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DRAGON AT SEA: CHINA'S NAVY IN STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY

Kenneth G. Weiss

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
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
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DRAGON AT SEA: CHINA'S NAVY IN STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY

Kenneth G. Weiss

Naval Planning, Manpower, and Logistics Division

A Division of **CNA** CONTRACTORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
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This paper (originally prepared for CNA's Sea Power Forum "Soviet and Other Communist Navies" held in November 1985) examines the prospects for Sino-U.S. naval relations from a strategic perspective. It reviews the status of China's navy as a fighting force and efforts to modernize that force. It also looks at China's navy in regional security issues affecting Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and the Indian Ocean. Finally, in discussing Sino-U.S. naval relations specifically, the paper concludes that some cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese navies seems to be in the interest of "peace and stability" in the Pacific. Whether the U.S. and China can surmount their differences to achieve some limited military (including naval) relationship remains an open question.

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INTRODUCTION

In a conference about communist navies, China is something of an anomaly. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is certainly communist and will no doubt remain so. But Soviet "hegemonism" has driven not only Moscow's wartime ally, the United States, into hostility, but also the Kremlin's former ideological ally, China. As a result, "communist" China and "capitalist" United States have looked to each other to contain the growing power of the Soviet Union.

In doing so, there has been a subtle and persistent movement toward military, including naval, relations between the U.S. and China. But, there also have been persistent difficulties in achieving them. Last year, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman traveled to Beijing to discuss military cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese navies.¹ But this year, the scheduled port visit by three U.S. warships has been delayed as negotiations seek to bridge the differences between China's concerns about sovereignty and the U.S. policy of never confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard ship.² Some U.S. analysts have questioned the wisdom of establishing naval relations with China, while others have defended the policy.³

In this paper, we will examine the question of Sino-U.S. naval relations from a strategic perspective, looking first at China's navy, then at its role in regional security, and finally at Sino-U.S. naval relations.

THE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY NAVY (PLAN)

China's Navy as a Fighting Force

Although the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet is more powerful than the entire Chinese navy, the Peoples Liberation Army Navy is not a negligible force (see the appendix). The growth of the Soviet Pacific fleet since the late sixties spurred Chinese efforts to improve their own naval capabilities. As the Soviets increased their out-of-area naval activities since 1968, Chinese naval ship building, which had declined along with other defense industries in the Cultural Revolution, began to increase. But like the other services' procurement, naval ship production declined after Lin Biao's coup attempt in 1971. Coincidentally, as U.S. naval strength declined in the Pacific after the fall of Vietnam in 1975, Chinese naval ship construction increased as a more pragmatic leadership gained ascendancy in China in the mid to late 1970s.⁴

Despite these fluctuations in procurement, the number of Chinese ships increased dramatically in the 1970s. The Chinese stepped up their production of larger surface warships, particularly the Luda-class destroyer, and introduced a new class of frigates, the Jianghu. They also began producing the Dajiang-class multipurpose ocean auxiliary and the Fuqing-class underway replenishment oilers—ships necessary for extended operations. The PLAN put more emphasis on the development of nuclear submarines like the Han-class SSN and the Xia-class SSBN. They apparently have also successfully tested an SLBM in their one Golf-class SSB. Indeed, about 20 percent of China's defense budget was devoted to naval forces in this period. As a result, China's conventional submarine fleet increased from some 35 to 100 boats, missile-capable vessels grew from 20 to over 200. In terms of numbers, China's conventional submarine fleet is the third largest in the world. Although these Romeos and Whiskeys are of an old design, they are well suited to the operations in the shallow waters along the China coast. At any one time, the Chinese can deploy some 500 SS-N-2s aboard those 200 vessels. The PLAN also has many land-based aircraft, about 800 planes.⁵

Despite these impressive numbers, the Chinese navy is mainly a coastal defense force—or perhaps, more precisely, a “contiguous seas” force. Chinese ships and naval aircraft are generally based on Soviet designs of the 1940s and 1950s. The navy's force is still largely composed of small coastal defense craft with limited range and endurance. However, Chinese destroyers and frigates armed with SS-N-2s and conventional weapons have a fair anti-surface warfare capability, but they are highly vulnerable to enemy submarines and aircraft because they lack modern sensors and weapons. They have little in the way of electronic warfare or electronic countermeasures and, apparently, have yet to deploy an operational SAM system. Indeed, the Luda destroyer does not have a combat information center, although there are reports that the Chinese are working on this problem. As a result, Chinese surface ships are not likely to operate beyond land-based air cover in wartime. Moreover, the navy's major surface combatants are not only lacking in capabilities but also in numbers as well.⁶

The PLA naval air force itself is largely composed of obsolete aircraft. Like the surface force, its large numbers are a fair threat to surface warships, but it is deficient in antisubmarine and anti-air warfare capabilities. The bombs and torpedoes of the IL-28 Beagle provide the main threat to Soviet warships, but the Chinese can also use MIG-21 fighters and the more capable TU-16 bomber. There are also reports that the Chinese have developed or acquired an air-to-surface missile. Even so, China's lack of sophisticated

airborne sensors and seaborne helicopters would make it difficult for the Chinese to detect Soviet submarines and kill them when detected. The Navy's air defense is handicapped by a lack of all-weather fighters, air-to-air missiles, and airborne and shipborne controlled intercept radars. Chinese aircraft also lack an aerial refueling capability, limiting their combat radius to 150 n.mi. offshore.⁷

The Chinese have a powerful submarine force. Technically, their Romeos and Whiskeys have the range and endurance to operate anywhere in the Pacific. However, they are slow and noisy when they snorkel. On long-range patrols, they would be highly vulnerable to the Soviet Navy's more sophisticated ASW capability. In turn, they lack the modern sensors and weapons to conduct effective operations against enemy submarines. (Indeed, the Chinese apparently suspect that Soviet submarines have operated in their waters at will.) Thus, in wartime, they are likely to operate in the China Seas, where the shallow waters would offset their disadvantage in speed and where the coastal crevices would make their detection more difficult. (In fact, the operation of the Soviet's new Kilo-class submarine in the South China Sea may indicate that they are designed to ferret out Chinese submarines hiding along the continental shelf—an area where Soviet SSNs would be at a disadvantage.) They would then wait in "wolf packs" for enemy ships off various choke points.⁸

China's efforts to update its submarine force have met with mixed results. A new version of the Romeo, the Ming-class SS, has yet to go into serial production—and probably will not. The development of the Han SSN and the Xia SSBN was plagued with problems. Until recently, the Chinese have long had a Golf SSB without a useable SLBM. Although there are reports that the Chinese are planning to deploy four to six SSBNs, they have yet to announce a successful launch of an SLBM from their SSBN. There are persistent reports that Chinese nuclear submarines continue to experience reactor problems. Whatever the case, the Chinese may be planning to concentrate on developing their conventional submarine force by improving their weapons and sensors.⁹

