


OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR US PEACEKEEPING COMMANDERS
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OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR US PERCEIVING COMMAND
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OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR US PEACEKEEPING COMMANDERS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WOLF D. KUTTER, INF

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR US PEACEKEEPING COMMANDERS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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During the past decade the United States participated in a number of peacekeeping operations outside the framework of the United Nations for the attainment of US strategic political objectives. Doctrine for US peacekeeping operations involving combat forces is only now emerging, borrowing heavily on UN experiences at the tactical level. Little has been written on the politico-military considerations that bridge the gap between political strategic objectives and tactical peacekeeping measures for the conduct of such operations. This study seeks to bridge this gap by articulating a peacekeeping continuum, a theoretical model for assessing the risks of any specific peacekeeping operation, and by developing operational guidelines for US peacekeeping commanders as a tool for successful mission accomplishment.

PREFACE

This Individual Study Project was produced under the aegis of the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, US Army War College. The scope and general methodology emanated from a review of US and UN peacekeeping literature and experiences gained on the ground by the author, as part of the Multinational Force and Observers. The author is deeply appreciative of the many officers that gave freely of their time to discuss salient aspects of this study, and the librarians at Fort Campbell, Kentucky and at the Army War College who facilitated the research effort. Finally, this study is dedicated to all the US soldiers who lost their lives while serving as peacekeepers for this great nation.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

United States participation in peacekeeping operations during the past 40 years has essentially been indirect, supporting United Nations peacekeeping with funds, logistic support, or small numbers of officers detailed as observers. Our most recent experiences in the Middle East though have forced us to focus, analyze, and discuss the nature and efficacy of peacekeeping operations. These experiences have been shaped by the Sinai Field Missions, the US Marine participation in the Multinational Force, (MNF-I and MNF-II), and the US Army's XVIII Airborne Corps support of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The United States' role in these endeavors during the past decade has been outside the framework of UN peacekeeping operations. While continuing our traditional support for UN efforts, we have become a direct national participant. We have fostered the introduction of US combat forces in support of US peacekeeping objectives. In the process we have highlighted the political nature of peacekeeping operations, as well as the contributions they make to United States strategic objectives.

A study of peacekeeping reveals that a substantial body of knowledge exists by virtue of the four decades of United Nations experiences. It even includes conceptual approaches gleaned from precursor operations attempted by the League of Nations.¹ However, very little has been written by US peacekeepers, nor by those associated with the application of the peacekeeping tool toward the attainment of US strategic objectives. Consequently, a gap exists in our doctrinal,

training, and strategic literature that is only now being addressed. This paper seeks to articulate a dimension that has not been explored-- guidelines for US peacekeeping commanders. Implicit is the assumption that throughout the balance of the 20th Century, and well into the 21st, the United States is very likely to field combat formations for direct participation in peacekeeping operations. Such guidelines are intended for commanders who will have brigade or battalion level peacekeeping responsibilities. Those responsibilities are vast. They embrace both a military and a political sphere, require cross-cultural empathy, and continued reflective study of the art of peacekeeping. Thus these guidelines are not intended to be prescriptive or all encompassing, but to serve as a framework for further analysis to ensure successful peacekeeping mission accomplishment.

The United Nation's constructive role as third party peacekeeper during the past four decades highlights the theoretical foundations and limits of peacekeeping. Conflict resolution through impartial, neutral third parties to control, or de-escalate crises between states, or within a state, has been the basis for UN commitment to peacekeeping operations. Most were ad hoc, of an emergency nature, relying on the international moral authority of force, and armed presence, rather than forceful means to control conflict. As such,

UN peacekeeping is designed to end hostilities through peaceful means, thereby creating a climate within which the peace process may be successfully applied. Peacekeeping is, therefore, not the culmination of conflict, but only the beginning of a new stage of the process in the peaceful resolution of conflict.²

Ideally, it is the use of noncoercive military measures for the continuation of diplomacy. The importance of a peacekeeping force does

not lie in its numerical strength or military capacity. It lies in the political will which it represents and the diplomatic capacity of the peacekeeping members to further conciliation and de-escalation.³ Thus the underlying purpose of peacekeeping operations is to provide a suitable political climate in which political aims can be pursued through a peace process.

The setting for UN peacekeeping operations has been essentially in areas beyond the immediate dominance of superpowers. "Soft areas" on the fringes of the East-West defense alliances, "extremities" of US-USSR power zones, areas of post World War II decolonization, and new independent, unstable regimes, highlight the loci of such UN operations.⁴ Theoretically, conflicts there, as elsewhere find their roots in an ideological, religious, ethnic, economic, internal, national boundary, or military potential basis.⁵ Responding to conflict situations with such varying origins, the UN has conducted the following types of peacekeeping operations: Investigations, Cease Fire or Truce Supervision, Supervision of Withdrawals and Disengagements, Interposition between Opposing Forces, Observation and Presence, Maintenance and Patrol of a Buffer Zone, Maintenance of Law and Order, Arms Control and Disarmament, and Supervision of Prisoner of War Exchanges. While establishing credibility and enhancing the peace process, these operations were not without cost.

The Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) continued to function in the midst of the Arab-Israeli wars--1956, 1967, 1973--and demonstrated great flexibility as the situation in the respective areas changed. UNTSO military observers remained on the cease fire lines, often under fire, and performed an invaluable service as go-betweens and as the

means by which isolated incidents were contained. They suffered a number of casualties, but won and maintained a reputation for honest, objective reporting that was recognized by all, even when the findings were to the disadvantage of one of the parties.⁶ Similarly, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a buffer between Israel and the Lebanese/Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), experienced substantial casualties. In one period alone, January-June 1980, 10 soldiers were killed by hostile fire or lost their lives, while another 22 were injured.⁷ The UN peacekeeping Force In Cyprus (UNFICYP), an interposition force between Turkish and Greek communities also experienced such difficulties. But none matched the problems of the UN peacekeeping force in the Congo, Organization des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC). ONUC's initial mission in 1960, maintaining law and order, ended up in a coercive peacekeeping enforcement role to preclude Katanga from splitting off from the Congo. In the enforcement process substantial casualties were incurred while the UN's peacekeeping enforcement role became a major international issue.⁸ The ensuing debate served to highlight the interrelations between the politico-military peacekeeping process and the limits of conflict resolution by international armed third parties. Consequently, no peacekeeping enforcement missions have been attempted by the United Nations since ONUC.

Throughout these UN experiences extensive efforts were made to capture "lessons learned" to form the basis of doctrine for future UN peacekeeping operations. The results reflected the will of the international community favoring noncoercive operations as the only

acceptable endeavor for UN peacekeepers. The key doctrinal principles that emerged stipulate the following:

- a. The cooperation and support of the parties to the dispute.
- b. The political support of a portion of the international community, including the two superpowers, but at a minimum the support of the United States.
- c. A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission.
- d. Sufficient freedom of movement for the force, or observers to carry out their responsibilities.
- e. An effective communications, command, and control system.
- f. Suitable, impartial, noncoercive forces.⁹

An analysis of peacekeeping failures, such as the premature withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF-I) in 1967 or the inappropriate mandate for the US Marine (MNF-II) in 1983, highlight the validity of these principles, the need to carefully study them, and to relate them to the specific peacekeeping environment once peacekeeping forces are committed. Each of these six principles has a dynamic of its own. Together they constitute a collective risk function which impacts on the potential for success of any given peacekeeping operation. That is, if the parties to a dispute are willing to accept a peacekeeping force, a realistic mission is given to that force and it is recognized as impartial, then the likelihood for mitigating conflict and facilitating the peace process is indeed high. Crucial is the consent of the disputing countries, their internal cohesion, and their political aims. Aims, cohesion, and consent may all prove to be dynamic over time and therein lies the risk--risk not only for potential failure of the

peacekeeping operation, but also risk to the peacekeeping force itself in terms of loss of life due to hostile actions.

Within the context of the American experience, particularly when we operate outside the framework of UN sponsored peacekeeping operations, it becomes critical to carefully analyze the impact of these principles on a specific peacekeeping situation. When US combat forces are involved as peacekeepers, then inexorably linked to them also are American will, strategy, and national objectives in a most visible manner. This visibility in the court of world opinion and the American public tends to sharpen the edge between success and failure in such peacekeeping operations. Thus "US peacekeeping operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to restore, achieve, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict" may well be an interim political solution that could constitute a potential disaster without possessing an inherent formula for a long-term solution.¹⁰

CHAPTER 2

THE PEACEKEEPING CONTINUUM

Construction of a peacekeeping continuum will facilitate understanding of both the political dynamics for conflict resolution, and the types of operations to be conducted.


THE PEACE KEEPING CONTINUUM



On one end of the scale are peace observation missions, on the other end peace enforcement, with the center of this scale representing peace-keeping presence operations. Third party, credible moral authority is vested in peace observer missions. Few in number, lightly armed--if at all, such as found in UNTSO or in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNOMOGIP), these observers reflect the left


end of the continuum. Peacekeeping presence, the center of the scale, represents the noncoercive nature of military units participating in such operations. These may be company to brigade level forces with guarantee, interposition, or buffer missions. Their mission is achieved through impartial presence, precise information flow to all parties, tact and diplomacy, and use of force purely as a last resort in self-defense. On the other end of the scale are peace enforcement missions with still larger military units in which specific use of force to achieve peacekeeping objectives is authorized. Peacekeeping enforcement missions encompassed ONUC's Congo operation, the US-Organization of American States' involvement in the Dominican Republic (1965), and US operations in Lebanon in 1983-1984.¹¹ The peacekeeping continuum scale can thus be overlaid with a parallel continuum depicting impartiality and the use of force.

THE PEACE KEEPING CONTINUUM



One can readily perceive that there is a basic dividing line between third party impartiality and the use of force. One can also argue that the dynamic of using force by peacekeepers, once unleashed, places them also in a disputing party role and lifts the mantle of third party neutrality. More and more force may have to be used to control conflict and thus one becomes part of the conflict. In the Dominican Republic, superior peacekeeping forces permitted the Gadoy government to coalesce, grow, and hand over the political reins to the broad based Balaguer government. In Lebanon unfortunately limited military means were unable to attain major political objectives once the shooting started.¹² Clearly the US Marines preferred to be third party neutrals, but they were not perceived as such after April 1983, and tragic consequences resulted. From our parallel continuum standpoint it can thus be highlighted that such use of force, falling between presence and enforcement operations can unleash dynamics that can have far-reaching political and strategic consequences. For the UN since ONUC, it has meant to avoid peacekeeping enforcement operations,--for the United States,--a precipitous withdrawal from Lebanon and all the attendant domestic handwringing over this political failure.


