Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.

Abstract

Alternative descriptions of a decision problem often give rise to different preferences, contrary to the principle of invariance that underlies the rational theory of choice. Violations of this theory are traced to the rules that govern the framing of decisions and the psychophysical principles of evaluation embodied in prospect theory. Invariance and dominance are obeyed when their application is transparent and often violated in other situations. Because these rules are normatively essential but descriptively invalid, no theory of choice can be both normatively adequate and descriptively accurate. (Author)

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 29, 1986
Accession Number
ADA168687

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  • Amos Tversky
  • Daniel Kahneman

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  • Stanford University

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