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
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
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COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CORPS REAR OPERATIONS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENNETH R. PIERCE, JR.

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responsible for command and control of corps rear operations. It recommends the Corps Rear Area Operation Center be combined with the Corps Military Police Brigade and the brigade commander be responsible to the deputy corps commander for rear operations. The study further recommends that the Corps Support Group Rear Operation Center be combined with the Military Police Battalion providing area support to the Corps Support Group.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CORPS REAR OPERATIONS

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The AirLand Battle doctrine focuses on three components of the corps commander's tactical battlefield: deep, close, and rear operations. There is much being written on strategic and operational war and its impact on the corps commander, but few meaningful discussions are currently being held on rear operations. Of those being held, most end on a note of confusion and dissatisfaction with the command and control procedures and operational concepts. This study focuses on Corps Rear Area Operations Center, responsible for command and control of corps rear operations. It recommends the Corps Rear Area Operation Center be combined with the Corps Military Police Brigade and the brigade commander be responsible to the deputy corps commander for rear operations. The study further recommends that the Corps Support Group Rear Operation Center be combined with the Military Police Battalion providing area support to the Corps Support Group.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background

The AirLand Battle Doctrine focuses on three components of the commander's tactical battlefield: deep, close, and rear operations.¹ Much is being written about strategic and tactical levels of war and the related doctrine as they relate to deep and close-in operations. Recently, there have been few meaningful discussions of the rear operations. Most conversations on rear operations end with statements of confusion and dissatisfaction with command and control procedures and the operational concepts.²

The rear operations doctrine encompasses the division rear, corps rear, and the rear areas of higher echelons. Because each rear area has its own characteristics, this study is limited to corps rear operations. As the research was conducted, it became clear that the "linchpins" in corps rear operations are the Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC). In spite of their importance, the RAOC are not on the active rolls, deploy late under all operations plans, are not in the normal corps chain of command, have no other function except rear operations, possess limited communications capability, and are unable to support themselves administratively or logistically.

This study focuses on the tactical roles of the corps and corps support group RAOCs, the corps military police brigade, and command and control of rear operations. The corps engineer brigade was not considered in this examination of tactical roles and missions because its missions and functions in rear operations are focused primarily on area damage control and its

tactical functions are of lesser priority.³ The recommendations of this study do not address the roles and missions of the engineers in rear tactical operations.

Statement Of The Problem

Command and control structure for rear operations, as currently presented in U.S. Army doctrine, is complex and poorly delineated. This paper will examine existing arrangements in an effort to determine what changes in organization or doctrine might be possible that would increase the capability of units to conduct rear operations.

Methodology

A detailed review of the resources listed in the bibliography was completed. Military publications of the last three years were reviewed for professional articles. The Joint Exercise Observation File was queried for rear operations after-action reports. Study visits were made to the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth; the Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort McClellan; and the 89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Hood. Telephonic discussions were held with Colonel Edwards, SPO, 310th Theater Army Area Command, Fort Belvoir, and Major Hoffman, SPO, 21st Support Command (Rear), Indianapolis.

At CAC, after a briefing on rear operations, discussions were held with Lieutenant Colonel Claude Allen on existing doctrinal concepts and current changes and innovations underway or being studied. Major(P) David Trueting, USAMPS, reviewed the missions and roles of the military police in rear operations and discussed ongoing changes and studies involving the roles and functions of the military police corps. The 89th Military Police Brigade

assisted in a review of their war plans and the corps and brigade field SOP's. Interviews were conducted with the brigade commander, Colonel James J. Hallihan, Jr. and his planning staff.

The major sources of doctrine and concepts discussed and compared in the study are from FM 90-14, Rear Battle, and FM 19-1, Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle. These manuals were used as a basis for the study, rather than unit SOP's, war plans, or mission statements, each of which are directed towards specific situations or circumstances. The field manuals provide the Army doctrine that will determine organization, equipment, and manning in the future. Findings and recommendations are directed towards generic doctrine and not to specific units or operations.