Although the Chinese have significant mine-laying capability, their mine sweeping force is largely confined to some 24 outdated Soviet T-43 class minesweepers and numerous, but even less capable, small auxiliary craft.¹⁰

China's amphibious warfare capabilities are also limited. Until the late sixties, amphibious forces were largely limited to some 30 odd U.S. World War

II LSM and LSTs inherited from the Nationalists – along with smaller vessels obtained from the Soviets or built on Soviet designs. In the early seventies, the Chinese introduced the Yuling-class LSM, the precursor for the more successful (and more numerous) Yuliang-class LSM. China has also had some success in producing a new LST of the Yukun class. There is a report that the Chinese have deployed an amphibious assault ship capable of launching small landing craft (or boats) – the Qionghsha. They also have some limited numbers of hovercraft. Their merchant fleet is composed of some 1,262 vessels of approximately 9.3 million tons.¹¹

In 1982, China announced the formation of a marine corps.¹² However, there is some doubt as to whether or not China has a true marine corps or naval infantry on the order of the U.S. or the Soviet Union.¹³ As one analyst puts it, "...China's naval landing force is poorly armed; lacks adequate air-ground communications equipment and practical experience in air-ground coordination; lacks specialized ships for heliborne operations; and is not outfitted with specialized amphibious landing vehicles and support equipment to pursue inland objectives at any appreciable distance from the shoreline."¹⁴ The Chinese have the lift for about 30,000 troops.¹⁵ But the number of amphibious ships is considered too limited for large-scale operations, and the ships are generally outdated and unsophisticated.¹⁶

The Chinese navy is organized into three fleets: the North Sea Fleet based at Qingdao, the East Sea Fleet at Ningbo, and the South Sea fleet at Zhanjiang. Naval Headquarters is based in Beijing. Like the rest of the PLA, the navy is divided into main forces and local forces. The main forces are directed by Naval Headquarters. The local forces composed of patrol craft and conventional torpedo boats probably are under dual subordination of Naval Headquarters and the regional commands. In some instances, interservice coordination must be undertaken as well.¹⁷

Naval Modernization

In the 1980s, funds for military modernization have been tight. The military ranks last in China's "Four Modernizations" of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense. The Navy has felt the pinch. The PLAN cancelled a contract with the British to modernize the Luda destroyer – partly, because of the poor performance of the Sea Dart SAM in the Falklands/Malvinas War, but mainly because of the high cost.¹⁸ However, since 1981, the Chinese economy has been clipping along at a growth rate over

7 percent.¹⁹ So more funds for the military (and the navy) may become available as China's economy grows. In the meantime, arms sales provide an additional source of funds for modernization. Indeed, the PLAN has apparently sold Romeo-class submarines to Egypt and patrol craft to Bangladesh.²⁰ The PLA has also announced plans to reduce its force by a million men releasing additional funds for modernization.²¹ The army, especially local forces, will probably bear the brunt of the cuts, but the navy will probably experience some reduction in force.

However, the PLAN should hold its own in the budget battles because Beijing is emphasizing the development of China's coastal areas. The Chinese have "opened" 14 ports, four Special Economic Zones, and Hainan island to foreign trade, investment, and development.²² (Although various difficulties—including reports of naval involvement in contraband trade—have slowed implementation, the Zhongnanhai* asserts that the "open door" policy will continue.²³) Furthermore, the Chinese have let numerous contracts to foreign oil companies for the development of China's off-shore energy resources—with mixed results so far.²⁴ The Zhongnanhai is also expanding China's commercial ship construction, merchant shipping, and fishing industries.²⁵ Thus, Beijing needs to improve the navy to protect China's coast from threat.

Although funds are tight, the PLAN is not standing still. A navy can be thought of as having four components: the doctrinal, the bureaucratic, the human, and the physical. The PLAN is concentrating on improving the first three—the "intangible infrastructure"—with a view toward the day when modern weapon systems become more readily affordable.

In regard to doctrine, the navy has abandoned "guerrilla warfare at sea" for "naval combined arms." Although the Chinese intend to continue traditional coastal defense operations for the time being, they have begun to emphasize the "mobile task force" as the basic unit of naval combat operations. Presumably, "combined arms task groups" will consist of surface, submarine, and shore-based naval air elements—the three combat arms of the navy—with a primary emphasis on the surface force. (Combined arms also implies better coordination of naval forces with those of the army and air force.) Since 1979, frequent task groups exercises have been conducted throughout the fleet areas. Moreover, the PLAN has made several forays into

* Zhongnanhai is the leadership compound in Beijing.

distant seas. In 1980, a 30-ship naval task force sailed to the South Pacific to observe and recover the missile used in China's first ICBM test. In 1984-1985, the Chinese sent an expedition to Antarctica aboard two vessels, the research ship, Xiangyanghong 10 and rescue ship J121, to establish the "Great Wall" research station there. In a dramatic departure, the recent sailing of a destroyer and supply ship to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh represents the Chinese navy's first foreign port calls.²⁶

In regard to the bureaucratic component, China is improving the organization, administration, and support services of the navy. It is unclear to what extent the reduction in force for the PLA will affect the navy. Presumably, the navy will follow the example of the air force in streamlining procedures and strengthening command authority by reducing the number of staff officers and deputy commanders. Older naval ships and aircraft apparently will be scrapped. The navy has also begun to shift personnel among commands instead of leaving them in the same assignments for years at a time. There are also more frequent operations among ships of different fleets. In the past, the three fleets operated as virtually separate navies. Furthermore, the Chinese are making efforts to improve their repair, maintenance, and logistical support capabilities. Interestingly, China's recent reorganization of the military regions reportedly lumped most of East China's naval bases in two military regions south of Shandong—probably to improve coordination among the combined arms.²⁷

In regard to the human component, professionalism is being stressed over ideology. The Chinese are emphasizing education, technical proficiency, and training in their various naval units, academies, and schools. Officers are to be younger and better educated. Indeed, the head of the air force, Zhang Tingfa, recently stepped down to make way for a younger Wang Hai. Although China's naval commander Liu Huaqing will remain, other high level officers in the navy have retired in favor of younger successors.²⁸

Although the navy has concentrated on improving its "intangible infrastructure," the PLAN has also been in the forefront of PLA efforts to modernize the physical component of armed forces. In doing so, the navy has been "walking on two legs," to use a Maoist phrase. The first leg represents the Navy's effort to make its own technical improvements in existing equipment, like perhaps installing cruise missiles on Romeo submarines. (The Chinese are apparently testing cruise missiles on one Romeo submarine.) Reportedly, the PLAN also is developing the HQ-61 surface-to-air missile for installation on the *Jiandong*-class frigate and various successors for the

