


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# MARXIST COUNTERINSURGENCIES

by

ROD PASCHALL

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While the 1950s and 1960s can be labeled the Western Counterinsurgency Era, the 1980s are rapidly becoming the Marxist Counterinsurgency Era. During the earlier period, Western nations and their allies were beset with insurgencies throughout the world: Greece, Malaya, Kenya, Indochina, Colombia, Bolivia, and Algeria to name a few. Certainly, Marxist states faced unrest and some armed opposition, but in this earlier period, it was the West that was besieged by guerrillas. The situation is now different. Of the 13 *current* insurgencies where armed guerrilla organizations are in strengths of over 5000, about half are against Marxist regimes. Over three-quarters of the 324,000 armed insurgents of those organizations are at war with communist governments.<sup>1</sup> If the 1950s and 1960s were a period of rising expectations in the Third World, the 1980s could be called the era of unfulfilled expectations, because most of today's guerrilla wars against the communists are in lands where Marxism has been recently installed.

The concern in these pages is not for Washington policy alternatives. What follows is an examination of Marxist counterinsurgency, how it came about, an analysis of the insurgents, and what portends for the late 1980s. In many respects, the Marxist Counterinsurgency Era is following the pattern of the earlier Western Counterinsurgency Era. In 1955, for example, well before the climax

of American counterinsurgency involvement, the United States had some 11,000 military advisors permanently stationed abroad, mostly in the developing nations. In contrast, the Soviets at that time had only a handful of advisors working in the Third World. Now the United States has less than a thousand such military advisors in the Third World, while the Soviets and Cubans are fielding some 32,000. A prime feature of the American military assistance in the 1950s was the provision of grain under the Food for Peace Program to US allies fighting insurgents. Today, the Soviets are mimicking the earlier American practice, often giving of their scarce grain supplies to Third World Marxist states. The United States had about 500,000 combat troops fighting insurgents during the Vietnam War. The Soviets, Cubans, and North Vietnamese now have more than 300,000 combat troops fighting guerrillas in six different Third World states—and that figure is climbing.<sup>2</sup>

All of this would be mildly amusing to Western observers except for the fact that how the Marxists fare in their counter-guerrilla endeavors will in some measure determine future East-West relationships. It is a subject worthy of study, worthy of an examination that takes into account the lessons of the earlier Western counterinsurgency period. But such a study should be devoid of the myths so prevalent in the West during that era.

## INSURGENTS AND COUNTERINSURGENTS

One of the myths that gained currency during the 1960s is that poverty causes insurgency. That belief had a corollary: economic development sweeps insurgency away. If the first supposition were true, most of mankind would be in revolt. Armed revolutions are not the product of poverty but are the product of those very few skilled revolutionaries who have been able to persuade, organize, lead, and survive a race against a government's security forces. The insurgent leader may use the issue of poverty to his advantage, but he needs far more than that to succeed. For the most part, the three billion disadvantaged of this world bear poverty stoically and rarely take up arms to better their lot. As to the corollary, economic development may be an important and laudable element in a government's plan to deal with insurgency, but history clearly indicates such efforts are not essential to success. Insurgencies have often been put down with repressive, brute force. Paradoxically, development pushed too far can sever the sometimes fragile threads of social stability—as the Shah of Iran found out. Additionally, economic development, hard enough to achieve in peace, is extremely difficult to produce in the midst of a guerrilla war.

Another myth is that in order to succeed, the guerrilla must have the willing support of the peasantry. This belief has a distinct Western appeal based on the tenet of majority rule. The corollary here is that the right (read: majority) will win. Unfortunately, the "right" side did not march into Phnom Penh in April of 1975. Pol Pot and his victorious Khmer Rouge, for example, did not have the willing support of the people of Cambodia. The support they gained throughout that war was achieved by beastly coercion. In these wars, he who is right does not necessarily win, only he who is left when the shooting stops.

A third myth is that these wars are wholly the result of the Cold War. The inevitable and trailing gem of flawed logic is

that if the superpowers would only stay out, guerrillas would go away. The fact is that wars of this type are regrettably consistent on this planet. Insurgencies today are actually replicas of the civil wars of the past. We no longer call them civil wars, but essentially that is what they are: "outs" versus "ins." When war became mechanized in the early part of this century, most of mankind found that it could not participate in the new form of warfare. Mao did not choose guerrilla warfare as a superior technique. He chose guerrilla warfare because he could not get the airplanes, tanks, and battleships to wage mechanized war. His civil war against Chiang Kai Shek was fought with the only tools he had at hand. Upon attaining victory, Mao quickly acquired as many aircraft, tanks, and warships as China could afford. Civil wars occurred all during the 19th and the early part of the 20th centuries when there were some 60 nations in the world. After World War II, the number of nation-states increased threefold. It is therefore not surprising that there has been a corresponding rise in the number of civil wars, conflicts we choose to call insurgencies.

Since these wars have been almost wholly centered in the developing nations, the "outs" had no option for mechanized warfare and followed Mao's example, selecting guerrilla warfare. Sooner or later, either the insurgent leaders or the leaders of the besieged government have asked for support from one of the superpowers. An

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avowed Marxist will likely obtain aid from the Soviets. Similarly, a leader who professes allegiance to the West stands a good chance of receiving Western support. The Cold War has colored these conflicts, but it cannot be blamed for their existence. They would probably have happened in any event.

So much for the myths. There are a few fundamentals that emerged from the Western Counterinsurgency Era. A substantial insurgency requires the counterinsurgent to field forces far larger than those of the insurgent. A general rule of thumb, widely accepted in international military circles, is that the counterinsurgent must have close to a ten-to-one advantage to be successful. Of course, that rule has a number of exceptions and certainly cannot stand alone. Insurgency is a complex phenomenon. However, the ten-to-one factor is no better and no worse than the two-to-one rule of thumb generally accepted as a rough estimate for the attacker's required superiority over the defender in conventional operations. The magnitude of the required superiority for the counterinsurgent is dependent on a number of factors, one of which is the nature of the insurgent's organization.

The 1960s taught us that there is a general structure to an insurgent organization. There are usually three and in some instances four parts to these formations. The first and fundamentally essential element is the auxiliary, a term found in post World War II American insurgency doctrine. The term has been dropped from most US military literature but has recently resurfaced in the lexicon of the Guatemalan insurgents. Users of the term normally define the auxiliary as the unarmed peasant who recruits for the armed guerrillas and supplies them food, clothing, and medical supplies. The auxiliary also performs two important intelligence tasks. The first task is obvious: finding out who, what, where, and when about the counterinsurgent. The second intelligence task is less well known but probably more vital. The auxiliary must accomplish counterintelligence tasks. He must verify the loyalty of the guerrilla recruits in order to prevent the unknowing

acceptance of the most powerful of all counterinsurgent tools: the penetrator. The auxiliary is the mother and father of insurgent organizations. It feeds, clothes, and protects the insurgent.

The second and most familiar element of the insurgent structure, the guerrilla force, needs little description. The guerrilla will often pose as a law-abiding citizen by day and fight at night.

The third and in some cases the last element of the insurgent organization is the underground. This element contains the shadow government of the insurgent organization and serves as its ultimate headquarters. The underground has to communicate and produce intelligence. It must manage a network of couriers and in some cases it controls an urban terrorist force. Some insurgent organizations have had their shadow government and headquarters outside the target nation, but this is a dicey choice. In the event of guerrilla success, those who have lived in the relative security of a neighboring state may find their claim to leadership held fraudulent by proud, victorious guerrilla combat leaders. Such may be the case with the insurgent leaders opposing the Nicaraguan government today. In the 1960s, it was a common American practice to use the ambiguous term "infrastructure" to identify the combination of the auxiliary and the underground. Many insurgent organizations have had only these three elements: the guerrillas, the underground, and the auxiliary. However, others have added another.

The fourth, and possibly essential, element of the insurgent organization of the 1980s is the regular force. Full-time field soldiers, the regulars keep the counterinsurgent's army on edge and concentrated to prevent its dispersal into small groups that could seek out and destroy the insurgent's guerrillas. The regulars are also useful for a sudden, all-out offensive to destroy the opposing army if the opportunity presents itself. Regulars can be recruited from the ranks of the guerrilla forces, as in the case of the Chinese civil war, or they may be of external origin, as in the case of the North

Vietnamese army during the later stages of the Second Indochina War. Should there be a substantial and well-disciplined regular force with assured reliability, the underground or controlling headquarters of the insurgent structure may be placed outside the country. In that case, the fruits of victory can be secured by the regulars. The guerrillas are important, but secondary.

The general anatomy of a successful counterinsurgent organization may also be depicted from the experience of the 1960s. The first and most important element is the security service. Police, informers, penetration agents, and a competent crew of intelligence analysts are the main components of such a service. All of this is most efficient if placed under one bureaucratic roof, as the efficacy of the security service depends on speed. It is essential for such an organization to do more than identify and locate the insurgent; it must have the power to make the arrest or stage the raid. Any substantial insurgency will require the arming of large segments of the nation's population. The militia may be tasked only to protect home and hearth, but if it is a sound organization, it can be used to defend vital bridges, power lines, and other likely guerrilla targets. The counterinsurgent must also have regulars. The regulars must root out and destroy armed guerrillas and, if need be, defeat the insurgent's own regulars. Finally, the counterinsurgent must have an effective government that is not only capable of raising, equipping, and effectively controlling its intelligence organization and armed forces, it must be resourceful enough to undercut the insurgent's appeal—whether by sheer force of arms, by being able to attract the enthusiastic support of the people, or more likely, by a combination of the two.

#### **MARXIST COUNTERINSURGENCY**

Fundamentals aside, what are the Marxist approaches to counterinsurgency? To those whose only source of information has been a steady diet of video tape from Afghanistan, the Marxist counterinsurgent surely appears to be a Neanderthal man,

stamping out resistance (or purported resistance) with hairy feet wherever it is found. While the Soviets may not be reluctant to use force, they are very knowledgeable in the more subtle ways of counterinsurgency. So too are the Cubans and, to a lesser degree, the North Vietnamese. Although the communists are traditionally viewed as revolutionaries, the ruling governments of these three nations are actually quite experienced in the methods of counterinsurgency. The Bolsheviks spent little time as guerrillas, but from the minute they took power in 1917, they were immersed in counterinsurgency. Russian leaders in the past 70 years have spent at least 30 of those years conducting major counterinsurgency campaigns. Castro had only about four years as a guerrilla, but he has been in the counterinsurgency business, both at home and abroad, for the last 25 years. The North Vietnamese have more experience in the role of insurgents or insurgent supporters, but their current leaders now have a decade of work against guerrillas in Laos and Cambodia. On the whole, the Marxist confederation is now an alliance of counterinsurgents, and Moscow is by far the most experienced.

Paradoxically, Kremlin leaders owe much of their success in counterinsurgency, and no small number of their current principles, to their czarist predecessors. Moscow has expanded its control of surrounding territory through the use of force and has been suppressing armed revolt on an almost continuous basis for some six centuries. With such a rich legacy of successful counterinsurgency experience, it is small wonder that the present leaders in the Kremlin have followed the examples of the Czars. The first of their principles is to divide their adversaries and encourage "barbarians to fight barbarians." As the Czar pitted the Kumyks against the Chechens, the Kabardians against the Avars, and the Christian Ossetians against the Muslim Azerbaidzhanis, the Marxist leaders of the 1920s played the Darghins against the Avars and the Ingush against the Chechens. In the 1940s, the Soviets recruited and led large formations of Ukrainians to battle their own people. In the

early 1950s, the Soviets recruited and armed a substantial Lithuanian militia to defeat the Lithuanian insurgents. As with Rome, "Divide and Conquer" is the supreme rule. A second principle normally followed by the Soviets is to use mass deportation and large-scale resettlement schemes to deprive the guerrilla of local support. Mass deportation was particularly successful against the Lithuanian and Ukrainian insurgents. A third principle has to do with placing your man in the other fellow's tent. The Soviets are, and the Czars were, noted for their skillful use of penetration agents. Another standard practice is to cultivate and indoctrinate tribal or regionally prominent families, particularly the younger members of those families. A similar program is used for religious leaders. Russians plan for the long term when they are engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign. Additionally, a Russian counterinsurgency hallmark is to gain firm control of cities and towns first. The countryside can wait. The Soviets do not, however, hesitate to employ forces in the countryside once they have laid the groundwork by establishing secure bases in the urban areas.<sup>3</sup>

Regardless of these "principles," the general outlines of an effective counterinsurgency force or the structure of an insurgent's organization, each counterinsurgency campaign is unique. Some of the principles may apply; others are discarded. An appropriate structure in one case may not be useful in another situation. A ten-to-one counterinsurgent-to-insurgent ratio may be preeminent in one instance and less important in another. With that in mind, an examination of current Marxist counterinsurgency campaigns includes a study of several dissimilar situations.

### Angola

With a population of about eight million and a literacy rate of ten percent, the oil-producing Marxist state of Angola is undergoing a tenth year of insurgency. There were several factions that fought and defeated the Portuguese in 1975. A mix of tribalism and politics promoted disagreement

and eventual armed conflict among those factions. The winning group, largely based on the Kimbundu tribe, asked for and received Cuban support one year after independence. The new Angolan government rapidly put the Cubans to work against opposition forces, the most prominent of which were the Ovimbundu and Chokde peoples under Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Bokongo tribe under Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola. The Cubans were successful in driving the opposition into the bush, but they failed to destroy the enemies of the young Marxist regime. This initial and limited Marxist success spawned new hope and support for the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in its endeavor against the government of South Africa. By this process, the war spread to Namibia, the land between South Africa and Angola. After a decade of fighting, Angola has some 110,000 combat troops, composed of both Angolans and Cubans, involved in the fighting. They use some 970 armored vehicles and 150 modern aircraft.<sup>4</sup> The opposition is largely composed of UNITA's 18,000 guerrillas and 23,000 auxiliaries, but the government now must concern itself with more than internal opposition.<sup>5</sup>

A running fight has existed between the Angola-based SWAPO and the government of South Africa since the mid 1960s. South African forces have staged border incursions against Angola some 14 times since 1975, and the whites have raised a fighting force from the Angolan Bokongo tribe. Not only has South Africa managed to defeat SWAPO's offensive operations, it has accomplished the unusual feat of putting the would-be insurgents on the defensive in their privileged sanctuary. Firsthand observers estimate that SWAPO now must devote 40 percent of its operations to defending Angolan soil in a fight for survival. White South African officers live with and lead the Bokongo force. The unit is reported to have led many of the South African incursions into Angola. The Bokongo tribe is largely located north of the Angolan capital of Luanda, and an active

insurgency in that region has been operative for some time. Savimbi's UNITA, however, is the real insurgent force to be examined here. It is based on the Ovimbundu tribe that inhabits the region south of the capital and provides Savimbi with a healthy, in-country auxiliary structure. He is usually comfortably based on Angolan soil, some 100 miles or so north of the border with Namibia. The techniques used by UNITA and South Africa are the classic methods of the guerrilla: cutting communications, destroying bridges, isolating economic centers, kidnapping, disseminating propaganda, and ambushing convoys.<sup>6</sup>

Although it is difficult to separate the normal inefficiencies of a Marxist command economy from the effects of a guerrilla war, the overall result has been devastating, even by African standards. Apologists have often cited the mass exodus of the Portuguese as the rationale for the sad state of the Angolan economy. After ten years that argument is wearing a bit thin. Angola, once a food exporter, is now a food importer. In late 1984, despite the severe drought in northwest Africa, Angola had Africa's largest delegation of the International Red Cross. Most of the Red Cross planes were flying as many as 30 flights a day to six regional centers. Expensive air transport was essential due to the ability of UNITA to close roads. Coffee production has dropped 95 percent in the last ten years. Once a tire exporter, Angola is now a tire importer. It is estimated that 90 percent of the Angolan state-run companies are losing money. Angola has what must be one of the world's most worthless currencies. The Kwanza is officially rated at 30 to the dollar, but goes for 1200 to the dollar on the black market—when anyone will take it. Angola is kept afloat by its oil exports, along with Soviet aid. Oil provides about 90 percent of Angola's foreign exchange. The United States is buying a little more than half the total oil production, with Brazil picking up another six percent.<sup>7</sup>

In order to prop up the disastrous Angolan economy, the Soviet Union is conducting an economic aid program. As shown by documents captured in Grenada,

Soviet aid is complex. It involves barter arrangements: raw materials for arms mixed with outright grants. The agreement with Angola provides that country about 200 million dollars per year. However, a recent estimate by a "senior State Department official" claims that the Soviets have poured some two billion dollars into Angola during the past two years. What is not known is how much oil the Russians took out. Cuba supports an estimated 6500 "economic technicians" in Angola. Other Soviet bloc states, including the Soviet Union, provide 3900 other "technicians." Although many of these "technicians" are probably police, intelligence, and security advisors, a healthy percentage of them are undoubtedly as advertised: advisors and administrators, working to make Angola economically self-sufficient. Additionally, Marxist states underwrite some 1655 Angolan students who study in bloc nations every year.<sup>8</sup>

South African border incursions and the constant and growing guerrilla activities of UNITA have made it imperative for bloc states to maintain a sizable military presence in Angola. In the case of the Cubans, who actually conduct combat operations, Angola has represented a ten-year-old battleground. In addition to their 25 to 30 thousand combat troops, Cuba supplies a substantial number of the 1600 military technicians in Angola. The bloc supports some 180 Angolan military students per year who train abroad.

The 40,000 members of the Angolan armed forces are augmented by a paramilitary force of some 50,000. Adding the 30,000 Cuban combat soldiers, this provides a total of some 120,000 troops facing UNITA's 18,000. Using the ratio of ten-to-one for the counterinsurgent to win, Angola's seven-to-one ratio falls short of the mark. The prospects are even dimmer for the Marxists when UNITA's 23,000 auxiliaries are considered. Also, UNITA has an in-country structure that has defied communist forces. Finally, the Marxists must tailor their operations against the insurgents and maintain some degree of concentration so as not to jeopardize deployments designed to react to South African border incursions. It is

therefore not surprising that Angola's government has not been able to use its road net to support its economy or control its population. The Angolan economy continues to deteriorate, and it is quite possible that the Marxist government will fail to survive.

### Mozambique

The insurgency in Mozambique is in some respects parallel to that in Angola. Whereas Angola nurtured SWAPO, incurring the wrath of South Africa, Mozambique harbored the Mugabe forces that eventually triumphed in Rhodesia. Mozambique also has served as a base for the anti-South African ANC (African National Congress). The latter organization is receiving Soviet arms through the Organization of African States. The reaction of Rhodesia during the 1970s was to exploit dissatisfaction with the Marxists of Mozambique by establishing support for the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), a rough duplication of the situation in Angola with UNITA. Tribalism is again a vital factor in the insurgency. The victorious Marxists that replaced the Portuguese in Mozambique were largely based on a minority tribe, the Makonde. Their black opposition includes the Muslim Macua tribe and the Yao, who have carried on their war with the Marxist government of Samora Machel for eight years. Peace negotiations with South Africa have failed in the same manner as the talks between Angola and South Africa.<sup>9</sup>

Estimates of the strength of the insurgent MNR organization range from 6000 to 15,000. External support is rumored to be from South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and the large Portuguese population in South Africa. Recent claims include even European support for the MNR. Protesting South African authorities readily point to the large stores of weapons and munitions left in Mozambique after the campaigns against Rhodesia and the Portuguese. The Machel government's charge that the opposition is composed of bandits may have some basis in fact, but Machel admits that the country is "living in a war situation." Regardless of where the insurgents' support comes from, the guerrillas

have been successful in choking the economy of Mozambique.

Guerrilla activity has been directed at controlling the rural areas and the transportation system. Essentially, the guerrillas own the countryside and the government controls the larger urban centers. However, in December 1985 the MNR reported that it was occupying two district capitals in central Mozambique. As in Angola, the government has been forced to use expensive air transport to feed many of the city dwellers. All of this has been vastly complicated by the drought of the early 1980s. The economy of Mozambique is probably in worse shape than that of Angola since the Portuguese found that Angola had to support Mozambique during the period of colonial rule. In 1984, the planting of crops was reduced by some 50 percent due to the strangled road net. The Machel government is, however, banking on American support. David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank has made two recent trips to Mozambique; three American oil companies are investigating an oil drilling venture; and the US government is considering 15 million dollars' worth of non-military aid.<sup>10</sup>

Mozambique has an armed force of 15,800 personnel equipped with 515 armored vehicles and 18 combat aircraft. Armed paramilitary forces amount to some 9500. The army is constantly required to escort civilian convoys on the roads and is regularly ambushed. Marxist bloc support consists of about 1000 Cuban troops and 550 bloc technicians. Mozambique has some 530 military students in bloc schools. In order to bolster the sagging economy, the Marxist nations have provided 2800 advisors and technicians, including East German security police experts. Training for about 2500 students from Mozambique is conducted in bloc schools.

An effective tribal auxiliary structure supports the guerrillas in Mozambique. The ratio of guerrillas to government opposition is about one-to-four, a ratio that projects a rather grim future for the Marxists. One difference from the situation in Angola is the absence of South African border incursions. If the armed forces of Mozambique ever do

begin serious counterinsurgency operations outside the populated areas, they can do so without having to look over their shoulders for an attack from their white neighbors.

### Ethiopia

The basis of insurgency in Ethiopia has its roots in the United Nations' 1952 decision to provide Haile Selassie's Ethiopia authority over the former Italian colony of Eritrea. When the emperor established Eritrea as a national region ten years later, active fighting began. The general insurgency throughout Ethiopia was sparked by the revolt of the Fourth Infantry Brigade in 1974. That insurgency spread to include dissident groups representing Oromo, Afar, Tigray, and Somali, as well as Eritrean, peoples. Initially, the Soviets backed the Eritrean guerrillas, but with the advent of a Marxist regime in Addis Ababa, Moscow quickly switched sides in order to assist in the defeat of their former allies. The war is now over ten years old and continues without an end in sight.<sup>11</sup>

There is little unity among the insurgents. For example, while the Eritrean movement has been striving for simple independence, the Tigre People's Liberation Front is bent on overthrowing the regime of Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. Moreover, the Eritrean element of the insurgency has only recently formed a rather loose union of their three splinter groups into the Eritrean Liberation Front. Despite the fragmented nature of the Ethiopian insurgency, the rebels have proved their ability to control not only large segments of the northern countryside, but also to hold populated areas of the north. The guerrillas' prime technique is to conduct ambushes on the nation's roads in order to stymie any government attempt to extend and maintain control of the countryside.<sup>12</sup>

The Marxist Mengistu regime is squarely based on the dominant Amhara peoples of central and southern Ethiopia. Almost all government offices are held by the Amhara. The great drought of the early 1980s has worked to the advantage of the government. The necessity to concentrate the northern

dissident tribes to facilitate efficient food distribution has given the government the opportunity to undermine the control of the insurgent leaders. The Ethiopian government has a large armed force of some 217,000 members equipped with 1775 armored vehicles and 180 combat aircraft, including some armed helicopters. The government also controls a paramilitary force of some 169,000. Bloc support for the regime is substantial.

Cuba is represented in Ethiopia by 12,000 combat troops. Other bloc nations have 1900 military technicians in the country. Marxist states also support an unusually large number of Ethiopian military students in training abroad. Currently, it is estimated that some 2095 members of the Ethiopian military services are studying within the bloc states. Economic aid from Marxist states is estimated at 15 million dollars per year. In order to bolster the Ethiopian economy, the bloc is providing about 2800 economic technicians and advisors. It is believed that there are about 5350 Ethiopian civilian students studying in bloc nations.

Although almost all of the West's attention has been drawn to the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents, a large number of the 20-plus non-Amharic ethnic groups of Ethiopia are in some stage of revolt. It is estimated that 85 percent of Eritrea is controlled by the insurgents. All told, the total guerrilla strength pitted against Addis Ababa is believed to be 34,000. Compared to a government and Cuban strength of 398,000, the rebels are at a twelve-to-one disadvantage.

### Afghanistan

The beginnings of the war in Afghanistan stem from the dissatisfaction of Moslem fundamentalists with the Afghan regime in the mid-1970s. The Soviet invasion of 1979, apparently a failed attempt to bring about order, has resulted in an unending blood-letting. It is in this land that the Soviet Union has exerted a serious, overt effort; has made a substantial investment in facilities, troops, and economic support; and has begun to use

the techniques and methods that have been successful against Moscow's previous insurgents.<sup>13</sup>

The opposition to Kabul and the Russians is estimated at 90,000 armed insurgents. Many, however, spend considerable time in nearby Pakistan, and as few as 20,000 are believed to be fighting in Afghanistan at any time. There is little solidarity between the various insurgent organizations. Most are based on a particular sectional, religious faction. Both Sunni and Shiite are represented among the guerrillas, and bickering between these groups is the norm. The insurgents are equipped with a variety of weapons, including shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. They dominate much of the countryside of eastern Afghanistan, and in this region Kabul's presence has been reduced to besieged towns that are dependent on air supply and occasional armed convoys. Much has been written about the lack of unity within insurgent ranks, but little note has been taken of the extraordinary difficulties that such disunity poses to the counterinsurgent.

For most practical purposes, the armed forces of Afghanistan have disappeared. At a strength of some 80,000 at the time of the Soviet invasion, they are now believed to have only 47,000. It is further believed that the desertion rate approximates 10,000 per year. What is perhaps of more significance is an organization called the KHAD, the Afghan security service. Its strength of 40,000 rivals that of the current Afghan armed forces. Led by KGB advisors and technicians, the KHAD produces what the Soviet armed forces need most: intelligence. If the Soviets do succeed in Afghanistan, it will be largely because of Afghan penetrators, agents, and defectors from the insurgents who operate under the control of the KHAD.<sup>14</sup>

Soviet strength in Afghanistan is some 115,000, with about 120 combat aircraft, 270 helicopters, and hundreds of armored vehicles. Moscow's economic aid is estimated at 500 million dollars per year, much of it in fuel and food that is needed to keep some form of an economy alive in government-

controlled areas. Soviet influence in the country is now pervasive. The Afghan flag has even been changed to resemble that of a Soviet republic. There are over 5500 Afghan military students in the Soviet Union and some 8700 other Afghans studying in the USSR. It is estimated that there are 2000 Soviet "military technicians" in the country and 3800 economic advisors. The Soviet Union has invested an enormous amount of capital in constructing roads, bridges, airfields, and communications facilities.

Soviet techniques against the insurgents include extensive propaganda campaigns and heavy indoctrination, even to the extent of rewriting Afghan history for school use. The Russians offer considerable financial rewards to those Afghans who serve the Kabul regime. For example, members of the Afghan militia now receive more pay than a prewar deputy minister. The Russians have spent a great deal of effort on religious leaders, recruiting mullahs who can be relied upon to support the government. The sweeps conducted by the Russian army in the countryside are partially designed to create refugees. Those who flee to populated areas within Afghanistan become subject to rigid population control measures. Of those who make the long journey out of the country to join one of the various resistance groups, only a small percentage return to fight. Those Afghans who stay in their valleys are reduced to a dangerous existence, eking out a living between Soviet offensive operations.

An estimate of the counterinsurgent-to-guerrilla ratio is about two-to-one. However, since only 20,000 guerrillas are in active opposition at any one time, a better figure is ten-to-one. Parallels with Vietnam are not appropriate in that the Afghans have no regular forces as did the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Afghanistan's resistance organizations do, however, have a considerable auxiliary structure within the country. Since that network is fragmented, it will be difficult for the KHAD to gain any advantage with a single penetration operation. Disunity provides some protection, if not concerted effort.

## Kampuchea

The Cambodian nation has been beset with insurgency for most of the past 15 years. After the 1975 fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge, there was a brief lull in the fighting. But when the North Vietnamese army installed the government of Heng Samrin in 1979, opposition began to coalesce and serious fighting broke out once again. In some respects, the war is a contest between Marxist regimes. China is backing the Khmer Rouge exiles and conducted a large-scale border incursion against Hanoi in 1979, shortly after the North Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. The Chinese rationale for the incursion is generally acknowledged to have been a retaliation for deportation of large numbers of the Chinese minority in Vietnam, alleged Vietnamese border violations, and for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Since that time, China has maintained steady support of the Khmer Rouge insurgents.<sup>15</sup>

The opposition to Heng Samrin and the Vietnamese is not only the 35,000 armed guerrillas of the Khmer Rouge. There are also Son Sann's 18,000-man People's National Liberation Front as well as Sihanouk's small 7000-man National Army. The latter two organizations are loosely connected and are recognized by the United Nations. It is doubtful that the Khmer Rouge have a sympathetic following inside Cambodia, but their forces recruit by armed coercion, in much the same way they did in the early 1970s. In July 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz was informed by the representatives of the two non-communist factions that their groups were recruiting at a faster rate than the Khmer Rouge; however, the strength of these elements is largely based on the growing Khmer refugee population residing in Thailand. As yet, the insurgents have not been able to seize and hold a single population center. The guerrillas claim that their operations range far to the south, and there are reports from a Canadian TV team that the insurgents are waging battle well into Cambodia. Deep-seated Khmer hostility to the Vietnamese might ensure popular support for the guerrillas in the countryside, but since

the Vietnamese seem to center their operations on the Thai border, a strong and active auxiliary base within the country for the guerrillas appears doubtful.<sup>16</sup>

There are some striking similarities between the regime in Kabul and Heng Samrin's Cambodian government. His army is rated at a strength of only 35,000, dwarfed by the Vietnamese force in the country of some 160,000. Additionally, a statement by General Le Duc An of the North Vietnamese army clearly indicates that the Vietnamese are in Cambodia to stay. Citing the "special relationship" of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, the general disclosed a unified command and the necessity for the entire population of Cambodia to follow the instructions of the party cadre. Such were the tactics and the party line of Hanoi's forces as they brought about the unification of Vietnam under Hanoi's rule. He went on to say that Indochina was a "single battlefield" and that his strategy would be to conduct pacification operations in the hinterland while maintaining regular operations in the border areas. A recent report of Soviet construction of a naval base at Ream lends credence to the conclusion that the Marxist stay in Cambodia is of a permanent nature.<sup>17</sup>

As long as the Vietnamese army maintains sizable forces in Cambodia, prospects for insurgent success appear limited. The ratio of counterinsurgents to insurgents is about four-to-one, but like the situation in Afghanistan, only a percentage of the guerrillas are on active operations in Cambodia at any one time. The war may be characterized as occasional border incursions by outnumbered insurgents. It is not a classic model of guerrilla war.

## Nicaragua

The insurgency in Nicaragua had its birth with two events during 1980 and 1981. The first was the expression of dissent against the Sandinistas by the Miskito, Sumo, and Rama peoples of eastern Nicaragua through their Moravian Church leadership. An anti-Cuban demonstration and protests against the promotion of Marxism brought about a

heavy-handed suppression of the Indians that Managua's Minister of Interior, Tomas Borge, later admitted to be a colossal mistake. Closing 50 churches, jailing priests, forcing Spanish into the classrooms, burning crops, and pressing a mass relocation of about 20,000 people, the Sandinistas managed to spark a revolt against themselves. The second event occurred a year later in Guatemala. A group of 60 former members of Somoza's National Guard met and formed the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (NDF), the largest of the rebel factions now fighting the Sandinista government.<sup>18</sup>

The various insurgent factions are loosely joined in a federation called the Unified Nicaraguan Opposition. The NDF is thought to have some 15,000 armed insurgents, and the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (RDA) of Eden Pastora Gomez is believed to be composed of about 5000 armed men. Although the NDF is primarily based in the north, near the Honduran border, it has recently established some elements in the south, near Costa Rica and Pastora's RDA. Both factions appear to be peasant-based and have few urban, middle-class recruits. There is an exodus of the urban youth from Nicaragua, but most are avoiding the Sandinista's unpopular conscription policies and are not joining the resistance forces. The motivation of the insurgent peasants seems to be based on a variety of religious, resettlement, and agricultural policy concerns. The vast majority of these recruits are from the northern provinces, long a bastion of conservative causes. It is difficult to determine how much insurgent recruiting is caused by Sandinista resettlement programs and how much is due to Managua's other policies. The distinction is an important one. If the recruits are spawned by resettlement, they are likely to be guerrillas-in-exile, elements without a substantial in-country village or urban auxiliary support structure. There is little indication that the insurgents have been able to sustain their operations from within the country. Like their Khmer cousins, they are substantially an army of irregulars, staging border incursions.<sup>19</sup>

Regardless of the insurgent infrastructure, the guerrillas have caused great

damage to the economy of Nicaragua. Although much of the insurgent activity is centered in the north, the tremendous expansion of Nicaragua's armed forces has taken manpower from an economy that is labor intensive. Large defense expenditures and the gradual withdrawal of capital investment have debased the currency, creating runaway inflation. Defense expenditures are estimated at 60 percent of the government's budget, and inflation is at 125 percent. The value of the Cordoba has recently been stripped of its official rate of 28 to the dollar because the black market rate was 500 to the dollar. The guerrillas have successfully disrupted the coffee harvest, which in the past averaged 150 million pounds. Currently, the government is expecting only 80 million pounds. Even if the guerrillas had not specifically targeted the coffee industry, it is doubtful that the Sandinistas could manage the manpower to pick the crop since their armed forces have grown to some 63,000 with a paramilitary force of about 3000. There are 40,000 Nicaraguans in the militia, but they seldom are used on offensive operations against the insurgents.<sup>20</sup>

Bloc support for Nicaragua began in 1980 while the United States was still supplying aid to the Sandinista government. The Soviets demonstrated their willingness to underwrite the regime in Managua by giving the government some 20,000 tons of wheat from tight Soviet reserves in 1981. An additional 60,000 tons of wheat came from Bulgaria and East Germany, leading the Sandinistas to believe that dependence on the United States for food was unnecessary. Since that time, the scarce Soviet grain situation has been eased by the resumption of US grain sales. By 1983, publicly known bloc economic aid packages had reached 220 million dollars, consisting, among other things, of road-building equipment, construction machinery, and the provision of port facilities. The Cubans have 4000 "economic, educational, and medical technicians" in the country as well as 2500 military personnel, some of whom are engaging in combat operations. There are 200 bloc economic advisors in Nicaragua along with 125 military advisors. The Sandinistas

have about 260 military students in bloc countries and 425 students studying there for the purpose of returning to restore the economy.<sup>21</sup>

The ratio of government forces to guerrillas is about three-to-one, but without a substantial urban and rural auxiliary support base, this figure may not mean much. This is particularly true when one considers that at any one time, the insurgents may have only about one fifth to one fourth of their strength on active operations. The actual ratio may be more accurately put at about sixteen-to-one.

### THE PROSPECTS

Predictions about the future success or failure of the Marxist counterinsurgency campaigns should be founded on the efficiency and effectiveness of counterinsurgency forces balanced against the structure, strengths, and effectiveness of the insurgents. There are also many external factors, some as yet wholly unknown, that will determine the eventual outcome of these conflicts. Forecasts can only be educated guesses. Considering what is now known, the prospects for insurgent success against Marxist counterinsurgent forces appear brighter in southern Africa than anywhere else.

In both Angola and Mozambique, Marxist forces have not attained the strength ratios to search out and destroy guerrillas while protecting vital national facilities. In both cases, the insurgents have an established network of auxiliaries, based on strong tribal ties. In both cases, the insurgents have active operational areas north and south of the capital cities. In Angola, the insurgent is further favored by the existence of South African regular forces whose border incursions keep Angolan and Cuban forces on edge and concentrated, a posture that inhibits small-unit operations, essential for effective counter guerrilla operations. In Mozambique, the government advantage is only four-to-one, a ratio that is not likely to produce success for the Marxist counterinsurgents. In both cases, the Marxists are increasingly

dependent on American financial support to bolster their weakening economies. If there is to be an ebb in the 40-year tide of Marxist conquest, the best chance is in southern Africa.

