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FINLAND'S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY;
ORIGINS AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

BY

COLONEL JUHANI A. NISKA

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

FINLAND'S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY;
ORIGINS AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

AN ESSAY

by

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ABSTRACT

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This essay examines the basic questions dealing with Finland's security policy after the Second World War, and military defense needed in the future to meet perceived threats. In order to find answers the economic-military-geographical features of Finland are studied. It seems that economically highly developed Finland still can benefit of natural features favoring defense, including a strong defense will of the population. Finland's post-World War II history has been peaceful. The same stands for the general situation in the area, which can be described as the "Nordic Stability." It is supported by armed forces primarily intended for territorial defense. The treaties Finland has signed are in support of her policy of neutrality. That policy is aligned to Finland's strategic situation: there are no strategic objectives in the country, but still everything has to be done to prevent any kind of military threat from developing through Finland against any of her neighbors. This is the bottomline of the recommendations made by the Third Parliamentary Committee in 1981. These recommendations are still valid. The first phase (1982-86) of a fifteen year development plan for the Finnish Defense Forces has so far proved to be quite successful. The suggested Fast Deployment Forces will serve Finland in her efforts to stay outside military conflicts.



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PREFACE

This Individual Essay was produced under the aegis of the US Army War College Department of Corresponding Studies to which the author had the honor to be assigned as a resident International Fellow during the Academic Year 1986.

This paper is designed to support an awareness of the specific conditions of a small country pursuing a policy of neutrality. The outstanding advices of Professor Michael I. Handel, the devoted assistance of Colonel Andrew F. Gothreau, the kind help offered by Mr. Albert P. Holmberg, and the excellent typing skills of Mrs. Connie M. Warner made the completion of this paper possible. And, finally, special thanks have to be given to Mrs. Aulikki Niska for her patience.

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FINLAND'S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY,
ORIGINS AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

INTRODUCTION

"The objective of Finnish security policy is to maintain the independence of the country and to safeguard the lives of its citizens. The aim is to live in peace and to enable Finnish citizens to develop their society and living conditions in the way they wish. The strengthening of general conditions of peace furthers this objective."

With these words the third parliamentary defense committee since 1971 defined in its report in March 1981 its view on the aims of Finland's security policy. The Third Parliamentary Defense Committee (III PDC) continued by explaining how it should be done.

"Through her own activities Finland seeks to prevent situations from arising which could pose a threat to her security. In case the situation becomes more tense, Finland will attempt to stay outside conflicts and to prevent the country from being embroiled in crisis and possible military operations. If the country should become a target of military operations, the task of its security policy is to safeguard the lives of its citizens and to create conditions for restoring peace with the least possible damage while preserving the country's independence."

Regarding instruments of power to be used, the III PDC maintained:

"The main instruments of Finnish security policy are its foreign policy and defence policy. Priority is given to foreign policy. National defence supports foreign policy both in times of peace and in possible crisis. Economic and trade policies have become more closely linked with the country's security policy. Our security policy must safeguard the continuity of the

basic line of police as well as independent decision-making under all circumstances."¹

The hierarchy of means was also clearly outlined. The III PDC chose to follow the generally accepted definition of Finnish security policy which had been established in the studies and reports of its predecessors. By definition, the essential elements of security policy are foreign policy and defense policy. The latter is also referred to as national defense. The national defense consists of military, economic, and civil defense, defense information, and the following sectors: maintenance of public order and safety, social and health care, and communications.

The impact of the three parliamentary defense committees of 1971, 1976, and 1981, appointed by the Council of State and manned by prominent members of the Parliament and high-ranking military and civilian experts, on the formulation, information and understanding of the Finnish security policy has been great. This influence has not been based on any formal procedures, since there is no administrative procedure to initiate a formal handling of a committee report outside the appointing ministry, but based on the recognized authority of the committee members and the report itself. All three committees had Professor Jan-Magnus Jansson, an esteemed scholar and politician, as their chairman. Consequently, he has had a major impact on the contents of the committee reports, which required--due to the large numbers of political parties in Finland--remarkable conciliatory skills.²

Hence, in order to present some main features of Finnish security and defense policy including trends in the development of Finland's defense forces, an elaboration of the topics can hardly be done without referring to the viewpoints of the III PDC report. Additionally, understanding how the contemporary situation has developed requires a brief survey of Finland, her

FINLAND'S POSITION IN NORTH EUROPE




FIGURE 1

history since the Second World War as well as her international treaties and agreements.

Finland has formed a close interacting brotherhood with her closest Nordic neighbors. The area consisting of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden has been defined by a great regional stability--although their basic security-political solutions differ. Thus, when discussing Finland, or any other Nordic country, the total geographical and political picture as well must be kept in mind.³

Ultimately, every nation is responsible for its own future. The stronger a nation, the more mistakes the country can survive. However, for small, militarily weak nations there are obviously much less tolerances possible. In this sense a small nation needs both a realistic grip of its situation and a bold approach to steer clear of possible crises. How Finland is managing is for the reader to evaluate.

ECONOMIC-MILITARY-GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF FINLAND

Finland (see Figure 1) lies between 60° and 70° north latitude: as far to the north as Alaska and just on the opposite side of the North Pole. In fact, one-third of Finland's 337,009 square kms area is north of the Arctic Circle. The total area, about the same size as Montana, makes Finland the fifth largest country in Europe. It extends about 1160 kms from south to north and 540 kms east to west with a narrow waistline of only about 190 kms. Finland would roughly make a bridge from Lake Erie to the Gulf of Mexico.

Finland's common land boundaries with the Soviet Union are 1219 kms in length, with Norway 716 kms, and with neutral Sweden 586 kms. On the south and west, Finland is also bounded by the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic, and by the Gulf of Bothnia. Although the straight length of the sea coast is

1100 kms the many bays and capes extend the actual coastline to over 4600 kms. The archipelago consisting of about 20,000 islands, the shallow bays, and innumerable rocks hamper navigation in the coastal waters. During the winter months navigation is further hampered by the freezing of the seas.