There is also a special risk/peace-process relationship over time for any peacekeeping operation. This can be portrayed graphically as follows:



The six aforementioned principles collectively constitute the risk function, are tied to the peace process, and are then related to a time dimension. An assessment can thus be made for any specific peacekeeping operation in terms of risks associated with it. A peace process that is stalemated, with portions of the six principles not met, raises the risks for potential failure in the first time period. But, as new diplomatic initiatives take hold, the six principles are more fully adhered to, then the chances for peacekeeping success increase in the second time period. This risk/peace process to time relationship can be tied back to the peacekeeping operations and use-of-force continuums. The risks may have become so large in an observation mission, that a larger force is required to lend credence to a presence

mission. Conversely, an enforcement mission that is effective by stilling violence and permitting the peace process to unfold may over time be reduced to a peacekeeping observer operation. The below cited macro model thus

THE PEACE KEEPING CONTINUUM



constitutes a framework for analyzing any specific peacekeeping situation and lends itself toward identifying potential crises that a US peacekeeping commander may face. It is within this context then that operational guidelines are suggested.

CHAPTER 3

EVALUATE POLITICO-MILITARY ENVIRONMENT AND FORMULATE THE PEACEKEEPING OBJECTIVES

Recognizing that peacekeeping operations are essentially political extensions of conflict resolution and the peace process, three fundamental questions come to mind. Where are we in the peace process? To what extent is the risk dimension, i.e., the principles adhered to? And, what is the nature of the proposed peacekeeping operation in terms of the use of force?

With respect to the peace process and the MFO peacekeeping operation for example, a focus on the resolution of disputed Taba, status of negotiations between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, and Egypt's pre-eminence within the Arab world all are factors. Consequently, any new diplomatic initiatives between President Mubarek of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan are worthy of careful consideration. A positive forward momentum in the peace process would suggest a conducive peacekeeping environment in which all parties would adhere to the mandate, however, this may also unleash the forces of frustrated political splinter groups. The risks associated with the peacekeeping principles should then be evaluated to the extent they have been satisfied. A clear and specific mandate, underwritten by broadly based political support, and accepted by cohesive host governments is obviously far preferable to the obverse. Yet, the warning bells did not ring for US decision makers during the execution of MNF-II. The last dimension, the evaluation of the horizontal peacekeeping spectrum suggests that the use of force and the number of troops available to

accomplish the stipulated peacekeeping objective are the critical components. Thus general compliance by the parties to a dispute warrants that force is used by peacekeepers only when directly threatened and in self-defense. On the other hand, as we move from peacekeeping presence to peace enforcement, the use of force to preserve peace is far more likely. The dilemma for the peacekeeping commander arises from the fact that his mission calls for presence, use of force last resort, when the reality of the situation may dictate measures under peace enforcement, tactical dispersion, and immediate return of fire when fired upon. Worse yet, when involved in US unilateral peacekeeping operations, such decisions may be vested in the National Command Authority, vice the ground commander.

The evaluation of the current or prospective peacekeeping environment should not stop there. It warrants continuous appraisal. Incidents such as Ras-Burqa (where innocent Israeli tourists were killed by an Egyptian policeman), the Achille Lauro, or the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis--all impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process. In turn US peacekeeping forces assigned to the MFO may be affected by frustrated Arabs. Similarly the political decision by the National Command Authority to rebuild the Lebanese Army had far reaching disastrous consequences for Marine 'peacekeepers' at the Beirut airport. That is, the first principle, to have the cooperation and support of all the parties to the dispute, evaporated.¹³ And, in the process of losing that support, the Marines' peacekeeping presence turned into a peacekeeping enforcement operation with full-scale company-level firefights.¹⁴ The lesson to be gleaned from this is that when the peace process, or the critical principles, trigger dramatic changes,

they impact on the nature of the ongoing peacekeeping operation and shift it on the peacekeeping continuum. A shift to the right, toward peacekeeping enforcement, means that limited military forces originally sufficient to execute a peacekeeping mission become inadequate for enforcement operations to achieve political aims. Conversely, a successful military buffer operation tied to substantial political progress can entail the reduction of forces to a point where unarmed observers complete the peacekeeping mission.

There is also considerable value in researching the original basis for commitment of US troops to peacekeeping operations. A rapid Presidential decision under Lyndon Johnson to conduct peacekeeping operations in the Dominican Republic is one thing, the ratification process under the War Powers Resolution Act for support of the MFO quite another.¹⁵ The former left itself wide open for criticism by the Fourth estate, the latter at least built support among the duly elected representatives of the American people. Thus political preconditions, Congressional ratification discussion, and articulated Executive Branch aims are important to recognize by the US peacekeeping commander. (Note: If for no other reason than to be able to comment on the key issues raised by Congress when congressional staffers visit and want to clarify them.)

Lastly, one can suggest that decision point benchmarks can be constructed after such a careful evaluation of the politico-military environment. The purpose of such benchmarks is not only to anticipate contingencies, but also to begin the focus on preventive measures to ensure the success of the peacekeeping objectives. For example, the extent that factions within a disputant's population perceive a US

peacekeeper as neutral will constitute such a decision benchmark. In turn, formulated peacekeeping mission objectives are restated in terms of operational requirements.

CHAPTER 4

ASSESS AND DETERMINE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE PEACEKEEPING SPECTRUM

Operational requirements emanate from a careful analysis of the diplomatic-political environment, the status of the peace process, the type of peacekeeping operation mandated, and specified and implied peacekeeping mission objectives. Peacekeeping objectives vary dramatically in relation to the peacekeeping spectrum. For example, objectives and operational requirements under peace enforcement parallel conventional military operations. They can be couched in terms of the use of force in time, space, and center of gravity. But, that is not the case for peace observation missions. The further left one moves on the peacekeeping spectrum, the more important are the requirements associated with third party impartiality, moral force vice the use of force, negotiations with disputant military forces, relations with the local population, and a strong, accurate reporting system. Preserving immunity, freedom of movement, and legitimacy in the eyes of the disputants becomes a major operational imperative. Similarly, as one moves from observation/investigation missions executed by a few responsible officer observers to battalion sized peacekeeping forces for buffer operations, another set of operational requirements emerges. Again, impartiality and the use of force solely for self defense are prerequisites, but more is expected. The quality of the communications, command, and control system may constitute a primary operational imperative, as well as discipline, professionalism, and inferred respect by the disputants for the peacekeepers' combat capability and physical

fitness. In essence peacekeeping force credibility is measured on a daily basis by many eyes, both by the disputants military or security forces, as well as the local population. Within this context there is little room for error, and so truly the brightest and best personnel are requested for such operations.

Another facet is the quality of the peacekeeping organization itself. A multinational force under the command of a third party senior general officer with an international staff is one thing, a unilateral, or semiunilateral force is quite another. Recognizing that peacekeeping operations are political operations, it becomes self-evident that contacts with the diplomatic community, higher command structures, and disputant government officials are the norm rather than the exception. Thus US peacekeeping force commanders require considerable sophistication to handle the queries of a visiting Prime Minister on one day, and on the next the probing questions from a senior US congressional staffer. With these responsibilities, plus those emanating from operational considerations, augmentations to the basic force structure may be warranted. These may consist of Foreign Area Specialists, Linguists, Engineers, Satellite Communicators, Intrusion Specialists, Public Affairs, Liaison Personnel, Counter Terrorist and Intelligence Specialists, etc.

Finally, if a third party Force Commander has been appointed and US forces are assigned, then a careful delineation must be made as to the reporting of incidents, violations, negotiation or adjudication responsibilities, and the scope of controlled responses to incidents involving US peacekeepers. Sovereignty decisions, critical detention power decisions, and methods of dealing with the population and

infiltrators in buffer operations become equally crucial. The final outcome of the operational requirements assessment is to determine specific measures that must be taken for successful peacekeeping mission accomplishment. Ideally an all inclusive, broad operational concept, easily understood by all, yet with sufficient specificity is desired.

CHAPTER 5

PRESERVE TIGERS AND NURTURE PUSSYCATS

Our national experience with peacekeeping operations has placed a focus on the dichotomy arising out of using highly trained combat formations for peacekeeping operations. Basically, "the peace soldier is one who is able to subscribe to the precepts of absolute minimal force, reliance on compromise and negotiation, and the recognition of the elusiveness of permanent political solutions."¹⁶ In contrast, the combat soldier applies aggressive violence to achieve a military end. Thus the dichotomy in skills at the soldier level, and the mindset at the leader level, place an extraordinary demand on all peacekeepers. For that very reason nations such as Canada, Norway, and Sweden have specifically trained, equipped, and officered peacekeeping forces. One could argue that the United States should do the same, given the likelihood of continued participation in peacekeeping operations requiring battalion to brigade formations.

Operational commanders then are indeed faced with a dilemma of turning 'tigers' into 'pussycats.' Examining the dichotomy between combat soldier and peacekeeper skills improves our understanding of the training and retraining issues that emanate from such missions. For the officer-observer, operating on the left side of the peacekeeping continuum, self-defense weapons are carried, or he may be totally unarmed. The real weapons he carries are precise impartial observations and reporting, reasoning, persuasion, tact, and diplomacy skills. For peacekeeping soldiers engaged in interposition, buffer, or presence

operations, the initial prerequisite is an understanding of each disputant's customs, mores, and sources of conflict, so that they can avoid inadvertent offensive cross-cultural actions. In these types of operations it can be expected that our soldiers are thrust not only between two forces geographically, but may also constitute a buffer between two dissimilar cultures. Additionally, no peacekeeping force can APPEAR to prefer one side over the other and thus find itself almost totally excluded from any social contact with the local population. Just being PERCEIVED as partial to one side or the other may entail the loss of cooperation, confidence in impartial presence, and trust that is vital for the peace process to continue. Consequently, complex instructions, detailed rules of engagement, and controlled response to centralized direction characterize such peacekeeping operations. This naturally is the exact reverse from combat operations where initiative, risk taking, aggressiveness and mission orders are prized. The peacekeeping leadership must therefore master the art of translating the political goals of peacekeeping into concrete terms that soldiers can understand and adhere to.

Social research and operational peacekeeping experiences conclusively demonstrate that highly disciplined, professional, and well led combat formations can adapt rather quickly and master flawless execution of peacekeeping missions. It is helpful to recognize that premission training prepares the soldier and his leaders psychologically. Once onsite, it needs to be followed up with continued mission training. Finally, when released from the peacekeeping role, key combat skills need to be rehoned that could not be maintained during the peacekeeping operation.

Peacekeeping training can be further subdivided into soldier, junior leader, and senior leader programs. For example, soldiers ought to be given a mission handbook, instructed on the background of the disputants, their population, customs and mores. Rules of engagement and critical mission tasks require special emphasis. The latter may include driver, generator, survival, map reading, and observation training. The former may entail memorization of the rules of engagement and careful followup to ensure soldiers clearly understand the rules precisely. Junior leaders must be capable of teaching the aforementioned subjects and carefully read, understand, and review peacekeeping mission standing operations procedures (SOP's). They may even require special leadership instruction on how to handle 24 hour, around the clock operations in an isolated outpost with no other leadership present. This may entail altering leadership styles and require organizational abilities that a young sergeant has not yet acquired. For senior leaders the training issues center around the correct balance between pure peacekeeping mission requirements and follow-on combat training requirements. These leaders must accept only the highest professional standards, and infuse the organization with a sense of pride in mission and training accomplishments. Wargaming what-ifs such as confrontations, negotiations, loss of life and limb, dealing with infiltrators, population or tourists, or water and sanitation emergencies--all have a high payoff. Recognizing that it is the junior officers and senior NCO leadership that reinforces high standards in professionalism, mission execution and training, requires that time be set aside for continued listening and coaching. It is there that the

contingencies are reviewed. It is through this training that junior leaders enhance their ability to assess situations and potential dangers that may compromise third party impartiality.

Thus part of peacekeeping commandership entails dealing with perceptions, norms, and values of aggressive tigers that are required to become highly disciplined, self-reliant, and resolute peacekeepers. If well led, soldiers will invariably take great pride in their unit and in carrying out their assigned peacekeeping orders. Indeed a unit forges a professional aura and special psychological edge that tends to have a very salutary effect on the disputant parties. This psychological edge needs to be nurtured at all times. It encompasses the way observations are reported, resupply is conducted, outposts are maintained, and impartiality is reinforced. It constitutes that special psychological "defensive" armor that facilitates success and gives added moral authority to the peacekeeper in his role as neutral third party that uses weapons only in self-defense. Additional credibility can be fostered through bayonet training, physical training, and live fire exercises at squad and platoon level. These tend to reinforce the authority of the junior chain of command and preserve the potential bite of the tiger.¹⁷ If properly executed, the meaning of that resolute professional capability will not be lost on the disputants.

CHAPTER 6

TAKE CARE OF SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES

For the individual soldier, peacekeeping duties entail a 24-hour, around the clock commitment until his unit rotates back to home station. From an Army standpoint we should insist that soldiers engaged in actual peacekeeping duties (as opposed to logisticians supporting peacekeeping operations) be limited to 180 day deployments. The initial reason is loss of collective training skills, but the paramount one is the stress, isolation, and boredom entailed by such missions. Extensive research demonstrates the basis for this rationale.¹⁸ For the US peacekeeping force commander the issue becomes one of squarely facing the fact that these conditions will occur and developing a strategy to mitigate them. Institutionally the initial reaction may well be to create work to fill a soldier's day. However, this may be construed as "make work" or "make play" to the detriment of mission execution. Consequently, a strategy that focuses and articulates PERSONAL and PROFESSIONAL GROWTH, and provides "private" time when feasible, will pay tremendous dividends.¹⁹ Even when dispersed over hundreds of kilometers in the Sinai, Egypt, a quality education program can be conducted (from internal resources) that provides for GED completion, college courses, correspondence courses and BSEP completion--all for the express purpose of increasing promotion points. Correspondingly, a focus on those skills that lead to skill badge awards (Marksmanship, Expert Infantry Badge, Expert Field Medical Badge) with promotion point impact pays tremendous dividends. Add to that appropriate awards recognition for

superb leadership or followership, and the soldier will quickly recognize the meaning of personal and professional growth.

