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STUDENT REPORT  
THE AIR FORCE INVOLVEMENT IN  
DRUG INTERDICTION - AN ANALYSIS  
MAJOR RICHARD WARD SHURTLEFF #86-2285  
*"insights into tomorrow"*

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TITLE THE AIR FORCE INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG INTERDICTION -  
AN ANALYSIS

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR RICHARD WARD SHURTLEFF, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR MAJOR JAY CLEM, ACSC/EDCJ

SPONSOR COLONEL RAY STRATTON, USAFSOS/CC

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## PREFACE

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This document is a staff analysis that can be used to acquaint anyone with the various history and problems relating to the Air Force's involvement in civilian law/drug enforcement. This document can also serve as a basic foundation for anyone tasked to put together an Air Force unit specifically dedicated to the full time support of civilian law/drug enforcement. In particular, this analysis will attempt to highlight those areas of critical concern to anyone attempting to understand the drug enforcement problem, and (through the use of this document) to help those individuals avoid many of the pitfalls encountered by Air Force commanders previously tasked to support civilian law enforcement. This text is also an attempt to document historically how the Air Force reached its current position of being a major participant in the nation's war on drugs. Further, with Congress' increased willingness to task the military (and in particular the Air Force) to support anti-drug operations, the importance of addressing the above questions becomes even more critical. Thus, this document attempts to provide insights that will enable the Air Force to better meet its anticipated additional Congressional tasking to support the war on drugs. This study will also pinpoint those fundamental deficiencies in the present drug interdiction campaign that impact the effectiveness and efficiency of Air Force units tasked to support these operations. Finally, this report will offer solutions to the most serious problems that currently confront the conduct of the nation's drug war.

Additionally, it is appropriate at this time to thank Major Jay Clem for serving as advisor for this project; Colonel Ray Stratton for sponsoring this work; and Major Tom Friers for his help and insight into the headquarter's intricacies behind the Air Force's increased involvement in civilian law enforcement.

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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Major Shurtleff spent the last three years (prior to his attending ACSC) operationally involved in the nation's war on drugs as the Executive Officer of the 20th Special Operations Squadron (20 SOS). During this period, he served as one of the principle operationally deployed commanders leading the Air Force assets assigned to Operation Bahamas and Turks (Op BAT). Op BAT involves units of the Air Force providing tactical mobility support to US and Bahamian law enforcement officials working to interdict the flow of illegal narcotics through the Bahamas and into the United States. Additionally, when Major Shurtleff was not deployed, he served as the staff support officer for the 1st Special Operations Wing (1 SOW) insuring that the necessary operational and logistical support flowed to the Air Force's Op BAT contingent.

Prior to Major Shurtleff's assignment to the 20 SOS/1 SOW, he served as the assistant Operations Officer for the United Nations Treaty Supervision Organization (UNTSO). In this position, Major Shurtleff was responsible for directing UNTSO activities throughout the Middle East. He has also served in the Pentagon and as a line helicopter pilot supporting Air Force and Department of Energy programs.

Major Shurtleff is a 1973 graduate of the Air Force Academy. In 1980, he received a Masters of Business Administration from Central Michigan University. He is also a graduate of Squadron Officer School and the ACSC correspondence program. He is married to the former Elaine [REDACTED] and they have six children.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface .....	iii
About the Author.....	iv
Executive Summary.....	vi
CHAPTER ONE -- HISTORY OF AIR FORCE INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL DRUG ENFORCEMENT	
BACKGROUND.....	1
The Political/Social Milieu.....	1
DOD's Objections.....	2
The Law - Posse Comitatus.....	3
Congress Legislates.....	4
DOD Responds.....	6
Civil Law Enforcement Requests.....	7
The Current Air Force Role.....	8
FUTURE OPTIONS.....	9
Congress.....	9
Laws and Legislation - New Directions.....	10
DOD/Air Force Options.....	11
CHAPTER TWO -- THE WAR ON DRUGS	
OPERATIONS IN SOUTH FLORIDA - AS ENVISIONED.....	13
Background.....	13
Conducting the Operation - Intelligence/Detection Phase.....	16
Conducting the Operation - Tracking Phase .....	18
Conducting the Operation - Seizure Phase.....	19
Conclusion.....	20
CHAPTER THREE -- THE WAR ON DRUGS	
OPERATIONS IN SOUTH FLORIDA - THE REALITY.....	23
Background.....	23
The Lacking Foundation - Command and Control.....	25
The Tie that Binds - Communications.....	27
A Basis for Joint Action - Intelligence.....	30
Conclusion.....	32
CHAPTER FOUR -- RECOMMENDATIONS	
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	34
Summation.....	34
Recommendations.....	34
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	37



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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**REPORT NUMBER** 86-2285

**AUTHOR(S)** MAJOR RICHARD WARD SHURTLEFF

**TITLE** THE AIR FORCE INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG INTERDICTION - AN ANALYSIS

Beginning in the early 1970s, Congress became concerned with the rising tide of drug use within the United States. As drug abuse continued to rise, fueled in part by the massive influx of illegal narcotics from abroad, Congress began seeking solutions to solve this drug problem. One solution Congress perceived as a possible aid in combating this influx of drugs was to enlist the special capabilities of the military to stem this flow of contraband. This Congressional sentiment finally reached a crisis point in December 1981, when Congress modified the Posse Comitatus Act to permit US military forces to take a more active role in what had finally become a national war on drugs. Since 1981, the level of military (and Air Force in particular) involvement in this drug war has steadily increased. In fact, Congressional sentiment for additional military/Air Force involvement in this war has not abated at all and has finally reached the point that Congress has directed the Air Force as part of the FY86 Defense Appropriations Act to form a dedicated full-time Air Force drug interdiction unit.

1. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the Air Force has indeed been given a new mission - drug interdiction - by Congress, and that the Air Force will not be able to effectively accomplish this mission unless major problem areas

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currently affecting the prosecution of anti-drug operations are addressed and resolved. In order to demonstrate that the Air Force does indeed have a drug interdiction mission, this study will first establish the historical background of military and Air Force involvement in civil law/drug enforcement. As part of its background material, this study will highlight a current drug interdiction operation in which the Air Force is already heavily involved. Additionally, this study will show how the Air Force is involved in providing various types of support to anti-drug missions by examining the operations of the South Florida Task Force (SFTF). In examining the SFTF, this study will document how the SFTF operation came into being, how the Air Force became involved, and how a typical drug interdiction operation was envisioned as operating within the context of the SFTF. Finally, this study will highlight that the current conduct of the nation's drug interdiction program is crippled by serious problem areas that must be resolved if the Air Force units tasked to conduct this mission are to be effective.

II. Problem: Although the Air Force has various units supporting civilian law/drug enforcement on both a regular and an incidental basis, no one has identified the problems that must be solved if Air Force units supporting the nation's war on drugs are to be used effectively and efficiently. Further, identifying these problems is critical (especially as Congress' desire for more Air Force involvement in this war increases); because, so far, this war has been unsuccessful despite the ever increasing use of the military.

III. Discussion: Based on this study's examination of the drug interdiction operations by the SFTF, numerous shortcomings within the current organization and SFTF's operational framework (and those of the other joint drug task forces - JDTF) are identified. Additionally, the ability of the Air Force to provide certain capabilities to help redress these operational deficiencies is also documented. In particular, the SFTF/JDTF system's major deficiencies are identified as being the elements of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I).

IV. Conclusions: As the Air Force has been mandated by Congress to become more involved in drug interdiction efforts, the SFTF/JDTF system's lack of adequate C3I capabilities makes the

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ineffective and inefficient use of the Air Force units sent to support these operations almost a 100% certainty. Therefore, the Air Force must do everything it can to remedy the C3I problems that cripple drug interdiction mission performance. By resolving these problems, the Air Force would insure that its units involved in drug interdiction would be utilized effectively and efficiently and the overall level of mission success enhanced.

V. Recommendations: The following are the recommendations derived from this staff analysis: (1) The Air Force must establish the policy that the fundamental C3I problems facing the JDTF/SFTF system be resolved before any more Air Force units are employed in a drug interdiction role. (2) The Air Force should volunteer to staff and write the operational Master Plan that outlines how a JDTF (and the SFTF) should be organized and thus eliminate the current C3I problems. (3) The Air Force should volunteer to provide the federal law enforcement establishment with the expert personnel necessary to establish and train various civilian agencies in effective joint task force operations in order to implement the JDTF Operational Master Plan. (4) The Air Force must establish a position that besides addressing the C3I problems includes clear cut policies and rules of engagement, a means of resolving conflicts between the agencies involved, and clear cut lines of operational authority that go beyond the JDTF/SFTF structure.

## Chapter One

### HISTORY OF AIR FORCE INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL DRUG ENFORCEMENT

#### BACKGROUND

##### The Political/Social Milieu

From the political, cultural, and emotional cauldron that was the 1960s, the United States still draws an evil brew of unresolved and continuously fermenting social ills. One of the major consequences of the licentiousness that marked this tumultuous period in our nation's history was (and is) the growing use and acceptance of illicit narcotics among an ever increasing portion of the US population.

This wide spread use of illegal drugs was so prevalent by the end of the Carter Administration, and the detrimental effects on the social fabric of the Nation caused by the use of these substances so noticeable, that the need to control/eliminate the traffic in illicit drugs became a major political plank in both the Carter and Reagan 1980 presidential platforms.

This call-to-action, demanding increased measures be taken to combat illicit drugs and narcotics, especially by interdicting them prior to their entry into the United States, continued to gain support within both presidential campaign organizations and throughout the country. So strong was the support for some type action to be taken in this matter that it became one of the highest priorities within the Reagan Administration's Transition Team following President Reagan's election in 1980.

In this light, President Reagan's Administration, in conjunction with both sides of the aisle in Congress, began devising ways and means by which the country could more effectively combat the influx and use of illicit drugs within the United States. In order for this "National War on Drugs" (as it came to be known) to be successful required that a vast increase in resources (both men and material) be dedicated to this all-out effort. Congress, although fully supportive of the "war" (and in many cases - especially among the Florida delegation - the driving force behind the Federal effort), began to realize the budgetary cost of such an expansive all-out national anti-drug

campaign. With this in mind, Congress began looking for ways in which the war on drugs could be waged without incurring unacceptable budgetary costs. At this same time, under the direction of the Reagan Administration, and again supported by Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD) was undergoing a massive increase in its level of funding as compared with the previous two administrations.

These two factors - the cry for a national war on drugs (at limited cost) and the increased level of defense funding - combined to bring the idea of military involvement in this war to the forefront (at least in the mind of Congress) as a means to both hold down the overall cost of the war to the American taxpayer, while at the same time vastly increasing the assets that could be dedicated to this effort (15:2). Just how critical Congress perceived it was to have the military more involved in this war is documented by the following statement taken from The Committee on the Judiciary's Report to the House of Representatives on H.R. 3519 (FY82 Defense Authorization Act):

The rising tide of drugs being smuggled into the United States by land, sea, and air presents a grave threat to all Americans. Law enforcement officials estimate that they are able to interdict only about 15 percent of the incoming illicit drugs. The menace posed to our society by this activity is substantial. Only through the dedicated work of all Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies can we begin to stem this tide. In fighting this battle, it is important to maximize the degree of cooperation between the military and civilian law enforcement (19:1785).

The Report went on to state: "This legislation [FY82 Defense Authorization Act] will provide [increased] material assistance to law enforcement" (19:1785). And, Congress should have added: "at no increased cost in our estimation".

#### DOD's Objections

However, Congress' desire to draft the military, and its vast resources, into this war on drugs ran up against a number of obstacles - not the least of which was the DOD's reluctance to become involved in the routine/daily support of civil drug enforcement. This reluctance was based on four major principles/objections. These four objections were delineated for Congress by Mr. William H. Taft IV [General Counsel, DOD, at the time Congress was holding hearings on H.R. 3519 in a letter to Congressman William R. Hughes]. General Counsel Taft stated that DOD's objections were based on the following:

1) DOD does not believe operation of DOD equipment by DOD personnel can be separated from the direct application of force in a law enforcement situation (19:1797).

2) There exists substantial potential for problems involving the civil liability of military personnel based on these DOD personnel acting within or outside the scope of their authority in situations involving direct confrontation with American citizens (19:1797).

3) DOD personnel involved in civil law enforcement would be diverted from their primary military duties which would be detrimental to the nation's security (19:1797).

4) And finally, no requirement has been put forward by law enforcement agencies stating any requirement for DOD personnel to support these agencies within the United States (19:1797).

Mr Taft ended his letter by stressing once again that should Congress disregard the above objections, it is of critical importance that "because of the likelihood of confrontation with United States citizens is greatest within the United States, the legislation should make clear that such direct participation [by the military] is authorized only on an extraterritorial basis" (19:1798).

In addition to the four objections enunciated by Mr Taft (which DOD clearly understood could be merely brushed aside should Congress direct), DOD also felt itself historically prohibited by law and precedent from engaging in civil law enforcement. By far, the more important and far reaching principle, this historic prohibition which DOD felt Congress was calling into question by asking it to become involved in the war on drugs, was that law historically encased in the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385.

#### The Law - Posse Comitatus

The concept of posse comitatus (which read literally is "power of the country") derives from the English common law whereby the sheriff could call all persons 15 years and older to assist him in preventing civil unrest (19:1786). As further defined by US law, "the Posse Comitatus Act makes it a felony except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress [to] use any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws" (19:1786). As seen by Congress and the courts, those "cases" where the military could be used were very specific and were generally restricted by statute to instances "involving civil disorders . . . , disasters . . . , and threats to Federal property . . ." (19:1789). Additionally, the military was

authorized to enforce civil law in instances involving protection of Federal and foreign officials, enforcement of US Customs and neutrality laws, and executing warrants relating to various civil rights violations (19:1789).

In any case however, DOD believed (by the very specific nature of these few exceptions and by the restrictive instances cited by these statutes) that the military was categorically prohibited from daily/routine involvement in civil law enforcement (15:2). Further, DOD perceived that the very history of the Posse Comitatus Act lent credence to the military's position. The Act arising as it did from the public's outcry and revulsion over the use of Federal troops to enforce civil law during the Reconstruction period following the US Civil War. So onerous and bitter was this experience that one of the first measures pushed through Congress after the ex-confederate states threw off Radical Republican control was the Posse Comitatus Act. This legislation effectively prohibited the reintroduction of Federal troops into the South as civil (civil rights) law enforcers for almost 100 years until the school desegregation crises of the 1950s and 60s (17:27).

### Congress Legislates

Despite DOD's objections and the strictures of the Posse Comitatus Act, Congress (as part of the FY82 Defense Authorization Act) moved to direct the military to become more involved in civil law enforcement.

In this area, Congress amended Section 905(a)(1) Part I of Subtitle A of Title 10 USC by adding a new chapter, Chapter 18, entitled: "Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials". This chapter (containing sections 371 through 378) was seen by Congress as primarily clarifying already existing military administrative practices (19:1791); and as a way to push DOD into more direct involvement (in routine civil law enforcement) by removing any ambiguities in the existing law which the military could possibly use (and had used in the past) to legally remain aloof from civil law enforcement (15:2).

This clarification by Congress on how it felt the military should be involved in civil law enforcement - especially those civil laws dealing with illegal drugs and narcotics - is made abundantly clear in section 371, "Use of information collected during military operations"; section 372, "Use of military equipment and facilities"; section 373, "Training and advising civilian law enforcement officials"; and section 374, "Assistance by Department of Defense personnel" (19:1790-1793).

Also within this new chapter, Congress effectively dealt with DOD's four major objections (raised by Mr Taft) by first

ignoring the military's concern for possible violence involving US citizens and military personnel in a routine civilian law enforcement context, and then ignoring the question of civil liability of US military personnel so involved. Secondly, Congress answered the military's contention that no requirement existed for DOD support of civilian law enforcement by establishing the requirement themselves. Thirdly, Congress answered DOD's concern about the effects of increased military participation in law enforcement on defense readiness by adding section 376, "Assistance not to effect military preparedness". In effect, this section placed the onus on the Secretary of Defense to insure military preparedness was not effected by support of civilian law enforcement; but, at the same time, to insure that all the support possible (including increased levels) would be provided by the military to the civil law/drug enforcement efforts (18:1116).

In addition to these statutes, Congress added section 377, "Reimbursement", as a caveat to DOD. In that, some forms of support to civilian law enforcement "may" require some amount of reimbursement as a prerequisite to military support. Congress also added section 378, "Nonpreemption of other law", which insured that nothing within this new legislation would detrimentally effect or limit the use of the military in civilian law enforcement roles already recognized by statute (18:1116).

Just as the military had envisioned, Congress (by the passage of this legislation) had brushed aside DOD's objections and forced the military head long into a civil law/drug enforcement role. But, what the military had not foreseen, was Congress's willingness to rewrite the Posse Comitatus Act to fully legalize this increased military participation in civil law/drug enforcement. In section 375, "Restriction on direct participation by military personnel", Congress took a marked departure from the current strictures of the Posse Comitatus Act. The [this] section authorizes the assignment of military personnel to operate and maintain equipment made available under section 372 of the Chapter [the new chapter - Chapter 18] (19:1794).

In addition to these steps, Congress made clear that they perceived the Posse Comitatus Act and the remaining prohibitions against military involvement in civil law/drug enforcement as applying only within the territory of the United States and not extraterritorially (19:1789,1795).

With the passage of this historic legislation on 1 December 1981 and incorporated in Public Law 97-86 (The Defense Authorization Act, 1982), Congress had legally cleared the way for the military to be pushed into an active role in the daily/routine enforcement of civil law, and in particular - civil drug laws.

## DOD Responds

Immediately following Congress' approval of this legislation, DOD began to plan and formulate positions and guidelines that could serve as the basis for implementing Congress' call-to-action for more military involvement in civil law enforcement. These positions and guidelines were finally formalized by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (ASD/MRA&L) and issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the form of a DOD Directive, Number 5525.5 on 22 March 1982 (13:7). This guidance established the policies and procedures that all DOD components would utilize in handling requests for assistance from federal, state, and local law enforcement officials seeking military aid in performance of their law enforcement duties (15:2).

Further, this DOD Directive established three major policies that would mark all of DOD's efforts. These policies were: first, to coordinate with civil law enforcement officials to establish long-range policies that would further DOD cooperation in the law enforcement effort; secondly, to provide civilian law enforcement agencies with information on what type and to what extent DOD could respond to their requests for military support in furtherance of their law enforcement duties (15:2); and thirdly, to "coordinate with the Department of Justice, Customs Service, and Coast Guard on matters related to the interdiction of the flow of illegal drugs into the United States" (15:3).

With the extent and method of how the military proposed to support civil law enforcement in place, DOD began the education process of informing the civil law enforcement agencies (at all levels) that the military's assets (both men and material) were now available (16:53). The primary means by which this education process was accomplished in the beginning was through the Federal Coordination Group for Drug Interdiction on which DOD had a representative by June 1982 (15:3). This group, primarily composed of Federal law enforcement agency personnel representing various organizations, sought "to identify how military assistance could best be used" (15:3).

