Deception and the Mediterranean Campaigns of 1943-1944

Abstract

The American military tends to disregard deception as a tool of war although it is a proven force multiplier and has helped to win many battles. Deception provides the means to 'get into the enemy's decision cycle' by forcing the adversary to take actions prejudicial to his operational timetable. This paper examines the contribution of deception to military operations at the operational level of war by focusing on deception in support of the campaigns in the Mediterranean during 1943 and 1944: the amphibious landings in Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and southern France, and the breakouts from the 'Gustav' and 'Gothic' lines in Italy. The research demonstrates the link between operational level warfare, operational maneuver, surprise and deception. The author presents several theories about the conduct of deception in the Mediterranean during World War II and its relevance to planning in support of contemporary military operations.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 31, 1986
Accession Number
ADA168052

Entities

People

  • Joseph E. Browne

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Biomedical
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Amphibious Operations
  • Birds
  • Civil War
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Employment
  • International Relations
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • Naval Operations
  • Navy
  • Second World War
  • Students
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies