The Delayed Entry Program: A Policy Analysis

Abstract

This research explores the effect of the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) on preaccession and first-term behavior of Army enlisted personnel. Two models, one exploring the DEP and preaccession behavior (DEP LOSS) and the other examining the impact of the DEP on first-term attrition, are combined to explore DEP policy trade-offs. Recruiting costs and training costs are used as a measure of DEP impact on force management. Specific Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) are examined and marginal cost measures are developed. Results show that when cost is considered, longer DEP lengths are recommended, when possible, for almost all personnel. Findings show that marginal costs vary by personnel characteristics and MOS job assignment. Keywords: Personnel policy, Attrition, Marginal cost, Logit, and Cost analysis.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 01, 1985
Accession Number
ADA167847

Entities

People

  • Alex G. Manganaris
  • Chester E. Phillips

Organizations

  • U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Army Personnel
  • Attrition
  • Business Administration
  • Cost Analysis
  • Cost Models
  • Costs
  • Education
  • Enlisted Personnel
  • Military Research
  • New York
  • Personnel Management
  • Probability
  • Recruiting
  • Recruits
  • Social Sciences
  • Specialists
  • Training

Readers

  • Life Cycle Cost Analysis
  • Naval Personnel Management