Throughout this formulation and education phase, DOD took the position that their resources (both men and equipment) were available as directed (legalized) by Congress, and that the military stood more than ready to support civil law enforcement - however, primarily in the area of civil drug law enforcement. As Dr Korb, ASD/MRAS&L, stated: "Under the legislation passed in December 1981, DOD acts as a service provider - or a form of subcontractor - to the civilian drug law enforcement community" (12:88). And, it was in this role - as a subcontractor - that DOD began to be known throughout the various levels of civil law enforcement. A subcontractor that now could and would provide

essential, but previously unavailable, resources for utilization by all the many faces of civil law enforcement.

### Civil Law Enforcement Requests

As the DOD education program began reaching more and more agencies, increased request for support from all levels of civil law enforcement began being received by all departments and components of DOD. DOD (in total) responded with all the assets at its disposal within the law and policies as formulated by Congress. By the end of the first quarter, FY83 (1 October thru 31 December 1982), DOD had received (throughout its various levels) 126 requests from assorted civil law enforcement agencies for varied types of support; and, the military had approved support in all but 5 of these cases (9:131-153). This trend continued and even grew stronger, so that by the end of the third quarter FY83, the number of requests had climbed to 456. Of the 456 received, DOD was able to support all but 20 of these requests (15:5).

The level of support provided by DOD has continued to grow, and this support has vastly increased the effectiveness of the civil law enforcement agencies supported. So much so, that the number of requests for DOD support received shows every likelihood of continuing to grow - with the amount of resources DOD is willing to provide being the only limiting factor.

As General Tice (Director, DOD Task Force on Drug Enforcement) remarked in his testimony to Congress, DOD "is making significant contributions to the anti-drug effort" (22:1). General Tice went on to delineate how DOD support had grown to such an extent that in "1984, active duty and reserve air crews from all three military services flew nearly 3,100 air sorties totaling about 10,000 hours of flight surveillance in support of civilian law enforcement agencies. That's an average of over eight sorties a day, every day of the year"(22:2). Further, General Tice stated that it was DOD's "contention that we are already providing a great deal of assistance [to civil law enforcement] and, I might add, will continue to do so" (22:6).

General Tice then concluded his remarks by summarizing DOD's position on support to civilian law enforcement: "The bottom line in this: if the proposal for DOD support is viable, we will assist. What we ask in return is recognition of the need for Defense to balance request for assistance with readiness implications and national security imperatives"(22:6).

With these type of achievements, and DOD wide support (from the top down), the military, as a whole, was well on its way to increasing involvement in civil law enforcement - especially in the drug interdiction role.

## The Current Air Force Role

From the very beginning of DOD's involvement in civil law enforcement, the Air Force had been a principle player in providing inputs to DOD's responses to Congress prior to the 1 December 1981 legislation; and to DOD's formulation of policy guidance and procedures after passage of the historic FY82 Defense Authorization Act. Further, once DOD directed the military departments to make themselves available to support law enforcement, the Air Force became increasingly involved in providing various types of support to these agencies. In this area, one of the first steps taken by the Air Force in providing this type of assistance was to formalize within the new existing guidelines the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar aircraft support of the US Customs Service. This formalization expanded the information the AWACS radar aircraft could provide Customs and the extent to which Customs could actually take part in AWACS operations - above and beyond that originally authorized in the earlier November 1978 agreement between the Air Force and Customs (9:280).

In addition to this support, the Air Force received 36 separate requests from law enforcement agencies at various levels between 1 October and 31 December 1982 alone (9:141). These requests ranged from a plea from the Miami Police Department for 300 tear gas grenades to quell a riot in Miami (9:142); to a request from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for the transfer of two Air Force UH-1N helicopters and their crew chiefs to DEA in order to support their operations in South Florida (9:147). Of these 36 requests for this type assistance made to the Air Force in this short period, the Air Force was able to provide the needed assist immediately in 33 of these cases (9:141).

By the end of 1984, Dr Korb (ASD/MRA&L) was able to report to Congress that the Air Force was:

. . . playing a substantial role in assisting drug law enforcement efforts. In the Gulf region alone, Air Force C-130 aircraft have flown frequent over-water training missions which included collateral support of the drug enforcement community during the past few months.

B-52 aircraft on routine training flights add to the information base on suspect vessels. AWACS radar aircraft are also used quite extensively along the Southeast, Gulf, and Southwest border areas.

The Air Force has also been providing assistance to the Drug Enforcement Administration in the Bahamas. There, a twin-engine, night-capable, over-water,

helicopter unit has helped DEA and Bahamian authorities produce an impressive record of drug interdictions.

As you know, Mr Chairman, one Air Force helicopter went down in the sea at the cost of the lives of three Air Force crew members and one DEA agent. Despite this tragic loss, we remain steadfast in our conviction to support the Bahamian authorities.

In addition to providing aircraft support, the Air Force has also signed agreements with the Customs Service granting them access to all information obtained in the combined Air Force/FAA Joint Surveillance System. In addition to this nationwide system of ground-based radars, the Air Force - with the cooperation of the Navy - has tied the balloon-borne radars at Cape Canaveral and in the Florida Keys into the Customs Service command center in Miami (11:6).

And in the year since Dr Korb's testimony, the level of Air Force support has not diminished, but has increased. This increase is indicated by such things as the massive Air Force participation in the most recent major anti-drug efforts in the Caribbean - Hat Trick II (5:15). And, by the recent permanent move (effective 1 October 1985) of Air Force helicopter assets from Northern Florida to the Miami area and the creation of a new Air Force helicopter squadron (48th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron - 48 ARRS) at that location in order to more effectively support anti-drug operations in the Bahamas (6:1).

#### FUTURE OPTIONS

##### Congress

In spite of Congress' mandated massive involvement of the military (and in particular the Air Force) in civil law enforcement, the war on drugs appears no closer to being won today than it did in December 1981. Thus, despite the increased numbers of seizures, the growing level of military participation, and the increased numbers of oversight agencies and additional levels of governmental bureaucracy created, the flow of illegal narcotics continues to increase - seemingly unabated or affected by all these efforts. As Congressman Glen English noted in his opening statement to the Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations on 21 March 1984:

In the 2 years that we have been watching, [since military involvement] the supply of cocaine has surged.

Its retail price, . . . , has plummeted by 400 percent, dropping from \$60,000 to \$15,000 per kilogram. Retail prices reflect supply: falling prices are a recognized indicator of increased supply (8:3).

Additionally, in the almost 18 months since Congressman English addressed this problem, the situation has only worsened. Senator Lawton Chiles, commenting (in late 1985) on the growing seriousness of the influx of illegal drugs into the US remarked:

All of the efforts to beef up drug interdiction forces, to break up organized crime drug rings and to strengthen criminal penalties are undermined by a situation of ever-increasing drug crops in foreign countries (4:1764).

With an increasing sense of frustration concerning our nation's seemingly total inability to effectively wage this war on drugs after over four years of extensive and intensive efforts - combined with daily headlines detailing the ravages illegal drugs are havocing among our young - Congress is once again seeking radical remedies to an increasingly desperate situation.

#### Laws and Legislation - New Directions

Once again, as it did in 1981, Congress is looking to the military, and in particular the Air Force, as a possible remedy to this national drug cancer. In particular, Congress is looking to DOD/Air Force to provide increased amounts of resources (both men and material) to be dedicated to this all out effort to win the war on drugs. And once again, Congress is beginning the process of possibly changing Posse Comitatus to allow even more military involvement in civil law enforcement as part of this increased and drastic attempt to favorably affect the outcome of this war on drugs.

Just how far the sentiment in Congress has gone toward modification of Posse Comitatus, and in favor of increased military involvement in this war on drugs, can be seen in a recent vote in the House of Representatives. This vote attempted to change Posse Comitatus to allow military personnel to actively "engage in search and seizure activities outside the land area of the United States. This amendment [H.R. 2553] passed the House 364 to 54" (4:1766). However, it was defeated in the Senate.

Further, Congressional action has not stopped at merely changing Posse Comitatus. It has also taken the form of even more far-reaching legislation such as that incorporated in H.R. 1307 and S. 531. These resolutions specifically call for the "creation of an Air Force Reserve special operations squadron [wing] that, for the first time in history, will have a drug

interdiction [civil law enforcement] mission" (10:2274). Additionally, these resolutions call for the funding of a special directorate within DOD entitled the Directorate of the Department of Defense Task Force on Drug Law Enforcement (10:2274).

All of these actions clearly and accurately portray the current sentiments of Congress. Additionally, these resolutions highlight Congress' willingness to take whatever steps it deems necessary in order to bring all the resources (particularly those entrusted to DOD/Air Force) of the Nation to bear on what is clearly perceived to be a growing national crisis. A crisis which Congress absolutely feels requires it to take "bold new step[s] toward bringing the Department of Defense [Air Force] more deeply into our war against the narcotics trafficker" (10:2274). And, although these proposed resolutions may or may not become law in the manner in which they were originally proposed, they clearly and poignantly portray the current mood of Congress on the issue of DOD involvement in the war on drugs.

#### DOD/Air Force Options

With this recent history of growing Congressional demand for more military involvement in the war on drugs, the military (and the Air Force) has found it prudent to not repeat the mistakes it made prior to the 1 December 1981 legislation in trying to stay out of the civil law/drug enforcement arena. So much stronger has Congressional support and sentiment grown (to have the military/Air Force more and more deeply involved in the war on drugs) since passage of that historic December bill, that it appears now that the Air Force's (DOD's) only option is to accept that drug interdiction/civil law enforcement has become a new and increasingly important full-time Air Force mission. Thus, if civil law/drug enforcement is indeed a new Air Force mission, then the Air Force needs to take the actions necessary to insure that its resources will be utilized effectively in prosecuting this mission - not in a vain attempt to refute Congressional assignment of the mission itself. Instead, the Air Force's actions should be attempting to convince Congress to allow the Air Force to determine how best its resources can carry out this mission.

