self-reliance. Certainly, the Soviets had employed threats and pursued a tough policy line toward the West before this in an effort to influence West European leaders and public opinion. After the Soviet Union had failed to achieve its objective of stopping or postponing INF deployments, these threats became more pronounced and belligerent. And now, at least in the short term, there was no corresponding effort either to negotiate with the United States in Geneva or to foster bilateral linkages with the countries of Western Europe.³

Soviet policy toward Western Europe during this winter 1983-fall 1984 period was significantly colder, harsher, and more threatening than it had been previously. When Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti visited Moscow in April, for example, he received an unusually chilly reception from the Soviet leadership. Indeed, his Soviet hosts reminded him that the volcanic destruction of Pompeii paled in comparison with a single nuclear warhead, and are reported to have threatened that "we will turn Italy into a Pompeii" if Italy continued with INF deployments on schedule.⁴ In the communique issued at the conclusion of the Andreotti visit, bland lip service was paid to "satisfaction" with the two countries' ties in economic and other spheres. Further, it was noted that "political dialogue" would be maintained on the basis of the existing Soviet-Italian protocol on consultations.⁵

On a visit to Moscow later that spring, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher also experienced a noticeable chilliness. Before Genscher's visit, on May 4, General Secretary Chernenko not so subtly mirrored ongoing, anti-German Soviet media commentaries

³In the immediate aftermath of Andropov's death in February 1984, there was a note of conciliation in some public statements coming out of Moscow. Soon after Andropov's death, for example, General Secretary Chernenko suggested in a Supreme Soviet election speech on March 2, 1984, that there were possibilities for breaking the East-West deadlock. This speech, however, brought no concrete follow-up, and subsequent Soviet policy statements regarding the West closely resembled those issued prior to Andropov's passing. And at the end of March, when President Reagan asked retired Lt. General Brent Scowcroft to send a private message to Chernenko, the American initiative was rebuffed by the Soviet leadership. For a discussion of Chernenko's speech, the Scowcroft initiative, and possible Soviet conciliatory moves in the immediate aftermath of Andropov's death, see Arnold Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Return of Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1984*, pp. 518-520. See also Strobe Talbott, *The Russians and Reagan*, Vintage Books, New York, 1984, pp. 82-85.

⁴*The New York Times*, May 21, 1984.

⁵"Moscow's Strategy Toward West Europe Since November 1983," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, FB 84-10046, July 16, 1984, p. 4.

when he warned in a public speech about "revanchists of every ilk rearing their heads." When in Moscow, Genscher tried to explore new avenues of possible East-West cooperation, suggesting that all issues were negotiable. The Soviet response was that no issues could be negotiated until INF deployments in Western Europe ceased and were removed.⁶

Not discouraged by the treatment accorded to his fellow European foreign ministers, British Foreign Secretary Howe went ahead with his scheduled visit to the Soviet Union at the beginning of July 1984. Just before Howe's departure from London, British Prime Minister Thatcher issued a perceptibly conciliatory statement, declaring that the current impasse in East-West relations could only be broken by dealing "with the Soviet Union not as one would like it, but as it is."⁷ The Soviet leadership was not impressed, however. Howe's efforts to improve the prevailing East-West climate and to restart superpower arms control talks were totally rebuffed by Moscow and he was subjected to several vitriolic anti-Washington diatribes from Gromyko. British officials left Moscow, commenting that Gromyko had been "arid" and "disappointingly negative."⁸

It is noteworthy that during this period, Soviet treatment of "progressive elements" outside the governments of Western Europe also was harsh. Several "friendly" European visitors to Moscow in the winter-spring of 1984, including German Social Democratic Party leader Vogel, who were accustomed to ingratiating cordiality, were treated with unusual coolness. In these discussions, "progressive" European visitors repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to return to arms control negotiations, arguing that the Soviet stance was making Ronald Reagan look conciliatory and the Soviet Union intransigent in European eyes.⁹ In response, the Soviets typically talked about the imminence of nuclear war and how much 1984 resembled 1939. Their intention was clear—to frighten the European Left into believing that nuclear war was imminent, to convince them of a need to continue their fight against the deployment of new NATO missiles, and thus to try to increase pressure on the United States to change course.

At the same time, during the first half of 1984, the Soviets took several initiatives in the military sphere, all of which were highly publicized, to complement this campaign of attempted intimidation. The Soviets announced the suspension of the moratorium on SS-20

⁶*The New York Times*, May 23, 1984. Also, "Moscow's Strategy Toward West Europe Since November 1983," p. 4.

⁷*The Guardian*, June 29, 1984.

⁸*The Times*, July 3, 1984. See also *Gorbachev's Visit to London and the Elusive Anglo-Soviet Thaw*, Radio Liberty 449/84, November 26, 1984, pp. 2-4.

⁹Confidential interviews.

deployment, which they said they had put into effect in March 1982. They also deployed a significant number of additional nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, justified as counters to Western deployments of cruise missiles in Europe. The Soviets announced the stationing of more submarines closer to U.S. shores. They held unusually large naval exercises in the North Atlantic. And, finally, there was minor harassment of Western airliners coming into and leaving Berlin. As a result of a constriction of landing patterns permitted by the Soviet Union, this step was a not so subtle reminder to Bonn of the continued vulnerability of Berlin's position.

V. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE, FALL 1984-PRESENT

As part of its effort to intimidate and promote a war scare hysteria in the West, the Soviet leadership opted not to participate in any nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States in the fall 1983-fall 1984 period. Reflecting growing concern in Moscow over America's Strategic Defense Initiative, the Soviet Union seemed to change course on their path in late June 1984 when it came forward with a surprise proposal to begin talks in Vienna in September to prevent the militarization of space, including the continued development of antisatellite weapons. Soon thereafter, the Soviet government indicated that Foreign Minister Gromyko would be amenable to a private meeting with Secretary Shultz and President Reagan following his attendance at the proceedings opening the United Nations General Assembly in September.

To the Soviets' surprise, the United States, under considerable pressure from Europe, responded positively: America was willing to discuss preventing weapons in space but in the context of overall missile reduction talks. This was not what the Soviet Union seemingly had in mind. And despite a meeting between Gromyko and Secretary Shultz in New York and a subsequent meeting in Washington between Gromyko and President Reagan, no U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations took place during the fall of 1984.