SS-N-2 Styx. The second leg consists of the incorporation of selected foreign technologies on older platforms—or on new ones of Chinese design, like the new frigate the PLAN is developing. Regarding foreign technology, the Chinese have expressed an interest in a full array of Western naval equipment, ranging from propulsion systems, weapons, aviation, electronics, and technical data processing. Indeed, French Super Frelon utility helicopters are being used on Dajiang-class submarine support ships, and other auxiliaries are being equipped with helicopter flight decks. Reportedly, French firms have sold two 100mm compact gun mounts and two Naja optronic directors that will be installed in two new Chinese frigates. China reportedly signed a contract to purchase U.S.-manufactured G.E. LM 2500 gas turbine engines—presumably for installation in the 2,500-ton frigate under development and in a 4,000-ton destroyer to be designed. The Chinese also seem interested in other U.S. weapon systems like the Mark 46 ASW torpedoes and Phalanx point defense system.²⁹

Indeed, the PLAN seems to be out front in forging a technological relationship with the U.S. Before becoming naval commander, Liu Huaqing had been the Vice Minister of Defense originally scheduled to visit Washington in 1981 to discuss an arms relationship with the U.S. A deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations that year led to the visit's cancellation.³⁰ However, the navy is the only branch of the PLA to host the head of a U.S. military service, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. And in return, Liu Huaqing recently visited the United States.³¹

THE CHINESE NAVY IN REGIONAL SECURITY

In this section, we will look at China's navy in relation to the Soviet Union and its ally, Vietnam, to Taiwan and to other regional issues, as well as prospects beyond the China seas.

The Soviet Threat

In a Sino-Soviet war, the Chinese believe that the Soviets' main effort would be on the ground. But the Soviet Navy might play a role in several possible scenarios. A Soviet effort to separate Xinjiang from the rest of China probably would not be followed by an amphibious landing because the province is so remote from the sea. But a Soviet attack from Mongolia might be accompanied by an amphibious landing at Tianjin in the Gulf of Bohai to capture Beijing in a pincer movement. If the Soviets invaded Manchuria, they

might also land on the Liaodong peninsula in an effort to sever the industrially important northeast from the rest of China. Interestingly, the Chinese seem to believe that the Soviets would follow up any success in northern China by seizing the Yangtze river basin after landing at Shanghai.³²

Conceivably, a Soviet amphibious assault would be preceded by an aerial bombardment, then a landing by naval infantry, perhaps supplemented by paratroops, immediately followed by a motorized infantry division. The Chinese would probably counterattack while the PLAN would no doubt concentrate on cutting off the sea lines of communication to the Soviet beach-head. (Besides helping frustrate an amphibious assault, the PLAN would probably try to complicate Soviet logistics from Europe to the Far East by forcing Soviet merchant ships to sail east of the Philippines.³³)

These concerns seem to be reflected in their exercises. For example, China reportedly conducted air and naval interception exercises in the Bohai Gulf at the height of the Ussuri crisis in 1969.³⁴ In 1981, the Chinese simulated a Soviet invasion from Mongolia.³⁵ Although the exercise mainly involved army and air forces, naval units were also said to have participated.³⁶ In January 1983, the Chinese reportedly conducted a combined arms exercise of army, navy, and air force units in the East Sea Fleet region to study anti-invasion operations.³⁷ Perhaps in related activity, an anti-airborne exercise was apparently conducted in Hubei province in June 1983.³⁸

The Chinese also see a growing threat to their southern coast from Moscow's military presence in Vietnam. China complains: "By moving northward, [Soviet naval and air] units can blockade China by sea and launch a joint converging attack on the country, with Soviet ground forces stationed along the Sino-Soviet border moving down from the north."³⁹

Beijing also sees the Soviet presence in Vietnam as part of Moscow's effort to encircle and intimidate China. During the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979, the Chinese apparently believed that a "surge" in Soviet naval and air activities in the South China Sea in support of Hanoi posed a threat to Hainan island and the Paracels. To signal their determination to defend their possessions, the Chinese mounted their first naval combined arms exercises. Since then, the Chinese have improved their naval facilities in the South China Sea and deployed additional ships, submarines, aircraft, amphibious vessels and coastal defense units to the region. Chinese marine corps

elements have apparently been deployed to Hainan and perhaps to the Paracels. In spring 1984, border skirmishes and intense shelling broke out on the Sino-Vietnamese border after Hanoi's offensive in Kampuchea spilled over into Thailand. The Soviets and Vietnamese again implicitly raised a threat to China's islands by conducting joint amphibious exercises near Cam Ranh Bay and Haiphong. Somewhat later, the Chinese raised their own threat to the Spratlys by mounting naval and amphibious movements in the area.⁴⁰

Moscow has also been helping the Vietnamese improve their naval capabilities in the South China Sea. The Soviets have provided the fledgling Vietnamese navy with Petya-class corvettes, OSA-II and Shershen-class attack craft, and BE-12 Mail ASW aircraft.⁴¹ The Soviets and the Vietnamese have also conducted joint ASW exercises to deal with the Chinese submarine threat in the South China Sea.⁴² According to one analyst: "PLA naval planners are concerned that Vietnam, with or without direct Soviet support, might decide to confront China over exclusive economic zones or the sovereignty of certain offshore islands in the South China Sea. Should such a situation develop, China would employ the appropriate level of sea, land, and air power to neutralize any aggressor's actions."⁴³

Taiwan

Although China's leaders have expressed their desire to use peaceful means to bring about the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, the Zhongnanhai has consistently refused to rule out the use of force to resolve the issue.⁴⁴

Needless to say, the Chinese navy would play a key role in any invasion of Taiwan. Taiwan's naval capabilities are limited. China's East Sea Fleet alone is superior to Taiwan's navy in submarines, missile craft, and coastal craft. Reinforced by the North and South Sea Fleets, China's navy could overwhelm Taiwan's small, but proficient naval forces. Moreover, China's naval air force substantially reinforced by the People's Liberation Army Air Force might overpower Taiwan's excellent air force by launching wave attacks and by destroying Taiwan's air fields.⁴⁵

However, it is estimated that the Chinese might need as many as 40 divisions to successfully occupy the island. But China's amphibious assault capabilities are limited both in terms of amphibious lift and in terms of

capable landing forces. Moreover, preparations for an invasion would have to be extensive. These efforts would certainly be detected. Beijing would have to take into the account the possibility that Taiwan could wreak havoc with such preparations by launching air attacks against the PRC's limited port, air field, communications, and command centers in the region. Moreover, Beijing's current efforts to develop Fujian province opposite Taiwan could be damaged if Taipei attacked industrial targets in an air campaign. The PLA would also suffer heavy losses in ships, planes, and men in any invasion of Taiwan. The financial cost of such a campaign would no doubt dwarf the expenses incurred in the PRC's costly invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Indeed, an effort against Taiwan might weaken Beijing's ability to confront the Soviet Union in the north and Vietnam in the south, while upsetting the PRC's links with Japan, ASEAN, and, of course, the United States. The Zhongnanhai would also be risking the reinsertion of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits—waters U.S. warships left in 1969 in a gesture of accommodation to Beijing.⁴⁶