Dealing with loneliness and isolation may entail enlisting the aid of a caring social worker as an augmentee to the force. He will not only be able to help the individual soldier, but also assist the leadership in coping with such problems. Neither should the spiritual needs be neglected. The most welcome sight on a forsaken, or hotly disputed outpost may be the chaplain! In turn it may be the chaplain and the social worker who will recommend personnel or leadership adjustments for the benefit of squad or platoon cohesion.²⁰

Forthrightness in explaining the need for exceptional sanitation programs and rigorous enforcement of safety procedures, particularly when conducting peacekeeping operations in an underdeveloped region of the world will ultimately earn the respect of the soldiers. So will any measures taken to improve his habitat and a conscious effort to PROMPTLY deliver mail from home. Soldiers will hunger for news and will want to have world events interpreted to them. Consequently, exceptional efforts must be made since events impacting on the peace process may in turn affect their peacekeeping duties.²¹

Building support at home, and taking care of the families once deployed can also have a tremendous boost for soldier morale. It should be recognized that once a US peacekeeping force is committed, the families of those soldiers also serve. They will be the first ones to ask for amplifying information. They will want to assess the risks associated with the mission, and have a firm grip on ways of communicating with their spouses, or sons and daughters. Thus, special efforts are recommended. A home station Family Support Group is

warranted, as well as adequate family member predeployment preparations.²² Finally, taking advantage of cross-cultural opportunities by participating in peacekeeping force sponsored tours or exchange programs among member nations in a multinational peacekeeping force setting contributes to the intense pride soldiers exhibit in their peacekeeping service, and love for country.

CHAPTER 7

EXPECT TENSIONS AND PITFALLS

Tensions will indeed occur that deserve special emphasis by a US peacekeeping commander. These fall into three categories: 1. Tension between the political concept, and the actual conditions on the ground. That is, the politico-diplomatic ends of the peacekeeping force simply may not be adequately reconciled with the military means at hand to achieve the professed purpose. This may be due to changing conditions that senior decision makers are either being shielded from, or do not want to accept. 2. In a multinational force setting, tensions between a force headquarters and its assigned US contingent. Invariably such a headquarters will have a European staff bias, a multinational flavor, and penchant by virtue of its diverse staff members' background, to bureaucratize all actions into concrete procedures. Elite US combat formations tend to pursue staff actions and problems aggressively. This aggressiveness, however, provides the seeds for tensions. Care must be taken to couch requests or actions in terms of previously issued force orders or SOP's. Interestingly enough, one may find that the staff is surprised that US peacekeeping commanders actually comply with orders, while other contingent commanders simply ignore them. Given a double standard, it still behooves compliance, if for no other reason than that is what is expected of professionals with high standards. 3. Tensions within one's own organization. These may be triggered by double standards clearly visible within the force, or expectations on the part of the force commander or his international staff that may not be in consonance with our national or professional experience. For example,

we prize athletic equipment in remote areas to build cohesion, esprit,-- and for its entertainment value. Concern for athletic equipment is not necessarily shared by officers with European backgrounds.²³

Pitfalls are generated by information stove pipes, force staff officers that can say NO, lack of intelligence, or even lack of support for increased security measures when facing potential terrorist threats. Consequently, a careful assessment must be made of forcefulness and speed of action, versus benign neglect that can be healed with time. Further, development of personal contacts may well be a premier requirement. These tend to have an inordinate value when judgments are passed out if ongoing peacekeeping situations have been 'correctly handled.'

CHAPTER 8

RESPOND TO SITUATIONS AND EXPECT THE TOUGH ONES

An even cursory analysis of peacekeeping operations suggests the requirement to expect tough situations and then develop techniques to deal with them. The realization must be accepted by the peacekeeping commander that certain situations can be anticipated, simulation exercises can be conducted, and guidance can be articulated prior to such events occurring. What follows then is not necessarily a catalog of potential situations, but enough to suggest follow-on research of UNIFIL, UNIFCYP, or International Peace Academy Lessons Learned.²⁴

Entrapment, encroachment, and discredit--are three means that have been historically used by disputants to test a peacekeeping forces' capabilities, organizational acumen, and patience. These three generic situations may have been contrived to demonstrate if a peacekeeping force is truly impartial, will use their weapons in self-defense, and is capable of accurate information flow, negotiation, and mediation. For example, the Israelis actually entrapped a young US officer in the contested area of Taba by suggesting he see the wonderful view of the Gulf of Aquaba from the top of the Sonesta hotel. Unfortunately, this action was subsequently touted by local Israeli officials as an MFO and US sanction to substantiate their claim for Taba. On the part of the Egyptians the reaction was muted, but stature had been lost. One should therefore expect "trial testing balloons" by disputants to gauge a peacekeeping force's reactions. If then the peacekeeping force is rotated every six months, the disputants have a clear advantage by virtue of experience and continuity. They also have by then an

expectation of what a peacekeeping force is supposed to do. To further demonstrate that point, the Israelis have in the past made a deliberate incursion into the MFO's Zone C airspace, which is also Egypt's airspace, simply to test the US battalion's reporting procedures--within the first month that a new US battalion conducts peacekeeping operations.

Sovereignty and its derivative--freedom of movement--have over the decades caused peacekeeping commanders considerable concern. To have a fence moved 60 feet at the MFO South Camp, required the approval of the most senior Egyptian bureaucracy in Cairo. Another example involved water--the most critical resource in the Sinai desert. The US has a small desalination plant at Nuweiba, Egypt. Egyptian perception was that this water, produced in Egypt, and transported by an MFO vehicle through Israel to the adjacent Colombian battalion peacekeeping sector, impinged on their sovereignty. Substantial negotiations were required to reach an understanding on this issue. Similarly, any efforts by disputants to curb "freedom of movement" by such an innocent method as issuance of a LOCAL pass, should be vigorously resisted. Accepting such a pass implies acceptance of a sovereign right, which a few weeks later may be applied capriciously by the central government.