Soviet relations with the countries of Western Europe were similarly inconsistent and inconclusive during the summer and fall of 1984. Of great interest to many Europeans—both West and East—was the planned trip by East German leader Erich Honecker to the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1984. This was set to follow West Germany's earlier monetary loans to the GDR and East Germany's decision to allow a large number of its citizens to emigrate to the Federal Republic. For many in Europe, the Honecker trip was of great importance not only in terms of its symbolic importance but also in terms of its possibly leading to much intensified links between the two Germanies. In the end, the Soviet leadership seemingly decided that the costs associated with a Honecker visit to Bonn, including a fear that this visit might lead to significantly improved West German-East German relations that Moscow could not control, outweighed the benefits. After a period of growing polemical warnings in the Soviet press in July and August, Honecker abruptly cancelled his trip at the last

moment. Bulgaria's Todor Zhikov, who was also scheduled to visit Bonn in September, cancelled his trip as well.

The conclusion of the 1984 U.S. election campaign, culminating in Ronald Reagan's reelection, seemed to set the stage in Moscow for the beginning of a new phase in the Soviet posture toward the West; a change in Soviet policy regarding arms negotiations with the United States was immediately noticeable. Within 10 days of the American election, General Secretary Chernenko had sent President Reagan a letter proposing new superpower arms control negotiations. Chernenko's letter led in turn to a joint announcement on November 22, 1984, that Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Shultz would meet in Geneva in January to hammer out an agenda for "umbrella" talks on arms control.

During December of 1984 and the first few months of 1985, there were a number of other signs indicating that Soviet policy was entering a new, less inward-looking phase following the American election. In mid-December 1984, Soviet politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev paid a highly publicized visit to Great Britain that was notable for a number of reasons. Among these was the fact that Mr. Gorbachev was Konstantin Chernenko's heir apparent and the fact that Britain had been repeatedly rebuffed earlier in 1984 in its attempts to normalize British-Soviet relations. During most of 1984, Great Britain had been viewed in Moscow as a staunch American ally on the INF issue and the Thatcher government was portrayed as having opted to reduce its role in international affairs to that of "a junior and frequently mute partner." In the Soviet view, London, by "backing up the U.S. administration's dangerous militarist policy and serving as its accomplice" in 1983-84, had assumed much of the responsibility "for the consequences of this short-sighted policy."¹ Now, with the Gorbachev visit, the Soviet Union on the one hand implicitly seemed to acknowledge a more independent role for Great Britain and on the other hand seemed to mark Britain as a possible focus for a new Soviet approach toward the West. For if Great Britain, the staunch ally of the United States and the linchpin of NATO, could somehow be weaned away or softened as a result of improved Soviet relations with the West, then the entire NATO structure might be undercut.

The Gorbachev visit itself augured well for an expanded Soviet relationship with the United Kingdom. In London, Gorbachev had a series of highly cordial meetings with the senior members of the Thatcher government as well as the top officials of the Labour Party. In these

¹S. Volodin, quoted in *Gorbachev's Visit to London and the Elusive Anglo-Soviet Thaw*, p. 4.

talks, Gorbachev expressly called for a "new era of détente" and expressed strong Soviet support for "major arms control reductions." The Western media widely praised Mr. Gorbachev, hailing him as "a man of power, intelligence and self-confidence." And following his week of meetings, Mrs. Thatcher surprised many in the West when she announced that she could "do business" with Mr. Gorbachev.²

Less than a week after Gorbachev's visit to London, then Soviet Premier Nikolai Tikhonov flew to Turkey. Troubled economically and a key element in NATO's southern flank, Turkey, in Soviet eyes, was a West European country and neighbor with which it was important to mend fences and improve ties. In two days of meetings, Tikhonov explored a number of areas for expanded Soviet-Turkish ties. In his talks in Ankara, Tikhonov also stressed Soviet support for "radical solutions" in the field of arms control. Before leaving Turkey, Tikhonov concluded two agreements on economic and industrial relations. One of these involved a projected \$6 billion in trade between the two countries in the next five years and the other concerned the regulation of technical and scientific relations over the next 10 years. In addition, a near-term agreement was concluded whereby Turkey would buy \$650 million of natural gas from the Soviet Union and \$60 million in electricity in exchange for Turkish food and industrial goods. All of this was agreed to in the spirit of ameliorating the "good neighborly relations" existing between the Soviet Union and Turkey.³

Ten days later, on January 7-8, 1985, former Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Shultz met in Geneva as planned. An "umbrella" framework for new arms control negotiations was in fact formally established: negotiations were to be conducted by a single delegation on each side divided into three separate working groups to deal with long-range arms, medium-range nuclear weapons, and space arms. Questions concerning all three types of weapons were to be "considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

During the week prior to the beginning of the actual negotiations in Geneva, politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitsky led a large Soviet "parliamentary" delegation to Washington that was the highest-ranking delegation to visit the United States in more than 10 years. Although the Shcherbitsky group's talks in Washington ranged over such issues as trade, human rights, and regional problems, the focus of the Soviet presentations was on arms control. Here, their emphasis was on the importance of concluding new arms control agreements

²*The New York Times*, December 23, 1984.

³*The New York Times*, December 27, 1984. For more details about Tikhonov's visit to Turkey and these concluded agreements, see "Report on Cooperation Pact with Turkey," *Pravda*, January 4, 1985.

which would, among other things, halt testing of antisatellite weapons and research on space-based defense systems. This was the central thrust of Shcherbitsky's presentation to President Reagan and it was the focus of the delegation's discussions with members of Congress.

