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STARC: KEY TO READINESS AND MOBILIZATION
OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BY

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

STARC: KEY TO READINESS AND MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

An Individual Essay

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Total Army policy has significantly changed the role of the Army National Guard (ARNG) in support of our country's national security objectives and our national defense policies. The basic issues are: identifying the ARNG organization that serves as the focal point for training and mobilization readiness; understand the complexity of missions and varied responsibilities of this organization; and highlight problem areas that require continued emphasis. Information was gathered using a literature search and personal interviews with mobilization planners and force structure experts. The need for a state organization to command and control ARNG units as well as the functions and responsibilities of the State Area Command (STARC) was reviewed.



STARC: KEY TO READINESS AND MOBILIZATION OF THE
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

As a component of the reserve forces, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has a long history of dedicated service to our country's defense effort. Table 1 outlines the extent of involvement in major wars and crises. The need for planning and utilizing a mobilized reserve force to meet contingencies can be traced to the establishment of the first militia units in Massachusetts in 1636. Throughout its 350-year history as a citizen-soldier organization, the ARNG has been available for mobilization in support of national defense policy in addition to accomplishing missions assigned by state government.

The role of the Reserve Components (RC) in support of national defense was dramatically changed in 1973 when the Total Army or One Army Concept became Department of the Army (DA) policy. The implementation of this policy meant that the RC was no longer considered a back-up organization to the active military but was an integral part and full partner in the Army's national defense effort. This resulted, in part, in the RC being given a more active and important role in deterrence, the cornerstone of our country's National Defense policy. The ability to deter war is related to governmental, as well as business and industrial mobilization capabilities. Examples of this are the rapid expansion of our industrial production and the ready availability of commercial airplanes through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). This policy has focused attention on the combat readiness of the reserve forces as well as their ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy. For many reasons which will be discussed later, this 1973 policy decision was an extremely significant milestone in the history of our country's reserve forces and their mobilization readiness.

Regular Army and Citizen-Soldier Army Mobilization
For Major Wars and the Berlin Crisis

Major Wars	Strength of Regular Army at Beginning of the War	Number of Militia/ National Guard and Army Reserve Mobilized	Total Serving in the Army During the War	Percent of Regular to Total Serving	Percent RC to Total Serving
Revolutionary War	0	250,000	250,000	0(+)	100(-)
War of 1812	6,744	458,000	522,654	1.3	87.6
Mexican War	7,365	73,532	115,906	10.3	63.4
Spanish-American War	28,183	170,954	274,817	10.3	62.2
World War I	127,588	208,000	4,057,000	3.1	5.1
World War II	187,893 (Sep 39)	377,000	11,260,000	1.7	3.3
Korean War	591,487	382,900	2,834,000	20.9	13.5
Berlin Crisis	859,000	119,622	-	-	-
Vietnam War	970,000	22,786	4,368,000	22.2	0.5

Note a: Numbers include the Continental Army. Statistics are unavailable that show the number serving who were not Militia members.

SOURCE: Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War, by Colonels John D. Stuckey and Joseph H. Pistorius; Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013: p. 96; 15 NOV 84; ACN 84005; US Government Printing Office: 1984 505 003 11855

TABLE 1

BACKGROUND

Prior to 1973 the reserve forces were considered a back-up force to the active military. As a result, they received minimal training opportunities, equipment and resources. Consequently, they could maintain a relatively low state of military preparedness and mobilization readiness. It was generally expected that once mobilized, training over a considerable period of time would be required to acquire the necessary skills to be combat ready. Based on previous mobilization experiences, it was further expected that as a back-up force, reserve units would not be provided the most modern equipment for training or for use in combat. Because of the training time anticipated to improve unit readiness upon mobilization, it was also expected that large numbers of personnel changes would be made through reassignments and unit cross-leveling. All of these issues, and many others, took on new meaning and were absorbed in the phrase that rapidly spread through the reserve forces in the late 70's which described the next war as a "come as you are" war. It was recognized that any future national emergency would require a readily available and well-trained reserve force that could accomplish assigned missions with a minimal amount of training time and changes in personnel and equipment.