In Ethiopia, the prospect for insurgent success is slight, but Marxism in that country does not rest on solid foundations. The insurgents are greatly outnumbered. They have only marginal unity of purpose. With their main strength centered in the north, the insurgents have little auxiliary support in central and southern Ethiopia. Furthermore, the ongoing famine is working to the advantage of the government in Addis Ababa. Without a central underground, headquarters, or shadow government, the insurgents are unlikely to form regular forces to complement their guerrilla formations. The Marxist counterinsurgents can therefore conduct small-unit operations designed to run the guerrilla to ground. As in the cases of Angola and Mozambique, American assistance is providing some direct benefits to the regime in power. In this case, however, Ethiopia is receiving more food assistance than it can manage and it is likely that even if the US aid were discontinued, other sources would make up for the loss. Although the prospects for continued aid are rather good, the military in Ethiopia has an undeniable proclivity to factionalism and unrest. There is a chance for a military coup d'etat from some quarter of Ethiopian soldiery, and it may come from a faction that opposes the heavy influence of foreign Marxist states. That is the probable reason that bloc states host such a large contingent of Ethiopian students. There is, nonetheless, little chance that any dissident Ethiopian military faction would cede to the demands of those insurgent elements that are insisting on independence. Insurgent success is therefore unlikely.

Although the traditional principles of Soviet counterinsurgency are rarely seen in the Marxist states of Africa, they are increasingly evident in Afghanistan. Massive resettlement, cultivation and indoctrination of tribal and religious leaders, large-scale use of penetration agents, and growing control of

populated areas have already taken place. If the Soviets remain true to form, the immediate future should see the use of force in the countryside on an unprecedented scale and the use of agents whose goal is to spark fighting between the different elements of the insurgents. It is doubtful that the insurgents will be able to increase the percentage of their forces that are actively deployed in Afghanistan, or achieve a better degree of unity. They have no known capability to consolidate a portion of their guerrillas into regular forces that would inhibit Soviet small-unit operations. The total absence of any moral restraints on the part of Soviet forces paves the way for the future: brutally effective campaigns in the countryside. This war will be a long one. But if and when Moscow decides to triple its forces in the country, the end will be in sight.

Without a strong internal support mechanism, there is little hope for the Cambodian insurgents. They do not appear capable of organizing the countryside against the North Vietnamese from their bases in Thailand. Hanoi is subjecting the Khmer nation to colonialism in the same fashion that it has South Vietnam and Laos. The insurgents have not attained guerrilla war. They are irregulars—recruited by force or from refugees. They are externally based. That pattern is duplicated in Nicaragua.

There is no indication that the insurgents have established any measure of population support in the countryside of Nicaragua. Nor is there evidence of an effective urban underground working against the Sandinistas. Insurgent leaders have recently expressed a desire for aircraft to handle their resupply problems: an indication that local support from the peasantry of the country is lacking. Internal dissatisfaction with the Sandinistas within Nicaragua will undoubtedly continue the flood of refugees, but this does not automatically translate into effective armed opposition to the Marxists. The prospect for the Nicaraguan insurgents to win on the force of their own arms is not a bright one.

Marxists have reason for optimism in the future of their counterinsurgency efforts. The campaigns are being waged within reasonable

costs, they fulfill the credo of communism, and there is a wealth of experience to draw on for technique and method. There are, however, two clouds on the Marxist horizon. First, these efforts will continue to absorb the time and energies of Marxist leaders to an extent that is probably out of proportion to the end worth of the enterprises. A second and possibly more serious consideration is that the Marxists may lose Angola and Mozambique. Such an event would have far-reaching psychological consequences and would be widely heralded as the ebb tide of communist conquest. For insurgents currently battling Marxist regimes elsewhere, the last half of the 1980s does not portend impending triumph. These insurgents would do well to look at the example being set in the southern portion of Africa. There, the insurgent has established a supporting structure of auxiliaries within the countryside of the besieged Marxist states. In that region, the insurgent is not an invading irregular, he is a guerrilla. In that part of Africa, the counterinsurgent would likely have to achieve the ten-to-one advantage. For the invading irregulars, who actually form the bulk of today's insurgents fighting Marxists, the mathematics are quite different. In their case, the counterinsurgent may not even need numerical superiority. Without organizing the countryside into an auxiliary support structure, the invading irregular is left to a more conventional form of warfare. In that realm of conflict, the rule of thumb is that the attacker must have the numerical advantage.

#### NOTES

1. Insurgent leaders usually inflate strength figures for their organizations, and governments opposing insurgents minimize guerrilla totals. Unless otherwise indicated, the figures herein are from *The Military Balance, 1985-1986* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985).

2. American military advisory numbers are presented in J. Ross Heverly and Harry O. Amos, "The Military Role in a Functional Collective Security System" (Washington: Department of Army, 1978). Soviet figures are taken from *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*. Cuban combat troop figures are taken from John Hoyt Williams, "Cuba: Surrogate Force for Soviet Power" *National Defense*, 69 (May-June 1985), 47-51.

3. A good summary of czarist and Soviet counterinsurgency techniques against Muslim insurgents is presented in Alexandre Bennigsen, "The Soviet Union and

Muslim Guerrilla Wars, 1920-1984: Lessons for Afghanistan," *Conflict*, 4 (Nos. 2-4, 1983), 301-23. Firsthand descriptions of Soviet techniques during the Lithuanian and Ukrainian insurgencies are provided in K. V. Tauras, *Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast* (New York: Voyages Press, 1962) and Yuriy Tys-Krokhaluk, *UPA Warfare in the Ukraine*, trans. Walter Dushnyck (New York: Society of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Veterans, 1972).

4. *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*.

5. *Ibid.*

6. An eyewitness report on South African efforts with the Bokongo tribe is contained in Morgan Norvel's somewhat macho account, "32 Battalion," *Soldier of Fortune*, 9 (February 1984), 46-89. A description of Savimbi's base area is found in Alan Crowell's account, *The New York Times*, 9 October 1985, p. 3. South Africa's effectiveness in aiding UNITA is assessed by an Angolan officer in *The New York Times*, 21 December 1985, p. 3.

7. A detailed view of Angola's economy and the effectiveness of UNITA against Angola is contained in the firsthand account of James Brooks' *New York Times* articles; see 16 December 1984, p. 1; 25 December 1984, p. 1; and 6 January 1985, p. 6.

8. Bloc aid to Angola is detailed in a Department of State report, "Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World" (Washington: Dept. of State, 1983). Unless otherwise indicated, all following bloc economic aid figures are derived from this document. The two billion dollar estimate was reported by Susan Rasky, *The New York Times*, 11 December 1985, p. A14.

9. An excellent analysis of the origins of the MNR is contained in Ian F. Beckwell and John Pimlott, eds., *Armed Forces and Modern Counterinsurgency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); see chapter five. See also *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 16 February 1985, p. 253. Soviet arms aid was reported by John Makhatini, an ANC spokesman, in a *New York Times* interview, 16 August 1985, p. A29.

10. The Machel quote and the economic analysis is taken from Alan Cowell's eyewitness reporting in his *New York Times* articles, 25 January 1985, p. A4; 1 July 1985, p. A3; and 9 July 1985, p. A2. The MNR claim of success in the center of the country is found in *The New York Times*, 5 December 1985, p. A9.

11. For the origins of the current insurgency in Ethiopia, see Yuhannis Abate, "Civil-Military Relations in Ethiopia," *Armed Forces and Society*, 10 (Spring 1984), 380-400.

12. The status of the Ethiopian insurgency was gathered on-site and has been depicted by Clifford May. See his *New York Times* articles of 6 January 1985, p. 3; 4 March 1985, p. A3; and 15 July 1985, p. A3. Indications of Eritrean insurgent unity is reported in *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 16 February 1985, p. 261. Also see Anthony Suau's eyewitness account in "Region in Rebellion," *National Geographic*, 168 (September 1985), 388.

13. A good description of the early years of the Afghan War is contained in Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past,

Present and Future," *Asian Survey*, 24 (April 1984), 373-78, 399.

14. Any number of firsthand accounts describing Afghan insurgents are available. Richard Bernstein's graphic presentation in the *New York Times Magazine*, 24 March 1985, pp. 30-53, and the reporting of Richard Bonner, *The New York Times*, 15 July 1985, p. A4, are good examples. Also see Paul L. Moorcraft, "Bloody Stalemate in Afghanistan," *Army*, 35 (April 1985), 26-36. The KHAD is described in Tahir Amin, p. 393.

15. The Chinese border incursion is summarized by a senior Indian officer in General Y. M. Bammi, "Sino-Vietnam War, 1979," *Combat* (December 1983), pp. 65-74. Also see King C. Chen, "China's War Against Vietnam," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 3 (Spring-Summer 1983), 233-63. Background details on the Cambodian insurgency are found in the reporting of Barbra Crossette, *The New York Times*, 25 January 1985, p. A2; 7 February 1985, p. A8; 15 February 1985, p. A3; 29 April 1985, p. A4; and 22 December 1985, p. A3.

16. A summary of the Canadian film crew's observations is contained in the 19 July 1984 issue of *The Nation Review*, Bangkok.

17. Le Duc An's article is in *Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, Hanoi, December 1984, pp. 28-43. Hanoi's methods to bring South Vietnam under complete control are described in Truong Nhu Tang, *Viet Cong Memoir* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1985), pp. 267-82. For the Soviet base at Ream, see Son Sonn's statement in *Indochina Chronology* (July-September 1985), p. 11.

18. The views of the Moravian Indians were gathered and are presented in Joan Frawley, "Among the Miskitos," *Policy Review* (Spring 1984), pp. 50-54. The status of the NDF is portrayed in the on-site reporting of James LeMoyné, *The New York Times*, 24 March 1985, p. 1; 23 April 1985, p. A1; and 9 August 1985, p. 1. Additional reports are provided by Stephen Kinzer, 11 April 1985, p. 1, and 12 April 1985, p. A3.

19. Strength figures for the insurgents are derived from Hedrick Smith's Washington-based report in *The New York Times*, 17 April 1985, p. A1. Insurgent activity is characterized in the series of interviews conducted by James LeMoyné noted above. The addition of antiaircraft missiles to the insurgent inventory was announced by Aristides Sanchez, an NDF spokesman, *The New York Times*, 13 December 1985, p. A9.

20. Economic figures are derived from interviews with Sandinista officials by Larry Rother, *The New York Times*, 10 February 1985, p. 9; 19 March 1985, p. 1; and 24 March 1985, p. 11.

21. Bloc support for the Sandinistas is based on *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, but adjusted with more recent figures presented by Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams; see *The New York Times*, 6 December 1985, p. 1. For information on American loans, see the statement of Commerce Secretary Baldrige, *The Baltimore Sun*, 22 December 1985, p. A4.



# SDI: A STRATEGY FOR PEACE AND STABILITY OR THE END TO DETERRENCE?

by

DAVID E. WINDMILLER

**S**ince the advent of the nuclear age, humanity has existed and "progressed" in a politico-military climate increasingly threatened by the possibility of instant annihilation. The prevailing condition now is one in which two superpowers possess and control the means, many times over, to terminate life as we know it on this planet. The nuclear capacities of the United States and the Soviet Union alone equate to roughly two and one half tons of dynamite for each person on the earth.<sup>1</sup> In this bipolar world, in which the antithetical political ideologies of the two superpowers continually and almost daily conflict with each other at varying levels of intensity, a state of mutual nuclear fear has also existed. Although it cannot be empirically proven, it appears that this state of mutual fear (i.e. the fear that one nation would inflict a nuclear counterstrike of unacceptably devastating proportion against the other, should the other strike first) has successfully ensured that to date these weapons of mass destruction have not been used to settle political differences. This threat of retaliation, in several variations, has become the bedrock of a general philosophy (I hesitate to say strategy) referred to as "deterrence."

Taking issue with the philosophy that the *only way to deter a potential adversary from using his nuclear means is to threaten him with one's own, along with a relative assurance that the retaliation would cause*

unacceptably high levels of physical destruction to the adversary, President Reagan proposed the following in 1983:

Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today. What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? . . . I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.<sup>2</sup>

This speech suggested the possibility that the United States could adopt a radically different approach to addressing the nuclear balance of power, and challenged the scientific and engineering communities to develop the means by which to accomplish it. It has come to be officially designated the President's "Strategic Defense Initiative"

(SDI) and dubbed "Star Wars" by the press and others. Attendant with this philosophy are a number of critical and controversial issues. These have been discussed in depth without resolution, and continued heated discussion and controversy are expected in the years to come. Some of these issues focus on the physical capabilities and limitations of technology and the potentially massive personnel and economic costs related to the development of SDI; others center on ethics, morality, stability, and ultimately on US military strategy. This article will concentrate on the latter factors, while largely assuming the former.<sup>3</sup> It will describe the political and philosophical genesis of the concept of SDI, present a brief synopsis of the Soviet threat which creates the need, and then describe the system and its theoretical objectives. An analysis of the potential effects of SDI on the development of strategy will precede some concluding judgments.

#### **POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND**

Since the late 1940s the United States has adopted a number of so-called strategies, or declared policies, to describe the manner in which it would contemplate using its nuclear capability. From the earliest policy of massive retaliation, a spectrum of strategic thinking can be discerned which has included controlled response, flexible response, realistic deterrence, mutual assured destruction (MAD), strategic sufficiency, essential equivalence, and countervailing strategy. At the heart of each of these is a question of target emphasis, usually defined in terms of counterforce or countervalue.<sup>4</sup> It is important to note that since the mid-1960s US nuclear policy has been heavily based on the assumption that it was technically and economically infeasible to develop an effective defense; when a defense was contemplated during the Nixon years, questions arose over its effects on stability, the arms race, the strategic balance, deterrence, etc. As a result, traditional deterrence theory has prevailed, based on the thought that the United States, even after suffering a Soviet

first strike, would retain a sufficient nuclear counterstrike capability to retaliate with a nuclear force of such magnitude that the Soviet Union could no longer function as a society. This threat, which essentially guaranteed the destruction of both the United States and the Soviet Union, would deter that first strike from ever occurring.

Two arms negotiations, resulting in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and SALT I, served to fortify this concept and essentially ensured the mutual vulnerability of the population centers of both nations. The ABM Treaty was ratified by the United States based on the conclusion that existing technology in 1972 did not offer the prospect of developing a sufficiently capable and cost-effective system (see endnote 3) without simultaneously encouraging the proliferation of offensive arms, while SALT I was ratified in the hope that mutually acceptable limitations on strategic offensive arms would result. (SALT II, which was never ratified, only put ceilings on the already excessively high level of strategic arms.)

This condition of mutual vulnerability and the threat of nuclear retaliation have thus guided US strategy and probably encouraged restraint over the past 40 years. However, Mr. Reagan no longer subscribes to the view that it is acceptable procedure to destine ourselves and our future generations to live

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under the constant threat of nuclear annihilation, nor the assumption that the United States retains a sufficient offensive nuclear capability to deter the Soviets. In other words, Mr. Reagan feels that the nature and capability of the threat have changed so dramatically over the past two decades that the underlying assumptions of our countervailing strategy may no longer hold.<sup>3</sup>

It is now the view of our national planners that the balance of power has altered to the extent that the United States can no longer be confident that after sustaining a Soviet first strike, its surviving nuclear capability will be able to fulfill its second-strike mission.<sup>4</sup> Ever since ratification of the SALT I and ABM Treaties, the Soviets have continued to expand and improve their nuclear capabilities, both passive and active. The Soviets have deployed the only existing ABM system and are currently deploying new ABM missiles (SH-04/08) to replace the aging Galosh; they are increasing the total number of launchers to 100, the maximum allowed by the ABM Treaty; they are hardening the silos of their land-based ICBM force; they are apparently developing a rapidly deployable ABM capability; they have deployed (or are soon to deploy) a number of ground- and air-based air defense systems capable of attacking nuclear missiles; and they have constructed a new large phased array radar, the location and orientation of which has impelled the President officially to declare it a violation of the ABM Treaty. Also a potential violation of the ABM Treaty is their testing of a surface-to-air missile (the SA-12) against a ballistic missile of the SS-4 class. Moreover, the Soviets have continued to place considerable emphasis on their civil defense program.

In conjunction with these defensive measures, the Soviets have concurrently embarked upon an unparalleled offensive modernization program that severely threatens the survivability of our own offensive systems (i.e. our retaliatory capability). Since the ABM Treaty, the Soviets have deployed, or have in test and development, at least eight new strategic missiles; five new classes of ballistic missile submarines; a new strategic

bomber; and highly accurate multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (i.e. MIRV nuclear warheads). They also have aggressively pursued laser, particle beam, and radio frequency wave technology for possible use as weapons with antiballistic missile and antisatellite (ASAT) applications. They also possess the world's only operational ASAT system. This list does not include the additional progress being made on short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. All in all, the Soviets now have 1398 land-based ballistic missiles with over 6000 warheads (most being of the highly accurate MIRV variety), with a megatonnage that has increased threefold over its 1972 level, plus 1000 submarine-launched ballistic missiles with nearly 3000 warheads. One analysis suggests that the Soviets could destroy, given the targeting accuracy that is now possible, up to 95 percent of American ICBMs in a first strike using only a small portion of their own force.<sup>7</sup> These developments essentially alter the balance in a disturbing manner; increasingly, the Soviets are seen to be preparing to ensure some level of survivability for their society while simultaneously developing offensive systems designed to allow for the possibility of a disarming first strike against the United States.<sup>8</sup>

Three factors can thus be seen to have influenced the formulation of a new strategy: first, a dissatisfaction with deterrence based on mutual vulnerability and the threat of offensive retaliation (combined with the view that such an offense-based deterrent, no matter how fearsome, may not last forever, with intolerable consequences for mankind);<sup>9</sup> second, the growth of the Soviet threat; and third, the recent technological advances that have been made in many areas relevant to defense against ballistic missiles, which may overcome the technological limitations that played such an important role in influencing the United States to support the ABM Treaty in 1972.<sup>10</sup>

The SDI, at this point, after having successfully passed two critical scientific feasibility reviews,<sup>11</sup> and after the promulgation of two national security decision

directives,<sup>12</sup> is described as a major research effort to identify technologies applicable to the possible development of an effective defense against enemy ballistic missiles. It is a program to which considerable scientific and financial resources are being allocated, the objectives of which are to determine the feasibility of developing a survivable, effective (with an acceptable level of confidence), cost-effective system that will defend the United States and its allies from ballistic missile attacks. The defensive system need not be "leakproof," but it must be sufficiently impenetrable that it would make an enemy uncertain that he could deliver a disarming first strike.<sup>13</sup>

Current research on the SDI is intended to stay within the constraints of the ABM Treaty. Given positive results, however, and following close consultations with our allies, the United States intends to consult and negotiate as appropriate with the Soviet Union on how to proceed, pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty. As currently contemplated, if the essential requirements of survivability, effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness can be met, the SDI will develop into a layered system that will be able to attack enemy ballistic missiles throughout their flight trajectories, from launch to terminal flight. Without addressing details of weapon technologies, a four-layered approach using three basic sets of technologies (kill mechanisms, surveillance/target tracking, and battle management) is foreseen. Enemy missiles are to be attacked during their boost phase (whereby effective attack could only occur from sea- and space-launched platforms); the "bus" is attacked again during the post-boost phase (again, where attack would probably occur from space, though possibly from air or ground platforms); surviving re-entry vehicles/warheads would be attacked during the mid-course phase (when all the re-entry vehicles and decoys are released from the bus); and finally, the residual reentry vehicles would be attacked during the terminal phase (the traditional concept of ballistic missile defense, whereby reentry vehicles are attacked by ground-based systems on their

descent through the atmosphere toward their targets. Needless to say, these concepts have some severe implications for treaties, stability, and arms control. The stated objectives of SDI include the following:

- To deter enemy nuclear attacks based on defensive rather than offensive capabilities.
- To contribute to peace and stability in the world.
- To complement and support efforts to achieve equitable, verifiable arms reductions.
- To reduce radically the power and utility of offensive nuclear missiles.
- To guarantee mutual security with our allies.
- To stabilize the relationship between offensive and defensive arms.
- To smooth the transition to a period of greater stability with reduced reliance on offensive nuclear arms and enhanced ability to deter war, based on an increased contribution of nonnuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms.
- To contribute, throughout all phases of SDI progress, to continued negotiations and diplomacy.
- To contribute to the ultimate evolution of a world free of nuclear arms.<sup>14</sup>

#### ANALYSIS

Although its objectives seem clear, its goals noble and undeniably attractive on the face, the SDI entails a number of related and valid issues which, if not properly addressed, could easily transform what may appear to be a desirable path to peace and security into one of instability and increased likelihood of Armageddon. Inherent within the context of SDI are the interrelated concerns of morality and ethics; level of effectiveness; clear identification of specific targets to be defended; effects on crisis stability; effects on our allies (particularly NATO); effects on current and future arms negotiations; and, probably most relevant, *perceptions* of SDI by the Soviets, our allies, and our public. These concerns, when fully considered, should then serve as a basis for the development of a coherent

strategy—something which has not yet become clearly evident. I shall attempt to elaborate on a few of these concerns, and relate them where possible.

The key issue is stability: Will SDI bring about a stable environment, one conducive to the eventual elimination of offensive nuclear weapons? This issue is largely dependent upon the system's overall effectiveness, the target areas being defended, and perceptions. It has been argued that unless the defense is perfect (i.e. no "leakage," 100-percent effective), it will encourage the enemy simply to intensify his efforts to deploy increasingly greater quantities of more capable offensive arms to ensure the availability of a sufficient number of systems to overwhelm the defense, thus further exacerbating the arms race and contributing to greater instability. On the other hand, if the defense were perfect, the enemy would then perceive itself to own an obsolete nuclear arsenal that could no longer credibly serve its deterrent role. Assuming also that it has no strategic defense comparable to that provided by SDI, this perceived lack of a credible deterrent could induce a feeling of vulnerability to the possibility of either a US first strike or political blackmail. As a result, a potential adversary, the Soviet Union, could feel compelled to preempt. Again, the result is instability.

From the US perspective, however, neither of these arguments is valid, for even if a less-than-perfect defense is deployed, it would create considerable uncertainty in the enemy's planning cycle should he desire to conduct a disarming preemptive strike (see endnote 13). Also, should he initiate a strike, even a less-than-perfect defense would probably allow far fewer warheads to penetrate, therefore limiting the damage (which doubtlessly would be considerable—perhaps devastating—even if only a few warheads penetrated). Theoretically, however, the lack of certainty regarding the successful launch of a disarming preemptive strike should suffice as deterrence. In the case of a perfect defense, the underlying question is whether the Soviets would risk global annihilation to keep from being potentially

dominated by the United States (Perhaps . . . a question of perception.) In either case, the former situation may in fact be the more stable of the two.

In addressing the related issue of SDI's effects on the arms race, certainly the Soviets could respond by significantly accelerating their offensive strategic programs, increasing the number, types (ballistic missiles, bombers, cruise missiles), and sophistication (countermeasures, penetration aids, exotic technologies, etc.) of their nuclear offense and defense. In this event, in my opinion, SDI may have contributed to greater instability and insecurity. This argument turns on the definition of cost-effectiveness, in which SDI is considered cost-effective only if it costs less to develop and deploy the SDI than it would cost to develop sufficient offensive arms and countermeasures to defeat the system.<sup>15</sup> To help avoid the possible instability that could result, however, it will be necessary to pursue such diplomatic aspects as open dialogue, friendly relations, full knowledge of intentions, etc. Actions during this period of SDI's development will also play a critical role, for, to the Soviets, actions speak much louder than words.

Another contributing factor, and one that again affects perceptions, concerns the targets being defended. As long as a BMD defends missiles (as the name suggests), that defense sends a signal that the intent is to use one's missile force as a retaliation measure, and it must therefore be defended against a first strike. If, on the other hand, population centers are to be defended and missiles are left undefended, the signal is that the missiles do not need to be defended because they will not be there if an enemy attack should occur (suggesting a first-strike intent). The perception in such a case, then, is that the population is being defended from an enemy's retaliatory strike. The problem with SDI is that it can be used to defend both missiles and populations, thus denying an adversary key information regarding intent. Once again, this situation may be considered destabilizing by sending ambiguous signals that cannot be easily or unequivocally interpreted. Accurate warheads on missiles

further exacerbate this problem by suggesting point (counterforce) targeting of enemy missiles. Perhaps a way to ameliorate this situation is to install ground-based missile defenses as the first element of SDI, then, as other elements of SDI are developed, to reduce the offensive capability. Again, open dialogue is critical.<sup>16</sup>

The Soviets are fundamentally different from Americans in their politics, ideology, social system, the way they think about peace and security, and in their world outlook.<sup>17</sup> The Soviets, as our primary adversary, will have the greatest effect on the extent to which a condition of stability or instability will result from SDI. Therefore, to assess the potential effectiveness of SDI as a new US strategy, it is critically important to understand how the Soviets perceive SDI and to correctly estimate how they will react to its implementation. To ignore the Soviet view, quite simply, is to invite disaster.

Shortly after President Reagan delivered his SDI speech, Yuri Andropov, then President of the Soviet Union and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, responded by assessing the SDI as a means for the United States to "acquire a first strike capability," and as a "bid to disarm the Soviet Union" by securing the possibility of destroying Soviet strategic systems and rendering the Soviet Union incapable of dealing a retaliatory strike.<sup>18</sup> Given its source, this statement should not be taken lightly. It clearly indicates that the Soviet Union views SDI to be offensive in nature and designed to support US strategic supremacy. It is not at all surprising that the Soviets should view SDI with such trepidation. They have considerable respect for US capabilities and technological potential, and they are probably confident that if the United States mobilizes its resources, it can be successful in developing an effective program. However, they also perceive the United States as a fundamentally aggressive, imperialist nation, one that has been hostile to the Soviet Union and has made every effort to retain a position of supremacy. They see the United States as the only nation that has employed nuclear weapons offensively (with

Hiroshima and Nagasaki defined not as targets to end World War II but rather as signals designed to intimidate the Soviets), and they assess the Baruch Plan as one to ensure the US nuclear monopoly. Furthermore, the creation of NATO is perceived as yet another indication of US hostility. These negative perceptions are not likely to change.

Given that SDI is being developed concurrently with MX, B-1B, Pershing II, cruise, stealth, and the space shuttle, one cannot help but understand that to the skeptical observer, the US development of SDI could be perceived as a system to establish US supremacy and a first-strike capability. To the Soviets, SDI fits a first-strike category, and they firmly believe it to be a threat.<sup>19</sup> Therefore it would not be presumptuous to assume that the Soviets will take whatever steps they feel are necessary (indeed, they have said they could and would) to ensure retention of a credible retaliatory capability and to undermine SDI. Their means would probably include overt diplomacy, active measures, and development of greater quantities of more sophisticated strategic military equipment. Also, they will likely redouble their efforts to obtain better defensive capabilities, and it would not be surprising, failing all else, to see the Soviets take some military or paramilitary actions against critical elements of SDI before the entire system becomes operational.<sup>20</sup>

Since the Soviet perception of SDI is so negative, the United States will have to make every effort to maintain an open, honest, and factual dialogue with the USSR if we hope to avoid creating instability. It will not be easy for them to accept this new strategy, nor, given many past US actions, is it likely that the United States will easily dispel Soviet suspicions. There will have to be tradeoffs between offense and defense. If pursuit of defense could possibly become mutually beneficial, then perhaps there is a chance for a more stable strategic relationship. It is clear, however, that the success of SDI as a military strategy must be inextricably linked to both the political and psychological instruments of power.<sup>21</sup>

Our allies have raised some concerns regarding the SDI program. Despite US pronouncements of its deep commitment to the defense of NATO, its support of the existing NATO strategy of flexible response, and its assurance that the technology of SDI will also be available to protect our allies from ballistic missile attacks (including short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles), some allies still have reservations. NATO nations view the potential of SDI as a weakening of the US commitment to provide Europe with a nuclear umbrella which inextricably links the security of the United States to that of Europe. To the Europeans, SDI inherently possesses the potential to decouple the defense of West Europe from that of the United States.

Moreover, West Europe still remains vulnerable to a variety of threats other than ballistic missiles, with the balance largely favoring the Warsaw Pact. A common NATO perception is that given a successful Pact invasion, the United States, while hiding behind the protection of its SDI, might be reluctant to escalate to nuclear warfare in order to save West European territory. To the Germans, deterrence in Europe can be maintained only if there is a shared US-European risk, and they see in SDI a willingness to "trade space for time" (i.e. a rejection of flexible response) which, to the Germans, is totally unacceptable. From this perspective, then, SDI has a decidedly destabilizing effect.

Potentially exacerbating this problem is the possibility that the Soviet Union, to compete with the United States, will also develop an effective strategic defense. (They are now known to be working on a strategic defense program.) Were this to happen, the Pershings now in Europe, along with the independent nuclear capabilities of both the UK and France, would no longer represent credible threats to the Soviet Union. As such, SDI will have essentially nullified the strategic nuclear capabilities of our allies and caused their de facto disarmament. The result could be a war fought in Europe, in which all of Europe is destroyed while both the United States and the Soviet Union remain unscathed (each withholding its ICBMs due to the

other's defense). Thus deterrence and the credibility of nuclear retaliation are both undermined.

It almost goes without saying that SDI cannot (must not) proceed in isolation, and must progress only concurrent with frank, open, honest, factual, balanced dialogue and negotiations—with our allies as well as our adversaries. Although the theory and declared intent behind SDI seem logical and moral, considerable potential exists for SDI quite simply to encourage greater instability and increased risk of war rather than ensuring the peace and security that are identified as its goals.

Arms control negotiations represent the only effective means by which to manage a transition to a defense-reliant deterrent strategy. The United States has offered to discuss the implications of defensive technologies with the Soviet Union and has stipulated that its research is consistent with the ABM Treaty. Both are positive steps. We intend to consult and negotiate pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty. As this treaty is widely held in high esteem by our allies and many senior US policymakers as a necessary element of deterrence, unilateral abrogation would probably be unwise from both a political and psychological standpoint. Meanwhile, SDI can work only if an offensive arms race is not stimulated. Every effort should be made to pursue radical arms reductions. To cause an acceleration in offensive arms production and deployment can only be counterproductive, and every effort should be made to reduce rather than increase this risk. The goal is to pursue balance on both sides—not superiority. Strategic, long-term stability can exist only if security is enhanced on both sides. Cooperation is desirable, and the United States must remain attuned to, and sympathetic with, the Soviet perspective; likewise, the Soviet leadership must do the same in their dealings with the United States. Overall, it will be actions, rather than words, that will determine the final outcome and affect the tenor of negotiations.<sup>22</sup>

Before concluding, one final consideration needs to be addressed with regard to SDI: its ethical and moral justification.

Critics of SDI have attacked it as being an unsound, unethical policy, while proponents argue the opposite. One should bear in mind, however, that for 40 years deterrence has relied on offensive threats that could lead to global annihilation. It is my opinion that although SDI holds considerable potential to contribute to instability in an already precarious world, it also holds the possibility that offensive nuclear weapons could be rendered obsolete. Certainly SDI should be considered no less moral or ethical than the extant policy of mutual assured destruction. Perhaps final judgment on the ethics of SDI should be delayed until we can assess the manner in which it is pursued by the United States and until we see some positive (or negative) results. Should SDI lead to its ultimate goal, then indeed it would be a morally and ethically correct choice.<sup>23</sup>

### CONCLUSION

Obviously there are many serious and complex issues associated with the prospect of developing a highly effective system to defend against ballistic missiles. Most important among these is the effect that deployment of an SDI will have on global stability. SDI may not be the right or sole answer to the threat of nuclear holocaust, but what is apparent now is that offensive nuclear arsenals are reaching absurdly high levels and arms control negotiations have not been successful in effectively altering this course. SDI represents a potential solution. It is too early in the research phase of SDI to draw any unequivocal conclusions regarding the efficacy of SDI as the correct future strategy for the United States, but some observations may help put the issue into perspective.

We currently live under the threat of nuclear annihilation and have no means to deter our primary adversary except to offer him a comparable threat of nuclear annihilation. Over the past 40 years, nuclear war has not broken out—perhaps the threat of retaliation works. But what happens if our retaliatory capability ceases to be a credible deterrent? The Soviets over the past 20 years

have deployed third and fourth (and are testing fifth) generation strategic missiles, increased their nuclear yields to twice the US level, significantly improved their targeting capabilities, and increased by 300 percent since the ABM Treaty the number of warheads capable of destroying hardened targets. Simultaneously they have spent roughly the same amount of money on defensive measures as they have on offense (the Moscow ABM system, mobile missiles, defensive radars, civil defense, super-hardened silos, new generations of air defense interceptors and surface-to-air missiles, etc.).

As for deterrence, it has become increasingly questionable whether the United States would retain a credible second-strike capability against the Soviets after suffering a Soviet preemptive strike against our own land-based missiles (all of which are in fixed sites and lack defenses) and bomber airfields. (Survivability of the submarine force, at least for the time being, is less in question, but SLBMs are slower, less accurate, and more vulnerable to defensive measures than are ICBMs.)

Coupled with the changing nature of the threat is the realization that technology may also have changed radically enough to make possible the construction of effective defenses. While not necessarily ensuring a reduction in the threat of offensive missiles, it at least holds the promise for a future in which perhaps a better balance between offense and defense can develop, thus making the world that much safer.

Many potentially destabilizing influences also must be considered. Among these are perceptions by the Soviets that the United States may be interested in developing a first-strike capability and perceptions by our allies that the United States may be reducing its nuclear commitment to their defense. The spectrum of potential reactions could certainly be most enlightening: We could see ourselves embroiled in another offensive arms race, or in a defensive arms race; we even could see the Soviets chance a preemptive strike. On the other hand, we could

see peace and cooperation (although this is doubtful given Soviet perceptions of the United States).

Stability could be reinforced. Targeting uncertainty could deter the Soviets from initiating an attack. Negotiations resulting in a mutually agreeable balance between offense and defense could result. Even if only a limited-capability defense were emplaced, it could provide adequate protection from accidental nuclear releases or limited attacks. These are all enormous improvements over what we have now. The most stable situation would be one in which both the United States and the Soviet Union deployed comparable defensive systems simultaneously, then began to eliminate their offensive nuclear weapons.

Whatever final judgments are made with regard to SDI, it should be kept in mind that no single policy or technological achievement will ever lead to a total abolition of the potential for strife and conflict. Strategic defense, in and of itself, will not solve the fundamental problems of the political rivalry that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. SDI holds the promise of possibly finding a safer way to work out our differences—it also holds the possibility of exacerbating those differences. To enhance the prospect of stability, SDI must be closely tied with an effective dialogue and associated arms control agreements. We must now also develop a military strategy to harness the potential offered by SDI while we continue to pursue political and psychological means to understand each other better and to develop agreements that are mutually beneficial, as well as beneficial for the world. Meanwhile, SDI, in the long run, at least holds out the possibility of transforming, though not transcending, the US-Soviet deterrence relationship: thus it should be pursued, but with caution and due deliberation.<sup>24</sup>

#### NOTES

1. Robert Jastrow, *How to Make Nuclear War Obsolete* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 72.
2. Ronald Reagan, televised address, 23 March 1983.
3. For purposes of this paper, both the ability of science and technology to develop an effective, survivable system and

the question of cost-effectiveness will largely be assumed. The rationale for this is that it is unlikely that science soon will resolve the issue of feasibility. As in the past with other technological advancements (Einstein did not believe that nuclear energy could be harnessed), there are as many brilliant, well-reasoned, credible scientists who believe that a system can be developed as believe otherwise. To continue a discussion of SDI on strategy, we must assume that the system exists to evaluate its potential effects. Likewise, one of the constraints imposed upon SDI by the President is that it be "cost effective at the margins," i.e. it must cost less to develop and deploy the SDI than it would cost to develop sufficient offensive arms and countermeasures to defeat the system. Therefore, if the system is not cost-effective, it will not undergo development, and further argument on SDI is moot.