In much the same vein and also in anticipation of the opening of the Geneva talks, former Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Italy and Spain in late February 1985. On both stops, Gromyko professed a keen Soviet interest in arms control. On both stops, though, he indicated that if the West wanted to make progress in reducing strategic and intermediate-range arms, the United States would have to abandon plans to build a space-based missile defense system. On the Gorbachev visit to London, on the Shcherbitsky visit to Washington, and on the Gromyko visits to Rome and Madrid, Soviet attention clearly had shifted away from the INF deployments to America's strategic defense programs and antisatellite weapons. For the Soviets, these were "not only the subjects of growing strategic concern but were also more vulnerable political targets than U.S. missiles in Europe."⁴

Accordingly, it was not surprising that when German Foreign Minister Genscher paid a surprise visit to Moscow in early March, space weapons were again the subject of Soviet concern. During this visit, which seemed to signal an end to West Germany's quarantine by the East, Genscher was warned that if the Kohl government cooperated with the Reagan administration in developing space-based weapons, it would become an "accomplice" in violating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. On the other hand, if the Kohl government voiced its disapproval of the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative, then the Soviet Union might be in a position, Genscher was told, to help further West German relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.⁵

Moreover, in late 1984-early 1985, Moscow was sending out somewhat contradictory signals concerning future Soviet relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. On the one hand, commentaries in the Soviet media continued to attack Chancellor Kohl's government for "militarism" and "revanchism." These attacks, unusually vitriolic during 1984, continued to appear into mid-1985, along with criticisms of West Germany's subservience to Washington.⁶ On the other hand, a few Soviet commentators, discussing such developments as the Flick

⁴Arnold Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Return of Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World* 1984, pp. 520-522.

⁵*The Economist*, March 9, 1985, p. 47.

⁶See "German Militarists and Revanchists Become More Active," *International Affairs*, September 1984, pp. 84-92. See also "Moscow Views Kohl's Talks in Washington," *Moscow Domestic Service*, December 1, 1984.

scandal, the decline of the Liberals and the growth of the Green Party, and Kohl's weakening domestic political position, observed elements of "realism" in West Germany's position on "key questions pertaining to relations with socialist countries." Writing in mid-February 1985, well-known Soviet commentator Nikolai Portugalov commented on this "realism" in Bonn and summarily noted that "the socialist countries' decisive struggle against the manifestation of revanchism in the FRG [has had] a definite positive impact on West German political life."⁷

In this light, it is significant that the long-dormant Soviet-West German trade commission met for two days in Bonn in January 1985, fueling speculation that Moscow was now on the threshold of ending a policy of trying to isolate the Federal Republic. It is also noteworthy that Mikhail Zimyanin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, led a Soviet parliamentary delegation to Bonn in the spring of 1985. In the view of Vladimir Semenov, the Soviet ambassador in Bonn, the high rank of the delegation's leader was intended to underscore the importance of West German-Soviet relations. Zimyanin's delegation was the first Soviet parliamentary delegation to visit Bonn in nine years.⁸ In addition, in mid-June, there were consultations in Bonn between the political directors of the West German and Soviet foreign ministries. The consultations were called to discuss German-Soviet relations in the context of East-West relations and to decide on celebrations for the August anniversary of the 1970 USSR-FRG treaty and for the September anniversary of the start of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

⁷*Izvestia*, February 14, 1985, p. 4.

⁸*Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, February 8, 1985, p. G-2.

VI. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE: POSSIBLE SHORT-TERM ALTERNATIVES

Considering these developments in late 1984-early 1985, what possible short-term alternatives do the Soviets have with respect to policy toward Western Europe? There seem to be at least five paths that the Soviet Union might follow after the November summit meeting, assuming that the Soviet leadership pursues an active foreign policy toward the West and is not consumed by domestic problems. Although these policy alternatives can be—and herein are—described as distinct from one another, they would in practice undoubtedly overlap one another. They would also depend, in practice, to a significant extent on contemporary political and economic conditions in the Soviet Union and on the policies that the West opted to pursue toward the Soviet Union. Inevitably, any future Soviet policy line would not be so coherently formulated or implemented as this discussion would suggest.

One alternative that the Soviet Union might opt to pursue in the short term would be a policy that sharply differentiated between the governments of Western Europe and that of the United States. Toward the United States, political relations would, in essence, remain strained. Economic relations would be limited. And no progress would be likely in the realm of new superpower arms control agreements, although talks would go forward and the Soviets would continue to prospect for major concessions.

West European governments would be treated quite differently. Indeed, a central thrust of this policy alternative would be a Soviet effort to try to counter hostile U.S. policies by expanding cooperative relationships with the different governments of Western Europe. Such a policy course would be designed, in essence, to develop an expanded political, arms control, and commercial relationship with Western Europe. Despite public denials, this, it would be hoped, would drive a serious wedge between the countries of Western Europe and the United States on such issues as SDI and continuing INF deployments and would increase pressure on the United States to follow policies on these issues more to Moscow's liking. There would, of course, be certain parallels between this Soviet policy alternative and a Western policy of differentiation toward Eastern Europe.

This policy alternative would inevitably involve an acceleration of the Soviet "de-demonizing" effort of the early 1980s, which was

temporarily put aside by Moscow immediately after the beginning of the INF deployments. A purposeful resumption of this effort might well entail, for example, a widely ballyhooed peace offensive toward Western Europe, featuring a range of both new and old arms control proposals designed to attract support in the West. Such an effort would undoubtedly include a call for the demilitarization of space, a nuclear freeze, a chemical weapon ban in Europe, a ban on all nuclear testing, and a moratorium on further INF deployments in Europe. It might also include a call for the reduction of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe and the ultimate establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the European continent. Or it might involve new declaratory and "military-technical" proposals concerning confidence and security-building measures in Europe, proposals transparently at odds with current NATO thinking on such measures at the ongoing Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. Any or all of these arms control initiatives would be put forward in an effort to weaken European support for American arms control and defense positions and programs; to encourage European perceptions that European security interests should be decoupled from those of the United States, particularly given America's growing interest in strategic defense; to broaden Soviet political and economic relations with the countries of Western Europe; and to encourage European indifference to aggressive Soviet activities in the third world.

Supplemented by an active public diplomacy and propaganda effort, this Soviet policy toward Western Europe could serve both short-term and long-term Soviet interests. Perhaps most importantly, it could increase near-term pressure on the United States to modify the Strategic Defense Initiative and could have a critical impact on the full deployment of Western intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. These deployments, after all, only began at the end of 1983. It will be 1988 before all 572 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles are deployed. If short-term Soviet policy can separate European policy from American policy in the defense and arms control area, such a policy would inherently hold out the hope of preventing the full implementation of the 1979 dual-track decision, or preventing deployments beyond the original 572 missiles, something the Soviets may fear in the post-1988 period if they continue to deploy additional SS-20s.

