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THE APACHE CAMPAIGNS: VALUES IN CONFLICT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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by

LINDA J. REDMAN, CPT, USAR

B.A., Oklahoma State University, 1962

M.A., Oklahoma State University, 1965

PhD., Oklahoma State University, 1974

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1985

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
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
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


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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE APACHE CAMPAIGNS: Values in Conflict, by Captain Linda J. Redman, USAR, 148 pages.

This study examines the engagements between the U. S. Army and the Apache Indians from 1846 to 1886. It attempts to determine what effects the values of the soldiers and warriors had upon the conflicts occurring during this forty-year period.

The examination revealed that many instrumental values held by the soldiers and Apache warriors were directly contradictory, although most conceptual values were not. Instrumental Values assigned to such cultural aspects as land use, property ownership, criminal justice, religious faith, and family and group loyalty differed sharply. Conceptual values for both factions identified the land as important, sought clear and swift justice for crimes, gave freedom of expression to religious beliefs, and emphasized the primary importance of family and group loyalties.

Initially, the Apache and Frontier Army co-habited the Southwest peacefully. Then, as Army regulars and volunteers became involved in actions which gave expression to the instrumental values they endorsed and the Apache did the same, warfare erupted. Military policies of extermination and Apache desire for revenge supported its continuation.

The conclusion of this study is that the differences in instrumental values led to increased conflict between the Army and Apaches. Lasting peace came only when both warriors focused on shared conceptual values.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to my Advisory Committee for their support and guidance during my research and writing this year. For intellectual stimulation and timely encouragement, I particularly thank my Committee Chairman, Major (Chaplain) Erwin Wichner. His guidance has been invaluable in the completion of this study. My gratitude also goes to Lieutenant Colonel Roy Stephenson and Colonel Don Martin, Junior, not only for their assistance as First Reader and Consulting Faculty Advisor respectfully, but also for their personal interest and concern.

I also thank the library staffs at Haskell Indian College, Kansas University, and the Army Command and General Staff College for their assistance in obtaining research materials for this study.

Finally, I thank my family for their assistance in typing and reproducing the various drafts of this paper and for their understanding throughout the entire process. To Melinda and Ron -- many thanks.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

War, in both the general and specific senses, is a tangible expression of a conflict of values... War creates and sustains many human values, personal and social: liberty, equality, fraternity, pride, loyalty, and resourcefulness.¹

In late January 1863, General Joseph R. West, Commander at Fort McLane, submitted to the War Department an after-action report on the capture and death of the "greatest chief the Apache had produced."² The report contended that the chief had been taken directly in a skirmish with a company of California Volunteers under the command of Captain E. D. Shirland and delivered straight to General West. The account goes on to state that despite heavy security--a watch of one sergeant and nine men--the chief rushed his guard about midnight. He was shot to death trying to escape.³ Yet, other versions of this incident have been told. According to Daniel E. Conner, a prospector who was present with Shirland's men, Mangas Coloradas, the chief brought into custody, had been lured from his band of warriors by a white flag of truce. As he approached alone and unarmed to meet the party of soldiers, he was quickly surrounded and escorted back to Captain Shirland's camp, where two men were assigned to guard him. That night, after a visit from General West, the men guarding him applied heated bayonets to the chief's bare

feet as harassment. When he vigorously protested after the third gouging, they shot him repeatedly.⁴

Was the chief captured or trapped? Was he murdered, in effect, or killed in line-of-duty action on part of the soldiers? Answers to these questions lie only partially with "facts"; they lie more fully with the values of the persons viewing those facts. The chief may be seen as a noble warrior who was victimized by the overwhelming power, greed, and hatred of the encroaching white civilization. Or he may be identified as an untrustworthy, ruthless savage, best dead, so as to be given no possible escape to return to a life of wanton killing of the local citizens. Or other, more objective views may be held.

The reports given here are only two of the many accounts of this widely-publicized incident.⁵ Yet they represent the most frequently recounted versions; and in their discrepancies, they succinctly illustrate a consistent problem the military encountered in its dealings with the Apache--how best to carry out a mission to protect the frontier and to establish acceptable relationships with such a savage people as the Apache appeared to be.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

This thesis contends that the clash in instrumental values held by both Apache and Army personnel in the early years extended the conflicts and that a greater focus on

common conceptual values in the 1870's and 1880's promoted peace between the two Nations.

To determine a basis for this contention, this study analyzes the role of personal and cultural values in the engagements between the U. S. military forces (to include volunteers and auxiliaries as well as regular Army personnel) and the Apache nation. The following chapters will review the Army's campaigns against the Apache, with a particular scrutiny of the values demonstrated by the combatants-- in contract to or in compatibility with those of their opponents. The impact these values had both on the course of battle and on continuing relations will also be examined as a part of the analysis.

DEFINITIONS

APACHE: Anthropologically, the term "apache" is applied to all Southwestern Athapascan Indians with the exception of Navajo. Thus, "Apache" includes a large and somewhat diverse group of tribes such as Mescalero, Nedni, Chiricahua, Jicarilla, Western, White Mountain, and Warm Springs Apaches-- and related tribes. For purposes of simplification, I use the broad term to include all the Apache nation taken together, not just one or a few groups. Where distinctions are clear and significant in the records, I will present the specific description in an attempt to make the discussion easier for the reader to follow.

BELIEFS: As stated in FM 22-100, beliefs are "assumptions or convictions that one holds to be true regarding people, concepts or things." They are learned as a part of one's socialization.

COMMITMENT: As stated in FC 22-1, a commitment is the dedication and willingness to recognize and support national, Army, and unit goals over individual desires. It includes entrusting oneself to accomplish these goals and involving oneself in duties and responsibilities. Although this phrasing specifically applies to the Army, the meaning of commitment here given is relevant also to any group-individual relationship, and would thus be applicable to Apache as well, if such dedication to group goals over individual ones is evident.

CULTURE: A system of values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors adopted by individuals for the purpose of group cohesiveness. It is developed and reinforced through the bonds of the group.⁶

HUMAN FACTORS: Broadly speaking, all personal traits and abilities of the human being--mental, physical, moral, and soiritual. These will be the focus of the following study, as the values of the soldiers and Indians are identified in their human actions and thoughts.

JUSTICE: As defined in FC 22-1, justice is a consistency in applying standards, granting rewards and punishments

with fairness and clarity of equality. It is meted out with a comprehensiveness of the whole, not sacrificing people affected by an action without taking their needs into account.⁷

NORMS: As stated in FM 22-100, norms are "rules or regulations" that members of the group follow. Formal norms are the official ones passed as law or general standards. Informal norms are the unwritten ones that a person follows to "belong" to the group through conforming to its actions or thoughts. These informal norms may or may not be consistent with the formal norms that are established.

VALUES: Broadly, values are something important to the individual, group, or organization involved in interaction with others or in individual activity. According to FM 22-100, values are "attitudes about the worth or importance of people, concepts, or things." Ralph Linton's definition, "Anything capable of producing similar choice responses in several of society's members" indicates a relationship between values and behavior which is pertinent to this study. Furthermore, his distinction between instrumental values (concrete, concise values) and conceptual values (abstract, generalized ones) is referenced in the discussion which follows.⁸ Traditional Army values are articulated in FM 100-1, THE ARMY, Chapter 4. The

The values identified on those pages, though certainly not an exhaustive list of Army values, are referred to as the Professional Army Ethic. The following explanations of the values are from FC 22-1 (3-2):

Loyalty to the Institution:

The first fundamental value can be restated by using two supplementary values.

(1) Loyalty to the Nation and its heritage. Army leaders take an oath to support and defend the Constitution. The ideals of freedom, justice, truth, and equality were founded on an ethic of human dignity and worth. This solemn act signifies a total commitment to serve the Nation's ideals in whatever capacity called upon, and to safeguard the Nation's interests.

(2) Loyalty to the Army. To meet his or her responsibility to the Nation, the soldier must be loyal to the military and civilian chain of command. This loyalty must flow in all directions--downward, laterally, and upward.

Loyalty to the Unit:

There is a two-way obligation between the leader and those who are led. (They are) devoted to each other. The development of cohesion flows from many resources, but a common purpose and a sense of belonging to a

purposeful unit that cares for its members are central to its growth.

Personal Responsibility:

Each soldier must accept the obligation to do each specified and implied task to the best of his/her ability and to assume responsibility for individual actions. For leaders, this value requires a willing acknowledgement of responsibility not only for what they do, but also for what their subordinates do. This value also includes a responsibility to behave ethically.

Selfless Service:

Self-interest must often be sacrificed for what is best for the unit. A selfless leader will encourage teamwork that is essential for a cohesive, effective unit.⁹

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This study examines values of the Apache and the U. S. Army of the frontier as they affect the Apache campaigns. Because values themselves are intangible, for the discussion which follows below, they have been abstracted from the words and actions of the participants of the various military engagements and from historical records of those actions. Since these encounters occurred in different Southwestern locations, with different opponents, and during different periods of time, the values identified are not expected to be the same for all the military personnel nor for all the Apache involved.

The changes, in fact, provide a basis for understanding some of the conflicts and resolutions that occurred.

The following statements from FC 22-1 appropriately note the conditions of value difference:

Values vary across societies, cultures, and organizations. (and) Individuals assign degrees of importance to their particular values. This order is transient; that is, over time, values vary in degree of importance. Thus, it is not a question of holding a particular value, but rather how important it is compared to others at that particular point in time....

The particular values an individual holds are neither completely stable or unstable. However, the main core of values is reasonably consistent across time...The more central the values, the more resistive they are to change. Values change, or at least value realignment, can be influenced by many different factors.

In Chapter Two this study concentrates on identifying primary values established by the general socialization and training of the Apache. Chapter Three looks at Army values and personal values of the variety of men comprising the military of the frontier. Chapter Four analyzes the values of the opponents as they interacted--it looks at conflicting values, at compatible ones, and at the changes in values that evolved during the periods of warfare. Chapter Five presents conclusions and recommendations for further study.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The great expansion westward was a popular topic for writers across the U. S. Hundreds of personal

narratives, and even hundreds more fictional accounts of frontier adventures, were published throughout the nineteenth century. It seems as if the excitement of the movement west captured the interests of readers of all ages and nationalities. Stories of Indians and cavalry actions sold quickly. That is, "literature" related to the period of Indian Wars abounds. Not all of it is helpful to historical researchers, however, so the task of identifying valid or authentic sources is a critical reading activity.

For this study, of greatest relevance are any sources which reveal something of the values of the participants. Thus, both official and "enhanced" stories or reports bear on the aim of research. Of primary significance as a resource of the period, of course, are official government documents, including treaties and presidential directives. The military actions also produced numerous official reports, orders, and policy statements. These will be included as they provide relevant data.¹⁰ Newspaper accounts of interactions between citizens, soldiers, and Apaches became popular daily reading from coast to coast. Some of these are accurate, on-site records; others are hearsay. Reliable statements from newspapers are good data sources, but the biased accounts also reveal something of the values of writer and publisher. Both types are relevant here.¹¹

Additional information about what happened during the campaigns has been recorded in private journals of military and civilian citizens who either passed through the Southwest or relocated for permanent residence there.¹² Photographs and paintings produced visual records of the period as well.¹³ Besides these types of sources which focus on factual recording, many period histories systematize the individual bits and pieces of information to provide clearer, more comprehensive views, not just partisan ones. Such studies as those by Utley, Dunley, and Terrell are included in this grouping.¹⁴

However, the flood of Hollywood-style, melodramatic productions which are westward movement spawned from the late nineteenth century through the present has caused current misunderstandings and confused perceptions of the human factors involved with the "Apache Wars."¹⁵ From many popular comics, novels, movies and exciting narratives, stereotypes emerge to entertain a public still curious about a people unfamiliar in lifestyle and beliefs. These popular stereotypes of the "Indian Warriors" (Tribal distinctions are not always clear) are starkly simplistic. Lummis' description of the Apache as he views them from Fort Bowie summarizes this image:

Not only is the (the Apache) the most war-loving of American Indians, he is also T H E B O S S W A R R I O R. He is strong to an endurance simply impossible in a more endurable

country. He has the eye of a hawk, the stealth of a coyote, the courage of a tiger--and its mercilessness.¹⁶

General stereotypes of the participants in frontier fighting also included the popular image of a military force of good humor, yet carefully disciplined, arriving with the best of timing to save those citizens threatened by the savages. Through superior skill and leadership, the cavalrymen and infantry achieved success with minimum losses, in episode after episode of this fictional West.¹⁷

Such images are represented in the following battle accounts by an enlisted trooper of the Sixth Cavalry, Anton Mazzanovich:

We were fully exposed to the fire of the Indians, for the ground was level. Sometimes, as we advanced, we would strike a place where the grass was ten or fifteen inches tall; then we would lie down flat. I can't say how close the bullets were dropping, but they certainly made a most ugly sound. Bullets that ricochet are most dangerous, for if one of those strikes you, it makes a terrible wound. When a bullet would whistle past with a z-z-zip z-z-zing! it was queer how the men would duck their heads. From time to time we moved slowly forward. Our officers were back of the line, moving to-and-fro so the Indians would not get a bead on them.¹⁸

Officers, too, helped create the dramatic image held of heroes in action. Recorded in Farish's History of Arizona is one of Captain John C. Cremony's accounts of his hand-to-hand fight with an Apache opponent. It is, as Farish states, "as thrilling as any of the stories of the West." In this long passage, Cremony captures most

of the general Hollywood pictures:

The last charge of my second pistol had been exhausted; my large knife lost in the thick dust on the road, and the only weapon left me was a small double-edged, but sharp and keen, dagger... A robust and athletic Apache, much heavier than myself, stood before me, not more than three feet off.

Cremony's account goes on to state how they thrust at each other with their weapons, tumbling to the ground with the force. He grappled with the "desperate savage" only to lose the ascendancy to the Apache. Cremony goes on

I was completely at his mercy....His triumph and delight glared from his glittering black eyes, and he resolved to lose nothing of his savage enjoyment. Holding me down with the grasp of a giant, against which all of my struggles seemed wholly vain, he raised aloft his long sharp knife, and said--"Pindav lickovee das -av -go, dee dah tatsan," which means, "The white-eyed man, you will soon be dead." I thought as he did, and in that frightful moment made a hasty commendations of my soul to the Benevolent, but I am afraid that it was mingled with some scheme to get out of my predicament, if possible.

Cremony continues to relate how his "erratic and useless" life passed in review before him in what was just an instant of time. He thought certainly he was doomed.

To express the sensations I underwent at that moment is not within the province of language.... I gave myself up for lost--another victim to Apache ferocity---(Yet) The love of life is a strong feeling at any time; but to be killed like a pig; by an Apache, seemed pre-eminently dreadful and contumelious. Down came the murderous knife, aimed full at my throat...

Again, Cremony summoned strength to dodge the strike and was able to bite the warrior's thumb, which had come within reach of his mouth. This allowed the overturn of the power positions.

I circled his body and plunged my sharp and faithful dagger twice between his ribs, just under his left arm, at the same time making another convulsive effort to throw off his weight....In a few moments (I) had the satisfaction of seeing my enemy gasping the last under my repeated thrusts.¹⁹

Lummis, Mazzanovich, and Cremony present images drawn from their first-hand observations in the areas and from their participation in the military-Apache encounters. However, pictures such as these tell only a portion of the interaction; these popular stories have been extracted from a fuller truth. The works of Lummis and Mazzanovich provide further descriptions of notable behaviors and attitudes of both Apache and white soldiers beyond the obvious stereotypes given here. Cremony is given to an exaggeration throughout his work, and, as an eye-witness, he has a perspective which impresses those who read his drama-filled accounts. Such "elaboration" of details about the Apache-Military confrontations distort the truth, however. When expanded or full accounts of the people involved are not as widely circulated as are the dramatic and sensational but partial ones, the "real" picture is lost. Misconceptions about values and

attitudes replace tentative descriptions; perceptions reflecting prejudices and antipathy multiply. A lack of valid knowledge and understanding of a people provides a rich ground for prejudice, fear, and distrust to grow. Indeed, these attitudes prevailed among both Apache and soldier and have been passed on through the century following their wars.

Although much has been written about the Indian Wars, my cursory review of this literature has not identified any study particularly focusing on this conflict in values between the Apache and Army.

BACKGROUND FOR THE CONFLICT

Because the opposing forces had emerged from quite divergent social, political, spiritual and military backgrounds, negotiations to avert military conflict could be expected to have only limited success. Many values and beliefs held by one or the other party seemed confusing or senseless or directly unacceptable when seen through ethnocentric eyes of the others. Even non-conflicting values (parallel or compatible ones, e.g., concern for family) were difficult for Apache and soldier to understand and communicate commonly.²⁰ Glaring behavioral differences usually provoked prejudiced attitudes against the opponents. Thus, some points of significant similarity in values were not recognized early in the relationship

nor made a part of the official government (and thus Army) policy as a possible basis for developing better and more peaceful relationships.²¹ It was not until the war had stretched over several decades that attention turned to solutions which emphasized values shared by the warring parties.

Peace involved a merging of some values and also some value changes for both the soldiers and the Apache. The question arises, however, regarding causes. What brought about these changes? Was it only the power of the military that brought the Apache to surrender? What happened in the contacts between the separate cultures? Did the common values ever play a part in the movement toward peace? Answers to these questions can be found by reviewing the action. From such a scrutiny, some distinctive categories of values emerge, and from them, some estimate of value changes can be made.

One of these categories of values includes rights of life (and death), liberty (and captivity, or reservation status), and the pursuit of happiness through work and play). Conceptual values related to these rights appear as significant to both sides throughout the wars, although the instrumental values associated with them initially varied extensively from soldiers to Apache.

However, during the final years of the conflicts, members of the two cultures exhibited more similarities in the values related to these basic rights.²²

Another category of values relates to the traditional Army values--loyalty to the Nation (larger group) and to fellow combatants (unit or band), personal responsibility and selfless service.²³ These are broadly those which have endured as a part of the U. S. military since its creation. They ultimately tie together national values based on the Constitution and affirmed by each officer accepting the charge of leadership to him by the national governing body. These values also guide the action of the enlisted soldiers as they carry out the orders of the officers to accomplish a mission defined according to the country's values.