4. Robert Kennedy and John M. Weinstein, eds., *The Defense of the West: Strategic and European Security Issues Reappraised* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 243. Counterforce targeting refers to the targeting of the enemy's nuclear delivery means. Countervalue targeting refers to targeting the enemy's population and economic centers. The current strategy is "countervailing," which emphasizes counterforce targeting but also includes the targeting of war-supporting industries, recovery resources, and political power structure while retaining an "assured destruction" capacity in reserve.

5. Department of State, "Strategic Defense Initiative," *Current Policy*, 7 March 1985.

6. Ibid.

7. Lewis E. Lehrman, "The Case for Strategic Defense," *Policy Review*, No. 31 (Winter 1985), p. 44. See also Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power—1985*, 4th ed., April 1985, pp. 25-59; and Paul H. Nitze, "SDI: The Soviet Program," *Current Policy*, 28 June 1985, for good, detailed assessments of the Soviet offensive nuclear and strategic defensive capabilities.

8. "Disarming" refers to the ability of one side to conduct an initial strike of such precision and effectiveness that the other side's remaining nuclear force would not represent a credible retaliatory threat.

9. Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition," *Foreign Affairs*, 62 (Spring 1984), 820.

10. Paul H. Nitze, "SDI and the ABM Treaty," *Current Policy*, 30 May 1985, p. 2; Richard C. Gross, "Arms Control: A New Lever," *Defense Science & Electronics*, 4 (February 1985), 12; also, refer to note 3 as regards discussion on technology.

11. These are the Defense Technologies Study Team (headed by James Fletcher) and the Future Security Strategy Study (headed by Franklin Miller and Fred Hoffman). The results of both found that emerging technologies held promise for strategic defense, and that research should be conducted toward that end. Bruce L. Valley, "The Ultimate Defense," *Proceedings*, 111 (February 1985), 32.

12. These are NSDD 6-83, which mandated the examination of technology that could eliminate the threat posed by ballistic missiles; and NSDD 119, which authorized an expansive research program to demonstrate the technical feasibility of intercepting attacking enemy missiles. Payne, p. 821.

13. Since neither the United States nor its allies have any BMD whatsoever, there currently exist no such uncertainties in the Soviet calculus. Accordingly, the enemy can know in advance (within a fair degree) what amount of force it will need to achieve a particular level of destruction. The vulnerability of the US ICBMs to a Soviet first strike was recognized by the

1983 Scowcroft Commission Report, and indeed, this situation is in defiance of Clausewitzian theory which emphasizes the interworking of offense and defense and the fact that differences exist between the plan (paper war) and reality. Clausewitz says, "Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." He uses the term "friction" as the force which causes difficulties and ensures that nothing will go entirely according to the plan, and introduces the concept of uncertainty. When defenses are entered into the strategic equation, the enemy's level of certainty must concomitantly drop. This, therefore, removes from him the advanced knowledge of whether his attack will be successful (thus, theoretically, discouraging the attack in the first place).

14. Harold Brown, et al., "The Strategic Defense Initiative," *Essays on Strategy and Diplomacy*, No. 3 (May 1985), pp. 34-36; and Office of the President of the United States, *The President's Strategic Defense Initiative*, January 1985.

15. According to one study, even if a four-layered defense were 80-percent effective in each of its layers, the Soviets, to be assured of achieving an appropriate level of damage on a first strike, would have to increase their current number of missiles fivefold, at a cost approaching two trillion dollars. Jastrow, p. 128.

16. An excellent discussion of the issue of crisis stability can be found in Robert Kennedy and John M. Weinstein, eds., *The Defense of the West: Strategic and European Security Issues Reappraised* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 167-75.

17. Although we both may have a common desire for peace and security, our definitions remain different: For the United States, peace may be the "absence of war and relaxation of tensions" with the Soviets. In contrast, for the Soviets, peace "implies a movement to the condition when

worldwide victory of socialism has made war obsolete." James D. Watkins, "The Strategic Defense Initiative: Keeping Teeth in the Policy of Deterrence," *Defense/85* (March 1985), p. 18.

18. Frank von Hippel, "Attacks on Star Wars Critics a Diversion," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 41 (April 1985), 10.

19. John Judge, "The Strategic Defense Initiative and Arms Control," *Defense Electronics*, 17 (March 1985), 96.

20. William E. Burrows, "Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security," *Foreign Affairs*, 62 (Spring 1984), 844; Sidney D. Drell, Phillip J. Farley, and David Holloway, "Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative," *International Security*, 9 (Fall 1984), 304; Von Hippel, p. 10; and McGeorge Bundy, et al., "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs*, 63 (Winter 1984/85), 266-67.

21. There is no intent here to ignore the significance also of the economic instrument. Clearly given the spiraling costs for offense and defense—for all parties concerned, including our allies—the importance cannot be overstated. Indeed, pursuit of the technologies necessary for developing an effective SDI or for accelerating the arms race (as a potential response) could virtually bankrupt some countries.

22. Consideration must also be given to the Space Treaty, SALT I, and SALT II (even though unratified). Further information on the relationship of SDI and arms control negotiations may be found in Drell; Judge, p. 104; Department of State, "The Strategic Defense Initiative," Special Report 129, June 1985, p. 3; and Nitze, pp. 2-3.

23. Refer to Department of State, Kenneth L. Adelman, "SDI: Setting the Record Straight," *Current Policy*, 7 August 1985, p. 3.

24. Payne, p. 842.



# WHAT FUTURE FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE?

by

WALLACE J. THIES

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A curious relationship has developed between the United States and its European allies in the 37 years since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. For all of the members of the Atlantic Alliance, the years since 1949 have been a period of unparalleled prosperity and economic growth. The members of the alliance have achieved a degree of military coordination and integration of separate national armed forces unprecedented in the history of alliances. No member has been coerced into leaving nor have any chosen to leave voluntarily, while four states have joined the original 12 as full members.<sup>1</sup> Most important, Europe has been at peace for four full decades, a period roughly twice the interval between the First and Second World Wars.

Political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have been quick to claim for the alliance much of the credit for the peace and prosperity that Europe has enjoyed these past four decades. They have also been quick to complain about the alliance's shortcomings, most of which they blame on their counterparts on the other side of the ocean. These complaints have not gone unnoticed among observers of NATO's affairs. Americans and Europeans, journalists and academics, military officers and civilian officials have all been quick to pronounce the alliance "in crisis," or at the least in disarray. Looking back over its history there seems to have been scarcely a year when NATO was not widely said to be in crisis, or even on the brink of disintegration.<sup>2</sup>

In retrospect, it should come as no surprise that assessments of the state of the alliance have taken this form. The North Atlantic Treaty was not a blueprint that specified to the smallest detail how the alliance was to be organized and run. It represented instead a commitment on the part of the signatories to make common cause and to strive to work out solutions to the problems that were expected to arise in the course of implementing the treaty in a spirit of goodwill and with a concern for the needs of the whole.

A recurrent theme in the negotiations that preceded the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty was the hope that the alliance would evolve into something more than a "mere military alliance," which was a concept that had fallen into disfavor in the liberal democratic states as a result of the revulsion over the two world wars that had been the product of the struggle for power and empire in Europe.<sup>3</sup> But for NATO to evolve into a community of states linked by more than simply fear of Soviet power would require a willingness on the part of its members to accept new responsibilities and obligations toward their partners. These were relatively easy to accept in principle but considerably harder to implement in practice.

To the European members, exhausted by two devastating wars in the span of a generation, the alliance offered an opportunity to shift a portion of the burden of providing for their security to the United States, which they continually urged to provide leadership, aid, and soldiers to the

cause of Europe's defense. But to American officials, the purpose of the alliance was to create a sense of security in Europe, which was expected to contribute to the restoration of the economic health and military potential of the European members. This would make possible a restoration of the European balance of power, which in turn would permit the withdrawal of most or all of the American military forces stationed in Europe, thus lessening the burdens on the United States.<sup>4</sup>

One result of these competing purposes was to introduce three permanent sources of tension and strain within NATO. One arose from the conflict pitting those who wished to press ahead toward greater community against those who gave primacy to defending the national interest. A second resulted from disagreements between those who felt that the alliance's principal military goal should be to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe and those who wished to put in place the armed forces necessary to defend against such an attack. Still a third stemmed from the desire felt by all members to ensure that the other members made the maximum feasible contribution in support of the collective goals while deflecting the efforts of their partners to scrutinize and criticize their own contributions.

Untangling the disputes that resulted from these divergent perspectives often required arduous investigative research, since the cleavages within the alliance as a whole were mirrored by divisions within governments, parliaments, and sometimes even within a single ministry. There thus grew up a veritable cottage industry of academics and journalists seeking to explain the often tangled and sometimes arcane roots of the alliance's many crises, the reasons why they were important, and their implications for the future. The alliance's very successes added urgency to this effort, lest years of progress in consolidating the Western community of states be jeopardized by a dispute that was allowed to fester.

This fascination with the alliance's many crises was not without its drawbacks. Alliance crises occurred so frequently and then faded from view so quickly that the

language used to describe them came to be inflated by observers who sought to convince their audiences that the situation really was serious. Instead of mere crises, disputes within NATO became "profound crises," "deep crises," "general crises," and so on. Terms such as these, however, were useful more for conveying alarm than for making precise and accurate judgments about the condition of the alliance. Discussions of NATO's troubled state typically began with the assertion that the alliance was once again "in crisis," followed by a review of causes, consequences, and possible solutions.<sup>5</sup> In effect, the existence of an alliance crisis was taken for granted, and no one defined the term "alliance crisis" in a way that would permit a disinterested observer to determine when the alliance is in crisis and when it is not.

The problems resulting from such a casual approach have become especially apparent of late. The last five years have witnessed a new sense of urgency in assessments of the state of the alliance. Increasingly, the theme has appeared in reporting and commentary on the alliance that this time things are different, that relations between the United States and its European allies are worse than ever before, and that the latest alliance crisis is the worst ever.<sup>6</sup> The very frequency with which NATO has been proclaimed to be embroiled in a potentially fatal crisis, however, should occasion skepticism about these claims.

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It is instructive to trace the evolution of such recent claims.<sup>7</sup> In just the last five years, disputes within the alliance over issues as diverse as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, defense spending and burden-sharing, the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe, the Siberian natural gas pipeline, and export subsidies and import restrictions have all been cited as the cause of the worst strains in the history of the alliance. In the past, it seemed as if the alliance confronted a new crisis almost annually. Now it seems as if almost every year the alliance confronts its greatest crisis ever. Are the crises of the last five years so much more severe than earlier disputes that we are justified in concluding that the condition of the alliance is worse now than ever before? Does the combination of several sharp disputes in a relatively short period of time justify the conclusion that the alliance has been caught in its greatest crisis ever? Or is it the case that observers of the alliance's affairs have routinely exaggerated the challenges that it faces?

A separate but closely related issue has to do with the evidence on which claims about the state of the alliance are based. Almost from the time the alliance was founded, observers have been discovering ominous trends, problems that are growing increasingly acute, and contradictions that are said to sharpen with each passing year. These claims are almost never accompanied by the kind of evidence that would permit a disinterested observer to verify whether the hypothesized changes really are occurring in the predicted direction. Instead, judgments about the state of the alliance often have been based on evidence that is largely impressionistic. Journalists accord considerable weight to the complaints of anonymous officials from defense and foreign ministries. Observers from the academic world take note of these complaints and write books and articles that seek to analyze the underlying causes and prescribe needed changes. The sheer volume of material published on the alliance's ills itself becomes an index of the seriousness of its troubles. The potential for self-fulfilling prophecies is very great.

Problems of definition and evidence are so fundamental that an appropriate starting point for an evaluation of recent claims concerning the condition of the alliance is with a reconsideration of the sources of tension and strain within it. Is there any evidence that suggests that the strains within the alliance have become noticeably greater during the past five years than they were during the alliance's first three decades?

#### 1947 ALL OVER AGAIN

The claim that the alliance had become embroiled in a crisis greater than ever before first appeared in the late spring of 1980, coinciding with a special meeting of defense and foreign ministers in Brussels to consider the alliance's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>8</sup> The meeting was intended to demonstrate unity of purpose and action by ratifying a package of proposals put forward by the United States, but it had the unintended effect of revealing a sharp divergence of views between the United States and its European allies.

By the time of the ministerial gathering in Brussels, Jimmy Carter's presidency had been severely tested by the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran, the attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca, and the attacks on the American Embassies in Pakistan and Libya, all of which occurred within a five-week span in November and December 1979. These events had a traumatic effect on the American people, but their effect on senior officials in the Carter Administration was even more important. The upheavals of November and December 1979 made plain how limited were American capabilities to project military power directly into the Persian Gulf region and galvanized the Administration to take action to correct the deficiencies that were now glaringly apparent.

Having been sensitized to the dangers to American interests and made aware of the limits on the ability of the United States to respond quickly to military challenges in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, senior members

of the Carter Administration were predisposed to regard any further shocks as posing an exceedingly grave danger. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of December thus crystallized and hardened fears that had emerged a month earlier; it also raised new fears as to whether the move into Afghanistan would be confined to that country or was merely the first step in an attempt to extend Soviet control over Pakistan, Iran, and ultimately the Arabian Peninsula. In the weeks that followed, the consensus within the Administration was that the events of the last two months of 1979 meant that it was 1947 all over again; just as the Truman Administration had built a political and military structure of alliances, bases, and aid agreements to contain Soviet expansionism in Europe, so now was it the duty of the Carter Administration to do the same to safeguard Western interests in the oil resources of the Persian Gulf.

The ensuing controversy in the United States over President Carter's pledge to use force if necessary to defend Persian Gulf oil had the effect of throwing the Administration on the defensive, both as to whether the United States had sufficient military forces to uphold the President's pledge and concerning the role of the European allies in the defense of shared Western interests. Limitations on the ability of the United States to project military power into a region so far away and so close to the Soviet Union suggested to many in the United States that it would be essential to call on the European allies to supplement American efforts. The armed forces of the European members of the alliance, however, were so heavily oriented toward the defense of their home regions that any allied contribution to the American buildup in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf would of necessity be relatively small. Even the larger European allies, such as Great Britain and France, had only a very limited capability to project military power into the Indian Ocean region.

Military constraints, however, were overshadowed by political considerations, which made it essential that the Europeans be seen as joining in the venture that the Carter Administration had set in motion. It would

not look right, especially in an election year, for the United States to be running risks and taking on the burden of defending the West's access to Persian Gulf oil when it was well known that the Europeans were much more dependent on that oil than was the United States. This made it imperative that the Carter Administration secure the active cooperation of the European allies, and that they be seen as joining with the United States in the effort to build a credible Western military presence close to the Persian Gulf.

The Carter Administration encountered problems from the start in its efforts to secure the cooperation of the European allies. There was considerable disagreement within the alliance concerning the implications of the Soviet move into Afghanistan for European security, and the Administration's insistence that the alliance respond with actions as well as words was viewed by some European members as unnecessarily provocative.<sup>9</sup> The Europeans did not agree that the Soviet move meant that it was 1947 all over again; they were not enthused about the prospect of a second round of the Cold War. While the Europeans accepted the American argument that the invasion had changed the strategic situation and that some response was essential, they sought to ensure that whatever response was agreed on would not jeopardize the increased trade and family contacts with the East that had been one of the principal European gains from the years of detente. They also sought to ensure that any alliance response would not be so costly as to severely strain national budgets.

In the end, the Carter Administration and the European allies were able to agree both on a modest package of steps to shore up the military balance in Europe and on a division of labor toward the Southwest Asia region, whereby the United States would take the lead in projecting military power into the region while the Europeans would supplement American efforts by taking the generally modest steps that were within their means in the areas of security assistance, economic aid, military deployments, and support for American forces. But the handling of the issue was marred by public sniping that left a bad taste all around. A

senior Pentagon official wondered out loud if the Europeans were as interested in their own defense as was the United States,<sup>10</sup> while some European officials accused the Carter Administration of jeopardizing the relative harmony that had been achieved in Europe by overreacting to a minor upheaval in a distant theater.

More important than the sniping was the impression that lingered as a result of this episode. What was noticed in the United States was not the agreements that were reached but rather the reluctance of the Europeans to respond promptly to American requests for assistance at a time when the United States appeared beleaguered and in need of their aid. What lingered was the impression of a Europe that had lost interest in sharing the burdens of the alliance and which cared only about reaping the benefits. This impression would have a powerful effect on European-American relations during the first two years of the Reagan Administration's tenure.

The transfer of power from one Administration to another often brings a temporary glow to European-American relations. The public sniping that characterized the relationship during the Carter Administration's last year very likely contributed to this phenomenon by raising hopes in Europe that the incoming Reagan Administration would bring with it a steadier approach that would be more responsive to European concerns. But while the Carter Administration used the glow that accompanied its accession to power to win the Europeans' consent to an ambitious Long-Term Defense Program intended to revitalize the alliance, President Reagan and his associates adopted a more strident approach that soon led to new strains in European-American relations.

The defense budget for fiscal year 1982 submitted by the Carter Administration as one of its last official acts envisaged real growth in defense spending of about five percent; President Reagan and his advisers quickly let it be known that they considered that figure inadequate and that ten percent or more was needed. Officials in the new Administration also made it clear that they

intended to take a tougher stance, at least verbally, toward the Soviet Union, and that they were more skeptical of arms control initiatives than were their predecessors. Nor was the new Administration reticent when it came to criticizing what it saw as laggardly defense efforts by the Europeans, although the criticisms were selective and directed mainly at West Germany, the ally with perhaps the most impressive record of strengthening its armed forces during the 1960s and 1970s. Administration spokesmen suggested that they expected greater defense efforts from the Europeans and implied that if such efforts were not forthcoming the United States might be compelled to reconsider its policy of defense cooperation with Europe within the framework of the alliance.

Perhaps the most serious problem with all the talk of toughness and higher defense spending that accompanied the Reagan Administration's first year was that it seemed to frighten the citizens of the countries of Western Europe more than anyone else. Almost as shocking to Americans as the seizure of the Embassy in Iran were the mass protests in Western Europe in 1981 and 1982, many of which mobilized hundreds of thousands of demonstrators and which seemed to identify the United States rather than the Soviet Union as the principal threat to peace. The Reagan Administration responded by decrying the apparent spread of neutralist and pacifist sentiment in Western Europe and by reviving suggestions that the Europeans had lost interest in defending themselves. The more that officials in Washington complained about the Europeans' shortcomings, the more this seemed to arouse those in Europe who argued that the United States had become dangerous and irresponsible and an untrustworthy partner for a detente-minded Europe. Recriminations of this sort fueled speculation about the viability of the alliance, and by the middle of 1981 predictions of its impending demise were fairly common. Some even suggested that the alliance was already on the brink of collapse and that it was only a matter of time before the decay reached the point of being irreversible.<sup>11</sup>

## A NEUTRALIST, PACIFIST EUROPE?

There can be no question that the alliance has been severely strained in recent years, but it nonetheless seems premature to conclude that the end is in sight. The strain that developed within the alliance in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and which seemed to worsen during the Reagan Administration's first year did not mark the first time that observers of NATO's affairs have claimed to detect signs of an impending collapse. All too often, tensions in the alliance have been exaggerated by analysts straining to make the point that this time the fatal crisis is really at hand.<sup>12</sup>

More important, many recent analyses of the alliance's problems and especially of the alleged shortcomings of the European members have lacked historical perspective. Suggestions from Americans both in and out of government that the Europeans have lost interest in defense and that neutralist and pacifist sentiments are spreading rapidly in Western Europe have failed to take account of the fact that many of the sentiments that some American observers have found annoying have always been present in Western Europe. What has changed is not so much the attitudes and beliefs of elites and mass publics in Europe as the salience of those attitudes and American sensitivity to them.

Indeed, recent claims that neutralist and pacifist sentiments have been spreading in Western Europe provide a good example of the failure to supply the evidence and historical perspective needed to support rigorous judgments on the condition of the alliance. These claims have been accompanied by a proliferation of catchwords and phrases intended to dramatize the changes supposedly occurring: "Euro-neutralism," "Hollanditis," "Denmarkization," and so on. What these claims overlook is that large segments of the publics of Western Europe have always found attractive the notion of keeping their countries out of quarrels between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the early 1950s, for example, one-third of West German respon-

dents on average took the position that Germany should stay out of the East-West struggle; the percentage of West German respondents preferring neutrality in the event of an East-West war rose from 37 percent in September 1952 to 46 percent in early 1954 to 53 percent in October 1954.<sup>13</sup> In a February 1964 survey, 42 percent of West German respondents thought neutrality between East and West was preferable to friendship with the United States, while 49 percent believed the latter to be the more desirable course.<sup>14</sup> Measured by public opinion surveys, neutralist sentiments do not appear to be any more widespread in the Europe of the 1980s than they were in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>15</sup>

More important, the European attitudes that have led some American analysts to question the value of the alliance are similar in important respects to attitudes widely held by Americans. Just as Europeans have been reluctant to become too deeply involved in conflicts outside of Europe to which the United States was a party, so too have Americans looked with disdain on the conflicts that resulted from the efforts of the Europeans to pursue their interests overseas. The United States was no more eager to support the Dutch in Indonesia, the British and French at Suez, or the French in Algeria than were the Europeans to become involved in American disputes with the Vietnamese, the Iranians, and the Cubans. The Reagan Administration's ambivalence about supporting the British during the Falklands War and its reluctance to jeopardize ties with Argentina is a recent case in point.

Similar complaints by Americans both in and out of government have centered on the claim that pacifism has been spreading in Western Europe in recent years. The attitudes of elites and mass publics in Western Europe often are described as if they have been changing rapidly in recent years in the direction of hostility to the alliance and all that it stands for, especially military preparedness and the link with the United States. The claim that anti-defense movements are growing in strength in countries such as West Germany and the Netherlands is

a crucial link in the argument that the condition of the alliance is worse now than ever before.

Claims of this kind are misleading in three respects: first, they oversimplify the problem of judging the extent of pacifist sentiment in Western Europe; second, they fail to take into account that many Europeans have always been concerned and even frightened about the role of nuclear weapons in the alliance's plans for deterrence and defense; and third, they overlook some striking similarities in the attitudes of Europeans and Americans concerning the use of nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy.

The extent of pacifist sentiment in Western Europe is difficult to judge with confidence, because a willingness to state that one is prepared to fight in defense of one's country can be significantly influenced by the wording of questions in opinion surveys. Questions that omit any reference to the kind of weapons that would be used and to the location of the fighting generally elicit sizable majorities of Western Europeans who would prefer to fight rather than accept Soviet domination. In a May 1982 survey, for example, 74 percent of West German respondents and 75 percent of British respondents said they were prepared to fight rather than accept Soviet domination; only 19 percent and 12 percent, respectively, said they would be unwilling to fight. In the United States, 83 percent said they were prepared to fight; only six percent said it would be better to accept Soviet domination.<sup>16</sup>

However, when a national sample in West Germany was asked in a 1980 survey whether their country should fight to defend itself against an attack *on its soil*, only 64 percent agreed; 19 percent were opposed. When asked in the same survey if West Germany should defend itself against an attack even if the war were fought primarily on West German soil, only 53 percent agreed; 31 percent were opposed. Only 15 percent were in favor of defense against an attack if nuclear weapons had to be used on West German soil; 71 percent were opposed.<sup>17</sup>

The results of opinion surveys are ambiguous as to whether pacifist sentiments have recently been increasing or holding steady in Western Europe. Surveys taken in West Germany suggest that a desire to avoid war at all cost rather than use nuclear weapons for defense has increased since the 1950s. The greatest increases in this respect came in the 1960s and early 1970s, when detente emerged in Europe, rather than at the start of the 1980s. However, other surveys taken in West Germany in 1954 and 1955 found that nearly two-thirds of West German respondents opposed American nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of a nonnuclear attack by the Soviet Union on West Germany; only about one-fifth favored a nuclear response.<sup>18</sup>

It is also important to distinguish between an aversion to defense strategies based on nuclear weapons and an aversion to military preparedness. Opinion surveys of Dutch and West German attitudes suggest that the percentage believing a military counterbalance is necessary to offset Soviet power declined hardly at all between 1974 and 1982. More important, even among Dutch respondents who felt their chances of personal survival were zero or very small in the event of war in Europe, more than three-fifths agreed that it was better to defend the Netherlands against a Soviet attack rather than capitulate.<sup>19</sup> Pacifism does not appear to be widespread in Western Europe in the sense that many West Europeans would refuse to fight under any circumstances, but many West Europeans are unwilling to resort to weapons that could result in the annihilation of their homelands.

Strong opposition to the use of nuclear weapons for defense is by no means found only in Europe. In a May 1982 survey, only one-fourth of American respondents thought the United States would be justified using nuclear weapons *first* in a war. Only 28 percent thought the United States would be justified using nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet attack on Western Europe.<sup>20</sup> The Europeans who organized protest demonstrations in opposition to the deployment of

new nuclear missiles in their homelands were voicing sentiments similar to those expressed by the residents of Nevada and Utah, who opposed the presence of the MX in their states, as well as the residents of Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and other American cities a decade earlier, who opposed the Nixon Administration's plans for constructing ballistic missile defense sites near their homes.

#### CAN THE ALLIANCE ENDURE?

There is of course no guarantee that the Atlantic Alliance will hold together, but on the whole a collapse seems unlikely. The strains that have appeared in recent years reflect long-standing concerns rather than novel or unprecedented developments. The lack of enthusiasm with which the Europeans greeted the Carter Administration's plans to shift American forces to the Indian Ocean reflected concerns first expressed in Europe during the Korean War about the diversion of American resources away from Europe as well as a fear of being engulfed in a Soviet-American conflict that started outside of Europe. Similarly, the apparent spread of "nuclear pacifism" in Western Europe in recent years is not the first time that European publics have rebelled against defense strategies that seemed to promise annihilation rather than protection. Protests of this kind were fairly common during the 1950s, as in the case of the "rebellion of the 20-year-olds" in West Germany during the rearmament debate, the *Kampf dem Atomtod* (Struggle Against Atomic Death) in West Germany in 1958, or the Aldermaston marches in Great Britain. The recent protests and demonstrations in Europe may appear to be an unprecedented strain on the alliance only because they have followed a period of nearly two decades during which European concerns were muted and European publics were quiescent because of the emergence of detente and the promise of reducing the danger of war through arms control.

The fears expressed during the protests and demonstrations of the last few years are

not a sign that the alliance is no longer valued by Europeans or that an American presence is no longer desired. Opinion surveys in recent years have consistently turned up large majorities in the countries of Western Europe who believe the alliance is still essential for the security of their country.<sup>21</sup> The protests are instead a reminder of fears that have always been present in Western Europe and which have come to the surface whenever it has appeared as if the Europeans have lost control of their destiny, whether because of American actions outside Europe that suggested a heightened risk of war or because the alliance seemed to veer in the direction of a focus on nuclear war-fighting.

What this suggests is that many of the tensions and strains that have recently troubled the alliance stem from a failure to recall why the alliance was formed and why it has endured. With the exception of a brief period in 1950-51, few officials on either side of the Atlantic have seen a deliberate Soviet attack on Western Europe as a serious possibility. Instead, the contest has long been recognized to be a politico-psychological one, in which the principal threat to the West consisted of Soviet efforts to use the fear of war and its consequences to intimidate the countries of Western Europe into cutting their ties with the United States. The purpose of the alliance was not so much to coordinate war plans as to provide a visible sign of American support, which was essential if the Europeans were to be sufficiently reassured to stand up to Soviet political pressures.

The central dilemma that the United States has always faced in its policies toward the alliance has been to find ways to reassure the Europeans of American support and to encourage them to join in taking the steps necessary to maintain a military balance in Europe but without frightening them into believing that it was their ties to the United States that heightened the danger of war. Soviet policy, in contrast, has long sought to convince the publics of the European members of the alliance that it was precisely the link with the United States that was most likely to bring on the war that Europeans

have long feared. The controversy in Europe over the alliance's plans to restore a military balance there by deploying new continental-range nuclear missiles to offset Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers is but the most recent example of the constraints under which American policy must operate and the opportunities open to the Soviets to play on the Europeans' fear of war.

Is there anything that can be done to diminish the fears that have become so salient in recent years and in that way bring an end to the mutual recriminations that have made the future of the alliance seem rather bleak? There are at least four ways in which the European-American partnership could be strengthened in the years to come.

First, it is important to recognize that both Americans and Europeans have an interest in steering discussions of alliance strategy away from war-fighting scenarios and nuclear targeting options. It serves no Western interest to suggest that an American President would find it easier to fire nuclear missiles at the Soviet Union if they were based in Europe rather than in the United States.<sup>22</sup> To convey that impression is to heighten fears in Europe that the goal of American policy is to wage limited nuclear wars confined to Europe and to provide the Soviets with a potent propaganda tool with which to further their efforts to split the alliance.

By the same logic, it is a mistake to exaggerate Soviet advantages in tanks and combat manpower while denigrating the alliance's conventional forces, thus implying there may be no alternative to early and massive use of nuclear weapons should deterrence fail. Recent events in Poland suggest that Soviet lines of communication through that country could be secured in the event of war only by garrisoning the country with large numbers of Soviet troops to guard against sabotage and uprisings. Large numbers of Soviet troops would also be tied down in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The East European members of the Warsaw Pact could hardly be expected to fight enthusiastically as part of an aggressive war against the West.

Second, essential to the goal of reassuring the publics of Western Europe is a sound military posture. Military solutions can never completely resolve political problems, but a sound military posture can be helpful in alleviating some of the fears that have arisen in Western Europe in recent years. If the alliance is to endure, its overriding goal must be to prevent nuclear wars, not to fight them. It must also strive to deny to the Soviets the political leverage that would come from obvious superiority in either nuclear or conventional forces. This means the alliance's forces should be sized and structured for deterrence rather than for nuclear warfighting. It also means that the alliance should avoid as much as possible a military posture that tempts preemption. Finally, the alliance should strive to avoid a military posture or strategic concept that would require early use of nuclear weapons in the unlikely event of another war in Europe.

Third, it would be helpful if American officials would adopt a less-patronizing stance toward the European members of the alliance. It is ironic that an Administration pledged to return power to local units of government whenever possible should believe that Washington offered a better vantage point than Bonn, Paris, or Rome from which to judge where the Europeans should purchase their supplies of natural gas. American officials have often claimed that the United States desires responsible partners, able to work with the United States rather than be dependent on it. They have been less willing to concede that the price of responsibility is independence, and that one consequence of independence is likely to be occasional disagreement. Disagreement does not mean the alliance is on the verge of falling apart. It is instead a normal feature of an alliance of democratic societies called upon to deal with issues as sensitive and difficult as those that arise in the course of making foreign and defense policy.

Americans should recognize that it is in their interest that the European members of the alliance have the stature and the wherewithal to pursue independent foreign policies. There are important areas of the world where the United States is restricted in

the presence it can maintain and in the influence it can bring to bear. Countries that may be wary of an extensive American presence are often eager to maintain ties with the West through one or more of the European members of the alliance. The more independent the Europeans are of the United States, the easier it will be for them to maintain a Western presence in areas where the United States is unable to perform that role.

Finally, it would be helpful if each new disagreement among alliance members were not greeted with exaggerated claims of the alliance's impending demise. It is essential that discussions of the alliance and its troubles retain a sense of perspective and an understanding of the obstacles it has overcome through the years. The ability to surmount past crises offers no guarantee that the alliance will be able to do so in the future, but an awareness of what obstacles were overcome in the past should make observers more cautious about concluding that each new crisis means the alliance is on the verge of collapse.

#### NOTES

1. The 12 original members were the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Portugal. Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.

2. On this point, see Stanley Hoffmann, "New Variations on Old Themes," *International Security*, 4 (Summer 1979), 88. See also Martin Hillenbrand, "NATO and Western Security in an Era of Transition," *International Security*, 2 (Fall 1977), 3; and Lawrence Kaplan, "NATO: The Second Generation," in Lawrence Kaplan and Robert Clawson, eds., *NATO After Thirty Years* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1981), pp. 3-4.

3. On this point, see Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), chaps. 2, 11, and 15.

4. As late as 1951, General Eisenhower told congressional visitors to his headquarters in Paris that the purpose of the American military presence in Europe was to gain time for the Europeans to build up their own forces, and that he hoped to begin withdrawing American forces from Europe within three years. On this point, see Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 506.

5. Recent examples would include Eliot Cohen, "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, 61 (Winter 1982-1983), 325-43; Henry Kissinger, "A Plan to Reshape NATO," *Time*, 5 March 1984, pp. 20-24; and Donald Nuechterlein, "The Widening Atlantic: NATO At Another Crossroads," *The World Today*, 40 (August-September 1984), 321-26.

6. See, for example, Josef Joffe, "European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, 59 (Spring 1981), 835-51; Stanley Hoffmann, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreason," *Foreign Affairs*, 60 (Winter 1981-1982), 327-46; and Robert Tucker, "The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics," *Commentary*, 73 (May 1982), 63-72.

7. The shifting basis for claims of the alliance's greatest crisis ever is discussed in more detail in Wallace J. Thies, *An Alliance In Crisis*, chap. 1 (forthcoming).

8. Bradley Graham, "NATO: Changing Alliance," *The Washington Post*, 12 May 1980, p. A1; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Tribulations of the Alliance," *The Wall Street Journal*, 22 May 1980, p. 20; and Michael Getler, "Crises Put New Strains on Alliance," *The Washington Post*, 24 May 1980, p. A1.

9. European-American divergences on the issue of Persian Gulf security are discussed in more detail in Joffe; Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis in the West," *New York Review of Books*, 17 July 1980, pp. 41-48; and Karl Kaiser et al., *Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should Be Done?* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1981).

10. Robert Komer, quoted in "Collecting a NATO Debt," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 21 April 1980, p. 13.

11. See, for example, "Did You Say Allies?" *The Economist*, 6 June 1981, p. 11; Leslie Gelb, "NATO Is Facing a Paralysis of Will, Experts Contend," *The New York Times*, 12 July 1981, pp. 1, 6; and Irving Kristol, "NATO At a Dead End," *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 July 1981, p. 20.

12. See, for example, Irving Kristol, "Does NATO Exist?" *Washington Quarterly*, 2 (Autumn 1979), 45-53; and Walter Hahn, "Toward a New NATO Consensus," in Walter Hahn and Robert Pfaltzgraff, eds., *Atlantic Community in Crisis* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), especially pp. 58-63.

13. Richard and Anna Merritt, *Public Opinion in Semi-sovereign Germany* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1980), p. 25.

14. Karl Deutsch et al., *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 118n.

15. A more detailed treatment of trends in European attitudes is presented in Bruce Russett and Donald Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, 98 (Summer 1983), 179-96. See also Wallace J. Thies, *The Atlantic Alliance, Nuclear Weapons, and European Attitudes: Re-examining the Conventional Wisdom* (Berkeley: Univ. of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983).

16. *World Opinion Update*, 6 (July-August 1982), p. 99.

17. Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman, "Is NATO in Trouble? A Survey of European Attitudes," *Public Opinion*, 4 (August-September 1981), 10.

18. These surveys are presented in Connie De Boer, "The Polls: Our Commitment to World War III," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 45 (Spring 1981), 128; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Are the Germans 'Collapsing' or 'Standing Firm'?" *Encounter*, 58 (February 1982), 79; Adler and Wertman, pp. 10-11; and Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957), p. 253.

19. Jan Stapel, "Surveys by Netherlands Gallup Affiliate Reveal Extent of 'Hollanditis,'" *The Gallup Report* (January 1983), pp. 20-21; De Boer, p. 129; and Noelle-Neumann, p. 78.