Indeed, acknowledgement of this new mission as a logical facet of low intensity conflict (which our national leadership is pledged to support) seems to be the impetus behind at least a portion of the Air Force's willingness to become more involved in the drug wars. Further, by taking this modified position, the Air Force has a much better chance to regain control of determining how this mission will be conducted and what assets will be utilized. Indeed, it seems to be these exact sentiments that are indicated in the Air Force's response to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees concerning

DOD's/Air Force's position on H.R. 1307 and S. 531, respectively. This 8 May 1985 response stated that:

The USAF on behalf of DOD, has no objection to favorable consideration of the bills [H.R. 1307 & S. 531] provided that: . . . Congress permits the designated armed force to select those platforms which might be most economically adapted to the dual peacetime [civil law enforcement] and wartime needs (23:1).

With the Air Force affirming this position (and representing DOD), the military has finally and completely taken an evolutionary (and some may say - revolutionary) step and become an organization with a clearly mandated and accepted corollary mission of civil law/drug enforcement.

This evolution/revolution has continued over the last six months, and has finally culminated in legislation incorporated in the FY86 DOD Appropriations Act which requires the Air Force to form a dedicated special drug interdiction element or elements within the next year (1:2). Not only has Congress mandated the formation of these elements, it has also mandated and funded (\$35 million) at least one of the types of these aircraft with which these elements will be equipped - the AC-130H-30 (1:2).

Thus, with this new mission clearly mandated and funded by Congress, acknowledged by the Air Force, and supported by the Administration; there remains only the question of how best to perform this recently assigned permanent Air Force mission of civil law/drug enforcement. Not only is the question how best to perform this mission, but how best to perform it with the Air Force's newly mandated drug interdiction elements working in conjunction with those civilian agencies and military units already supporting this mission (both full-time and incidentally).

However, in order to answer the above questions, this study will next highlight a current joint civil law/drug enforcement operation by focusing on the background elements and organization of the South Florida Task Force (SFTF). Through examining these aspects of the SFTF, as well as its operations in the area of drug interdiction, this study will thus lay the basis for understanding how drug interdiction operations are currently being conducted. With this level of understanding established, this study will then identify the major problems currently hampering drug interdiction and the effectiveness of the Air Force assets supporting these operations. Finally then, this study will recommend solutions to these problems that will incorporate (in their very nature) the answers to the principle questions posed in the preceding paragraph.

## Chapter Two

### THE WAR ON DRUGS

#### OPERATIONS IN SOUTH FLORIDA - AS ENVISIONED

##### Background

In using the SFTF as an example to highlight and then study the problems of joint anti-drug operations (especially those involving military assets), it is important to realize that many of the problems encountered were inherent in the very formation of the SFTF (and in the JDTF concept) itself. As such, it then becomes even more critical to gain an appreciation of how the SFTF came into being and what mission this organization was originally intended to accomplish. Thus, in order to gain these required insights, it is necessary to understand the factors which created the impetus that ultimately gave birth to the SFTF.

The factors involved in the creation of this anti-drug campaign are many and varied, but the primary factor (as previously mentioned) was that the Reagan Administration (as part of its 1980 campaign) had promised to take action against the increasing drug-financed criminal element that was moving into southern Florida in increasing numbers. This promise by the Reagan administration led to the formation in February 1982 of the SFTF (21:18). Additionally, because of the uniqueness of this organization, and the various elements involved, the SFTF was placed directly under the control of the Vice President. This organization included 19 different federal, state and local agencies, and was to be administratively headed by the Commander of Coast Guard District 7. Some of the agencies that were made part of the SFTF included the FBI, DEA, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), FAA, CIA, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and many others. Despite the numerous problems created with so many agencies contributing elements to this first prototype JDTF, this organization was initially felt to be successful. As a result of the success of the SFTF, 12 additional JDTFs were created in the nation's major cities in October 1982 (21:18).

However, despite being the prototype, a major difference existed between the SFTF and most of the other anti-drug efforts launched at this same time. Further, it was this major difference that makes understanding the SFTF experience so essential; because, it is this difference that applies uniquely to federal law enforcement's attempt to effectively utilize Air Force/military assets in the anti-drug/drug interdiction role. In particular, the major difference confronting the SFTF was that it was only the SFTF who had a primary part of its mission as drug interdiction prior to the drugs entering US territory. Thus, much of the SFTF's emphasis was placed on drug interdiction versus drug investigation and arrest. Also, as corollaries to this critical difference, it was only the SFTF whose area of operations extended outside the borders of the US and included the sovereign territory of other nations; and whose forces included large numbers of military personnel on both a temporary duty and full-time basis (21:18-22).

Because of these factors, and the increasing involvement of the military in drug enforcement, DOD and the Air Force from the very beginning of SFTF type drug interdiction operations attempted to provide detailed guidance and direction from the top down on the appropriate roles, actions, and responses the individual Air Force units should take when requested to support civil law enforcement organizations. This detailed guidance emanated (at the DOD level) from ASD/MRA&L in the form of DOD Directive 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials; and at the Air Force level from HQ USAF/XO [XOORC] in the form of AF Regulation 55-35, Operations Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. This joint guidance provided the foundation which enabled the military/Air Force to support civilian law enforcement as Congress mandated in the FY82 Defense Authorization Act.

In support of this encompassing and detailed top down guidance, the military services, and the Air Force in particular, have taken steps to make available the resources necessary to support civil law/drug enforcement operations. Indicative of this support was the recall of General Tice to active duty to head DOD's Task Force on Drug Law Enforcement beginning in January 1984 (11:4); and the military support (via dedicated manpower) of the creation of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) in June 1983 (12:92; 14:1).

In particular, NNBIS, with its primary mission of attempting to coordinate civilian requests for incidental military support of law enforcement, has been a major player in supporting the Congressionally directed growth of the military/Air Force involvement in drug interdiction/law enforcement. And, although NNBIS has been criticized for various faults and shortcomings

(8:21; 20:4; 14:1), it has effectively met its mandate to create the means for coordinating the military's enhanced support for civilian law enforcement. One key factor in NNBS's enhancement of the military's support to civilian law enforcement came about primarily because "Air Force and other uniformed services representatives are assigned to the operations information centers to provide expert operational advice on resources capable of supporting civilian law enforcement incidental to normal operations and training" (13:31). This is especially true of the Miami NNBS center and its relations with the SFTF (24:--).

However, despite the presence of NNBS, other elements unique to the SFTF area of operations complicates drug interdiction in south Florida and has caused even more military resources to be committed. These elements unique to the SFTF center around the fact that much of the drug traffic entering south Florida comes through the Bahamas. As an independent nation, the Bahamas jealously guards its sovereignty and is very reluctant to allow the SFTF to operate within its territory.

To overcome these problems, the Narcotics Attache's office within the American Embassy, Nassau, Bahamas, developed the concept of providing types of US support to the Bahamian Government that would allow Bahamian police officials to enforce their own anti-drug laws within their national territory. Beginning in October 1982, this program of providing support to the Bahamian Government (code named Operation Bahamas and Turks - Op BAT) was put into place. Op BAT originally included DEA aircrews flying both aircraft and on loan US Army UH-1H helicopters. These US supplied resources provided the Royal Bahamian Police Strike Force (RBPSF) teams the tactical mobility to interdict drug shipments within Bahamian territory. As the Bahamians had never before had this capability of rapidly extending the influence and authority of their police force throughout all the territories of this island nation, this program begin to achieve almost immediate positive results in interdicting drug shipments.

Although not officially part of the SFTF (Op BAT was part of the Bahamian Country Team under the direction of the Ambassador), Op BAT soon became recognized as a key front line element in the success of the SFTF's drug interdiction program by DEA, SFTF and NNBS (as well as Op BAT) officials (25:--).

However, by early 1983, it became clear to the DEA (both in Nassau and the SFTF, as well as in Washington D.C.) that it alone could not continue to support Op BAT. Thus, DEA, working through its parent organization (the Department of Justice) and the Vice President's staff, began seeking military support for Op BAT. Originally, the support DEA desired was merely the loan of

additional helicopters from the Services that could be used to increase the anti-drug effectiveness of the RBPSF teams (26:--). Despite this original intent, the end result was the assignment to Op BAT (beginning in May 1983) of an Air Force element consisting of two helicopters and approximately 22 crew members/support personnel to provide the tactical mobility required for this portion of the SFTF's drug interdiction mission (26:--).

Once this strengthened Op BAT was in position, the SFTF (supported by a growing NNBS staff) was in a far superior tactical position from which to prosecute its war on drugs - especially the drug-interdiction portion of its mission. These improvements were almost immediately reflected by the increased effectiveness of the SFTF as a whole (21:18).

(For the purposes of this study, the SFTF's drug interdiction campaign will be said to have become fully operational in May 1983 with the addition of the full time tactical mobility provided by the permanent Air Force presence in the Bahamas. Therefore, the examples, trends, and problems documented in this study will only reflect data and/or occurrences since May 1983 (27:--)).

To fully understand how this dramatic improvement came about, and at the same time to lay the groundwork that will enable this study to analyze the problems of the SFTF (problems that are inherent in nation's entire anti-drug effort), this study will next examine the three phases that constituted the SFTF's (and all JDTF's) drug interdiction campaign. The three phases of the drug interdiction are the Intelligence/Detection, Tracking, and Seizure phases. Thus, in order to understand the SFTF's drug interdiction mission, and the Air Force/military's role in this overall campaign, this study will first examine how the Intelligence/Detection phase of this operation was designed to be conducted.