The 1973 policy decision resulted in new programs and procedures emerging from all of the headquarters having responsibility for reserve forces. Programs assigning organization missions, personnel, training, logistics, and mobilization planning for the reserve forces were restructured. Examples of these are: the CAPSTONE program which establishes a specific wartime chain of command and explicit mission requirements for all RC units; each RC unit has a specified Mobilization Station (MS) and notifies the installation of training and support requirements needed at mobilization through the annual

submission/update of the Post-Mobilization Training and Support Requirements (PTSR); all RC units must prepare and maintain a comprehensive Unit Mobilization File (UMF); each Continental United States Army (CONUSA) headquarters conducts a biannual review and approval of the mobilization plans prepared by Major United States Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC), State Area Commands (STARC) and MS. These are only a sampling of the myriad initiatives and actions that have been established to improve the mobilization readiness of RC units which reduces the time needed upon mobilization to validate unit capabilities to accomplish wartime missions.

The number of systems and the amount of planning and training devoted to mobilization has reached the point that some have suggested that the mobilization planning and execution system is the most comprehensive, complicated and difficult system in the military services. It has also been suggested that the RC's have been saturated with requirements under these new systems to the extent that no new requirements should be assigned to the RC until the capability to accomplish additional tasks has been evaluated.

All of these issues and actions, as well as many others, have created a training, readiness and mobilization awareness and sensitivity among the ARNG leadership who recognize the importance of a well-defined and tested organization at the state level which can successfully command and control ARNG units during peacetime and upon mobilization. From the ARNG perspective, the key to any future mobilization is directly related to how well each National Guard State Headquarters or State Area Command (STARC) succeeds in accomplishing its missions.

STARC RESPONSIBILITIES

Each of the 50 states as well as the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands

has a STARC. The STARC's were established in 1981 and are organized in accordance with National Guard Regulation 10-2.¹ Over 18,000 personnel, which is less than 3 percent of the total ARNG strength of 440,000, are currently authorized in the 54 STARC TDA's.

The requirement for a STARC headquarters is founded primarily in two separate needs. The first was for a streamlined and centralized organization. During the years following World War II, a number of relatively small Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) were developed to augment the State Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, the organization that preceded the STARC. For Example, TDA's for such operations as State Operated Training Sites, State Military Academies, Command and Control Headquarters, etc., had been developed as a result of the expanded and changing role and responsibilities of the ARNG. In some cases these organizations were very fractured and not well organized. The second need was to have an organization which had a wartime mission that was compatible with its peacetime functions and responsibilities. This is manifest in the fact that the STARC now has command and control responsibilities for units assigned to the state in peacetime as well as the early phases of mobilization and at other times as directed by higher headquarters. The STARC has command and control of state units whenever these units are not performing federal duties and therefore ensures their availability and readiness to accomplish state missions.

An element in the STARC which has some unique functions and responsibilities is the Post Mobilization State Headquarters. As a component of the STARC, the functions of this section frequently raise questions primarily because its activities are focused on the state-related missions and functions of the militia while many of the personnel assigned upon mobilization will be in federal duty status. This headquarters has the

pre-mobilization mission to be activated for command and control functions for large-scale support of civil authorities for the protection of life, property, preservation of peace, order, and public safety. The post-mobilization mission of this section is to assist in the mobilization of Army National Guard and Army Reserve Units within the state as well as assisting state authorities in the planning and employment of militia units for state missions.

While there is a great deal of commonality concerning the mission, functions and organization of the STARC's, there is also a great deal of diversity. The STARC is a military organization that operates and directs the day-to-day activities of the ARNG within the state. Because each state has varying numbers and types of units dispersed throughout both urban and rural areas, the types of problems in dealing with such issues as training facilities, logistical support and maintenance operations, etc., are extremely varied. An example is the problems confronted by the ARNG in the states of Texas and New Jersey. Both states have an armored division. The units comprising the 49th Armored Division in Texas are spread over a large geographical area and have accessibility to an excellent armor training facility at Fort Hood near the central part of the state. New Jersey, on the other hand, has the 50th Armored Division units dispersed over a much smaller geographical area and there are almost no facilities appropriate for armor training in the state. While both of these units have the same basic military mission, each of the STARC's associated with these units is confronted with unique personnel, logistics, training and organization problems associated with support requirements to ensure unit readiness.

FEDERAL MISSIONS

Although each STARC is organized somewhat differently, they all have similar pre-mobilization and post-mobilization federal and state missions.

The pre-mobilization federal mission of the STARC is to command, control and supervise ARNG units within the state and ensure they are prepared and equipped for service in time of war or national emergency. In addition, the STARC must be prepared for mobilization, provide military support to civil authorities in support of civil defense plans and plan for CONUS land defense missions. It has responsibilities to the appropriate CONUSA which is responsible for unit training as well as the review and approval of STARC mobilization plans. The STARC is also responsible for submitting mobilization TDA's through the CONUSA for comment. The significance of this is the fact that the CONUSA commands and controls the STARC after mobilization.

During mobilization, the STARC has command and control responsibility for mobilized units. This includes coordinating their movement to mobilization stations (MS) or ports of embarkation, clearing property accounts and securing federal property not taken to the MS. Other post-mobilization federal responsibilities include: coordination with other government agencies; family assistance; and assist with Reception and Onward Movement of DOD Noncombatant Evacuees (ROMODNE). In addition, planning for the Land Defense of CONUS (LDC); Military Support of Civil Defense (MSCD); and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACAP) must continue.

To ensure adequate and uninterrupted support of the STARC mobilization missions, the peacetime TDA remains in place until M+60 and assigned STARC personnel are "fenced" during this time. At M+60, the STARC commander must coordinate with the CONUSA any remaining function/requirements and justify the continued assignment of personnel to the STARC. Based on decisions by the CONUSA commander, STARC personnel are available for reassignment. It is expected that a number of STARC personnel will remain in federal status in the

state to assist the CONUSA with such war-related requirements as Family Assistance, LDC and MACAP.

In a few cases, STARC's have some very unique pre-mobilization and post-mobilization missions. The Idaho STARC, for example, in addition to having the normal STARC responsibilities also operates Gowen Field, a military installation, during peacetime and wartime.

STATE MISSIONS

The pre-mobilization state mission of the STARC is to command, control and supervise ARNG units employed in support of civil authorities in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order and public safety. The post-mobilization mission, on the other hand, is to accomplish the following: assist in organizing and training the state guard; perform command and control functions in support of civil authorities; and to reconstitute the National Guard when units return from federal service.

STARC ORGANIZATION

Each state military department is similar in the fact that during peacetime The Adjutant General (TAG) as the chief military officer for the state works for the governor (Encl. 1). As commander-in-chief of the National Guard units in the state during peacetime, the governor makes policy decisions as well as gives guidance and direction to the TAG and the Assistant Adjutant Generals who supervise the day-to-day activities of the National Guard.

While STARC's have unique organizations and variations in their functions, NGR 10-2 provides guidelines for organizational structure. Enclosure 2 shows a typical STARC organization. The STARC is a Troop Program Unit (TPU) with the majority of assigned personnel being National Guard technicians and Active Guard Reserve (AGR) who work for the state military department. These personnel are assigned duties that are complimentary to their full-time

military duties. By having similar duties during peacetime and upon mobilization, it is intended that greater efficiency and continuity is provided in supporting mobilized units.

In discussing the STARC Command Section, it should be noted that the TAG, an appointee of the governor,* in some cases is not an Army General Officer and in some cases is not a Federally Recognized General Officer. This has created some confusion because the authority to operate and direct the activities of the state units in peacetime is the responsibility of a senior officer who by virtue of the limitations mentioned cannot command the STARC. In those cases where the TAG cannot command the STARC, another officer who meets the qualifications is assigned the position of STARC commander. It is expected that TAG's who do not function as STARC commanders will direct the activities of the Post Mobilization State Headquarters or function in some type of military advisor capacity to the governor. In some cases, Assistant Adjutant Generals have been assigned as STARC commanders. It is important to note that each state has a unique command situation within the guidelines of NGR 10-2. The command section is responsible for commanding and coordinating all activities of the state ARNG.

In providing guidance for the organization and staffing of the 54 STARC's, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) recognized the uniqueness of each state in terms of types of units assigned, facilities available, state missions, etc. The general guidance provided in NGR 10-2 allows a limited amount of flexibility in structuring the STARC organization. As a result, most of the

*In two states, the Adjutant General is elected and in the District of Columbia, Guam and the Virgin Islands, the AG is appointed by the President.

STARC organizations are different. While this structuring arrangement has satisfied requirements and has not created any difficult problems for NGB, it is anticipated that there may be a future requirement for standardization. This is prompted in part by the current Army initiative to standardize TDA's. The diversity of STARC TDA's does create some restrictions on NGB in terms of the justification, audit and review process. One obvious concern of the STARC about standardization will be the loss of flexibility in providing for a "tailored" TDA. An example of the diversity in STARC TDA's is reflected in the number of personnel authorized. Guam, for example, has less than 200 personnel authorized, whereas states such as New York, Texas and Alabama are authorized well over 600 personnel. While part of this diversity is directly related to the number of personnel and units supported by the STARC, other factors have to do with the types of units being supported, additional STARC support requirements, etc.

Because the STARC is organized along standard directorate staff lines or in the G-staff configuration as depicted in FM 101-5, the Chief of Staff section as well as the Directorates of Personnel, Logistics, Maintenance and Plans, Operations, Training and Military Support have functions that are traditionally associated with those types of staff elements. The intelligence function is typically performed by the latter of these directorates although each state has the authority to establish a separate intelligence directorate. In addition, each state must have a Selective Service Section, Human Relations/Equal Opportunity (HR/EO) Section, and a United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) Section. These sections are usually incorporated as an element of an appropriate directorate such as the HR/EO section as a branch in the Directorate of Personnel, etc.

Each state has the option of assigning the USPFO Section either as an element of the Logistics Directorate or as a separate section. Because of the broad range of supply, maintenance, logistics and fiscal management functions performed by the USPFO in peacetime and the fact that it is directed by a National Guard officer on active duty, many states have made the USPFO a separate section from the Logistics Directorate. While not duplicating functions, the Logistics Directorate and the USPFO must closely coordinate numerous activities.

In staffing the STARC, there are a number of functions that are unique to the ARNG. Some states, for example, are responsible for operating annual training sites. There are nine state-owned, state-operated (SOSO) training facilities such as Camp Shelby, Mississippi, Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, and Camp Ripley, Minnesota. Other unique functions that require staff supervision and planning are the operation of Combined Support Maintenance Shops (CSMS), Multiple Annual Training Equipment Sites (MATES), Unit Training Equipment Sites (UTES), Army Aviation Support Facilities (AASF), and the Military Academy.

In addition to these widely accepted functions, most states have identified unique functions that require STARC augmentation. For example, some states have units that do not have authorization in their organization for mess personnel and yet this function needs to be performed for that unit during Multiple Unit Training Assemblies (MUTA). In these instances where the need can be justified and documented, mess personnel will be provided to support the unit but the personnel are assigned as augmentees to the STARC TDA. Upon mobilization, these personnel are mobilized with the STARC and not the supported unit.

Mobilization Training and Issues

Shortly after the organization of STARC's in 1981, the NGB established and funded a mobilization exercise program. NGR 350-3 outlines the requirements for STARC's to conduct annual mobilization exercises and assist state units in conducting Mobilization and Deployment Readiness Exercises (MODRE) and Readiness for Mobilization Exercises (REMOBE). MODRE's are conducted by high priority units every three years in conjunction with overseas deployments while REMOBE's are conducted by high priority units every three years for those units that have not had an opportunity to participate in a MODRE. At this time, funds are not available for non-high priority units. The NGB exercise program is growing at a very rapid rate. Funding for the program was \$3 million in 1985 and is expected to reach \$21 million by 1990. These exercises provide the STARC's an opportunity to test and evaluate internal procedures, SOP's and mobilization plans as well as providing valuable experience for unit personnel in support of their mobilization function.

In some cases, CONUSA headquarters have established programs which support the NGB exercise program. The First US Army (FUSA) at Fort Meade, for example, has established a Mobilization Exercise Branch within the ODCSOPS which conducts STARC exercises for the 14 STARC's in the FUSA area when requested. This branch also conducts mobilization conferences on an annual basis and mobilization workshops upon request.

The number and scope of STARC mobilization training exercises has significantly increased during the last three years. In some cases STARC's have been involved in mobilizing and deploying entire brigades and, most recently in 1985, the North Carolina STARC mobilized the state's entire ARNG at Fort Bragg. These exercises are providing valuable learning experiences and serve as excellent training opportunities to evaluate individual and unit

capabilities. They also provide a realistic assessment of the types and quantities of resources required to support mobilization.

In spite of the increased number of exercises and emphasis placed on resolving mobilization issues, many continue to surface in subsequent exercises. A method of tracking problems and issues at all levels needs to be developed. This needs to be complimented by a systematic plan for the resolution and communication of identified problems and issues.

Mobilization planning guidance for the STARC's is provided primarily by US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) through the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) and CONUSA supplements. Issues involving STARC mobilization responsibilities that continue to receive a great deal of attention are: post-mobilization training; Mobilization Movement Control (MOBCON); family assistance; ROMODNE; and the State Guard.

There has been a great deal of discussion for a long time on the best and most efficient method of identifying and reporting unit post-mobilization training requirements to the MS. The need for this information is founded in two requirements. First, each MS has the requirement to calculate, forecast and plan for such training requirements as logistical support, training, support, facilities, etc., prior to mobilization. Secondly, there is a need for units to critically evaluate their training status on a regular basis and identify those areas of deficiency that are critical to the unit's ability to accomplish its wartime mission. Units can then plan on training to remedy deficiencies at the MS within resource and time constraints. Units are required to submit annual post-mobilization training plans through the STARC and MS to the CONUSA for approval. This system has been accused of creating hardships on each unit as well as the STARC to annually report and update training requirements. Some people have described the information being

reported as repetitious, while others have suggested that the information reported and procedures utilized are extremely important to the evaluation and planning process. There is a need to continue an assessment of this process and provide guidance as appropriate.

MOBCON is a plan which addresses the need to have a centralized staff element within each state to coordinate the movement of all military personnel and equipment through the state during peacetime as well as wartime. This requirement has been documented and approved by the appropriate agencies and headquarters; however, agreement has not been reached on the required staffing and resourcing plan. An evaluation program is presently being implemented in nine states to help resolve these issues. It is expected that the MOBCON plan will be implemented during the next three or four years as a STARC function.

FORMDEPS² requires that the STARC provide two types of family assistance: direct actual services and information referral and follow-up (IR&F). Upon mobilization, the need for providing family-related services to the dependents of mobilized soldiers is dramatically increased. In Maryland, for example, it is expected that more than 24,000 dependents will be eligible for family services if the ARNG is mobilized. In some states, such as Georgia and Virginia, which have several major military installations, this will be a lesser problem than in states such as Iowa which have no major military installations. A large number of issues such as personnel to provide services, services to be provided, location of assistance centers, training of servicing personnel, etc., are being addressed. While most STARC's are in the early stages of family assistance planning, others such as the Rhode Island STARC, have well-developed plans. A great deal more work needs to be accomplished by all agencies and personnel involved in family assistance

planning. Once these plans are developed, it is extremely important that they be tested and evaluated.

REMODNE is an area of probable STARC involvement that will require a wide variety of services and support functions. Because of the number and location of transportation points involved, as well as unprogrammed and unresourced logistics requirements, STARC responsibilities will be extremely diverse. One of the primary concerns with REMODNE planning is trying to identify numbers of personnel involved and services required at returning transportation facilities. Resourcing and planning requirements will continue to be areas of concern for the foreseeable future.