20. Judith Miller, "Poll Shows Nuclear Freeze Backed If Soviet Doesn't Gain," *The New York Times*, 30 May 1982, p. 18.

21. See, for example, the surveys presented in Russett and Deluca and in Adler and Wertman.

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# THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

by

MICHAEL L. BROWN

**T**he term strategy means many things to many people. To the military purist, it continues to mean, as it did to Clausewitz, "the use of engagements for the object of the war."<sup>1</sup> To others, however, the simple equation of strategic matters with military matters no longer provides an adequate definition. As the international system becomes more and more complex, and the distinction between war and peace increasingly blurred, even the strongest nations have to use all of their resources, not just their military capabilities, to protect their vital interests. For these reasons, it has become necessary to develop a more expansive concept of strategy that includes not only the military, but other dimensions as well.

In order to distinguish between traditional military notions of strategy and the more expansive integrated concept, the latter is generally called national strategy. The most widely cited definition of this term is that provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They call it "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives."<sup>2</sup> Although this definition provides a sound basis for the formulation of national strategy, American policymakers often have been unable to integrate the economic dimension in particular into a coherent strategic framework.

The fundamental problem has been a failure to think about economic policies in strategic terms. With respect to the Soviet Union, for example, during the decade of the

1970s the United States tried to use economic instrumentalities to simultaneously foster political cooperation, control the rate of Jewish emigration, slow the pace of economic and military modernization, and punish the Soviets for their interference in Poland and for their invasion of Afghanistan. While economic tools may have been able to make a substantial contribution to the ends desired in some of these instances, the net effect of trying to accomplish them simultaneously and with uncoordinated and inconsistent policies was simply to confuse the Soviets as to our strategic aims.

In order to begin thinking about economic policies in strategic terms, it is necessary to understand how and under what conditions economic policies can contribute to strategic ends. In general, economic policies can serve strategic ends in five ways: to enhance regional stability, to achieve leverage over the policies of other countries, to increase the capabilities of allies, to reduce the capabilities of adversaries, and to engage in signaling. Using historical examples, this article will show how and under what conditions economic policies can be used to achieve these objectives. The final section will present some simple guidelines for the use of economic instruments in achieving strategic ends.

## FREE TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

Ever since Adam Smith, scholars have posited the existence of a link between free trade on the one hand, and international

peace and understanding on the other. Policymakers, too, have adopted this view. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State from 1933 to 1944, believed strongly that

unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with war . . . [if] we could get a freer flow of trade—freer in the sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions— . . . we might have a reasonable chance of lasting peace.<sup>3</sup>

Hull was not alone in this view, for it is frequently cited as one of the major lessons learned from the 1930s.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to cite free trade as the economic dimension, and support for the United Nations as the political dimension, of America's 1944 plans for its postwar strategy.

Because the Soviet Union refused to open its borders and participate in a free trade regime, by 1946 it became clear to American policymakers that the approach had failed to work in a worldwide context. Nevertheless, these same policymakers were still convinced that the theory underlying the link between free trade and international peace was a valid one. The Soviet refusal to participate in the postwar economic system simply forced scholars and statesmen to realize that essential to the establishment of a free trade regime was a certain degree of political concord among the participating states. Since agreement on basic political principles did exist in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II, American policymakers reasoned that free trade might serve to reduce the risks of conflict among the principal European countries.

The Schumann Plan for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) offered the United States an opportunity to encourage the formation of a free trade regime to enhance regional cooperation and stability. Although US policymakers realized that if the organization were successful the American share of the European market would shrink, they determined that the political advantages of a unified Europe would outweigh these costs.

More important, they reasoned that the integration of the German economy with those of other European countries would reduce the apprehension with which these nations viewed the FRG and would hasten the day when Germany was accepted back into the family of nations. This was an important strategic consideration to the United States, which was advocating the integration of German troops into the defense of Western Europe.

Today's policymakers still accept the link between free trade and peace. In 1983 Ronald Reagan noted,

I've been around long enough to remember that we [adopted protective measures] once before in this century, something called Smoot-Hawley. We lived through a nightmare. World trade fell by 60 percent, contributing to . . . the political turmoil that led to World War II.<sup>5</sup>

Even so, American policymakers appear to have forgotten the lessons of the ECSC. If political stability and regional cooperation is in America's interests, and in most areas of the world it certainly is, then it would seem appropriate for the United States to assist in the development of regional free trade associations. Yet, while the United States has offered pro forma encouragement to the establishment of regional economic organizations, it has not followed through and offered diplomatic and economic incentives that could have made them a reality. In this vein, the United States has failed to realize

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the enormous strategic benefits that could have accrued as a result of their formation.

### LEVERAGE

The exercise of leverage is a second way in which economic tools can serve strategic ends. In a general sense, leverage can be divided into two categories, positive and negative. Positive leverage, the granting or offering of rewards, can be an effective instrument of policy, particularly when the offering country wants to develop or maintain a long-term positive relationship with the target.<sup>6</sup> One of the prime examples of the utility of positive leverage occurred during the Camp David negotiations in 1978. In these talks the United States achieved a degree of influence which it might not otherwise have had by offering economic assistance to both Egypt and Israel. Unfortunately, unlike attempts to exert negative leverage, positive leverage costs money. The Camp David Accords cost the United States nearly five billion dollars annually. Principally for this reason, there are few other recent instances in which the United States has tried to employ this type of influence.

Negative leverage can come in one of two forms, explicit and implicit. An attempt to exercise explicit leverage exists when one nation either overtly threatens to impose economic sanctions, or physically does so, against the target of the influence attempt. Unfortunately for advocates of sanctions, it is becoming increasingly evident that because nations against which sanctions are imposed can generally find other countries with which to trade, and because the external economic attack frequently fuses together the body politic, sanctions as a coercive instrument seldom succeed.<sup>7</sup> Still, because target governments and populations are not always sure of their ability to thwart the economic restrictions, the explicit *threat* of sanctions has proven successful in a number of instances.<sup>8</sup> The more successful form of economic leverage, however, would seem to be implicit in nature.

It was this type of leverage that formed the mainstay of German economic strategy in

the years immediately preceding World War II.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, it has been argued that this type of leverage has been the principal method by which the United States has dealt with Latin America over the years. If, for example, a South or Central American government leaned too far to the left, it was generally understood in these countries that Washington would react strongly, and that the recalcitrant government would suffer the same fate as that of Salvador Allende in Chile. Note that when implicit influence exists there is no need for verbal threats; the relationship is simply understood.

Another interesting aspect of implicit leverage is that while periodically it may be necessary to impose sanctions in order to demonstrate the power relationship, too many demonstrations can prove counterproductive, for if the target countries see that sanctions can be beaten, then the implicit threat is no longer useful. In this vein, it is arguable that the economic restrictions imposed as an element of America's human rights campaign in the late 1970s succeeded only in demonstrating how difficult it was for the United States to hurt intractable allies economically.

A number of scholars and policymakers have suggested that the United States attempt to develop a relationship of implicit influence with the Soviet Union. While Samuel Huntington is frequently given credit for formulating the outline of such a policy,<sup>10</sup> that is only because scholars have misunderstood Henry Kissinger's proposal for the development of a "seamless web" between the Soviet Union and the West. Attempts to portray the Kissingerian approach as just another version of containment are fundamentally flawed, for they fail to realize that he was trying to implement a strategy of "restraint," where the Soviets themselves would control their impulses for adventurism for fear of losing the benefits of Western trade.<sup>11</sup> To be sure, no economic leverage can dissuade the Soviets from pursuing activities they consider to be in their vital interests, but it might, in some cases, be able to deter them from pursuing what they otherwise would see as little- or no-cost targets of opportunity.

Whether this approach would have been successful in the 1970s is unknowable, for like most other economic approaches, it requires time to be effective—time to establish trading relationships and time for each side to understand where leverage can work and where it cannot. Unfortunately, Kissinger's approach was not given sufficient time. Before even the first strand of the web was spun, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, by tying most favored nation trading status for the Soviet Union to specific levels of Jewish emigration, ended the experiment.

#### **ECONOMIC POLICIES AND CAPABILITIES**

While the United States has failed to use economic tools to encourage regional stability, and has only sporadically engaged in attempts to achieve leverage, American policymakers constantly use economic instruments to increase the strategic capabilities of allies. Although military aid is the most obvious way of accomplishing this task, economic aid can be useful in two other ways. First, by giving a friendly country the wherewithal to provide essential domestic services, the donor can release resources for other programs, including those required for national defense. While the ratio of dollar given to dollar spent on military programs may make this a less efficient technique than military aid for improving an ally's military capabilities, there may be domestic and international constraints which make it the preferred alternative, as in the case of El Salvador.

There is a second way in which economic policies can contribute to an ally's capabilities. One of the greatest threats facing many Third World countries is not invasion from its neighbors, but the danger of revolution from within. Because of America's interest in regional stability, these situations are frequently inimical to the United States' strategic objectives. Moreover, as Americans have learned time and again, these insurgencies, once begun, are difficult to control. It would seem that in these cases an ounce of prevention is worth far more

than a pound of cure. Economic policies can form the mainstay of that prevention.

It is often argued that through foreign aid and trade subsidy programs the standard of living in less-developed countries can be raised to the point where the individual citizen is no longer vulnerable to the promises of revolutionary ideologies. Once again the best example comes from Europe. In 1947-48 the European economies were falling apart; only the bare necessities of life were available, and even these cost dearly. Communist parties throughout Europe were taking advantage of the situation and making promises of a Shangri-la that would exist if only they were brought to power. The United States saw the political situation as critical. Fortunately, American policymakers correctly perceived the root cause as economic and adopted what may have been the strategic coup of the century, the Marshall Plan.

The Plan proved successful for three reasons. First, it was given sufficient time and resources to work. By dedicating 17 billion dollars, nearly 2.75 percent of GNP over four years, the United States clearly dedicated sufficient resources. By contrast, foreign aid to all countries amounted to 9.3 billion dollars, just 0.28 percent of GNP, in 1983. Moreover, throughout the 1950s, American policymakers pursued economic reconstruction with single-minded determination, allowing no other goals to interfere with it. Even after the end of the official aid, the United States continued to do everything in its power to foster economic growth in Europe. Finally, the policy of economic reconstruction was integrated with other elements of strategy; diplomatic initiatives were adopted and military policies were pursued which encouraged European economic growth while protecting the affected countries from Soviet intrusions.

During the 1960s, as revolutions sprang up throughout South America, the United States decided to try the same approach on that continent in the much-vaunted Alliance for Progress. The program as conceived was a sound one. It was to provide 20 billion dollars spread over a ten-year period to develop both the agricultural and industrial

bases of Latin American countries. Unfortunately, a blue-ribbon commission formed by President Kennedy, orienting on the dollar cost rather than the potential strategic gains, did not agree. They argued, "For the present . . . we are convinced that reductions are in order in present military and economic assistance programs."<sup>12</sup> The resulting cut in foreign aid effectively gutted the Alliance for Progress and similar programs around the world. Indeed, in 1962 the entire American foreign aid budget was only 3.8 billion dollars, representing a smaller commitment of GNP than had any foreign aid budget since 1947. Moreover, once it became evident that the affected Latin American countries were going to be able to control their domestic insurgencies with armed force, the impetus behind the program virtually disintegrated. Significantly, however, the causes underlying the instability were not addressed. In sum, the Alliance for Progress failed both because insufficient resources were dedicated to it and because it was not given enough time to work.

It was not until insurgency in El Salvador threatened the existence of that government, and stability in Central America more generally, that this approach once again attracted followers. President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative was clearly designed to improve the standard of living in the region and thereby to remove the attractiveness of insurgent promises. Yet, while the Caribbean Basin Initiative is certainly a step in the right direction, American policymakers appear to have learned little from history. First, the program does not provide nearly enough assistance. Trade and investment incentives must be supplemented by significant amounts of aid before the economic problems of the region, and of the individual peasant, can begin to be addressed. Second, although it appears as if the Administration expects to reap the results of the program in the next few years, it is doubtful that any political results will be realized in the short term. Indeed, at the current rate of investment, it may be well into the next decade that any noticeable results are

achieved, assuming the program lasts that long. As the European experiment should have taught, for the Caribbean Basin Initiative and similar programs to bear fruit, they must become a part of American strategy over the long haul.

### THE ECONOMICS OF DENIAL

Besides increasing an ally's strength, economic policies can also be used to deny certain capabilities to an adversary. In one approach, that of economic warfare, the object is to wage war on the adversary's economy by refusing to take part in any kind of trade and by encouraging allies to do the same. The enemy is then forced to dedicate to the civilian sector resources he might otherwise have had available for military purposes.

Obviously, economic warfare is most appropriate in time of war. Between 1947 and 1949, however, this strategy became increasingly popular, particularly in the United States, as the preferred method of dealing with the Soviet Union. Scholars differ as to the success of this policy. Some argue that the embargo was counterproductive because it forced the Soviets to produce their own goods and develop their own technologies, and because it pushed the nations of Eastern Europe further into Soviet arms.<sup>13</sup> Others suggest that while it did not destroy the Soviet Union, it did slow the pace of Soviet economic and military development and thus should be considered at least partially successful.<sup>14</sup>

Whatever the effectiveness of this approach, by the late 1960s the economic warfare strategy was becoming increasingly irrelevant. The technological and economic gap between the United States and other industrialized countries was shrinking. At the same time, these other countries began to perceive their national interests, and the threat the Soviet Union posed to those interests, somewhat differently than did the United States. Many of them saw real advantages to be gained by drawing closer to Moscow. Finally, all Western countries, the

United States included, began to rely more and more on international trade for continued economic growth. Governments could not ignore internal political pressures to seek markets in the East.

Attempts to adopt economic warfare policies during the early years of the Reagan Administration confronted all these difficulties. In 1982, when the United States tried to halt construction on the Yamal Pipeline by refusing to allow American firms to support the project, the government found that most of the necessary technology was available in Europe. At first the Administration responded by trying to dissuade the Europeans from selling the requisite technology and equipment to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the countries involved in the project thought it was in their national interest to do so. When Washington tried to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction to halt the use of technology licensed from American firms, the Europeans were outraged, pointing out that companies operating on their territory were subject to their jurisdiction. Overall, the incident created significant tensions between the United States and its allies. The primary lesson to be learned is that economic warfare is not, at present, a practical economic strategy with respect to the Soviet Union.

A second stratagem that can reduce the capabilities of an adversary is a strategic embargo. The intent of this approach is not even to try to reap the indirect advantages that might accrue from waging war on the target's economy, but to deny the opponent's military establishment the direct technological advantages that might otherwise be available from international trade. While nearly every Western country agrees in principle with this approach, the difficulty has been in defining exactly what constitutes military technology.

To date the United States has favored a broad definition of military technology and correspondingly tight restrictions on all high-tech products. Most Europeans, on the other hand, advocate a narrower interpretation of the term and believe that American proposals

unjustly interfere with free trade. The differences between the US and European positions have sometimes spilled over into the political arena and caused serious divisions among the allies. Although in a technical sense the Americans may be correct in believing that a great deal of Western technology finds its way into the military sector of the Soviet economy, it is absolutely critical that US policymakers realize that the question has broad strategic ramifications not only for East-West relations, but for West-West relations as well. Just as in the formulation of military strategy, there are times when the differing points of view among allies must take precedence over what even the most powerful member of the alliance would otherwise want.

### ECONOMICS FOR SIGNALING

While symbols and gestures are frequently dismissed as unimportant or trivial, they are in fact critical to the practice of foreign policy.<sup>19</sup> It is through these actions that states communicate their vital interests and their desires to other members of the international system. If successful, these signals can serve purposes out of all proportion to their costs.

Sometimes, however, mere statements and diplomatic notes do not effectively convey the seriousness of the sender. In these cases the medium becomes the message. For example, had President Carter merely expressed his feelings on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the United Nations, the message would have been that the United States was only moderately concerned. Because he accompanied this kind of protest with economic and military measures, however, it became clear to the Soviets that the United States considered the Soviet action a serious threat. Economic sanctions are a particularly effective medium for the communication of signals because they actually do harm to the imposing country. They in effect say, "We are so concerned about the situation that we are willing to harm ourselves to indicate our seriousness."

Economic measures can be useful signaling devices in at least three ways. First, they can be used to send signals to allies. When Britain imposed sanctions on Southern Rhodesia, for example, the United States followed suit not because it thought the sanctions would force a change in the Rhodesian government, but because the Americans thought it important to demonstrate their solidarity with the British. In another example, Australia and Canada both imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union in 1980, not because they thought the sanctions would force the Soviets out of Afghanistan, but because the United States had asked them to take that step. One only has to recall how upset the American government became when France and Germany balked at following the US lead in the high technology arena to realize the importance of sanctions as signals to allies.

Sanctions also can be imposed to affect the attitudes and perceptions of potential adversaries. When sanctions are applied against one country for a specific policy or set of policies, the message to other countries is that they too can become the object of sanctions if they adopt similar practices. This was clearly one of the major purposes underlying the American sanctions against Argentina over its human rights policies. While there was certainly some hope that the United States could coerce the Argentines, equally as important was the desire to communicate to the rest of the world that the United States was serious about its human rights campaign.

Finally, the signal sent by economic sanctions can obviously be directed at the country against which the sanctions are imposed. While sometimes they are employed simply to demonstrate disapproval, as were those imposed by the United States against Uganda's Idi Amin in 1978, they can also be used to demonstrate the credibility of specific warnings. They are particularly useful in this context for at least two reasons. First, because sanctions impose a physical cost on the target, there is little prospect that the message can be shrugged off or ignored as easily as a verbal protest. And, again,

because economic actions levy a burden on the imposer as well as the target, they provide concrete evidence of just how seriously the issue at hand is being taken.

The quintessential example of such a use of sanctions occurred in the case of the 1980 American grain embargo. While some authors continue to believe that the United States was trying to coerce the Soviets into withdrawing from Afghanistan, this was clearly not the case. Indeed, President Carter remarked when he discussed the restrictions with members of Congress, "We anticipate that this withholding of grain to the Soviet Union will not force them to withdraw . . . . We understood this from the beginning."<sup>16</sup> Rather, the intention of the sanctions was to tell the Soviet leadership that "further aggression by you will result in the possible exercise of additional power by the United States . . . above and beyond economic and political actions."<sup>17</sup>

#### **SOME PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY**

The specific economic policies necessary to accomplish any of these tasks will vary from category to category, and from case to case. Nevertheless, there do appear to be a few guiding principles that can increase the probability of success.

The first principle is the need for *adequate resources*. Whether the strategic purpose is denying capabilities to an adversary, for example, or increasing the capabilities of an ally, it is essential to dedicate resources sufficient to the task. In a strategic embargo this principle will demand the establishment of an organization with enough manpower to monitor and police the export controls. It may also require the expenditure of public funds to offset the losses suffered by the affected industries in order to prevent pressure from special interest groups to lift the controls. As far as increasing the capabilities of an ally is concerned, recall that the Marshall Plan required 17 billion dollars spread over four years to achieve its purpose, and that the original designs for the Alliance for Progress called for 20 billion dollars over

ten years. There is no doubt that the use of economic policies to achieve strategic ends is not cheap, but national security never is.

The second principle is the need for *sufficient time*. By tradition and by the nature of their political institutions, Americans tend to be impatient and shortsighted. Economic policies designed to serve strategic ends cut against this grain, for they frequently take years to bear fruit. Indeed, depending on the level of resources committed, they could take decades. Moreover, even when these economic programs do begin to make a difference in the strategic environment, it is not always immediately apparent. How does one tell in the short term, for example, when regional stability has increased, or when an adversary's capabilities are less than they would have been in a free trade regime? Economic policies designed to serve strategic ends must be given sufficient time to work; they must be part of a long-term strategy, not a short-term quick fix.

*Integration* is the third principle. Recall that the Marshall Plan in particular was integrated with other elements of strategy. The military presence which prevented Soviet intrusions, the political coordination and negotiations, and the psychological preparations both at home and in Europe were direct contributors to the American success. The signals Jimmy Carter sent when he imposed the grain embargo, formally organized the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and initiated a far-reaching propaganda campaign in the Middle East were all complementary and designed to send one set of strategic signals to the Soviet Union. It is doubtful that either the Marshall Plan or the grain embargo would have been successful if the economic aspects had been employed alone, but by integrating the economic aspects with the military, political, and psychological dimensions of strategy, both accomplished the purposes for which they were intended.

The final principle of the economic dimension of strategy is *consistency*. Because the use of economic instruments can seem to be so simple and so dramatic, policymakers sometimes use them for tactical rather than

strategic reasons. Unfortunately, such a use of economic tools can obscure and degrade the effectiveness of the overall strategy. The myriad of economic policies the United States has pursued with respect to the Soviet Union provides only one example of how confusion among both allies and adversaries can result. Economic policies must be consistent with one another so that the strategic purpose is not obscured.

In an age in which threats to American security seem to increase daily, it is essential that the United States pursue a coherent and coordinated national strategy. Moreover, because our principal advantage over our major adversaries lies in America's economic strength and vitality, it is imperative that the economic dimension be thoroughly integrated into the overall strategic approach. This article represents an attempt to provide a general framework suggesting how and under what conditions economic instruments can make a positive contribution to the achievement of national objectives. If we continue to employ these instruments haphazardly and without regard for the historical evidence, they will serve only to confuse our adversaries as well as our allies. If we employ them intelligently, however, they will make a positive contribution to our national security.

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# COMMON MAN, UNCOMMON LEADERSHIP: COLONEL CHARLES N. HUNTER WITH GALAHAD IN BURMA

by

SCOTT R. McMICHAEL

**I**n the spring of 1944 in northwest Burma, two opposing armies gathered their energies for an epic battle contesting control of South Asia. There, in a mysterious theater little known to Americans, a mixed British-Indian and Chinese-American force fought one of the largest land battles of World War II against the Japanese. In the course of this memorable battle, a great story took form and was played out beyond the front lines in the depths of the deadly Burmese jungle. At the center of this story was a remarkable unit, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), codenamed Galahad, popularly known in history as Merrill's Marauders.

Unloved, misunderstood, and mercilessly abused, perhaps the most badly handled American force in the war, Galahad rose above the miserable situation in which it found itself and accomplished its extremely difficult missions in heroic fashion but at great cost. The men of Galahad were ably served by a group of selfless, courageous leaders, at the head of whom stood not Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, as official history records, but Colonel Charles N. Hunter, in name the Deputy Commander but in fact the actual field commander. This article is an account of Colonel Hunter, his uncommon leadership, and the unit he led.

In the China-Burma-India Theater in 1943 an extraordinary collection of commanders had been assembled. Assessed by some military historians as the ablest British field general in the war, Lieutenant General (later Field Marshal) William Slim led the British-Indian 14th Army. In China, the venal and untrustworthy Chiang Kai-Shek headed the Chinese Nationalist army. Young, aristocratic, and regal in bearing, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten presided over the entire theater as Supreme Commander. The two commanding generals closest to Galahad, however, were Major General Orde Wingate and Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell.

Orde Wingate typified a strain of eccentric, unorthodox officer which the British army seems to produce every other generation or so. Moody, suspicious, imperious, brilliant, yet dangerously unstable, Wingate had been saved from an ignoble end to his checkered career by Field Marshal Wavell. Wavell had obtained Wingate's assignment to Burma, where he had placed Wingate in charge of a special, long-range penetration brigade which had successfully interdicted Japanese lines of communication (LOCs) for three months in 1943. One year later, Wingate was raising a total of seven brigades

of special troops (known as the Chindits) to infiltrate into the Japanese rear again to create even more havoc. Galahad was one of the seven brigades, and the only American one, formed for this extremely dangerous mission. Although he was temperamentally unsuited for high command, Wingate's hypnotic power of leadership attracted men of talent and character. His Chindits had scraped out a place of honor in the annals of British military history by the end of the campaign.

Galahad, however, did not go to war with the rest of Wingate's Chindits. Although trained under Wingate's eye in accordance with his vision of long-range penetration, Galahad passed to Stilwell's Northern Area Combat Command in January 1944. Stilwell had accomplished this coup through his adamant personal request to Mountbatten, who acquiesced in the interests of Allied unity.

"Vinegar Joe" Stilwell is one of the more complex and controversial figures in America's military pantheon. Most people remember him as an abrasive and cantankerous general, but one who was ideally suited to deal with the crafty, unreliable Chinese army under Chiang. Stilwell's bluntness and intolerance are often pictured as attractive "American" qualities in this context because of their contrast with the wily, intriguing, false nature of Stilwell's oriental allies. Enshrined in Fort Leavenworth's Hall of Fame, Stilwell retains the image of a hard-talking, tough commander, not given to easy cooperation, but worthy of our admiration in spite of all his faults.

In reality, Stilwell's faults went much deeper than mere flaws in his personality. A full-blooded misanthrope, he hated the British with a passion which defies belief and he lacked true empathy for his own American troops.<sup>1</sup> He had no feel for soldiers, sending them to die seemingly without an inkling of what they might suffer. Stilwell also tolerated an incompetent staff in an era when the skills of American general staffs were acknowledged as the best in the world.<sup>2</sup> Composed of relatives and yes-men, his staff reflected Stilwell's own warped view of the

world; they committed many excesses of mismanagement in Stilwell's name. Moreover, despite his reputation as an ascetic fighting general, Stilwell sometimes failed to go forward when he should have to see what was happening on the front with his own eyes. Galahad came to rue the day that they fell under Stilwell's command.

In contrast to these famous general officers, Charles Hunter was a self-effacing, uninspiring, somewhat dour professional officer. A native New Yorker and a West Pointer, Class of 1929, Hunter had previously served in the Philippines and the Canal Zone. Before joining Galahad, he ran a combat training course at Fort Benning for officers going overseas. Hunter knew his military craft and he knew his own mind. He was tough, capable, and confident. He believed in US Army doctrine as the best in the world, and he ran his outfits by the book. As far as Hunter was concerned, no better guide existed than approved field service regulations, yet in Burma he was to show flexibility and adaptability rather than an unthinking, narrow-minded approach to the battlefield. Like most West Pointers of his time, Hunter was no complainer. Duty-honor-country came first with him. A stickler for details, Hunter was a perfectionist in his approach to training and administration. Hunter judged his superiors and subordinates by a harsh standard which he also applied to himself. He sought the respect and loyalty of his subordinates but not their affection. In the end, he won their hearts, though he would never have used those words to describe their regard for him.

### THE BEGINNINGS

Hunter's association with Galahad began in September 1943 when he responded to a call from the War Department for 3000 volunteers to participate in a dangerous mission. As the senior man in the contingent heading for Burma from the continental United States, Hunter received a briefing on the operation from the War Department. During this briefing, Hunter learned that Galahad was expected to suffer 85 percent

casualties, a prophecy which proved to be deadly accurate. Hunter organized his detachment on the West Coast and set sail for India, picking up the other Galahad contingents from the Pacific theaters enroute.

Arriving in India in late October 1943, Galahad and Hunter were badly treated from the start. Having been assembled from various units in several theaters, the men of Galahad needed a bond about which to cohere—a stirring name, a flag, a patch, a crest, a recognized leader. Incredibly, all these were denied for some time. When an official name finally was assigned, it stirred up snorts of derision: the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). It sounded more like a rear-echelon service unit than a fighting regiment about to embark on a dangerous mission. The question of a unit commander was similarly botched. A number of officers senior to Hunter cycled through the unit from October to December 1943 without assuming command. Finally, on 6 January 1944, Stilwell placed Brigadier General Frank Merrill in command, forcing Hunter, now the Deputy Commander, to rescind the order he had published only days earlier assuming command himself.

Despite these unfortunate events, Galahad began to acquire a sense of being, largely due to the efforts of Hunter and his three battalion commanders. In the absence of a clear command structure, Hunter stepped in to fill the vacuum. Assisted and guided by Colonel Frances Brink, who was well acquainted with Wingate's operational concept, Hunter quickly implemented an arduous training regimen designed to forge the unit into the tempered steel that the coming operations demanded.

Wingate's plan for 1944 envisioned the infiltration by ground and air of his Chindit brigades deep into the Japanese rear. Using the cargo aircraft as supply truck, the radio as telephone, and fighter-bombers as direct support artillery, the Chindits intended to remain behind enemy lines for an extended time in order to disrupt seriously the Japanese LOCs, especially those leading north to the enemy forces facing Stilwell. In addition, these Chindit operations were

designed to contribute directly to an advance by forces under Slim and Stilwell. Thus, the Chindits, including Galahad, had to be experts in junglecraft and had to be tough enough to survive for some time on short rations in forbidding terrain under constant threat from the Japanese.

Wingate announced that the brigades would be withdrawn after 90 days. The US War Department had also warned theater headquarters that a three-month operation was envisioned as the probable limit to the unit's capability. The previous year's Chindit operation had demonstrated beyond doubt that remaining in the enemy's rear beyond this time risked complete destruction. The Japanese themselves formed only one part of the danger. Tropical diseases, malnutrition, injury, psychoneurotic breakdown, and sheer exhaustion also threatened each man. Ultimately, noncombat casualties far exceeded those inflicted by the enemy. Many soldiers simply faded into death, losing their desire to go on as sickness, terror, and weariness sapped their will to live. The question of a 90-day limit to Galahad's operations became a source of great bitterness to them.<sup>1</sup>

Being forewarned of these perils, Hunter undertook to reduce such losses by insuring that his men were as well conditioned and well trained as possible before they crossed into enemy territory. As a result, he placed them on limited water and rations, loaded them with huge packs, marched them unmercifully day and night, and pushed them beyond the limits they thought they could

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


endure. Moreover, he trained Galahad in the vital skills needed to operate in deep jungle: map reading, jungle navigation, patrolling, river crossings, tactical drills, infiltration, night operations, evasion, camouflage, hand-to-hand combat, and especially marksmanship. Hunter permitted every man of Galahad to fire every weapon in the unit and he insured that leaders were cross-trained in several skills. Life was hard, the demands unrelenting. Under these harsh conditions, and impressed with the competence of their leaders, Galahad grew into a capable, confident unit, which perversely began to take a measure of pride in its stepchild status.

An interesting occurrence during this training phase demonstrated one of Hunter's most characteristic traits, his great faith in US Army doctrine and experience. During the first of his several visits to Galahad's camp, Wingate addressed the men and explained his long-range penetration concept in some detail. Unimpressed by Wingate, Hunter held the troops until he had left the area. He later recalled,

I explained that his [Wingate's] concept should not be considered too revolutionary and reminded the men that the United States Army had a long tradition of fighting deep in hostile Indian territory; that we should look at the coming operation in light of the history of our Army in opening the West.'

Incidentally, although Wingate, Mountbatten, and others frequently visited Galahad (somewhat to Hunter's annoyance), Stilwell did not visit the unit at all during their



training and preparation, a fact which lowered Stilwell in Hunter's estimation.

As final preparation before going into battle, Hunter hiked Galahad over 140 miles from their last assembly area to their jump-off site well beyond Ledo. Hunter claimed later that this decision, despite its unpopularity at the time, "paid the highest dividends" in bringing the unit into its final fighting trim. Galahad marched right past Stilwell's headquarters during this trek. Again, the great man failed to make an appearance and so missed an opportunity to encourage the unit with a kind word, handshake, or simple acknowledgement of their existence. Stilwell did, finally, drop in to talk

to Galahad's officers in their assembly area just before their departure.<sup>5</sup>

### COMBAT OPERATIONS

In February 1944 Stilwell directed Galahad to conduct a series of deep encirclements around the right flank of the Japanese to establish blocks directly athwart the single main road in the enemy's rear, but close enough to the forward defenders to pose a short-term threat. The plan called for the first blocks to be established at Walawbum in the Hukawng Valley and the second blocks near Shaduzup in the Mogaung Valley. Once Galahad was in position, Stilwell intended to push his Chinese divisions hard against the Japanese 18th Division, forcing them to divide their attention between his two forces. Stilwell issued no written orders for these two initial operations. Instead, he simply told Merrill, "Oh hell, Frank, let's settle this together. You know what I want, so go and get it for me."<sup>6</sup>

Stilwell's disregard for such a basic practice as issuing written orders disgusted Hunter. Later he wrote that there were two ways for doing things in northern Burma—the Stilwell way and the Army way.<sup>7</sup> Especially disturbing to Hunter was the absence of any intelligence of Japanese dispositions. Merrill did not question or object to this slipshod approach to combat; as Deputy Commander, Hunter did not feel he had the right to make an issue of it. Thus, Galahad pushed off on 24 February 1944, unclear in regard to where the Japanese were, but determined to do well.


The first operation at Walawbum was a definite success. Probing carefully along the Japanese right flank, the three battalions of Galahad snaked around to the Japanese rear with such speed and skill that they arrived at their objectives retaining tactical surprise, despite having made contact enroute several times. Brushing aside the small Japanese rear detachments in the area, the battalions settled in quickly to fight off a determined and heavy enemy counterattack conducted by the Japanese main forces which acted rapidly to remove the threat to their rear. In particular,

the 2d and 3d battalions fought two intense engagements in which platoons and companies found themselves fighting for their lives in separate actions. Merrill and Hunter monitored the situation closely and coordinated air resupply, but essentially they permitted the battalion commanders to fight their own battles without interference.

Despite being outnumbered by a wide margin, Galahad dealt the enemy a hard blow through its superior marksmanship and steadiness under fire. Striking down 800 of the enemy for the loss of only eight of its own killed and 37 wounded, the 5307th stunned the Japanese who had expected to sweep them away with ease. Ominously, a large number of sick soldiers had to be evacuated at the end of the action.<sup>8</sup> Already, the jungle was taking its toll in disease and exhaustion. The outfit as a whole, however, blooded and well-rested, turned to its next mission with confidence.

In winning its first battle streamers in Walawbum, Galahad's turning movement caused the Japanese to fall back farther in one week than they had in the previous three months. The next "short hook" embraced the same concept as at Walawbum. Galahad's battalions were to slip around the Japanese rear again into blocking positions on their LOCs at specified areas north of the important Japanese supply depot at Kamaing. However, several problems occurred in this second operation.

To begin with, Stilwell modified Hunter's plan to take all three battalions on a wide loop to their objectives. Instead, he directed two widely separated approach marches into the area. He sent the 1st Battalion on a very shallow approach to Shaduzup while the other two battalions under Hunter infiltrated on the wider loop to a greater depth at Inkangahtawng. The 1st Battalion bumped into the Japanese again and again as they pressed toward their objective in an agonizingly slow and tension-filled advance. (The 2d and 3d battalions, although traveling a much greater distance, arrived at their blocks four days earlier.) The 1st Battalion surprised the Japanese garrison at Shaduzup in a night attack, held against



the inevitable counterattacks, then turned their positions over to the advancing Chinese.

Hunter's operation, on the other hand, almost immediately went awry. Just as Hunter was positioning his blocking forces, Merrill received a report from Stilwell's staff that a strong Japanese force from the south was trying to flank Galahad. Stilwell's staff ordered Merrill to withdraw from the blocks in order to meet this threat. Despite his belief that the higher headquarter had overreacted, Hunter immediately coordinated the withdrawal, ordering his commanders to evacuate wounded and take a resupply enroute to the new block.

The sudden orders to reverse direction created a sense of insecurity in the ranks of the 2d Battalion, which disintegrated into panic as the long winding column of men came under accurate artillery fire from the Japanese with whom they had recently broken contact. Order was restored and the chaos subdued when Merrill and his staff made contact with the battalion and quieted their fears. Merrill had reassumed direct command of the 2d and 3d battalions as a result of the change in plans.

Eventually both battalions negotiated the long, difficult trek into their new positions, conducting several masterful tactical actions along the way. Merrill put the 3d Battalion in at Hsamshingyang (the site of a small air strip) and the 2d Battalion at Nphum Ga, but then had a heart attack and was evacuated, leaving Hunter to handle the coming battle. The Japanese, following close behind, quickly surrounded the 2d Battalion, cutting their link to Hsamshingyang. Over the next 11 days, from 30 March

to 9 April, there followed the siege of Nphum Ga, a desperate, vicious fight with no quarter asked or given.