#### Conducting the Operation - Intelligence/Detection Phase

From the very beginning, the Intelligence/Detection phase was seen as the critical foundation on which the overall success of the drug interdiction campaign in southern Florida would rest. For, without good intelligence and detection, there would in fact be no suspects to track or seize; and, therefore, no drug interdiction campaign. Thus, the need and requirement for good intelligence and detection drove, and continues to drive, many of the decisions the SFTF makes.

Further, this need for good intelligence and a sound detection capability is what has been the basis for much of the

SFTF's requests for military support. For example, the SFTF's requests for routine detection support are daily answered by the Air Force's "Seek Skyhook" radars at Cudjoe Key and Cape Canaveral, Florida. Additionally, the SFTF's intelligence/detection requirements are also being met by Navy P-3s and E-2C which provide low-level and long-range platforms to detect both aircraft and boat targets for investigation of possible drug trafficking. Other intelligence/detection support is provided to the SFTF by Air Force elements in the form of B-52 maritime patrol missions and E-3A sorties coordinating various intelligence/detection efforts. In addition, the assets of NORAD are sometimes called upon to provide needed intelligence/detection information available as a result of the capabilities of its air defense systems (21:20-22).

In addition to intelligence/detection capabilities provided by these militarily supplied platforms and fixed radars are the intelligence/detection assets (with their respective capabilities) of the various members of the SFTF. These include the intelligence/detection capabilities of the FAA's radars, towers, and Flight Service Station (FSS); and the US Customs Service's radars along the Florida coast, at Andros Island in the Bahamas, and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In addition to the above assets, further intelligence/detection capability is provided by the non-radar equipped Air Force helicopters and DEA aircraft flying out of the Bahamas on routine visual patrols. Also, similar type visual intelligence/detection is provided by DEA aircraft flying routine anti-drug patrols out of locations in Panama, other parts of Central American, and South America.

In the end however, it is the total of all these assets which combine to provide the key element of intelligence /detection which ultimately allows the SFTF to implement its drug interdiction campaign. But, it is not only the above described capabilities on which the SFTF can draw to meet its intelligence/detection needs. In fact, the SFTF has the ability to draw on the more directly related intelligence assets of its member agencies. These more intelligence related assets include such intelligence/detection sources as undercover agents, informants, concerned citizens, and detailed drug related data bases that belong to such SFTF members as the FBI, DEA, ATF and local law enforcement agencies. Additionally, the military provides such generic intelligence as weather forecasts and equipment capabilities.

With this wealth of intelligence/detection information from such a variety of sources, the storage and dissemination of the information becomes extremely critical. Thus, it was to meet this critical storage and dissemination need that the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was created. EPIC's purpose is to

provide and integrate "all drug information available from all agencies involved in preventing illicit drug traffic and (to) share this knowledge with all Federal and State Authorities" (21:17). And, in fact, most of the Federal law enforcement agencies supply information to EPIC (21:17).

Thus, with the detection and intelligence capabilities described above, the SFTF is able to lay a solid operational foundation on which it can base its drug interdiction campaign. Additionally, with this foundation in place, the next phase - tracking - of the SFTF's interdiction campaign was able to come on line and further the overall progress of this portion of the nation's war on drugs.

### Conducting the Operation - Tracking Phase

As the second major phase of all drug interdiction campaigns (including that being conducted by the SFTF), the tracking phase has (as one of its major characteristics) the ability to utilize many of the same resources chronicled in the previous phase to bring about the successful culmination of this phase of the campaign - i.e. the tracking of the drug traffickers. However, the successful accomplishment of this phase does not rest entirely on the capabilities previously described. The SFTF also has available the services of Marine Corps OV-10s and their crews which operate out of Homestead AFB, as well as Customs, DEA, and Coast Guard aircraft and helicopters from various bases, which can be used to track potential traffickers.

What normally occurs is that the trafficker is initially detected by radar or E-3A, etc. Then, a Marine Corps OV-10, or other tracking aircraft, is alerted and vectored to intercept the trafficker. Once this intercept has occurred, the tracker stays with his target (usually at the target's six o'clock), while at the same time being monitored by whatever asset initially detected the suspect target. This process then continues until the target lands in the US (or some foreign territory) and the third phase of the interdiction campaign can be implemented.

The key point in this tracking phase however, is that the target must be at some point handed over to a tracking platform that has similar aerodynamic capabilities as the target aircraft itself. In other words, the E-3A must hand off the suspect target to an interceptor/tracker such as the OV-10 or Customs Twin-Cessna so that this tracker can then follow the suspect into its landing field. It does no good for the E-3A to detect the target and then track it all the way from the point of detection to the point of landing, unless the E-3A can vector a visual tracker to a successful visual intercept of target. The reason

that merely detecting the target, and then following it with the radars of the detector, is not an effective tactic is that unless there is a visual tracker that can land right behind the suspect, the suspect will be lost in the ground clutter. Additionally, the detecting platforms are so valuable in their detection role and so scarce, it would be an extreme misuse of assets to have these (let alone impractical because of the size of these aircraft versus the size of most suspect aircraft) to have these detectors try to follow the suspect aircraft to their point of landing. Further, if in fact any contraband exists, it will be disposed of prior to the arrival of any local law enforcement officials notified via phone or radio.

However, if a tracking asset makes the successful visual intercept required, it can then follow the suspect to its point of landing and land right behind the suspect. Additionally, if for some reason the tracker can not land, it can still vector other law enforcement assets in helicopters or on the ground to be in a position so that the next and final portion of the drug interception campaign - the seizure phase - can take place

#### Conducting the Operation - Seizure Phase

Given the basic operational foundation described in the previous paragraphs, the seizure phase of any drug interdiction operation is in fact one of the easiest to accomplish in theory. For example, if the intelligence/detection and tracking phases have been accomplished as originally envisioned, then all the assets tasked with accomplishing the seizure phase have to do is to follow the suspect aircraft into its landing area and effect the search and seizure of any contraband found based on the legal strictures of the particular case. In fact, it was just as described above that the seizure phase of the SFTF's drug interdiction operation was designed to work.

Thus, with the above described design in mind, the SFTF put into effect the seizure phase of its own drug interdiction program utilizing the assets of its various contributing agencies. These assets include both Federal and local agencies providing arresting officers, and (in some cases) the military providing transport for these officers. In particular, the SFTF, through its various capabilities, notifies the concerned local and/or Federal agencies of the target aircraft's (or boat's) apparent destination and any description or markings of the particular suspect gained from the visual intercept and tracking aircraft. Then, the SFTF requests these agencies to be in position to aid the tracking aircraft effect the seizure once the aircraft/boat lands/comes into port. In the end however, it is up to the agents on the tracking aircraft in many cases to effect

the seizure. This condition results because the suspect many times lands in a remote area or in an area far away from any law enforcement agency (Federal or state). In the end however, once the suspect has landed, been searched, and any contraband seized, the entire drug interdiction mission is completed with the termination of the seizure phase of the operation.

Thus, by implementing the seizure phase, along with the intelligence/detection and tracking phases, the SFTF's drug interdiction campaign is operative. However, the success of this (or any) drug interdiction campaign rests on the integration of all the contributing assets that go into making up the various phases and elements of the particular drug task force and its mission. In particular, only when a solid foundation exists based on the successful implementation of all three phases of the drug interdiction operation and the effective utilization of all the assets assigned to the mission; each phase's success building upon the success of the previous phase made possible by the effective and efficient use of all available resources; can the overall drug interdiction campaign become successful.

### Conclusion

In the case of the SFTF's drug interdiction campaign, as contrasted against the description of success provided in the previous paragraph, the overall operation can only be said to have achieved limited success. The reasons that the SFTF's drug interdiction operation achieved only limited success are many and varied and will be addressed in a following chapter. But, the fact exists that the SFTF has achieved some limited success in interdicting drugs. Thus, in order to understand how the SFTF achieved the success it did, and at the same time to lay the groundwork for understanding why this success has only been partial, this study will look at one particular example of a successful SFTF drug interdiction operation.

The particular example of a successful joint drug interdiction operation that this study will address took place on 2 June 1983. On that date, US Customs radar at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba picked up a radar target approaching the Windward Passage. This particular target fit the profile Customs had developed to identify potential drug traffickers. Since this particular target met the profile, Customs began the tracking phase of this drug interdiction operation by launching one of their aircraft from Guantanamo Bay to make a visual identification. This visual identification was accomplished via the Customs radar at Guantanamo Bay vectoring the aircraft to a successful intercept. Once this intercept was accomplished, the Customs aircraft pulled up behind the suspect aircraft, copied its numbers, and made a

close visual inspection of the aircraft (completely unobserved by the pilots of the suspect plane). Once again, the visual inspection of this particular target fit the profile previously developed to visually isolate potential traffickers.

With both the radar and visual profile confirmed, Customs then began tracking the suspect aircraft through the Windward passage and into Bahamian airspace. At this same time, the numbers and identification of the suspect aircraft were feed into the EPIC information system which reported back that this particular aircraft (a red/white Aztec - #N48168P) had been suspected of being used as a contraband transporter on previous occasions. With this information in hand, Customs notified Op BAT that a suspect aircraft was entering its area of operations and requested support in apprehending this suspect. By this time, the suspect had entered the central Bahamas and a DEA aircraft and Air Force helicopter (with a RBPSF team on board) were launched to follow the suspect. The Aztec flew toward the Bahamian island group nearest the US - the Biminis - with a Customs aircraft still tracking the suspect. (The original Customs tracker from Guantanamo being replaced by a Customs aircraft out of Homestead AFB, Florida.) Behind the Customs tracker came the DEA aircraft, and farther back the Air Force helicopter with the Bahamian police on board.