Although Apache warriors took no oath at a commissioning, had no Constitution or Congress to give them a framework to guide development of values; nonetheless, they operated by following definite values which also fit into this category of professional and personal loyalties. Their code of behavior differed; yet they did have an ethical code by which their actions were judged and guided. Conceptual values of the two cultures appear similar; instrumental ones, however, appear as stumbling blocks to friendly relations.²⁴

Many false assumptions about the Apache and their fighting prowess or motivations to fight have been identified. To clearly separate myth from fact, to distinguish real actions from Hollywood scripts, the following chapters review the engagements between the Apache and the U. S. Army as presented in official records and other historical accounts. These pages will give first a cursory review of the general attitudes, beliefs, and values of the basic groups from which the soldiers and Apache warriors emerge, and then provide the analysis of that interaction.

NOTES

1. H. L. Parsons, "Some Human Roots of Inhuman War," cited in MQS II, Training Support Package, Ethics and Professionalism. August 1982, page 10-13.
2. Thomas E. Farish, History of Arizona, II (1915), 150.
3. January 28, 1863, Official Records, Ser I, Vol 50, part 2, pp. 296-97. Also Shirland's report to Mcleave, dated 22 January 1863, enclosed. N41/1863 RG 94, NARS gives a quite similar account.
4. Daniel E. Conner, Joseph Reddeford Walker and the Arizona Adventure (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press 1956), pp. 34-42.
5. Among other accounts are those given by Norman B. Wiltsey, Brave Warriors (Caldwell, ID: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1963), pp. 148-151 and Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 250-253. In the account given by John M. Tebbel in The compact History of the Indian Wars (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1966), General West is reported to have told the sentries: "Men, that old murderer has got away from every soldier command and left a trail of blood 500 miles along the state line. I want him dead or alive tomorrow morning. Do you understand? I want him dead!" (p. 196)
6. Further discussion of culture and socialization may be noted in Brenton Berry and Harry L. Tischer, Race and Ethnic Relations, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978.)
7. In addition to the Army's definition of justice given here, a discussion of it as a leadership trait is given on page 3-4 of FC 22-1.
8. Ralph Linton, "The Problem of Universal Values" in Method and Perspective in Anthropology: Papers in Honor of Wilson D. Wallis. Ed. Robert F. Spencer. (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1954), pp. 145-147. Linton offers an example to illustrate a difference between instrumental and conceptual values: modesty is a conceptual value; the method of properly covering the body--e.g. wearing loin cloths or long dresses or trousers--is an instrumental value.

9. Additionally, one might consider values such as those identified on evaluative instruments as the Officer Evaluation Report and the Enlisted Evaluation Report. All these are based on the fundamental national values mentioned in the Constitution and embraced in the "American way of life." For further discussion of values and value changes, see Berry and Ticher, pp. 36-39.

10. For general Army records, this study relies on Annual War Department Reports, Congressional documents and unit records as available. Other material has been cited below from secondary sources when sufficient information is not otherwise accessible.

11. Although such newspaper "coverage" was an exaggerated and sensationalized account of events, several newspapers did make an effort to produce factual statements about incidents occurring in the isolated settlements along the routes through Apache territory. Particularly, the San Francisco Chronicle and the New York Times carried regular news from the area, and Lummis' Dateline Fort Bowie provided detailed sketches of conditions of life and military activity there.

12. Autobiographies of General Crook, Geronimo, and General Howard provide personal insight into the Apache-Army relations. Also, several diaries, journals and letters from both enlisted and officer personnel and from a few Apache give voice to different perspectives on the encounters. Among these eye-witness statements are those by Grenville Goodwin, Anton Mazzanovich, George Forsyth, Jason Betzinez, Eve Ball, John Bourke, and Britton Davis.

13. Notably the works of George C. Catlin, Frederic Remington, and Seth Eastman stand as pictorial comments on the time and place of frontier Army action. In their widely publicized works, these artists recorded personal portraits of the Army and Indian combatants, as well as pictures of life facing them throughout the environment. See the painting at Appendix C.

14. Among the comprehensive histories of the major conflicts between the Apache and Army are those by George Croghan, William H. Leckie, John W. Bailey, John Tebbel, Dan Thrapp, and Robert M. Utley.

15. One might consider here the whole array of "Cowboy and Indian" movies, television series and the

countless Western novels which have been popular throughout the past century and a half. Such works overflow with common stereotypes which cloud true accounts of action, reaction and personal exchanges. Furthermore, these works particularly encourage pictures of total evil against pure right; and in so depicting the opposing sides in an incident, often ignore propriety in their historicity.

16. Charles F. Lummis, Dateline Fort Bowie, Ed. Dan L. Thrapp (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979) p. 48.

17. As Don Rickey, Jr. states in his article, "The Enlisted Men of the Indian Wars," Military Affairs, 23 (1959-1960), pp. 95-96, "...the commonly held concepts of Indian Wars enlisted men are the product of romantic distortion, paucity of basic research materials, and too many bad movies!" Fighting did not occupy most of their time--but the myth that it did and that the soldiers were always successful continues in such current statements as a recent comic strip in the Kansas City Times, 14 January 1985. It reads: "Better late than Never"--"Small consolation to the scalpees when the cavalry is tardy."

19. Farish, The History of Arizona, I, 274-476.

20. One of the nagging questions regarding U. S. military policy followed when fighting the Indians relates to this value--Could a strategy be considered moral when it specifically aimed at using surprise attacks to find and destroy Indian villages where women and children would unquestionably be present and suffer death or injury? Similarly, fanatical claims against the Apache as brutal savages rang out each time they killed or captured women and children. Neither side accepted the thought that the other side had high values for the life of the family. Attitudes related to this perspective will be discussed further in Chapters Two and Three.

21. Linton, p. 472. He notes, "The values whose contravention brings the sharpest and most immediate response are those at the instrumental level. Thus, two societies which share the same basic conceptual value may fail to realize the fact because of their different ways of implementing it....The values on which there is most complete agreement are those which have to do with the satisfaction of the primary needs of individuals."

These two points are evident in the conflict between the Apache and U. S. military.

22. Changes in values are difficult to assess on a large scale. Although different bands within the tribes often followed quite similar paths to secure safety or to gain property from their depredations, accounts do not focus on collective attitudes so much as on the attitudes and beliefs of the great leaders for the activities--the war chief or warriors. However, changes in behavior will be identified as collective when tribal members follow the leader. Linton's article notes this about values in a changing society: "To understand the relation of values to the operation of a society, one must recognize that values are an integral part of any society's culture and that, with regard to their origin, transmission, and integration, they follow the same rules as other culture elements. The normal society consists of an organized, self-perpetuating group of individuals which persists far beyond the life span of any one of its component members. Its persistence is made possible by the presence of a culture, e.g., an organized series of ideas and behavior patterns which are transmitted from generation to generation within the society. The culture as a whole provides techniques by which the members of the society can both satisfy their individual needs and cooperate toward common ends." (p. 147)

23. From the Office of the Secretary of the Army comes this statement: "Total Army leadership is founded upon the time-tested principles of leadership and is intended to develop in all members enduring values of--

Loyalty to the Nation and its heritage
Loyalty to the Army
Loyalty to the Unit
Selfless Service
Personal Responsibility" (7 December 1981)

24. To be sure, the warrior novice training and taboos and rituals related to it do constitute a type of commissioning and restriction. This ritual is discussed more fully in Chapter Two. See Western Apache Raiding and Warfare, Grenville Goodwin; The Apache Warriors, George Baldwin; and An Apache Life-Way, Morris E. Opler.

CHAPTER TWO

APACHE SOCIALIZATION AND NORMS

It matters not by what process or method of schooling the Apache has become the most treacherous, bloodthirsty, villainous and unmitigated rascal upon earth; it is quite sufficient that he is so,¹ and that he is incapable of improvement.

During much of the nineteenth century, direct engagements between various U. S. Army units and diverse bands of Native Americans throughout the territory west of the Mississippi River sought to establish clear social and political relationships between the Natives and the citizens and government of the United States. The mission of the Army at that time derived from the imperatives of national expansion. As Utley mentions in his discussion of the national focus on Manifest Destiny, "...protection of the frontier populations and travel routes from hostile Indians placed the largest demand on the Army."² Military engagements with the various tribes during the latter half of the century are collectively called "the Indian Wars", but the action did not bear much similarity to other wars fought during the period--e.g. the Civil War or the Mexican War.³

Besides facing unconventional fighting tactics, the Army met a formidable foe in the Apache. The territory over which the men fought was unfamiliar and un-

unfriendly to the military newcomers, yet it provided homes and safety for the Apache. Thus, from the beginnings of the relationship between the Army and the Apache, critical differences in attitudes, values and behaviors provided a basis for problems to arise. The point of view expressed by Captain Cremony suggests one perspective frequently taken, but the process or method of schooling the Apache went through does mean something when one chooses to understand who and what the "enemy" really is.

The following discussion categorizes areas of Apache enculturation and related values into these broad groups: environmental survival; social survival and spiritual powers. Focus is on the development of the youth to fit into the group and to fulfill the group's expectations and individual roles according to "tradition".

ENVIRONMENTAL SURVIVAL:

Even from earliest youth, Apache males and females learned skills and attitudes which could enhance their survival throughout life in an environment teeming with both natural and human hostilities. Although the various bands of the Apacian tribes dwelt in distant parts of the Southwest and ranged down into Mexico and up into Colorado, they all faced hardships of the terrain and weather.⁴

See the map at Appendix A for a broad view of the territory

included. To develop fitness for living in such environment, one particular focus of the young Apache's training lay on development of a physical hardiness.

From the harsh realities of the environment and the difficult conditions of the semi-nomadic life of the tribe, the Apache developed definite values to provide general guidance for survival in daily life as well as during warfare. A review of particulars of the training and the programming of values commonly held within the tribes is provided below as a background to the later discussion of the values in conflict.

First, training began early to enable the Apache to survive in the difficulties and dangers of their environment. Such training involved those kinds of activities which produced endurance, strength, or a general hardiness. All Apaches learned to value these traits, for they were essential to life.

Geronimo recounts certain games he was encouraged to play, for instance, which involved running and quickness in movement.⁵ But instructional efforts went beyond mere child's play in implanting a value for survival skills. Adams' study assesses the schooling as critical in many of the camps:

One Apache father explained to his son (that) an Apache's best friends were not his relatives but his brain, eyesight, hands and legs. Of these, his legs were perhaps the most important.⁵

Often, young Apache males were sent to run long distances to develop their speed and endurance, to be used as necessary skills when raiding or going on the warpath. They may have had missions of carrying messages from their band to another, or they may have been given chores of herding horses which had wandered away. These running skills were to be useful throughout life and were valued highly by all.

Goodwin's notes indicate that running ability also impacted upon the assignments a warrior might expect as a member of a war party--"The spearsmen were always the best runners."⁷

Further, running ability was in some instances thought to be related to possession of (or association with) special powers. "There were 'leg songs' sung to cure tired legs on the warpath," one of Goodwin's sources recalls.⁸ Such singing might effectively rejuvenate the whole party, if the power was appropriately called out. For some others the power was more directly personal in application. Such as possessed running power were not necessarily medicine men, as were those who might be called on to sing general 'leg songs'. Goodwin's sources give this as an account of how the running power appeared:

Some men has galke'ho'ndi (running power).
That way they could run fast on the warpath.
...A man who has this power can run long
distances, and even on the shortest day could

run from Ft. Grant to Ft. Apache and get there in midafternoon.⁹

Even though not all warriors could run that fast, that long, the ability to go long idstances with strength and endurance was important to each man.

A tangent to the skill of running was development of knowledge of terrain and the effects of weather on traffica-bility of the countryside. Early on, Apache youth learned the layout of the area the band ranged. Each member learned availability of water and passage points through the mountains and deserts. That is, in running from place to place, Apache warriors gained valuable familiarity with their habitat and its ways of supporting or hindering their life and movement.

Building general strength in arms and upper bodies was also necessary. The male Apache was sometimes given rather simple but challenging tasks to do as a means to gain such strength as needed. Adams notes that some fathers would order their sons to "fight a tree, striking the rough bark of its truck with their hands and breaking its branches' to toughen the muscles and develop general strength."¹⁰

Tolerance of the extremes of climate was developed naturally, for the Apache tribes ranged through mountain and desert regions through bitter cold and exhausting heat. However, beyond tolerance is the ability to work effectively in such extremes--and that was another value to the Apache.

Conditioning of the youth to withstand heat and cold sometimes took measures that appear abusive by today's social standards. A father might have his son go stand in the snow for a period of time without any clothing on, or he might require his son to labor in the heat of a summer day--or days--without water.¹¹ He might have him go without sleep for a period of days, to learn to conquer sleepiness. Drastic measures such as these indicate how much importance was attached to a survival based on individual endurance and strength. The Apache had to be physically hardy to survive; and the fate of the whole band depended on the ability of each of the members to develop these traits.

The Apache also had to learn deceptive skills to survive in the environment. Training for survival from hostile actions of other Indian tribes, Mexican or American soldiers included the arts of stealth and deception as well as endurance. A culture whose daily life involved raiding and possible warfare had to be constantly alert and guarded in movement. Warriors had to be cautious in raiding to avoid giving enemy time and opportunity to thwart their efforts. They had to be quick but deceptive in return trips to their rancherias to avoid being caught and punished or to avoid leaving a trail for the soldiers or enemies to find the camp and attack in reprisal.

Of course, their primary use of deception to protect themselves came through their thorough knowledge of their

mountains and deserts. They knew where hiding places lay; they knew every trail through the area.

But they also had to learn certain skills in practicing deception. One was to operate well at night. To do this, youth were sometimes involved in "search" games at night. Also, the Apache made most trips--even social ones--at night. On such trips, women, men, and children all had to exhibit adeptness of night movement.¹² However, a combination of familiarity with terrain and careful timing was involved in their best use of darkness as an advantage. It was important that the cycles of nature be understood and figured in with any planning:

In the old times they used to figure on getting to the enemy country when the moon was full. They would set the time so that they would arrive there just about the day that the moon would come up in the evening--full, ... This was so they could travel best at night.¹³

Ability to move at night and remain undetected, knowledge of moon cycles and how far one could travel in how much time was not all the Apache learned. Many other skills were involved in successful stealth--such as almost noiseless movement, covering of tracks, etc. And these were skills that might be demanded for long distance movements:

When we had to cross open country, we always waited for evening, and even then we were very careful not to leave any tracks. Sometimes we used to walk just on our toes to leave a small track. And sometimes we kept a man out behind to brush over our tracks with some bushes. Our old war parties used to travel far into Mexico this way.¹⁴

For concealment, the Apache learned to use materials of nature at hand as well as features of the terrain and darkness. One incident illustrates the expertise to which this skill could be developed and suggests how valuable such abilities would be:

One American who later became friendly with the Apaches described this skill. 'While crossing an extensive prairie, dotted here and there by a few shrubs and diminutive bushes,' he wrote, "Quick Killer (an Apache he knew) volunteered ...to show me with what dexterity an Apache could conceal himself, even where no special opportunity existed for such concealment...We proceeded a short distance until we came to a small bush, hardly sufficient to hide a hare. Taking his stand behind this bush, he said, "Turn your back and wait until I give the signal."...I said: "No, I will walk forward until you tell me to stop." ...(He) hailed me to stop and find him. (I had gone but ten steps.) I returned to the bush, went around it three or four times, looked about it in every direction--there was no possible covert in sight; the prairie was smooth and unbroken, and it seemed as if the earth had opened and swallowed the man. ...(Finally) I called and bade him come forth--he rose laughing and rejoicing, within two feet of the position I then occupied.

With incredible activity and skill he had buried himself under the thick gamma grass, within six feet of the bush, and had covered himself with dexterity that one might have trodden upon him without discovering his person. Such skill is essential to an Apache, for it enabled him both to ambush his enemy and to escape from them.¹⁵

Individuals learned to survive by their own efforts and skills. They wanted to survive to help the group, but they each had to develop independent survivability, especially on the run.

SOCIAL SURVIVAL

Daily life of the Apache required certain other important skills, too. Many of these relate specifically to the needs of the community as a whole. Because of the scarcity of naturally provided food and water in much of their living area, tribal members learned ways of making efficient use of what was available. Sharing efforts to provide food was the norm and highly valued.

Both male and female children were expected to help the women gather nuts and berries with trips to the forests often lasting all day. They also went to the field with their parents to learn farming--planting and cultivating of crops used by the whole group. That is, even before the Apache were placed on reservations with the hope of their learning "farming", they did know something about growing crops. Fall harvest--a time of preserving food--was important so the winter's dirth could be alleviated. Discussing the importance of their crops, Geronimo recalls:

Melons were gathered as they were consumed. (However) in the autumn pumpkins and beans were gathered and placed in bags and baskets, ears of corn were tied together by the husks, and then the harvest was carried on the backs of ponies up to our homes. Here the corn was shelled, and the harvest stored away in caves or other secluded places to be used in the winter.¹⁶

So by example and direct instruction, the Apache learned that nature's supply of food was limited; food had to

be specially cared for and preserved, but also supplemented with those items gained from raids. Particularly, if not enough summer produce was realized, raiding became vital as a source of sustenance. And all the activities required to feed the Apache were community ones -- with products of the labor shared as were the responsibilities. The division of labor between men and women indicated significant instrumental values around those sex roles, too. Men raided or fought to bring in meat or provisions; tilling the land was more definitely women's and children's work. Warriors used the products women raised, as did women use provisions men procured. Goodwin records the warrior use of the food stores when readying rations for war parties:

On the warpath, when we started out, we always got food ready to take along. We used to pack mescal on our backs, also buckskin sacks filled with ground corn. They used to pound the fruit of the prickly pear up into dry cakes and let it harden for us to take along. These cakes were about eight inches in diameter. Also we had ground berries in buckskin sacks. Whenever we stopped to camp, we would mix these berries with mescal and water and eat them.¹⁷

A lack of individual ownership claims or selfish (individuals) use of crops or hunted game characterized the tribal relations. Thus, members worked in the fields or went on hunts or raids for the benefit of all. Accordingly, great emphasis was placed on learning the

skills necessary to bring in something that aided the survival of all -- a successful crop or a successful raid. Selfless service appeared to be a high instrumental value among the Apache in this way.