The ferocity of the engagement matched anything seen in any theater during the war. Resupplied only by air and fighting by day and night, the 2d Battalion's men lived a day-to-day existence. Wounded men were treated by aid men and returned directly to foxholes on the tiny perimeter. When the water ran out, sulfa drugs were taken dry; the mules all died of thirst or fire. Unable to break through to Nphum Ga with the 3d Battalion, Hunter recalled the 1st Battalion from Shaduzup, from whence it raced with breakneck speed.

During the impasse, Hunter was asked if he feared that they might all be trapped. "Don't you ever get scared?," his questioner asked. Hunter replied, "Wait until you've had twins." Hunter believed that an officer must keep his fears to himself.<sup>9</sup>

On 4 April, Hunter ordered an all-out effort by the 3d Battalion to relieve the 2d. The 3d Battalion commander asked Hunter to address his men before they pushed off again. In his no-nonsense fashion, Hunter replied, "We have been attacking up this g----- hill for four days now and getting two-bitted to death by casualties and getting nowhere. Today, let's take what casualties we have to, to get the job done. In the long run you will lose fewer men. Good luck."<sup>10</sup> In order to increase the chance for success, Hunter also had a faked message dropped into Japanese lines that described a plan to drop a battalion of paratroopers behind the Japanese. The message was to be supported by a dummy drop of supplies in the area. Showing additional imagination, Hunter also sent a platoon around the left flank and ordered it to simulate a much larger force.

The 1st Battalion arrived at Hsam-shingyang on the 7th, but the men were exhausted and crippled with dysentery and malaria. Nevertheless, a 250-man force was assembled under the command of Captain Tom Senff. Sparing no effort to relieve the men trapped at Nphum Ga, Hunter directed Senff to circle around to threaten the enemy's rear.

By 9 April, the Japanese had had enough. Pressured from the rear, pounded by US aircraft, and having lost at least 400 men to Galahad marksmen, the Japanese command pulled out. The siege of Nphum Ga was over; Hunter had won. However, the battle had cost Galahad 59 killed, 314 wounded, and around 379 too sick to remain in the field.

Knowing that depression and listlessness frequently followed such a desperate fight, Hunter immediately put the survivors to work burying the dead, burning the mules, and covering other remains with lime chloride. He also sent out patrols to track the fleeing Japanese. Once the area had been

restored to a measure of wholesomeness, Hunter instituted a program of training and rehabilitation, even to the point of ordering close order drill. Hunter commented in his book, *Galahad*, on this decision:

I am constantly amazed at the reaction of the troops, the historians, and professional colleagues. One would think that only a crackpot or a genius would prescribe close order drill for a jungle outfit deep in North Burma. Actually soldiers like to drill. It is good exercise, it creates a feeling of comradeship, acquaints the men and officers with each other's good and bad points, and it requires little preparatory mental work.<sup>11</sup>

Whatever one might think about the quality of Hunter's decision, one would be inclined to agree with him that only a crackpot or a genius—or an officer who knew his men very well—would do such a thing.

By the end of this short rest and recuperation period, *Galahad* had been in action behind enemy lines for over nine weeks. They had suffered a very heavy blow at Nphum Ga in a battle for which they were not suited by organization or training. After fighting over 500 miles of jungle, the men were exhausted. They were subsisting almost exclusively on K-rations, a survival ration wholly inadequate for maintaining strength in the demanding conditions of jungle war.<sup>12</sup> Sickness and disease had infiltrated their ranks. Every day, soldiers fell ill with malaria or dysentery or some other malady. Now another danger had appeared, the deadly scrub typhus, transmitted by a tiny mite. Moreover, the sheer tension of operating in territory controlled by the Japanese had also taken its toll on nerves and well-being. Under these conditions and having fought two major battles, the men of *Galahad* felt that they had earned relief. They all remembered that Wingate had promised a 90-day limit on their operations. That time window was closing, and *Galahad* expected Stilwell to honor it.

It was not to be. Stilwell intended to keep *Galahad* in the field until he had extracted every conceivable ounce of military utility.<sup>13</sup>


As the rumors filtered through the organization that Stilwell had another mission for them, the first reaction was that the rumors were an ugly joke by someone with a warped sense of humor. When it became clear that Stilwell was serious, the men grimly set their teeth and accepted their ill fortune with the fatalism of men who are doomed.

Colonel Hunter, however, had no illusions about a 90-day limit. Having been forewarned by Merrill (who was recuperating in the rear) and being the kind of man to keep looking ahead, Hunter put his staff to work planning a move to Myitkyina (pronounced Mitchinar), the next obvious objective. He sent local native scouts over the formidable Kumon Mountains, 6000 to 8000 feet high, to seek an unobserved route to this vital Japanese strongpoint 65 miles away.

### ON TO MYITKYINA

Stilwell had, in fact, decided to send Galahad to seize the airfield at Myitkyina. Galahad was reinforced with a Chinese regiment and reorganized into an M, K, and H Force. Though unwell, Merrill remained in overall command from the rear. Rather than promote Hunter to field command of the force, however, Stilwell brought in another member of his personal team to act in Merrill's stead. Hunter apparently did not begrudge this decision, but his men resented it strongly.<sup>14</sup>

Hunter was appointed to lead H Force to make the main attack. Hunter received no instructions regarding what he should do after the airfield was taken. Merrill simply told him that when the airfield fell, he (Merrill) would fly in to take command



again. Merrill also announced that Galahad would be relieved at Myitkyina. This news reinvigorated the men.<sup>15</sup>

In an incredible feat of endurance and sheer perseverance, Galahad marched 18 days without pause, crossed the mountains (which were so formidable that they were not even outposted by the Japanese), and appeared undetected on the outskirts of Myitkyina. One of the participants in this trek described it most vividly:

We set off with that what-the-hell-did-you-expect-anyway spirit that served the 5307th in place of morale, and I dare say served it better. Mere morale would never

have carried us through the country we now had to cross. We had fought with mountains before, but none like those of the Kumon Ranges under the monsoon rains . . .

We were scarcely ever dry. When the rain stopped and the sun came out, evaporation would begin. The land steamed. The combination of heat and moisture was smothering. You had to fight through it. For those most weakened by disease, it was too much. For the first time you began to pass men fallen out beside the train, men who were not just complying with the demands of dysentery—we were used to that—but were sitting bent over their weapons, waiting for enough strength to return to take them another mile. During the worst times heretofore we could always count on one thing to keep us going—and that was the process of keeping going itself. As long as the column was on the march, men somehow seemed to be able to keep up, and it was only when we laid up for a day that the sufferers would collapse. But it did not work any longer. We had stragglers. Whenever we bivouacked, men who had been incapable of keeping up with the column, slowly as it moved, and were too tired to worry about the danger from any Japanese there might be lurking about, would be plodding in for hours afterward, unsmiling and clammy with sweat. There was a feeling in the organization that it was coming apart. And Myitkyina was still 60 miles away.<sup>16</sup>

After a quick reconnaissance and a short rest period, Hunter captured the airfield on 17 May in a quick, daylight attack which caught the Japanese completely off guard. At the conclusion of this short battle, with the airfield in Allied hands, Hunter had only 1310 Galahad soldiers left of 2200 that had started the trek. Almost all of the casualties were from injury, disease, and exhaustion. Virtually every soldier had a fever of some kind and was plagued with oozing sores or dysentery. Despite these terrible losses, the capture of the airfield was a stunning success, thanks to the maneuver which only Galahad could have performed, coupled with a prompt, effective tactical attack. Stilwell was overjoyed.

Inexplicably, in a display of gross military incompetence, Stilwell completely failed to take advantage of this coup-de-main. Instead of flying in strong infantry reinforcements, food, and ammunition, as expected by Hunter, Stilwell's staff deployed antiaircraft units and airfield construction troops! As a result, a magnificent opportunity was lost. Stilwell's mental lapse, which no one has ever satisfactorily explained, allowed the Japanese to build up the Myitkyina garrison to the point where it could only be taken after a three-month siege instead of by storm. In this manner, the stage was also set for the final and most dismal chapter in Galahad's history.<sup>17</sup>

Stilwell compounded his initial error of not taking Myitkyina by storm by refusing to accept the offer of an excellent British division to accomplish the task.<sup>18</sup> Stilwell insisted that the town be captured by the Chinese and American troops. Once more, Galahad was pressed into the fray despite the fact that it had virtually ceased to exist as a fighting force. Merrill flew in as promised but he didn't stay, his health again making him unfit for duty. Once more, Stilwell elected not to elevate Hunter to command. Instead, he brought in a succession of new faces, none of whom worked out to Stilwell's satisfaction. During the next several weeks, Hunter endured the sight of seeing the remnants of his force destroyed in fruitless attacks against Japanese strongpoints without proper combat support. In one case, the 2d Battalion's men were so tired that they kept falling asleep during an engagement (the battalion commander himself fainted three times); by the end of the month of May, the battalion was down to 12 men.<sup>19</sup> Yet, these were the men (among Chinese units) that Stilwell intended to use to win Myitkyina. There is no evidence that Merrill attempted to deter Stilwell from this course.

Hunter's faith in the Army system at the time was so strong that he assumed that Stilwell simply had not been made aware of the appalling condition of the 5307th. Realizing that neither Merrill nor his interim replacements intended to brace the old man, Hunter decided that he would be remiss not to do it himself. Accordingly, he wrote a

short, blunt letter in which he described the shameful treatment which Galahad had received from Stilwell's staff. He personally delivered the letter to Stilwell on 27 May rather than send it through channels where clerks might read it. The letter essentially described Galahad as an unwanted "visiting unit for which the theater felt no responsibility." It enumerated numerous instances in which the morale and health of the command had been damaged, such as: the apparent ban on promotions and decorations; the unresponsiveness of Stilwell's staff to legitimate requests and inquiries; the lack of credence given to reports describing the poor health of the command; and the continued retention of the unit in the combat zone past the expected time for relief. Stilwell never responded to Hunter regarding any of the specific allegations other than to note that the letter was strongly worded. Later the letter became part of the basis for an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the complete breakdown of Galahad.<sup>20</sup>

Over the next two months, Hunter observed the sorry spectacle of previously evacuated Galahad men still unrecovered from their ailments being returned to the mud-filled trenches at Myitkyina for combat duty. Some accounts also allege that members of Stilwell's staff deprived some men of Galahad of their airplane passes after they had been identified by medical personnel at Myitkyina for evacuation to the rear as unfit for duty. These travesties, and others, were committed in an overzealous attempt to comply with Stilwell's command to get every able-bodied soldier to the front. The same overzealousness led to the commitment of woefully untrained replacement units into the breach, where they were massacred. Meanwhile, in the rear, the care afforded the men in the convalescent area set aside for Galahad was so bad that there were virtual riots.<sup>21</sup> Seldom have American soldiers been treated so heartlessly.

Thus came Galahad to an inglorious end. It was never reformed. Instead a new unit, the 475th Infantry Regiment, a proper unit with a flag and a lineage, was established. It embraced the Galahad survivors and was

commanded by the former 1st Battalion commander of the 5307th. Today's US Army Ranger battalions trace their lineage through the 475th to Galahad.

Hunter's involvement in the Burma campaign ended similarly. His fate remained tied to Stilwell, who finally gave Hunter command of the American forces engaged in Myitkyina. In his indomitable way, Hunter knocked these forces into shape. They were still hammering away at the Japanese in Myitkyina when the town finally was captured in August. In typical fashion, Hunter was relieved of command without explanation by note and ordered back to the United States *by boat*. Later, the reason for this unusual order became clearer. The treatment of Galahad had become a scandal. Several different organizations were prying into the facts, including the press. Hunter's return by ship guaranteed that he would be incommunicado for some time, long enough for interest to die and for the responsible parties to cover the trail. The bitterness which Hunter experienced as a result of this whole affair is evident from his memoir, yet it is also clear that he treasured his service with the men of Galahad.

## CONCLUSIONS

Few people know the real story behind Galahad, but military professionals ought to. Among other reasons, the account is useful as a case study of senior tactical-level leadership. As such, Hunter's example demonstrates that one does not have to be a Patton or a MacArthur to do well as a commander. Perfection, genius, or charismatic leadership are not prerequisites for success in combat. Hunter was a perfectly ordinary officer with many faults whose performance, however, was extraordinary in the situation in which he was thrust. In this context, it is also worth noting that some of the most significant, rewarding, and enduring challenges for a military professional will be found below the general officer level. This study also makes an interesting contrast between an enshrined military hero, Stilwell, and the tactical unknown who brought Stilwell a good measure of his fame. It is the first point,

however, the question of senior tactical leadership, to which I would like to devote the remainder of this article.

To begin, it is important to note as a foundation to further discussion that the situation in which Hunter found himself from October 1943 to August 1944 could scarcely have been more difficult. From beginning to end, Hunter's own personal standing in the organization was uncertain. Was he the commander or was he not? Did he have Stilwell's confidence or did he not? Into what areas could he legitimately extend his authority? What decisions were his alone and which had to be referred higher for approval? How far could he rely on Merrill to defend the interests of the command?

Furthermore, the missions which Galahad carried out so nobly and obediently were fraught with danger and unrelenting pressure. Disease, exhaustion, forbidding terrain, monsoon rains, inadequate rations, unbearable hardship, and the ever-present tension and stress of being in the enemy's rear combined to create an environment which can hardly be described with mere words. On top of it all, no efforts were made by the higher command to assure the men of Galahad that their efforts were recognized and appreciated. Given impossible tasks which they executed faithfully, Galahad's men were treated like dogs. One battalion in the 5307th went two months without mail. Promotions and decorations were withheld until the end of the campaign. Only one hot meal is recorded during the months of March to May. No heritage, no colors, no patch, no mail, no decorations, no comfort supplies, no recognition—it is a wonder and a cause for great admiration that Galahad performed as well as it did.

These, then, were the conditions under which Hunter endeavored to carry out his responsibilities. As one studies his example, it becomes evident that he had good points and bad, both of which bear mentioning.

Hunter's most important quality was knowing his craft. He frequently inspected troop dispositions and made corrections where they were needed, moving foxholes or machine guns to better sites. He would not

tolerate tactical incompetence and blistered those responsible for tactical errors. At the same time, he could be innovative and flexible when necessary. He did not slavishly follow tactical doctrine; he molded it to the situation. It is clear that he saw such flexibility as a fundamental aspect of tactical doctrine. All of Hunter's tactical plans proved to be successful during the campaign. His subordinates and the troops had confidence in him. They trusted his tactical sense and ground leadership.

Hunter also led by personal example. He remained in the field, enduring the same hardships as his men during the campaign. His standards were high, even harsh, but he ensured that his own performance measured up. He knew the importance of seeing and being seen, thus he frequently was found on the perimeter and beyond it. He neither complained nor tolerated complainers. He could have aided a collapse of morale by entertaining complaints and being over-sympathetic. Mission-oriented to a high degree, Hunter saw great virtue in unvacillating obedience to orders. His speech at Nphum Ga is a clear picture of his attitude to his combat tasks. He neither feared nor was he reckless about closing with the enemy.

Hunter recognized talent in his subordinates and he used it. He gave them a free rein but monitored each situation closely. Clearly, he had no concern about drawing credit to himself, although it must be admitted that he was slow to praise.

In regard to troop welfare, there is no doubt that Hunter understood soldiers and cared for them, albeit in an unsentimental manner. Whenever he could, he saw to it that they were properly resupplied and rested. He endeavored to ensure that Galahad was used only for the tasks for which it had trained. It is true that he pushed them to their limits, yet this too was for their own good. He was strong enough to stand up to their mutterings, knowing that in the end they would understand that he was right. Again, he asked them to endure nothing that he was unwilling to endure himself. Much of the abuse which his men suffered, however, was beyond his control. To the extent of his ability and

within the limits of Hunter's own mission orientation, it is fair to say that he cared for his men as much as he could.

On the negative side, one might criticize Hunter on the grounds that he was too slow to stand up to Stilwell and his staff (although it was reasonable for him to expect Merrill to carry this standard). Perhaps Hunter was overly conscious of his uncertain status. One cannot help but wonder why he did not take Merrill to task for his many failures to make good on his promises. Why did he wait until 27 May to give Stilwell his letter? Why did he not insist more adamantly that his men be withdrawn from the combat zone at Myitkyina? It appears that Hunter may have possessed a quality which is common to many US officers today and which has been noted by many foreign observers—an overly developed loyalty to higher commanders at the expense of subordinates. Hunter's own memoir demonstrates that he had a great unwillingness to question and challenge Merrill, Stilwell, or Stilwell's staff. Still, he was the only one of Galahad's commanders to face Stilwell, and he faced him alone, risking his career to do so.

Hunter also seemed to be overly intolerant of the weaknesses of others and slow to recognize his own. At other times, his judgment showed strange twists. More than once when visitors from rear headquarters came to visit Galahad at Nphum Ga, Hunter staged fake firefights, which he found humorous. Commenting on the poor care being given his men in their convalescent camps, Hunter remarked that everything would have been fine if the camp administration had brought in 50 or so prostitutes to solace them. His distress over the rumors of their poor care apparently was ameliorated by the fact that he technically had no responsibility for them since he remained in the combat zone.

In conclusion, Hunter was no saint. The distilling effect of Galahad's campaign was such that his strengths and flaws both became apparent. Nevertheless, one final comment is in order. Even as the command disintegrated, Galahad's officers and men knew that given the chance, Hunter could pull them together

again. Distressed that he had obtained no special recognition, they felt a loyalty and esteem toward Hunter that few commanders can arouse. They forgave him his faults and held him high in their memories. As the ultimate measure of Hunter's leadership, the testimonies of his own men bear the strongest witness that he deserves our respect.

#### NOTES

1. Stilwell's antipathy for the British is well known and has been cited by many different histories of the campaign. That he lacked true empathy for his own American troops is a harsh statement but also a true one that should be plain to the reader from the facts presented in this article. Louis Allen in his *Burma. The Longest War, 1941-1945* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1984) states twice that Stilwell "crucified" Galahad (pp. 320, 363). Raymond Callahan, *Burma, 1942-45* (Newark, N.J.: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1978), p. 139, states that Stilwell "ruthlessly used" both Galahad and the Chindits. At Myitkyina, Stilwell directed that combat-evacuated Galahad troopers in hospitals or convalescing in rest camps be returned to combat. He also employed untrained US troops as reinforcements in the infantry role at Myitkyina. Totally unready, some of these American soldiers had not seen a weapon since basic training. One entire company was massacred by the Japanese shortly after it arrived. See Charlton Ogburn, Jr., *The Marauders* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), pp. 261-62, for more information on this heartless sacrifice of lives.

2. Every single comprehensive source that I have consulted on the Burma campaign in 1944 indicts Stilwell's staff for poor planning, lack of coordination, indifference to troop welfare, failure to keep lower staffs informed, failure to monitor tactical situations, and other indications of incompetence. The staff even failed to keep Stilwell informed about the conditions of the US and British troops under his command. See Michael Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope* (London: Leo Cooper Ltd., 1971); Terrence O'Brien, *Out of the Blue* (London: Collins, 1984), and Shelford Bidwell, *The Chindit War* (New York: Macmillan, 1979), particularly p. 274. The staff's incompetence undoubtedly was exacerbated by Stilwell's own disdain for staff work and his very secretive approach to operations. See also Bidwell, p. 91.

3. The belief that there would be a 90-day limit to operations by Galahad (and the other Chindit brigades) was widely held by the men in the ranks as well as the officers. The belief was based primarily on statements by their own leaders (Wingate, Hunter, Merrill, and even Stilwell) that the units would be withdrawn after this time. There is absolutely no question that Galahad was totally used up by the end of this time period, owing to the unbelievably harsh conditions and privations that they suffered. Expecting relief after their last operation to Myitkyina, the survivors of the force were devastated to find out that Stilwell intended to keep them in the combat zone indefinitely. See Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *The China-Burma-India Theater. Stilwell's Command Problems*, part of the official United States Army in World War II series (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1956), p. 34; Ogburn, p. 227; Allen, p. 366.

4. Charles N. Hunter, *Galahad* (San Antonio, Tex.: The Naylor Company, 1963), p. 5.

5. Ogburn, p. 86.

6. Bidwell, p. 85; Hunter, p. 20; Romanus and Sunderland, p. 149.

7. Hunter, p. 56.

8. The large number of sick soldiers evacuated at Walawbum (136 men) undoubtedly was connected to the fact that a good many of the Galahad volunteers from the Pacific were already sick or had a history of chronic sickness, particularly malaria, when they arrived in India. Some, apparently, had even volunteered in the hopes of receiving better medical treatment in a new command. The medical history of Galahad's campaign is reflected vividly in James H. Stone, *Crisis Fleeting* (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, 1969), ch. 5.

9. Ogburn, pp. 206-07.

10. Hunter, pp. 77-78.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17. Hunter states that the inadequacy of the K-ration was known by all concerned but accepted with the view that the unit would be withdrawn after three months on the "starvation diet." See also Stone, pp. 302-03, 308. Average weight loss exceeded 20 pounds and was as great as 50 pounds. The specific mix of rations provided by air drop to Galahad was 80 percent K-ration, 5 percent C-ration, 5 percent 10-in-1 rations, and 10 percent B-rations.

13. See Bidwell, p. 275, and the citations in note 1. See also Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45* (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), pp. 570 and 575.

14. Hunter, p. 88. See also Ogburn, p. 291, regarding the high esteem in which Hunter was held and the distress felt by his men that he received so little recognition.

15. The promise of evacuation probably had the greatest effect on the perseverance of Galahad to keep driving on to Myitkyina. Merrill promised the men that they would be installed in a "well-appointed rest camp" and "given a party to cause taxpayers to shudder." (Ogburn, p. 227). Even Stilwell allowed that Merrill could begin evacuating Galahad at Myitkyina "without further order if everything worked out as expected." (Tuchman, p. 570.)

16. Ogburn, p. 231.

17. The interference of Brigadier General Stratemeyer, CG, USAAF Burma-India, in this affair should not be overlooked. Concerned about airfield security, Stratemeyer disrupted the deployment schedule in order to send in anti-aircraft troops and airfield engineers. Stilwell and his staff failed miserably to control the flow of reinforcements to Myitkyina. That there was no immediate plan to take the town of Myitkyina once the airfield fell is incredible. As the author of the Myitkyina operation, Stilwell bears ultimate responsibility for the failures of his staff and the interference of his subordinate, Stratemeyer.

18. Allen, p. 367; Hunter, p. 138; Romanus and Sunderland, p. 233; Bidwell, p. 260. All these sources imply or state that the British 36th Division was available to Stilwell in May. Bidwell says it was "earmarked" for him.

19. Romanus and Sunderland, p. 240.

20. Hunter, p. 191; Ogburn, p. 270.

21. The deplorable conditions of the rest camps are described by Ogburn (pp. 272-78) and Hunter (pp. 203-04). Hunter describes the camp conditions as "indescribably poor"; Ogburn's comments are even more graphic.



# MOBILE GROUPS: PROLOGUE TO OMG

by

RICHARD ARMSTRONG

**T**he aim of Soviet military operations is the destruction of the enemy. This destruction is to be accomplished by developing tactical into operational and subsequently strategic success. Like most arts, this rather simple objective belies the technical difficulties of structure and execution. With significant changes in the past few years, the Soviet armed forces have exhibited a surprising degree of flexibility and innovativeness in their force structure and fighting doctrine. In particular, the identification of the operational maneuver group (OMG) has been the focus of great speculation in the Western press.<sup>1</sup> While some articles have acknowledged Soviet mobile group operations of World War II, most have failed to present a full appreciation for the basis that mobile group operations represent to current Soviet military planners on OMGs. Concurrent with Western writings on the OMG, Soviet military publications, in a characteristically direct usage of their historical studies, are defining the lessons of mobile group operations for applicability to OMGs.<sup>2</sup> While World War II mobile groups operated in a comparatively simple environment—tanks sought to dominate the battlefield and aviation gave rudimentary support—a similar concept on today's battlefield would be dependent upon past lessons fused with modern technology and operational objectives. A closer scrutiny of mobile group operations on the eastern front may more sharply define our expectations in the structure, composition, and use of contemporary OMGs, for the OMG story cannot begin without the mobile group experience.

Before looking at the Soviet use of mobile groups on the eastern front, it is necessary to review the doctrinal context within which mobile groups developed. Soviet military research between the world wars concluded that in World War I the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone in most cases did not lead to great operational success. Failure generally resulted from two basic causes. First, forces and equipment that could achieve high attack tempo were unavailable. Tanks and aircraft had shown their potential when used in small numbers. Their technical reliability, however, did not suit them to participate in high-speed, deep attacks. Second, the lack of improvements in breakthrough techniques and the unskillful coordination of separate arms, especially infantry and artillery, did not resolve the problem of breaking through an enemy defense to its entire depth.

Based on a rigorous analysis of World War I in his book *The Character of Contemporary Army Operations*, V. K. Triandofillov, Chief of Operations in the Red Army Staff, developed the concept of a mass mechanized army which could be employed deep into the battlefield. The Soviets' new, mechanized-based offensive doctrine began to take shape in the field service regulations of the late 1920s. Soviet military theoreticians reached the conclusion that successful offensive operations would require not only a decisive penetration of the enemy defenses, but also a rapid transfer of the main efforts of the attacker to the enemy's operational depth for the purpose of developing the offensive. Tank and mechanized forces

would play the key role in performing the second mission.

Throughout the 1930s under the watchful eye of the youthful Marshal Tukhachevsky, the Soviets applied these theories through tactical maneuvers into force structural changes. As a result, by 1936 the Soviets had created four mechanized corps. The production of tanks and vehicles necessary to implement these theories became an integral part of the Soviets' first five-year plans.

On the eve of World War II, after the purge of the Soviet officer corps and the confusing experiences of the Spanish Civil War, occupation of eastern Poland, and war with Finland, the Soviets temporarily dismantled the mechanized corps. Only in late December 1940, based on General Zhukov's experience at Khalkin Gol on the Mongolian-Manchurian border and observations of the German success in France, did the Soviets reverse their regressive trend and begin rebuilding a mechanized force capable of fulfilling a deep-battle concept. It was a reorganization caught mid-stride by the German invasion of June 1941.

During the four years of fighting on the eastern front, the Soviets gradually applied their theory of deep combat operations. They solved the World War I problem of penetrating defenses by employing massed artillery fire and air strikes to support infantry making the initial penetration. Mobile groups followed on the most important axes with the objective of rapidly developing the attack to the whole depth of German defenses. Soviet experience convinced them that the decisive condition for complete destruction of the enemy was achieving a high attack tempo, for even short halts gave the enemy breathing space to maneuver or counterattack.<sup>3</sup> The Germans conditioned the Soviets well by their ability to react literally overnight to Soviet maneuver.

The basic mission of mobile groups was to develop the tactical success. They were committed through gaps, at boundaries, or from the flank of the first-echelon units, primarily along successful axes. The axis for committing second-echelon units into battle

varied according to the situation. An important difference between mobile groups and second echelons was that mobile groups had specific missions and were committed to battle at or near the beginning of the operation in order to develop the attack swiftly in depth, while the second echelon was usually used after the immediate objective was secured.<sup>4</sup>

Experience showed that successful offensives required not only a decisive breach of the German defense but also a swift shift of the attacker's main effort into the enemy's operational depth for the purpose of developing the offensive. The key role in achieving the latter objective was played by the tank armies, cavalry-mechanized groups, and tank or mechanized corps, which were the mobile groups of the armies and fronts.<sup>5</sup>

Under the scrutiny of the Soviet Supreme High Command, the Soviets closely studied the experiences of the tank armies and corps actions in all operations and generalized that experience. These experiences were distilled in the form of High Command orders and directives issued with important instructions for use of tank troops by armies and fronts.<sup>6</sup>

Initially, fronts and armies did not possess large armored units. Front mobile groups consisted of cavalry and infantry formations supported by small tank battalions or brigades. This followed experience gained in the war with Finland when units like mobile groups were created with tank brigades reinforced by rifle battalions and sappers.<sup>7</sup> These groupings, however, had insufficient combat power to develop success to a great depth.

Coincidentally with the three periods of the war were three organizational phases which Soviet armored forces went through.<sup>8</sup> During the first phase, from July 1941 to early 1942, large tank units were pared down to smaller ones (brigades, regiments, battalions) for easier command and control of the limited number of available tanks. In the 1942 winter battles around Moscow, Soviet forces were unable to surround large enemy groupings and press home the deeper attack. Without large tank formations in the front and army organization, the Soviets concluded

that the important task of developing the tactical success to the operational depth could not be fully achieved.

In the second phase of the war, from April 1942 to the end of the year, the Soviets formed tank and mechanized corps and, concurrently, their first tank armies. However, the tank and mechanized corps lacked an armored infantry, and the tank armies were formed from diverse infantry, cavalry, and tank units. Meanwhile, Soviet combat practice was also refining their offensive techniques. On main assault axes the Soviets began using large tank formations with the primary mission of assisting infantry forces in the breakthrough and development of the attack. The Soviets considered tanks primarily an offensive resource.

Initial offensive experiences with the newly formed 5th Tank Army at Voronezh in July 1942 showed the disparity in combat capabilities and mobility among the army's rifle divisions, tanks, and cavalry corps. Such a mobile group composition proved too awkward and unwieldy to control. The need to counter the considerable tank capabilities of the Germans spurred the Soviet effort to develop even larger and better-balanced tank units.

In the third phase of development, from 1943 to the end of the war, the Soviets refined the organization and improved the composition of tank formations. In 1944, improvements in the firepower and maneuverability of tank corps increased their tactical independence. These improvements resulted in the creation of real capabilities for inflicting deep strikes against the Germans and

for conducting combat operations with a higher momentum than before.<sup>9</sup>

By the end of the war, Soviet tank armies were composed of two or three tank or mechanized corps. The basic trend was toward increased firepower, greater unit autonomy, higher mobility and maneuverability, and more easily controlled regiments, brigades, and corps. These were the characteristics necessary for successful mobile group operations.

**T**he main operational objectives of mobile groups were to inflict deep strikes in order to scatter and destroy the units, to complete a tactical encirclement of the main enemy groups, to hold off enemy concentrations of tactical and sometimes strategic reserves, and to occupy and hold important objectives and lines until the approach of infantry units.

Successful operations by front and army mobile groups in developing the attack to the operational depth depended greatly on the circumstances of their commitment to battle, on close cooperation with other ground forces and air support, and on firm troop control. Ideally, the basic method for developing a breakthrough was to have mobile groups begin their combat operation only after the infantry divisions had broken through the Germans' main defensive zone. In most Soviet operations, however, mobile groups were committed on the first day of the battle within the German tactical defense zone. Mobile group tank strengths proved necessary to assist infantry units in creating a breach in the main defense zone. Only in isolated instances did the Soviets commit mobile groups to battle after the first-echelon armies had already broken through the entire tactical defense zone. Usually, mobile groups were not intended for the breakthrough but rather for their specific mission.<sup>10</sup> The commitment of the mobile groups to action on the first day was one of the decisive moments in the front or army attack.

Operations of separate tank or mechanized corps acting as army mobile groups on the first day of the commitment to the breakthrough advanced from 15 to 50 kilometers. If the German defense was more

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deeply echeloned, the advance was held to 15 to 25 kilometers; if not deeply echeloned, the advance could be 35 kilometers or more.<sup>11</sup>

Mobile groups typically operated separately from the main forces of the front when they carried out their combat missions. Throughout the war the organizational structures of the tank and mechanized formations that comprised the mobile groups were improved to ensure their combat independence and survivability when operating deep. The major lesson the Soviets learned was that separate mobile groups could be established and could function independently during operations when separated for long periods from the main attack forces.<sup>12</sup>

Mobile groups used concentration and assembly areas prior to commitment to combat. While corps-sized mobile groups used concentration areas 25 to 150 kilometers from the line of contact, on an average concentration areas were 50 to 70 kilometers to the rear.<sup>13</sup> Concentration areas less than 50 kilometers from the Germans were hard to conceal and hindered immediate redeployment to new or unanticipated axes. Areas more than 100 kilometers distant resulted in excessive expenditures in combat vehicles because of routine equipment malfunction on long-route marches before combat operations.

Army-sized mobile groups used combined concentration and assembly areas which were usually situated outside population centers in natural cover and concealment. Assembly areas were designated for the transfer of mobile groups in the direction of impending operations, and they provided concealment as close as possible to the line of contact. Such assembly areas were 20 to 40 kilometers from the line of contact for tank armies, 10 to 20 kilometers for corps.

Mobile group units were configured in assembly areas for ease of movement to a line of commitment without further regrouping. For its move to commitment, each corps was given two routes within a zone of 8 to 20 kilometers for tank armies, 6 to 8 kilometers for mobile corps.

Mobile group formations usually consisted of two echelons, artillery groups, and a

reserve, depending on the situation and mission. In corps-sized mobile groups at least two brigades (usually tank) and a large portion of the support weapons were assigned to the first echelon and designated to achieve the immediate mission. The corps second echelon reinforced the attack for deep exploitation, repelled German counterattacks, and consolidated success. Reserves, in battalion to brigade size, dealt with unexpected German tank attacks on the mobile group's flanks and rear, and exploited and consolidated offensive success.

The reconnaissance elements of first-echelon brigades began the advance on their respective axes. Behind the reconnaissance followed movement support detachments, which began necessary obstacle-clearing on the movement routes for their parent brigades.

Upon approaching the line of commitment, forward detachments in the form of reinforced tank or mechanized brigades usually were deployed into combat formation and cooperated with the infantry units' attacks. Facilitators of battle, these forward detachments generally activated the offensive and immediately influenced the depth of the operation while in some measure disorganizing the defense. Having assisted in breaking down the resistance in the main defensive zone, the forward detachments rushed on to the second defensive zone in order to break through it on the march.

If the mobile groups had to complete the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defensive zone after the infantry units engaged the main German defensive zone, then in this case only the forward detachments or part of the mobile group's first-echelon forces were called upon to seize the second German defensive line. Only in those instances did the combat actions in breaching the second defensive zone of the Germans take on a drawn-out nature.

Forward detachments, usually a tank brigade, had the specific mission to seize and hold important tactical or operational objectives, disrupt German defenses in depth, and partially prevent maneuvering of enemy operational reserves.<sup>14</sup>

Under favorable conditions, the mobile groups were committed to the battle after the first-echelon armies had already penetrated the entire German tactical defense zone and sometimes even into the rear area. Most often this occurred on the second through the fifth day of the operation at a depth of 15 to 35 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area and sometimes even farther. Such a method of commitment to battle was called a "clean" breakthrough.

If the mobile groups were committed to a clean breakthrough, they usually advanced from the assembly areas to the line of commitment with the forward detachments of the first-echelon units in front of them. The mobile group main force moved behind the lead units in route columns and, after passing through the entire tactical defense zone of the Germans, overtook the infantry and rushed into the operational depth. Sometimes only the forward detachments of the mobile groups deployed into the battle formations when overtaking the infantry.

Aviation formations selected to support the combat actions of the mobile groups became operationally subordinate to the commander of the mobile groups with the beginning of commitment to battle. To coordinate the actions of ground attack aircraft, the commander of the supporting air division was located in the mobile group command post and had communications with both the airfield and aircraft that were airborne. In the first-echelon brigades and forward detachments were air army personnel who would guide aircraft to specific targets. Mobile groups seized serviceable airfields on which supporting aircraft could be quickly relocated in order to keep air support in the immediate vicinity of the mobile groups.<sup>15</sup> Air strikes combined with artillery fires cleared the path along which the mobile groups operated.