Of course, there is a whole menu of limited actions that the Zhongnanhai could take against Taiwan short of an invasion. The most serious possibility is a blockade of the island by the PLAN's submarine fleet. The Chinese apparently have the capability to enforce a blockade.⁴⁷ (However, one analyst argues that the PLAN might suffer heavy losses in a blockade because PRC submarines would find it difficult to operate effectively in the limited sea space around Taiwan without interfering with other maritime traffic⁴⁸). Overt military action might also rally Taiwan's population around the Kuomintang, ending PRC hopes that popular sentiment will eventually force Taipei to negotiate reunification with Beijing. Again, intensive preparations for a blockade could precipitate an air campaign against the mainland by Taiwan's air force. In the event of a PRC move, the Taiwanese have hinted they would launch a counterblockade of the mainland.⁴⁹ A blockade then might precipitate a long, costly struggle with all the attendant political, economic, and military risks of an invasion—without necessarily forcing Taiwan to negotiate.⁵⁰ Similar considerations no doubt discourage other possible limited measures against Taipei like a PRC effort to force up insurance rates with a "paper" blockade or a PLA attack on Taiwan's offshore islands.⁵¹ Even so, a blockade, however unlikely, is a worrisome scenario.

It seems even less likely that the PLAN would be used to assert China's extensive maritime island and resource claims against U.S. friends and allies in the region. In 1974, China used its navy to seize the Paracel Islands from the South Vietnamese. However, the Chinese have been anxious to gain U.S., Japanese, and ASEAN support against the Soviet Union as well as economic

and technological aid for China's Four Modernizations. So the likelihood that China would use its navy against Western interests is rather low.⁵²

PLA Navy and the Indian Ocean

It has been suggested that the Chinese SSBNs will eventually operate in the Indian Ocean because the intermediate range CSS-NX-3 could hit Soviet European targets from there. In this scenario, Chinese SSBNs would be supported by PLAN general purpose force operating out of Pakistani ports. In this way, China's nuclear umbrella would be unmistakably extended to Pakistan, discouraging Islamabad's development of nuclear weapons.⁵³

Chinese SSBN deployments to the Indian Ocean seem highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. PLAN's unsophisticated SSBNs would be vulnerable to Soviet ASW while operating in open seas and especially while transiting to and from the Indian Ocean.⁵⁴ Despite China's first ever port calls to South Asia, Chinese SSBNs operating out of Karachi with the support of general purpose forces seem even more unlikely. Such a scenario would require a substantial diversion of PLAN's most capable forces from the defense of China proper for operations in the Indian Ocean. Besides these resource costs, China would incur substantial political costs. India and other littoral nations would probably find such Chinese involvement with Pakistan objectionable, further polarizing the subcontinent and damaging Beijing's efforts to woo New Delhi away from Moscow. Moreover, Beijing would find itself highly dependent on Islamabad's good will and the vagaries of Pakistani politics. In political, economic, and military terms, it would be more sensible for the Chinese to develop a new class of SSBNs and longer-range SLBMs than to deploy their future SSBNs to the Indian Ocean. Indeed, China, like the Soviet Union, may find that SSBNs are very valuable, but potentially vulnerable assets that require substantial divergence of general purpose forces for their protection.⁵⁵ The PLAN is more likely to deploy their SSBNs near their coast in the Bohai Gulf where they can be protected rather than in the Indian Ocean. China's SSBNs may, in fact, reinforce the PLAN's role as a coastal defense (or "contiguous seas") force.

SINO-U.S. NAVAL RELATIONS

In this section, we will look at the prospects for a Sino-U.S. naval relationship. Although the Soviet threat draws Washington and Beijing closer together, differences over other issues divide them. Yet from a strategic

perspective, the case for some military, including naval, cooperation between the U.S. and China seems to be a good one.

The growth in friendly relations since the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 have enhanced both U.S. and Chinese security. For the U.S., the benefits are obvious. U.S. forces in the Pacific are no longer tied down by a hostile China.⁵⁶ After all, the U.S. not only fought Chinese troops on the Korean peninsula between 1950 and 1953 but also became involved in the war in Vietnam, in part, to contain perceived Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia. Between 1955 and 1969, U.S. military forces, primarily naval ones, countered Chinese moves in numerous crisis incidents—including two serious ones involving Taiwan in 1954-1955 and 1958.⁵⁷ Since 1969, the Taiwan Straits have never been more peaceful. (In emergencies, Taiwanese fishing boats even find safe haven in mainland ports.⁵⁸) Beijing also seems to exercise a restraining hand on North Korean aggressiveness, while looking toward better relations with the South. Indeed, in March 1985, Beijing and Seoul amicably settled an incident involving Chinese vessels encroaching on ROK territorial waters while chasing a mutinous PLAN patrol craft.⁵⁹ (However, the Soviets have taken advantage of these developments to improve their military ties with North Korea by providing Pyongyang with MIG-23s and by conducting a highly significant naval ship visit to North Korea's port of Wonsan.⁶⁰) The Zhongnanhai is also supporting Thailand's confrontation with Vietnam over Kampuchea.⁶¹ Beijing and Tokyo have begun holding military talks.⁶² The possibility of joint Sino-Japanese military, presumably naval exercises, has been raised.⁶³ Moreover, a significant number of Soviet troops are deployed against China instead of the West.⁶⁴ Chinese forces are also countering Hanoi along the Sino-Vietnamese border, and Chinese arms are helping the guerrillas against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese in Kampuchea.⁶⁵ As a result, the U.S. has greater flexibility in responding to Soviet "hegemonism" elsewhere, especially the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region.