Further, in mid-1985, there is some reason for the Soviets to be hopeful that this policy course may bring positive results regarding both Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium, after the Martens government finally opted in early 1985 to deploy 16 cruise missiles on schedule, the government was toppled in July, primarily for other reasons. New elections were held in October and Martens is again prime

minister. But it is unclear how the new Belgian government will handle future cruise missile deployments. In the Netherlands, the situation is even more unclear. After delaying INF deployments for two years—the only one of the five NATO countries to alter the 1979 schedule—the Dutch government decided in November 1985 to accept cruise missile deployments. However, the opposition Labour Party, flying high in 1985 polls, has firmly ruled out any compromise with the currently governing parties over the stationing of cruise missiles at Woensdrecht. And it is unclear at this writing whether or not the Dutch parliament in February 1986 will ratify the government's decision on cruise missile deployment, or perhaps put it off until after the next Dutch elections, scheduled for May 1986.

If a two-track policy were purposefully pursued by the Soviet Union, it is unclear exactly how the Federal Republic of Germany would be treated. One variant under this option would be to treat the West German government in a manner different from other governments in Western Europe. Under this variant, as was the case during much of 1984, the Federal Republic of Germany would be singled out for particular blame among European countries for greatly increasing the chances of nuclear war in Europe by accepting intermediate-range nuclear forces on its soil. The West German government would be repeatedly attacked in Soviet media commentaries, more so than any of the other West European leaders. And Chancellor Kohl would typically be grouped with President Reagan as a leader of the global "imperialist" and "revanchist" forces seriously jeopardizing peace in Europe.

An alternative variant under this policy option would be for the Soviet Union to treat the West German government in a manner similar to that of the other governments of Western Europe. Vitriolic attacks against the West German government and Chancellor Kohl personally would cease and cooperative bilateral relations in the political and economic areas would proceed, including Soviet encouragement of future West German approaches to the countries of Eastern Europe. Which variant regarding the Federal Republic of Germany the Soviet Union would choose under this differentiated policy option would turn on such things as Soviet thinking about domestic political conditions in West Germany, Bonn's stance on strategic defense and an INF moratorium, developments in Eastern Europe, and which policy course the Soviets felt would best advance their interests in these areas.

A second policy alternative would be the converse of the first, i.e., a differentiated Soviet policy that envisaged improved relations with the United States and cool Soviet relations with the countries of Western Europe. Under this policy option, the Soviet Union would pursue with

new vigor nuclear arms control agreements with the United States, including a possible new superpower agreement concerning space arms. Such a positive Soviet policy toward the United States would likely go beyond arms control to entail, for example, freer emigration policies, significantly expanded trade and cultural relations between Moscow and Washington, and the establishment of some kind of superpower co-management mechanism for the handling of international crises in key regions of the world.

This policy alternative would call for the purposeful continuation of limited relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the countries of Western Europe on the other. Harsh Soviet propaganda would commonly be aimed at West Europeans and West Germans in particular, with the idea of increasing West German-European tensions. And while expanded Soviet-European bilateral commercial and cultural links might be possible under this policy option—if the terms were sufficiently favorable to Soviet interests—intra-European détente would not go forward. Indeed, under this option, the Soviet Union would likely tighten the screws on its East European allies and prevent forward movement in the development of West European-East European ties.

A third near-term policy alternative for the Soviet Union with respect to Western Europe would be a policy course similar to the one that was pursued during the fall of 1983-summer of 1984 period, an alternative that might aptly be termed a policy of defiance toward the West. If the Soviets were to opt to pursue such a policy course toward the West, it would be a policy that did not sharply distinguish between the governments of Western Europe and that of the United States. In contrast to Soviet policy of early 1983 when there was a differentiated détente approach, for example, this policy of defiance would likely be characterized by: strained political relations between the Soviet Union and the governments of Western Europe; a virtual frozen silence in U.S.-Soviet political relations; Soviet indifference to Western pleas about aggressive Soviet activities in third areas, such as Afghanistan and Angola; and no nuclear arms control negotiations.

Such a policy of defiance would be directed, in part, at both the governments and the publics of the West and would be inspired by the thought of intimidating the countries of Western Europe into pursuing policies more favorable to Soviet interests. Frequent talk in Moscow about the increasing possibility of nuclear war, how the 1980s increasingly resembled the 1930s in Europe, and consistently linking "fascism" to American "militarism" and "imperialism" would all be central to this policy line. Harsh public, verbal attacks on selected

European and American leaders would also be part of such a policy course.

At the same time, sympathetic attention would be purposefully paid to "progressive" European opposition leaders—German Social Democrat Brandt or British Labourite Kinnock, for example—but this attention, if proffered, would likely be extended more selectively and with lower expectations than existed during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Antinuclear political leaders in and out of government who favored "realistic" and "peaceful" policies would likely be high on the list of Europeans deserving special attention from Moscow.¹

A fourth policy alternative that the Soviet Union might adopt in the short term would involve an active Soviet effort to pursue a broad-based neo-détente relationship with both the United States and Western Europe, a relationship that bore some resemblance to the détente relationship of the early 1970s. This policy alternative would be premised on the Soviet realization that the United States and its West European allies could not be meaningfully separated as a result of Soviet policy; that there was no escape in the near term from an essentially bipolar world; that the United States was too important in a bipolar world to deal with except in a direct manner; that the Soviet Union would be well-advised to stabilize East-West competition with the United States, particularly given America's burgeoning strategic defense effort; that many of the countries of Eastern Europe would inexorably favor expanded political, economic, and cultural relations with the countries of Western Europe and it was preferable for the Soviet Union to manage these relations by leading them; and that a respite from the currently high level of East-West tensions might provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to focus on internal problems.

The exact nature of a near-term Soviet effort aimed at pursuing a relaxation of tensions under this policy option would depend to a large extent on the character and tone of Western policies toward the Soviet Union. That is, a Soviet effort to try to pursue a broad-based neo-détente policy with the West could have a number of different variants, depending in important ways on the West's posture toward the Soviet Union. Such a Soviet policy course would likely involve, however, new initiatives in the political, cultural, economic, human rights, and perhaps most centrally, the arms control area. Historically, for the Soviet Union a policy of détente with the West has typically had as a key component the reduction in the risk of nuclear war with the

¹See V. Mikhailov, "Western Europe: Time is Running Out," *International Affairs*, May 1983, pp. 110-117.