After completing the breakthrough of the German defense, the most characteristic missions of mobile groups operating in the operational depth were to engage German reserves, preempt subsequent defensive lines, cross water obstacles, fight to hold key terrain, pursue withdrawing German forces,

and seize important installations or facilities.<sup>16</sup>

Once through the tactical defense zone, the mobile groups' main mission was the defeat of the Germans' operational reserve.<sup>17</sup> Advancing at high rates in the operational depth well ahead of the friendly first echelons seemed to attract German reserves. Mobile groups would immediately encounter reserves rushed to close the breakthrough and intended to prevent the advance by holding them within the limits of the tactical defense zone. Impressed by the Soviet speed in exploiting even the smallest penetration, the Germans were forced to make every possible effort to immediately seal off penetrations, however small their own counterattack force.<sup>18</sup>

Combat actions against attacking reserves took the form of meeting engagements. These engagements would develop in broad zones of 20 to 60 kilometers and last from one to three days.<sup>19</sup>

The Soviet researchers concluded that in the course of fighting in the tactical defense zone the Germans, as a rule, used all of their closest operational reserves and for the next several days were practically unable to offer any serious resistance to the offensive of the mobile groups.<sup>20</sup> The Germans then rushed to bring the reserves from a strategic depth into the offensive zones of the mobile groups and by counterattacks or by occupying defensive positions delayed further advances by Soviet mobile forces.

The Soviets noted that the conditions for fighting German reserves in the beginning and at the end of an operation differed substantially. Fighting German reserves during commitment to battle, although it did affect the future course of the operation, nevertheless usually was fought jointly with the first-echelon units and in cooperation with aviation. Mobile group combat vehicles and equipment were close to established strengths, and they usually achieved a force ratio in Soviet favor.

Conditions for fighting German reserves in the closing phase of an operation differed completely. Then, mobile groups had expended a considerable part of their forces and

weapons and were deficient in supplies and fighting vehicles. Moreover, they operated a great distance from the main forces of the fronts and sometimes without air support. While in the first phase of the operation Soviet mobile groups fought German reserves by direct offensive actions, in the closing phases fresh German reserves frequently forced mobile groups onto the defensive after brief meeting engagements.

The mobile groups' ability to develop the success was directly dependent on their adeptness to overcome rear defensive lines and water obstacles quickly. After completing the breakthrough of the Germans' tactical defense zone and the defeat of their immediate operational reserves, the mobile groups turned to pursuit of the retreating German troops. An important requirement during pursuit was a high offensive momentum. Tempo was the nexus between tactical capabilities and operational possibilities. Soviet studies showed that the tempo in the operational depth largely relied upon the skillful and dynamic actions of forward detachments.

Forward detachments rushed into the depth of enemy defenses, slipped into the rear of their retreating groups, captured bridges and river crossings, cut off the retreat of the enemy troops, and also forestalled their occupying defenses at earlier prepared lines.

In the event the mobile group encountered major German strongpoints, they tried not to engage them but to bypass these points to maintain momentum and move even deeper.

The German defenses in the operational depth usually were characterized by an insufficiently developed fire plan, hastily organized and spread units, and poorly used terrain marked by incomplete engineer preparations of barriers and obstacles. Against these hastily occupied defenses, the mobile group broke through on the move or with a short artillery preparation when an attack on the move was unsuccessful. In the latter case, the breakthrough's failure was often attributable to mobile group commanders waiting for the arrival of additional support, usually artillery. By hesitating they lost the

element of surprise, and the Germans had time to consolidate and improve their defense. "Achieving dependable artillery support of the operations of tank armies in operational depth," noted a senior Soviet doctrine writer, "required the creation of a sufficient quantity of fast moving artillery . . . [T]o the very end of the war this was not done."<sup>21</sup> A number of mobile group operations successfully breached defenses in the operational depth on the move without massed artillery by substituting the firepower of the tank cannons and the support of air strikes.

Organizing and preparing breakthroughs on the move was done during the approach to the defensive line. The mobile group's offensive zone width varied and depended on the availability of men and equipment, the German grouping, the nature of the defense, and terrain conditions. Correlating these factors allowed Soviet commanders to concentrate their main efforts. During attacks, mobile groups often were not superior overall to German forces. However, concentrating men and equipment on the main axis, the Soviets achieved a considerable local superiority.

The simultaneous breakthrough of German defenses in several sectors proved to be quite effective. Large Soviet offensives often used a multiple of mobile groups advancing along parallel axes. Constant cooperation between the neighboring mobile groups was accomplished through mutual awareness of missions and the constant exchange of information. Such a method of attack did not allow the Germans to maneuver their forces and enabled the Soviets to split, isolate, and destroy the defenders in a short time. Such a breakthrough technique increased the difficulty for the defenders to detect the main strike axis and gave them little opportunity for organized resistance. Additionally, spreading mobile groups avoided a large concentration of men and equipment, which lowered losses from German ground attack aircraft.

In engagements for defended built-up areas, mobile group momentum decreased sharply and many times stopped entirely.

Therefore, the mobile groups tried to bypass built-up areas and attempted to cut off and encircle German garrisons for subsequent destruction by following infantry units. While it was advisable to go around German centers of resistance, the Soviets did take into consideration whether more time would be spent bypassing one than it would take to deploy and organize an engagement to overcome it.

Whether centers of resistance were bypassed by mobile groups in the operational depth also depended on the nature of their mission. In the course of some operations the Germans blocked the path of mobile groups with an organized defense on a wide front, occupying it with individual strongpoints. In these situations, mobile groups were forced to deal with the German resistance, breach the defense, and then resume their freedom of operational maneuver.

Quite often mobile groups were forced to cross several water obstacles during an operation. In fact, though, tank armies had insufficient river crossing equipment. What was assigned to them often lagged behind because it lacked comparative cross-country mobility. Thus one of the basic missions of the forward detachments was to seize river crossings, which made possible a more rapid crossing by the mobile groups.<sup>22</sup> Success depended on reconnaissance in order to determine the number of bridges and fords. Forward detachments were given the mission of seizing identified crossing points. While artillery moved forward as fast as possible, aviation support had the mission of isolating the crossing sector from German reserves and establishing air supremacy in the crossing area.

In the course of offensive operations, successful night operations were conducted by forward detachments of mobile groups. Regrouping and marches by the mobile groups were done mainly at night. This enabled them for a certain amount of time to conceal from the Germans the plan of the Soviet command and sharply reduced losses from German air strikes.

The Soviet Belorussian operation of 23 June to 29 August 1944, depicted on the accompanying map, is a good example of


extensive and multiple uses of mobile groups by armies and fronts. In an effort to complement the Allied invasion of Normandy, the Soviets planned a major operation with the objective to destroy the German Army Group Center and parts of Army Groups North and Northern Ukraine.

The tank armies and mechanized corps (the latter were included in the cavalry-mechanized groups [CMG]) were used primarily as front mobile groups. In the Third Belorussian Front, two mobile groups were organized: the 5th Guards Tank Army and a CMG (III Guards Cavalry and III Guards Mechanized Corps). In the First Belorussian Front, two mobile groups were also established: 2nd Tank Army and the second CMG (IV Guards Cavalry and I Mechanized Corps). The Second Belorussian Front's mobile group consisted of two tank brigades, a rifle division, and a self-propelled artillery regiment. An exception, the I Tank Corps, was assigned as the front mobile group for the First PreBaltic Front.

The separate tank corps (with the exception of the I Tank Corps, First PreBaltic Front) were employed as mobile groups for combined arms armies advancing in the fronts' main sectors. The II Guards Tank Corps comprised the mobile group of the 11th Guards Army; the IX Tank Corps did the same in the 3rd Army; I Guards Tank Corps, in the 65th Army; and XI Tank Corps, for the 8th Guards Army.

A unique employment of the mobile groups in the Belorussian operation was that separate tank corps, as army mobile groups, were used for completing the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and for supporting the commitment of the front mobile groups, tank armies, and CMGs. The Soviets planned the successive commitment of the mobile groups to battle. For example, the II Guards Tank Corps, 11th Guards Army mobile group, was to be committed to battle on the first day of the operation, while on the fourth day in the same sector the 5th Guards Tank Army, the mobile group of the front, was to be committed.

The commitment to battle of the mobile groups of the armies and fronts was a crucial and difficult stage. This was marked by a



number of essential features determined by the overall plan of the operation, by the nature of the German defenses, and by the terrain conditions. Depending upon the developing situation, the commitment to battle of the follow-up echelon was carried out on different axes and frequently in a manner quite unlike what was envisaged in the plans of the army and front operations. For example, the 5th Guards Tank Army was to be committed to battle according to the first variation, that is, on the Orsha-Borisov axis; but this was canceled as the Germans put up stubborn resistance to the troops of

the 11th Guards and 31st armies. The 5th Guards Tank Army was regrouped to the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front and committed to battle on the Bogushev-Borisov axis, where a CMG had been committed two days previously. Having caught up with the rifle formations at a depth of 30 kilometers from the previous forward edge, the tank army began to rapidly pursue the Germans and came out in the direction previously planned for it.<sup>23</sup>

The Soviet forces broke through the German defenses simultaneously in six sectors, encircled and destroyed German

forces in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, destroyed German units in Orsha and Mogilev, and then encircled and destroyed the main forces of Army Group Center in the area of Minsk. Soviet forces achieved the liberation of Belorussia, seized parts of Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland, and forced the Narev and Vistula rivers, having advanced 550 to 600 kilometers and in some sectors 1000 kilometers.

Soviet conclusions on the experiences of mobile group combat operations within the operational depth ascribe their achievements to swift, decisive, and continuous day and night action and to the use of wide maneuvers when carrying out combat missions. The high momentum of mobile group attacks was achieved mainly through their aggressive use of forward detachments. They accomplished decisive action by avoiding drawn-out engagements and battles for major strongpoints unless necessary. By maintaining continuous operations they attempted to enter the Germans' rear area and to intercept their main lines of communications as quickly as possible.

As the Soviets refined their employment of mobile groups during the second and third periods of the war on the eastern front, many aspects of the combat and service support for these groups were continuously improved in capabilities and numbers.

A significant area relevant to OMG employment today was the organization and employment of air defense for mobile groups. Through the course of the war the primary trend was a greater density of ground antiaircraft fire under a centralized control and closer cooperation with fighter aviation support.<sup>24</sup> Antiaircraft artillery groups were formed and organized to protect the mobile groups from assembly areas through the breakthrough and into the operational depth. Fighter aviation from the front air armies flew counter air protection to cover the mobile groups throughout the operation against German air strikes.

Soviet studies of air defense support to mobile groups identified the following apparent needs: a highly mobile, armored antiaircraft weapon system that had cross-

country and adverse weather capabilities; an organized system of reconnaissance for enemy air, using mobile radars in the course of the operation; and a centralized control of air defense personnel and weapons in repelling enemy air raids.<sup>25</sup>

Rear services for mobile groups proved to be the most difficult of organizations and operations to support.<sup>26</sup> Mobile groups consumed large quantities of fuel and ammunition: "According to World War II experience the average daily fuel and ammunition requirement of a tank army of medium strength was 600-700 tons. To satisfy this requirement it was necessary to provide, for a distance of 200-300 kilometers, 270-300 trucks with loads."<sup>27</sup> The front transports delivered comparatively little fuel to the mobile groups. Mobile groups were forced to organize their own supplies for the entire offensive operation, frequently reducing their rate of advance.<sup>28</sup>

Attempts were undertaken by the fronts to supply mobile groups by air transports, but the small number of available air transports carried an insignificant amount. One notable success was the major air resupply of forward detachments of the 6th Guards Tank Army during the Manchurian campaign in August 1945.

Local food resources were widely foraged to reserve the precious cargo space for the more critical ammunition and fuel. The nature and amount of work related to road traffic support necessitated having such road units as a bridge-building company, traffic control platoon, road platoon, and security platoon.

Mobile groups used all forms of transport to evacuate sick and wounded. When roads were lacking or Germans cut the lines of communications to the rear, sick and wounded were left at temporarily organized hospitals near inhabited areas until the arrival of the front-line forces.

Because of the high rate of advance and the great distances from the main forces of the fronts, the importance for autonomy in rear services for mobile groups increased. A recent review of Soviet mobile group experiences concluded, "A profound and creative study of the question related to rear

services support for mobile groups in the course of the last war will aid in successfully solving today's problems in developing organic and operational rear services."<sup>29</sup> Such is the Soviet advice for what may be assessed as the Achilles' heel for OMGs.

The mobile groups' operational tempo and distance from friendly front lines significantly influenced maintenance support. Combined arms armies did not have organic repair facilities until 1944 and were unable to provide support to mobile groups. Tank corps did not receive organic maintenance units until 1942, when they began to include two mobile repair bases for medium repair on tanks and motor vehicles.

Maintenance support for mobile groups was organized for three stages in an operation: preparation, movement to the line of commitment, and operations in the operational depth.<sup>30</sup> The Soviets brought units to full strength in the preparation phase and attempted to maintain that level in movement to commitment. The third stage, mobile group maintenance support at the operational depth, was of course more problematic. Studies showed the average daily breakdown rate of tanks and self-propelled assault guns in corps-sized mobile groups to be 8 to 10 percent from start to combat, and in two to three days of battle they lost up to 50 percent of the tanks.<sup>31</sup>

The basic method was to repair equipment directly in the forward unit areas. Repair and recovery groups of the tank battalions deployed behind the battle formations of the battalions while the maintenance support companies of brigades and corps deployed behind the first-echelon brigades. Maintenance observation posts were organized for checking tanks and summoning repair equipment to damaged vehicles in the tank battalions. Brigade maintenance teams repaired directly at the place where equipment broke down. Vehicles requiring labor-intensive repairs were evacuated to the corps assembly point for damaged vehicles. When rates of advance were high (40 to 50 kilometers) or limited recovery capabilities existed, corps did not organize the assembly points. Maintenance support for corp mobile

groups was based on organic resources located at the rear command post.

For corps-sized mobile groups, army and front maintenance resources were used to repair combat vehicles on the line of commitment to a breakthrough to ensure the complete moving of tank and mechanized corps' organic repair and recovery units into the operational depth.


The quality of maintenance support also was affected by the supply of spare parts and materials. Centralized supply from army and front depots depended on ground transport lines; when these lines were broken, maintenance units had to use parts and assemblies from vehicles that would not be repaired. Mobile group experience showed that corps-sized mobile groups operating in the operational depth usually received 40 to 50 percent and sometimes all of their parts and assemblies from irretrievably lost equipment.<sup>32</sup> German General von Manteuffel thought Soviet salvage and repair services performed extraordinary feats. He therefore issued orders that incapacitated tanks were to be set on fire.<sup>33</sup>

Another area of World War II mobile group experience that bears significantly on OMG operations today is command and control. A command post (CP) system was established that included in the first echelon of an army (or corps) mobile group a main command post and a rear command post. During operations, operational groups headed by the army or corps commander often were established to accomplish the role of a forward CP.<sup>34</sup> Small in size, operational groups were assigned staff officers with communications means to direct the army and corps staffs in accordance with the commander's instructions.

During the course of an army-sized mobile group operation, the forward CP was located six to ten kilometers from the line of contact; the main, 15 to 25 kilometers. The rear CP was located 25 to 30 kilometers behind the corresponding rear CPs of subordinate corps.<sup>35</sup>

Army-sized mobile groups changed CP locations by leap-frogging, rear CP to the main, main CP to the forward. These shifts

### Composition of an Operations Group for a Tank or Mechanized Corps From Torstukha and Portugal'skii, *Troop Control in an Offensive*



were done at night during the least active periods of combat. By the middle of 1944, the established practice was to work out a special plan for the movement of the CPs. Shifting the CPs depended on the tempo and the conduct of the attack. Forward CPs moved once, twice, or even more times a day; main CPs usually moved once a day; and rear CPs moved once in two or three days.<sup>36</sup>

A corps-sized operation was very mobile. For example, Soviet analysts computed that the IX Tank Corps during the Vistula-Oder operation halted 20 to 30 minutes for every one to five hours of movement. The speed of set-ups and tear-downs of CPs depended largely on staff teamwork and quick preparation of communications and equipment: corps CPs averaged 40 to 60 minutes.<sup>37</sup>

When distances were too great for available radios and made dependable direction and control impossible, the Soviets turned to mobile means, such as communications planes. In these circumstances, forward CPs were frequently established.<sup>38</sup>

During rapid rates of advance, commanders issued short combat orders by radio and liaison officers carried duplicate messages. Sometimes at the end of the day, subordinate commanders and their chiefs of arms and services would meet in the main CP. They would summarize the day's combat operations, adopt decisions for the following day, and assign the combat missions.

The primary purpose for mobile groups was to rapidly shift the focus of combat to the rear area and thereby maintain a high rate of advance; today's OMGs have the same purpose. The importance of this dimension in operational-level warfare was succinctly described by the well-known Soviet front commander Marshal I. S. Konev, who wrote in his memoirs: "Thus the whole orderly system of the enemy's defenses which envisaged an appropriate sequence of committing the reserves to action, was disorganized. And this was very important, because precisely such a disruption of the integrity of the enemy's forces and of the system of their control is a sine qua non for successfully developing an operation to great depth."

With a vast reservoir of mobile group operational experience from World War II, it is no surprise that Soviet military analysts have turned to it for guidance. For the Soviets, the Marxist-Leninist imperative is to solve problems of military science on the basis of the methodology of dialectical and historical materialism.

In the body of available historical data, the Soviets believe they have the basis for operational analysis that can adapt the previous concept to the modern battlefield. With rigorous study in the areas of operational doctrine, logistical and fire support, and command and control, they will have considered critical mobile group problems

relevant to successful OMG operations. Their adaptations also will incorporate an understanding of the effects of technology and its influence to the full depth of the enemy defenses with strikes by missiles, aviation, long-range artillery, and airborne and air-mobile assaults. How the Soviets define and refine combat entities within the context of their historical experience will shape the force structure, equipment composition, and employment of OMGs. Now, the OMG story begins.

#### NOTES

1. See C. N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group: A New Challenge for NATO," *International Defense Review*, 15 (No. 9, 1982), 1177-86; C. J. Dick, "Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups: A Closer Look," *International Defense Review*, 16 (No. 6, 1983), 669-776; John G. Hines and Phillip A. Peterson, "The Warsaw Strategic Offensive: The OMG in Context," *International Defense Review*, 16 (No. 10, 1983); Chris Bellamy, "Antecedents of the Modern Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG)," *RUSI*, 129 (September 1984); Michael Ruehle, "The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: Is the Threat Lost in a Terminological Quarrel?" *Armed Forces Journal*, 122 (August 1984); Henry S. Shields, "Why the OMG?" *Military Review*, 65 (November 1985), 4-13.

2. G. Chernykh, "On the Employment of the 6th Guards Tank Army in the First Echelon of a Front," *Voyenno Istoricheskii Zhurnal (Vizh)* (No. 3, 1981), pp. 66-69; N. Kireyev, "From the Experience of the Employment of Forward Detachments of Tank (Mechanized) Corps," *Vizh* (No. 9, 1982), pp. 20-27; I. Krupchenko, "Methods of Developing Success at Operational Depth by the Forces of Tank Armies, Tank and Mechanized Corps," *Vizh* (No. 7, 1981), pp. 12-20; V. Odintsov and V. Ovsyannikov, "Rear Support for Mobile Groups," *Vizh* (No. 3, 1983), pp. 43-49; I. Tormozov and V. Tokarskii, "The Organization of Air Defense for Mobile Groups of Armies and Fronts During Offensive Operations of the Second and Third Period of the War," *Vizh* (No. 4, 1983), pp. 21-27; A. Krupchenko, "Technical Support of Tank and Mechanized Corps Operations as Mobile Groups," *Vizh* (No. 6, 1982), pp. 27-33; see also for major studies of armored forces: O. A. Losik, *Formation and Combat Use of Soviet Tank Troops During the Years of the Great Patriotic War* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979) and A. I. Radzievsky, *Tank Strike* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977).

3. A. I. Radzievsky, *Tactics by Combat Example (Division)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 71.

4. I. Krupchenko, p. 12.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

6. Losik, p. 118.

7. P. A. Rotmistrov, *Steel Guard* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984), p. 45.

8. Soviet recent historiography, which calls the fighting between the Soviets and the Germans the Great Patriotic War, has divided the war on the eastern front into three periods. The first period, 22 June 1941 to 18 November 1942, is the strategic defense. The second period, 19 November 1942 to the end of 1943, is the basic turning point in the course of the war. The third period, January 1944 to 9 May 1945, is the defeat of the German forces and the liberation of occupied European countries.

9. Losik, p. 72.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

12. P. Kurochkin, "Operations of Tank Armies in Operational Depth," *Voyennaya mysl'* (November 1964), trans. in *Selected Readings From Military Thought 1963-1973*, comp. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta Hoeber, published under the auspices of the US Air Force (Washington: GPO, 1982), p. 65.

13. Losik, p. 123.

14. Modern battle missions for forward detachments could include the above missions with the addition of destruction of the enemy's nuclear delivery systems, small advancing enemy reserves, and air defense groups. In the April 1965 issue of *Voyennaya mysl'*, General Vorob'yev noted that it would be reasonable to adopt the term "Operational Forward Detachments." Both the old and new concept is to dispatch the detachments with the "desire to increase the speed of the advance and to increase the depth of simultaneous action against defenders on important axes." I. Vorob'yev, "Forward Detachments in Offensive Operations and Battles," *Voyennaya mysl'* (April 1965), trans. in *Selected Readings From Military Thought 1963-1973*, pp. 97-98, 101.

15. Losik, p. 141.

16. I. Krupchenko, p. 13.

17. Kurochkin, p. 75.

18. Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-233, *German Defense Tactics Against Russian Breakthroughs*, October 1951, p. 32.

19. I. Krupchenko, p. 16.

20. Losik, p. 137.

21. Kurochkin, p. 79.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

23. O. A. Losik, "Application of Armored and Mechanized forces in the Belorussian Operation," *Vizh* (No. 6, 1984), pp. 22-23.

24. I. Tormozov, p. 27.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

26. V. Odintsov, p. 43.

27. Kurochkin, p. 80.

28. V. Odintsov, p. 43.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

30. A. Krupchenko, p. 28.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

33. B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Other Side of the Hill* (London: Cassell, 1951), p. 333.

34. I. Krupchenko, p. 18.

35. Radzievsky, *Tank Strike*, p. 205.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

37. P. P. Torstukha, R. M. Portugal'skii, *Troop Control in an Offensive* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981), p. 178.

38. Kurochkin, p. 80.



# LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND *THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF REBELLION*

by

DONALD L. DAVIDSON

**S**hould Christians encourage and support Marxist revolution? An increasing number of liberation theologians say yes. In justifying this conclusion, these churchmen cite both social conditions and scripture. The theme of freedom is deeply rooted in the New and Old Testaments. In his inaugural address at his hometown of Nazareth, Jesus characterized his mission with a quotation from the prophet Isaiah:

The Spirit of the Lord is on me,  
because he has anointed me  
to preach good news to the poor.  
He has sent me to proclaim freedom for  
the prisoners and recovery of sight  
for the blind,  
to release the oppressed, to proclaim  
the year of the Lord's favor.<sup>1</sup>

In this text and throughout the Gospels we see the great concern of Jesus for the poor and the oppressed and his expectation that his followers would come to their assistance ("whatever you did for one of the least of these my brothers, you did for me"). Furthermore, a central motif for both Christians and Jews is the Exodus, in which God, through Moses, delivered the Hebrews from enslavement in Egypt. As these

scriptures illustrate, the concept of liberation is fundamental in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and it has become the central theme of liberation theology.

As a distinct movement, liberation theology is of fairly recent origin. It emerged during the dynamic 1960s, influenced by several factors: the example of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a German theologian executed by the Gestapo for his resistance activities and his collaboration in the plot to assassinate Hitler;<sup>2</sup> the Christian-Marxist dialogue, especially in France; the civil rights movement in the United States; and the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), which reaffirmed the mission of the church as service and urged every Christian to work for social justice according to Gospel principles. In Latin America, where liberation theology developed most fully, the effects of these factors were heightened by conditions of pervasive and increasing poverty, a tradition of authoritarian governments controlled by the military or ruling oligarchies, and a new model for revolution emanating from Cuba and led by Che Guevara.

This article traces the evolution of liberation theology in this revolutionary setting, beginning with a summary of the movement's rise and some of its basic tenets.

After considering the reaction of the church hierarchy in Latin America and Rome, attention is given to Phillip Berryman's *The Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions*,<sup>4</sup> which details church involvement in the violence of this turbulent region. The article concludes with an assessment of the implications of liberation theology for US policy.

In seeking ways to apply the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, Latin American bishops met at Medellin, Colombia, in September 1968. At the conclusion of this conference, the bishops issued a letter which became the charter for liberation theology. Strongly attacking "economic neocolonialism" and structures (i.e. not simply individuals or groups) of injustice that created and maintained poverty, the bishops declared the church on the side of the poor and endorsed nonviolent means of liberation from sin, ignorance, hunger, and oppression. In light of the supportive relationship between church and state traditionally existing in Latin America, the Medellin statement was revolutionary.

After Medellin, *comunidades de base*, or "basic Christian communities," began to emerge. Because of a shortage of ordained clergy, these "people's churches" were led largely by laymen, especially in rural areas. When tutored by liberationists, these communities also became centers for *concientizacion*, a process of consciousness raising where scripture was discussed in light of the Medellin mandate to liberate the poor from unjust economic and political structures. Marxist concepts of class struggle, alienation, oppression, and revolution often were used to analyze social structures and to plan programs of liberation.

Amidst this diverse popular movement, a theology professor at the Catholic University in Lima named Gustavo Gutierrez published a seminal text entitled *A Theology of Liberation* in 1971.<sup>5</sup> In the introduction, Gutierrez describes his book as a reflection based on the Gospel and experiences of men and women "committed to the process of liberation in the oppressed and exploited land

of Latin America."<sup>6</sup> Although he uses theological categories (e.g. God, Christ, Church, Salvation, Sacrament), he argues that Marxism may provide the best "formal framework" for social analysis.<sup>7</sup> Efforts for political reform and economic development have failed to address the root causes of injustice; thus, what is needed, according to Gutierrez, is "a social revolution" to achieve a radical break with the status quo, a profound transformation from the class and private property systems to a socialist system. The oppressed class must replace capitalist oppressors. Because the political arena is "conflictual," liberation requires confrontation. The two kingdom or separate planes theory, where the state is supreme in secular matters and the church rules in religious, is rejected. Christ is Lord of all; the church is in the world; the church is the world. The Christian's vocation includes working for a just society; "to participate in the process of liberation is already, in a certain sense, a salvific work."<sup>8</sup> Through liberation a "new man" and a "new society" will be created in Latin America. Whatever else the Kingdom of God may be, it is a radical historical process which begins with the establishment of a just society on earth. In this society, human nature is transformed from individual selfishness to one of community service. Citizens give according to their ability and receive according to their needs. The means of production are owned collectively, and they serve the common good. In case all this

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sounds familiar, Gutierrez is quick to point out that the liberation movement in Latin America is unique and not to be confused with socialist failures in other parts of the world. He does imply that the Cuban revolution may be a model for creating this new society in Latin America.

Gutierrez was soon joined by other liberation theologians.<sup>9</sup> Some of these, like Dom Helder Camara, Leonardo Boff, Jose Miguez Bonino, and Enrique Dussel, advocate nonviolent approaches to liberation, while Gutierrez, Juan Luis Segundo, Hugo Assmann, and others argue for the legitimacy of violent means. The liberation theology movement grew rapidly in the 1970s through the work of these theologians, in combination with the proliferation of basic Christian communities,<sup>10</sup> political repression, worsening economic conditions, and the rise of other opposition organizations. In addition to providing a religious rationale for revolution, some priests participated directly in revolutionary groups. In Nicaragua, for example, Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann, Edgar Parrales, Fernando Cardenal, and his brother Ernesto Cardenal joined the *Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional* (FSLN) and serve today as officials in the Sandinista government.

Nevertheless, liberation theology remains a minority movement in Latin America. In 1979, Archbishop of Medellin Alfonso Lopez Trujillo (elevated to cardinal in 1982), an opponent of Gutierrez and liberation theology, intensified his counterattack at the Latin American bishops' conference in Puebla, Mexico. He contends that the church should protect its pastoral independence by remaining politically neutral in the current struggles for power. Another important critic is Cardinal Obando y Bravo of Nicaragua.<sup>11</sup> His brief support of the Sandinista government in 1979 turned to sharp criticism in 1980. He strongly opposed the participation of priests in the government and official restrictions on the church. At the Puebla conference and increasingly since then, Pope John Paul II has criticized the Gutierrez, Boff, and Cardenal theologies of liberation. The Vatican endorses the concept

of liberation, but opposes this movement's alliance with Marxism and the establishment of "people's churches" in conflict or competition with the hierarchical church. The Vatican's Sacred Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith issued an "Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation," dated 6 August 1984 and signed by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, which warned of "deviations" that are brought about by "certain forms of liberation theology which use, in an insufficiently critical manner, concepts borrowed from various currents of Marxist thought." The Instruction also criticized liberation theology for examining church structures from the perspective of a class struggle, which posits truth in the "church of the base" and represents "a challenge to the sacramental and hierarchical structure of the church, which is willed by the Lord himself."<sup>12</sup>

The church in Latin America remains sharply, if unevenly, divided between proponents and critics of liberation theology.<sup>13</sup> The vast majority of church leaders are committed to liberating change; the principal questions center on pace, means, and alliances to bring about change.

**T**he ecclesiastical and military tumult of Central America has regenerated interest in liberation theology in the United States, resulting in political debate, vigorous theological discussion, and a new body of literature. *The Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions*, by Phillip Berryman, is published by the Maryknoll Fathers and is one of many Orbis Books advocating liberation theology. (Indicative of the level of their influence, members of the Maryknoll Order also advise House Speaker Tip O'Neill on Latin American policy.) I will give considerable attention to this book for several reasons. Berryman provides numerous examples of revolutionary activities by basic Christian communities and other exponents of liberation theology. The book itself is a contemporary representation of this theology, written by one strongly committed to its liberation tenets and equally critical of US

policy. Moreover, Berryman participated in the Central American movement and is a key figure in the American discussion. He is frequently invited as a consultant or conference speaker by groups which are interested in evaluating US policy in Central America. Although some of his views may not be acceptable to all, they certainly merit our consideration in assessing the impact of liberation theology in Latin America and on US policy.

The author's "basic sympathy and commitment" is with the poor in Central America and those groups "struggling for change." He begins his account by describing the evolution of one of these groups, a basic Christian community founded by Father Ernesto Cardenal at Solentiname, an isolated island in Lake Nicaragua. Berryman bases much of his narrative on Sunday dialogues recorded in Cardenal's four-volume work, *The Gospel in Solentiname*.<sup>14</sup> These Gospel discussions, according to Berryman, are similar in style and content to dialogues in other basic communities he observed. In these Bible studies participants draw parallels between Gospel events and characters and the "political realities" of Nicaragua. For example, the Herods are like the Somozas; the Luke 4:16f text (partially cited in the introduction of this article) is Jesus' "first political manifesto." Pilate is like the "gringo ambassador" to Nicaragua; Roman soldiers are like Somoza's National Guard; Satan tempts Jesus to take a "developmentalistic" approach to reform. Jesus is "the greatest revolutionary" (like Che); Christian love demands the building of a new kind of society—socialism (like Cuba). In discussing the means by which the new society will be achieved, violence, if necessary, is justified. Pastor Cardenal recalls the following quotation with approval: "Christ forbade the sword but not the machine gun."<sup>15</sup> A peasant paraphrases Christ: "We must love the enemy but he doesn't say we can't fight them." Berryman cites the following discussion of communism as representative:

LAUREANO: "A perfect communism is what the Gospel wants."

PANCHO, who is very conservative, said angrily: "Does that mean that Jesus was a communist?"

JULIO said: "The communists have preached what the Gospel preached, that people should be equal and that they all should live as brothers and sisters. Laureano is speaking of the communism of Jesus Christ."

And PANCHO, still angry: "The fact is that not even Laureano himself can explain to me what communism is . . ."

[CARDENAL] said to Pancho: "Your idea of communism comes from the official newspaper [*Novedades*, Somoza's newspaper] or radio stations, that communism's a bunch of murderers and bandits. But the communists try to achieve a perfect society where each one contributes his labor and receives according to his needs. Laureano finds that in the Gospels they were already teaching that. You can refuse to accept communist ideology but you do have to accept what you have here in the Gospels. And you might be satisfied with this communism of the Gospels."

PANCHO: "Excuse me, but do you mean that if we are guided by the word of God, we are communists?"

[CARDENAL]: "In that sense, yes, because we seek the same perfect society. And also because we are against exploitation, against capitalism."

REBECA: "If we come together as God wishes, yes. Communism is an equal society. The word 'communist' means community. And so if we all come together as God wishes, we are all communists, all equal."

WILLIAM: "That's what the first Christians practiced, who had everything in common."<sup>16</sup>

In concluding his description of Solentiname, Berryman reports that in October 1977 a number of young people (apparently accompanied by Cardenal) participated in an attack on the nearby town of San Carlos, and

then retreated into Costa Rica where they joined other Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) forces.<sup>17</sup> The author also records later that many of those who were deeply involved in the Christian community of Solentiname became important figures in the FSLN and that almost all of them "seemed to arrive at a point where they no longer saw themselves as Christians."<sup>18</sup>

Berryman's book documents crimes of both the left and the right, but in accord with his basic sympathies, he gives much more attention to violence committed by governmental forces and right-wing terrorist organizations. In El Salvador, for example, he describes the ascendance of Major Roberto D'Aubuisson and the White Warriors Union (UGB), a right-wing paramilitary organization he reputedly founded. In 1977, to rid the country of "Jesuit guerrillaism," the UGB warned all Jesuits to leave or be "systematically eliminated."<sup>19</sup> Berryman believes that D'Aubuisson, with General Medrano (assassinated in 1985), is responsible for the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero, who was executed while conducting mass on 24 March 1980.<sup>20</sup> The author also discusses the deaths of Father Rutilio Grande of Aguilare, Father Alfonso Navarro, Father Ernesto ("Neto") Barrera, the four US churchwomen, and others. Occasionally, Berryman records violent actions by resistance groups in "retaliation" for right-wing repression. He even identifies some clergy who accompanied guerrilla forces as pastoral agents and perhaps combatants, including Sister Maribel Arriola, Father Ernesto Barrera, and Father Rogelio Poncelle. Nevertheless, he is usually ready to excuse or rationalize actions of the left. He paints a Robin Hood image of leftist guerrillas and a Gestapo portrait of the right-wing forces. Concerning Guatemala he writes: "In a word, the army practiced systematic torture and terrorism (that is, killing or threatening to kill noncombatants as a political technique) and was largely indiscriminate in its violence, while guerrilla violence was targeted."<sup>21</sup> The author's obvious bias may be somewhat justified. An informal US intelligence report covering El Salvador

indicated that in the late 1970s and early 1980s human rights violations by the right exceeded those of the left by a margin of ten to one. A subsequent report, however, suggests that violence from right-wing groups has been reduced dramatically in the last three years, and death squad activity has virtually ceased.<sup>22</sup>

In his final section, Berryman centers his discussion of the ethical legitimacy of the "revolutionary *proyecto*" (plan, program) on three issues: the need for economic transformation, the political order (democracy), and the use of violent means. His fundamental premise on the economy is that those who labor should receive a fair share of the wealth they produce. That is, the economy should serve the needs of the majority. In the capitalist systems of Central America this will not happen, Berryman concludes, because "the oligarchies, in league with the military, manage the political process and have been willing to support a high degree of repression to maintain their privilege."<sup>23</sup> In these conditions, revolution is justified in self-defense and because "justice demands expropriation" to achieve a socialist redistribution of wealth and means of production.