CHAPTER II

DOCTRINE

General

The corps rear area is a profusion of activity, much of it independent and unrelated. Host nation, combat support, and combat service support units intermingle and function individually, performing their support missions. Rear operations doctrine is an attempt to bring control, organization, and unity of effort to these diverse, heterogenous units. Current doctrine is extremely detailed but not easily understood. FM 90-14, Rear Battle, specifies a functionally oriented, command, control, and communications apparatus. The combat support and combat service support units are given two chains of responsibility, a technical command chain and a tactical command chain.⁴ It takes careful analysis to understand the relationships between the RAOC, the support units, their headquarters, and the base and base cluster organizations. Command and control and lines of authority are confusing and difficult to explain. Not having the RAOCs on active rolls, working daily with the corps units, further complicates the problem in coordinating and planning combat operations. The current doctrine specifies a thorough, detailed outline of basic principles, objectives, and tasks to be performed to insure continuous support through the rear to the close and deep battles. The key feature of the doctrine is the RAOC with its centralized tactical planning and control of rear operations. The execution of the rear operations is the responsibility of the bases, base clusters, military police, engineer units, and, where required, tactical combat forces.

Principles and Objectives

The basic elements of the rear operations doctrine are the principles and objectives established in FM 90-14.⁵ It is appropriate to review those at this time.

Rear Operations Principles

Unity of Effort: This principle ensures the uninterrupted support of the main effort and the protection of the rear area. The keys to the rear operations are sound planning, early warning, continuous OPSEC, and the rapid deployment of sufficient forces and resources to counter the threat.

Economy of Forces: This principle involves combat support and combat service support units defending themselves against attempts to disrupt their operations. They must be able to minimize destruction, reinforce their units, and, if necessary, gain time until response forces arrive. If an enemy incursion exceeds the capability of units (MP and CSS) in the rear battle, combat forces will be assigned to the rear battle to neutralize the threat.

Responsiveness: The immediate reaction and rapid deployment of sufficient combat power and area damage control (ADC) resources to destroy the enemy and to minimize damage. Responsiveness is achieved through:

- Effective command relationships and command supervision.
- Reliable communications.
- Accurate intelligence.
- Centralized planning and decentralized execution.
- Organic mobility of rear operations response forces.
- Training and rehearsals.
- Prior assessment of the capabilities of bases and facilities to withstand enemy attack.

Rear operations objectives:

- Secure the rear areas and facilities.
- Prevent or minimize enemy interference with command, control, and communications.
- Prevent or minimize disruption of combat support and combat service support forward.
- Provide unimpeded movement of friendly units throughout the rear area.
- Find, fix, and destroy enemy incursions in the rear area.
- Provide area damage control (ADC) after an attack or incident.

Current doctrine tasks units for internal defense and the military police for external, outside the base area, or to assist when the unit's capability is exceeded by the threat. In addition, selected critical units or installations and facilities have organic military police security or are assigned military police by the rear operations officer.

CHAPTER III

THE ORGANIZATIONS

Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC)

In November 1985, the Army Vice Chief of Staff approved 17 RAOC organizations for the reserve forces. There are five types of RAOCs: division RAOCs, corps RAOCs, Corps Support Group (CSG) RAOCs, TAACOM RAOCs, and TAACOM Area Support Group (ASG) RAOCs. The corps RAOCs and the TAACOM ASG RAOCs are the same TO&E unit.⁶

At corps, the RAOC is located at the rear area command post (CP) established and commanded by the deputy commander.⁷ The G3 is responsible for staff supervision of the RAOC and recommending to the commander tactical areas of responsibility and command for rear area combat operation.⁸ The Corps RAOC provides centralized tactical planning and control of rear operations through use of its base defense liaison teams and tasking the bases, clusters, CSG RAOC, military police, engineers, and EOD units as required.

At each Corps Support Group, there is a CSG RAOC to plan and direct rear operations in their area of responsibility. The CSG RAOC is a staff coordination element within each Corps Support Group and works in direct coordination with the Corps RAOC. Mission requests for commitment of military police, explosive ordnance reconnaissance units, and engineer support is made to the Corps RAOC, which will allocate resources based on the situation in the total corps rear area.⁹

The Corps Support Group RAOC is a staff coordination element within each Corps Support Group with area responsibility. In direct coordination with the Corps RAOC as a management center, it prepares plans, conducts coordination, and utilizes its base defense liaison teams (BDLT) to address each base organization, training, and preparedness for self-protection and survivability.

When the RAOC manning and organization was approved in November 1985, the manpower authorization of the Corps RAOC was reduced from 37 officers and 71 EM to 21 officers and 45 EM, or a total of 66 spaces. The RAOC is no longer capable of operating without administrative and logistical assistance. It must be co-located with a unit capable of providing support. The same is true for the CSG RAOC. It was reduced from 11 officers and 25 EM to eight officers and 15 EM or a total manpower of 23.¹⁰ The missions of the Corps RAOC are as follows:¹¹

- Corps rear area responsibility; not a functional responsibility
- Terrain management
 - assist in positioning of units in rear area with the G-3 and the support command commander
 - establish rear area tactical chain of command
 - designate base commanders
 - designate cluster bases and commanders
- Intelligence gathering
- Vulnerability analysis of the rear area
- Main supply routes and key route, planning, management, and monitoring
- Area damage control
 - planning
 - monitoring
 - execution
- Establish tactical communications net for rear operations command and control

- Provide missions to military police, engineer, and EOD control centers
- Obtain and disseminate intelligence information
 - prepare rear intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
- Host nation interface
- Training of base forces
- NBC monitoring

Military Police Brigade

For the purpose of this study, the Corps military police brigade is the standard TO&E organization as outlined in Chapter 6, FM 19-1. Organized and deployed to provide area support to the corps rear, subordinate units are assigned missions and functions within geographical areas. For periods of time, however, subordinate units could be assigned a functional mission. An example of a functional mission would be the assignment of a unit or element to enemy prisoner of war evacuation or an internment mission. Normally, however, the Corps military police brigade provides area battlefield combat support and combat service support missions. Although the immediate supervisor of the military police brigade commander is not specified, it is normally the deputy corps commander. Current doctrine indicates that the brigade commander is responsible for planning and conducting combat operations against threat forces in the rear area. Within the brigade capabilities, the commander provides response forces to assist bases that are under enemy attack. Military police forces respond and conduct combat operations to destroy the attacking enemy forces within their capability. When enemy forces

exceed their capability, the military police commander notifies the RAOC and then participates in rear area combat operations with combat forces when requested.

Normally, the authority to commit military police resources is retained at the corps RAOC. In some commands this tasking authority has been delegated to the CSG RAOC for certain levels of commitment (e.g., platoon size elements), while commitment of larger military police force is under the operational control of the tasking RAOC until completion of the mission or, if a tactical combat force (TCF) is employed, until relieved by the TCF commander.

The military police battalions of the military police brigade are normally employed in an area support role. Battalions would usually be assigned area of operation boundaries to coincide with, but not necessarily duplicating, a Corps Support Group area. The battalion commander coordinates closely with the support group, provides general support, and is responsible for responding to RAOC taskings within the area.

Military police battlefield missions of battlefield circulation control, combat operations (rear), enemy prisoners of war, and law and order missions are undergoing a transition.¹² Currently, the military police emphasizes the primacy of the battlefield circulation control with its sub-elements of:

- Route reconnaissance and surveillance
- Main supply route regulation and enforcement
- Straggler control operations
- Support to refugee control operations
- Support to river crossing operations
- Support to passage of lines
- Support to NBC operations

The traditional area security mission has been realigned, designated as combat operations (rear) and includes the following sub-elements:

- Security of critical assets
- Base defense response operations
- Security of special weapons
- Reconnaissance patrol operations
- Patrol operations
 - reconnaissance patrols
 - combat patrols
 - security patrols
- Counter-incursion operations
- Air base ground defense operations
- Terrorism counteraction

Enemy prisoner of war mission and law and order missions, except for an emphasis on terrorism counteraction, remain the same.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

Comparison of Roles and Missions

In a Corps rear area, military police battlefield missions designated under battlefield circulation control and combat operations (rear) are of vital interest to the RAOC and are integral parts of its primary missions of planning, coordinating, and directing rear operations. This interdependence and overlapping of roles and missions can also be illustrated by examining both organizations simultaneously. The table on the succeeding page is a comparison of unit missions found in FM 19-1 and FM 90-14.

The military police are in the process of reexamining their role in rear operations. The military police have to reevaluate which, if any, mission is predominate or primary. The Military Police School has recognized that many sub-elements of battlefield circulation control and combat operations (rear) will be accomplished concurrently as military police are employed throughout the breadth and depth of the rear area, i.e. route reconnaissance and surveillance, main supply route (MSR) regulation and enforcement, reconnaissance patrolling, patrol operations, NBC support.¹³ However, they have not emphasized the increased security requirements posed by the threat. The primary threat targets in the rear area are command and control centers, nuclear storage and firing sites, and airbases.¹⁴ The planning and execution of offensive and defensive measures for protection of these elements, plus the other sub-elements of combat operations (rear), are the responsibility of the RAOC. When doctrine is uncoupled from the

<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>RAOC</u>	<u>MP BRIGADE</u>
Terrain Management	Yes	
Area Responsibility	Yes	Yes
Intelligence		
- Area Reconnaissance		Yes
- Intelligence Preparations of the battlefield	Yes	Yes
- Reporting	Yes	Yes
Vulnerability Analysis	Yes	Yes
- Prioritize for security	Yes	Yes
Controlled Routes	Yes	Yes
- Monitoring main supply routes (MSR)	Yes	Yes
- Alternate MSR and refugee routes	Yes	Yes
Area Damage Control		
- Planning	Yes	
- Monitoring	Yes	Yes
- Execution		Yes
Tactical Communications System	Yes	Yes
Coordination with Host Nation	Yes	Yes
NBC Detection and Reporting	Yes	Yes
Airfield, C3 and Critical Site Security	Yes	Yes
G-3 Staff Responsibility	Yes	Yes
Deputy Corps Commander Supervision	Yes	Yes
Training of Base Personnel	Yes	*
Enemy Prisoner of War		
- Collection	Yes	Yes
- Evacuation	Yes	Yes
- Internment	Yes	Yes
- Site location	Yes	Yes
Law and Order	**	Yes

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- * Military police personnel will be tasked to assist combat units by doctrine, but realistically the military police will probably conduct a large portion of the training.
- ** As the HQ monitoring area, the RAOC will not only be interested but will be involved in discipline. It is also responsible for designating the location of any US prisoner internment facilities in its terrain management mission.

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TABLE 1 - COMPARISON OF MISSIONS

environment of the Federal Republic of Germany and examined in a neutral or reduced host nation support situation, the RAOC and the military police brigade become even more closely linked.

Corps Support Groups and Military Police Battalions

If Corps Support Group RAOC were assigned as a staff coordination element within the military police battalion instead of the Corps Support Group, it would require the military police battalion area to duplicate the Corps Support Group boundaries and would limit the flexibility of the brigade commander to realign battalion area support within the Corps Rear Area, but that would not be a problem under normal circumstances. The RAOC, combined with the military police battalion, would provide the support group commander(s) a single commander, provost marshal, as rear operations planner and executor. The battalion commander has not only his own elements but is in the direct chain of command of the military police brigade and the Corps RAOC for command and control and logistical support.

In addition to the duplication of roles and missions of the Corps RAOC and the military police brigade, another test of the feasibility of integration is to examine the impact of consolidation on the principles, objectives, and command and control of rear operations.

Rear Operations Principles

Unity of Effort: Unity of effort has not been served by having two separate headquarters. Both organizations are planning, but the execution of the plan or plans lies with the military police brigade. Planning and coordination by the commander who is responsible for execution will result in better coordination and operation.

Economy of Forces: This principle will be enhanced by the consolidation. The commander responsible for reaction will be directly involved in the coordination and monitoring of the situation. The commander who commits the forces will be providing command and control, not the separate RAOC which is now given operational control of committed forces. Once the RAOC is integrated into the brigade and the battalion staffs, the duplication of effort can be eliminated, probably reducing the manpower required to plan and execute rear operations in the brigade and RAOC headquarters.

Responsiveness: All of the factors listed as contributing to responsiveness are better achieved through the consolidation. Effective command relationships and command supervision are certainly strengthened as the command structure is simplified. Communications are improved by the use of the brigade and battalion facilities. Accurate intelligence will be improved since the RAOC staff and the military police staff will work jointly on information received from the supporting and supported units and staffs. Certainly the planning will be more centralized, as will training and rehearsals.