For Beijing, the benefits are equally obvious. China, in turn, no longer confronts a hostile United States. As one Chinese analyst puts it, security and economy rank first and second in Beijing's priorities—with ideology a distant third.⁶⁶ Friendly relations with the United States have enhanced both China's security and economic prospects. For example, the Chinese feel that involvement in the Korean War against the United States not only cost them lives and treasure but also retarded China's economic construction.⁶⁷ (Indeed, the Chinese still resent the Soviets for requiring reimbursement for Moscow's aid in the conflict.⁶⁸) Moreover, NATO in the West and the U.S. presence in

the Pacific limits the Soviet threat to China. As the Chinese point out, "there are some factors which make it difficult for the Soviet Union to wage a war against China. First, the Soviet Union needs to obtain an assurance of security from the West. Second, it will find it necessary to conduct a large-scale military mobilization because a million men (in the border area) will not be sufficient in a war with China."⁶⁹

Indeed, the Chinese apparently believe their opening to the West has countered Soviet efforts to encircle and intimidate them. As one Chinese analyst points out, "The Soviets have eventually recognized the foolishness of their past intention. China is too large, as the Soviet Union itself is, to be encircled and isolated, *much less a China with an open-door policy*."⁷⁰ Beijing is also looking to the United States and other western countries for technology, trade, and investment. Finally, China's friendly relations with the U.S. (and the sense of security they provide) have helped the Chinese ease tensions with the Soviet Union — mainly through some increase in trade and contacts.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the Chinese remain wary of the Soviets. Huan Xiang says, "It is part of the Russian psychology that they consider themselves the father while the others should be the sons. Unless the Russians change this attitude, there will not be any socialist family. Instead, a serious antagonism of interests will remain because the Soviet Union wants to gain control over other states which, however, have no desire to be controlled."⁷²

The Soviets, in turn, are concerned about the unfavorable shift in the balance of power on their eastern flank.

In the global context of implementing its imperialist policy the American ruling quarters attach great strategic military significance to the vast region of Asia and the Pacific. American strategy there hinges on the striving to buildup political and other kinds of pressure on the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and the national liberation movement.... As for U.S. global strategy, Washington continues to devote attention to the region, which it regards as closely linked with NATO activities aimed at confrontation with the Soviet Union. It is hoped to put military pressure on the USSR from another direction — the East....

* Emphasis added.

Alongside other means of achieving this [presumably, U.S. relations with Japan, other Asian states, and the U.S. military build-up], the United States feels it extremely important to build towards a durable strategic relationship with the Peoples Republic of China.⁷³

As Sun Zi (Sun Tzu) points out, the best way to counter an enemy is to frustrate his strategy – and to do so without fighting is the acme of skill.⁷⁴ As a result, the Kremlin has sought to compensate for its political failures in the region by building up its military capabilities. While U.S. strength in the Pacific declined with the end of the Vietnam War, Soviet forces in the Far East increased from about 22 divisions in 1965 to 53 divisions today, from fewer than 1,500 combat aircraft to more than 2,000, from fewer than 600 ships to more than 800.⁷⁵ The Soviets have also modernized their forces in the region to include SS-20 missiles, Backfire bombers, and Kiev-class carriers.⁷⁶ Moreover, the Soviets have not only extended their military reach further east in the Pacific but have also established a substantial military presence in Southeast Asia athwart the SLOCs between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

As students of Sun Zi, the Chinese are concerned about the growth of the Soviet navy. The Chinese have based their security on a strong NATO in the West and U.S. presence in the Pacific.⁷⁷ A Soviet capability to deny the seas to the U.S. would not only fracture NATO and U.S. alliances in the Pacific but also threaten U.S. sea lines of communication in the event of a future conflict.

As the Chinese point out:

Washington used to possess an obvious naval superiority, but the Soviet Navy has since grown, steadily through modernization, and is now able to contend with Washington all around the world. The Soviet Union can now strike North America. The superpower's rivalry over the seas will intensify with time because the sea not only constitutes an economic lifeline for the West, but serves as a vital route for troops and supplies in wartime.⁷⁸

The Chinese also see the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay in global terms:

In the event of war, Soviet naval and air units stationed in Cam Ranh Bay can set off eastward and, in cooperation with

the Soviet forces stationed in bases at home, launch a two-pronged attack from the southern and northern flanks against the U.S. 7th Fleet and the U.S. military installations in the Western Pacific. By moving southward the Soviet units in Cam Ranh Bay can promptly seize the Strait of Malacca, the strategic passage linking the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and thus cut off the oil supply line to Japan, as well as the link between the U.S. fleets deployed in the two oceans. By moving northward, these units can blockade China by sea and launch a joint converging attack on the country, with the Soviet ground forces stationed along the Sino-Soviet border moving down from the north. And, finally, by moving westward, the Soviet units from Cam Ranh Bay can enter the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region, join forces with the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, and surround Europe from its flank... This has not only strengthened its strategic posture in the Asian-Pacific region but is also of great significance to its global strategic deployment.⁷⁹

As a result, the Chinese are countering the Soviets in Vietnam and striving to improve their navy. Even so, they still have faith in the U.S. Navy's capability to deal with the Soviets. Although one Chinese analyst notes the Soviet threat to U.S. SLOCs, he also cites Admiral Crowe as saying: "In the Pacific, it's essentially a naval-air threat. Any time it's naval air, we start at less of a disadvantage. We have a great Navy, and we have a terrific Air Force. Man for man, unit for unit, the Soviets cannot match us."⁸⁰ This same analyst also sees a parallel, if independent, naval role in dealing with the Soviets:

Some of the strategists overestimate the potential of the Soviet threat with its forward bases in Vietnam.... With American bases in the Philippines in the east, Indonesian Natuna Island base in the south and the Chinese Southern fleet in the north, the sphere of actions for the Soviet naval-air detachment in Vietnam would be limited in the South China Sea.⁸¹

The Chinese seem to have adjusted their tactics on the three obstacles (Soviet military presence on the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and Soviet support for Vietnam's involvement in Kampuchea) to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations to their strategic perspective.

Recently, Deng Xiaoping suggested that the Soviets could begin removing the "three obstacles" by pressuring Hanoi to withdraw Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea while retaining Soviet bases in Vietnam.⁸² Deng's remark was rather disingenuous, however, because the Chinese know that Moscow's support for Hanoi's adventure in Kampuchea is the price the Kremlin pays for Soviet bases in Vietnam. Moreover, the question of whether or not Beijing would require the removal of Soviet bases from Southeast Asia as a future step in improving Sino-Soviet relations was left ambiguous.⁸³ Finally, the Zhongnanhai realizes that China, U.S., and ASEAN military presence limits the usefulness of Soviet bases in Vietnam at present.

Thus, a Sino-U.S. military, including naval relationship, however, limited, might have a sobering effect on Soviet truculence toward both China and the U.S. Like the rest of the PLA, the Chinese Navy's capabilities are limited, but it is large and powerful enough to complicate Soviet calculations of the "correlation of force" in the region. Sino-U.S. military ties might further complicate Moscow's calculations.

The Soviets are concerned about U.S. military ties with Beijing because they fear such ties would strengthen a relationship between their two rivals. In 1973, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev hinted to U.S. officials that a Sino-U.S. military agreement "would confuse the issue" and provoke Soviet military action against China or perhaps the U.S.⁸⁴ Although the Soviets now recognize that Sino-U.S. differences limit any Sino-U.S. military relationship, they remain concerned.