United States. East-West arms control negotiations and agreements have been seen as critical to reducing this risk and would likely remain so, if a détente policy alternative were pursued.

Inevitably, if the Soviet Union were to opt to pursue a broad-based détente relationship with the West, it would mean that the Soviets would have to concomitantly modify a number of their arms control positions. For example, it seems likely at a minimum that the Soviet government would have to alter its notions about equal security in Europe, including the idea that Soviet nuclear forces in Europe must be equal to those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France combined. It would also probably mean that the Soviet Union would have to modify its current objections to America's Strategic Defense Initiative and the deployment of at least some Pershing II missiles in Europe. Further, it would also mean that the Soviet Union would have to seriously consider: (1) discussing strategically significant ballistic missile reductions in the START context; (2) addressing past U.S. charges of arms control violations and (3) discussing American proposals for the stringent verification of new arms control agreements, possibly including on-site inspection.

For the Soviet Union to opt to make such changes in its arms control positions and in the short term to try to effect a neo-détente relationship with the West might signify a major change in the way the Soviet Union sought to approach the United States and Western Europe. Or, on the other hand, it might just signify a continued long-term effort to loosen ties within the Atlantic Alliance, but through the choice of different short-term means to this end. If the Soviet approach to the West under this option were in fact driven primarily by Soviet interest in loosening European ties with the United States, then Soviet efforts to pursue this neo-détente policy option might, in some ways, resemble the differentiated policy called for under the initial policy alternative described above. Under this fourth option, a policy of broad-based neo-détente toward Western Europe and the United States would be pursued as a way to expand Western Europe's room for political and economic maneuver and, in so doing, inevitably increase tensions within the Western camp. As Michael Sodaro has recently noted, for many Soviet policymakers, "a policy of confrontation' in Europe could only reinforce Western Europe's dependence on the United States and encourage the unity of the Western allies, whereas 'if the threat relaxes the contradictions rending them may be aggravated.'"²

²Michael Sodaro, "Soviet Studies of the Western Alliance," in Herbert Ellison, *Soviet Policy toward Western Europe*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1983, p. 252.

A fifth short-term policy alternative for the Soviet Union would be a confrontational policy toward the West, a policy the opposite of the détente policy alternative and which would resemble the Soviet approach toward the West during the immediate postwar years. The choice of a confrontational policy alternative would be premised on a perception by the Soviet Union that détente with the West was a failed policy; that the West was relatively united and unremittingly hostile to Soviet interests in the near term; and, consequently, that dealing constructively with either the Europeans or the Americans or both together was not now possible. Under the policy of defiance that the Soviet Union pursued during roughly the first half of 1984, East-West relations were generally poor, but there was no direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Nowhere, for example, were American and Soviet soldiers directly engaged in hostilities. Nor, for that matter, was there any one region of the world where American (or European) forces and Soviet forces seriously offered the prospect of a major direct confrontation.

If this fifth policy alternative were pursued by the Soviet Union, this situation would likely change. East-West areas of difference would be directly addressed, not swept under the rug. There would be a concerted effort not only to separate Europe from the United States but to divide Europe within itself. There would also be a stepped-up Soviet political and military effort to intimidate Western governments and publics. There might be, for example, a crisis over Berlin, such as the one that the Soviets brought on in 1961. There would certainly be an intensified effort to stop Western research on strategic defense, to prevent the next phase of NATO INF deployments, and to undercut the support of growing segments of West European populaces for their conservative governments. Finally, there might also be increased Soviet and Soviet-inspired terrorist activity against West European and American targets. The key point is that, unlike the situation under a policy of defiance, under this confrontational policy alternative Soviet policies and associated efforts at intimidation would be carried out through assertive Soviet actions as well as Soviet words. Aggressiveness and interventionism would be the hallmarks of the fifth Soviet policy alternative.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

In the summer of 1985, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions about the character of near-term Soviet policy toward Western Europe. These conclusions are much more easily drawn now than a few months ago. For the Soviet Union, under the leadership of General Secretary Gorbachev, President Gromyko, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, has provided in recent weeks some clues about the direction of its policy toward the West. On the basis of the clues provided to date, it seems highly unlikely, for example, that the Soviet Union will adopt in the near term the second, third, fourth, or fifth policy alternatives described in Sec. VI. It does not seem likely that the Soviet Union will soon adopt a policy line toward the West similar to that in the 1960s that is designed to improve relations between the superpowers but to keep relations between the Soviet Union and Western Europe much less cordial; or a policy of such defiance toward Western Europe and the United States (like that of 1983-84) that no arms control negotiations would be possible; or a policy of broad-based détente (as in the early 1970s) that is acceptable to both the East and the West; or a policy (like the 1950s) that is purposefully confrontational toward the West. These policy alternatives might conceivably prove to be realistic medium-term choices for the Soviet Union, but they are not likely to characterize the thrust of Soviet policy toward the West during 1985-86.

Rather, short-term Soviet policy, despite public denials, is likely to proceed along the path suggested by the first alternative—a differentiated détente policy that focuses on cultivating improved bilateral relations with the countries of Western Europe and attempts to drive a wedge between the United States and its NATO allies. Such a policy would reflect substantial continuity with the policy tack adopted by Moscow during the early 1980s, before the Soviet Union opted for a policy of defiance toward the West in the fall 1983-fall 1984 period. This differentiated détente policy would, in essence, have two tracks, as was the case earlier. On one track would be Soviet relations with the United States. The emphasis in Soviet policy would be on repeated public calls for a revival of a détente relationship with the United States; arms control, at least rhetorically, would be accorded highest priority. In practice, the Soviet Union would in the near term prospect in both the arms control and commercial fields, hoping for unexpected American concessions or at least a possible softening in America's

position. In arms control, this would probably mean some flexibility on the American side concerning space weapons, testing of antisatellite weapons, the development of cruise missiles, or limiting the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In the commercial area, this would likely mean new trade concessions, among other things. In short, there would be interest in improved relations with the United States but on Soviet terms.