Over four-fifth of the total area is covered by forest and marsh. The remaining area divides roughly half and half into cultivated area and water. There are over 55,000 lakes. Thus, over a quarter of the country's central area is water. Fairly convenient areas for the operations of modern ground forces are mainly found in Southern, Southwestern, or Western Finland. The road net (75,000 kms, an average of 220 meters per square km compared with e.g. about 1.9 kms/square km in Federal Republic of Germany) favors north-south bound communications (Figure 2). For instance, in Northern Finland there are basically only three transverse roads crossing the Finnish-Soviet border. Their lengths--before they cross the Finnish-Norwegian border and depending which western switch is studied--is between 190-520 kms. Their usability for military operations is limited by the obstacles of and in the surrounding terrain.⁵

Although the climate in Finland is Arctic only in North Lapland, the Nordic location causes the temperature to frequently drop to 25°-35° C below the freezing point especially in the northern and northeastern parts of the country. Coupled together with the long and dark winter or the nightless days during the summertime the climate strongly impedes and influences the possibilities to perform military operations.⁶

Half of Finland's 4.913 million (1.1.1986) inhabitants live in the three southern and southwestern provinces, where half of the economical and industrial resources are situated. The average density is about 16 persons per square km, but the northern province of Lapland has only two inhabitants




FIGURE 2

per square km, as compared with e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany: 247 persons per square km. Still, one out of three of all the people living north of the 60th parallel is a Finn. Well over a half of the Finns live in cities. There are only thirteen cities with a population over 50,000 inhabitants. The capital city, Helsinki has a little less than half a million inhabitants.

Ten percent of the 6,000 km railroad is electrified. Due to the large area of Finland, the domestic air traffic system is well developed with twenty airfields having a length of more than 2.4 kms and an additional twenty-two with paved runways longer than 1.2 kms. They enable the Finnish Air Force to spread out its fighters in times of crises to avoid unnecessary casualties--without losing the C³I capabilities due to the developed infrastructure of communications.

The marine nature of Finland is highlighted by the 11 major and 34 minor ports along her coast. About nine-tenths of the foreign trade (exports about \$12.5 billion in 1983) is transported on ships. The only route to the great oceans goes through the Danish Straits. If that route is not usable it would seriously impact the foreign trade of Finland of which more than three-fourths is done with the western or neutral countries.⁷

The Finnish defense industry provides the armed forces with almost all the required infantry ordnance. It produces field and coast artillery howitzers and guns, modern field communications equipment, air surveillance radars, C³I-materiel, engineering materiel, and equipment for defense against nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. Finland has been able to manufacture under license SAAB J-35 "Draken" interceptors and the BAe "Hawk"-jet trainers. Its shipyards have built all the new naval ships including the "Helsinki"-class fast attack craft equipped with SAAB "Rb-15" SS-missiles. Finland does not, however, intend to produce heavy armored

fighting vehicles, although it manufactures an armored personnel carrier and cross-country vehicles of high performance. Nor are there any plans to manufacture missiles or aircraft of a higher sophistication than basic trainers. The basic trainer of the Finnish Air Force is a domestic Valmet "Vinka."

During the last decades roughly a third of the procurements have come from domestic sources, a third from western, and a third from the Soviet Union. The mix of the equipment utilized by the Finnish armed forces is, thus, rather unique. The Finns have been able to compose a materiel structure of their own, especially when they habitually modify their equipment of foreign origin according to their own demands. In order to maintain the needed high degree of trustworthiness towards all parties involved, no transfer of technical information to third parties can be tolerated. Thus, the high degree of secrecy concerning Finnish procurements is readily explained and justified.

As far as possible the Finns have tried to produce a domestic capability to maintain their equipment of foreign origin. This is, on the other hand, a spinoff of the efforts to sustain a domestic defense industry. The strong domestic political restrictions placed upon export of defense material (about 0.06-0.08 percent of total trade) has undoubtedly hampered the utilization of the demonstrated know-how and capabilities of the Finnish defense industry.⁸

Of the 49.4 billion US dollar Gross National Product (GNP in 1983, 10,186 USD per capita) only 1.5 percent was spent on the military defense. That share--about five percent of the state budget--has been constant during the last fifteen years. The low figures probably reflect the preferences of the politicians more than those of the people. According to annual opinion polls

the defense-will in Finland is very high. About 83 percent of the population considers Finland worth defending by arms.⁹

Due to general conscription Finland has a pool of about 1.2 million military trained reservists. About 700,000 of these are available for the armed forces in a general mobilization. During a timespan of five years, 400,000 conscripts and reservists get their basic or refresher training to fulfill the manpower needs of, e.g. a couple of dozen infantry brigades and some hundred independent battalions and other units of the general, local and support forces. The ground forces will receive air defense support from sixty Saab J-35 "Draken" and MiG-21 "Bis" interceptors. A small, but in coastal warfare specialized navy is backed up by a rather strong coastal defense system belonging to the Army. The 3,500 man strong Frontier Guard cooperates with the Defense Forces and will participate in the defense of the country either wholly or partly integrated with the Defense Forces.¹⁰

Nevertheless, remembering that the peace-time strength (Figure 3) of Finland's armed forces is less than 40,000, of which a majority are conscripts fulfilling their national obligation, Finland remains a "weak military power" in the international environment.¹¹ However, it would be a grave military mistake to underestimate the defensive capabilities of the Finnish defense system. The real average growth of the outlays for the military defense from 1972 to 1986 has been about +3.8 percent per annum--a quite convincing figure for one and a half decades.¹² There must be positive results based on that systematic funding. The high mobilization capability is, thus, certainly not a military deception, as the war-fighting abilities demonstrated during World War II testify. This fact along with the specific military-geographical natural features and an inherent war-fighting doctrine combined with a both



FIGURE 3

strongly expressed and tested determination to safeguard the independence of the nation have helped the Finns to preserve their sovereignty.

Finland is an industrialized country with a nature and climate that do not favor any large-scale land operations. The geography and infrastructure of the country are not particularly advantageous to transverse movements, although the road net is steadily improving due to peacetime economic and domestic demands. Although the frost, snow, and conditions of visibility hamper operations in winter time, the terrain, weather, and the infrastructure of the country offer many advantages to a defender, who has been able to tailor all his defensive measures with only one aim: to maximize local and territorial defensive capability to these specific circumstances. Here, again, the Finnish Lapland is a very special area. It will pose great difficulties not only for the attacker but obviously for the defender as well. The better the capability to maneuver outside the roads while still being able to concentrate the firepower against a road-bound invader, the better the odds for a defensive success in those circumstances.

The coastal waters of Finland are uniquely well suited for defense by coastal and light naval forces. Only the airspace over Finland can be considered "normal" according to European criteria. However, the hampering effects of the climate and weather to operations in the air must still be taken in account. Air Force units living and trained in these circumstances do probably have a qualitative advantage over units not used to the area.