Berryman defines democracy as "rule by the people," or "people power." He contends that all forms of democracy are incomplete. Western democracy, such as that in the United States, does not adequately represent the wishes of the people. In presidential elections, for example, the best actor, not the most qualified, wins. Also, important decisions in areas such as defense policy and economic planning are made largely outside of the democratic process. Marxist "democracy" in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is spoiled by forced labor camps, official suppression of dissidents and minorities, and actions such as the invasion of Afghanistan. The "bourgeois democracy" of Latin America only serves as a mask for "oligarchical/military rule," replete with structural violence and fraudulent elections. Not surprisingly, Berryman finds little to criticize in Marxist revolutions in Central America. He is favorably disposed to the

modes of "people power" in Cuba and Nicaragua as new (and improved) forms of democracy. He offers no criticism of suppression of dissent in these countries. To the contrary, in a later section he suggests that criticism of a fragile Marxist revolution (i.e. in Nicaragua) may undermine the revolution and, thus, the overall good resulting from it.<sup>24</sup> He concludes that Latin American countries should be allowed to develop "their own forms" of democracy. Of course, the form he commends is "economic democracy," in which the principle of economic equality takes precedence over Western bourgeois concepts of individual political rights.

Concerning the use of violence, Berryman contends: Central Americans did not "choose" violence; rather, "after suffering violence for a long time, and seeking to exert pressure for their rights through nonviolent means, they still suffered violence repeatedly."<sup>25</sup> It was at this point that they turned to armed groups and engaged in combat. "Structural violence" followed by "repressive violence" produced "revolutionary violence." Berryman concludes that non-violent means are insufficient to overthrow ruling groups and to achieve necessary social change in this region. Therefore, he argues for the ethical position of "just insurrection."

After endorsing the legitimacy of the revolutionary cause and the necessity of violent means, Berryman then turns to an assessment of rebel tactics. He does not object to armed occupation of villages because this is a propaganda action and it is violent only if someone resists. He acknowledges no ethical concern over this gunboat diplomacy from the left or in holding villages hostage at gunpoint. He agrees with rebel arguments that attacks on property are "war taxes" to finance opposition operations, are "recuperation" of what rightly belongs to the people, or are normal military tactics in war to tie down forces or destroy the economy of the enemy. Concerning "combat and killings," Berryman is more restrictive. Torture, rape, and direct killing of civilians ("those not

responsible for the death of others") are never justified. Legitimate targets include government military and police forces and paramilitary groups responsible for repression or killing. He considers kidnapping the most ambiguous case, but concludes: "I find no grounds for justifying the kidnapping of people who themselves are not guilty of personally shedding the blood of others."<sup>26</sup> It should be noted in Berryman's evaluation that he presupposes a state of war between governments and guerrillas (which he prefers to call the armed opposition), and that the latter are legitimate combatants, not "criminals" or "terrorists."

Berryman concludes the book with a more formal statement of his theology of liberation. His discussion contains many of the themes developed by Gutierrez; however, he relies more heavily on the work of Karl Rahner<sup>27</sup> and Jon Sobrino.<sup>28</sup> Without fully rejecting traditional theology, Berryman adopts liberation definitions for Christian categories. He characterizes the conflict in Central America as a holy war between "rival divinities": the "living" God of the poor and the idolatrous "death" god of the rich and powerful. "Sin" is unjust social structures and oppression (e.g., "Somocismo is sin"). "Conversion" is adopting a "preferential option for the poor" and changing the social structures of sin. Because sin is social, there also must be "social grace." In times of oppression, revolutionary movements are agents or "bearers" of grace. Faith is, with the grace of God, "fidelity to the process of history as it unfolds."

With 40 pages of notes and bibliography, *The Religious Roots of Rebellion* is rich in source materials. From his interviews and research, the author is able to acquaint us with many of the principal actors and events in the Central American struggles, but Berryman's survey of repressive political and economic conditions in the region and the role of the church in addressing these conditions is not academically rigorous. It contains simplistic argument and some inaccurate data. More useful is the mosaic Berryman presents of

liberation theology at work. Indeed, his own values, attitudes, presuppositions, logic, and biases illustrate features characteristic of this movement.<sup>29</sup> Yet, the subjectivism of Berryman also causes the most serious weakness in this book. His biases override his objectivity in selecting and interpreting factual data. For example, he interprets the hostile treatment accorded the Pope during his Nicaraguan visit in March 1983 as a result of the Pope's poor judgment and a spontaneous outcry of the people; he admits no orchestration by the Sandinista regime. He characterizes Sandinista censorship of the church in Nicaragua as "unwise" politics. Yet, when similar actions are taken by other regimes, it is "repression." In seeking to convince Americans that Marxist governments can change and reform from within, he illustrates his point by claiming that in Poland "the majority of the Communist party supported Solidarity."<sup>30</sup> He does not explain why this same party outlawed Solidarity, nor mention that the vast majority of Poles overwhelmingly reject the legitimacy of the Communist Party.<sup>31</sup> In his treatment of terrorism, violence, repression, and human rights, Berryman roundly criticizes actions of the traditional structures of power, but he routinely rationalizes these same actions by Marxist movements.

Much of the above appraisal of Berryman's work could be repeated for liberation theology in general. This movement advocates many legitimate ethical precepts. Injustice is wrong, whether perpetrated by individuals or social structures. Jesus was most sympathetic to the poor and oppressed. God is concerned about the sacredness of individual and collective life. It is the church's responsibility to work for a more just social order in this world. Christians should resist oppression and violence. Government is responsible, to the best of its ability, for providing mechanisms or structures for meeting the basic needs of its citizens. Individuals or groups should not so monopolize the instruments of power that people are deprived of basic human rights and a voice in the government. Indeed, as

Americans should recognize, even revolution is justified under certain conditions.

What about the common criticisms of liberation theology? Are they accurate? Is this movement a "horizontal religion," one that neglects the transcendent element of God, who stands in and above history? Not completely, at least not in the works of major theologians like Gutierrez and Boff. However, extensive emphasis on the "process of history" and political activism tends to point in this direction. Bonino argues, for example, that there is no truth outside or beyond the historical events in which men take part.<sup>32</sup> Certainly, this was the case in the Solentiname community, where revolutionaries discussed "atheistic" Christianity and then ceased to see themselves as Christians by any description.

Does liberation theology endorse a utilitarian ethic in which the ends justify the means? Yes, at least to some extent. Segundo describes Christian ethics as "a morality of ends."<sup>33</sup> For liberationists, the highest ethical principle is the greatest good for the poor. This good justifies revolution and even terrorism. However, as seen in the work of Berryman, this end does not justify all forms of violence. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe liberation theology as a form of situation ethics. The theological method urged by Gutierrez and others begins with the human condition—the political, economic, and social context as viewed through Marxist analysis. From this starting point, scripture is then reinterpreted and principles of action derived. In this admittedly subjective approach, truth and right behavior are to be determined in the historical context.<sup>34</sup>

This brings us to our next question: Are liberation theologians "Marxists in clerical clothing?" Yes, definitely! Ernesto Cardenal explicitly describes himself as a Marxist, a follower of Christ, and a revolutionary.<sup>35</sup> Even those theologians who reject violent means generally endorse and use Marxist concepts of class struggle, alienation, revolution, and economic socialism. They naively envision a basic change in human

nature, that is, the development of a "new man" and a "new society" from a socialist utopia. These theologians deprecate Western political forms as "bourgeois democracy" and capitalism as "economic imperialism." Yet, they also reject some elements of Marxism-Leninism. They do not hold a strictly materialistic philosophy. Contrary to patterns in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Vietnam, and elsewhere, they believe that Marxist social structures can be established without the accouterments of totalitarianism, repression, and atheism. Liberation theologians discount accusations that they are contributing to a coordinated international communist conspiracy. Nevertheless, many cite Cuba as a model for revolution and social organization, and a few, like Cardenal, have received training in Cuba. In classifying liberationists as Marxists, I do not mean to imply that they cease to be Christians. I am suggesting, as Pope John Paul II did, that these theologians are overly optimistic in believing that they can utilize Marxist analysis and cooperate with Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries and still avoid communist dictatorships. Furthermore, for those who favor Cuban and Soviet models, communist dictatorships are not undesirable consequences.

**F**inally, what are the implications of liberation theology for US policy? As outlined by President Reagan in his address to Congress in April 1983, US policy in Central America has four main goals: (1) support for democracy, reform, and human freedom; (2) support for economic development; (3) support for the security of threatened nations; and (4) support for dialogue and negotiated peace in each country.<sup>36</sup> Liberation theologians have clearly rejected the first three of these goals. There exists a thorough correlation between liberationist views and those of Central American revolutionary movements. Or, to adopt the wording of a guerrilla fighter from Esteli, Nicaragua: "The Frente Sandinista and the Christians are one and the same."<sup>37</sup> Liberation theology, therefore, adds a formidable religious dimension to the political

opposition confronting US policy in Central America. Moreover, this religious opposition is not limited to Central America.

Liberation theologians are also influential in North America. Universities and seminaries conduct courses in liberation theology, and scholars search for a US theology of liberation.<sup>38</sup> Robert McAfee Brown affirms approvingly: "We will have to realize that there are liberation theologies developing in our midst, and that the significant North American contributions are going to come from blacks, Hispanics, women, Asians, gays and lesbians."<sup>39</sup> Through direct contacts, Latin American liberationists have influenced many leaders of mainline churches in America. For example, Bishop William Boyd Grove, United Methodist leader in West Virginia, notes the controversy in the Roman Catholic Church and adds: "The controversy also has divided the United Methodist Church into factions that decry or defend various theologies that move under the banner of 'liberation.'" After traveling to Latin America, Grove himself is convinced that liberation theology "is an articulation of the Christian faith that is deeply rooted biblically and that relates the biblical message to the economic and political context within which people live out their lives."<sup>40</sup>

The influence of liberation theology can also be seen in the small but growing Sanctuary Movement. This movement advocates civil disobedience to US law and protest of Central American policy by harboring illegal aliens from El Salvador and Guatemala. The movement was officially born on 24 March 1982, the second anniversary of the murder of Archbishop Romero, in the Southside United Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona. Now over 200 congregations in 12 denominations in 30 states are affiliated with the Sanctuary Movement.<sup>41</sup> One apologist explains: the same conditions prompting liberation theology are responsible for the flight of Central American refugees to the United States. These refugees "incarnate this new theology of liberation for the North American church." They provide an opportunity for US Christians to protest

government policy and demonstrate their own "preferential option for the poor"; that is, to "serve the rule of love" rather than the "rule of money and violence."<sup>42</sup> Two antagonists add:

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the movement is primarily dedicated to opposing U.S. Central American policy. What is not so well understood is that many sanctuary leaders view the movement as the centerpiece of a strategy for radical change in the United States under the motif of liberation theology.<sup>43</sup>

Many in the Sanctuary Movement are among those directly lobbying Congress against US policy. Over 65,000 have signed a "Pledge of Resistance," which now amounts to a network coordinated by Jim Wallis of individuals and groups who are committed to civil disobedience and lobbying to change US policy. Among Protestants, the Interreligious Task Force on El Salvador and Central America provides a network for 28 national and regional agencies and over 350 task forces at local churches. The Religious Task Force on Central America serves a similar function among interested Catholics. Another organization, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, works with about 100 organizations in lobbying Congress.<sup>44</sup> To date the lobbying effort has concentrated primarily on blocking congressional approval of US economic and military assistance to the regimes of Central America.<sup>45</sup>

Many significant questions concerning Central America remain unanswered. Furthermore, in the present polarized circumstances, some of these appear unresolvable. Liberationists and policymakers approach the conflicts through different alliances, data, and objectives. Liberationists look foremost from the perspective of the poor at oppressive social conditions. Despite the risk that Marxist guerrillas may establish communist dictatorships, liberationists look to these groups as agents of revolution and social change. Policymakers, on the other hand, focus primarily on the threat posed by

the Marxist insurgents, fearing that victorious movements will establish totalitarian regimes linked strategically with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Although concerned about social conditions, policymakers are more concerned about these strategic alliances and the threats they pose to US interests. These differences are leading to a deeper sense of alienation for some in both church and state.

A few points are clear. Liberation theology has rightly signaled the imperative of social justice, but it has made an unholy alliance and in some instances even endorsed terrorism to achieve its earthly program. Latin American governments must make substantial reforms or increasingly be confronted by violent movements for change. Recognizing that instability in Latin America is caused by both social conditions and revolutionary insurgency, the Reagan Administration has no option but to provide both economic and military assistance. No amount of military assistance alone will achieve lasting justice and order; it must be more than matched by political reform, economic development, and improvements in human rights. The fundamental problems in Latin America are social, not military. As long as they remain, these conditions will provide fertile ground for the roots of rebellion—and liberation theology.

#### NOTES

1. Luke 4: 18-19 (*New International Version*).
2. Matthew 25: 40.
3. Compare Dietrich Bonhoeffer's *Life Together* (New York: Harper & Row, 1954); *Letters and Papers from Prison*, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York: Macmillan, 1967); and *Ethics*, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York: Macmillan, 1965).
4. Phillip Berryman, *The Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1984).
5. Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation*, ed. and trans. Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1973).
6. *Ibid.*, p. ix.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
9. These include Dom Helder Camara, Catholic Archbishop of Brazil (*Revolution Through Peace and Spiral of Violence*); Juan Luis Segundo, a Jesuit from Uruguay (*A Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity*); Jon Sobrino, a Spanish Jesuit now living in El Salvador (*The True Church and the Poor and Christology at the Crossroads*); Jose Miguez Bonino, a Methodist theologian in Argentina (*Christians and*

*Marxists: The Mutual Challenge to Revolution*); Hugo Assmann of Brazil (*A Theology for a Nomad Church*); Enrique Dussel, an Argentine now teaching in Mexico (*Ethics and the Theology of Liberation and Philosophy of Liberation*); and perhaps most prominent, Leonardo Boff, a Franciscan friar from Brazil (*Salvation and Liberation, Jesus Christ Liberator, and Church: Christ and Power*). In the original Portuguese publication, Boff's last book carried the subtitle, "Essays in Militant Ecclesiology" and resulted in his censure by the Vatican in May 1985.

10. An estimate in 1983 placed the total number of basic Christian communities in Latin America between 100,000 and 150,000, with possibly 50,000 in Brazil alone. See Ronald T. Libby, "Listen to the Bishops," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1983), pp. 79-80.

11. Obando y Bravo rose from humble birth to become the first native Nicaraguan Archbishop. Pope John Paul II elevated him to cardinal in 1985, probably because of his opposition to liberation theology and the Sandinista regime. See Andrew Reding, "Getting to Know Managua's New Cardinal," *Christianity and Crisis*, 22 July 1985, pp. 307-10.

12. Robert McAfee Brown, "Liberation Theology & the Vatican: A Drama in Five Acts," *Harvard Divinity Bulletin* (April-June 1985), p. 6.

13. Berryman suggests, for example, in Nicaragua between 15 and 25 percent of the Catholic clergy support the revolution, while the rest are "with the bishops." Similarly, he describes the basic Christian communities as a "minority phenomenon." Berryman, p. 266.

14. Ernesto Cardenal, *The Gospel in Solentiname* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976-82).

15. Berryman, p. 19.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

20. Following Archbishop Romero's death, according to Berryman, the influence of the church in El Salvador declined. Bishop Arturo Rivera y Damas, Romero's successor, was more reserved and cautious and he took a stance "above" the conflict, "equidistant from both sides." Rivera was sympathetic to Christian Democrats and "more clearly opposed to—and perhaps afraid of—Marxism." Berryman, p. 153.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 209-10.

22. Colonel Lyman C. Duryea, personal interview, 8 November 1985. Duryea knows of no deaths attributable to death squads in the last 18 months. Until recently Duryea was the US military attaché to El Salvador. He is presently a member of the faculty, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Elliot Abrams indicates that the number of civilian deaths in El Salvador has fallen from a high of 9000 in 1980 to 771 in 1984. See "Sanctuary and the Sanctuary Movement," *This World* (Spring/Summer 1985), p. 10.

23. Berryman, p. 286.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 356.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 319-20.

27. See Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity* (New York: Seabury Press, 1978) and *Theological Investigations*, Vol. 14 (New York: Seabury Press, 1976).

28. Jon Sobrino, *Christology at the Crossroads* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1978).

29. Berryman offers a perspective and model for effecting liberation theology. He speaks favorably of the poor and oppressed, basic Christian communities (the popular

church), socialism, Marxism, revolution, armed opposition (guerrilla) movements, and Cuba. He criticizes the rich and powerful, the hierarchical church (including the Vatican), capitalism, Western democratic values, the status quo, existing regimes (except in Nicaragua), and US policy.

30. Berryman, p. 307.

31. See Leopold Unger, "Poland: The People Versus the Party," *The Wilson Quarterly*, 7 (Spring 1983), 50-68.

32. "Liberation Theology," *The Economist*, 13 October 1984, p. 32.

33. John R. Pottenger, "Liberation Theology: Its Methodological Foundation for Violence," in *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*, ed. David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 115.

34. Situation ethics subordinates all ethical rules to the context, without regard for general ethical principles. It is this procedure that distinguishes situation ethics from other deontological or teleological theories. To some extent, however, all ethical decision-making should consider the immediate context. Ethical courses of action may vary in different situations. It is when basic principles vary that ethicists are inconsistent. In recent years some Christians in the Western world have articulated inconsistent ethical principles. Alarmed over the prospects of superpower conflict and nuclear war, they have endorsed the position of pacifism. Concern for social justice in Latin America, however, has led many of the same to approve of violent revolution. Berryman personifies this inconsistency. Although he represented the American Friends Service Committee, traditionally a pacifist Quaker organization, he supported violent revolution. He advocates liberation of those in Latin America oppressed by poverty, capitalism, and bourgeois democracy, and of those in the United States under the apocalyptic tyranny of nuclear holocaust. He suggests that the central issue for liberation theology in the United States should be the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons by the United States (p. 397). No doubt both of these tenets are viewed favorably by the forces supporting the expansion of Marxism-Leninism.

35. See Michael Novak, "The Case Against Liberation Theology," *The New York Times Magazine*, 21 October 1984, p. 51.

36. See Langhorne A. Motley, "The New Opportunity for Peace in Nicaragua," *Department of State Bulletin*, 85 (June 1985), 81.

37. Sandy Darlington, "The Bible, The Frente and the Revolution," *Christianity and Crisis*, 22 July 1985, p. 302.

38. Russell Barta, "Liberation: U.S.A. Style," *America*, 13 April 1985, pp. 297-300.

39. Brown, p. 10.

40. William B. Grove, "Liberation Theology: A Challenge to US," *The United Methodist Reporter*, 4 January 1985.

41. Robert F. Drinan, "The Sanctuary Movement on Trial," *America*, 17-24 August 1985, p. 81. As of December, the Catholic Church (primarily Maryknoll and other orders) provided the largest number of sanctuaries, 32. The Friends were second with 28, and the Unitarians third with 21. Other denominations are: Presbyterian, 16; United Church of Christ, 12; Lutheran, 9; Brethren and Methodist, 7; Mennonite, 6; and Baptist and Episcopal, 5. The Southside United Presbyterian Church is one of four churches in Arizona, representing the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) and the American Lutheran Church, that filed suit against the government for undercover activities associated with the investigation of the Sanctuary Movement in Arizona. Eleven leaders of this movement are

now on trial in Tucson (see "Churches Sue U.S., Alleging Illegal Acts in Inquiry on Aliens," *The New York Times*, 14 January 1986, p. A1).

42. Ignatius Barr, "Strangers and Sojourners Together," *New Catholic World*, 228 (May/June 1985), 131.

43. Kerry Ptacek and Laura Ingraham, "Sanctuary and the Sanctuary Movement," *This World* (Spring/Summer 1985), p. 12.

44. Leon Howell, "Organizing the Opposition to U.S. Policy," *Christianity and Crisis*, 22 July 1985, pp. 296-99.

45. Not all participating in the Sanctuary or lobbying

efforts support violent revolution. From his work with Sojourners, Wallis appears to be a pacifist. However, it is fair to say that these persons and groups are "liberationists" who seek to alleviate suffering in Central America by helping people escape and by opposing US policy, which they believe aids oppressive governments. According to the CBS Evening News (10 December 1985), local religious leaders were influential in the Los Angeles city council decision to ignore federal immigration officials and to grant sanctuary to political refugees from Central America.



# VIEW FROM THE FOURTH ESTATE

## EMPLOYING FORCE TO ADVANCE POLICY

Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA Ret.

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In unleashing its power in the Gulf of Sidra, the United States has reaffirmed—at long last—that it is willing to apply military force, but it is not yet clear that the government has agreed on how to do it.

Seen in the larger context, the events of recent days in the Mediterranean as well as Central America suggest that Washington is reviving its "containment" policies of earlier years and is prepared to use force to back them up.

Containment has slipped badly in the past 15 years. Earlier, during the so-called cold war, the boundaries between U.S. and Soviet interests were clearly defined. With détente, the boundaries became fuzzed, and the Soviets began to probe until resistance was met. The U.S., impeded by a loss of national will in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, was slow to resist, allowing a series of countries to fall into the Marxist orbit. The U.S.S.R., in effect, had slipped the leash of containment.

More recently—beginning with the first stirrings of the Carter Doctrine in 1980 to block Soviet expansion in the Mideast and now gathering steam with the Reagan Doctrine—the U.S. has begun to resist and reassert the fundamentals of containment policy.

But how does Washington do that?

The longstanding disagreements between Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger are evidence that the question has no easy answers. The State Department tends to see combat divisions, aircraft-carrier battle groups and fighter squadrons as tools of diplomacy. It would apply them to show the flag, to threaten, to conduct "surgical" military strikes, to send diplomatic signals to friend and foe alike of America's power and influence in the world.

The Pentagon argues that military power is for fighting to win, not for diplomatic signaling. Its forces are less a scalpel than a battle-ax designed to kill people and destroy property in the

name of America. It is an adversary's perception that the U.S. has both the military means and the will as well as the resolve to use those means that makes American military power an instrument of foreign policy. Unless backed by such will, military shows of force degenerate into bravado and mere posturing.

The American interventions in Lebanon in 1958 and again in 1982-84 illustrate the distinction. When President Eisenhower intervened in 1958, the initial American landings were seen everywhere as only the first stages of a massive U.S. involvement. Military units at home and in Europe began moving toward ports, evidence that the nation would do whatever was necessary to meet its objectives.

The 1982-84 Lebanon intervention demonstrated what can happen when such resolve is lacking. That time the U.S. servicemen were seen as bluff, a fact made obvious by Congress's limitations on their numbers, mission and duration of commitment. Afraid of being drawn into a conflict with Soviet-backed Syria, the U.S. specifically ruled out the use of sufficient power to bring the crisis to an end. In October, 1983, with the massacre of 241 servicemen, the bluff was called.

Contributing to this failure was the imprecision of America's objectives, partially a result of institutional differences between the State and Defense departments. For compromise and peaceful settlement of disputes, the diplomats need maximum room to maneuver. Ambiguity frequently is a virtue. The military, on the other hand, needs precise objectives in order to know exactly where to land the force, sail the ships and drop bombs.

Neither department fully appreciates the other's position. In a crisis, the Pentagon needs as much advance warning as possible in order to mobilize forces for battle, and is impatient with State's seeming indecisiveness. State, in turn, sees military preparations as destabilizing. Add to this

the fear by both that leaks will compromise operations in advance, and the result can be military forces committed to action at the 11th hour, inadequately prepared and rehearsed.

Meanwhile, the changing status of forces around the world adds practical constraints to the use of military power to support foreign policy. Many of the poorest Third World countries now have sophisticated arms and equipment.

Satirist Hilaire Belloc summed up Britain's late-19th-century foreign policy: "Whatever happens/We have got/The Maxim gun/And they have not." The Maxim—an early machine gun—gave the British an enormous advantage over native Asian and African tribesmen armed only with spears. But, as Navy flier Robert Goodman, shot down over Lebanon in 1983, would attest, those days are gone forever.

Another practical constraint is the lack of sufficient forces to do everything at once. Much of America's fighting strength is committed to the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other regional alliances. Such alliances, of course, are critical in the East-West confrontation. But they can hinder U.S. ability to counter threats outside the areas of the alliances.

Fortunately for U.S. policy, none of these inhibitions applied in the Gulf of Sidra. It would appear that the United States is making some progress in realizing the ideal, expressed by General Matthew B. Ridgway in 1954, in which "The soldier is the statesman's junior partner."

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### TIT-FOR-TAT IN VIETNAM IS WHAT THE BRASS HATED

George C. Wilson

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**I**n last week's clashes around the globe [23-29 March], from the Gulf of Sidra to the jungles of Honduras, the United States was using a military strategy that goes by the name of "proportionate response." In simpler language, it is often known as "tit-for-tat." Libya shoots a missile at our planes? Our planes shoot a missile at their missile site. Nicaragua sends troops into Honduras? We helicopter Honduran troops in to attack the Nicaraguans.

The admirals and generals seemed to be fervently embracing the tit-for-tat strategy last week. This is odd because it is similar to the strategy they've been bitterly denouncing in the last dozen years of rehashing the lessons of Vietnam. It has the same pitfalls as "gradual escalation," "the eye-dropper tactic," and "fighting with one hand tied behind our back" which called for the American military to fine-tune military power so some pressure was put on Ho Chi Minh, but not too much.

The tit-for-tat strategy gives the enemy the initiative because the American military must provoke someone like Libya's Muammar Qaddafi

to punch so the well-prepared counterpunch can be delivered. But the widest, deepest pitfall of all under tit-for-tat is that it doesn't win anything decisively. There is no clear objective. The U.S. military is kept punching and dying to make diplomatic points. Unless political leaders can clearly explain why soldiers are punching and dying, the public—and then the Congress—gets turned off by the endeavor at hand and refuses to support it any longer. Then the military, which felt it was just following orders, is blamed for not knowing what it is doing. All this just happened in Southeast Asia.

So why, a little more than 12 years after the last American combat soldier left Vietnam, are U.S. military leaders walking smartly down the same road again—as they did in Lebanon and are doing in Libya and Central America? The Joint Chiefs are going along with tit-for-tat once again without protest. There is some distant rumbling among their former colleagues now retired, like the respected Army general officer with impressive Vietnam credentials who told me: "If Nicaragua is as big a threat to us as President Reagan told us it

is, we should either have the guts to go down there with troops and clean it out or shut up about it. What we're doing now is no strategy at all."

Yet the current embrace of tit-for-tat becomes less surprising the longer one stares through the American military's telescope and picks out these features on the landscape of 1986:

- A hardline Republican president named Ronald Reagan wants to look tough by "doing something" but is just as apprehensive as a moderate Democrat named Lyndon Johnson was about military operations which might cost American lives and inflict what the military calls "collateral damage"—a euphemism for killing innocent women and children in the target area.

- The world is linked by television screens which any dictator with a camera can dominate for a night with pictures of "collateral damage" or of a captured American pilot or sailor apologizing, after torture, for his deeds. North Korea's Kim Il Sung (Pueblo crew), North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh (downed fliers), Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini (U.S. embassy hostages), Syria's Hafez Assad (Lt. Bobby Goodman), Yassar Arafat and assorted hijackers all have shown they know how to use TV cameras to embarrass, inhibit and influence the United States.

- The American military is strictly volunteer, with no prospect that either Reagan or Congress will bring back the draft in peacetime to speed the deployment of replacements to a battle, should it become too big for volunteers to handle. Vietnam started out as a brushfire war, but the Army had 1,570,000 men and women in uniform at its height in 1968. Today's Army is half that size at 781,000. Washington Post correspondent Bob Woodward has reported that the Pentagon warned Reagan administration officials exploring the possibility that it would take up to six divisions—more than 90,000 troops—to overthrow Qaddafi in concert with Egyptian forces. The All-Volunteer Force could not take on that big an effort without leaving other trouble spots all around the world dangerously uncovered. The tit-for-tat strategy does not require this kind of manpower.

- The American public would almost certainly desert, condemn and vilify everything military—just as it did when Vietnam went sour—if their sons started dying in places of no visible consequence to the United States like Libya, Nicaragua and Lebanon. The Vietnam trauma has generated a "never again" school within the military when it comes to getting too far out ahead of public opinion. A Washington Post-ABC

public-opinion poll released last week indicated that 62 percent of the American people oppose their government trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.

- A new generation of "smart" weapons allows tit-for-tat to be implemented with little risk of starting a big war, getting Americans killed or captured, or causing the dreaded collateral damage. One family of such weapons is even called "fire and forget." Punch off the missile and then run. The missile will find its own way to target. No bayonet needed.

Smart weapons promise to solve so many problems they have become irresistible, as evidenced by their extensive use against Libya last week. U.S. Navy A6 bombers launched Harpoon cruise missiles with 500 pound warheads at Libyan patrol boats from miles away, out of sight of the human eye. It was the computerized brain of the missile itself that locked onto the boat and directed the weapon to its target.

Navy planes fired Harm missiles into Libyan radars from a safe standoff distance. The missiles rode the Libyan radar beams right into the emitting dish and then blew up. If Russians had been at the nearby trailer at Surt, as expected, they would not have been killed by collateral damage. Meanwhile, if the U.S. pilots had been shot down, they would have landed in the water. With a little luck, U.S. helicopters, not Qaddafi, would have rescued them.

Smart weapons also promise non-involvement at the time Congress is demanding non-involvement—at least that which is visible or direct—by the American military in places that look like Vietnam. Nicaragua is the current case in point.

Take a smart weapon like the Stinger anti-aircraft missile. It is shoulder-fired and directs itself to the target by seeking heat. The Stinger can be described as a tit-for-tat weapon because it can be sent to the contras as a response to the Soviets sending the Sandinistas helicopter gunships. It also could be described as a graduated response, not a sharp escalation by the United States. The American military would not be directly involved; it would keep its distance from the missile vs. helicopter battle, which could be bloody. As a result, this smart weapon matches all the requirements the generals and admirals could have for projecting American military power.

This look through the U.S. military's telescope shows the apparent advantages of the tit-for-tat strategy. What it does not show is that tit-for-tat has the same fatal flaw in 1986 in Libya, Nicaragua and Lebanon as it had in Vietnam. The

strategy is a pacifier for frustrated presidents, demanding right wingers and restless admirals and generals. But nobody knows where today's tit-for-tat strategy is supposed to end up—so it may bring nothing but trouble and divisiveness. Once again, as in Vietnam, there is no clear, agreed-upon objective. I hear echoes of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk saying that we are going to keep up what we're doing until they stop what they're doing. Whatever that meant.

A lot of people feel good about the United States finally punching Qaddafi in the nose. Hooray for our side. He deserved it. But what was the real object of the exercise? "If we have to have three carriers go into the Gulf of Sidra to challenge a pissant country like Libya," a Navy pilot familiar with the exercise told me, "we ought to hang it up."

Why an armada? One carrier would have been plenty, two extra insurance, if navigating in those waters up to 12 miles from shore was the idea, as was advertised.

Was the real objective to bomb Libya heavily in hopes of leading to the overthrow of Qaddafi? If so, U.S. military leaders were carrying out a strategy which had an objective many of them opposed. Many military leaders would rather have a stable Libya with Qaddafi than an unstable Libya without him. Thoughtful military leaders warn against doing anything that destabilizes fragile Third World countries like Libya.

Was the goal of the naval exercise code named Prairie Fire to deter Qaddafi from terrorist acts? Again, administration officials deny this was the objective. Weinberger said last week he did not know whether crossing Qaddafi's "line of death" in the Gulf of Sidra would deter or incite the volatile Libyan leader. "I can't see how it would encourage him to do anything. Whether it deterred him or not requires the resident psychiatrist to come in and help us, and that is with his rationality. I just don't know." As Weinberger spoke those words in the Pentagon studio extra guards were on duty in the offices of top Navy officials in the building. The theory apparently was that Qaddafi would follow our strategy of tit-for-tat: Our Navy hit him; he would hit our Navy. But if Qaddafi ignores that script and sends a terrorist to blow up the Woodward & Lothrop department store, as terrorists blew up Harrods in London, to score his tat, what then? Is there a strategy? Weinberger's "I just don't know" answer is not reassuring here.

On the other side of the world, in Central America, the tit-for-tat strategy was taking us

down another dark road last week. An uncertain number of Nicaraguan troops crossed into Honduras to attack base camps of the contras. The United States responded by flying Honduran troops near the battle zone but not into it. It was another version of tit-for-tat. Managua sent troops into Honduras. Washington carried Honduran troops to fight them. And the Americans kept their distance from the fray so there would be no captives for the Sandinistas to display; no direct involvement to upset the Congress. The helicopter, in that sense, was another version of a standoff weapon for waging war in a half-pregnant fashion in the twilight zone of Central American.

But where is this strategy leading, if not on up a ladder of escalation with no objective at the top? Despite the Vietnam parallels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are going along with tit-for-tat, probably because they cannot think of anything better to do given today's political environment.

**T**he only place where the tit-for-tat strategy has had time to play out under Reagan is Lebanon. The results were disastrous—but somehow forgotten. I watched from a front seat the strategy implemented heroically by the men ordered to carry it out. I was on the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy for the full seven months of her 1983-1984 deployment, with most of that time spent off Lebanon.

A lone terrorist while I was aboard the carrier penetrated the Marine compound in Beirut on Oct. 23, 1983, and detonated explosives which killed him and 241 servicemen, mostly Marines. Reagan had sent the Marines into Lebanon with no clear objective. They were to provide a "presence." He vowed to avenge their deaths. Navy officers on the Kennedy, USS Eisenhower and USS Independence standing off Lebanon planned a retaliatory bombing strike. It was never launched.

On Dec. 3, 1983, two of the Kennedy's F14 reconnaissance planes were shot at by missiles over Lebanon. It was not the first time this had happened, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended responding in kind by the next morning. They could have suggested using the battleship New Jersey standing off Lebanon. This would have provided the distancing and assured no fliers would be killed or captured. But, the chiefs told me afterward, they felt it would be more in keeping with the tit-for-tat strategy to employ carrier planes. They would be attacking the same kind of missile sites that had attacked them. Reagan approved the bombing raid.

The anti-aircraft sites selected for bombing were so small that the fliers had to dive low to see them clearly enough to—as ordered—avoid collateral damage. Low altitude increased their vulnerability and two bombers were shot down by soldiers firing “smart” shoulder-fired SA7 anti-aircraft weapons. One pilot, Lt. Mark Lange of the Kennedy, was killed in the raid. Lt. Bobby Goodman, Lange’s bombardier, was captured. Syria flashed Goodman’s picture around the world to score propaganda points and eventually released him.

The Marines were withdrawn from Lebanon on Feb. 7, 1984. There had never been an objective, and none was reached. Tit-for-tat did not lead anywhere in Lebanon. The important question now is where is it taking us in Libya and Central America?

\* \* \* \* \*

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## BOOK REVIEWS

**Command in War.** By Martin Van Creveld. 339 pages. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1985. \$20.00.

This ought to be a good book, an important book. And it is, even though to some degree in spite of its content. The introductory chapter whets the appetite and establishes that the author has found an educational void that needs filling. He scopes the problem well and presents its facets in succinct outline, through intriguing questions and thought-provoking declarations. Re-reading my marginal notes on the pages of Chapter 1 prove to me that I was both interested and impressed with what the author planned to do. His points, that command has its own history and that it hasn't been analyzed adequately, are well taken. His identification of what is needed to make such analysis is well presented. I expected enlightenment in a long-neglected field of study.

First, though, I found myself plodding through glimpses of military history, discovering a few gems of thought interspersed with enough flip comments to keep today's reformers happy. Thus the introduction of a generic "directed telescope," any of several techniques by which successful commanders have focused directly on subordinate commands by bypassing the normal layered and staff-dominated communications linkage, competes with digressions such as the definition of a staff as "a body of assistants attached to any figure in the military, government, or business who wants to look at all important."