Rear Operations Objectives

The objectives of rear operations will be enhanced by the consolidation of the RAOC and the military police command. Except for internal defense forces of the bases and clusters, the military police is the only force used by the RAOC to accomplish all the objectives; each objective is an integral part of the components of basic military police missions found in battlefield circulation control and combat operations (rear).

Current doctrine tasks units for internal defense and the military police for external or assistance when the units capability is exceeded by the threat. In addition, selected critical units, installations, and facilities have organic military police security or are assigned military police by the rear operation officer. Since the military police is the only force reasonably available to perform this objective, it should be given the responsibility and the resources to plan and control the execution.

Command and Control

Combining the RAOC and the military police brigade has the most significant effect on command and control. FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, says it best, "Rear area operations are characterized by centralized planning, coordination, and supervision, and decentralized execution ... clear-cut lines of authority for specific rear area protection responsibilities must be established and maintained at all levels before any plans or operations are initiated." FM 63-4, Combat Service Support Operations, also stresses the need for clear-cut lines of authority for rear area operations to be established before any plans or operations are started. The following are command and control advantages of the consolidation:

- One headquarters would have the responsibility and authority to plan and execute rear operations.
- Support and supporting units would coordinate with one headquarters for planning and resources to assist in tactical rear operations.
- Simplifies and expedites decision making on the commitment of resources to support bases and critical sites, facilities, or units.
- Reduces span of control for the rear operations center officer (deputy corps commander) and the support commander.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

1. Current doctrine for organization of the corps rear operations needs to be modified to centralize and consolidate the command and control system.

2. The Corps RAOC and military police brigade battlefield missions and tasks are congruent and overlap in numerous, significant areas.

3. The command and control of rear operations would be enhanced through centralization and would be simplified if the military police brigade and the Corps RAOC were combined.

4. The combination of the CSG RAOC and the military police battalion assigned the same area of responsibility would be a significant enhancement of command and control of corps rear operations.

5. The RAOC must collocate with another headquarters capable of providing administrative and logistical support. The military police brigade headquarters is capable of providing that support and can augment and increase the capabilities of the RAOC in planning, communications, and civil military liaison. Additional resources may be saved if the two organizations are combined.

6. The span of control for the deputy corps commander and the staff would be reduced if the military police brigade and the RAOC were combined. The staff and the deputy corps commander would have a single commander responsible for terrain management, tactical planning, reporting, coordination, and execution of rear operations. Command and control of tactical rear operations would be centralized in the military police brigade.

7. The base and base cluster concept is sound and should be retained. The dual reporting system for technical and tactical operations is a problem because of equipment and training deficiencies, but it is a sound concept until or if the support commanders assume responsibility for rear tactical operations - an event which is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.

Recommendations

1. The corps RAOC and the Corps Military Police Brigade be combined and the Military Police Brigade Commander assigned responsibility for rear operations, reporting directly to the rear operations officer, the deputy corps commander.

2. The Corps Support Group RAOC become a staff coordination element within the Military Police Battalion that is assigned area responsibility for the Corps Support Group. The Military Police Battalion commander then becomes responsible to the support commander and the Military Police Brigade commander for rear operations in his area of operation.

Follow-on Actions

1. Examine the Military Police Brigade TO&E and the Corps RAOC TO&E to determine what personnel and equipment can be consolidated, reduced, or eliminated when the RAOC staff is collocated with the Military Police Brigade staff.

2. Determine the recommended location of the Military Police Brigade Headquarters and Corps RAOC element. Current doctrine recommends the Military Police Brigade be in vicinity of Corps main, but rear operations doctrine recommends the RAOC be at Corps rear. Upon consolidation, both should be collocated, but whether at Corps main, rear, or another location needs to be determined.

3. Determine feasibility of combining the division provost marshal operations and the division RAOC under the command of the division provost marshal.

4. Determine the feasibility of combining the TAACOM RAOC and the TAACOM Military Police Brigade and the Area Support Group(s) RAOC with the supporting area military police commander.