As a conclusion, it seems that the natural military-geographical features of Finland even today favor the defense over the offense.

FEATURES OF FINLAND'S POST WORLD WAR II HISTORY

On 24 April 1945 the last German soldier was forced by advancing Finnish troops to leave his position in the extreme part of North-West Finland. "The War in Lapland 1944-45," the last of Finland's three World War II wars had been brought to an end. "The Winter War 1939-40" and "The Continuation War 1941-44" were fought against the Soviet Union. All those wars provide very strong evidences of the firm determination with which the Finns safeguard their independence. They secured for Finland her integrity, constitution, judicial system, and political institutions of a Western democracy. And, most importantly, besides Great Britain and the Soviet Union, Finland did not have to suffer from an occupation army after the war had ended--as was the fate of most of the European countries involved in World War II. Thus, Finland was never "liberated;" the foundation of her own-chosen future policy of neutrality was, in fact, laid.

The prize of freedom was very high. The total loss of lives was about 85,000 persons, which was two percent of the population. Eleven percent of the country's area was ceded to the Soviet Union, a tenth of the population had to be resettled, and the war reparations had to be paid for by predominantly manufactured industrial products. Porkkala, a peninsula covering 380 square kms and about 20 kms to the west of Helsinki, was leased to the Soviet Union to be used as a naval base for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. An Allied Control Commission supervised the stipulations in the temporary peace treaty signed in Moscow on 19 September 1944 were closely followed. The Commission left Finland after the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947. That treaty puts restrictions on Finland's armed forces. These restrictions will be discussed later.¹³

While the nation was busy recovering from war damages, a Defense Revision was initiated on 24 May 1945. It finished its report in March 1949. According to its recommendations, the duration of the basic active service time for conscripts was set to eight or eleven months. In 1952, the ground forces adopted an organization based on brigades instead of divisions and regiments, which were considered to lack the necessary flexibility. In 1957, the Defense Council (a body similar to the U.S. National Security Council) was reestablished.¹⁴

Meanwhile a treaty was prepared to be the keystone for Finland's future security policy. After negotiations the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) was signed in Moscow on 4 April 1948. The text was based on a formulation of the Finns. The result was a military treaty--not a treaty of military alliance. Its preamble guaranteed Finland the right to stay outside the conflicts of interests between the Great Powers, and, thus, opened the gate for a foreign policy based on peace-oriented neutrality.¹⁵ The military articles and importance of the Treaty of FCMA will be discussed below.

The successful hosting of the Olympic Games of 1952, reassured Finland as well as the participating nations that a brighter future was underway.

Only after joining the United Nations in 1955 and after the Soviet Union returned--before the expiration of its lease--the Porkkala naval base to the Finns in January 1956 could Finland breath more freely. Having a Soviet military base close to the capital city had not given Finland a credible testimony of a policy of neutrality. The earlier than expected return of the base, nevertheless, expressed clearly how the area of military tension had moved away from the Finnish shores to the Southern Baltic. This can be

compared to the prewar situation, when the Soviet Baltic Fleet was crammed in the easternmost corner of the Gulf of Finland.

Participation, since 1956, in the United Nations peacekeeping operations, membership in the Nordic Council in 1955, the associate membership with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1961 and full membership in 1986, the membership of the United Nations Security Council in 1969-70, acting as a host nation for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (SALT) in 1971-72, the agreements with the European Economic Community (EEC) and its socialistic counterpart the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in 1973, the strong commitment in the Helsinki Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the constantly expressed support of arms control and reduction measures strengthen the profile of the Finnish policy of neutrality.¹⁶ Being the eleventh wealthiest nation in the world, measured by the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita,¹⁷ and being a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) support the possibilities to implement Finnish security policy.

Since the beginning of the sixties, Finland's policy of neutrality has been approved by all the major powers. The last time, though, a specific reference to a "neutral Finland" appeared in a joint Finnish-Soviet communique was when President Urho Kekkonen extended the Treaty of FCMA in 1970 with Moscow.¹⁸

The Finnish efforts since May 1963 to change the "de facto" non-nuclear area of the Nordic countries into a "de jure" nuclear-weapon-free zone has so far met with little success.¹⁹ The idea is supported by the Swedes and even the Danes; Norway--due to strong NATO-restraints--of all the Nordic countries has so far shown the least interest in the suggestion.²⁰ As an expression of popular opinions the diets of both Greenland and Faroe Islands

have, however, declared their respective areas "nuclear weapon-free in peace and war."²¹ The Soviet Union is supportive of the concept.

Another arms-control arena where the Finns have been active is their contribution to efforts aimed at the prohibition of chemical weapons. In 1972 a research project was initiated for the creation of the verification capacity needed in the control of chemical warfare agents. In 1984 a comprehensive report of the technical means available for the verification of non-production, stock-piling, alleged use and destruction of chemical warfare agents and their precursors was presented to the UN Geneva Committee on Disarmament.²²

As a conclusion, it can be stated that the Finnish post-World War II foreign policy has been successful. Its daily efforts to secure the nation's sovereignty is based on the concept of maintaining friendly relations with all nations, especially with the Soviet Union and her Nordic neighbors. Its primary goal has been to keep Finland out of conflicts between the Great Powers, while at the same time attempting to promote peaceful solutions to conflicts through international organizations and negotiations, such as the UN and CSCE. Accordingly, one could suggest that the term "Finlandization"--in the negative sense it has been used--does not apply well to present-day Finland or the Finnish experience.²³

One feature of Finnish post-World War II foreign policy should further be remembered. Finland cannot allow its policy of neutrality to be compromised by military cooperation of any kind in peacetime. Thus, it was very clear that, for example, in 1979 the Finns rejected a Soviet proposal for combined maneuvers.²⁴

MILITARY FORCES IN THE REGION

One feature of the post-war history--and a very real one--is the military forces in the cost vicinity of Finland:

In the west is neutral Sweden with a post-mobilization modern army of 700,000, an Air Force with 524 combat aircraft, and a capable navy and coastal defense.²⁵

In the north-west is Norway with a military strength (without NATO enforcements) of her armed forces of 320,000, 92 combat aircraft, and a modern coastal defense and navy including 14 submarines.²⁶

In the east is the Leningrad Military District of the Soviet Union. Its ground forces consist of nine motorized rifle divisions, one airborne and one artillery division, an air assault and a naval infantry brigade (mobilization could thus field one front with two all-arms armies). The strength of the tactical aviation is about 225 aircraft to which can be added 300 attack and transport helicopters of the ground forces. The Northern Fleet is the second strongest of the Soviet fleets, with about 200 surface combatant ships and 116 submarines. Also based on the Kola Peninsula is about 60 percent of the Soviet sea launched ballistic nuclear missile (SLBM) forces: 576 missiles and 39 Strategic Force submarines.