It was during this portion of the tracking phase that this train of aircraft following the Aztec was observed by boats that were in place to receive the contraband. This observation by these boats resulted in the Aztec beginning to make evasive flight maneuvers in an attempt to run the aircraft/helicopter following it out of fuel. These maneuvers did no good, and (as the boats the Aztec was supposed to rendezvous with had turned tail and headed for Florida) therefore the pilots of the Aztec began throwing the bales of marijuana they were carrying into the ocean. However, they were unable to get rid of all the contraband before they ran out of gas and had to ditch their aircraft approximately 2 miles south of the main island of Bimini. From this point on, the seizure phase of this particular drug interdiction operation began to take place.

Since the Aztec had ditched at sea, the Air Force put the RBPSF team they were carrying ashore on Bimini. From there, the RBPSF team commandeered a local boat, proceeded out to the Aztec, and arrested the two pilots who by this time were afloat in their survival dingy. With the arrest, this particular drug interdiction operation was successfully completed (28:--).

In the end, this mission was successful because each of the three phases of the operation were successful in and of themselves. Thus, the cumulative success of each phase resulted

in the overall mission being successful. Not only was this mission successful, but the important fact is that it was successful because it involved US Customs, DEA, Air Force and a RBPSF team working together in cooperation. Further, this mission was successful because it also followed the classic drug interdiction pattern as described in the pages of this chapter - That is, this mission involved the joint conduct of the intelligence/detection, tracking and seizure phases inherent in any successful drug interdiction operation. Thus, this mission was (in and of itself) successful because each of the elements/assets involved were used effectively and efficiently; and each of the respective elements cooperated and provided the capabilities necessary to create success in each of the three critical phases.

With this fundamental understanding of how drug interdiction operations should be conducted, as well as the example of a successful operation documented, this study will next address those problems that currently cripple the effectiveness of the majority of the nation's anti-drug missions.

## Chapter Three

### THE WAR ON DRUGS

#### OPERATIONS IN SOUTH FLORIDA - THE REALITY

##### Background

In pointing out the SFTF's lack of success in conducting its drug interdiction campaign, this study is not meant to serve as a vehicle to impugn the integrity or dedication of any of the numerous individuals and organizations that have participated in this effort. Instead, this study's purpose is to point out those areas of the SFTF's (and nation's) drug interdiction campaign that dramatically need improvement in order to better utilize the Air Force/DOD assets dedicated to support this mission. At the same time, this study will highlight those areas in which the Air Force in particular can provide the expertise and assets needed to bring about the required improvements in the nation's anti-drug operations.

Thus, by identifying the various problems currently facing drug interdiction operations (as exemplified by the SFTF), as well as some of the Air Force assets and expertise available to remedy these problems, the Air Force assets currently committed to support anti-drug operations can be better and more effectively used. Ultimately, by correcting these areas of needed improvement, the Air Force will be better able to meet its continued direction from Congress to further support drug interdiction. At the same time, the Air Force would be limiting the detrimental effect supporting this mission may have on combat readiness by more effectively utilizing the assets already committed to these operations in lieu of increasing the amount of Air Force support assigned.

In the end, identifying and correcting these areas will insure that Air Force tasked assets will be used effectively and efficiently to stop this influx of drugs. Not only will these drugs be stopped from entering the SFTF's theater of operations, but by more effectively utilizing the assets available, this contraband would be stopped from entering all those joint anti-drug operational theaters that protect the nation's borders.

Finally, and most importantly, the assets available (both military and civilian) to conduct these operations must be used effectively and efficiently if there is to be any chance of winning this war on drugs.

To lay a foundation to bring about this effective use of these Air Force assets, the previous chapters have discussed the increasing involvement of the Air Force in the war on drugs during the 1980s. Also, these chapters have highlighted the fact that it now appears that even larger amounts of Air Force/DOD resources will be committed by Congress to this struggle. Thus, the Air Force must insure its resources involved in civil law/drug enforcement are used effectively; if not, the entire Air Force's well-being suffers. Therefore, it is with the Air Force's effectiveness and structural health in mind that this chapter will examine how and why Air Force/DOD assets involved in the war on drugs are not being used effectively.

In Chapter 2, this study highlighted how the SFTF came into being, its overall organization, some of the key players, how the SFTF intended to interdict drugs, and how the SFTF can accomplish this interdiction mission under optimum conditions. What the previous chapters did not detail however, is that despite the massive resources committed (including Air Force/DOD assets) to this drug interdiction campaign, this portion of the SFTF's war on drugs is neither effectively organized to use these assets, nor is the SFTF generally successful in conducting drug interdiction operations. In fact, the example of the joint drug interdiction operation of 2 June 1983 (described at the end of Chapter 2) was a success based on individual cooperation, not on sound organization. Thus, successful operations such as the one on 2 June 1983 have been the exception, and not the rule, in the SFTF's drug interdiction campaign (29:--). And finally, the most compelling indication of just how ineffective the overall national drug interdiction campaign has been can be seen in the fact that the price of cocaine on the street has fallen by nearly 50%; while at the same time the purity of cocaine available has increased dramatically (2:62).

In the end then, the 2 June 1983 mission was successful only because each of the elements involved chose to cooperate. Had these elements not cooperated, as is often the case, this mission would have probably failed. And, if the other agencies involved had not had a high priority for seeing this mission through to completion, the use of the Air Force's dedicated assets would have been ineffective. The key point is that to be successful, the agencies involved can not merely depend on the "cooperation" of the other agencies engaged in these joint operations - they must be assured of it. To get this assurance, someone must be placed in charge with the authority to set priorities and direct

the action - there must be a single command and control structure established for these drug interdiction operations.

#### The Lacking Foundation - Command and Control

With this background in mind, the first and most important area of needed improvement that this study will address is in the area of overall command and control (C2) of the entire drug interdiction campaign. In fact, the problem is that there is no overall C2 of the drug interdiction mission, and this lack of centralized C2 underlies the whole lack of success drug interdiction operations have experienced within the SFTF area of responsibility (30:--), as well as that of the Nation as a whole (8:109; 11:1,21).

As Commander G. Thomas Morgan (USCG) pointed out in his, The Search for a Successful Maritime Drug Interdiction Strategy: "Failure in the past to control [drug] smuggling has been due to poor, unproductive performance by in-place agencies created by a lack of positive cooperation, sound strategy and above all firm guidance and leadership" (21:26). Further, the nation's General Accounting Office (GAO) reiterates this same point concerning the lack of overall C2 for the nation's anti-drug efforts in several documents compiled for Congress concerning various anti-drug operations (14:2). In fact, the GAO even entitled one of their documents addressing this lack of C2, or what the GAO calls "coordination" and "oversight" (14:2), with the following - Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Strong Central Oversight, (GAO/GGD-83-52, June 13, 1983) (14:2).

In fact, examples of this basic lack of overall C2, and its resulting negative impact on drug interdiction operations occurred time and time again during the normal course of the SFTF's attempts to operate joint anti-drug operations (30:--). In particular, during the course of day-to-day operations between May 1983 and June 1985, there was never anyone given C2 who had the overall authority to organize all the related elements involved in the drug interdiction campaign that covered the entire theater (30:--).

Thus, on numerous occasions DEA and Air Force assets in the Bahamas would not be operational due to various reasons. Yet, Customs (due to this lack of overall C2) was unaware of this and would be expending resources (including attached Air Force assets such as the E-3A) attempting to interdict drug traffickers operating in Bahamian territory. The result being, that without DEA and Air Force Op BAT assets to transport the Bahamians, and despite Customs best efforts, no contraband was interdicted. Thus, the overall operation was not effective (30:--). This lack

of success was directly relatable to the fact that there was never an individual or element placed in a position of real C2 authority (i.e. - the power to hire and fire), and thus no "coordination" or "oversight" could take place. In the end then, this day-to-day lack of SFTF C2 resulted in what David S. Harvey described as the various "bureaucratic agencies" involved in this drug interdiction operation being "uncoordinated, and therefore unable to focus on the problem" (3:19) - stopping the influx of drugs.

This lack of focus is a direct result of no C2 element being given the authority to direct the drug interdiction operation, and has resulted in inter-agency squabbles, battles of jurisdiction, and an unwillingness to support other agencies for fear that the agency aided would gain ground in the battle for budget dollars over the aiding agency as a result of the success of a particular operation (3:16,21; 31:--). For example, it took almost two years to get permission to carry Bahamian police officers into the US on board USAF helicopters. These helicopters were involved in hot pursuit of suspects operating in Bahamian waters near Miami. And, because no C2 element existed which could make the required decision (in the face of various agencies placing their own interests above increasing the effectiveness of the SFTF's drug interdiction mission, it took two years to finally achieve consensus among the various agencies involved (32:--).

Thus, this ineffective use of USAF resources occurred because there was, and still is not, an effective and empowered C2 element in being that can take control and direct the various agencies involved in joint drug interdiction operations. Most importantly however, is the fact that this area of needed improvement exists not only within the SFTF, but throughout the entire nation's anti-drug operations. Thus, the major area of weakness that ultimately cripples the effectiveness of the SFTF, and all the other joint anti-drug operations, is that the command and control functions of these organizations merely exist on paper (15:6). In fact, the designated heads of these joint anti-drug operations have no ability to enforce the command decisions that are required to be made in order to effectively control joint theater anti-drug operations (15:6).

With this lack of an effective and empowered C2 element recognized, the next logical step to remedy this shortfall would be to create such a C2 element. And, it is in the process of creating such a C2 element that the Air Force could play such an effective part. In particular, it is in the area of organizing a C2 element and staff that the Air Force with its expertise in joint operations would be invaluable in laying the foundational structure that would enable this C2 function to be effective.