When actions do occur that highlight one side's or the other's attempt to violate truce, armistice, or withdrawal provisions, a clearly defined mechanism should be set up to report, evaluate, judge, and then possibly counter such actions. A suggested method is to label all such actions as "incidents" throughout the reporting system. Since both disputants invariably listen in on the peacekeeping communications systems, this tends to help maintain a professionally calm atmosphere,

rather than fuel inflamed passions. Only the most senior force peacekeeping officials should make the judgment that an "incident" is in fact a "violation." Such violations may then be passed to a "Joint Commission" for immediate resolution.²⁵

The act of rendering assistance can be a tough one. An accident involving innocent tourists can by virtue of peacekeeping force assistance become an international incident. Pursuing a policy of providing assistance only when "life or limb" are at stake may still imply unacceptable involvement in the eyes of one of the disputants by virtue of cultural attitudes toward life, medical care, and observing bureaucratic principles. Similarly, one's own peacekeeping force headquarters may not offer acceptable negotiation positions or mediation services. If contract civilians, initially under the peacekeeping commander's care, are required to be turned over to a disputant side and are known to be classified as "infiltrators," one tends to cast doubt on such orders, particularly if a previous "infiltrator" mysteriously died while incarcerated.²⁶

The recognition throughout this process of responding to situations and expecting the Tough Ones ought to be the concept of nurturing the peace process. That is, the peace process can be arrested, set back, or totally broken off by the actions of a peacekeeping force. Correct handling of key situations becomes profoundly important to continue to build trust, set aside disputant apprehension, and maintaining--even enhancing--peacekeeping force credibility. There may indeed be a price in this. Casualties due to accidents or firefights must be expected. No, all peacekeeping environments will be as benign as the MFO. UNIFIL's extensive casualties highlight a peacekeeping commander's dilemma

between mission accomplishment and loss of soldiers due to disputant actions--all for the cause of peace. For US commanders the task of marshalling expeditious medical care for injured in remote peacekeeping areas is a very special challenge. Consequently, a seriously injured, or dead soldier drill is a must.²⁷ Such drills ensure that the medical evacuation channel is rehearsed, standby cross border clearances are exercised, and appropriate officials are notified.

CHAPTER 7

OPPORTUNITIES NOT TO BE MISSED

Virtually every peacekeeping operation that the United States ground forces have been involved in, has entailed special relationships with contingents from other nations. Our recent experiences in the Sinai, Egypt, and in Beirut, Lebanon are no exception and place emphasis on the role US peacekeeping commanders have in this regard.²⁸ In fact guidance from the highest US political levels may well be to foster intercontingent relations when in a multinational peacekeeping setting. Implementing such guidance can lead to some very interesting experiences, that ultimately end up to be treasured opportunities for soldiers and commanders alike. Thus this is one area where these challenges are not to be missed!

Social requirements in this kind of milieu may, however, tax a commander. Ambassadors, defense ministers, senior political aides, and numerous generals tend to visit US peacekeeping operations. The uninitiated will quickly learn that hosting is an art in itself and one that we do little to prepare our peacekeeping commanders. Further, most of these visits are tied to higher political purposes, such as the peace process, or international consensus for the peace process. It pays to be reflective prior to hosting such VIP visits. Similarly, visits by political or defense figures of the disputant nations may have substantial significance that ultimately may impact on the safety of the US peacekeeping force. All of these visitors may provide clues as to the state of the peace process and the attendant risk factors.

Consequently, such visits should never be viewed as a burdens, but as opportunities for successful mission accomplishment.²⁹

CHAPTER 10

PRESERVE THE SAFETY OF THE COMMAND

Any careful reading of the Long Commission report, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger's fourth criterion for the commitment of US forces, will demonstrate the special requirement levied on US peacekeeping commanders to provide for the safety of their command.³⁰ Implicit in peacekeeping operation must be the recognition that for the US such operations are potentially high risk ventures. State sponsored terrorism, frustrated terrorist splinter groups, or covert operations by disputants--all can lead to massive US casualties. We must recognize that this kind of threat is serious and will not abate in the immediate future. Consequently, one can be on the benign end of the peacekeeping continuum, have no 'enemies,' yet still be subject to terrorist attacks. Within a multinational peacekeeping setting, a US commander should endeavor to foster a multinational approach in all his actions toward the disputants, the population, and even within the overall force context. By making visible several member nations of a peacekeeping force, vice US presence, by insisting that one speaks for peacekeeping "force" interests, vice a US battalion interest, and by scrupulously adhering to a mantle of third party impartiality, one enhances the safety of the command.

One can get lulled into a false sense of security. Soldiers on pass for example in Eilat, Cairo, or Tel Aviv are vulnerable and provisions must be made to control and protect them. This is not easy, particularly since some peacekeeping operations are NOT authorized to collect intelligence information. Consequently, a special effort must

be made to develop social contacts among disputants that might be helpful in identifying potential threats. Additionally, a careful review of passive security measures is warranted on a periodic basis. Changing guard, barrier, outpost, reinforcement, patrol, light and aerial patterns is key for security enhancements. Carefully interpreting local, national, and international events may suggest increased alert measures long before a higher Force headquarters orders them. For the latter the bias is to avoid projecting increased military preparedness because the multinational force has "no enemies," only the US battalion does. Thus a substantial dilemma can exist that places a special burden on the US peacekeeping commander.³¹ This can get further complicated when, for example, in responses to Holy Jihad threats, US peacekeepers in the Sinai increase security measures. Egyptians in the area however perceive these measures as loss of face. To them we appear to challenge their country's ability to maintain the security and safety of US soldiers in the Sinai.