By the beginning of the 1980s..., what could be called a structure of U.S.-Chinese military contacts within the framework of general U.S.-Chinese relations had evolved.

Official spokesmen of the two countries are not inclined to advertise their military contacts.... The existing links between the military mechanisms of the two countries, a certain degree of military-political cooperation on the basis of "coincidence" or "parallelism" of interests, as well as military-technology contacts are components of the military relations between the USA and the PRC.⁸⁵

Moscow has tried to drive a wedge between the U.S. and China by alternating policies of hostility and conciliation. For example, not long after Soviet truculence in the Ussuri crisis in 1969 and the Sino-Vietnamese border

war in 1979 failed to prevent Washington and Beijing from drawing closer together, the Kremlin opened negotiations on both occasions to ease tensions with China and the U.S.⁸⁶ In a similar manner, Soviet relations with China and the U.S. had reached a low ebb in mid 1984, with Washington over U.S. deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe and with Beijing over Sino-Vietnamese border incidents and President Reagan's trip to Beijing in April 1984.⁸⁷ However, the prospect of a Sino-U.S. arms relationship as a result of an exchange of trips by Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman probably helped encourage (among other factors, especially the Strategic Defense Initiative) the Kremlin to improve relations with both the U.S. and China.⁸⁸ Since then Moscow has resumed negotiations with the U.S. over limiting nuclear weapons and even agreed to a meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev to discuss the subject.⁸⁹ At the same time, the Soviets concluded an economic agreement with the Chinese after an exchange of high-level visits – and, in the wake of the superpower summit, the Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministers scheduled trips to each others capital.⁹⁰

Thus, Sino-U.S. military ties, or at least their prospect, seem to encourage the Soviets to seek better relations with both countries – after their hostility fails. Naval relations would be particularly useful in this regard because the Sino-Soviet rivalry is most dangerous along their border. Ties between the U.S. and Chinese navies represent a less direct threat to the Soviet Union, even in terms of defensive weapons transfers. As a result, Sino-U.S. naval relations might improve Moscow's behavior without "confusing the issue." (Furthermore, such cooperation might help sustain Sino-U.S. relations in the face of any Soviet efforts to disrupt them.)

However, such cooperation makes other Asians feel uneasy, especially the Taiwanese, Indonesians, and Malaysians. As mentioned earlier, the Taiwan Straits have never been more peaceful. Beijing apparently hopes to achieve reunification with Taiwan on the model of Hong Kong – the "one country, two systems" approach. But the PRC has never abandoned the option of using force to resolve the issue. Last year Deng Xiaoping even suggested that the PRC has the power to blockade Taiwan. Since then, Beijing has backed away from that claim. In June 1985 General Secretary Hu Yaobang claimed in an interview that the PLA did not have the capability to blockade Taiwan, let alone to invade the island. Furthermore, he said that the PRC preferred to achieve reunification through peaceful means but that Beijing could not abandon the threat of force because Taipei would then have no incentive to negotiate. He refused to put any time limit on achieving

reunification, and suggested stringent conditions on the use of force against Taiwan – all masked in bellicose rhetoric. Force would be used only if a small minority stood in the way of reunification (he admitted that popular sentiment was currently against union with the mainland.) Beijing would take into consideration the reaction not only of the U.S., but also other nations, presumably Japan, ASEAN states, and even the Soviet Union concerning the use of force against Taipei. Finally, the PRC would not move unless (military and political) success were assured. Because these conditions are not likely to be fulfilled anytime soon, the Hu Yaobang interview *may* represent a considerable concession by the PRC on the issue of force vis-a-vis Taiwan.⁹¹

The Malaysians and Indonesians and other Asians are also concerned about Sino-U.S. military relationship with the PLA because they view China as a long-term threat and the Soviet Union as only a short term one. It has been suggested that a U.S. naval relationship with the PLAN would upset the naval balance in the region without appreciably improving Chinese capabilities against the Soviets.⁹² However, if the U.S. and Soviet Union are subtracted from the equation, there is no naval balance; rather, there is an imbalance that strongly favors the PRC. Chinese naval surface and subsurface capabilities as opposed to their air and projection capabilities are already greater than Taiwan and the ASEAN states.⁹³ So any U.S. aid for the PLAN's surface and subsurface capabilities must help China against the Soviet threat – since these capabilities are already so great against the other regional states.

The Chinese are also trying to improve relations with the ASEAN states.⁹⁴ (Indeed, China is willing to provide one ASEAN state, Thailand, with submarines and fast-attack craft.⁹⁵) Significantly, the Chinese tried to reassure the ASEAN states by quoting Secretary of State George Schultz's speech at the recent ASEAN-U.S. Ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur as saying,

No discussion of the prospects for peace and stability in Asia would be complete without mention of the People's Republic of China. The United States regards China as a friendly non-aligned country. On many international issues China's policy is parallel to ours, on other issues it is not. Our relationship with China is premised on the fact that the former outweighs the latter.

China's emphasis on economic modernization—an emphasis that has already produced impressive achievements—should give Beijing an additional strong stake in a stable and secure international environment...

Thus, we believe that a secure China working at modernization can be a force for peace and stability in Asia and the world. An insecure and frustrated China would not serve our interests—or yours. China's ability to defend itself against the Soviet threat is crucial to the global balance of power and to stability in East Asia.

To that end, the United States and China are cooperating in selected defensive—I stress the word 'defensive'—military areas. We are mindful of your interests. Our policy ensures that any upgrading of China's defensive capabilities will in no way jeopardize the security of our friends and allies in this region.⁹⁶

Needless to say, any arms relationship with the Chinese is also limited by their lack of foreign exchange for large arms purchase and their fear of becoming dependent on the U.S for military equipment. Moreover, the Chinese are sensitive to those aspects of a military relationship with the U.S. that might compromise their sovereignty and independence—the controversy over the U.S. port visit, for example. Finally, China's moves toward the U.S. will be limited by their fear of unduly provoking the Soviet Union. After all, the Chinese need to reduce tensions with the Soviets to achieve their ambitious goals for economic and military modernization—goals Moscow views with considerable unease.

Even so, some cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese navies seems to be in the interest of "peace and stability" in the Pacific. Whether or not the U.S. and China can surmount their differences to achieve some limited military (including naval) relationship remains an open question.