5. A separate detailed examination of the rear operations in the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO countries must be conducted to determine the impact of consolidation. The unique host nation contributions and operations in the rear area have significant impact on organizations tailored for employment in that environment. Army doctrine and organizations, however, should not be developed only within the European scenario, rather, rear operations doctrine should be modified and tailored for the European environment. Appendix A, FM 90-14, is an excellent discussion of the host nation support in central Europe.

6. Corps military police missions, in support of the deployed divisions and rear operations, must be reevaluated for criticality and utility in today's combat environment. As an example, current technology in communications and mobility has resulted in far less control requirements on critical supply and transportation routes and other lines of communications. The Corps Mobile Subscriber System will have a tremendous impact on mobility and control measures available to assist during or to direct movement. Exercises in the European environment and safety considerations have resulted in large numbers of military police being used for passage of lines, river crossing operations, and convoy movements. In a combat environment, military police missions will have to be prioritized based on the threat. The threat

focuses on air fields, nuclear storage sites and delivery means, and command and communications centers must be countered at the expense of traditional missions even more than it has thus far in military police doctrine.

ANNEX A

DEFINITION OF TERMS

AREA DAMAGE CONTROL (ADC): Preventive and control measures taken before, during, and after hostile action or natural or man-made disasters to reduce the probability of damage and to minimize its effects and limit damage.

AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS (ASO): Actions taken to protect personnel, material, and facilities from enemy rear attack. ASO includes area reconnaissance, intelligence collection and reporting, limited rear area combat operations, security of designated personnel, units, convoys, facilities, and MSR critical points, NBC, surveillance and monitoring, and area damage control.

BASE: A position that is occupied by one or more units. A base has a defined perimeter. One person, usually the senior person present, acts as the base commander.

BASE CLUSTER: Combat, combat support, and combat service support units in the rear area are employed, based on mission requirements, and are grouped together for mutual support and protection. A base cluster has no clearly defined perimeter.

BASE DEFENSE LIAISON TEAMS (BDLT): A team of two officers and two enlisted personnel assigned to each rear area operations center to perform direct contact with bases, base clusters, lower echelon RAOC, and higher and adjacent headquarters.

BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER (BDOC): A command and control element or operations center established at each base to coordinate base defense and area damage control.

BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL (BCC): Operations taken to expedite the movement of personnel and vehicles to support the commander's tactical plans.

COMBAT OPERATIONS (REAR): Indicates military police combat and security functions that are emphasized in rear operations. Accorded a mission status, it includes: security of critical sites and special weapons, base defense response, patrol operations, counter-incursion and terrorism counteraction, and air base ground defense operations.

COUNTER-INCURSION OPERATIONS: Those proactive measures taken to deny enemy access to landing zones, drop zones, and avenues of approach to critical assets; also those measures taken to delay or destroy airborne, airmobile, or ground incursions in the rear area.

JOINT EXERCISE OBSERVATION FILE (JEOF): A WWMCCS-based computer program used to build, maintain, and retrieve a historical record of observations made during joint exercises. The file contains input from evaluation teams observing joint issues during USREDCOM exercises and of other unified commands since 1978.

REAR AREA COMBAT OPERATIONS (RACO): Obsolete term, included as a part of rear operations.

REAR AREA PROTECTION (RAP): Obsolete term, included in rear operations.

REAR BATTLE: Obsolete term, replaced by rear operations.

REAR BATTLE OFFICER (REAR OPERATIONS OFFICER): Appointed by the echelon commander, based upon the factors of METT-T, to control the rear operations. At Corps it will be the Deputy Corps Commander; at division, if rear operations require, there may be a rear area command post which may be commanded by the Assistant Division Commander, Support.

REAR OPERATIONS: Replaces the term rear battle. Those actions, including area damage control, taken by all units (combat, combat support, combat service support, and host nation) singly or in a combined effort to secure the force, neutralize or defeat enemy operations in the rear area, and ensure freedom of action in the deep and close-in battles.

REAR AREA OPERATION CENTER (RAOC): A rear area control center responsible for planning, coordinating, directing, and monitoring rear operations.

TACTICAL COMBAT FORCES (TCF): Those combat forces the commander assigns the mission of defeating rear battle threat forces.

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