Vulnerability Analysis of Soviet Division-Level Troop Control.
Abstract
This study describes the Soviet troop control system in the motorized rifle division and analyzes it to determine its potential vulnerabilities. The study begins with a review of the evolution of the Soviet troop control system at the division level during and since World War II, followed by a brief analysis of what the Soviets call their scientific basis for tactical planning. Several specific aspects of the current division troop control system are then analyzed: (1) Decisionmaking and Planning Process, (2) Role of the Division Staff, (3) Division C2 Facilities/CPs, and (4) Impact of Cybernetics and Automation. The study concludes with an analysis of the vulnerabilities/means of exploitation of the Soviet division troop control system. One of the key findings from the historical analysis was that inadequate intelligence was the most frequent cause of disruption to Soviet forces at the division level during World War II. This may well be the main reason why the Soviet division decision cycle is so heavily dependent upon an accurate assessment of the battlefield. We can expect the Soviets to continue to move toward greater centralization and automation of division troop control. Computer automation will increasingly be applied to Soviet troop control activities and assist in the decisionmaking process. U.S. planners should maximize their efforts to identify those critical events and thus allow commanders to bring to bear the means to disrupt the Soviet troop control process at these critical times. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 02, 1985
- Accession Number
- ADA167256
Entities
People
- Bruce L. Meisner
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College