Even without substantial hope for such a turn of events in its dealings with the United States, it seems likely that Moscow would in the near term continue prospecting in talks with American officials. This approach would have the effect of buying time for the new Gorbachev regime to consider its stance and to consolidate its political position without committing itself to a new policy line. Further, if there is one important political lesson that the Soviet Union learned from its adoption of a policy of defiance earlier, it is that to further Soviet interests in Europe and elsewhere around the globe it is necessary for Moscow to appear to favor détente and arms control with the United States. Refusal to participate in arms negotiations with the United States has been tried and found to be a losing tactic. Should such participation induce concessions, so much the better from a Soviet point of view. In the meantime, the Soviets would undoubtedly hope that such participation would at least shore up the Soviet Union's "peace-loving" image and at the same time have the effect of increasing allied pressure on the United States to be more flexible in its arms control talks with the East. Peter Carrington, the NATO Secretary General, recently observed that such a Soviet approach would reflect continuity in their policy, for "experience over the years has shown that the Soviet Union doesn't get down to business if it thinks that concessions are going to fall into its lap without it making any concessions on its side."¹

Of considerable importance as well, such an approach would allow the Soviet Union to pursue most effectively the second track of a differentiated détente policy—that of expanding relations with the countries of Western Europe at the same time as exacerbating differences between those countries and the United States. As already noted, by mid-1985 there was growing evidence that the Soviet Union in the service of such a wedge-driving effort had decided to carry on a peace offensive centered around criticism of America's Strategic Defense Initiative.² Gorbachev's visits to Great Britain and France,

¹*The Washington Post*, March 16, 1985, p. A28.

²See Testimony of Richard Burt on "Developments in Europe, May 1985," Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 22, 1985, Ninety-Ninth Congress, 1st Session, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1985.

Shevardnadze's visits to Helsinki and New York, Gromyko's visits to Rome and Madrid, Genscher's talks in Moscow, Tikhonov's visit to Turkey—these and several other diplomatic missions all involved efforts by Moscow to simultaneously find new areas for cooperative bilateral agreements and to convince Europeans that it was unwise and potentially dangerous to be allied with the United States, particularly in support of America's Strategic Defense Initiative. This American effort was widely portrayed as leading toward a destabilizing, expensive spiral in a new arms race in space. The mid-March 1985 public statements of General Secretary Gorbachev and chief Soviet arms control negotiator Viktor Karpov criticizing America's strategic defense program; continuing Soviet media commentaries that attack President Reagan for favoring "dangerous, militaristic policies"; current Soviet pronouncements about an INF moratorium, including offers of bilateral INF discussions with France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands; and recent Soviet calls for a no-first-use pledge in the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe can all be interpreted as part of an ongoing Soviet peace offensive designed to exploit and widen differences between the United States and its European allies.

How long will the Soviet Union persist in pursuing this sort of two-tracked, wedge-driving, differentiated détente policy toward the West? It is, of course, difficult to answer this question with any certainty. Internal factors affecting Soviet policy decisions, for example, will probably remain obscure and ambiguous. Soviet views about the evolution of the correlation of forces will also likely be of critical importance but difficult to assess with any certitude. It does seem likely, though, that Soviet perceptions of the emerging evidence regarding at least four considerations will be of some significance. First, the Soviets will weigh the evidence as to the likelihood that they will succeed in extracting concessions from the United States through the pursuit of this policy. If this differentiated détente approach induces or holds high promise to induce the United States to make unexpected concessions in the arms control and commercial areas—concessions made under increasing pressure from Western Europe and a restive Congress—then it seems reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union will persist in pursuing this policy tack. Conversely, if this policy approach does not lead to or hold serious promise of leading to new concessions from the United States, Moscow may have a greater incentive to consider adopting a new policy line.

A second consideration that is likely to affect the future course of Soviet policy toward the West will be Moscow's perception of Atlantic Alliance unity over defense and arms control policies. If the pursuit of

a differentiated détente policy is perceived in Moscow as leading to serious divisions within NATO over the wisdom of such efforts as strategic defense, continuing INF deployments, continued underground nuclear testing, a no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge, or national force modernization programs, then the Soviet Union is likely to continue this policy course. On the other hand, if Soviet efforts to increase intra-Alliance differences on these issues (especially SDI) prove to be counterproductive, have the effect of enhancing Alliance cohesion, and lead Moscow to reach a pessimistic assessment of the trends in the East-West balance, Moscow will be more likely to rethink its policy toward the West. For a variety of reasons, SDI is for now a less divisive issue in terms of intra-Alliance politics than INF. But the longer-term impact of SDI on the functioning of the Atlantic Alliance is unclear, and the Soviets seem determined to use this issue as a central part of their current wedge-driving efforts.

A third consideration likely to have an important impact on future Soviet policy toward the West relates to Soviet perceptions about the prospects for antinuclear opposition parties to gain power in the late 1980s. If the West European Left is seen by Moscow as having a substantial chance to accede to office in the next elections in countries such as Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example, then a policy of differentiated détente toward the West in the interim period may hold considerable appeal. If, on the other hand, this is not in prospect, there may well be increased incentives for Moscow to adopt a different policy line toward the West in the medium term.

Finally, the situation in Eastern Europe is a fourth consideration that is likely to have a significant impact on future Soviet policy toward Western Europe. For Moscow, ensuring continued East European responsiveness to Soviet interests is a *sine qua non*. If, for example, the pursuit of a broad-based détente policy toward the West were perceived in Moscow as undercutting this responsiveness, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to follow this policy course. On the other hand, if a given future policy approach toward Western Europe were perceived as helpful to maintaining or enhancing Soviet interests in Eastern Europe, then that approach would likely commend itself highly to the Soviet Union.³

Perhaps at the time of the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress, scheduled for February 1986, the Gorbachev regime will formalize a new medium-term policy line. At present, both the Soviet Union and

³For a more detailed discussion of how East European considerations are likely to affect future Soviet policy toward Western Europe, see A. Ross Johnson, *The Future of Soviet Policy toward Western Europe: East European Considerations*, The Rand Corporation (forthcoming).

the United States are prospecting in and posturing about arms control discussions in Geneva while seeking to convince West European parliaments and publics that they are serious in those arms control negotiations. Curiously, it seems that each superpower is more confident about its efforts to positively influence European opinion about its intentions than about the possibilities of achieving concrete progress in the talks themselves. And this is likely to continue to be the case in the near term.