In the south--and with a general direction of interest toward southwest--is the Baltic Military District (MD) of the Soviet Union. It belongs to the Soviet Western theatre of military operations (TVVD) while the former belongs to the Northwestern. Both are subordinated to the Western Strategic Theatre (of War, GTVD). Three tank, six motorized rifle, two airborne and two artillery divisions form the bulk of the ground forces. The Baltic MD Air Force has some 360 aircraft and 80 helicopters. The Baltic Navy consists of 45 principal surface combatants, 230 minor combatants, 25 amphibious

crafts, 32 submarines, including six "G-11" with 18 SLBM, some 130 aircraft, and a naval infantry brigade.²⁷

The impressive military forces of the other countries bordering to the Baltic Sea (Poland and German Democratic Republic, members of the Warsaw Pact, and Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany, members of NATO) are more connected with Central Europe, although they can influence the situation in Northern Baltic.

Some observations can readily be stated:

- Although impressive, the armed forces are much less concentrated than those in Central Europe.

- The Nordic Cap area is very important to the Soviet Union, due to the basing of its SLBM-forces and Nordic Fleet in the area of Murmansk. Its interest is thus of a global nuclear and naval strategic nature--as for NATO as well, based on the concept of strategic balance.

- The straits between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom, on one hand, and the Danish Straits, on the other hand, form major choke points for naval operations in time of war.²⁸

- The remarkable military strength of neutral Sweden has been and is an important and supporting factor in the stable post-war Nordic political-military situation.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES AFFECTING FINLAND'S DEFENSE

As a militarily weak power it is understandable that Finland has tried to support peace enhancing actions in order to help avoid and control crises. Accordingly, Finland has signed the Second Hague Peace Conference Agreements of 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928, the Convention of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 1930, the Convention defining

aggression of 1933, the Geneva Agreements of 1949, the Partial Test Ban of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the Sea-Bed Treaty of 1971, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, the Environmental Modification Convention of 1977, the Added Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Agreements of 1977, and the Convention on "Inhumane" Weapons of 1981. In addition, Finland has joined the Treaty of Paris' wartime naval justice of 1856, the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, the Declaration of the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, and most importantly, the United Nations' General Assembly Resolution #3314 (XXIX) of 1974 (in which aggression at last generally was defined) and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation of 1975 with the Madrid Agreement of 1983).²⁹

The above mentioned agreements give an indication of Finland's stand on matters concerning the legal principles of warfare and arms control. Still, there are some other treaties, which have a more dominating effect on Finland's security policy and defense. They are in chronological order: the Convention of the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland Islands of 1921 and the Agreement on the Aaland Islands between Finland and the Soviet Union of 1940, 1944, and 1947; the Charter of the United Nations and its 51st article; the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947; and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of 1948, later renewed in 1955, 1970, and 1983 to be in force til the year 2003. These treaties and their impact will be discussed in more detail.

The perceived naval importance of the Aaland Islands caused Sweden to attempt to take possession of them in the aftermath of Finland's "War of Liberation" in 1918. In 1921 a convention concerning the non-fortification and neutralization of the islands was concluded between the Baltic Sea

nations, France, and Great Britain. After their wars Finland and the Soviet Union--who had been left outside the former--made a separate agreement. Under this agreement Finland undertook to demilitarize the islands, to abstain from their fortification (which Finland had done twice during the World War II wars) and from placing them at the disposal of other states' armed forces. In peacetime Finland may temporarily send armed forces to maintain order, carry out inspections in the area by one or two light warships, or carry out surveillance from the air. If the neutrality of the zone is endangered it is nevertheless Finland's unconditional obligation to provide for the security of the islands by all military means possible. This task demands a capability to mobilize, deploy, and employ sufficient ground, air, and especially naval forces for fast implementation of defensive actions. Accordingly these capabilities have been visibly demonstrated by several military maneuvers in Southwest Finland during the last decades.³⁰

In the Paris Peace Treaty--according to the general spirit after World War II--surprisingly Great Britain demanded limitations on the size and scope of the Finnish armed forces. Although opposed by the Soviet delegation, the restrictions took force. Finland is authorized armed forces consisting of a total strength that does not exceed 41,900 personnel (army 34,400, navy 4,500 and 10,000 tons, and air force 3,000 and 60 aircraft). Finland shall not possess, construct or experiment with any atomic weapon, any self-propelled or guided missiles or apparatus connected with their discharge, sea-mines and torpedoes of non-contact (induction) types, submarines, motor torpedo boats, or specialized types of assault crafts. Nor shall Finland possess or acquire any aircraft designed primarily as bombers with internal bomb-carrying facilities. These restrictions have not had any grave effect on Finland's defense. The allied countries never demanded that Finland ceded the surplus

equipment of her large (about 0.5 million) World War II-army. Every time the peacetime strength was going to exceed the regulated strength, due to large after-war year-classes of the conscripts, this was allowed by the signatories. Furthermore, when Finland was allowed to employ defensive missiles and impulse sea-mines in 1963 and 1982 respectively, no serious obstacles to the development of the defensive ability of Finland are in effect. One could hardly imagine Finland to be in a need of or having the funds for "B-1" or Tupolev "Backfire" bombers . . . Finland could--if considered necessary--have the last peacetime restrictions removed by the UN Security Council. So far there has not appeared to be any real need for such an action.³¹

The Treaty of FCMA is the most important treaty in Finnish security policy. It is a military treaty, but not a military alliance pact. The first article runs as follows:

In the eventuality of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany or any stated allied with the latter, Finland will, true to her obligations as an independent state, fight to repel the attack. Finland will in such cases use all her available forces to defend her territorial integrity by land, sea and air and will do so within the frontiers of Finland in accordance with the obligations defined in the present agreement and, if necessary, with the assistance of, or jointly with, the Soviet Union. In the cases aforementioned the Soviet Union will give Finland the help required, the giving of which will be subject to mutual agreement between the Contracting Parties.