The following narrative of the activities following a successful raid illustrate how the values discussed above are synthesized in such an important part of Apache life:

(When) we would start on our way back home, herding all our stock and packing the rest of the things we had captured, we kept two good men out in front, and two other men way out behind as guards. The rest of us herded the stock along in the middle. If the men out in front saw danger ahead, then they would come back and tell us and we would change our direction. This is the way we travelled, never sleeping at night, and going fast until we were out of the country and close to home. We had to watch all the springs on our way, as there were likely to be some Mexicans living near them. This way sometimes we only got water once a day, sometimes once in two or three days.¹⁸

Cooperation, cunning, endurance, and maneuverability such as described here make up only a part of the values in the whole operation:

When we got safely out of the Mexican country, then we stopped and sent two men back a long ways to stay and guard. Then we would make camp for a couple of days and rest up. Now we would fix all our moccasins up, and our ropes, and cook up lots of beef and make grub up into a pack. Just as we had done before when we started out from home. This way we wouldn't have to make a fire again.

Now we set off again. When we got pretty near home, up towards our mountains, the chief would send a man ahead to tell all our relatives that we would get back on a certain day, and to meet us at a certain place and to get ready for us. Then our relatives would be happy when they heard what we had done. When we got in everything we brought back we divided among our people. "Good, thank you," they would say.¹⁹

The group's spoils were to sustain the whole band, even though the individuals did not all contribute equally to their acquisition. Thus, a spirit of community developed among the members of the band. Survival of all depended very clearly on the skills and courage of the warriors. A man's "warrior" success was a basic meaning to his life. The young males emulated the warriors, spending their early years fine tuning the skills required of the man. Young women learned to serve and support the warrior roles.

Other factors related to the raiding parties also illustrate the influence of the group ties which came into play as the raiding parties were formed. The Apache learned how to get something that was needed from someone who had it -- a good and necessary act for survival:

Four or five or six or ten men who were good friends together would go out raiding. We used to do this in order to get horses from the Mexicans. We used to go to where the Mexicans were living and capture lots of their ponies. When we brought these back to our country we butchered them to eat. The horse hides we used for making our moccasin soles with.
... Just as we had raided the Mexican and Pima and Papago before, now we raided the

White People. We took their horses and cattle, and drove them back to our country and used them. Cowhides we used to make moccasin soles of. We also made some into buckskin ... (Americans) had rifles, caps, powder, and bullets, and we captured these for ourselves. We kept on fighting the Americans with these. Now when we killed them we took their shoes and pants and shirts and coats and boots, and used them for ourselves, and dressed like Americans we had seen. If we saw some Americans in big wagons, we would go to them and capture their outfit. In these wagons we found lots of flour, blankets and calico, and all other things. We took what we wanted out of them and used it for ourselves. Out of the calico we started making dresses for the women.²⁰

Although there was a strong sense of community among the warriors of the band, the broader sense of humanity was not a strong one, as suggested here in the separation of "ourselves" from those who fell victim to the raids. The Apache sharing this narrative with Goodwin makes no moral judgment about their capturing and taking property or life from the Mexicans, Pima, or White People. What was needed for the Apache was taken at great risk and used for the good of the whole. A utilitarian ethic provided parameters of good and bad for the group. Importantly, then, items were valuable to the Apache because of their utility to them; but the Apache did not seem to understand that they might have equal or higher value for the owners. The Apache defined property rights quite differently than did Mexicans or Americans. Within their own tribes, the Apache learned that snaring

was the norm; insofar as other -- outsiders -- might be involved, what property those people might have could be soon the property of the Apache, if the latter had the opportunity to get it and had an actual or perceived need for it. It appears as though consideration was not given to utility outside the tribe. A double standard was followed, and such as it was, it created social difficulties when the Apaches were asked to build peaceful relationships with those on whom they had waged their wars and against whom they had conducted multitudes of raids.²¹

SPIRITUAL POWERS:

A third set of behaviors indentified among the Apache relates to spiritual beliefs and practices. For each member of the band, spiritual power was an honored characteristic. Not every warrior had special powers, but any tribal member -- male or female alike -- gave credence to certain spiritual practices and beliefs. The Apaches were a religious people in this regard.

The Western Apache term divi (supernatural power) was used to refer to one or all of a set of abstract and invisible forces which were believed to derive from certain classes of animals, plants, meterological phenomena,

and mythological figures within the universe as they understood it. Any of the "powers" could be acquired by a person -- but it was by no means easy. If properly handled, the power could be used for a variety of purposes, however, and the person who held the power was sought out by other members of the tribe on special occasions for a sharing of the knowledge, ability, or other aspect of the power. It was believed that through prayers and singing of appropriate chants, the particular medicine man or woman could control and manipulate the "power," and in that way have some effect over the affairs of others.

From the Apache warriors he interviewed, Goodwin recorded several descriptions of these powers. The diversity clearly suggests a pervasive belief and practice related to them:

The most important power for war is indake "ho" ndi ("enemies - against power"). It is the real war power. This power comes from Nayanegane ("Killer of Monsters") from in the beginning he was the one who went all over the earth doing things and killing monsters, and he was the first one to use his power in doing this, so it all comes from him.²²

As in daily practical training, then, we find that spiritual focus is also on that which would bring some kind of success in the Apache endeavors against those from whom they are to wrest their living or to carry out their revenge.

Additional passages which illustrate the various

forms that the power could take include these stories from Goodwin's interviewees:

If you have "enemies-against power" and you only have a knife and another man attacks you with a gun, then, you can win out and kill him if you use the power and liken yourself to a mountain lion. Also, if you use this and call yourself mountain lion, and a man shoots you with a gun, even then you will get him and kill him, even if you have nothing.²³

Geronimo, though not a chief, was regarded to have strong powers. It was believed that he could not be killed by a gun in battle. Also, one of the warriors Goodwin interviewed says that such men as this, who had power over guns would in battle say words over it, and put their power in it. Furthermore, you could also get him to put their power in your gun for you, pray over it, so you would never miss anything. This could be done for hunting as well as war. Also if a fight was coming off soon, then he would pray over his own gun this way and put his power in it.²⁴ Another warrior spoke of a similar power he held. While out on a raid to steal horses, he had a dream:

"I dreamed that someone talked to me, "tomorrow a man wearing a long beard and a mustache will take the rope away from you." (This meant that he would be attacked and the person would steal his horses.) ... (Later) While I was riding, I looked back over the canyon to the south and saw some people coming slowly on big horses ... Now while they shot at me I said a few words to my power, "Hold their guns up; don't let them shoot at me. Let the bullets go over." When I spoke these words not one of my horses got hurt, and I didn't even hear the sounds of the bullets. In those days we used to pray in war like this.²⁵

According to the records of both Goodwin and Opler, the Apache sang "prayers" before all critical activities, not just in war. Raiding was also important, although war parties often raided as well as fought. Warfare and raiding were separate activities to the Apache. On a raid, it was imperative to avoid engagements with the enemy. The intent was to take provisions and return without loss. Warfare, however, sought out the enemy for physical retribution; the subsequent raiding was merely an additional defeat the Apache dealt an opponent.²⁶

For both activities the Apache sought support from spiritual powers. Also the belief that a power was no good to a reckless or incautious warrior served to limit actions which would increase the danger to the group. Apaches usually attacked at night or from covered positions during the day, and only when victory seemed probable. They deferred to an enemy more numerous than they, seeking peaceful agreements with those tribes or nations appearing mightier than they. They valued possessions of the best medicine or greatest powers, and did not challenge enemies they believed to have stronger powers than they, if they could avoid a conflict.²⁷

As for ceremonial activities, the Apache held war dances and victory dances as a means of bringing all the people and power to bear on the event. Again, the distinction between warfare and raiding is clear. Only after the Apache

returned from war did they hold a special victory dance -- for "just plain cattle raids" there was no war dance or victory dance, according to the warriors that Goodwin interviewed. Prayers were chanted for both, but ceremonies differed. Warpath was a means of seeking justice for wrongs against one or many of the tribe's members. Cautious deliberation preceded decisions to make war, and once the decision was made, prayers were sung to invoke the powers needed for success. The war dance served as one means of petitioning the Great Spirit for assistance in efforts to avenge lost relatives. According to Apache tradition, only those warriors who had proved themselves (completed their novice internship) went on warpath. The war victory dance was also a restricted activity, allowing participation of those who had fought in the battle being celebrated.²⁸ This was a praise for powers leading to victory. All Apache tribes exhibited a consistently strong spiritual focus such as this.

Another activity through which the Apache brought their spiritual powers to bear as a part of their warfaring and also their daily life was the sweat bath. This bath was not, however, a cleansing ceremony like that of the Pimas, but was rather a positive instructional opportunity.

When men got back from the warpath they would all take a sweat bath. They would be all dirty and would want to wash themselves. They would sing gogosi (happiness songs) and by doing this

they would pray. They did not sing all these songs. There were too many of them. We sang about twelve nantasi (chief songs). After that we sang any songs we wanted to, divisi (power songs) for any power, Snake, Lightning, Deer-- any kind -- it did not matter. The twelve chief songs are called chief songs because in them the people are instructed how to live, just as a chief instructs his people in the ways of living when he talks to them early in the morning. We only sing four of these songs at a time in sweat bath, then come out. It takes three times in sweat bath to sing them. Then the fourth time we sing any kind of song. We make the sweat bath big enough to hold eight to twelve men -- a big one. The day after we got back the women used to wash our hair out. The second day we took this sweat bath. We did it in the daytime, never at night. Not only the men who had been to war went in the sweat bath, but men who had stayed home also went because they would want to hear the stories of what happened.²⁹

Other activities that occurred after the successful war or raid included the dance for distribution of the spoils. This was a social occasion but also one which exhibits Apache beliefs in powers:

After coming back from a raid or the warpath with lots of horses and American cattle, they would hold a dance, for the women, called indi biqidecoital (enemies their property dance). There would be lots of people there. The women didn't dance for nothing. When they were singing, the women would call out and ask for a horse, or blanket, or calico -- all kinds of things. The men did this also, and those who had captured these things would give them to the people who asked this way for them.³⁰

In the various dances and baths, the Apache found ways of sharing their spiritual experiences as well as their material goods. Spiritual concerns appear as nat-

ural and communal.

Perhaps most interesting of all persons who possessed powers was the "true" medicine man. He was held in high esteem throughout the tribe as well as in the smaller bands where he might stay. These men were looked upon to provide the necessary song to protect, cure, or heal, or to any way aid the members of the group. He would sometimes beat tom-toms, dance, sing, or sprinkle certain concoctions upon the person(s) being subjected to his powers. For curing a person, he was given a payment, and for special "blessings" for the warpath, he would expect some of the spoils brought back. The special powers of such men elevated them to positions of esteem among any tribe or band. Although they were not chiefs, they had great influence on actions of the warriors. Problems arose in the relationship between the Army and Apache when the value of the medicine man was not adequately recognized.³¹

Learning all ceremonies, songs, and rituals used to invoke spiritual presence or assistance was not mandatory for each child. Many songs were known only by those who became medicine men; some were known only by women; and some only by warriors. However, for each Apache, there was no doubt that the powers called on through song or special "talks" held the greatest importance for the one who had the power. To have a power was valuable to

the Apache. Thus, for many Apaches, the spiritual element permeated life and tied together the framework for his or her existence. Enculturation regarding powers and beliefs involved some specific training, but more often, it was an influence through modeling.

Several superstitions governed activities of daily life. Jason Betzinez mentions particular ones that seemed to be hard for many Apache to overcome:

The Apache notion was that if you handled a dead coyote you would develop some bad habit such as twitching your mouth, jerking your head, or even going crazy. If you touched a snake, the skin would peel off your hands ... If you met a snake in your path, you should mark a cross on the ground in front of you.³²

Furthermore, several taboos or special restrictions on certain actions were to be observed during critical periods of life:

On the warpath there were special terms and words for everything, not the regular speech. On starting south from White River, on the way the men used just regular speech until they crossed the Gila River, but from there on till they recrossed it on the way back, they had to use this special speech ... For instance, when they came on the fresh trail of the enemy, instead of saying, "Here is where the enemy passed by," they will say cidoliek (something has been dragged by here), and another way is ienotiek (here it has hopped along like a frog).³³

Taboos for a wife while her husband is gone on a raid or to war were also to be observed:

She prays every morning for four days after he goes; every time she pulls a pot of meat

off the fire, she prays that he may get what he wants. She must only use one end of the fire poker to poke the fire till he gets back. This applies also to grown daughters in the same wickiup. In the case of a single man whose mother and grown sisters live in his wickiup, they do the same.³⁴

Throughout the Apache nation, certain significant beliefs and values appear as a part of the spiritual powers and spiritual focus commonly held by all. The conceptual values appear to be universal ones: beliefs of man's inadequacy in the face of many situations and of the existence of beings with powers exceeding one's own and who will give him aid if he can learn the correct method of approaching them.³⁵

SUMMARY

What values are understood from such a life as here described? Do tribal values appear to have priority over those of the individual? Just what are the primary ones? Perhaps the most important point to be made in a generalization about Apache values is that they clearly related to both individual and tribal wants. Customs and traditions developed the warrior through strict cultural influences, but each person's actions were influenced to a degree by personality factors as well. As a result, paradoxical and inconsistent behaviors sometimes stemmed from the separate value sources. Identification of an exact value -- priority rating for all Apaches is a topic beyond the scope of this study. However, certain group value appear to be highly ranked among the various individuals in the numerous tribes and bands. As Linton suggests in his essay on values, the conceptual values have the broadest similarities; instrumental ones include more variety -- among the Apache as among other peoples.³⁶

Freedom from want and freedom from fear were obviously desired above many other significant conceptual values. The Apache community's efforts to endure hardship and risk life in gaining even a basic subsistence indicate a high ranking for "freedom from want." The emphasis on deceptive operations, on mobile living quarters, and on

careful guarding of group movement suggest that "freedom from fear: is also a primary value. These values had historically been maintained at a high cost to the Apache -- even before the Apache and soldiers engaged in combat. The Apache continued to hold the values and continued to pay for them in lives and time. Because the Apache raided or plundered to stand off want, that value impacted significantly on the Army as it entered the Apache lands.³⁷

Another value, Freedom of religion, existed naturally for the Apache before they became subjects of missionary efforts and wards of the U.S. Government. Throughout the Southwest, the religious expression of the Native Americans reflected several similarities, even though different tribes may have had a few variances in worship form, ritual, or belief. The Apache held strong beliefs but respected the beliefs of others; they did not orient efforts to require any others to adopt their particular beliefs. The concept of a missionary religion was confusing to the Apache. And the concept of a Savior (Jesus Christ) was also incomprehensible. However, all natural things were valued and treated according to the various beliefs and superstitions held about them.³⁸ Exercise of powers, recognition of an appropriate reaction to signs, utilization of medicine men, and regular performance of ceremonies or observation of taboos were all a part of the freedom of worship enjoyed by the Apache prior to their engagement with the Army.

Conceptual values of loyalty, honesty, and selflessness were in high evidence among the Apache, too. Yet the behavior giving meaning to these values did not always parallel that which was the norm for the White American. Loyalty was largely supported by kinship bonds and by band affiliations. The size and makeup of raiding parties varied from one ride to another. That is, such a warrior as Geronimo could be seen on one raid with only two or three other men; another time he may have been affiliated with twenty others, including women and children, and still another occasion, he may have fought with a group of one hundred warriors as a part of a war party.³⁹ Charisma and skill established the Apache warrior in a leadership position. Loyalty of his followers was kept by his skill.

The value of honesty meant a literal telling of truth for each part of an agreement concluded. The extent to which this value may have been held is described by Farish in his reflections on Geronimo:

He was a man who scorned a liar, was always truthful in all things, his religion was truth and loyalty ... He said to me once, "Chickaswa, a man should never lie!" I replied: "No, he should not, but a great many do." He said: "That is true, but they need not do it, if a man asks you or I a question we do not wish to answer, we could simply say: "I don't want to talk about that."⁴⁰

Not only this famous warrior, but the general populace of the Apache nation regarded honesty to be one of the strong-

est values involved in interpersonal relations. The word of a warrior or of any person with whom some dealings or trades are being conducted was to be taken as literal and binding. Breaches in agreements made conditions for avenging the wrong -- within the Apache tribes as well as between whites and Apaches.

As for selflessness, the warrior who carried out his raid to gain food and material items for the group or the warrior who joined a raiding party to assist a friend in his avenging a wrong both exhibited a concern and loyalty to others. His involvement may not have been personally stimulated -- other than through a personal bond to the friend or kinship bonds. But the warrior responding to the appeal for help displayed selflessness, particularly when he risked his life to assist a friend or his family in trying to secure food and provisions for the tribe.

However, not all warriors were motivated to risk life only to support another. Also, according to Apache justice, as each Apache felt wronged, he or she could exact punishment of a self-determined magnitude and risk. That is, a warrior such as Mangas Coloradas, Cochise, or Geronimo led others into battle to avenge wrongs and also to simply carry out personal hatred. Some warriors fought or raided because it brought them esteem and glory -- a personal recognition. Those warriors who fought most

savagely and incautiously to seek such personal acclaim were not following general Apache traditions and norms, however.

The degree of payment to be exacted from an enemy for a wrong committed varied, then, according to the intensity of anger or hatred of the avenger. Apache tradition did not have a specified punishment for each "crime" although payment in kind usually satisfied the wronged party. If a warrior were killed in battle, the surviving family was allowed to take punishment measures as they chose with whatever prisoner(s) happened to be delivered. For this reason, some tortures occurred some captives were held as slaves, and some were just brutally killed outright. Apache justice was individually administered, but was sanctioned by the tribe and carried out as swiftly as possible. It was difficult for these people to understand the white man's justice which did not discriminate (to them) between guilty and innocent and which seemed to take indirect methods and too much time to be carried out.⁴¹

Indeed, the Apache whom the Frontier Army encountered throughout the Southwest was not a simple opponent. His one-dimensional image as no more than a wild and savage warrior riding helter-skelter across the territory killing all people in sight belied the true complexity of Apache character. The image of the savage has, nevertheless,

been a popular one, supported by such eye-witness descriptions as this one Cremony gives:

Kindness and generosity provoke his contempt, and he regards them as weaknesses. Chastisement does not procure his vengeance with any more certainty than want of caution. The man who deems it the highest achievement to become a dexterous robber is scarcely an object in whom to repose confidence.⁴²

In all tribes and throughout all activities, Apache life-style did give high value to warrior status and its related skills. However, other concerns place that part of the Apache's life into a perspective different from that suggested above. To summarize the important characteristics of the Apache, one must include these as a minimum:

1. Skill in adapting to climate and terrain
2. Skill in deceptive techniques
3. Physical fitness and endurance
4. Independence as self-sufficiency
5. Interdependence as "family" bonds
6. Belief in "powers" beyond oneself
7. Belief in revenge justice

To be sure, raiding and warfare activities (including the training and preparation for and conduct of the raids) consumed much of the time and energy of Apache daily life. But raids and warfare were not daily occurrences. Prompted by survival and by vengeance needs of the group, the raids were reactions reflecting certain group values, as well

as some personal ones. Those identified above include these major ones:

1. Freedom from want
2. Freedom from fear
3. Freedom of religion
4. Loyalty
5. Honesty
6. Selflessness

When taken together, these values suggest the essence of an opponent quite different from the one the Army anticipated.

The instrumental values the Apache used to practice their religion, to secure food for their hunger, to demonstrate their honesty and loyalty, for example, draw clear lines of difference between the Apache and the soldier. Apache conceptual level values were hard to recognize and understand by soldiers who reacted with condemnation, fear, or confusion to instrumental level expressions. Immediate and far-reaching problems could be expected to arise in a relationship between the Apache and the soldiers whose ideas of the enemy did not match reality.

NOTES

1. John C. Cremony, Life Among The Apaches, (Glorietta, NM: The Rio Grande Press, 1970), p. 320.
 2. Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, p. 2.6.
 3. Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars, pp. 45-46.
 4. See Appendix A for a map of Apache territory which shows the great distance included in Apacheria.
 5. Geronimo, p. 24. See also other biographies such as that by Adams, Geronimo (New York: G. P. Putnam, Sons, 1971). Adams states: "The Apache could cover a greater distance in a day on foot than the best mounted cavalry units -- seventy miles or even more. On a social trip, the women and children were not expected to equal this pace, but they were required to walk much faster than any white woman or child normally could, for the warriors could not be asked to protect laggards." (p. 69).
 6. Adams, p. 49.
 7. Goodwin, p. 262.
 8. Goodwin, p. 274.
 9. Goodwin, p. 273. The calling out of powers is a significant factor in Apache conduct of warfare and raiding activities. Spiritual values are discussed more fully below in this chapter.
- The distance here mentioned is approximately 80 miles over rough terrain. See the map attached at Appendix B for distances. Bourke also notes that one of the Apache scouts employed by General Crook on his 1883 campaign travelled over six miles over the mountains in less than an hour (50 minutes): "He reached us at 1.05, and handed General Crook a note dated 12.15." (p. 75)
10. Adams, p. 49. Geronimo also notes the popularity of such exercises as pulling up trees and picking up huge rocks. See Geronimo, p. 56.
 11. Jason Betzinez, I Fought with Geronimo. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, CO., 1959), p. 27. See also

Adams and Geronimo for similar situations.

12. Betzinez, pp. 50-52.

13. Goodwin, p. 261.

14. Goodwin, pp. 257-258.

15. Adams, pp. 71-72.

16. Adams, p. 49.

17. Goodwin, p. 256.

18. Goodwin, p. 259.

19. Goodwin, p. 260.

20. Goodwin, pp. 262-263.

21. Linton, p. 466 "Social values which are universally present are of the utmost interest since societies rather than individuals are the units in the human struggle for survival. They also establish the limits within which many values are operative." Linton's statements seem particularly applicable here, as distinctions between the opposing societies separate them as "valid" judges of acceptable actions. Linton further states this characteristic of societies: "...the individual's tribe represents for him the limits of humanity and the same individual who will exert himself to any lengths in behalf of a fellow tribesman may regard the nontribesman as fair game to be exploited by any possible means ..."

22. Goodwin, p. 270.

23. Goodwin, p. 271.

24. Goodwin, p. 273. Other powers that medicine men were called on to use included "enemies-against power" to make hail and wind on the enemy, and "bat power" whereby the medicine man made warriors like bats to be elusive in a fight. Also, Na'itluk, a power with songs used to foretell coming events on the warpath was an important one.

25. Goodwin, pp. 271-272.

26. Thrapp, pp. xi-xii

27. Goodwin, p. 297. In Farish's History of Arizona, the Apache are described in these words:

"An Apache never attacked unless fully convinced of an easy victory. They would watch for days, scanning every move, observing every act, and taking note of the party under espionage and of all their belongings. Their assaults were never made on the spur of the moment by bands accidentally encountered; they were invariably the result of long watching -- patient waiting, careful and rigorous observation and anxious counsel." (Farish, I, 200.)

28. Goodwin, p. 281, and see also Opler, p. 76.

29. Goodwin, p. 281.

30. Also, when Colonel Carr arrested the Apache Medicine Man, Nock-aye-det-Klin-ne, he ignored the importance this person was given within the tribe. Before Carr could get MM to the Fort, his unit was attacked by Apaches who had followed. The scouts also fled in confusion, with three being later convicted by court-martial and hanged. This incident well illustrates differences between the Apache and soldiers regarding spiritual values. See Sidney B. Brinckerhoff, "Aftermath of Cibicue" The Smoke Trail (Fall 1928), pp. 122-123.

31. Betzinez, p. 36.

32. Betzinez, p. 37.

33. Goodwin, p. 265.

34. Goodwin, p. 267.

35. Linton, p. 465. Spiritually related instrumental values of the Apache included many rites and superstitions which were interpreted as despicable and irreligious by soldiers whose spiritual values differed. A source of opinionated judgment was this difference in religious beliefs.

36. Linton, p. 461.

37. This choice of action -- to raid rather than to farm was a cultural interpolation, an instrumental value which changes during the course of the contact between Army and Apache nations.

38. Opler, p. 23.

39. John Bourke, Gentile Organization of the Apache, p. 16. Sometimes the changing associations of warriors into bands or clans confused the Army whose ideas of loyalty

to unit meant an assignment to one company for the duration of enlistment. This became an issue more relevant to the Army, however, when the Apache scouts were enlisted as an aid.

40. Farish, History of Arizona, Vol II, p. 229.

41. George Baldwin, The Warrior Apaches, (Tucson: O. S. King, 1965).

42. Cremony, p. 320.

CHAPTER THREE

ARMY SOCIALIZATION AND NORMS

"There seems to be a special sense in which society as a whole looks to the military profession as a final reservoir of its most precious human value"¹

What prompted actions and judgments of soldiers battling the Apache warriors may be better understood through a review of the character and condition of the men in the Frontier Army. The values, attitudes, beliefs and experiences brought with them into the campaigns necessarily impacted on how the relationship developed. The following paragraphs will discuss the commitment, skills, and values typical of the soldiers -- both officer and enlisted -- who were called upon to fight the Apache.

Regarding commitment and skills, one must note some distinction between regulars, volunteers, auxiliaries, and scouts. The four categories of men often served together on assignments, but each reflects a unique character.

REGULARS

Professional Factors - Enlisted:

The regulars were the most diversified lot, carrying out their military assignments with widely differing commitments. Among the ranks were many veterans, "hard bitten men" who had experienced both the Civil War and

campaigns against hostile Indians during the 1850's.² These men were military professionals, generally well-trained and ready to carry out any mission given them. In the early years of the Apache campaigns, these veterans were the mainstay of the small Regular force which was assigned to the West.

However, the post-Civil War regular Army was mostly composed of new soldiers: 1) young men who joined to serve as "soldiers of the republic" as had their honored fathers, brothers, or other male relatives during the Civil War; 2) recent immigrants from Europe -- many of them taking the opportunity to learn English and become oriented in American ways through military service;³ and 3) Negroes -- from both the North and the South, some literally homeless, except for the Army.⁴

After 1875, fewer veterans remained within the Regular Army but increased numbers of adventure seekers and social runaways enlisted. Increased demands for men to protect the frontier drove recruiting efforts to accept and assign men to the frontier with very little training in what they were to face.⁵ Questions regarding the Army's professionalism arose during this time of expansion, yet the leaders and men worked to carry out their mission, despite harsh criticisms.

The various categories of enlisted service, as expected, exhibited different levels of commitment to the mission; but overall, one of the concerns for Army leaders

from the top of the Chain of Command all the way down to the frontier unit commanders was the high rate of desertion.⁶ As a matter of fact, the rates were of such concern to Lieutenant General P. B. Sheridan, commanding General of the Army in 1884, that he concluded his report condemning those who deserted:

Men desiring to reach the West are often without means of doing so. Ascribing no value whatever to the sacred oath of enlistment, they become recruits simply and solely in order to procure Government transportation westward, fully intending to desert upon arriving at their western stations. Others, enlisting without this original purpose of deserting, are enticed by the higher wages they find prevailing in the West, or are allured by excitements of mining regions. They invent some valueless excuse for their discontent with the service, and desert at the first convenient opportunity. Some desert viciously, without any particular reason; after deserting they go to some remote place, where they are unknown, re-enlist under false names, and repeat this crime indefinitely if they so choose. Many are utterly incorrigible offenders; they enlist, desert, are apprehended or surrender, are tried by courts-martial and are punished by imprisonment. After serving their sentences of confinement, they again enlist at places escape recognition and are sent to new companies. Here, becoming dissatisfied with their stations of their officers, even if not detected, they will reveal themselves as former deserters, whereupon the law admits of no alternative but to immediately discharge them, without punishment, as having fraudulently enlisted, as did the notorious "bounty jumpers" of the last war.⁷

General Sheridan continues to call them the "worst elements" among the bad lot of deserters. On the whole, he lambasts the men who desert as not fitting into the Army profession-

alism anyway and only doing it harm by their tangent and transient relationships.

Through this official condemnation, Sheridan is suggesting that values of loyalty, honesty, and selfless service are lacking among such as would leave. He is thus saying that such values ought to be among those exhibited by the soldier who performs his job daily. That soldier who served with the regulars had to overcome fear, boredom, and hard work assignments to make it through an enlistment term. It was not easy, but many loyal men kept the Army functional and successful in carrying out the mission given them.

Certainly, fear of the opponent affected the performance of many of the men. Expecting the worst possible treatment in life or death, some soldiers chose to desert rather than face the enemy yet to be met. Even though the soldier might have had only rumor for information, the mounting fear motivated reactions among the troops. Rickey notes the condition in these words:

No aspect of Indian Wars history has been distorted as much as has the subject of combat with hostile Indians. For the enlisted man an Indian campaign meant grueling cross-country marches in extremes of heat and cold, slim rations of food and water, and the possibility of catching an Indian bullet or arrow. Pitched battles were rare in Indian campaigns -- though most soldiers viewed the hostile warriors as being good fighters. Recruits often reflected a fear of Indians that generally accompanies a contemplated struggle with the unknown, and soldiers sometimes tend-

ed to attribute almost supernatural powers to the Indians. All knew that in the event of a defeat, or if one were cut off from the command, that he had better use his last cartridge on himself.⁸

Faced with such a grim prospect, some left the area; some stayed to fight. The desire for self-preservation directed each soldier according to his values; loyalty to the unit and the Army tempered some thoughts of fleeing. Yet desertion rates remained high, for whatever reason.

But all was not threatening to the life of the frontier soldier. Among the activities of field service, the men found tedium as well as excitement and fear:

On the frontier, this field service was escorting, patrolling, scouting, and at times campaigns or expeditions against large forces of hostile Indians ... Escort duty was for the majority of the troops always distasteful, but escorting a "bull" or "ox" train was the worst. Escorting a government or contractor's mule train was less tedious but more difficult.⁹

General Forsyth recalls his experiences with this duty and how his men reacted:

From the moment a mule train entered a hostile Indian country until it left it, there raged a contest of wits between the officer in charge and the wildest, shrewdest, most cunning horse thieves that ever the sun shone on. The Indians more eager than when on the track of an ox train, were untiring in pursuit of their prey.¹⁰

Regular Army personnel assigned to the frontier were generally less skilled in survival and maneuver operations than their opponents. Their lack of knowledge of the territory and lack of understanding of Apache

methods and motivations often left the soldier unprepared to accomplish the mission easily or successfully.

Yet, through extreme difficulties, many soldiers continued to serve well. Parker praises those regulars who stayed through hardships and met the challenges of frontier service:

... for more than twenty years our soldiers on the plains and mountains were engaged in a warfare almost as disastrous as our struggle for the Union. We fought for the preservation of the Union and they fought for "The Redemption of the West." Their service was equally as arduous as ours. The same long marches, camp and garrison life, and their many battles with hostile Indians were equally as dangerous and far more horrible many times over, in results, than we encountered during the Civil War.¹¹

Commitment, then, was a factor that kept some of the men fighting, despite dire conditions. For one particular group of regulars, the black soldiers, commitment appeared to be the strongest, if service loyalty and performance are indicators of such:

All in all the black soldiers made a good appearance and earned the respect and support of their officers. Officers testifying before Congress regarding Army reorganization in 1878 argued that the black regiments were crack outfits and ought to be retained for the good of the service. An Army surgeon stationed at Ft. Sill stated that the blacks took "more interest in their personal appearance than the white soldiers."¹²

Thompson regards as even higher recognition of the skill and loyalty of the black units, the request by General Miles to replace the 1st Infantry with the 24th or 25th

Regiment (1886). In a desire to have the best troops available for campaigning against the rebelling Apaches, Miles paid tribute to these regiments by indicating his preference for either of them.

And what of the foreign-born enlistees? Mazzanovich recounts one incident which suggests a concern regarding their commitment:

While the water carriers were gone, a bit of comedy was staged by an Irishman of our troops. He ... was holding horses. As I have stated, the Indians were paying considerable attention to our mounts with their rifle fire. The name of this Irishman was Delaney. He thought the Indians were getting too rough, so he dropped the bridle reins and made a dash in an effort to put as much distance as possible between himself and the savages. Lieutenant Overton called him to come back, but Delaney had business elsewhere, and kept on running. We all had to laugh, for it was really funny ... Doubtless he found a good, safe place (to watch the rest of the events unfold).¹³

Some while later, this soldier emerges from behind a rock, crawls back to the rest of the unit, and obeys his commander's order to "go over there and get some ammunition; then get up here and redeem yourself." Mazzanovich records:

"Delaney did as ordered, and when half way up, turned round and said with a grin, Bejabbers, Oi will blaze away into them now."¹⁴

Certainly one incident does not show conduct that all -- or even a majority -- might have exhibited. What the incident suggests, nevertheless, is that such enlistees may not have been fully oriented regarding the nature

and extent of their expected service within the Army.¹⁵
Finding that reality contrasted so sharply with expectations created attitude problems among many soldiers -- foreign or native-born alike.¹⁶

Ostrander outlines the "rude awakening" that many of the troops felt:

As we got farther into Indian country, I found that the enthusiasm for the wilds of the West I had gained from Beadle's dime novels gradually left me. The zeal to be at the front to help my comrades subdue the savage Indians -- which had been stimulated by the constant calls for troops passing through my hands at headquarters -- also was greatly reduced. My courage had largely oozed out while I listened to the blood-curdling tales the old timers recited. But I was not alone in this feeling. When we got into the country where Indian attacks were likely to happen any moment, I found that every other person in the outfit, including our seasoned scouts was exercising all the wit and caution possible to avoid contact with the noble red men, instead of looking for trouble and a chance to punish the ravaging Indians, the whole command was trying to get through without a fight.¹⁷

Many regulars, then, may have been somewhat reluctant participants of the campaigns, even if obedient to orders.

Professional Factors - Officers:

Among the regular officers who led the men into battle against the Apache, a great diversity of age, experience, and professionalism also appears. Utley sums up these contrasts in the early frontier Army in these words:

On the one hand there were vigorous and

ambitious young line officers glorying in the traditions of professionalism so dramatically established on the battlefield of Mexico and striving to perpetuate them in the dismal little forts in the West ... There were also older officers who laid the groundwork for the new professionalism back in the 1830's and 1840's and who still had valuable years of service ahead of them ... On the other hand, there were the dead beats, nonservers, and narrow martinets whose abilities had been dulled by age, boredom, and alcohol.¹⁸

A rather unpleasant image of post commanders has survived the period, supported by comments such as those of General George Crook, who, as a new lieutenant, saw "petty tyrants" who "lost no opportunity to snub those under them, and prided themselves in saying disagreeable things. Most of them had been in command of small posts so long that their habit and minds had narrowed down to their surroundings ... Generally they were the quintessence of selfishness."¹⁹

Other negative pictures of frontier officers have been given as well by military historians such as Utley. Low pay, slow promotions and general stress related to the management of unhappy, poorly fed, clothed, and quartered men, and to the adjustments to drastic shifts between boredom and fear, exacted a heavy toll on the officer corps throughout the period of the Indian Wars. Of course, the Civil War took most officers for at least one period; but many others resigned, or joined volunteers (to have a higher rank). Professionalism among officers became more noticeable and was established as a norm only during the post-Civil war

period (although the officer corps could boast of a 73%²⁰ West Point educated force by the mid 1850's).

As one of the key commanders in later years, General Crook brought with him, and influenced his subordinates to exhibit as well, a character different from that of many of the early commanders. His experiences as a young lieutenant had provided him with lessons he wanted to avoid repeating. As Division Commander, he set high standards for well-trained and committed (loyal) troops. Through his leadership, he focused on the realities of mission and determination to resolve (not just end) the conflicts. He also influenced several others to adopt such positions in the last days of the wars.²¹

The kind of diversity in commitment evidenced among enlisted personnel was found also among their leaders, although during the last years of the century, both enlisted and officer were developing more professional status. Yet even then, the officer corps did not provide unified and consistent professional leadership. No common traditions and loyalties bound the corps together. Harmony never existed among the various quarreling factions -- infantry vs cavalry; staff against line; regular vs volunteer -- dissension and jealousy prevailed throughout the period of Indian wars. The friction resulted in a varying degree of disruption in efforts to accomplish unit missions. Also, it had a negative impact on the establishment of satisfactory

relationship with the Apache.