The military history itself is of the "reminder" type, that is, most readers of this book will have read it before, probably in much greater detail, but will appreciate having it brought to mind again if it contributes to this particular study. Unfortunately, I did not always recognize the connection, and I was annoyed with the common problems of campaign descriptions in which place names were not on the all-too-few maps accompanying the text and the plethora of subordinate commanders' names made memorizing a command hierarchy mandatory if one wanted to understand what was being reported. In the end, each of the historical examples was a well-chosen presentation of how command was exercised in spite of and in violation of the principles that were evolving in the author's

presentation. Napoleon, the Germans, and the Israelis were successes even though they neglected or overlooked or ignored so much that they couldn't make things work right. The British at the Somme and the Americans in Vietnam were failures because they couldn't make it work right either.

From all of this, in a fascinating way, the author comes to some very sound conclusions and presents some very interesting observations. He did write an important book. Students of the military art will find it very useful, and I hope that a budding author or two will be piqued to delve more exhaustively into an important topic. I'm glad I've read it.

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**Old Battles and New Defences: Can We Learn From Military History?** By Correlli Barnett, Shelford Bidwell, Brian Bond, John Harding, and John Terraine. 137 pages. Brassey's Defence Publishers, London and New York, 1985. \$17.00.

This collection of five historical studies, commissioned by the British Ministry of Defence, raises a question that is too often dismissed with easy generalizations: What can we learn from military history? In a brief, thoughtful introduction, Major-General Anthony Trythall, formerly Director of Army Education in the UK, comes down neither on the side of the enthusiasts nor on that of the skeptics. Military history, he writes, "of immense value in itself as an exercise in the search for truth, must be treated with caution when one proposes to use it in any way." Nevertheless, all technological innovation to the contrary, the study of military history may sometimes "provide concrete lessons, [and] almost always, if undertaken with caution, it will provide insight and illumination" (pp. 2-3). That is well said, even if General Trythall's judgment holds true only for those historical analyses that are the products of serious archival research and intelligent, imaginative interpretation. Military history, regrettably, more than many other kinds of history, is characterized by an amazing amount of retelling and mindless copying, as though the

significance and drama of the subject make research and original thought on the part of the historian unnecessary.

Each of the five essays in this volume discusses an interesting topic in a serious, searching manner. Two essays are closely related: John Terraine writes on "Indirect Fire as a Battle Winner/Loser" in World War I, with a brief addendum on the combination of artillery and tactical air power in the final assault on Tunis in May 1943. Shelford Bidwell analyzes the use of artillery in four battles—Cambrai 1917, Alam el Halfa 1942, Salerno 1943, and Reichswald 1945—and stresses the role of artillery as a life-saver of infantry. Correlli Barnett traces the French counterstroke of 18 July 1918 against the German advance in the Marne salient. He believes his case study reveals certain factors of general validity—proper timing, catching the enemy off balance, and surprise—but though obviously important, these elements gained their decisive impact from the opponent's inferiority in men and materiel, and from the psychological and political crises that by the summer of 1918 were shaking the German high command, its forces, and the empire.

From a study of the German Ardennes Offensive of 1944, John Harding draws some lessons concerning the importance of surprise, speed, and flexibility. But again these abstract principles seem less to the point than the specifics of the situation. To mention only some noted by the author: Hitler's faulty strategic aim, superior Allied intelligence, inadequate German resources, and Allied air superiority after the weather cleared from 23 December on. Finally, Brian Bond writes on the battle of Arras on 21 May 1940, a minor episode, but interesting because, as Bond notes, "It was the only real British offensive during the melancholy withdrawal to Dunkirk, and it exerted a shock on the German high command out of all proportion to its strength" (p. 61).

For this reader, Bond's essay is the most successful of the five in reconstructing and interpreting the past. In part that is so because Bond is an exceptionally gifted scholar, who over decades has gained a deep understanding of the British army in the 20th century; in part, because his topic is the most circumscribed of the five. Historical studies are usually most effective when they integrate generalizations with the close examination of specifics. Bond has written a case study not of a campaign or a large-scale operation, but of an encounter battle lasting little more than 24 hours. He can treat the details of what actually occurred, and then speculate on

their larger implications. He reconstructs the battle with its myriad causes and effects, and the complex, never perfect links between intent, execution, and result, in masterly fashion. When it comes to the lessons that this brief military encounter of the past holds out to today's officer, he is suitably circumspect: "The military historian is not well-qualified to extract contemporary lessons from case studies and his chief hope must be that the evidence he produces will 'speak for itself' when examined by serving officers. The lessons from the battle of Arras in 1940 must therefore be both tentative and rather general" (p. 82). He then proceeds to list six, ranging from the fact that even a small, improvised force may be able to damage a much more powerful opponent to the strategic and political possibilities and limits of such an improvised counterattack. Not only serving officers but also military historians will benefit from reading and pondering his study and the companion essays in this little book.

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**America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform.**  
By Gary Hart with William S. Lind. 301 pages.  
Adler & Adler, Bethesda, Md., 1986. \$17.95.

Admiral Eccles, during his lifetime of study of the art of war, commented often on the temptation of students to view political and military affairs as puzzles rather than as difficulties. The difference, he would explain, is that puzzles, however difficult, have solutions; while difficulties, however simple, must continuously be overcome.

Senator Gary Hart and his long-time associate William S. Lind have assailed with typical fervor the puzzle of defense in a democratic society. For observers of the military reform movement, the themes are familiar, as are the targets and the selected historical evidence. It is convenient to have this distillation in one volume in order to view a large portion of the movement's objections in one place. The rather prolific core group of reformers has compiled a formidable number of articles and books over the last several years, but *America Can Win* presents a sort of anthology which will allow a wider exposure of the reform movement.

Those familiar already with Bill Lind, John Boyd, Steve Canby, Norman Polmar, Chuck Spinney, and Pierre Sprey will find the same

arguments without some of the shrill rhetoric which has, in the past, obscured the sincerity of their efforts.

Hart sets early the tone for the book: "No one should seek to lead this nation who is not totally committed to its security." If that were sufficient, rather than only a necessary qualification, for national leadership, Senator Hart would vouchsafe himself Presidential timber. There is no mistaking his commitment to national security. Those who have reduced the motivation of the reformers to that of saving money will be challenged by Hart's consistent avoidance of that theme. Instead the theme is "small size and simplicity." This is not a two-dimensional, quantity versus quality debate. Hart insists on "true quality—quality in combat."

Hart sets for himself five goals: to prove we do not today possess an effective conventional defense; to warn that we are headed for disaster if we do not change our approach to defense; to outline the steps necessary to reform our military and political institutions; to argue that we should "change the kinds of weapons we buy and the way we buy them"; and "to change the way we think about defense." He is far more successful in addressing the middle three than he is in addressing either the first or the last. This is primarily the result of Hart's reluctance to present a clear definition of American defense interests, even though he recognizes that "our interests cannot be defended until they are defined." He adds, "We do not have a clear definition of American interests as we close the twentieth century." Sadly, nowhere does he choose to define our interests other than in the vague concept of national security.

Hart wants the book to be about "most of all, the genius in conceiving and executing strategy, tactics, and doctrine in combat." He thwarts his own efforts early by assuming that "most of the issues that affect whether or not our forces can win in combat on the tactical and operational levels must be independent of strategy." Although certain that America can win, Hart is less certain about what winning entails. "Winning may not mean annihilating the enemy; doing so may push the Soviets into being the first to use nuclear weapons." Yet the end result of maneuver warfare, said to be a common theme among the reformers, is "to panic and paralyze enemy commanders." Why panic does not risk that which annihilation does is not clear.

It is disappointing that Hart treats so briefly the subject of nuclear weapons and nuclear war.

He offers two "obvious reasons": "First, it makes no sense to speak of winning a nuclear war." Second, "there is no such thing as nuclear war except as a hypothesized form of combat. There is no combat experience in nuclear war, so all thinking is pure speculation." This dismissal does not appear to be consistent with the preface, which establishes, "The new terror of nuclear annihilation has fundamentally altered thinking about defense . . . All policymakers must take this fact into account."

Tactical nuclear weapons are dismissed with "Tactical to us is Dusseldorf to our allies." Additionally, Hart assumes that linkage to the strategic nuclear arsenal makes tactical nuclear weapons "not practical battlefield weapons."

Hart's assertion that tactics and operations must be independent of strategy seems to expand to suggest that military strategy should be developed without respect to policy. His critique of NATO policy which respects the East-West German border even after a Warsaw Pact attack is somewhat ironic. "NATO would not counterattack across it. This is not a viable policy. It makes the whole of Eastern Europe a sanctuary for the Soviets."

An entire panoply of defense issues are addressed, from firepower-attrition versus maneuver warfare to M-60A3 versus M-1 ("One billion dollars buys 1,100 M-60 tanks but only 360 M-1's"). Hart's comparison of the US Navy's maritime strategy with traditional maritime strategy concludes that the Navy supports "the precise *opposite* of a maritime strategy." He is critical and concerned about "the diversion of our aviation in the early stages of a conflict to a private war with enemy air defenses."

Further recommendations and observations in this far-reaching assessment include an officer corps reduction of 50 percent in the field grade and flag ranks. He allows that may not be enough of a reduction, "but it would make a good start." He assails officer education from the university/academy level through senior service colleges for not teaching our officers about war. Hart asserts that weapon development and procurement is "riddled with problems," stemming from too little competition and even less direction. His views on Department of Defense reorganization are much in keeping with the Senate staff report to the Committee on Armed Services, October 1985, often called the "Locher report."

This book was not written for the uniformed military nor for many of those in government. It appears to be very much an effort to explain and

popularize the tenets of the military reform group to informed citizens. As a result, the effort is less encumbered with pragmatism than might be demanded by other audiences. There is a refreshing maturity to this discussion of military reform. Hart has laudably avoided what Admiral Eccles described as "our time-honored, and very foolish, habit of approaching issues on a basis of adversary confrontation rather than careful analysis, each issue [becoming] polarized, with consequent buildup of semantic distortion, defensive mechanism and specious moralistic appeals." As Hart suggests, "As usual, reality rests somewhere in between."

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**Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism.** Edited by Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold. 268 pages. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1986. \$28.00.

This book's title signals its main themes. It is activist, seeking creative ways to engage the terrorist menace. It is positive, proceeding from the premise that the struggle is "winnable." And it advocates a multidimensional approach characteristic of strategies in traditional wars, mobilizing the full arsenal of the state against the enemy.

Its major contribution is that self-consciously strategic approach, treating a variety of policy instruments and the problems and prospects of orchestrating them against terrorists. The use of force is a prime concern, but also addressed are diplomatic tools, international communications, legal rules, security practices, covert operations, and intelligence, among other aspects. The analyses vary in quality from chapter to chapter, but the questions the editors asked their authors to address are good ones, even if the answers sometimes fall short of expectations. Particularly noteworthy are the chapters by William Farrell on organizational disabilities, Neil Livingstone on "proactive" measures, and James Burtchaeil on the moral principles governing the effort to "fight back."

The editors recognize that an "all-embracing strategy," a standard feature of many expert prescriptions, is probably beyond our capacity to develop. They call, instead, for a *variety of strategies* employing a variety of tools. Their analysis is meant to awaken readers to the full

range of national strength available for use in the battle. Terrorists, after all, have only violence in their arsenal. States have much more, and with some energy and inventiveness they can bring those other resources to bear with great effect.

There is notable tension throughout the book concerning the place of force in US policy. This is the major focus of at least six of the chapters. The editors do not depart from their advocacy of a broad-based approach, but they clearly believe that tools of force are the most in need of rehabilitation. Several chapters explore the rationales and principles governing the use of violence to prevent or punish terrorism. Authors note the rules which constrain forcible measures, but they seek to clarify what the rules permit as well as what they proscribe.

Though prominent terrorists and their supporters are named, the book does not try to define the enemy systematically, thereby finessing a major practical obstacle confronting policymakers. Moreover, many of the policy recommendations it offers will not surprise readers who have followed the public discussion of the terrorist problem. But its call for a more robust and capacious strategic arsenal is an important one, worth a great deal of attention in Washington and elsewhere.

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**"And I Was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets.** By Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, with Captain Roger Pineau and John Costello. 596 pages. William Morrow and Company, New York, 1985. \$19.95.

**Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History.** By Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. 699 pages. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1986. \$19.95.

Custer's last stand, the assassinations of Presidents Lincoln and Kennedy, and the Pearl Harbor attack stand out among American tragedies in terms of the vast literature each precipitated and the public's apparently insatiable craving for more. So far 102 titles have been published on Pearl Harbor, with the 1980s one of the most productive periods. Despite the widespread interest, however, surprisingly little has been uncovered in recent years from the torrents of newly declassified materials that would

seriously affect the skirmish lines drawn early on by the principal opposing camps of orthodox and revisionist proponents. The latest addition to the ongoing Posthumous Prange Series (he died in 1980) surely is no landmark, but the Layton memoir contains some fresh, significant insights that may turn researchers in new directions.

*Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* is an interestingly written recapitulation of the orthodox stance Gordon Prange, history professor at the University of Maryland, took in his best-selling *At Dawn We Slept* (1981). That earlier work reaffirmed the findings of the congressional investigation of 1945-46, which, in turn, defended the Roosevelt Administration and focused on the alleged mistakes of the Navy and Army commanders on Oahu in 1941. The newest book, written by Prange's former students from his files as well as from recently opened records, is aimed mainly at refuting the Roosevelt conspiracy thesis as revived in John Toland's *Infamy* (1981). The arguments against Toland's revisionism are sound, but there is little noteworthy evidence that was not in *At Dawn We Slept*.

Students of the war against Japan have long hoped for an autobiography by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet from December 1940 to February 1946. He had his manuscript memoirs well underway when he died in 1984. Unfortunately, it is difficult in reading "*And I Was There*" to distinguish Layton's thoughts and phrases from those of his two collaborators. The book, however, deserves a special niche in Pearl Harbor historiography not only because it provides the long-awaited views of a key participant but also because Layton's position on Pearl Harbor is apart from the orthodox and revisionist schools. He sees the principal responsibility for the fiasco of December 7, 1941, resulting neither from the faults of the President nor of the chief Oahu commanders but, instead, from the fierce bureaucratic infighting in the Navy Department and between the Washington and Pearl Harbor intelligence communities. Layton fervently defends Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, and Commander Joseph P. Rochefort, head of radio intelligence on Oahu, who became scapegoats for the Navy Department's intelligence errors prior to the Pearl Harbor and Midway operations, respectively. He maintains that misinterpretations and machinations by naval intelligence leaders in Washington might have caused disasters in the Midway and Solomons naval actions, as they had at Pearl Harbor, if Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had not

succeeded in pushing his own intelligence staff's more accurate predictions.

The reader who made it through *At Dawn We Slept* is advised to skip the Prange sequel. But he should not miss "*And I Was There*", where he will be fascinated by a genuine insider's version of what it was like trying to outsmart the Japanese in the Pacific intelligence war while at the same time endeavoring to counter the hostile maneuvers of naval bureaucrats in Washington.

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**The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939.** By Robert Allan Doughty. 232 pages. Archon Books, Hamden, Conn., 1985. \$27.50.

Ever since the catastrophic events of May 1940, historians have argued about which were the most important weaknesses or errors that would account for the French army's unexpectedly poor performance. Some historians have found the "seeds of disaster" in the ill-trained mass army resulting from short service conscription, in the transient and unstable coalition governments, or more generally in the decadence of French society. Others have looked for more specific explanations such as the over-defensive "Maginot mentality" or undue dependence on unreliable allies.

Colonel Robert Doughty, making excellent use of newly available archival material, persuasively argues that French army doctrine provides the key to the otherwise scarcely credible paralysis of the high command once the Panzer forces had crossed the Meuse. Although Foch, Pétain and their successors made intensive efforts to profit from their experience in the First World War, they used history too selectively: the organization and doctrine they devised was more suited to cope with battle conditions in 1918 rather than 1940. Little thought was given, moreover, to what might happen if the critical battle of the frontiers was once again lost.

Very sensibly, Colonel Doughty does not confine his analysis of "doctrine" to the concepts studied at the military institutions and embodied in the manuals, but places it clearly in its political and strategic context. Republican ideology committed France to a poorly trained nation-in-arms with a small professional cadre; this drastically limited her tactical and strategic options. Moreover, the dire consequences of being invaded in 1914 with the loss of vital industrial regions led to

the quest for impregnable defenses to protect the more vulnerable sectors of the front. The Maginot Line, as Doughty correctly stresses, largely fulfilled its purpose, but its very existence and its great expense both constricted doctrine and reduced the budget available for new equipment. Finally, France continued to tolerate a ludicrously complicated and fragmented organization of committees and councils for the political and military command of the armed forces. Doughty shows that although Gamelin was nominally Generalissimo from 1935, he could not in practice exercise effective command; hence his wry marginal note on his copy of the charges at the Riom trial: "The title is one thing. The power is another."

Even after allowing for these mitigating factors, however, Gamelin and his colleagues are shown to have been blinkered, conservative, and rigid in their approach to doctrine. In short, they made the fatal assumption that a future battle with Germany could be fought on France's terms with strict central control and slow, carefully orchestrated advances. The mobile arms—tanks, armored cars, cavalry—as well as aircraft, must be subordinated to the requirements of infantry and artillery. Thus the infantry could not advance more than four or five kilometers without halting for several hours to allow the artillery to make a corresponding advance in support. As late as 1939 a new manual stressed the necessity for tanks to move to a strict timetable to cope with the problem of tank-artillery liaison. Though partly aware that radically different operational concepts had gained favor in Germany, the French high command insisted that their doctrine of the centrally controlled, methodical battle would prevail. Their complacency is all the more remarkable given that Germany was almost certain to enjoy the strategic initiative.

Colonel Doughty has done an excellent job in thorough research and lucid exposition within his carefully defined terms of reference. Several previous students of the subject have stressed the inadequacies of French army doctrine, but none has so systematically explained its origins, tenets, and implications. One's only regret is that the author refrained from exploring some of the interesting questions on the periphery of his subject. How much attention, for example, did the French pay to British mechanized experiments in the late 1920s and early 1930s? (Liddell Hart receives only one passing mention and Fuller none.) What impressions did French observers gain from German tank maneuvers in the late 1930s, and were their reports ignored? How ac-

curate was French intelligence regarding German strategic planning, particularly during the Phoney War, and if Gamelin knew of the concentration of Panzers opposite the Ardennes, why did he not change his plan? Finally, one would have welcomed more discussion of the French army's views on airpower and the reasons for the virtual absence of army-air cooperation. These reservations, however, do not seriously detract from the merits of this excellent historical case study which should also provide criteria for the assessment of contemporary doctrine.

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**Fighting Soldier: The AEF in 1918.** By Joseph Douglas Lawrence. Edited by Robert H. Ferrell. 165 pages. Colorado Associated University Press, Boulder, Colo., 1985. \$15.00.

Thanks to the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, and the keen eye and editorial pen of Indiana University historian Robert H. Ferrell, *Fighting Soldier* is available to those of us convinced that the human dimension of war has been neglected in our age of quantification and systems. The book is an absolutely first-rate personal account of a young South Carolinian's experience as an enlisted man and commissioned officer in the Great War. It is clearly written in an understated style and conveys an almost quaint and archaic naivete characteristic of a certain American gentleman-type of the period. Patriotism, a sense of duty, and a yen for adventure motivate young Lawrence to join the National Guard in June 1917 and enable him to serve nobly as a junior officer in some very hard fighting on the Meuse in the final months of the First World War.

Lawrence's combat experience in World War I, in contrast to the European experience recorded by Graves, Sassoon, Jünger, Remarque, et al., was brief, but the intensity of the combat he experienced was sharply etched in his memory and is lucidly presented in his prose. The book can be read in two or three hours, is clearly made in America, and belongs on the shelf next to Keegan, S.L.A. Marshall, Farwell, Masters, and the excellent memoirs and novels of the Great War.

*Fighting Soldier* reminds us that man is the centerpiece in war.

COL Henry G. Gole  
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**Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle.** By Richard Holmes. 436 pages. The Free Press, New York, 1985. \$19.95.

Richard Holmes' *Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle* (originally published in Great Britain as *Firing Line*) is an attempt to provide a serious work about the experience of the individual soldier in combat. To achieve this end, Holmes relies mainly on a number of written first-person accounts of veterans and his own interviews with 150 soldiers of varying nationalities who fought in "the World Wars, the Korean conflict, the Arab-Israeli wars, the Vietnam War, an assortment of minor conflicts in the post 1945 period, and, finally the Falklands War of 1982." He supplements these sources with several general sociological or psychological texts in order to explore the human reaction to battle.

The book fails to fulfill its promise. Data provide significant problems. Who, for instance, are these 150 interviewed veterans? Are they regulars, reservists, officers, NCOs, or territorials? How did Holmes select these men and what questions did he ask them? Holmes doesn't tell us, and without knowing these prerequisites, a reader is unable to determine if their recollections are representative of men in battle. Next is the question of selection among secondary sources, because the author uses no primary ones. Holmes has read widely, but uncritically. This unfortunate combination results in a shallow, repetitive recital of unoriginal military episodes weakly joined thematically by superficial psychological pronouncements.

These remarks highlight another observation, namely that the author prepared the book in haste without stringent editorial guidelines or meticulous thought. These lamentable lapses may account for the exact same quotation from Charles Carrington appearing on page 65 and reappearing on page 149 to illustrate the exact same point or the redundant example of Colonel Cross on pages 18 and 46. The bibliography of secondary sources initially seems impressive, but an overreliance on the British infantry experience, particularly in World War I, and recycling several of the same authors throughout the text undercut Holmes' generalized assertions. The recurrent use of Tony Ashworth on pages 27, 75, and 318 offers an example.

The book is also flawed as a serious work of historical sociology because the comparative groups are so dissimilar. Cross-cultural and chronological differences are dismissed, which

reduces the experience of an 18th century guardsman and a German SS soldier in the Soviet Union to equal levels in Holmes' analysis. The disingenuous comparison of the British officer experience in the Falklands with the American counterpart in Vietnam for "equality of sacrifice" is meaningless because temporal, spatial, geographical, cultural, and institutional (i.e. the British were volunteers in elite formations, the Americans were not) factors were unique to those wars. A thorough, detailed examination of comparable groups for comparable periods might be helpful rather than merely lumping an "everyman's soldier" mentality together and maintaining it valid for the ages.

In sum, leaps from century to century, from total to limited war, and from European to American cultures on a single page may provide entertaining anecdotes, but they do not substitute for rigorous analysis and continuity of argument. This book is to be recommended for a few hours' entertainment, but certainly not as a serious scholarly work on an important subject.

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**The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment.** Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala. Scholarly Resources, Inc., Wilmington, Del., 1986. \$35.00.

This is a book of essays surveying the failures and achievements of the Reagan Administration's first term in the area of defense policy. The authors are competent and experienced students and, in many cases, practitioners of the making and implementation of US defense policy.

Overall, the essays are extremely well done and cover the prime areas of current public concern regarding the Reagan record. The three best efforts are the ones by James Oliver and James Nathan on the continuity between the Reagan and Carter defense programs, Lawrence Korb on defense manpower programs in the Reagan first term, and Professor Cimbala on the Reagan first term's strategic offensive force modernization efforts.

The Oliver and Nathan piece, in my opinion, makes a persuasive case that the Reagan Administration's defense policies thus far have been (and are likely to continue to be) the Carter Administration's policies with only slight modification at the edges but with a lot more money

spent on achieving the goals sought by those policies. On the whole, I found myself in agreement with this argument, especially regarding conventional force levels and strategies. I found the argument less convincing in the area of nuclear forces and strategies.

The chapter by Lawrence Korb presents a powerful and tightly reasoned defense of Reagan manpower policies in general and the volunteer force in particular. The evidence which he marshals on behalf of those policies is impressive. I found especially interesting his comparison of the savings resulting from increased retention in the volunteer force with the savings resulting from lower-cost initial tours in a conscript force. This is an important point which many advocates of conscription often overlook.

Professor Cimbala's article on the Reagan strategic offensive force modernization program is a well-written and balanced effort to describe the efforts of the Administration to modernize and improve the force in the face of much domestic opposition and a large Soviet advantage in this facet of military capability. Cimbala's discussion of the costs and benefits of the great Scowcroft compromise is especially astute.

The two worst chapters in the book are those by Charles Gellner on arms control and Sam Sarkesian on special operations. The Gellner article appears to be less a discussion of Reagan policy than a chance to rehash many tired and, in at least one case, discredited arguments in favor of "arms control at any price." For example, at one point Gellner argues that the evidence to the effect that the Soviets have cheated on arms agreements is "ambiguous."

The chapter by Sarkesian is not so much badly reasoned or written as it is superficial. I kept waiting for him to become specific or to come to some kind of denouement, but it never happened. As a result, I found this chapter to be something of a letdown, especially since Sarkesian's writing in other areas (notably civil-military relations) has been so good.

Chapters by Vincent Davis and Donald Snow on, respectively, decision-making in the Reagan defense program and ballistic missile defense are both well done. I have only minor quibbles with each of them.

Finally, we come to Alan Sabrosky's chapter on the war powers act. I found this work to provide a very insightful description of the effects of the act and the response to it of the several Presidents who have had to live with it. Though I admit that it is difficult to determine any deterrent

effect which the act may have, it may be greater than Sabrosky gives it credit for. I also find myself in some disagreement with his normative evaluation of the act. Sabrosky sees the act as "unconstitutional, ineffective and unwise" (p. 133). This may be so. However, the act represents to me an effort by the Congress to maintain its constitutional power to declare war in a new environment in which a formal declaration of hostilities is not always feasible. The only alternative would seem to be Harry Summers' suggestion that we stop thinking of war as an "all out" affair.

To conclude, despite my disagreements, I would strongly recommend this book to all those interested in the continuing evolution (or possible lack thereof) in US defense policy and strategy.

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**NATO in the 1980s: Challenges and Responses.**  
Edited by L. P. Brady and J. F. Kaufman.  
Praeger Publishers, New York, 1985. \$39.95.

It is rare that a book is outdated before it is published. *NATO in the 1980s* is such a book. The March 1981 session of the International Studies Association consisted of panel reports on the challenges of NATO. The text is a compilation of those reports.

The general theme of the panelists was, naturally, that there was a crisis in NATO and that political and economic difficulties in the alliance represented serious challenges. The second portion of the text presents responses to the challenges presented, but the inordinate amount of time required to prepare these responses made the entire text less than topical.

The panelists wrestled with problems such as the LRTNF decision, the political response to the invasion of Afghanistan, and the possibility of NATO forces being committed in Iran. These were important topics—five years ago. NATO now faces a new set of challenges, and the 1977 views of Helmut Schmidt do not have the same degree of relevance.

The panel reports themselves are excellent; the concept of prepared responses to panel reports is noteworthy. Unfortunately, the five years from the reports to the book have, as always, been ones of rapid change in NATO, and the current "crisis in NATO" is based on a whole series of different

challenges. The editors are applauded for a great concept and a good effort, but the book is not recommended for professional reading. It is in the realm of the historians.

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**The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy.** By Joseph J. Collins. 195 pages. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1986, \$24.00.

The subject matter of Major Collins' valuable study is clearly conveyed by its title and, unlike a number of books, the text delivers what the author has promised. It is a well-written, carefully researched study (almost 20 percent of the text is devoted to notes and bibliography), carefully focused to secure answers to what the author regards as the most important questions raised by the Soviet invasion and the continuing brutal effort to subdue that valiant and as yet unconquerable nation. This is a subject that has started a modest-sized cottage industry of scholarship since December 1979, and this study fits in well in the front rank alongside the works of authors such as Arnold, Bradsher, Newell & Newell, and Hammond, and the shorter contributions of scholars such as Dupree, Khalilzad, Krakowski, and Valenta.

The author poses and then answers for us four questions in regard to this extraordinary event in post-World War II Soviet foreign policy:

- What were the Soviet motivations, internal and external?
- How have the invasion itself and subsequent military operations been conducted, and what are the relationships between these methods and the original motivations?
- How does this event fit into the commonly advanced explanations of the use of force in Soviet foreign policy?
- What conclusions can be drawn regarding changing trends in Soviet foreign policy?

The book begins, after laying out the problems to be addressed, with a historical background from 1838 to 1978, leading up to the immediate situation facing Soviet decision-makers in late 1979. After a detailed study of the invasion per se, there follow two chapters of analysis of the decision to invade in the light of background and immediate factors. The progress of the war is then addressed through the end of 1984 with accounts of military operations, political operations, and

regional and international reactions. Finally, the author answers the questions he has posed for himself at the start.

As the author tells us in his introduction, his study is focused on Soviet foreign policy, specifically in its military aspects, and his sources are largely Soviet and Afghan communist official statements, reinforced by US government documents, interviews, and secondary works. I feel, speaking from the point of view of a specialist in Afghanistan and the region and not a Soviet specialist, that such an approach, inevitably, will tend to downplay local factors. The author himself points out that one of the major lessons of Afghanistan is how woefully wrong the Soviet leadership could be in evaluating local and regional conditions. We should be careful in our analysis not to repeat their mistakes. A closer look at the state of Afghan-Soviet relations in the 1970s, including the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 and of the Da'ud regime in 1978, might yield a more purposeful and less reactive explanation of the background motivations of Soviet policy. But to attempt this requires a thorough examination of Afghan and Pakistani sources. There, the seeming paradox of new economic and military aid to Da'ud might be readily explained as part of a rather successful deception project (since Da'ud did not move against the well-known communist leadership until the last days of his regime), as a necessity of forging a reasonable political and military instrument to carry out the coup, or merely as putting into place assets which would soon be in good communist hands.

In describing and analyzing the relations of the Soviets with the *Khalqi* regime of Taraki and Amin and the decision to invade, as well as military and political operations through 1984, the author is on surer ground. These actions have been in response to deteriorating local conditions, influenced by recent Soviet successes in other third world contexts and reinforced by US inaction (at least in the decision to invade). I found this the most valuable part of the book, particularly the linking of the Afghanistan case to the developing Soviet doctrines on third world conflicts and "socialist internationalism."

Major Collins points out in a convincing manner that the Soviets have solved neither their political nor military problems thus far. Their puppet regime remains totally dependent and the *mujahiddin* are stronger internally and in their international support. In this current situation the Soviets have no *immediate* plans to take advantage of their strategic advance for future

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
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regional gains, but this could well change in another decade unless the Afghan freedom fighters receive even further political and military support from both regional states and the United States.

The author suggests a well-thought-out strategy of military and political actions to give such aid. It is encouraging that some of these measures are now being undertaken in the year and a half since this study was completed. Although we will probably never know the final answers to the questions posed in this book, it is clear that Major Collins has posed the right questions and given them careful and systematic examination. It can be read with profit by all members of the defense community.

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**76 Hours: The Invasion of Tarawa.** By Eric Hammel and John Lane. 266 pages. Pacifica Press, Pacifica, Calif., 1985. \$22.95.

Based on after-action reports, *76 Hours* incorporates materials from interviews and exchanges with more than 150 participants of the battle for Betio. It contains 31 photographs, taken from the air and on the ground, of the action and of the men who influenced this battle. Six maps at the beginning of the book and a detailed explanation of the involved combat organization, provided in an appendix, give the reader ready reference for clarity.

As US military might in the Pacific began to rebuild and establish a plan for victory over Imperial Japanese forces, it became obvious that if a central Pacific sweep was to be conducted, it would be necessary to provide for land-based air support and to protect the lines of communication and supply. To permit a massing of effort against the main Japanese stronghold, the line from Hawaii to Japan required flank protection and the

implantation of sources of fire support. Guadalcanal, in the Solomons, and Betio, of the Tarawa atoll in the Gilbert Islands, were the first of such planned support bases.

A collection of accounts of frustration, heroism, despair and triumph, *76 Hours* is effectively arranged in chronological sequence. It places the reader in the landing vehicle to experience the trip toward the beach; it plunges him into chin-deep surf for a treacherous walk to shore under enemy fire from tenacious Japanese defenders who were determined to die rather than relinquish control of the small air facility located on Betio. The central theme of the book is an examination of individual and small-unit determination to overcome personal fears and take whatever physical actions were needed to carry out their assignments in the face of death. "The ground itself was worthless; it was too sandy to farm or support livestock, and there was not enough of it." The committed forces are portrayed as being mostly fresh, not tested under fire, eager to get on with the business of revenge upon the Japanese, and largely oblivious to the threat opposing them on the beach.

The determination portrayed in this account was perhaps responsible for overcoming the factors that worked against the amphibious force. These opposing factors present lessons for future operations in preparing for and conducting attacks from the sea.

Lessons can also be gleaned by today's students of the operational level of war. The chaos that exists, particularly when amphibious operations are involved, as the division and corps-level headquarters struggle to maintain communication and to determine the status of operations, casualties, supplies, or fire support must be overcome by prior planning. Brute force or sheer numbers will not be sufficient if we are to survive against anyone other than an isolated minority force with no chance of reinforcement.

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## 1986 PARAMETERS READERSHIP SURVEY

The following results, shown in percentages, have been compiled from the first 1899 responses received from a survey of 4124 field grade and general officers in January and February 1986.

1. What is your military status?

Field Grade 74.6 (1417)

General Officer 25.4 (482)

2. For your particular needs, how well do most *Parameters* articles cover their subjects?

Too superficial 3.0

Sufficient depth 91.2

Too much depth 5.8

3. How useful to you is the information in *Parameters*?

Very useful 22.1

Slightly useful 22.2

Moderately useful 54.4

Not useful at all 1.3

4. To what degree do you examine each issue of *Parameters*?

Read all or almost all articles and features 14.4

Read some articles and features, skim others 68.3

Skim all or most of the issue 14.7

Read titles of articles and author's names only 2.3

Do not examine the issue 0.3

|                                                      | Strongly<br>Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 5. <i>Parameters</i> is interesting.                 | 0.7                  | 3.3      | 12.7    | 61.0  | 22.3              |
| 6. It is informative.                                | 0.5                  | 1.9      | 11.2    | 61.1  | 25.3              |
| 7. It has helped broaden my professional background. | 0.8                  | 1.9      | 22.5    | 49.5  | 23.9              |
| 8. It is a stimulating forum for new ideas.          | 1.5                  | 7.3      | 33.1    | 42.5  | 15.5              |
| 9. Authors of articles are knowledgeable experts.    | 0.5                  | 3.1      | 27.3    | 52.0  | 17.2              |
| 10. It is easy for me to read.                       | 1.1                  | 5.1      | 15.2    | 54.8  | 23.8              |

11. The purpose of *Parameters* is to provide for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, national and international security affairs, military history, military strategy, military leadership and management, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Thereby, it serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs. Do you feel *Parameters* accomplishes its stated purpose?

Yes 93.7

No 6.3

12. Is the subject matter addressed in *Parameters* appropriate for a military professional journal?

Yes 96.8

No 3.2

13. Compared with past years, how has the quality of *Parameters* changed in the last year or year and a half?

Improved 21.1

Deteriorated 1.2

Stayed the same 50.9

I am not able to judge/no comment 26.8

# ... From the Archives

## PROFESSIONAL DISCUSSION

Open discussion of doctrinal matters and consideration of opposing viewpoints are vital to the evolution of military thought. Blind belief in the veracity of current doctrine and imposition of censorship to suppress conflicting ideas can be fatal to an army and ultimately to a nation.

In 1935 Charles de Gaulle published a slender book entitled *Vers l'Armee de Métier* which espoused a small, professional army of mechanized units for the defense of France. This proposal was anathema to a General Staff dedicated to supremacy of defensive doctrine embodied by the Maginot Line and a Socialist government with a deep-seated distrust of a professional military. For his audacity de Gaulle was removed from the 1936 promotion list.

André Beufre recounts the edict issued by General Gamelin, Chief of the French General Staff:

There is widespread discussion of motorization and mechanization. I wish it to be understood that the sole authority for the establishment of doctrine is the General Headquarters of the Army. All articles and all lectures on these subjects will therefore be submitted and authorized by the said authority before they are published or delivered.

Everyone got the message and a profound silence reigned until the awakening of 1940.

Source: *The Fall of France*, by General André Beufre (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967).

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