The second article states that:

The High Contracting Parties shall confer with each other if it is established that the threat of an armed attack as described in Article 1 is present.

The Treaty is of a purely defensive nature. It is restricted to Finnish territory only. It does not include any military cooperation which would come into effect automatically. The Third Parliamentary Committee considers that

the Treaty offers alternatives of varying degrees to strengthen Finland's defense if her own capabilities are insufficient for repelling an attack of the kind defined in the Treaty. Resorting to these political and military measures depends on the kinds of activities Finland considers necessary in the situation for her security. It has to be observed that the Treaty does not contain any specific provisions for the level of Finnish military capability; ". . . all her available forces. . ." remains a matter for Finland's own judgment.

As a conclusion it can well be stated, that the purpose of the FCMA is to maintain peace and avoid such a situation that Finland becomes involved in the sphere of a crisis. It also takes away any need to speculate on Finland's stand; it will never act as a base of operations against Soviet Union--nor against any other nation.³²

Remembering that the 51st article of the Charter of the UN secures for every nation the right of self-defense and that the Final Act of the Helsinki CSCE contains obligations for military confidence building measures, the picture of international agreements affecting Finland's military defense becomes clear.³³ It can be considered that although there are restrictions and obligations imposed upon Finnish defense, none of those are any real obstacles for Finland's possibilities to build a credible military defense according to perceived and assessed needs--if not the number of first line combat aircraft. It has to be remembered, though, that with her rather low defense expenditures and the high prices of modern combat aircraft, Finland could hardly afford more first line combat aircraft than the existing sixty she now employs.

Finland has acceded treaties and agreements that well serve her security policy. Her peace-oriented foreign policy of neutrality is supported by the

national defense--restricted in some tolerable senses. To be able to stay outside the great powers' conflicts of interests she has, to some degree, to rely on arms--although not to the same extent as Sweden, the true exponent of armed neutrality.

FINLAND'S STRATEGIC SITUATION

The Third Parliamentary Defense Committee (III PDC) assessed in 1981 Finland's strategic position and her military-political situation. It considered that the security of Northern Europe is a part of European as well as overall global security. The sea areas bordering on Northern Europe have continued to increase in importance. The military base network of the Soviet Union located on the Kola Peninsula plays a key role in its global strategic/nuclear and naval strategy. The possibilities of economical exploitation has further increased the importance of the Northern cap and sea areas.

The southern part of Northern Europe was considered to be contiguous with the military focal areas of Central Europe. The Danish Straits are of a great strategic importance for both NATO and the Soviet Union Warsaw Pact. Although the strategic significance of Northern Europe has increased, the situation in the area has remained stable, primarily due to the efforts of the Nordic countries. The committee did not consider that the prestockage of equipment of a US marine brigade in Central Norway alters the general picture in view of all the restrictions Norway has unilaterally imposed on her activities within NATO.³⁴

Considering the above mentioned post-mobilization strengths of the regional troops a conclusion can be drawn: all parties have a clear defensive posture. There are in fact no major offensive capabilities to be found

without massive strengthening of the forces from elsewhere. Due to the geographical circumstances of Northern Europe, especially the Northern Cap-area, deploying new troops to the region will take time and be highly visible by modern means of intelligence.

These assessments are very much in line with earlier ones. Some new aspects may be worth consideration.

The growing activity of US naval forces (Forward Maritime Strategy) in the area, in the Norwegian Sea and even in the Baltic, is not a desirable feature. The challenges it puts forward against the Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic in peacetime, appear to unnecessarily raise the tensions in the Nordic area without any visible military profits. Besides, in time of crisis the naval forces can rapidly be directed to vital areas.³⁵

The Strategic Defense Initiative presented by President Reagan is another new feature which might negatively influence the situation in the Nordic area. If no agreements can be reached on nuclear disarmament, and if an effective SDI-system can be developed, then the importance of the Soviet SLBM-weapon system will strongly increase. Accordingly, the importance of the Soviet Murmansk bases will grow--with even stronger reasons for the Soviet Union to secure the area against any perceived threats.³⁶

The intentions behind the violations of Swedish territorial waters since 1981 are very difficult to understand. However, one fact remains clear. It is very important for a neutral country to act resolutely and firmly to repel violations of her territorial integrity in order to maintain the credibility and gain the respect of foreign nations.

In the political-military arena, the III PDC assessed Finland's prevailing situation as secure. Because there are no strategic targets in Finland that would attract or justify military aggression, the military

importance of the country depends on whether the territory could be used to reach objectives of strategic value outside Finland. Theoretically, the Finnish Lapland could offer an invasion route for the military alliances. Similarly, the same may apply to Southern Finland and the Aaland Islands, because they contain the route between Stockholm, Sweden's capital, and Leningrad, the second important area of Soviet Union, after Moscow. Thus, it should serve the interests of all parties if Finnish Lapland remains inviolate. It is also essential for both the Soviet Union and Sweden to recognize that Finland's southern areas cannot be used for military operations directed against them.³⁷

The III PDC also stressed that Finland cannot be used as a base area for air operations against her neighbors, nor her air space as a short-cut route. Avoiding violation of Finnish (and Swedish) air space helps the country stay outside the other party's counteractions and demands, and thus, preserves the buffer-zone value equally for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This would, of course, be even more important if cruise-missiles would ever be used.³⁸ Hence, Southern Finland with Helsinki and Aaland Islands, Lapland, and the territorial air space are the key strategic areas for Finland.

The political-military position of Finland is closely interconnected with the situation in Europe and Fennoscandia. As long as there is a possibility of a military conflict in Europe the risk of a military conflict in the Nordic area cannot be excluded. But, due to the tight connection, no separate major military crisis can occur in Northern Europe without the risk of an immediate escalation. There are no options available to chance-taking in this matter.

The Committee concluded that the Finnish political-military situation is decisively affected in peacetime by how Finland's military capability is perceived to be in controlling her territory during a military conflict. This

applies to all parts of the country without exceptions. First, it is especially important to retain Soviet trust in Finland's efforts and capabilities to meet the obligations of the Treaty of FCMA. Secondly, Finland must retain Sweden's and Norway's (NATO's) trust in the fact that there will not arise a threat through Finland against them.³⁸

Perhaps the III PDC should have elaborated a little deeper on the subject of covert threats that, e.g. forces especially trained for "special" operations could impose on a country like Finland. In a time of increasing tension between the Great Powers there could be a temptation to use these kinds of units to achieve political and even strategic goals. These units together with other forms could bear pressure on Finland. The latter include psychological, economical, and political operations--not to forget acts of military demonstrations and terrorism or sabotage.