NOTES

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- [7] Ray Braybrook, "China's Naval Aviation," *Defence: China 1982*, Supplement to *Defence* (Nos. 1-2, 1982): 37-45; *Jane's Defence Weekly* (15 June 1985): 1132. DIA, *Handbook 1984*, 55-61; Swanson, *Eight Voyage*, 278. See also Weiss, *The Sea is Red*, 18.
- [8] DIA, *Handbook 1984* 55-61; Wettren, "The PLA Navy," *Defence: China 1982*, Supplement to *Defence*, (Nos. 1-2, 1982): 37-45; *Far Eastern Economic Review* (11 June 1982): 21-25; *Soviet Military Power, 1985* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense 1985), 131; See also Weiss, "The Sea is Red," 18. Chinese belief in Soviet violations of their territorial waters is apparently reflected in their desire for improved ASW capabilities. See Department of the Navy, *Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1986*, 9.
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- [10] DIA, *Handbook, 1984*, 59. *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1985-1986*, 105.
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NOTES (Continued)

- [44] There is a very interesting interview with PRC General Secretary Hu Yaobang on this subject: Hong Kong, *Pai Hsing*, (1 June 1985), *FBIS: China*, (3 June 1985): W7.
- [45] Martin L. Lasater, *The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984): 123-130.
- [46] *Ibid.*; *DIA, Handbook*, 1984, 59; Jacobs, "China's Amphibious Navy," *Asian Defence Journal* (June 1985): 34-43; Weiss, "The Sea is Red," 28-29.
- [47] David G. Muller, Jr., "A Chinese Blockade of Taiwan," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, (September 1984): 51-55.
- [48] Kenneth Bohlin, comments on Muller, "A Chinese Blockade of Taiwan," in U.S. Naval Institute, *Proceedings*, (March 1985): 87-90.
- [49] Hong Kong, *Pai Hsing*, (1 June 1985), *FBIS: China*, (3 June 1985): W8.
- [50] Martin L. Lasater and L. J. Lamb, "Taiwan: Deterrence to Remain Unchanged," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, (June 1985): 39.
- [51] *Ibid.*
- [52] Weiss, "The Sea is Red," 28-29.
- [53] Yaacov Vertzberger, "South Asia," *CDP*, 255-258.
- [54] Indeed, the Soviets are paying more attention to ASW than in the past. Perhaps, in part, in reaction to the Chinese SSBN threat? See James M. McConnell, "New Soviet Methods for Antisubmarine Warfare?" *Naval War College Review*, (July-August 1985): 16-27.
- [55] Robert G. Weinland, "The Evolution of Soviet Requirements for Naval Forces—Solving the Problems of the Early 1960s," Center for Naval Analyses Professional Paper 368 (December 1982).

NOTES (Continued)

- [56] Deputy Secretary of State, Walter J. Stoessel points out that the Reagan Administration views "China as a friendly country with which we share many common interests.... To start with, the strategic benefits that we see now—some 10 years after rapprochement—have been substantial. It is an obvious, but often overlooked and vitally important fact that the United States and China no longer face each other as hostile adversaries and no longer need to deploy forces against one another. This has made a tremendous difference to both nations and will continue to be of critical importance to planners on both sides. Walter J. Stoessel, "Developing Lasting U.S.-China Relations," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. (1 June 1982).
- [57] Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., "U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955-1978: Vol. II-Summaries of Incidents and Responses," Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution 322-Vol. II, (July 1977).
- [58] Beijing, *China Daily*, 27 July 1985, *FBIS: China*, (30 July 1985): U2.
- [59] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (4 April 1985): 10-11. However, the recent defection of a Chinese TU-16 bomber pilot to Taiwan via South Korea had a less favorable result from Beijing's view. *Washington Post*, (31 August 1985): A25. Even so, the PRC thanked South Korea for returning the plane's radio operator and the remains of a dead navigator. *Washington Post*, (15 September 1985): A21.
- [60] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (29 August 1985): 22-23.
- [61] Weiss, "The Sea is Red."
- [62] However, Xu Xin, Deputy Chief of the PLA general staff visit to Japan in return for Japan's Vice Minister of Defense Natsume Haruo's visit to Beijing in May 1985 has been postponed because of his "work on the PLA's reorganization." Tokyo, Kyodo, 16 August 1985, *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily Report Asia and the Pacific* (16 August 1985), C1. Hereafter cited as *FBIS: Asia*.

NOTES (Continued)

- [63] *Ibid.* *Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily*, (24 May 1985): 2.
- [64] *Defense of Japan, 1984*, (Tokyo, Japan: Defense Agency, 1984, 30-34.
- [65] *Asian Security 1983*, (Tokyo, Japan: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1983): 16,203. A journalist covering the mujahideen's war against the Soviets in Afghanistan noted that nearly all the weapons of the Afghans he saw were of Chinese make. *South China Morning Post*, (27 November 1985): Features-1.
- [66] Ding Xinghao of the Institute of International Relations in Shanghai in a presentation on "Chinese Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia," at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., 10 April 1985.
- [67] *Ibid.*
- [68] *Ibid.*
- [69] Statement by Chinese military leaders to Japanese reporters in September 1978. Tokyo, *Mainichi Shimbun*, (13 September 1978): 9.
- [70] Hua Di, "The Soviet Threat to the Northern Pacific Region from an Overall Point of View," unpublished paper, presentation to the symposium on "Regional Balance of Power in the Pacific Basin," sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University, Honolulu, Hawaii, (21-22 February 1985): 8-9.
- [71] Even so, Sino-Soviet trade remains a fraction of Sino-U.S. trade and is even less significant in terms of China's trade with other Western nations. Although the percentage increase in Sino-Soviet trade was up almost 40 percent in the first half of 1985, it is a small fraction of China's overall trade. Moreover, China's trade grew by 30 percent in the first half of 1985 over the first half of 1984 so the Soviet share of the China market has only increased slightly. Since China plans to continue its growing involvement in foreign trade, the Sino-Soviet trade agreement signed by Yao Yilin in July 1985 is probably less

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- significant than it seems. Beijing, Xinhua, (24 July 1985), *FBIS: China*, (26 July 1985): A1; Beijing, Xinhua, (10 July 1985), *FBIS: China*, (11 July 1985): C2-C3. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping recently said "Sino-Soviet relations have improved in the areas of border trade and culture. There is no suggestion that there is normalization in the political sphere." Beijing, *Zhongguo Xinwenshe*, (21 July 1985), *FBIS: China*, (22 July 1985): D2.
- [72] Hamburg, *Der Spiegel*, (26 December 1983), *FBIS: China*, (29 December 1983): A6. According to Gilbert Rozman, Huan Xiang represents a hard-line attitude towards the Soviets that is currently being challenged by a new school of Chinese Soviet watchers. Curiously though, Rozman's conclusion echoes Huan Xiang: "Scholarly writings on the Soviet Union cannot by themselves alter the course of Sino-Soviet relations. The burden is still on the Soviet Union to accept China as an equal, socialist partner and to conduct its military and foreign policy on the borders of China with respect for China's interests. If the Soviet side delays very long in alleviating these concerns, and if Soviet reforms do not boost the economic growth rate to provide improved grounds for optimistic assessments of Soviet prospects, time may work against positive views in China. In the tradition of Yugoslavia, the Chinese are asking the Soviet Union to accept a less centralized and more diversified socialist world." Gilbert Rozman, "China's Soviet Watchers in the 1980s: A New Era in Scholarship," *World Politics*, (4 July 1985): 474. It's worth noting Rozman's reference to Yugoslavia. It should be recalled that Soviet hegemonistic behavior not only precipitated the Cold War with the U.S. and other democratic nations after World War II but also socialist ones as well -- the Stalin-Tito split of 1948. Arguably, if the Soviets changed their behavior towards socialist states, they would also change it towards capitalist ones as well because their hegemonistic behavior is at the root of their conflict with both.
- [73] V.I. Biryukov, "China in U.S. Strategic Schemes," July-September 1984 in Moscow, *Far Eastern Affairs, USSR Report: Problems of the Far East, Joint Publications Research Service* (July-September 1984): 79. Hereafter *USSR: Far East: JPRS*.