For example, the Air Force could be tasked to provide staff members with experience in joint military operations, and demonstrated skills in organizing such matters, to the designated C2 authority for a particular JDTF. These Air Force members would then serve as organizational/technical advisors to the JDTF commander during the JDTF staff formation process, the assignment of particular areas of responsibility, and the all important delegation of authority to the various layers of command.

This use of Air Force personnel as advisors in this role would accelerate the learning process and avoid many of the pitfalls inherent in the first time activation of any joint activity. By so doing, the very necessary C2 element required for effective anti-drug operations would be created and made operational in a much shorter time and without many of the usual first mistakes and disasters of an inexperienced joint staff. But, the most important accomplishment of these Air Force advisors would be to help remedy the most critical shortcoming of the nation's anti-drug campaigns - the lack of real leadership in the form of JDTF C2 elements with real authority to command and control.

In the end, this lack of effective and empowered C2 is such a glaring and basic foundational weakness in the structure of the SFTF (and the rest of the nation's drug interdiction efforts) that it is the fundamental cause of all the other weaknesses and areas of needed improvement that currently exist within the nation's drug interdiction operations (13:2). As Ted Galen Carpenter (of the Cato Institute) pointed out in a recent Time article: "Despite the rhetorical bravado and a few highly publicized successes, the U.S. [drug interdiction] effort has been a bitter disappointment" (2:62). It is with this in mind then, that this study will address the two other principle areas of needed improvement that must be remedied in order to increase the effective utilization of Air Force assets dedicated to this mission and overcome this "bitter disappointment". To accomplish this understanding, this study will next address the need to improve the element that once you have an operational C2 system in place will allow that system to be effective - communications.

#### The Tie that Binds - Communications

As shown in the previous paragraphs, the principle drug interdiction element needing improvement is C2. This lack of C2 affects all three phases of the drug interdiction mission addressed in Chapter 2, and ultimately results in the overall ineffectiveness of the entire operation. A corollary to this lack of effective C2 (that is almost as crippling to the effectiveness of the drug interdiction mission) is the lack of adequate

communications with which to even coordinate (let alone direct or control) the various elements participating in these joint operations. This lack of adequate communications also directly impacts and degrades the effectiveness of all three phases of the drug interdiction mission and must be improved if the Air Force assets being dedicated to this cause are to be utilized efficiently.

In particular, during the course of normal operations in support of the SFTF, one of the problems that continually hindered the success of anti-drug missions (and the effectiveness of the military units involved) was the total lack of adequate communications planning and organization between the various agencies of the SFTF. With all of the various organizations involved in at least one of the three phases of a particular drug interdiction operation, there existed no central radio system or network on which all the agencies were required to communicate during the course of a given operation. On numerous occasions when drug interdiction missions involved such agencies as the Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, and the Air Force, none of participating agencies were operating on a common frequency range. For example, DEA operated primarily on VHF; the Air Force on UHF and HF; Customs on UHF; the Coast Guard on marine VHF; and the ground teams usually had little or no communications capability whatsoever. Thus, during the course of a normal operation, the assets involved could not communicate, even though they were usually within a mile of each other and following one another (33:--).

Additionally, even though most the aircraft were equipped and operated HF radios, these radios' characteristics were such that they did not allow aircraft or vessels within a short distance of one another to communicate on these systems. To overcome all these numerous communications shortcomings, operational instructions had to be relayed through a makeshift system involving commercial telephone lines and radio patches. This network required switching from system to system in order to have any chance of getting the needed information to the particular aircraft involved in a given operation. These communications inadequacies greatly hampered the effectiveness of the entire drug interdiction effort in the SFTF theater and resulted in the inefficient utilization of manpower and resources. For example, because of the communications problems described above, Customs aircraft (on numerous occasions) interdicted DEA aircraft involved in anti-drug operations. Because there was no means or communication plan in place which required all the agencies involved in the SFTF to operate, monitor, and maintain compatible communications systems, these agencies had no way of determining what the other was doing while airborne. In fact, the intercept and track could only be called

off after the local Customs headquarters had called Op BAT or the local DEA office on the phone and had established the identity of the aircraft involved. Then, the respective organizations would call their aircraft (on their different operational radios) and tell them to break off the action (34:--).

However, this lack of compatible communications equipment and system planning is only the first in a litany of communications short falls that have hampered the effectiveness and efficiency of drug interdiction efforts within the SFTF, and the rest of the JDTFs. For example, even when the radio systems of the various agencies are compatible, there exists no secure voice capability, which coupled with a total lack of radio discipline or security consciousness among the majority of agencies participating, has already compromised all the primary radio frequencies utilized by the organizations involved in SFTF anti-drug operations (35:--). For example, on four different occasions, Op BAT forces captured drug traffickers who had all their radios tuned to the primary drug interdiction frequencies being utilized at that time. Additionally, on two different occasions, drug traffickers were captured with documents that listed the applicable frequencies for all radio systems being utilized by the various members of the SFTF (35:--).

This lack of secure voice, or as a minimum some type of radio discipline and sense of operational security (OPSEC) when utilizing open radios, has resulted in inefficient and ineffective use of the military assets assigned to the SFTF. Similarly, if these communications deficiencies are not remedied, they would generate the same lack of success for any Air Force units assigned to a JDTF under similar circumstances.

In addition to the two major communications problems already addressed, a third primary communication shortfall exists which also leads to the ineffective and inefficient use of the Air Force assets assigned to support the SFTF and other JDTFs. This third element of required communications improvement is primarily in the area of data link/voice communications capability that can be provided by satellite communications (SATCOM). The communication capability provided by SATCOM (especially in the data mode) is essential to increasing the overall effectiveness of anti-drug operations. Further, SATCOM can provide the capability to truly enhance command and control, especially at the operational level. For example, during the eight months that a data link SATCOM was available to Op BAT, it greatly enhanced this operations ability to monitor the flow of aircraft and vessel traffic through the Bahamas because the SATCOM provided a direct link into the computer data base at EPIC. Once this system was removed, Op BAT's ability to update and monitor this traffic flow was lost, and with it the ability to establish

trends and possible drug trafficking methods of operation (36:--).

With the various communications inadequacies within the nation's drug interdiction program identified, especially those that hinder the effectiveness and efficiency of SFTF operations, the importance of rectifying these problem areas becomes apparent. It is in this area of rectifying these communications short falls that the military's expertise could be useful in solving these problems. Once again, as in the case of C2, the Air Force could be tasked to provide advisors to establish an effective communications blueprint that would solve the problems of this nature that have been identified in the previous pages. This use of Air Force advisors could begin almost immediately and take the form initially of nothing more than in-depth training programs for all the various task force agencies on the importance of radio discipline and OPSEC. Additionally, the Air Force Communications Command could be tasked to study the communications needs and requirements of the JDTFs (including data/voice SATCOM), and to come up with a plan these task forces could adopt to provide the communications capabilities needed to effectively employ and utilize the assets (including Air Force resources) already committed to the nation's war on drugs.

In the end, the improvement of the SFTF's communications capabilities will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of all the various units involved. Equally as important as the above, this improved communications capability will provide the base on which a solid C2 system can be built. Finally, and most importantly, a solid command, control, and communications (C3) system will provide the necessary basis for attacking and solving that final area of drug interdiction operations that requires immediate improvement - operational and tactical intelligence.

#### A Basis for Joint Action - Intelligence

As previously addressed, no operation, especially ones as involved and demanding as drug interdiction operations, can hope to be effective, efficient, and ultimately successful unless they are built upon a solid C3 foundation. But, there is a fourth element to the above equation that is equally as important, and must be included, if the goal of the mission is operational success. This fourth element is intelligence - its collection, analyzation, and application. Thus, the success of the SFTF's drug interdiction mission (and the success of all JDTFs) rests on a four pillared foundation of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I). And, as in the case of C3, there is a dearth of effective use of intelligence within the SFTF and the rest of the JDTFs.

As Congressman English stated to the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations: "the largest single stumbling block, the critical problem which absolutely must be overcome, is the almost total lack of accurate, tactical intelligence upon which to base the use of our few [drug interdiction] resources" (8:3).

There are many reasons for this lack of intelligence capability. But, one of the most readily apparent goes back to the fact that there is not anyone in command of drug interdiction efforts at the SFTF and JDTF level. This results in the various agencies involved not sharing their intelligence information with other agencies for fear of compromising their operatives or losing the credit for a big "drug bust" because of shared intelligence with a rival agency. This fact was clearly pointed out by David S. Harvey in his article in Defense and Foreign Affairs on SFTF operations. As Mr Harvey stated: "nobody particularly wants to talk to another agency about [drug interdiction] operations in progress" (3:21).

This type of lack of intelligence sharing occurred on several occasions during Op BAT/SFTF operations. In several cases, Op BAT forces were never notified that a large shipment of drugs was in the Bahamas until after the agency with the intelligence on this shipment had determined that it had no way to seize the contraband because this particular load was not going to go directly into the US. This lack of intelligence sharing occurred despite the fact that this shipment had earlier landed at various airports in the Bahamas at which Op BAT forces could have intercepted the load. In the end, this particular shipment was never intercepted due to this lack of intelligence sharing (37:--).