If, for instances, a joint effort by Finland, Norway and the Soviet Union could be established to exploit the natural economic resources in the Northern sea-areas, a gradual closing in on the unsettled matter of how to draw the boundaries between Norway and the Soviet Union's territorial, economical sea-beds could be achieved. Thus, a matter of conflicting areas of interests could be solved. One has to remember, that there is a working relationship between Norway and the Soviet Union on Svalbard.

Although the III PDC recognized that developments in nuclear weapons technology and nuclear doctrines have increased the probability of the use of nuclear weapons, the level of Finland's defense capability could not, however, be determined by demands of a nuclear war-waging capability. Continued attention should nevertheless be given to the (civil) defense against the effects of nuclear weapons.³⁹

An isolated attack against Finland was considered unlikely by the III PDC. Consequently, it was assessed that the primary task of the Finnish defense forces would be to repel a limited conventional attack against the nation on through the country. That attack would be a part of a wider military conflict. Still, more probable than a sudden outbreak of war in Europe would be a gradually worsening situation. It could last for a long time without erupting into open war.⁴⁰

There are few reasons to argue against the above assessments. Many rational reasons--not to mention a sound instinct of self-preservation--speak against an open armed conflict between the alliances in Europe. The perceived risk of even an unintended escalation is too high. Consequently, for all nations acting in the European arena, the need to have a capable security-political crisis management system is more obvious than ever before. This is even more important for a militarily weak nation pursuing a policy of neutrality, such as Finland.

REQUIREMENTS ON AND DEVELOPMENT OF FINLAND'S MILITARY DEFENSE

The concept for Finland's military defense is strategic territorial defense in a framework formed by operational zones of the military areas (Figure 3). The military areas are further divided into military districts. The Commander of a military area has the total responsibility for the preparation and implementation of defense in the area. The military districts are responsible for the preparations of and the mobilization of wartime forces (general, local and support units) and certain tasks of local defense.

Finnish operational art and tactics stress the concepts of maneuver, area and local defense. Geographical and climatic features will be utilized to maximum level. Starting from the sea and land boundaries the attacker will be

the object of delaying and attritional operations in a deep zone. By concentrated, extensive counterattacks in areas favoring Finnish light troops the enemy will be prevented from reaching his goals--vital areas--and ultimately will be beaten. In areas that might be seized by the invader, fighting will be continued by the means of territorial "guerrilla" units. By ambushes, limited raids and attacks the enemy, his lines of communications and logistical support will be worn out and his momentum seized. In South Finland the implementation of defensive measures will be of a more unbending and repelling nature.⁴¹

The III PDC was obviously satisfied with the above concept for defense which considered the participation of almost the entire male population: a general conscription, a very strong reserve, and a system of flexible readiness. The Committee also examined the military tasks, as prescribed by the law issued in 1974, of the Defense Forces and the Frontier Guards. The tasks require the capability to guard the borders of the country, to carry out surveillance throughout her entire area, and to protect the territorial integrity in peacetime as well as in time of crisis situations. They also include the ability to defend the country, as well as to protect the lives, the basic rights, and the property of Finnish citizens in case the country is attacked. The III PDC determined that these tasks will be relevant for the next fifteen years, that is, until the middle of the nineties.⁴²

Based on its assessments, the III PDC placed the following requirements on Finland's military defense capability:

In peacetime, Finland must be able to guard her borders and to control the territory and air space of the country with an effectiveness that is likely to be sufficient for detecting violations. Following the detection of a violation, Finland must be able to take immediate steps to identify the violator and be able to use such forceful measures that the violation calls for in peacetime. With the help

of reconnaissance and surveillance activities, Finland will have to be able to obtain information about such changes of the situation that may come to pose a military threat to the country, in time for allowing her to take necessary actions for upgrading her defense preparedness.

During a threat of war, Finland must be able to regulate her defense preparedness flexibly and with as little inconvenience as possible, in accordance with the requirements of the threat at any given time. Finland will have to be able to intensify border patrolling and territorial surveillance in order to extend surveillance coverage to exposed areas. Finland must also be able to concentrate sufficient forces in these areas to prevent the exploitation of her territory and to deter an attack against the country.

In time of war, when our country is the object of an attack, all available resources must be concentrated on the defense of the country. By using depth of the territory, Finland will inflict casualties and loss of time on the invader and prevent him from reaching areas vital to the continuation of our defense. Through defensive battles, Finland must, even in the most trying circumstances, safeguard the living conditions of the population and create conditions for the political leadership to take requisite measures.⁴³

The III PDC examined the development of Finnish defense capability from both a fifteen-year long perspective and a five-year development plan for 1982-86. The former will be discussed, because it exhibits in a more general way the trends.

The Committee assessed that the available reserves will diminish with the smaller size of age groups, to some 600,000 men in the 1990's. It also considered that it would not be possible--without substantially raising the level of defense spending--to simultaneously eliminate considerable deficiencies in the equipment of the main forces of the 1981-composition, and to improve the capability of the Fast Deployment Forces (FDFs) to meet the future needs. The III PDC chose to give the priority to the development of the FDFs required to prevent exploitation of Finnish territory. These forces,

thus, should be rather well equipped. Their strength, including air force and naval combat units, mobile army units, upgraded surveillance, command/control, border, coastal, and necessary logistical formations, could be limited to 250,000 men. These forces, flexibly regulated according to the demands of the situation, would be much easier to sustain during prolonged times of increased international tensions or threat-of-war-situations than a fully mobilized force. Still, avoiding the principle of equally well or badly equipped forces, the repelling capability and, thus, the deterrent effect of these forces could be better than that of an equal amount of the main-force units.⁴⁴

The III PDC considered that the development of the FDFs should be strongly emphasized to enable them to be equipped and trained to meet the requirements of the 1990's.