If indeed the enlisted ranks and the officer corps seem to exhibit unclear and inconsistently held values of loyalty, honesty and selfless service, one need look only a little wider and higher to see other elements of the Army providing no better model for character traits in regard to carrying out the frontier mission. A divided source provided the directives. With a change in presidential directive, the Army's mission changed. With a change in philosophy of the Secretary of War, the Army's operational focus changed. With a change in leadership in the field, the Army's tactics changed. Men were led into different kinds of battles against the Apache with different objectives at different times during the forty-year period.²² Whether Sheridan's extermination policy, Grant's peace policy, Crook's "food or bullets" policy, or Howard's "Bible policy" was the order, the Army was to carry it out. Such shifting of policy from the top and shifting of tactics in the field brought significant negative influences into the relationship, as will be discussed further in Chapter Four below.

SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS -- ENLISTED AND OFFICER:

Although they operated as a single force, Army regulars were not a socially unified group. They were a fighting group, but the men did not have culturally similar backgrounds, nor were they expected to intermingle

socially, especially those of different rank. The larger group -- the civilian environment -- did not always support the Regular Army soldier's norms. The prevalence of Christian religious beliefs (held in varying degrees) among the Army was one of the strongest common influences among the regulars. Judeo-Christian principles, though not always followed, provided a frame of reference used to evaluate enemy and comrade alike.²³

Summarizing influences on the Regular Army soldier, then, we see that Regular Army personnel were often not well-prepared or trained to fight and survive in the campaign environment against the Apache and that commitment problems abounded. Generally, survival skills of the Regular Army were initially weak. Personal interaction between the civilian community and the officers was not the key for social survival -- although there was a professional interdependency for survival. (The Army protected civilian life and property and the community provided the Army with provisions and horses.) Protocol values for the soldier came primarily through the military group, with such common behaviors as gambling and drinking often practiced even though they were officially unacceptable to either general society or the profession of the Army.

Because the general Judeo-Christian principles served as a foundation for civilian mores, a degree of

common understanding of religious guidelines for life existed among these soldiers. Spiritual unity did not.

VOLUNTEERS

Professional Factors:

The second category of troops, the volunteers, provided key augmentation to the post-Civil War Army, somewhat the same as they did during that great war. That is, they were mobilized in response to troubles within certain geographical boundaries, but stayed to fight beyond their initial home area.²⁴

Utley identifies characteristics of these Army men as follows:

Volunteer regiments were mustered into service for terms varying from 6 months to 2 years. They were to be employed wherever and however the army needed them ... The volunteer regiments tapped strata of society beyond the reach of peacetime recruiters, and the ranks filled with men of a physical and mental caliber unusual in the typical Regular unit before the war. If less amenable to discipline, they were also more highly motivated and more aggressive. Westerners predominated, and most of them claimed some experience with frontier life and Indian ways. Although many of their company and regimental officers were lamentably deficient, they served under a top command of more than ordinary knowledge and ability ... With few exceptions, the ranking commanders boasted frontier experience, either in the Regular Army, or a civilian pursuit, and they applied themselves with a zeal rare in earlier years.²⁵

Among the units were the California Column, first

occupying the area around and including Tucson in 1862. Also, New Mexico Volunteers joined the efforts to subdue the Apache. Particularly notable in the characteristics of the volunteers is that they brought clearer expectations of their job with them. They were more familiar with the climate and terrain than were the Regular Army personnel, it appears, and could endure some of its hardships with less loss than the Regulars could. General Halleck, whose California Column marched to the Rio Grande for the first engagements, received the following commendation on the ability of his men:

It is one of the most creditable marches on record. I only wish our (Regular) Army had the mobility of the California Column.²⁶

But, service time for volunteer units was an indefinite factor. Usually, the time was short, and could, on occasion affect the use of the volunteers on a particular campaign. In 1864, General Carlton's plan to blanket Arizona with troops numerous enough to defeat all hostiles was curtailed by late autumn because many of the California companies had reached the end of their term of service, and in order to muster them out, Carlton had to suspend the Apache campaigns and to assume the defensive with a reduced Army.²⁷

Nevertheless, the volunteers making up the state regiments called on to serve against the Apache brought

a spirit for their work and fought fiercely during their terms. Their commitment was to bringing peace through abrupt and decisive military action. Not always was it a value for them to be loyal to the profession of the Army or to exhibit selfless service. Their loyalties were more often aligned with those persons among whom they lived from day to day. That is, the volunteers most directly reflected the values and attitudes of the general public in the area -- with personal and bitter hatred sometimes guiding their actions rather than Army values or professionalism. Such actions as the raid on a Jicarilla Apache encampment near Las Vegas is a prime example. Although this particular band had not been recently active in depredations, New Mexico volunteers carried out a punishment attack on them anyway.²⁸

Safety for the public was thought to lie in annihilation of the Apache, a thought which led to some actions directly violating Army ethics. One example cited by Terrell relates to the above company of volunteers as they concluded their attack. One soldier found an apparently abandoned Apache baby -- approximately eight months old and still strapped in his carrier board. His reaction was to grab it, saying, "Let me see that brat ... You're a little fellow now but will make a big injun by-and-by." He tied a rock to the carrier and threw it and the baby into the river to

drown, noting, "I only wish I had more to treat the same way."²⁹

Perhaps the words in these examples are conjecture, but the action of killing all Apaches -- whether women, children, or combatant warriors was not uncommon, especially by volunteers who sought to rid their homeland of a threat. Safety was a high value to these soldiers -- a freedom from fear for life made possible by an absence of Apaches.

Social and Religious Factors:

The volunteers were generally a socially unified group. They had personal ties to the community which they served professionally to protect. They were less strict than were Regulars in observing the clear distinctions between military ranks. Norms for the volunteers conducting military operations often paralleled those for their general social standings. That is, volunteers sometimes valued the ideas and attitudes of the larger group members as more appropriate guidance for action than a general military policy appeared to be. For the volunteers there was a clear correlation between will of the people and operation of the Army. A defense of the territory was to include specific locales and techniques that fit the people's needs.

AUXILIARIES

Professional Factors:

The third category of soldiers, local militia

auxiliaries, also included volunteers. Particularly during the early periods of contact and through the 1860's, these volunteers directly affected the general development of the relationship between the Army and the Apache. Their attitude and demeanor were echoes of the state volunteers, with an organizational variance toward less military structure and control.

The extent to which hatred of the Apache drove actions of such forces as the militia is indicated in the words of Arizona Territorial Secretary Richard McCormick who wrote, "The sentiment here is in favor of an utter extermination of the ruthless savages who have so long prevented the settlement and development of the Territory."³⁰

An Arizona territorial militia was organized under King S. Woolsey to carry out such military operations as needed. He hired some thirty Indian fighters and some Pima and Maricopa auxiliaries to carry out raids and attacks against rancherias of the Yavapais, Western Apache and Pinalis. One notable incident was Woolsey's luring thirty warriors into his camp with promises of tobacco and pinole only to fire on them as they gathered, killing twenty-four of the Apache. Although he was also officially criticized later for attacks on Apache rancherias in which women and children were killed in large numbers, he defended himself:

It Sir is next thing to impossible to prevent killing squaws in jumping a rancheria even were

we disposed to save them. For my part I am frank to say that I fight on the broad platform of extermination.³¹

Woolsey's values do not represent those of all volunteers and auxiliaries, but he is more typical than not. During the same year, other elements of volunteers (California units from Tucson and Ft. Bowie) under Major Edward B. Willis, Captain Thomas T. Tidball and Captain Whitlock struck various rancherias of Chiricahus, Coyotero, and Pinal Apaches, killing numbers of women and children along with warriors.³²

With a personal-revenge involvement in resolution of the conflicts between Apache and the general populace, the volunteers fought as the primary Army elements during the first twenty years of the period being studied. Their commitment to combat involving total destruction of the Apache served as a basis for further conflicts as well as revenge action and reaction continued. In attacking the Apaches indiscriminately, they often prompted an Apache revenge action which escalated their attacks on the soldiers. When the Apache justice values were discounted or ignored by attacking units, continued conflict was certain.

Social and Religious Factors:

These auxiliaries had similar social influences and religious influences to those the volunteers experienced. Their even shorter-term military commitment allowed less time for being acculturated into the Army and adopting its values than that time given to the volunteer Army personnel. For auxiliaries, as for volunteers, the will (wants) of the local community often prompted action rather than Army policy exercising full control of the military efforts.

SCOUTS

Professional Factors:

The fourth category of soldiers were scouts, who became a part of the Frontier Army in the last half of the period being studied. This quasi-military group included civilian scout units and Indian scout units who were hired to fight separate from or alongside Regulars and volunteers. Although the scouts were initially non-military personnel and designated as trackers and guides only, they were later "enlisted" for combat service as well and led in military actions by regular military officers. Such individuals were unique volunteers -- recruited specifically to perform their scouting jobs and also to fight against the Apache.

General Forsyth tells how he was hired to command an early scout company. General Sheridan had called him to his office one day in August, 1868:

"I have determined to organize a scouting party of fifty men from among the frontiersmen living here on the border. There is no law that will permit me to enlist them, and I can only employ them as scouts through the quartermaster's department ..."³³

Forsyth received his order an hour after he agreed to head this scout company for General Sheridan.

You are to without delay, employ fifty (50) first-class hardy frontiersmen, to be used as scouts against the hostile Indians, to be commanded by yourself, with Lieutenant Beecher, Third Infantry, as your subordinate. You can enter into such articles of agreement with these men as will compel obedience.³⁴

The explanation of his recruiting efforts makes an interesting part of this story. He reveals several points regarding both the commitment and ability of the men who were employed.

There was little trouble in obtaining capable and competent men for my new command. Hundreds of men who had served through the bitter civil strife of 1861 to 1865, either for or against the government, had flocked to the frontier, and were willing and even anxious, to assist in punishing the Indians, while many a frontiersman was only too glad to have an opportunity to settle an old score against the savages. In two days, I had enrolled thirty men at Fort Harker, and marching from there to Fort Hayes, sixty miles westward, I completed my complement in two days more.³⁵

Such auxiliaries were much like the militia and state volunteers described in the paragraphs above. They had both the skill with weapons and knowledge of the territory to aid in their campaigns against the Apache. Plus, many of them had personal motives to fight and avenge the death or injury of someone they knew.

Individual men were hired as scouts as well. The practice was not a new one. Men such as Kit Carson and Bill Cody continued to be employed with the Army even though full companies of scouts were also used. Their reputations and personal connections made them preferred over the scout companies by some commanders.

Kit Carson, e.g., who served both as scout and as

commander of the New Mexico volunteers, was acclaimed in Arizona history as "an Indian fighter and scout who helped win the Southwest."

His word was always kept; he was the soul of honor and the Indians, knowing this, respected Kit Carson. They admired him for his fair dealings and called him "father," but it may be asserted here that their respect for him was inspired by the fear of his unerring aim and fighting blood.³⁶

Such individual scouts as these also impacted on the relationship between the Apache and the military, by their acting as a liaison, as tracker, and as fighter.

A third category of scouts is perhaps the most controversial in use at the time -- the Indian scout. And among those Indians used, the Apache used against other Apache provoked the most discussion. The issues of commitment and serviceability surfaced repeatedly. These auxiliaries generated clear statements of differing opinion. Many commanders did not trust Indian scouts so they did not employ them, or condemned them even while using them as did LT. McDonald in his account of an 1881 engagement:

To my order to go on, an explanation that a soldier had to risk his life if necessary to carry out his orders, they most solemnly demurred; neither would any single one consent to go through and develop the position on my promise to make all available dispositions to cover his retreat should he discover the enemy's position without being killed ... I finally taunted them as cowards and squaws ... attempting to shame them.³⁷

In the position he took, McDonald ignored or discounted

Apache concerns regarding warfare. He used Army values, not Apache values in trying to goad his scouts into a battle area where they could gain no advantage.

In 1866, Congress had authorized the hiring of Indians as scouts -- and from 1866 to 1870, a battalion of Pawnee Scouts had been organized into military units and employed against other Indians effectively.³⁸ In many earlier instances, Indians from one tribe or another had voluntarily ridden into battle with the Army against tribes who had been their long-time enemies (such as the Pima who helped track the Apache). Sometimes the Indian assistance was not accepted, as in the case of Col. Kearney not employing Mangas Coloradas against the Mexicans. In many other instances, the Indian scouting brought a skill to the unit which was otherwise severely lacking. Nevertheless, for many commanders, the Indian scout was best selected if clearly not akin to those tribes against he would fight.

Use of the Warm Springs scouts against the "Snakes" during the 1866-1867 campaigns in the Northwest was judged a success, and praised highly by Generals Halleck and Steele. General Halleck wrote:

The officers are unanimous in favor of greatly increasing the number. As guides and scouts, they are almost indispensable.

General Steele wrote:

Being armed, mounted, and supplied, and

backed by troops, they cheerfully led the way into the middle of their enemies. In the late expedition, they have done most of the fighting and killing. They have also proved themselves to be very efficient when acting alone. They are very effective as guides and spies and in destroying the spies of the enemy. It is my opinion that one hundred, in addition to those now employed, would exterminate the hostile bands before the next spring, with troops enough in the settlements to prevent their getting supplies from that source.³⁹

Despite the positive reports from these commanders, the general officer support was not unanimous. Among those distrusting the Indian scouts was General Philip Sheridan:

I doubt if any process whatever can, in one or two generations, develop (in them) the qualities necessary for the rank and file of our army ... Soldiers should possess the attributes of civilized men ... They (Apaches) do not possess stability or tenacity of purpose ... They cannot appreciate responsibility or the sacredness of an oath ... a race so distinctive from that governing this country that it would be neither wise nor expedient to recruit our army from their ranks.⁴⁰

Also, General Sherman insisted that the Indians, when used by the Army, be restricted to scouting duty only. However, when pressed on the directive by General McDowell, Commander of the Division of the Pacific in 1881, Sherman gave the commander the initiative to "decide how to use his resources."⁴¹ Regardless of their expertise, Indian Scouts did not find ready acceptance into the Army.

The questions of loyalty remained at the forefront of the minds of many military men. Although only the one instance at Cibicu involved any indication of confusion

or treachery on the part of scouts, not all men who were asked to serve beside the Indian scouts could forget that one questionable incident. Anton Mazzanovich, e.g. records his desire to make "good Indians" (i.e. dead ones) of the scouts accompanying his unit: "They are treacherous and not to be depended on in an emergency."⁴²

Nonetheless, the recorded facts show that the scouts could not be dispensed with. In every case of actual or potential conflict between Indians and whites, Indians were called on to help to defeat the hostiles or to prevent hostilities from breaking out.

General George Crook's use of Indians as scouts and auxiliaries against the Apache reflects some elements of the differing levels of military acceptance. In his campaigns against the Apache in 1872-73, he employed primarily Pima and Maricopa Indians, traditional enemies of the Apache and often victims of the Apache raids. This use followed that which Generals Halleck and Steele recommended so highly. Later in his Sierra Madres campaign, Crook used Apache against Apache. He stated his philosophy in these terms:

In warfare with the Indians, it has been my policy -- and the only effective one -- to USE THEM AGAINST EACH OTHER. ... to operate against the Apache, we must use Apache methods and Apache soldiers, of course with white soldiers along ... They are indispensable. We could not have made any progress without them ... Nothing

has ever been accomplished without their help.⁴³

Crook's statement continues to attest to their loyalty and ability. Specifically he speaks to the "uproar because the Chiricahua Indians have been employed as Scouts." Crook defends their use by declaring their superiority over any of the other Apaches, and refers to Al Sieber and Frank Bennet as "cheerfully admitting that Apache scouts are indispensable."⁴⁴

Whether white or Indian, scouts brought skill and mobility to the frontier Army and enhanced its ability to carry out its mission. Yet the involvement of the Indians as loyal and committed to the Army and U.S. ideals was an unanswered question to many at the time and even later. The commitment of the white scouts was of no concern, although the lack of discipline of both Indian and civilian scouts displeased many commanders.

SUMMARY

These Regulars, volunteers, auxiliaries and scouts combined to serve as the frontier Army, tasked with protecting the citizens of the Southwest from Apache hostile actions. Although they brought with them a diversity of values and attitudes, the institution of the Army bound them together for action. In the Chain-of-Command structure lay an influence which could mold a unit into a single body -- operating as one. Even though

volunteers and auxiliaries may have appeared less disciplined in dress and military courtesies and less conventional in tactics than regular Army personnel, joint operations showed the men to be more alike than different when they worked together as a unit. Institutional values were evident.⁴⁵

In operations such as that described below, a unity of spirit seemed to unite the segments of the detachment embarking on its mission. The author's value judgement is uttered as representing all of the men:

... the young lieutenant raises his hand and gives his final instructions. Fours right, "aarch." Foorud, guide left." and the soldiers move with measured step across the parade-ground to the waiting wagons. "Fours left, 'aarch, halt, right dress, hrrunt." the little detachment stands in line, while the senior sergeant, saluting turns it over to the command of the officer. Sturdy, hardly fellows this little company of American infantrymen, from the veteran weather-beaten soldier on the right there to the blond-haired, red-cheeked lad, who has but recently joined with the last batch of recruits from the east, looking in their easy-fitting, serviceable blue uniforms ready for anything that may turn up from a game of baseball to a fight with the savages; the agency people are stirring, too, and a motley procession of Indians, mounted and dismounted, with painted faces, are moving out to help search for the hiding wretches.⁴⁶

Ultimately, then, the Army who fought the Apache was a mixture of men from all parts of the United States, the territories and from parts abroad. Experience and

inexperience combined in many of the units; dedication to duty and personal motives directed actions among men. Volunteers offset the inabilities of Regulars; regulars exerted pressure to bring volunteers under the discipline of military law and order. The Army as an institution thus worked to bring about unity in diversity so that a very difficult and dangerous mission could be accomplished. The values of the Army as a whole, then figure significantly in the relationship, as efforts to assure the Nation's ideals and Army ethics guided the military action.