NOTES (Continued)

- [74] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.
- [75] *Defense of Japan 1984*, 30-34.
- [76] *Ibid.*
- [77] Weiss, "The Sea is Red," 31-35.
- [78] Beijing, *Beijing Review*, (23 April 1984), *FBIS: China*, (2 May 1984): A6-A7.
- [79] Beijing, *Shijie Zhishi*, (16 March 1985), *FBIS: China*, (26 March 1985): C1.
- [80] Hua Di, "The Soviet Threat to the Northern Pacific Region," 6.
- [81] *Ibid.*, 8-9. Indeed, Hua Di's whole paper argues for the usefulness for the U.S. of strategic cooperation with China.
- [82] Beijing, Domestic Television Service, 17 April 1985, *FBIS: China*, (18 April 1985): G1.
- [83] *Ibid.*
- [84] Richard M. Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, Vol. II, (New York: Warner Books, 1978), 427-428; Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985), 168; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1982): 233.
- [85] Biryukov, "China in U.S. Strategic Schemes," 80.
- [86] Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 187; Richard M. Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, Vol. I. (New York: Warner Books, 1978), 501-504; Strobe Talbot, *End Game: The Inside Story of SALT II*, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1979): 255-256; *New York Times* (19 June

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- 1979): 1; *New York Times*, (6 June 1979): 11; *New York Times*, (24 September 1979): 1; Hong Kong, AFP, (18 September 1979), *FBIS: China*, (18 September 1979): C1; *New York Times*, (4 April 1979): 5; *New York Times*, (7 April 1979): 4; *New York Times*, (8 April 1979): 5; *New York Times*, (15 April 1979): 11. See also Weiss, "Power," 35, 72, fn 303.
- [87] Weiss, "The Sea is Red."
- [88] Arguably, the Soviets found themselves isolated from both the West Europeans and the Chinese in the face of the U.S. SDI threat, while having failed to prevent the deployment of U.S. intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe and closer Sino-U.S. military ties. So the Kremlin dispatched Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to meet with Secretary of State Schultz about resuming nuclear arms talks in early January 1985. In turn, the Soviets rescheduled Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov's trip to China to discuss economic relations for late December 1984. His visit had been indefinitely postponed in a Soviet fit of pique over Reagan's trip to China and Sino-Vietnamese border incidents in the Spring of 1984. *Washington Post* (22 November 1984): A1; *Washington Post*, (12 December 1984): A29. See also Weiss, "The Sea is Red."
- [89] *Time*, (9 September 1985): 16-33.
- [90] Beijing, Xinhua, (28 December 1984), *FBIS: China* (31 December 1984), C2; Beijing, Xinhua, (10 July 1985), *FBIS: China*, (11 July 1985): C2-C3. *Washington Post*, (13 December 1985): A1.
- [91] Tokyo, Kyodo, (11 October 1984), *FBIS: China*, (11 October 1984): D1-D2; Hong Kong, *Pai Hsing*, (1 June 1985), *FBIS: China* (3 June 1985), W5-W12.
- [92] Lasater, "The Dilemma of U.S. Arms Sales to Beijing," 5.
- [93] Curiously, Lasater himself makes this point in the case of Taiwan. Lasater, *The Taiwan Issue*, 122-130. For the other Southeast Asian navies see, *Pacific Defence Reporter 1985 Annual Reference Edition*

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(December 1984-January 1985), 139-147; Beijing, Zhongguo Xinwenshe, (21 July 1985), *FBIS: China*, (22 July 1985), D2.

- [94] Indeed the Chinese are making headway in improving their relations with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore through trade ties. Beijing, Xinhua, (11 July 1985), *FBIS: China*, (11 July 1985): E1; Beijing, Xinhua, (5 July 1985), *FBIS: China*, (8 July 1985): E5; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (5 September 1985): 16-18.
- [95] Curiously, this point is made by Bradley Hahn, "South-East Asia's Miniature Naval Arms Race," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, (September 1985): 24. Although U.S.-PRC naval relationship is mentioned as a factor, the region's naval arms race is largely a response to the Soviet maritime presence in Vietnam. Indeed, Hahn has written in favor U.S.-PRC naval relations. Hahn, "China: Emerging Sea Power," *Proceedings*, (March 1985): 107.
- [96] Beijing, Xinhua, (12 July 1985), *FBIS: China*, (15 July 1985): E1-E2.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1
CHINESE NAVAL FORCES

Submarines	Number
Xia-class SSBN	2
Golf-class SSB	1
Han-class SSN	3
Ming-class SS	2
Romeo-class SS	87
Romeo-class SSG	1
Whiskey class SS	<u>15</u>
Total	111
Principal combatants	
Destroyers	19
Frigates	<u>30</u>
Total	49
Minor combatants	
Patrol combatants	14
Amphibious warfare ships	52
Mine warfare ships	24
Coastal and roadstead patrol craft	1,004
Amphibious warfare craft	530
Mine warfare craft	<u>80</u>
Total	1,704
Support ships	
Underway replenishment ships	3
Material support ships	3
Fleet support ships	38
Other auxiliaries	88
Yard and service craft	<u>380</u>
Total	512
Total ship strength	2,376

SOURCES: Defense Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, 1984* (DIA: Washington, D.C., 1984); *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1985-1986* (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd., 1985), 92-109.

TABLE 2
CHINESE NAVAL AVIATION

Bombardment

Intermediate-range B-6/TU-16/BADGER
Medium-range B-5/IL-28/BEAGLE

Air Defense

F-5/MIG-17/FRESCO
F-6/MIG-19/FARMER
F-7/MIG-21/FISHBED

Surface Attack

A-5 FANTAN

Total: Approximately 800 aircraft

SOURCES: Defense Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, 1984* (DIA: Washington, D.C., 1984); International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1984-1985* (London: IISS, 1984): 92-93.