Another important element contributing to the lack of an effective intelligence capability for the SFTF in particular (and the JDTFs in general) is that even when the intelligence is shared, there exists no central framework for analyzing the intelligence that is available and then rendering some kind of value as to its worth to be acted upon (8:109; 11:21; 14:7). For example, on numerous occasions Op BAT would be provided intelligence on some activity supposedly going on in its operational area; yet, all that was provided by NNBS, or EPIC, or Customs was the raw intelligence. There existed no capability within the SFTF to take this intelligence and provide any kind of analysis as to its value. In fact, there was never any attempt made to analyze the intelligence or even to correlate this bit of intelligence data with other intelligence available. The end result was that it was left up to each of the particular agencies to try to make sense out of the small portion of intelligence it had available, if any analyzation of the intelligence was

attempted at all. For example, in two different specific cases, if Op BAT had acted upon the raw intelligence provided by the SFTF, it would have resulted in Op BAT assets being sent deep inside the Cuban Air Defense Zone (38:--). This is a coarse example, but one that clearly demonstrates the need for an element at the SFTF (JDTF) level to collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate intelligence at the tactical level.

Without an intelligence analyzation element of this kind, the nation's drug interdiction efforts, especially as reflected at the tactical level as in the case of the SFTF, will continue to be ineffective and inefficient. Therefore, the critical fourth pillar of the anti-drug foundation that must be put in place immediately is that of intelligence analyzation and dissemination. And once again, this an area where the Air Force can provide expertise and advisors that would allow the formation and implementation of an effective tactical intelligence element at the SFTF (JDTF) level. These Air Force intelligence operatives could quickly establish the organization and data links necessary to effectively utilize the assets of the national intelligence community including the data base at EPIC. With this organization in place and functioning, it could then begin formulating the tactical intelligence packets that would contain the pieced together information about the time and place of specific drug shipments necessary to make the overall drug interdiction mission at the operational level more effective.

With the creation of an effective intelligence section, all four elements of the critically needed C3I system would be in place. The result of having this operational C3I system in place would be immediately manifest in the increased effectiveness and efficiency of the various units assigned. More importantly however, the military (and in particular the Air Force) assets currently assigned and/or tasked would be better utilized, thus decreasing the overall number of units necessary to accomplish the mission.

### Conclusion

As stated in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, this study has identified the major areas that must be addressed and corrected in order for the nation's war on drugs to become effective enough to make a difference - and thus, ultimately, for the Nation to have a chance to win this war. The four major elements identified which demand immediate correction are the areas of command, control, communications, and intelligence - C3I. These critical elements are truly missing from the SFTF and JDTF levels and must be fully established and put in place. For, as the General Accounting Office pointed out: Federal drug

interdiction efforts "still fall far short of what is needed to substantially reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States" (14:6); and "our work in the drug enforcement area over the years has shown that a lack of coordination [C3I] among federal agencies has persistently hindered federal drug interdiction efforts" (8:109). Thus, to enhance the effectiveness of the assets employed (both military and civilian) assigned to the war on drugs, a basic C3I foundation must be established; and further, a sense of "coordination" between the various agencies involved must be created and made to operate.

## Chapter Four

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Summation

As pointed out in the beginning chapter of this study, the Air Force has become more and more involved (willingly or not) at the behest of Congress in the nation's war on drugs. This trend is going to continue as indicated by Congress' willingness to direct the formation of a full-time Air Force drug interdiction unit (1:2; 7:9279). Thus, with these facts in mind, the Air Force is faced with a number of options - all of which (no matter the course chosen) will not affect the central point that the Air Force is now in the drug interdiction business. Therefore, what this study recommends is that the Air Force approach this newly assigned full-time drug interdiction mission from the basis that those critical problem areas of command, control, communications, and intelligence must be addressed and corrected if the allocation of Air Force assets to this struggle is to be justified by the results attained.

#### Recommendations

The Air Force has been steadily tasked to provide increased support to the nation's war on drugs. As this increased level of support is clearly the mandate of Congress, the Air Force has recognized its responsibility to support these efforts. However, the Air Force also must insure that the assets it releases to support these anti-drug operations are utilized efficiently. And, as clearly shown in the preceding chapter, there does not now exist a sound operational framework that can utilize the assigned Air Force elements effectively. Therefore, to insure that the Air Force units tasked to support anti-drug efforts are utilized fully and effectively, the Air Force should recommend that a JDTF Tactical Drug Interdiction Master Plan be formulated. This Master Plan should address and answer the critical issues of command, control, communications, and intelligence as specifically addressed in Chapter 3 of this study.

Further, the Air Force should volunteer to take the lead in helping to staff and formulate such a Master Plan. The Air Force

should take this step because of its expertise and familiarity with joint operational plans that specifically address C3I issues. Also, the Air Force is a known neutral party in the federal "turf battles" between the various law enforcement agencies involved in drug interdiction operations. Thus, as a neutral party, with no "drug interdiction turf" to protect, the Air Force can outline what is the most operationally sound means in which to conduct these anti-drug operations.

Specifically, the Air Force must make it clear that the issues of C3I must be addressed and solved, if the Air Force is going to continue to be tasked to support these operations. For, unless these C3I issues are resolved, the Air Force assets involved will not be utilized effectively and efficiently. Thus, these Air Force assets' absence from the combat readiness side of the national equation will not reflect an equal enhancement on the social fabric side of that same equation. Further (as part of this recommendation), the Air Force should make it clear that it is willing to provide the personnel (with the necessary expertise) to establish the C3I systems (as outlined in Chapter 3).

Additionally, the Air Force should take the position that although it possesses excellent detection, surveillance, and tracking platforms, as well as many other assets that could aid the drug interdiction mission, none of these assets will be available to aid in this effort unless steps are taken to remedy the current causes of ineffective utilization. Also, the Air Force must make it clear that it makes no sense (from a national security perspective) to waste Air Force assets supporting an operation in which there exists no C3I system to effectively utilize these assets. Further, that until these serious operational shortcomings (that have been identified by numerous reports of various government agencies) are resolved, the Air Force can not in good faith provide all the assets available to aid in these drug interdiction operations.

In the end, whether the Air Force leads or whether some other group writes it, the Air Force must make clear that before any more Air Force assets are committed to anti-drug missions a Master Plan for JDTF operations must be formulated. This Master Plan must address the issues of real operational command and control, communications needs, and intelligence requirements. It must also lay out the need for clear cut policies, a means of resolving conflicts between agencies, and clear cut lines of operational authority that cover the entire JDTF structure. For example, a JDTF could be formed on a basis similar to that of a military joint task force, with operational command flowing out of an all powerful JDTF commander through such organizations as

an air component commander, maritime component commander, and ground component commander.

Finally, unless the Air Force makes clear that to support the war on drugs without such a Master Plan would be a criminal waste of manpower and resources, the current inadequate system will continue to operate; and the nation's moral and physical well-being will continue to be drowned in a sea of illicit drugs. As Commander Morgan stated: "Only through intensive cooperation and guidance by the Federal government with jurisdiction over all the agencies would the war against drugs begin to have a positive effect in limiting supply" (21:15).

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24. During the period, 30 May 1983 through 30 June 1985, the Author (while serving as Commander or Operations Officer of Op BAT's Air Force element) worked in close cooperation with the Miami NNBS staff, particularly the Air Force staff members, during the course of numerous drug interdiction missions. This statement reflects the valuable support NNBS provided in conducting the majority of these missions.

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25. Op BAT's role as part of the front line in the SFTF's drug interdiction mission was made clear to the Author during numerous meetings he attended at the American Embassy in Nassau, Bahamas. In particular, Op BAT's front line role was made clear by then Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters, Mr DiCarlo, on 15 September 1983, during the course of his tour of anti-drug operations in the Bahamas.
26. This synopsis of events was garnered by the Author from various DEA officials involved in the creation of Op BAT. This collection of information took place over the course of two years in which the Author worked with these individuals in directing Op BAT operations.
27. This date was selected because beginning 1 May 1983, the Bahamians (and in fact the SFTF) had the means to go out among the islands of the Bahamas and actually put forces on the ground on a continual basis to seize drug caches; and this ability did not exist prior to this date.
28. The Author was actually involved in this mission as the Operations Officer for the Air Force Op BAT element. He followed the course of this mission from the Op BAT Operations Center in the American Embassy at Nassau, Bahamas and directed the Air Force helicopter assets involved. This operation was further documented by message in Op BAT SITREP #30, AMEMBASSY NASSAU 062046Z JUN 83.
29. This observation is based on the Author's two years involvement and experiences in attempting to conduct joint drug interdiction operations supporting the SFTF as part of Op BAT.
30. This lack of C2 was reflected throughout Op BAT/SFTF operations and was continually encountered by the Author as he attempted to organize and administer support for various drug interdiction missions.

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31. On several occasions, the Author, in his position as Commander or Operations Officer of the Air Force's Op BAT element, was told while conducting a drug interdiction mission that a certain course of action could not be taken because it would aid a particular agency at the expense of another.
32. The Author personally presented this plan in June 1983, and again on 28 June 1984. Approval of this plan finally occurred in late September 1984.
33. The Author observed and dealt with this lack of communications capability throughout his involvement in the Op BAT mission. He not only experienced its affects as a Commander, but also as a crew member involved in the direct prosecution of these missions.
34. In his role as Commander and Operations Officer, the Author personally observed this occurrence on numerous occasions and actually made the phone calls to get the intercepts terminated.
35. As a crew member, and as the Mission Commander, the Author took part in these missions. He personally observed the frequency set up on two of the aircraft captured; and he debriefed the aircrews involved in the other two incidents. Also, he reviewed the documents captured from the drug traffickers that contained the lists of operational frequencies.
36. In his role as the Air Force Op BAT Commander, the Author operated the SATCOM system and witnessed the positive effects it had on the conduct of the drug interdiction mission.
37. The Author was personally involved in this incident. In following up on this mission, he was informed by the Case Agent of the particular agency involved that they had hoped to seize the drugs themselves in order to secure all the credit.

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38. As the Commander of the Op BAT Air Force element, the Author was personally involved in these incidents and actually kept the Op BAT assets from being directed into this area.

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