The Committee also manifested the roles of the services. For safeguarding the integrity of the airspace and territorial waters the Air Force and the Navy are indispensable. The Army, including the coastal and air defense artilleries, is indispensable for repelling and deterring an attack against Finland or through her territory. In unexpected situations the mobilization of the ground forces has to be protected by air and naval forces, and army operations have to be supported in areas of major importance by them. On the other hand, the army will secure their bases. The III PDC declared that the Finnish Defense Forces have to constitute a viable entry. The task of repelling an attack will determine the level of investment for development of the army. The task of repelling an invasion will determine the capabilities, and thus, the level of investments of the air force and the navy mainly to the extent that the resources geared to their primary tasks will permit.⁴⁵

In the Committee's view, arrangements should be made to enable the use of the full mobilization strength of 600,000 men in situations where the fast deployment forces are not sufficient for deterring and repelling an invasion. If needed, the troops based on the large reserves will give Finland's defense depth and durability as well as a protection to cope with unforeseen developments. The Committee recognized that equipment for forces not included in the fast deployment forces can, however, be improved only on a limited scale. In many occasions they will have to rely on transfer of materiel from the FDFs, when they are modernized. The tasks of these reserve forces will have to be defined accordingly.⁴⁶

For the army the most important development project will be the creating and equipping of the FDFs units. Their mobility, fire power, anti-tank and anti-air capabilities, and combat durability are the main development objectives. Their C³I-systems must be reliable in all circumstances. Special attention will be paid to equip the forces intended for operations in Lapland according to unique requirements. As a whole, wherever it is feasible, priority will be given to simple, easy-to-use and inexpensive defensive weapon-systems and equipment.⁴⁷

Future air defense needs require a comprehensive C³I and radar network, three squadrons of first-line all-weather interceptors and air defense missile-systems in those exposed areas not covered by interceptors. Mobile air defense missile-systems will be deployed particularly in the country's exposed northern border areas. They are also needed for the protection of the most important national objectives and air bases, since the Committee concluded that these targets cannot be effectively protected by other means.⁴⁸

The repelling of naval and amphibious attacks will emphasize coastal defense in the Gulf of Finland. In the northern part of the Baltic and in the

Aaland Islands the priority will be on naval weapons systems; in the Gulf of Bothnia mobile weapons systems detached from elsewhere will be used, if needed. The focus of development of the coastal artillery will shift from fixed to mobile artillery and ground-to-sea missile systems. Three new high-speed combat vessel flotillas will replace escort ships and motor gun boats. Specific attention will be devoted to mine-warfare capability.⁴⁹

The III PDC recommended that while improving the patrolling and surveillance capability, in conditions of peace as well as in various threat situations, the Frontier Guard will seek cooperation and standardization in their equipment purchases with the Defense Forces.⁵⁰

Furthermore, the III PDC suggested a yearly one percent increase of the employed personnel of the Defense Forces, increases in the amount of refresher exercises for reservists (from 35,000 a year to 80,000 reservists in the late 1990's), better social benefits for the conscripts, and more resources for operations, maintenance, real estate, and administration.⁵¹

After studying five different spending proposals and development plans, the Committee agreed on long-range development objectives to be achieved in fifteen years, 1982-1996. This envisages an average of five percent real growth of annual defense spending. In its detailed recommendations for 1982-86, however, the III PDC suggested a total of about 17.5 billion Finnish Marks (FM, at 1981 price level) for the military defense. That meant an annual real growth of only 3.8 percent. The NATO-recommendation on an increase of three percent probably influenced the Committee more than the calculations presented by the planning experts . . . However, deflating the recommendation to 1986 estimated constant price level, and taking the exchange rate of one US dollar (USD) to 5.2 FIM (31 March 1986), the recommendation equals about 25 billion FIM and 4.8 billion USD. Of that funding, 31 percent

should be used for acquisition of military equipment. The share of air defense would be 34 percent, the ground forces' share would be 38 percent, the naval defense's 18 percent, and the last 10 percent would be used for purchases not specified by the defense sector.⁵²

The Committee estimated that the share of the GNP would still be about 1.5 percent and the share of the national budget about 5 percent. Indeed, the III PDC did not envisage any new divisions of the state fundings for different purposes.

In its report, the III PDC suggested (page 61) that if there is no specific need to appoint a new parliamentary defense committee, it should not be done just routinely. This suggestion has been honored. It can be considered as homage towards the III PDC and its work, that, although there is rapid development in the different sectors of life, the report is still basically valid. The report and its recommendations have been the blueprint for the measures taken to develop the defense capabilities of the Finnish Defense Forces since 1982.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1982-86 PLAN

Instead of the planned gradual increase in 1982-86 of the defense spending by an annual 3.8 percent, the outlays jumped in 1982 with a remarkable 17 percent in real value. During the years until 1986 the level of defense spending in constant prices remained the same. Thus, the military budget for fiscal year 1986 (about one billion USD) is about five percent below the level recommended by the III PDC--without possible additional budgets. The final statement of accounts will be visible in the beginning of fiscal year 1987.

Some clearly measurable observations can be made. Only 50 percent of the suggested net increase of employed personnel (1000 persons) has been achieved. Instead of a total increase from 35,000 reservists trained 1981 to 50,000 in 1986, the number of reservists will be only 44,000 men. An increase by more than a quarter is nevertheless a significant achievement. Neither has the "per diem" of the conscripts developed as planned. It (about 2.7 USD) will amount to a two-thirds of the recommendation. The pace in enhancing the training has been slower than suggested by the III PDC. On the other hand, the funding for the operations and maintenance of equipment has exceeded the recommendation by four percent. The funding for real estate and general management has been kept on a slightly lower level than planned.

Although the above objectives are of importance, the materiel development is even more important. The level of the defense equipment decides, in many cases, the capability of the unit to perform its tasks. The fundings for the procurement program has been achieved by about 96-97 percent (1000 million USD). The deficit in the amount of about 40 million USD has slightly delayed some air and ground defense programs. Nevertheless, all the main objectives set for the period 1982-86 have been achieved.

The army modernization is on its way. The mobility of the FDFs-units is improving by the purchase of different kinds of cross-country vehicles, "T-72"-tanks and "BMP"-infantry fighting vehicles modernize the armor brigade, new anti-tank missiles together with the procurement of a domestic 155mm gun-howitzer improve the firepower, as well as the domestically developed AA-artillery C³I system. New water-crossing equipments made in Finland are added to the inventories as are many kinds of land-mines. A new domestic 130mm heavily armored turret-cannon for the most important harbor defense

batteries and a major modernization of the surveillance and fire control systems for coastal artillery are well underway to deployment.