Beyond the period from the present until the next party Congress, if a decision is made in Moscow to move away from the kind of differentiated détente policy described here and to move, for example, to a more broad-based détente relationship with the West, including the United States, then the evolution of Soviet behavior in three areas will be good indicators of such a change. First, there are human rights issues and emigration. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to adhere to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and to pursue the kind of open policy on Jewish emigration that naturally led to the disappearance of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, this would be an important indicator of a changed Soviet approach toward the West. Second, there is Soviet policy toward certain regional issues. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to adopt a more conciliatory approach toward the amicable resolution of outstanding differences in Afghanistan, Angola, or Central America, this would probably signify an important change in Soviet policy toward the West. Third, and most importantly, there is arms control, where there are a number of ways that the Soviet Union could boldly signal a change in their approach toward the West. Modifying objections to America's strategic defense effort, agreeing to strategically significant reductions in the number, vulnerability, and throwweight of their ballistic missile warheads, dropping an unrealistic insistence on no Western INF deployments in Europe, changing its thinking about how to deal with British and French nuclear forces within the Geneva context, being willing to consider more stringent verification measures, taking steps to address American allegations about the illegality of the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar site, negotiating seriously and confidentially in Geneva with a perceptible toning down of public propaganda attacks against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative—these are all steps that the Soviet Union could take which would point toward an evolution in their approach toward the West.

Regardless of the policy line that the Soviet Union opts to pursue toward the West in the future, there is little question that the fundamental continuity of long-term Soviet objectives toward its West European neighbors will remain—the peaceful transformation of the

dynamic political status quo in Western Europe in favor of the Soviet Union. As we have seen in the recent past, however, Soviet tactics to achieve this objective can and do change, depending on pragmatic judgments that are made at any given time. It is in the West's interest to understand the motivations and correlations of forces that affect these pragmatic judgments. For only by doing so can it hope to induce the Soviet Union to pursue policies toward Western Europe that will be constructive from an overall Western point of view.

SELECTED CHRONOLOGY

- December 12, 1979 NATO ministers approve deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe; also request East-West talks on limiting these long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF)
- December 27, 1979 Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
- January 4, 1980 President Carter announces anti-Soviet measures in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
- October 2, 1980 British Labour Party backs unilateral disarmament for the first time in 20 years
- October 17, 1980 The United States and Soviet Union begin preliminary talks on limiting long-range theater nuclear forces
- November 4, 1980 Ronald Reagan elected President of the United States
- April 7, 1981 NATO Nuclear Planning Group reaffirms twin goals of LRTNF modernization and verifiable arms agreement
- October 24, 1981 Large antinuclear public rallies in several European capitals
- November 18, 1981 President Reagan proposes "zero-option," which would cancel planned NATO intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) deployments if the Soviet Union dismantles its medium-range SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles
- November 30, 1981 U.S.-Soviet talks on limiting INF open in Geneva
- December 13, 1981 Martial law declared in Poland; the United States ends all pending aid to Poland
- February 2, 1982 The United States tables draft treaty in Geneva embodying "zero option" proposal
- March 16, 1982 General Secretary Brezhnev announces that the Soviet Union is suspending deployment of new SS-20 missiles in European Russia

- May 9, 1982 In speech at Eureka College (Illinois), President Reagan proposes one-third reduction in American and Soviet land- and sea-based ballistic missile warheads
- June 18, 1982 The United States extends trade sanctions on materials for Soviet natural gas pipeline to include subsidiaries of U.S. companies; move subsequently rejected by the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Italy
- June 29, 1982 U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) begin in Geneva
- July 16, 1982 U.S. and Soviet INF negotiators secretly discuss "walk-in-the-woods" initiative, which is subsequently rejected in both Moscow and Washington
- September 29, 1982 Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko meet in New York but talks yield no new agreements
- October 1, 1982 German Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, with Free Democratic Party support, is elected chancellor, ending 13-year Social Democrat-Free Democrat ruling partnership
- November 10, 1982 Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev dies; former KGB chief Yuri Andropov subsequently named to replace him
- November 22, 1982 German Social Democrats overwhelmingly vote to reject new NATO INF deployments
- December 7, 1982 Danish Parliament freezes Denmark's contribution to deployment of new NATO missiles in Europe
- January 1, 1983 In major story, *Pravda* blames deadlocked arms control talks on American effort to achieve military superiority
- January 4, 1983 German opposition SPD leader Hans-Jochem Vogel visits Moscow
- February 25, 1983 German Chancellor Kohl publicly attacks Soviet Union for unprecedented meddling in German electoral campaign

- March 6, 1983 Christian Democrats in West Germany score major electoral victory, winning 244 seats in 498-member Bundestag; new Green Party wins 27 seats and gains parliamentary representation
- March 23, 1983 President Reagan, in national address, launches the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), challenging American scientists to develop effective antiballistic missile defense to counter Soviet nuclear threat
- April 7, 1983 Soviet official Vadim Zagladin interviewed on Hungarian television, openly praising and encouraging "progressive forces" in the West
- June 9, 1983 Conservative Party under Prime Minister Thatcher wins majority of seats in British general elections
- June 27, 1983 Christian Democrats and Communists suffer losses in Italian national elections; Socialist Bettino Craxi emerges as Prime Minister
- August 28, 1983 Andropov sends letter to Craxi, urging delay in Italian INF deployments
- September 1, 1983 Soviet Union shoots down Korean Air Liner #007 after it strays into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 persons aboard
- September 26, 1983 President Reagan, in speech at United Nations, stresses the importance of arms control and announces new U.S. INF proposal
- September 28, 1983 In strongly worded statement, Andropov denounces "militarist" course of Reagan administration
- October 22, 1983 Major anti-INF demonstrations in several European capitals
- October 26, 1983 Andropov offers new concessions in INF, which the United States dismisses as "vague"
- November 22, 1983 West German Bundestag votes 286 to 226 to go forward with INF deployments
- November 23, 1983 Soviets walk out of INF negotiations; refuse to set new date for resumption, and send threatening letters to German Chancellor Kohl, British

Prime Minister Thatcher, and Italian Prime Minister Craxi

December 8, 1983 START session ends; Soviets refuse to set new date for resumption of talks