NOTES

1. COL. M. M. WAKIN, CITED IN MQS II, TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGE, pp. 1-10.

2. Rickey, p. 91.

3. Thompson, p. 112. Of the 183,659 men who enlisted in the Army service in the decade 1865-1875, Thompson reports that 86,593 were not American citizens at the time of their enlistment. Many more had claimed citizenship only quite shortly before enlistment.

4. Thompson, pp. 112, 114-115. Thompson's study indicates that blacks enlisted for about the same reasons as whites, (to see the West, to escape the drudgery of the farm, or to run away from something), but their desertion rates were low, esprit d'corps was high, as was performance, despite rampant racism.

5. Rickey, p. 92.

6. Secretary of War Reports 1871, Vol. I, p. 12. There was an over 30% desertion rate for the 24 and a half year period.

7. Secretary of War Report, 1884, Vol. I, p. 9.

8. Rickey, p. 95.

9. Welty, p. 587.

10. Forsyth, The Soldier (New York: 1908), Vol I, p. 153.

11. Parker, Supplement, p. 45.

12. Thompson, 114. Secretary of War Report, 1889, Vol I, p. 9 noted that as career oriented soldiers, blacks were an exception to most others enlisting in the frontier army.

13. Mazzanovich, p. 169.

14. Mazzanovich, p. 174.

15. Thompson, p. 112. He gives additional examples here of immigrants who were tricked into enlistment, completely unaware of assignment responsibilities.

16. Utley, Thompson, Rickey and Welty all agree on this reaction as a common one.

17. Ostrander, p. 114.

18. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, p. 30.

19. Crook, His Autobiography, ed. Martin Schmitt, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 10

20. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, p. 33. In 1855-56, e.g. the Pierce administration had been forced to fill 116 commissioned vacancies with civilian appointees because the officer corps was so short in manpower. And, although these men lost no edge on "frontiership" to the West Point graduates (who received no education on fighting Indians), they lacked even the basics of military operations and tactics. See Secretary of War Report for 1856 for additional statements of concern.

21. Crook did not receive support from his Chain-of-Command for all his operational recommendations. This point will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

22. White, The Jacksonians, pp. 194-6. Here is a description of this weakness of the corps. Also, consider the variances between Bartlett's, Grant's and Sherman's policies. See also Dunley's Wolves for the Blue Soldiers, p. 45.

23. See Cremony, pp. 320-321 for typical evaluations.

24. Legislation in 1861 authorized both a volunteer Army and a militia in addition to the Regular Army. These three Army components were retained as legal after the war as well. See SEAT 268-11, July 22, 1861; 274-9, July 25, 1861; 279-81, 29 July 1861; 287-91, 3 August 1861; 314 5 August 1861; 317-8; 6 August 1861. These documents are the basis for calling into service the various military units which fought along the frontier.

25. Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 259.

26. Aurora Hunt, Western Frontier Dragoons, (Glendale, CA: Westernlore Press, 1958), p. 236.

27. Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 259.

28. Terrell, p. 190.

29. Terrell, p. 208.
30. Letter 5 March 1864 to Poston, OIA New Mexico Field Papers, RG 75, NARS. Quoted by Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 256.
31. Clara T. Woody, ed. "The Woolsey Expeditions of 1864" Arizona and the West, 4 (1962), 157-176.
32. Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 256.
33. Forsyth, p. 10 and Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 53. Utley notes that Forsyth's scout company was later disbanded although it had been successful during its activation period.
34. Forsyth, p. 10.
35. Forsyth, p. 11.
36. Farish, pp. 108-115.
37. Farish, p. 89.
38. Secretary of War Report, 1879, Vol I, iii. See also, Secretary of War Report, 1880, p. 3 and 1881, pp. 133-4 for other favorable reports on the use of Indian scouts.
39. Secretary of War Report, 1867, Vol I, pp. 73, 74, 79.
40. Commission on Indian Affairs Report. Senate Report 348, 1884, pp. 1-2.
41. Dunley, p. 67. Betzinez records the eagerness with which Apaches signed up for scouting duty; "(When they) enlisted as scouts and went off with the troops to hunt down fellow tribesmen, they were happy as bird dogs in a field of quail." (p. 54). He emphasizes their need to do something interesting and challenging (of value to them).
42. Mazzanovich, p. 249.
43. Lummis, Dateline Fort Bowie, pp. 120-122.
44. Lummis, p. 123. His description of the in-house division of thought is clear here. In Crook's

autobiography are other statements which indicate differences of opinion between white scouts and commanders. Crook claims that it is not all white scouts who discredit the Indians, however, but rather those "white scouts of the Frank Leslie stamp who want the positions for themselves." (p, 172).

45. Dunley, pp. 67-68.

46. Ruffus E. Zogbaum, Horse, Foot and Dragoons
(New York: Harper, 1882) pp. 166-167

CHAPTER FOUR

"Nineteenth century whites frequently assumed that the Indians were doomed because of unwillingness or inability to change ... But the Indians of the trans-Mississippi West often displayed great adaptability in trying circumstances, although they did not always adapt in the ways whites thought best for them.¹

The stage was set: 1) One Nation defending its territory and life ways: 2) an army defending another people who chose to move to that territory or who must traverse the territory on their way further west. The Apache position was culturally defined: maintain tribal integrity and secure survival needs. The Army's position was operationally defined: protect the frontier. The Army's military operations against the Apache (and the Apache's against the military) were triggered by civilians and by elements of federal and state governments as the two peoples sought to secure their general welfare.

The Army, as an extension of American society and enforcer of its will and values, approached the Apache with inconsistent behavior, sometimes negotiating treaties for land; sometimes co-occupying it without agreement; sometimes removing the Apache by force. Although certain general values served to guide U.S. Army troop employment throughout the period 1846-1886, fluctuation in their priorities stood as a major hindrance to development of effective

and lasting peaceful relations with the Apache. Apache values changed some, too, during these years, in some ways increasing the conflicts, in others moving toward their resolution. Some warriors chose to fight to the death, almost fanatical in their attacks. Others looked for safer and more distant locations within the territory. Still others sought peace.

How did these value changes occur? The military force alone did not bring a cessation of hostilities, although military operations were a significant factor. It was a combination of this force of the U.S. Army, aided by Apaches themselves, which set conditions opening the cross-cultural communication necessary for establishing peaceful relations.

In examining what happened between the Apaches and the Army, the following two generalities are proposed. One, in their involvement in conflict -- regardless of the instigating factors -- both Apache and Army personnel followed cultural values that initially had carried them into battle but which ultimately led them into peace. Two, by looking beyond the instrumental level of certain values toward the conceptual level, leaders of both forces were able to effect more peaceful relations. That is, when men such as General Otis Howard and Cochise began to negotiate co-existence and General George Crook and Chatto and Chihuahua reached agreements, they focused on common values which guided

cooperative and friendly relations. Both sides exhibited some changes in the values which had earlier led to direct military conflicts.

Values pertinent to the changing relations are grouped for discussion in this chapter into the following broad categories: instrumental and conceptual. Within the framework of these divisions, the values of the Apache and the military relating to matters of group values (mission, group integrity, law and order) and personal values (loyalty, courage, morality, and religious faith), as well as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness will be compared.

In reviewing the influence of these values on the campaigns, it becomes evident that the opponents had many similar characteristics and desires, and yet, particular methods of satisfying them were unacceptable to the other, i. e., judged to be immoral or unethical. This chapter will discuss the values in conflict and focus on the efforts of such men as Howard, Crook, Cochise, and Chihuahua to bring peace.

INSTRUMENTAL VALUES:

Group values: Mission.

Initially where the Apache and the Army stood in opposition most obviously was on concept and use of the territory. Both perceived themselves to be the "legitimate" authority for the area -- "owners and managers" as it were,

yet the definitions of ownership and goals of management proved to be incomparable and incompatible. Clearly, the instrumental values each group ascribed to territory reflected its own cultural needs or wants and customs. These were not significant in the earliest phase of the relationship, but as limits were placed on one or the other, conflict resulted. From early efforts to negotiate peaceful cohabitation and use of the land, both formal and informal agreements were concluded. However, treaties and contracts that were established between such Apache leaders as Mangas Coloradas and Cochise, and the Army officials who were in charge of protecting the early sparsely located and mostly transient white population were a misleading indicator that good relations would or could continue.

Each party held an ethnocentric view of the meaning and significance of the agreements. An attempt to share the territory was merely a time bomb of conflict which ticked away toward explosion.

For the Apache, the Southwest had been a home long fought for and preserved through constant hardship and bloodshed. Settlers and soldiers provided new territorial threats the Apaches challenged on the warpath. Ever since the Apache settled in the Southwest from their original Alaskan homeland, they were known as warlike.² However, the coming of the Spanish increased their fighting experiences. The Apache first fought Spanish invaders hoping to drive them

away; then they fought Mexicans who carried on the effort to gain control of Apache lands. They also began to fight against previous friends among the Indians, such as the Pueblo, whom they took on as enemies when they aligned themselves with Spanish or Mexican leaders. The Apache's commitment to fight for their land was, thus, their mission that became an unrelenting and obsessive drive.

Encroachments into Apache lands or attempts to restrict territorial freedom of the Apache evoked an immediate and intense response to protect that Apache authority through warfare. The instrumental value regarding defense of territory (mission) ranked as a primary one. Apaches gave time, energies, and life to the value of their territory -- as home and as a source of food and protection. The area would not be given up without a desperate struggle.

But what value did the territory have for the Army? Many soldiers of the regular army neither desired to be there in the first place nor planned to stay long once they got there. The high rate of desertion mentioned earlier was, to be sure, caused by a number of different factors other than the unwillingness of soldiers to serve on the frontier. But one point cannot be ignored in view of its consistency throughout the period. Personally, soldiers -- in large numbers -- did not want to be in the Army that faced the Apache. Even many of those soldiers who remained with their units recorded indications of low opinions of

the area, calling the territory a "wasteland," a land "Godforsaken," and worthless.³

Institutionally, too, the Army appeared to regard the territory as less than desirable to occupy. Camps and forts were constructed to be temporary dwellings and cantonment areas. Provisions for long-term occupation were lacking. Even such daily matters as pay, food, blankets, and ammunition for the units (whose presence would indicate some importance to maintaining the force), were starkly neglected by the system.⁴

Why, then, did the Army challenge the Apache for the space? If the territory meant something negative to the military and something positive to the Apache, why did not the Army let those who prized it, have it? What brought the Army into conflict with the Apache over the territory?

Several factors bear on the answer. First, not all elements of the Army held the views mentioned in the paragraph above. Volunteers differed from the Regulars in regard to this value. Many of them claimed units of the land for their own. The militia and volunteers within the Army included miners and ranchers whose livelihood was threatened if Apaches were not kept off the territory they wanted for their own. As settlers, they were planning to make their present and future existence from the land. Their instrumental values were much like those of the Apache -- they were willing to fight for the use of the land as they desired. Their in-

terests were to secure their personal survival and economic prosperity. These men supplied the Army with a personal commitment to fight.

Second, a broader element of the Army provided a value needed to direct the institution's time, money, energy and life to claiming the land of the Apache. From the President to the Secretary of War, through the Secretary of the Army and the Division Commanders, came the orders which bound the Army to the territory so long as the mission of "protect the frontier" had not been completed. As members of the U. S. military, officers and enlisted men alike were responsible for enforcing official policies and laws of the nation. In so doing, they were to serve not as a group of individuals, but as single arm of the government (the people). Instrumental values related to a mission of securing the territory for use of the American citizens drove the Army to its first occupation. Instrumental values related to how this mission was to be accomplished differed during certain years of the period. Army policy reflected different leadership goals and different interpretations given them.⁵

As its mission dictated, the Army was to subdue hostiles who threatened the life of American settlers and to secure passages to the West. In carrying out this mission, the Army's "land claims" also evolved from an additional duty to enforce provisions of various treaties

negotiated, to include the Southwest. With territorial boundaries established by treaty between Mexico and the U.S., and with reservation boundaries established by treaties, congressional acts, and/or informal agreements, the Army was quite busy monitoring and checking Apache movement when it could.

Early in the Army occupation of the Southwest, the Apache and the military had avoided direct conflict mainly because the Apache thought anyone who defeated the Mexicans to be their friend. Even when the Army stayed and Commissioner Bartlett began an attempt to enforce the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo by stopping Apache raids from Arizona into Mexico, and by protecting Mexicans from Apache captivity, these first clashes were worked out without widespread bloodshed.⁶ Mangas Coloradas used his position as chief to allay the vengeance welling within Apache parties who felt wronged by the losses. However, the Apache did not comprehend the nature of an international boundary and land treaty between the U.S. and Mexico not the personal land claims of individual U.S. citizens within the newly 'acquired' land. Private ownership of land was an instrumental value with little significance to the Apache.

Since the Apache, not the Mexicans, controlled the area, they could not understand how the Americans could justify their land claims as coming from victory over the Mexicans. The Apache had, through warrior prowess, es-

established boundaries allowing them sufficient space to meet tribal survival needs. They kept their fighting skills finely tuned -- to raid or to punish Mexicans or other Indian tribes as needed to maintain their territorial control.

They had been happy to see the U.S. soldiers chase the Mexican soldiers away, and thus considered them allies. They regarded Apache dominance secure when Bartlett and the small military force left the Tucson area without warfare. But the white miners remained to continue prospecting for the gold they believed to abound in the mountains of Apachedom.

Mangas Coloradas, as chief and spokesman for the Mimbres in the area, first attempted to redirect these men from his territory to another area where he claimed they would find more of the yellow dust and nuggets. Since he had observed their energies expended in search of the ore, and since he and his people did not want the whites in their lands, he hoped to entice them to leave by telling them of another place where gold could be found.⁷

Yet, because he did not value the land for gold as they did -- that is, did not share the same instrumental value for it -- he underestimated its worth to these miners (and to the many others who would continue to flock to the Southwest in search of the instant wealth they believed to lie in wait for them). These early miners beat Mangas

severely, but did not kill him. Their expressed aim was to dissuade him from interfering with their mining efforts and to leave them alone for the rest of their stay in the territory.

Thus, two specific clashes in instrumental values related to the mission of protecting the territory appear in these early incidents. The opposing forces defend accordingly.

For Mangas, suffering such a humiliation as a personal attack meant loss of esteem and position, unless he could reclaim honor and exhibit true Apache strength and prowess over the enemy. He chose the warpath to seek repayment for the action both personally and culturally. His personal vengeance led to the first large scale cruel and bloody wars of the Chiricahua and Mimbres Apache against the whites.⁸ These raids and attacks consequently generated actions from the Army. Apache claim and use of the land directly clashed with what the Army was charged with protecting.

Regarding reservations for the Apache, the instrumental values associated with the land significantly affected the soldiers and Apaches. The Army assumed a mission of enforcing reservation boundaries, arresting hostiles, escorting them to federal stockades, or to new reservations, etc. The Army was also called on to count and tag the various members of each tribe and/or band who

settled on the reservations as they were created. They also were assigned to provide guards for relocation efforts and to police removal of individual Apache prisoners of war. The Army thought it important for the Apache to be in an exact place and observe private property lines. The Apache still wanted to live off the land.

Army responsibility to enforce reservation boundaries brought soldiers into direct conflict with Apaches who did not accept the limits on their territory as redefined. Reservation outbreaks time and again brought the Army after the Apaches. For the Apache, a new lifestyle was required for living according to the conditions of the area and to the federal laws. Betzinez describes some of the Apache feelings:

We were issued rations once a week and as we were not allowed to wander away to hunt game, we were entirely dependent on this issue ...

The great disadvantage to this life was that we had nothing to do. It is true that many Indians were lazy so far as farming was concerned, but who could farm in that desolate country? (San Carlos) If they had been set in some kind of activity in which they were interested or experienced, the warriors would have been happy and would have exhibited great exertion.⁹

As Betzinez indicates, unrest among the warriors was not long in growing to such intensity that outbreaks occurred. He describes this development:

Many of our tribe, especially the wilder ones from Mexico (Juh, e.g.) had never learned to practice self-control or to live with their

misfortunes. This together with the dissatisfaction with the surroundings built up among the Neddahe and Chiricahuas an increasing restlessness which spread to all the bands. Even the usually peaceful Warm Springs Apaches were affected. The older people wished to return to their home country. The younger men began to talk of going on the warpath. After considerable confusion and argument the more warlike spirit prevailed. The day came when many warriors began stealing and buying guns and ammunition and otherwise preparing for conflict.¹⁰

Although military leaders of the Army and chiefs of the Apache tribes made attempts to negotiate peace between the people of the Apache nation and of the United States, these differing notions of land use and the instrumental values assigned them affected behavior of members of the nations accordingly. Where segments of the populations chose to act on these values, the groups fought.

The Army police actions thus carried out the nation's value placed on private property, on a settled rather than nomadic community, and on manifest destiny. The Apache's instrumental values of land were condemned by the U.S. soldiers, although conceptual values related to land and mission were not totally incompatible.

Group Values - integrity of the unit:

When soldiers protected the territory of Mexicans and personal homesteads of settlers through military operations (firepower), warfare between the Army and Apache

erupted. Apaches reacted predictably to defend their freedom of movement and to reclaim authority over activities in the area. The Army did the same -- to claim as U.S. territory that same area. It was important -- a primary value for both forces to act in defense of territory. Tied in with this defensive posture were values of the group and its organization to defend the values held. Army and Apache opposed each other as groups -- representative of their respective nations. That is, they became warfare targets in blue or in warpaint. General military objectives for the group, such as the establishment of armed superiority over the threat, guided Apache and soldier into bloody engagements.