By a procurement of Saab J-35 "Draken"-fighters the goal of three interceptor squadrons has been achieved. The 1970's initiated program to develop a sophisticated short-range air surveillance and command/control radar system--so important for e.g. cruise missile defense--is in its last phase to be completed. A mixture of modern transports, including Focker "Friendships" and "Lear Jets" have replaced obsolete "DC-3's."

The Navy's first flotilla of Finnish-built fast combat vessels equipped with Swedish Saab "RB-15" sea-to-sea missiles will be in service during 1986. The modernization of the two fast gunboats is underway, as well as the purchases of modern ammunition, sea-mines, and other special naval equipment.

Although the blueprints of the III PDC have not totally materialized during the first five-year period, Finland can still be rather satisfied with the achievements. The general direction of the development curve has definitely been positive. Indeed, in times of a recession in the world economy with general decreases in the military budgets or slower growth than anticipated, it gives an affirmative expression of the consistent political will to secure the modest development of the Finnish military capabilities--as outlined by the Committee.⁵³

Nevertheless, General Jaakko Valtanen, the Commander in Chief of the Finnish Defense Forces, has several times declared his anxiety with the slow progress.⁵⁴ Particularly the lags in personnel jeopardize the abilities of the armed forces to perform according to needs. He has already taken actions to streamline the organization in order to rationalize the personnel management. However, there has never been any surplus personnel in the rank and file. Much further rationalizing is not possible without negatively

affecting readiness. In times of five percent unemployment, on one hand, and a lot of work to be done in the defense community, on the other hand, it would seem to be more appropriate to give an individual a job than pay him unemployment fees. . . .

In view of the continuation of the development programs outlined by the III PDC, the budget for 1987 will be very revealing. It will give a clear indication of whether there still exist the political will to go on towards the established aims for the military defense in the Middle of the 1990's. There will probably be the need to slightly refine some programs. It would probably be wise to develop less personnel intense systems and procedures in order to cope with a slower than planned increase in active personnel force levels. The growing threat of actions by conventionally armed but unconventionally performing military special forces, may demand new approaches and means. Still, the main task remains the same: to continue the initiated modernization of the FDFs--the military key means to be used as a crisis management tool in times of danger.

CONCLUSION

Since the termination of the Second World War, Finland has pursued a very consistent policy of security. In order to advance her own security she has tried to increase Nordic stability and to advance tension decreasing measures, mainly in the European arena. She has taken every step necessary to stay outside conflicts of interest between the Great Powers. The main instrument in this activity has been foreign policy, which the Finns for good reasons call a peace-oriented policy of neutrality. In order to be able to assure her neighboring nations that a military threat by or through Finland will not occur, Finland has both signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and

Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, and declared that her territory will not be used for hostile actions toward third parties. Her ambitions in the field of foreign policy are well reflected by the treaties and agreements to which she has acceded. Finland's trade policy is also well aligned with her foreign policy and supports her concept of the political benefits of common economic interests.

However, in the contemporary world it is not sufficient to try to assure the world of one's peaceful intentions if there is not any credibility of being able to stand behind the assurance. It is the task of the nation's defense to provide the policy credibility. A well-demonstrated defense will, which is still undiminished amongst the population, is but one important instrument of power in service of the national policy's credibility. The other important instrument is the military defense of Finland. The large pool of military trained reservists, the great mobilization preparedness, the territorial defense system adapted to available resources, and the actions taken to develop the defense capability as well as to derive advantage by skillful use of the natural features of the country, all these factors are intended to demonstrate that an attack against Finland will not end quickly and the losses will not equal the possible advantages. A creditable policy demands, furthermore, that even in peacetime the defense forces have to actively demonstrate their capabilities by repelling resolutely all violations against the territorial integrity.

It is obvious that, by the above measures to develop the Finnish Defense Forces, the Finns hope to enhance the deterrence against any aggression. The fast deployment forces--when they are fully developed--will provide the political leadership with a new flexible deterrent instrument. The extremely low level of defense spendings can, however, endanger the attempted aims.

There is always the risk in a time of rising costs for defense equipment that one attempts to build a bigger house than there are bricks reserved for that purpose--or, even worse, that available bricks are used for less vital purposes. However, fortunately, a defensive capability seems to be easier to achieve both technically and economically in present times compared with an offensive capability.⁵⁵

Although the Finnish Defense Forces can increasingly be considered as a crisis management instrument to prevent armed conflict, it has to be kept in mind, that there cannot exist a credible deterrence unless the armed forces are trained, prepared and equipped for war. In a case like Finland, it is always a question of national survival, if she has to fight a war. The concept of a large mobilization is, thus, very logical. An attack against Finland will cause a total mobilization; the war will turn out to be a war against a totally committed people. Even with troops of the most modern design--and due to the demands of Central Europe there can never be a lot of them--the attacker will find such a defense close to impossible to defeat, especially if there are restrictions upon the time or the forces available. Therefore, the concept of a people's defense "à la Finland" is not so obsolete after all. In a era of high-tech it is only too easy to forget that the aim of an attacker is to force the defender to give up his will to defend. Thus, as long as the Finnish people preserve their strong defense will, it probably is the strongest, single deterrent against aggression.

The three parliamentary defense committees since 1971 proved to be very valuable in formulating generally accepted guidelines for the development of national defense policy. It can also be considered, as a sign of political flexibility, that when the need for such a committee no longer was acute--after the comprehensive report by the III PDC--formal reasons were not

considered strong enough to establish a fourth "pro forma" committee. When specific reasons arise, the instrument to aid the normal executive administration and the parliament is available. Such a specific reason could arise very soon, if the resources for the military defense begin to decrease too much from the III PDC recommendation.

The Finnish security policy has so far proved to be successful. There are no reasons to expect that it will not be so into the future. The Finns have learned through hard experiences that whatever can be done to enhance peace and stability in North Europe must be done. By actively promoting peace and understanding between nations Finland strengthens her own independence.

It is, nevertheless, very important to keep in mind what Max Jacobson, the former Finnish Ambassador to the United Nations, wrote in the introduction of his book "Finland Survived."⁵⁶ He stated: "The military values displayed by the Finnish people in the 1940's provide no defense against the threat of a gradual dilution of national identity in a world dominated by a few powerful entities able to exploit the new 'supertechnologies'. The survival of Finnish independence will depend on the ability of the Finns to continue to maintain the high degree of political and social cohesion, self-reliance and vitality of national spirit they have shown in the past decades."

NOTES

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