CHAPTER 11

RECOGNIZE THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA

The impact of the media, the fourth estate, on peacekeeping operations should never be underestimated. By their very prerogative to question all facets of a US sponsored and participated peacekeeping operation a US peacekeeping commander must be mentally, psychologically, and organizationally prepared to deal with them.³² If any lesson can be drawn from the Beirut bombings, the Red Sea Mining, TWA Flight 874, and the Arrow Air Crash at Gander, New Foundland it is that the media will pursue any angle that is newsworthy, to include the rationale for administration peacekeeping policies or practices. Once the public questioning begins to gather consensus, the congressional investigative committee process surely follows. Those hearings too will be duly reported, along with the ultimate findings that are issued by the committees, or appointed commissions. In essence, the media has tremendous impact on policy makers who may have committed peacekeeping forces to a trouble spot of the world. The policymakers may not have had the time to build a consensus between the Administration, Congress, and the American Public needed for such a commitment of forces. Consequently, whatever consensus does exist may be fragile, or flawed. The precipitous withdrawal of the Marines following the Beirut bombing amply demonstrates this.

The issue of US peacekeeping commanders dealing with the media is thus far more dramatic when examined in the light of a fragile consensus within the United States for a particular peacekeeping operation. It must be recognized that the American people simply do not suffer

casualties amongst their soldiers lightly. Any such casualties become instant news. Incumbent on the peacekeeping commander is the requirement to do everything in his power to preclude such casualties. Stress on safety, and a stress to project a third party, impartial peacekeeping role is thus absolutely paramount. Otherwise the American Will to accept such casualties will directly collide with the Administration's Will to facilitate a peace process.

CHAPTER 12

CONCLUSIONS

US involvement in peacekeeping operations with combat forces highlights to each participating soldier the sense and commitment this nation has for its deepest moral values. Soldiers thus willingly endure and serve with pride. However, such service is fraught with risks unparalleled in the experience of US commanders at the battalion/brigade operational level. It is at this operational level that the linkage to the political end of peacekeeping objectives, and the national strategic objectives are clearly evident. The intermeshing of political, diplomatic, and military concerns require unparalleled sophistication, and a highly disciplined, unflappable force. Recognition of this politico-military linkage and the nuances of the peacekeeping environment are crucial for successful mission accomplishment. Most important is the ability to conduct a risk assessment and relate it to the peacekeeping continuum. It is THAT analytical outcome that structures subsequent decisions and guidance to soldiers and leaders within the command, the interrelationships with disputants, other multinational contingents, diplomats, and any force headquarters. Ultimately it must be recognized that a peacekeeping force cannot by itself resolve conflict, but it can manage conflict by quieting things down. It can lower the level of hostilities and prevent further loss of life and property. But, it cannot resolve the problems that caused the conflict. Thus, we are inevitably tied to a political peace process

which in itself is dynamic, may last years, and requires continued risk reassessment.

During the past decade of US direct involvement in peacekeeping operations the myth may have been born that successful peacekeeping operations can be conducted outside the purview of the United Nations and the international will it represents. One points to the success of the Sinai Field Missions and the Multinational Force and Observers as potentially significant models for future regional peacekeeping operations sponsored under the aegis of the United States. Both of these operations had the clear consent and adherence by the disputants. In fact, the MFO operation was implemented AFTER the Israeli-Egypt peace treaty had been signed. Thus stilling conflict while a peace process was in progress was not the issue. Only in the larger context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process articulated in the Camp David Accords does the MFO peacekeeping operation fit the essence and rationale for such operations. Here the "UN international will" was substituted by the will of the US and ten other nations to give the soldiers on the ground the psychological mantle for the conduct of operations. MFO operations are conducted within the most comprehensively codified framework ever devised to ensure success. Consequently, hastily conceived peacekeeping operations to mitigate conflict are more likely to take place. For US commanders of such operations the risks will be inherently far greater, and for them guidelines set forth in this article may potentially be more appropriate. And, the risk assessment model of the peacekeeping continuum may provide a framework for analysis, and guideposts for action.

A final note of caution, worthy of consideration by all US peacekeeping commanders, was best expressed by a senior UN officer who commented on the 'superstitious belief in the magic of mere UN presence' by stating:

Soldiers and their political masters see seldom eye to eye on the aims and tasks, and definitely not on the means and methods in the field. When soldiering and politics meet on a more or less ill-defined and impossible mission, the political decisions easily become tantamount to self-deception and the soldiers are left in the lurch.³³

Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in his "The Uses of Military Power" gives special meaning to the following, particularly in the aftermath of the Beirut bombing when he stated that "the relationship between our objectives and the force we have committed--their size, composition, and position--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary."³⁴ US commanders of operational peacekeeping forces should therefore not voice the UN lament, but actively participate in the reassessment process because the risks can be very high indeed.

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