Desires to preserve unit integrity to defeat the enemy drove both groups, but the units or bands did not all use the same tactics to do this. Instrumental values for military actions differed. For example, a group of California or New Mexico volunteers engaged the Apache more aggressively than did the Sixth Cavalry. White Mountain Apaches engaged in raiding and warfare when Jicarilla Apache negotiated peace. Groups of soldiers or of Apache did not share exactly the same values -- but for the Army and for the Apache in general, one significant factor is that a sense of unity was achieved for one through the chain of command and for the other through kinship bonds. Both valued group integrity, but the instrumental values around

how to obtain it or preserve it were not similar.

Indeed, unit or band, the groups both had some sense of oneness. For the soldiers, the chain of command provided the link between each segment of the Army. For the warrior, both kinship and status gave an organizational structure of sorts to the band. To be sure, the Apache war party had no similarity in organization to a company or regiment of soldiers. Frequently, it was charisma, rather than institutional command authority, that legitimized the leader-follower relationships for the Apache. Military law enforced the command structure within the Army. Rank existed in both, but standards used in defining the groups indicate some clear difference in values.

The Army recruited its enlisted men from all segments of the nineteenth century society; and in its efforts to secure enough men to field a frontier force, it brought together both brave men and cowards; men who were skilled and some who were incompetent; those who were honest, true and fair men as well as those who lied, cheated and betrayed their colleagues. Most men in the Regular Army were strangers prior to their assignment to the unit; most militia men and volunteers were friends and/or relatives, as discussed above. The cohesion of the units differed widely, but a common factor bound the men together -- the Army. The unit was treated as a single-minded group. It had a single leader and the men had a single mission under that leader.

The military discipline -- laws and regulations -- molded the group.

Apache men were more loosely united in formal structure, but more strictly bound by honor and convention of culture than were the soldiers. If a chief or warrior leading the party gave a command in battle, the other warriors followed it as they saw appropriate. They feared no court-martial for failure to obey orders, but they were guided by expectations of the group that an Apache warrior would act on certain values. Recklessness, imprudence, cowardice were censured. The warrior who violated the standards was no longer respected as a member of the group, or was no longer followed into battle, depending on his status and the magnitude of his error or leadership failing.¹¹

However, warriors did not always agree on how to help the group survive. One of the weaknesses Betzinez attributes to the Apache is an internal dissension. He notes that oftentimes personal differences in leadership style or battle plans led to a bid for power among individuals of the warrior group, as it does in development of any group.¹² To the Apache, challenges meant physical combat, resulting in a splitting of bands into even smaller segments, although kinship bonds (clan relationships) never lapsed. Dissension then, might be seen among Apache warriors preparing to go on a raid. More unity through clan obligations arose for the Apache on the warpath.

The Apache's needs for survival exercised the greatest unifying influence on the bands. That is, from each and every member of the group arose a desire for the spoils of warfare or raid. If warriors were not successful, not merely their pride suffered, but people went hungry, feet went uncovered, and bodies unclothed.

For the Army, dissension among troops was not allowed, regardless of the action. Even though the Army's tactical units were composed of diverse individuals, the Army's structure and discipline allowed the commander to count on a committed force when he issued orders. Apache chiefs and warriors leading raids could not necessarily expect the same degree of response. Those who built their war parties from the clan relationships perhaps could expect less dissension, but still did not have the formal control held by Army commanders. To be sure, Apaches did not have total anarchy in their warfare. They fought as a unit -- to aid the whole group -- yet individual initiative and skill accounted for the maneuver and fervor of the battle.¹³

The difference in source of control over the integrity of the unit figures to be even more significant in the last campaigns against the Apache. Even though many chiefs chose to live in peace, they did not have a system which could culturally or militarily bind all subchiefs and warriors together with an absolute authority. Clan affiliation effected obligations for warfare; local bands

supplied the warriors for raiding parties.¹⁴ Individuals warriors at times chose to continue raiding or to take to the warpath against Mexicans or Americans even though peace agreements had been reached between a chief and an official of the U.S. Government -- usually an Army officer.

Not only in treaty negotiations and in reservation residence did the differences in individual-group relationships impact on the campaigns. Also when the Apache scouts were hired to join Army forces, the instrumental values related to group integrity clashed. In employment of Apache warriors as advance party scouts for infantry and cavalry units, commanders faced the dilemma of attempting to integrate them into the Army as "soldiers" or allowing them to operate as Apache fighters. If the latter option were followed, it fostered a disruption to discipline and order of the Army unit to whom they were attached.

The unit was important as the fighting element to both Apache and soldier, but it was organized for different purposes and thus reflected different instrumental values. After the battle, the Apache group returned to the larger society and shared what they gained. After a victorious battle, the Army returned to a fort or other military installation, to file reports and issue some awards or commendations to those who fought well, but the "rewards" of the battle were not shared with society at large, even if society at large did consider the efforts of the Army to

be of value to them in establishing better security.

Group Values - Mores (Law and Order):

The roles of the chief and the commander reflect some definite differences in values of the groups. The position of authority among the Apache was retained essentially by proven action and group respect. The position of the commander of the Army units was filled rather by official orders -- although personal contacts and interpersonal relationships did have some bearing on some of the assignments. Each served as the official representative of a system of law and order with instrumental values not clearly understood -- sometimes totally rejected -- by the opponents.

Particularly among the warrior groups, eloquent and charismatic leaders could influence the determinations of against whom and how the group fought. That is, leaders like chiefs Mangas or Cochise could exercise an influence to restrict the warriors attacks or raids, or they could assemble large numbers of warriors and commit them to war against an enemy. Personal revenge of both Mangas and Cochise, as a matter of fact, led men to war after they had exerted all their personal influences to guarantee initial long periods of peace. The source of law and order for the Apache was, however, ultimately based on the traditions of the tribe. Warlike as they were, the Apache valued peace with honor, too.

Within army units, the leadership also affected what the unit accomplished. Some commanders such as Carlton or West devised large scale or sweeping plans to send men out to locate and attack any Indian encampment they found. Others, such as Crook, carried out their mission more reactively, responding to Apache depredations or interventions, rather than attempting to initiate the engagements. They pursued hostiles, but gave protective treatment to noncombatants. These latter leaders sought to establish law and order through disciplining the "errant" Apache, rather than eradicating all of them, as the former attempted to do. In trying to stop illegal behavior while letting the other life ways of the Apache continue, Crook got better cooperation from the Apache than earlier commanders received.

The military discipline needed to accomplish the missions set forth by commanders or higher headquarters was, of course, based in the chain of command itself and regulated through the military justice system. When Apache scouts were employed to work with Army units, additional problems arose when soldiers expected Apaches to abide by Army regulations and Apache warriors expected the Army to have more consistency in administration of justice.¹⁵

Personal Values - Loyalty:

Both Apache and soldier had difficult duties to perform. Both had hardships and scarcity to face in fulfilling responsibilities. And, most significantly, both warrior and soldier were ready and willing to die in line of this duty. It is not so much the presence or absence of a value placed on duty, then, but the instrumental nature of that value which separates the Apache and soldier.

A strong sense of duty carried some soldiers through heroic actions such as the battle during which Mangas Coloradas was shot or when Chief Loco was killed.¹⁶ Some other soldiers, such as Captain Jeffords, even worked for no pay for a long period of their service.¹⁷ Despite the high desertion rates, the men who fought the Apache or served as escorts, scouts, or guards were a dedicated group, even if not highly skilled in frontier fighting techniques.

Values related to loyalty of the soldiers were not all military ones. That is, each soldier had some life outside of the Army. Whether it involved a family (nearby or back in the East), a hobby of hunting, drinking, or whatever, the soldier had significant relationships with others besides his military comrades. For the soldier, the unit was only one group into which he fit. For the Apache, however, the fighting group was also the family and the community, the school, the social life, and all things.

One major difference between the status of the in-

dividual within the groups had to do with kinship. The soldiers were, regardless of personal values of commitment, paid members of a group formed to carry out a national policy. The individual warrior, on the other hand, was selected to join the raid because of his fighting prowess and also his personal relationship to the person leading the party (or the persons following him). Although both soldier and Apache had group integrity and individual loyalty, it is clear that the extent of the commitment of the Apache exceeded that of the paid soldiers.

Personal Values - Courage:

Apache social values inculcated into the individual directed him to honor his kin. His fatalistic spiritual values directed him to fight cautiously but bravely, so as to be ready to die if it happened to be his time. The careless or impetuous warrior was not respected nor sought out for assistance on raids because the aid of the raid was to avoid contact with the persons from whom the provisions were to be taken. When attacking with a war party, however, the chief desired to be supported with warriors who looked forward with excitement to the battle ahead.

To be a great warrior meant to be adept at getting to the enemy without suffering harm or loss -- a discipline of movement before, during and after the fighting. Although the reputation of the Apache as the most

ferocious of Indians often carries with it the thought of reckless abandon in attacking their enemies, such was not the case in all battles. Indeed, the individual warriors knew how to fight; they were deadly in combat; and they appeared to have no fear of death. Some of them were known to torture male captives; some took scalps. However, torture was not a usual practice, as noted by the warriors Goodwin interviewed, nor was scalping.¹⁸ If either practice was pursued, a meaning was significant. The warriors involved were trying to avenge a similiar act; the warriors were responding to some action in excessive anger; or they were engaged in a battle which was apparently a "last ditch" effort.

To the U.S. soldier, courage meant to fight whenever the enemy was found, to engage the enemy regardless of numerical differences, time of day, or terrain. When scouts employed by the Army balked at an order to fight in terrain they considered disadvantageous, against odds which favored the enemy, they were labeled cowards and laggards. Instrumental value differences relating to courage promoted early incompatibilities of the men which later had to be resolved for them to work together as a military team.

Personal Values - Morality:

U. S. soldiers regarded Apache actions of warfare immoral and savage. Without reflecting on causes of

Apache war party attacks, and without distinguishing between a raid and a war effort from the Apache, the soldiers were oftentimes caught up in police actions and rescue missions or punishment raids which might have been avoided. That is, the soldiers at times reacted to the movement or action of a particular Apache band by punishing a whole tribe. Or, sometimes, the soldiers were called on to seek out tribal camps and destroy grain, provisions, and shelters, to impound cattle, sheep or horses which might be in the area, even though the band of Apaches subsequently attacked were not the ones who had been actively depredating the area. Soldiers did not always distinguish between "good" and "bad" Apache when they found large herds of animals. All Apaches were considered thieves and murderers. And the moral code of American society levied harsh judgments against the guilty. For many of the Army personnel fighting to protect the frontier, there was no such person as a "good" Indian unless he or she was dead. This disregard for the Apache as a person violated the Army ethic, but it prevailed as a strong opinion among many of the civilians (and many of them were volunteer army personnel). The instrumental values defining morality and soldier ethics contrasted sharply between the Army soldier and the Apache.

Personal Values - Faith:

Differences in Army and Apache instrumental spiritual values widened the gulf between the peoples. For the soldier,

Judeo-Christian principles of faith, hope and charity were to guide character development. Not all soldiers were Christian, nor were they all religious, but most were familiar with Judeo-Christian precepts forbidding stealing, lying, killing, etc. that were also laws of the land.

The introduction that Bishop H. B. Whipple wrote for Helen Hunt Jackson's A Century of Dishonor addresses the religious attitudes of the country during the past century:

The American people have accepted as truth the teaching that the Indians were a degraded, brutal race of savages, who it was the will of God should perish at the approach of civilization. If they do not say with our Puritan fathers that these are the Hittites who are to be driven out before the saints of the Lords, they do accept the teaching that manifest destiny will drive the Indians from the earth. The inexorable has no tears or pity at the cries of anguish of the doomed race.¹⁹

Identical concepts regarding man's relationship to a Supreme Being were not held by all soldiers, but many have done as Cremony did in the threat of death -- utter some prayer to God. Religion was not a primary part of the soldier's life, but was a familiar aspect.

By contrast, religion was an integral part of the Apache's life. Nearly all activities, large and small, involved some spiritual focus. Likewise, battle evoked prayers and spiritual concerns. For each warrior, following the accepted codes of honor, of courage, of duty to the

group was pleasing to the Great Spirit, who granted life and powers to him. Dying in dishonor or cowardice left the warrior homeless. The spirit of even the bravest of warriors, however, would not rest until that warrior's body was properly burned. The warrior did not fear death -- but he did want to have the proper treatment after death so that his spirit could find its place. The Apache generally accepted death as simply another expectation of a day. Death from hardship or battle was a common occurrence among all Apache bands. A stoic acceptance of death appears in such words as the Apache sang prior to battle: "It is a good day to die." However, they did not dare fate; they did not charge into battle until they had reconnoitered the situation as thoroughly as possible. Then, they could fight and die honorably. Also, they did what they could to protect the whole group from the devastating effects of the environment. They were desirous of living rather than of inviting death -- but still they accepted whatever happened as it came.

EXCEPTIONAL BEHAVIORS

There were individuals who did not follow the traditional Apache values of personal, social, or spiritual caution in relating to others, however, and these men, too, must be discussed. As pointed out by such leaders as Cochise and Chihuahua, some "wild" men might choose to leave the reservation, to raid a ranch of a person

friendly to the Apache, or to fight against another warrior or trader, even though those actions would be censored by other group members. Sometimes the lack of morality was attributed to the intoxicant tiswin, which the Apaches brewed; sometimes to whiskey which white traders provided abundantly (though illegally), and sometimes to the very nature of the Apache tribe in general. That is, for many, the reason for Apache raiding and warfare did not seem to matter. Among those atypical Apache warriors, Geronimo and Old Nana stand as the most well-known. Old Nana fought ferociously even past seventy years of age. Geronimo led various sizes of raiding and war parties but was never a chief. He was known as a liar and rebel by both Apache and Army leaders.²⁰

Other factors outside the traditional values of the Apache and Army personnel which affected the relationships include the operations of various Indian agents. Although the Army was tasked with negotiating peace agreements and with bringing the Apaches onto reservations, the agencies were operated by civilians. Many of these men did not consider either Army or Apache values as they went about their business. Betzinez identified several concerns the Apache raised, including dishonest distribution of food rations.²¹

Croghan also records continuing problems. He

mentions a succession of agents being removed from position and Army officers being relieved of post command over variances they had growing out of operation of the 1146th Number, 72 Article of the Rules and Regulations of the Army. This article required the commander and agent to act together in issuing the Indian provisions. Their differing values often caused inefficient and unreliable issue.²² Often they were so embroiled in their own disputes over who ran the Indian operations, they ignored the Indians themselves.

Perhaps the most damaging of the external factors was the "Tucson Ring," or "Indian Ring," as it is also called. This group included Apaches, Army men, and Indian Bureau personnel operating together illegally peddling guns, whiskey, and other provisions. Results of this corruption were disastrous to peace efforts. The Apache who were victimized began to break away from reservations, to plunder, torture and return to earlier lifestyles.²³

General Crook condemned the system which gave full management authority to neither the Army nor the Indian Bureau. He believed that "ninety-nine-hundredths" of the Indian troubles were caused by Indian agents and traders, by their mismanagement.

If you will investigate all the Indian troubles, you will find that there is something wrong of this nature (mis-handling of issue) at the bottom of all of them, something relating to the supplies, or else

a tardy and broken faith on the part
of the general government.²⁴

Some agents, of course, recognized Apache values as significant. These men tried to consider the Apache as they implemented federal policies. John Clum and Tom Jeffords were among these men; yet they, too, were often caught in situations wherein policies blatantly disregarded Apache needs. They both resigned finally in dispute over reservation movements and inadequate issues.²⁵

CONCEPTUAL VALUES

Although conflicts continued to arise from differences in instrumental values, men such as Clum, Jeffords and Crook on the one side, and Cochise, Peaches, and Chihuahua on the other, helped direct more attention toward common values the nations shared on the conceptual level.

Both valued honor, justice and truth. Both held family and community in high esteem. Both considered their fighting ability to be a basis of self-worth and acceptance within the general community. A new look at meanings given to the instrumental values involving such areas of life as these finally brought about some changes. Through dialogue between such men as Jeffords and Cochise, the Apache began to understand more fully the justice

system of the soldiers. Through dialogue between such chiefs as Chihuahua and Crook, the Army began to recognize basic values of the Apache, such as family love and unity. Although none of these men represent the whole of the Apache nation or the Army, what resulted from their negotiations with each other is that there was a change in the frame of reference in which the relationship could continue to be developed. A new focus emerged -- on conceptual values, not just instrumental ones.

The words Chihuahua spoke to Crook when he surrendered in 1886 exemplify this recognition of some shared values:

I've thrown away my arms. I'm not afraid; got to die sometime. If you punish me very hard, it's all right, but I think much of my family. You and almost all your officers have families, and think of them, so I hope you will pity me and will not punish too hard. 26

With a look beyond the concrete differences, the two sides began to take cautious steps toward peace.

NOTES

1. Dunley, pp. 208-209.
2. Adams discusses the backgrounds of the Apache, pp. 4-5. See also Bourke and Opler for discussions of their geneology.
3. Parker, Supplement, p. 19.
4. Utley, Croghan, and other historians discuss this at length.
5. Fey, for instance, is one who notes specific changes in official policy: in 1859, "The policy is to gather the Indians upon small tribal reservations within the well defined exterior boundaries of which small tracts of land are assigned, in severalty, to the individual members of the tribe ..." In 1871, Congress discontinued treaty making and a system of agreements was substituted. In 1890, Commissioner Morgan stated: "The settled policy of the government is to break up reservations, destroy tribal relations, settle Indians upon their own homesteads, incorporate them into the national life, and deal with them not as nations or tribes, or bands, but as individual citizens." (pp. 66-67).
6. Farish, I, pp. 87, 142.
7. Farish, I, p. 67.
8. Fey, p. 28.
9. The San Carlos reservation as located in a desertlike area where summer temperatures "often reached 110 degrees or higher. Dust storms were common the year round, and in all seasons except the summer, the locality swarmed with flies, mosquitoes, gnats, and other pesky insects." (Betzinez, p. 54)
10. Betzinez, p. 47.
11. Opler, p. 125.
12. Betzinez, p. 9.
13. This individual fervor was something which was especially frightening to the soldiers facing the Apache in battle. Individually, the Apache was stronger than most Army men. Note again the comments from Cremony in Chapter 1.

14. The character of a chief still had the greatest influence on the nature of the battle. Most sources note the great influence of Mangas, Cochise, and Old Nana, for instance.