December 10, 1983 Soviet Marshal Ogarkov issues statement on the increasing threat of nuclear war as a result of INF deployments

December 30, 1983 West Germany says the first nine of 108 Pershing II missiles to be deployed in that country are now operational

January 16, 1984 President Reagan makes major, conciliatory address on U.S.-Soviet relations

January 17, 1984 Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko meet in Stockholm on the occasion of the opening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe; talks yield few results

February 9, 1984 Yuri Andropov dies; Konstantin Chernenko subsequently named to be General Secretary

March 2, 1984 Chernenko hints at possible new avenues to break U.S.-Soviet deadlock but hints come to nothing

March 11, 1984 West German Social Democratic leader Hans-Jochem Vogel in Moscow; receives cool reception

March, 1984 Retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, in Moscow on private business, tries to deliver personal message from President Reagan to General Secretary Chernenko but is unable to see any top-ranking Soviet officials

April 23, 1984 Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti in Moscow; Gromyko threatens to turn Italy "into a Pompeii"

May 7, 1984 Soviet Union announces decision to boycott Olympics

May 14, 1984 Soviet Union announces movement of submarines closer to U.S. shores

May 20, 1984 West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher receives cool reception in Moscow;

- told that the Soviet Union will not resume arms control negotiations until all INF missiles are withdrawn from Western Europe
- May 31, 1984** NATO Foreign Ministers issue Washington Declaration pledging Atlantic Alliance unity
- June 13, 1984** Dutch Parliament approves plan that would permit delay in cruise missile deployments two years beyond scheduled 1986 deadline if there is progress in U.S.- Soviet negotiations; decision to be made on November 1, 1985
- June 14, 1984** Chernenko attacks Western interest in arms control as part of "a position-of-strength" strategy
- June 21, 1984** French President Mitterand in Moscow; expresses agreement with President Reagan that no new concessions should be made in order to resume superpower arms control talks
- June 29, 1984** Surprise Soviet proposal to begin space arms control talks with the United States in September; affirmative U.S. response not accepted by the Soviet Union
- July 3, 1984** British Foreign Minister Howe in Moscow; subjected to anti-Washington diatribe from Gromyko
- July 20, 1984** Soviets send delegation to nuclear disarmament conference in Perugia, Italy; Soviet positions attacked by several Western antinuclear activists
- September 1, 1984** Chernenko proposes arms control discussions concerning space weapons
- September 4, 1984** East German leader Honecker announces postponement of trip to the Federal Republic of Germany; Bulgarian leader Zhikov's trip also postponed
- September 15, 1984** Italian Prime Minister Craxi releases letter from President Reagan expressing "deep American commitment" to new arms control accord in an effort to deflect charges that the United States is not serious about arms control

- September 27, 1984 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Democratic Presidential candidate Walter Mondale meet in New York
- September 28, 1984 President Reagan and Gromyko meet in Washington
- October 16, 1984 Chernenko interview with *The Washington Post* in which he lays out conditions for new arms control talks
- October 27, 1984 Seven major West European nations assert European "identity" in defense matters and support reorganized Western European Union
- November 6, 1984 Ronald Reagan reelected President of the United States
- November 17, 1984 Chernenko letter to Reagan proposing future arms control talks
- November 22, 1984 Joint U.S.-Soviet announcement that a new round of arms control talks will begin; Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko to meet in Geneva in early January to develop agenda
- November 26, 1984 Belgian Prime Minister Wilfrid Martens calls for delay in deployment of cruise missiles in Belgium, pending developments in Geneva in January 1985
- December 22, 1984 Soviet leader Gorbachev ends week-long visit to London; Prime Minister Thatcher declares that she "can do business" with him
- January 7-8, 1985 Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko meet in Geneva; set agenda for March negotiations on reducing strategic nuclear arms, medium-range weapons, and space arms
- January 15, 1985 Belgian Prime Minister Wilfrid Martens in Washington; affirms Belgian support for dual-track decision but vague about timing of scheduled cruise missile deployments in Belgium
- February 22, 1985 British Prime Minister Thatcher in Washington; declares that there are "no differences" between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning strategic defense

- February 26, 1985 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Rome; urges Italy to break with the United States and oppose Strategic Defense Initiative
- March 3-4, 1985 German Foreign Minister Genscher unexpectedly meets with Gromyko in Moscow to discuss East-West relations
- March 6, 1985 Italian Prime Minister Craxi in Washington; supports research on strategic defense but emphasizes central importance of arms control
- March 8, 1985 Soviet politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitsky meets with President Reagan in Washington; differences about strategic defense aired
- March 11, 1985 Chernenko dies; Gorbachev named Soviet General Secretary
- March 12, 1985 U.S.-Soviet "umbrella" negotiations on arms control open in Geneva
- March 14, 1985 General Secretary Gorbachev accepts invitations to visit Bonn and Paris; gives vague response to U.S. proposal for a summit meeting
- March 14, 1985 Belgian government announces decision to begin the immediate deployment of cruise missiles as scheduled by NATO
- March 15, 1985 British Foreign Secretary Howe expresses "serious questions" about America's Strategic Defense Initiative
- March 20, 1985 Belgian government wins 116-93 vote of confidence on decision to deploy cruise missiles
- April 7, 1985 Gorbachev announces Soviet moratorium on SS-20 deployments until November
- April 26, 1985 Gorbachev tells Warsaw Pact meeting that the Soviet Union supports at least a 25 percent reduction in ICBM launchers
- June 10, 1985 The United States indicates that it will not undercut SALT II
- June 10, 1985 Italian voters reject a communist-backed economic proposal, strengthening the Craxi coalition's position

- June 26, 1985 Gorbachev publicly accuses the United States of "wasting time" in Geneva; hints at possible Soviet walkout
- July 1, 1985 Gromyko named President of the Soviet Union; Shevardnadze named Foreign Minister
- July 3, 1985 U.S.-Soviet summit announced for mid-November
- July 16, 1985 Belgian Prime Minister Martens' government falls; new elections set for October
- July 29, 1985 The United States and the Soviet Union propose new nuclear test ban initiatives
- July 31, 1985 Shultz and Shevardnadze meet in Helsinki to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and to discuss the November summit meeting

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