Each state has a need to reconstitute the state militia once National Guard units have been federalized. The state militia receives direction from the Post-Mobilization State Headquarters which will become responsible for the state missions of the National Guard after mobilization. Duties could include anything from security of vacated armories to civil assistance in a natural disaster. Many states are presently organizing a state guard; however, under present guidelines this organization is not eligible for federal funding. As a result, there are a number of problems concerning uniforms, equipment, training, pay, etc. In addition to numerous state level initiatives, the NGB has long range goals of obtaining funds and resources for this important mobilization asset.

In addition to the mobilization planning functions that generally involve all STARC headquarters, there are a number of areas of mobilization planning that are isolated situations that require additional planning. For example, additional planning is needed for the Eastern Area Aviation Training Site (EAATS) at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, and the Professional Education Center (PEC) in Little Rock, Arkansas.

As an organization, the STARC has performed its peacetime mission for over five years and has participated in numerous exercises to assess its ability to perform its mobilization mission. As an observer of several exercises and participate in numerous conferences, meetings and conversations, this author feels that the STARC is a viable organization that is properly organized and can accomplish its mobilization mission. One of the strengths of the STARC is the concept of utilizing the full-time expertise of assigned personnel in peacetime and upon mobilization. While exercises have identified numerous problems, one of the glaring weaknesses of the STARC is the tendency toward compartmentalization. This includes the fact that there is a tendency for staff sections to limit coordination. The transportation section, for example, will limit its coordination with the operations section, etc. In those cases where an exceptionally strong Chief of Staff directed staff activities and additional training was accomplished, these problems were minimized.

SUMMARY

The National Guard has a long history of participation in our country's national defense effort. The role of the National Guard in supporting federal missions is complicated by the responsibilities that exist to support state missions--a function that is unique to this element of our country's military forces.

The adoption of the Total Force Policy of 1973 dramatically changed the role of the RC. In evaluating the role of the National Guard state headquarters to meet increased requirements and responsibilities, it became apparent that a change in organization structure and functions was required. This resulted in the establishment of the STARC in 1981.

In establishing the organization structure for the STARC, NGB provided some flexibility in allowing each state the opportunity to address unique training, logistics and mobilization problems. The most significant change resulting from this reorganization is the establishment of a headquarters within each state which has command and control responsibilities during pre-mobilization and post-mobilization.

During the last five years, a number of programs have been established by NGB and the various CONUSA to exercise the STARC and assess their ability to accomplish their mobilization. These exercises have also provided a method to identify problems and assess the functioning and capability of the STARC to accomplish assigned missions.

These exercise programs have identified a number of important problems and issues that need to be resolved. In addition, they have provided excellent training opportunities for STARC personnel as well as units that will work with STARC's during mobilization.


NGB has done an excellent job in establishing realistic guidelines for the organization of STARC's. The funding of a meaningful exercise program has provided STARC headquarters the opportunity to assess its ability to accomplish post-mobilization missions.

It is important that increased emphasis be placed on resolving identified problems as they directly affect the readiness of our military forces. The success of our country's effort in deterrence will be influenced by an aggressor's perception of the readiness of the ARNG and how quickly and efficiently this force can be integrated into the Total Army's war fighting effort.


Mobilization plans are developed with the expectation that National Guard units are well-trained, maintain a high state of readiness and will be

deployable in a relatively short period of time. It is the mission of the STARC to ensure that the ARNG obtains this high state of readiness. Through the accomplishment of its missions and functions, the STARC is one of the key organizations to success in any future military endeavor by this nation.

PEACETIME CHAIN OF COMMAND



Enclosure 1



Source: National Guard Bureau, Mobilization and Readiness Division, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

ENDNOTES

1. National Guard Bureau, National Guard Regulation 10-2: Organization and Functions State Area Command, Army National Guard, Washington: 19 November 1982.

2. Forces Command, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System, Vol. III, Part I, pp. PE-4-1-PE-4-2, Fort McPherson, GA: 24 January 1985.

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