15. During the Court-Martial of the scouts who had served Colonel Carr at Cibicue, it was pointed out that the terms of enlistment were not clear, that discipline of the scouts had been different than that given the other unit members. See Brinckerhoff, "Aftermath of Cibicue."

16. "Cooke," p. 119.

17. Farish, II, p. 283.

18. Goodwin's information on scalping is a good reference on the lack of importance such action was to the Apache. See pp. 280-285.

19. Jackson, XIV

20. Lockwood, p. 223

21. Betzinez, p.

22. Croghan, p. 157.

23. Tebbel, pp. 296-297. Bourke also discusses the corruption rampant among the activities managed by members of this ring. ("General Crook in Indian Country.")

24. Crook, Autobiography, p. 227. Indian traders are also condemned by several writers. Croghan, p. 165, discusses their unscrupulous operation.

25. Lockwood, pp. 222-223.

26. Lummis, p. 33.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOLUTIONS

With all his faults, and he has many, the American Indian is not half so black as he has been painted. He is cruel in war, treacherous at times, and not over cleanly. But so were our forefathers. His nature, however, is responsive to a treatment which assures him that it is based upon justice, truth, honesty, and common sense; it is not impossible that with a fair and square system of dealing with him the American Indian would make a better citizen than many who neglect the duties and abuse the privileges of that proud title.¹

Looking at tribal (cultural) background and leadership behaviors provides a fairly clean understanding of the Apache's actions which occurred during the white American settlement of the Southwest. Likewise, a review of the organizational weaknesses, the confusion regarding policy toward the Apache, and the shift of responsibility for control of the Indians between various agents, departments and bureaus of the U. S. Government provides an understanding of the Army's actions. Such reviews often lead to opinions which see faults of one side or the other. Rarely are both perspectives taken into consideration.

This thesis has maintained that the interaction between Apache and soldiers was pushed into "war" by the values and attitudes of people from both sides. Examination of the values exhibited by both Army personnel and Apache warriors reveals a devaluation of the opponent by both sides.

This perspective opened the relationship to cruel and long-lasting warfare. Without respect or regard for the humanness of the opponent, no positive steps could be taken to resolve differences peacefully and permanently. The misunderstandings and prejudices pushed the relationship further and further into continual warfare. Each side chose combat to respond to unacceptable actions of the other side. The fighting continued--partly due to limited knowledge regarding some of the values of the opponent, partly due to misperceptions regarding other values; and partly because of direct incompatibility of still other values held by the different societies.²

The general image of the Apache held within the American psyche was that they were substandard and subhuman beings. Wide publication from Southwestern newspapers and from petitions for help sent from citizens in New Mexico and Arizona to the Secretary of War contributed to the image.³ Although some eastern humanitarians did influence the government's general Indian policy for a time, the prevailing attitude expressed through the Chain of Command that directed Army leaders into action was not one of acceptance of Apache values. The image reflected white civilization's measures of worth and used value-laden nomenclature to describe the Apache.⁴

From the Apache perspective, the white civilization had little to offer that made life more bearable. They, too, regarded the opponent to be untrustworthy and unscrupulous. Repeatedly, the Apache pointed to dishonesty, corruption and greed as the major characteristics of a society which they condemned.⁵

Conceptual values held by the opponents were not so incompatible as were the instrumental ones. But these were also great sources of dispute and conflict. Differences in values related to religious expression and belief, in wearing apparel, in family relationships (nuclear families vs. extended families, i.e.), in the methods and "rules" of carrying out justice, and in property ownership became separation points and instigators of combat. To many of those involved in the conflict and to many of those who were living in the Southwest, it appeared that no resolution to the differences would be found. At least, it seemed that no permanent solution for peaceful co-existence of the people would be realized. The wars drug on for decade after decade, through change of government and change of Army commanders.

Peace between the opponents exacted a high cost-- but it did finally happen. With this peace, a definite merging of values occurred. Although full assimilation of the Apache into the U. S. mainstream did not occur, the conflicts were halted when it became less valuable to either the Apache or the Army to continue combatant activities. That military

power of the Army proved too deadly for the Apache is no doubt a factor in value changes. But that power alone did not seal the peace, for earlier military engagements had repeatedly led to negotiations, treaties, arrests, and transfers that were only temporary lapses in the conflicts throughout the forty years.⁶ The new approach included both military superiority and concern for human factors. Adjustments in instrumental values of both soldiers and Apache warriors occurred.

MERGING OF VALUES

General George Crook's campaigns against the Apache in 1873 and 1883 serve to illustrate changes in the instrumental values of the Army and the Apache to a degree which prompted more peaceful relations.

By 1873, the mission of the Army had been redefined somewhat from its earlier one of "protect the frontier." With the implementation of President Grant's Peace Policy, the Army also took on a responsibility for protecting the reservations and the Apaches on them.

General Crook's first campaign effected a surrender of virtually all Apache tribes across the territory who were not already assigned to a reservation. His efforts to establish peace embody certain points at which some merging of Apache and Army values could occur--and other points at which a significant impetus to change values could be exerted. The trademark of General Crook was his famous riding mule "Apache"--and his soldiers with their mule trains became familiar sights

as they tracked the Indians across the territory. His approach to combat the Apache with training, equipment and animals suited to the environment brought him success. His consistently honest and direct dealings with the Apaches also brought him their trust. He began his command by learning everything he could about the situation through riding from reservation to reservation and listening to the grievances of the Indians--something nobody else had done. Protected only by a small escort, he even rode into the mountains to talk to known hostile chiefs in their villages. Only his reputation for fair dealing saved him from expected attacks.

When he heard everyone's story, Crook took actions that worked to establish more acceptable conditions for prolonged peace. He used his troops to remove all the miners, squatters and ranchers who were trespassing on the reservations. Using his governmental powers, he extinguished as much corruption as he could in the Indian agencies that were operating in his territory. And he also held the Apache responsible for becoming civilized and self-sustaining; and, as an essential to this, told the Apache they could select suitable homes anywhere inside the reservation, instead of roving nomadically over the whole of it. The head men of the respective bands were to be held responsible for the behavior of their people. Some of the brightest, best and most influential of them would be enlisted as soldiers, but would reside among the people, and would assist in leading them toward self-government.

Whenever a tribe showed an incapacity of self-control, it would be brought into the agency where it could be controlled. If any band became bad, the other bands were to join together and control it. Crook promised to bring in white soldiers only when the Apaches proved themselves incapable of self-control. One condition of their being allowed to pick out individual homes on the reservation, was that they must support themselves after their crops came in in the fall. The chief would be held responsible if any tizwin was made. They were to put their spare money into horses and cattle. Their future was to depend upon themselves, as Crook worked with them.⁷

Among other points where values merged was direct combat. General Crook echoed the request of many previous commanders when he demanded enough troops to send to the mountains in pursuit of hostiles. He recognized, however, that it was imperative to bring sufficient military power into the areas to portray to the Apache the size and might of their opponent. He knew Apache attacked when they expected to win, that they deferred to superior forces and sought peaceful co-existence in such cases rather than pursue continual war. Crook maintained that his force must be large, heavily armed, mobile, and well-trained. Specifically, he used not only the Army's values of discipline and general training to select his force, but applied the highly ranked Apache values related to survival skills as well.⁸

Regarding the territorial boundaries between Mexico and the U. S. and those boundaries of the various reservations, Crook again effected a merger (or redefinition) of values. That is, he sought approval to act where and when he could in pursuing any hostiles. But he also made it clear that reservation locations of peaceful Apaches would be safe from any Army attacks. His proposal recognized the value of land use for safety and basic subsistence for the Apache. He declared their crops and rancherias to be safe on the reservation. Yet, he also indicated that the Army's operations to pursue hostile (or renegade) Apaches would define all land as open to Army maneuver.

Other values which Crook's actions seemed to bring together involved the use of the Apache scouts. In his initial use of scouts, Crook had employed volunteers from any of the tribes. However, he particularly selected those from the very tribe which he was charged with tracking down on his last campaign. Although his opinion was not shared by all, he did prove successful in his efforts to restore peace and secure a commitment for its permanence.

RESOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICT:

Thus, as instrumental value differences were reduced, open conflict between Apache and Army became less frequent. Focus on development of peaceful relations centered on establishing some new values within the Apache--such as desire for

private homesteads, desire for reading and writing skills (education, as defined by the white culture), and acceptance of new laws and customs. John Bourke describes the reservations under Crook's supervision:

"The transformation effected was marvellous. Here were six thousand of the worst Indians in America sloughing off the old skin and taking on a new life. Detachments of the scouts were retained in service to maintain order; and also because money would in that way be distributed among the tribes. Some few at first spent their pay foolishly, but the majority clubbed together and sent to California for ponies and sheep. Trials by juries of their own people were introduced among them for the punishment of minor offenses, the cutting off of women's noses was declared a crime. the manufacture of the intoxicant tizwin was broken up by every possible means."⁹

Earlier, some agents had not viewed the Apaches as adaptive.

Fey quotes one assessment in these words:

Americans who were setting out to make a new society could find a place in it for the Indian only if he would become what they are--settled, steady, civilized. Yet somehow, he would not be anything but what he was--roaming, unreliable (by white standards), savage. So they concluded that they were destined to try to civilize the Indian and, in trying, to destroy him, because he could not and would not be civilized."¹⁰

Despite such gloomy predictions, the Apache proved to adapt in ways that were not earlier thought possible. The success of Crook's approach suggests that Betzinez' views were shared by other Apaches. When the Apache had motivation to do something (a value for it), they were able to accomplish the task or meet the challenge as necessary.

Although both sides wanted peace, elements within each had earlier militated against it. Yet, these decades of conflict slowly laid a basis for a final peace that was understood and accepted by both Army and Apache. The early peace overtures on both sides had not lasted long. In fact, their short duration, problems in semantics of the agreements and conditions of the restraints on personal actions of either parties (such as territorial boundaries for the Apaches, and restrictions on trading of the white businessmen) contributed to increased hostilities. But what had followed from the initial peace agreements with such tribes as the Jicarillas and Pinalis, and even the Mescaleros and Chiricahuas, were a series of indirect steps to lasting peace as the groups learned more about their opponents' expectations of them and about their opponents' own values.¹¹ Those steps ultimately provided experience which effected adjustments in values supporting co-existence without warfare. During the forty years of conflict, Apache loss of life, starvation, and exposure first prompted warfare, as they responded to the problems by using reaction/problem resolution. This was initially a highly valued response. Later, however, similar problems were responded to with different actions. Army difficulties in addressing treaty violations, and indeed, participation in attacks upon individual tribes, or bands who may not have been "guilty" of any illegality in the eyes of the Apache also fed the fires for war during the

early years. However, the Army, too, later used different tactics and policies to address the problems of co-existence.

A change in instrumental values was evident in both the Apache and the Army. The conceptual values of life simply overrode the instrumental values related to revenge or to raiding as the best means of food supply for the Apache. Also, the Apache accepted reservation life when it appeared to provide life, enough liberty that warriors were allowed to hunt, farm, or wander within the area, and some opportunity for happiness in that warriors, women, and children alike could continue to practice many of the Apache folkways.¹² The following words of Chihuahua at his surrender to Crook indicates changed instrumental values, but a continued adherence to conceptual ones:

I hope from this one we may live better with our families, and not do any harm to anybody. I am anxious to behave. I think the sun is looking down upon me, and the earth listening. I am thinking better. It seems to me that I have seen the one who makes the rain and sends the winds--or he must have sent you to this place. I surrender myself to you because I believe in you, and you have never lied to us. ...

The Army was also influenced by the conceptual values of life and liberty. Values that it was charged with defending for a segment of the population were also realized as pertinent and legitimate to those of the people they were fighting. Grant's Peace Policy has first generated programs that addressed

conceptual values; but it was not until Army commanders in the field were able to mesh those concepts with some clearly compatible instrumental values that some progress was made for lasting peace. General Crook's position effectively combined values so that great strides could be made in negotiations and, once the cycle of action/reaction of battle deaths could be slowed, other elements of justice, cooperation and daily living could be addressed more successfully.¹³ General Crook's philosophy for working with the Apache sums up this new focus:

It is not advisable to let an Indian think you are afraid of him even when fully armed. Show him that at his best he is no match for you. It is not practicable to disarm Indians. Their arms can never be taken from them unless they are captured while fighting with their arms in their hands, by sudden surprise or disabling wounds. When Indians first surrender or come upon a reservation, they anticipate being disarmed, and make their preparation in advance. They cache most of their best weapons, and deliver up only the surplus and unserviceable. The disarming of Indians has in almost every instance on record proved a farcical failure ...

In dealing with this question, I could not lose sight of the fact that the Apache represents generations of warfare and bloodshed. From his earlier infancy he has had to defend himself against enemies as cruel as the beast of the mountain and forest. In his brief moments of peace, he constantly looks for attack or ambush, and in his almost constant warfare no act of bloodshed is too cruel or unnatural. It is, therefore, unjust to punish him for violations of a code of war which he has never learned, and which he can with difficulty understand.

He has, in almost all his combats with white men, found that his women and children are the first to suffer, that neither age nor sex is spared. In the surprise and attacks on camps women and children are killed in spite of every precaution; nor can this be prevented by any orders or foresight of the commander, any more than the shells fired into a beleaguered city can be prevented from killing innocent citizens or destroying private property. Nor does this surprise the Apache, since it is in accordance with his own custom of fighting; but with this fact before us we can understand why he should be ignorant of the rules of civilized warfare. All that we can reasonably do is to keep him under such supervision that he cannot plan new outbreaks without running the risk of immediate detection; for these new acts of rascality, punish him so severely that he will know we mean no nonsense. As rapidly as possible, make a distinction between those who mean to do well, and those who secretly desire to remain as they are. Encourage the former and punish the latter. Let the Apache see that he has something to gain by proper behavior, and something to lose by not falling in with the new order of things. Sweeping vengeance is as much to be deprecated as silly sentimentalism. 14

CONCLUSIONS

From the examination of these campaigns, it appears that peace between the Army and the Apache could have been achieved with less bloodshed and much earlier. If the conceptual values of the Apache had been recognized and taken into consideration by the early military authorities when government officials sent the Army to negotiate the conditions of co-existence between the early white settlers and the Apache and when agents were assigned, certain battles in the 1850's through the 1870's could have been avoided.

If the Apache had realized during those early encounters that they were opposing an Army with "endless" supply and personnel, their position of warfare might have been different. Both the Army and the Apache are seen as underestimating the capabilities and the true nature of their opponent. Their differences in instrumental values had defined their positions as more incompatible than they actually were.¹⁵ Motivations for attacks of the most devastating magnitude would have been reduced if the Army's policy of extermination had not directed early indiscriminate killing. Similarly, even the number of raids could have been reduced if the Apaches had accepted alternate solutions to securing food and establishing warrior prestige as were offered by the Army. An understanding of not just the culture, but of the personal and group values was needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

What then are the implications to be drawn from these conclusions? Are there lessons to be learned from the engagements with the Apache? Do factors such as the values of the opposing warriors, or the opposing nations have an applicability to today's conflicts?

The study of values has assumed much more than academic interest for the modern world. With the rapid improvement in means of communication which has taken place during the last century and the resulting increase in cross-cultural contacts, the potentialities for conflict have

become greater than ever before. It is obvious that unless the various nations which compose the modern world can come to some sort of agreement as to what things are important and desirable, we are headed for catastrophe.¹⁶

Linton's quotation is a declaration that values do matter. With modern warfare have come many new challenges to the planning and conducting of battle. Strategies formulated today need thorough assessment of the enemy. The human element has been one of the constants of battle throughout the ages. Warriors of any age, of any place, and faced with any threat have certain values which directly bear on their conduct. Although these values may vary from one warrior to another, within each unit, and indeed, within each state or alliance there are values which affect how that warrior combines with others to fight or to restrain from fighting. Whether the individual as leader or the state as policy maker set the limits for operation, personal values do play a significant part in what happens.¹⁷

Relationships between values and conflict are depicted vividly in the Apache Wars. The Apache behaviors based on tribal instrumental values generated contempt, fear, and confusion among the settlers and soldiers. Similarly, the actions of the Army aroused contempt and defensive feelings on the part of the Apache. Mistrust and disgust felt by both the Apache and the soldier toward their opponent contributed to the continual warfare. Only when understanding and sensitivity to

each other's needs and concerns occurred, did peace and negotiations follow. Throughout the years following the close of the wars, dialogues have continued to address matters of importance to the parties. When values receive such appropriate attention, peace follows. This lesson is one applicable to any age.

NOTES

1. Linton, p. 157.
2. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 have presented the revelant data.
3. Utley, The Indian Frontier, pp. 33-36.
4. Particularly the statements of Cremony, Mazzanovich, and Sheridan might be noted as expressing such an opinion.
5. Farish's The History of Arizona, Vol. II cites statements attributed to Cochise and Chatto regarding their distrust of the white negotiators. Bourke's An Apache Campaign, records statements of scouts echoing similar distrust.
6. Even the peace established after General Crook's first major offensive in 1872-73 was tentative. Also, see Key's study for an examination of the various groups of American citizens impacting on the work of the Army during these years.
7. Tebbel, p. 299.
8. He echoes the requests given by earlier commanders, but also specified the training of his soldiers, his mules, and his scouts to work together. Nothing was left to chance. See Bourke, "General Crook in the Sierra Madre," The Smoke Signal.
9. Bourke, "General Crook in the Indian Country," Century Magazine, March 1891, p. 206.
10. Fey, p. 34, citing Ray Harvey Pearce.
11. Dunley, p. 213. See also Linton, p. 152 for discussion of the relationship between values.
12. Lummis, p. 31.
13. Dunley, p. 214.
14. Lummis, p. 168.
15. Linton, p. 158.
16. Linton, p. 157.

17. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience, discusses at length the importance of values in modern strategy formulation and in all negotiations.

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
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
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APPENDIX A



APPENDIX B



APPENDIX C



A Reconnaissance, by Frederic Remington. Whether employed in units such as General Crook organized or individually as scouts and guides, Indians played an important role in the army's operations against the western tribes. From *Century Magazine*.

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