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
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
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deterrence strategy to deal with it. Also considered are the terrorist groups and their close ties to sponsoring states which is a network of nations including the Soviet Union. Legislative measures that have already taken effect are discussed, as well as public opinion and support for the use of force. Recommended actions to counter terrorism are based on the philosophy of "just cause," and the principles that any response must be proportionate to the threat and highly discriminate in its application. Only through multinational cooperation can there be a viable different strategy. Responsible nations must join together and work toward the objective of denying the terrorists their goals by making terrorist acts counterproductive and costly. The terrorists and their sponsor-states must fear the consequences of their actions. To be effective, only responses that include economic sanctions, political isolation, and limited surgical strikes against approved targets within terrorist sponsor-states that have been positively identified as instigators of terrorist activities will combat and defeat these outlaws. Terrorism is like cancer. If it is left unchecked, and not stopped now, it will spread into the United States.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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US Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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The basic premise is that terrorism, in particular international terrorism, can not be allowed to continue. There is a consensus among responsible nations that terrorism does threaten international order and must be combatted. A possible policy and strategy to deal with the problem is suggested. Data was gathered from literature, Department of State documents, and interviews. The growing threat of terrorism as it affects national interests is examined along with the problems of developing an effective deterrence strategy to deal with it. Also considered are the terrorist groups and their close ties to sponsoring states, which is a network of nations including the Soviet Union. Legislative measures that have already taken effect are discussed, as well as public opinion and support for the use of force. Recommended actions to counter terrorism are based on the philosophy of "Just Cause"; and the principles that any response must be proportionate to the threat and highly discriminate in its application. Only through multinational cooperation can there be a viable deterrence strategy. Responsible nations must join together and work toward the objective of denying the terrorists their goals by making terrorist acts counterproductive and costly. The terrorists and their sponsor-states must fear the consequences of their actions. To be effective, only responses that include economic sanctions, political isolation, and limited surgical strikes against approved targets within terrorist sponsor-states that have been positively identified as instigators of terrorist activities will combat and defeat these outlaws. Terrorism is like cancer. If it is left unchecked, and not stopped now, it will spread into the United States.

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Preface

Terrorism is the enemy of the people of the United States. In his bid for attention to his cause, the terrorist relies on and hopes for a fearful general public, easily shaken in its faith in the laws and the state.¹ Terrorists can no longer achieve the same shock effect or obtain the same results using tactics they used 10 years ago. Staying in the headlines requires acts of ever greater violence.² The result has been a steadily escalating series of criminal acts against unsuspecting victims. With the massive increases in terrorist activities throughout the world and the proportionately larger risks of attack to Americans from these criminal acts, it has become necessary for the national leadership to develop a viable response to terrorism. Secretary of State Shultz has said: "We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense." Our senior leaders in the United States government need to be able to react with swiftness and certainty against those who engage in terrorism. The President must know if he will have a broad public consensus on the moral and strategic necessity of action. There will be no time for a debate after every terrorist attack.³

Is America satisfied with the past and current policies to counter terrorism? Will Americans support a policy that calls for forcefully preempting and retaliating against terrorist acts? How willing would they be to sacrifice the lives of hostages or the lives of U.S. forces to stop terrorists? Until these questions are adequately answered, there can be no consistent policy for dealing with criminal acts of international terrorism.

I. Terrorist Activity

Terrorism is a form of warfare that uses unpredictability and surprise to accomplish criminal acts against individuals and/or the public and the government for political purposes. Terrorism is premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.⁴ International terrorism is terrorism involving citizens or territory of more than one country.⁵ The terrorist is the enemy of not just one country or race, but of all civilized nations which value law, freedom, and stability. Secretary of State George P. Shultz has stated, "Terrorism, wherever it takes place, is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies - against our most basic values and often our fundamental strategic interest."⁶

More Americans were killed and injured in 1983 by acts of terrorism than in the 15 preceding years.⁷ Terrorists have increasingly employed high-casualty violence more freely than they had in prior years, and the attacks by these groups were marked by a lack of discrimination as to the targets. U.S. diplomats, government officials, personnel traveling abroad, and unlucky bystanders are increasingly becoming victims. More than 20 percent of the 597 international terrorist incidents in 1984 involved U.S. targets, however, citizens of at least 76 other countries were also victims of criminal terrorist acts.⁸

During the past decade alone, there have been almost 6,500 terrorist incidents. Over 3,500 people have been killed in these incidents, and more than 7,600 have been wounded. American

citizens have been the victims of more than 2,500 terrorist incidents, with nearly a thousand being killed or injured.⁹ In 1985, there were over 800 incidents of international terrorism against all people - up 60 percent from the annual average of 500 for the period 1978-83 ¹⁰. (See Appendix A, chart 1, International Terrorist Incidents, 1980-85.)

If we study the evolution of terrorism, then it becomes apparent that the prospects for a slowdown in international terrorist activity appear dim. In fact, Ambassador Robert Oakley, the Director of the Office for Counter-terrorism and Emergency Planning, predicted that on the international side "the terrorism threat is likely to grow and be with us for at least another decade."¹¹ It will not easily disappear for many reasons: a worldwide system of competitive arms sales makes modern weapons available more easily to terrorist groups; mass communication assures instantaneous publicity for terrorist acts; travel is easier between different countries, and border controls are diminishing, particularly in Western Europe; and, most important, in an age when weapons of mass destruction, as well as increasingly lethal conventional armaments, have made regular warfare too costly, terrorism is viewed by certain countries as a cheap way to strike a blow at their enemies with little or no retaliatory action¹².

Most terrorists act with the aid of countries that are inimicable to democracies. President Reagan has asserted that they are terrorist states, and are now engaged in acts of war against the government and people of the United States, but their

activities are global. More than 85% of the world's terrorist acts occur in Western Europe, Latin America, and in the Middle East. (See Appendix A, Chart 2, Geographic Areas of Terrorism.) Further, the major trend is that nearly half of all terrorist attacks are now occurring in the Middle East or have been committed elsewhere by Middle Eastern terrorists¹³.

Terrorism no longer consists of the random acts of isolated groups of local fanatics. It is now a method of warfare, no less because it is undeclared and most often denied¹⁴. This criminal violence involves the indiscriminate targeting of innocent people who have no known role in either causing or redressing the alleged grievances of the terrorists, and U.S. citizens have been frequent casualties and still remain the prime target of foreign terrorists around the world. (See Appendix A, chart 3, U.S. Casualties Resulting From Terrorism.)

In the U.S. we view terrorism as a low-intensity conflict, but for our enemies it is a major strategy directed primarily at Western nations and institutions, and their friends and allies. Terrorism is one of the most important problems facing this nation today and it is growing in significance. This country and its citizens traveling and living abroad face a high risk of attack from terrorists.

II. Threat to Democracy

Currently, the world's leading supporters of terrorism are Libya, Iran, Syria, South Yemen, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, and, at least indirectly, the Soviet Union¹⁵. The Soviet Union

clearly supports international terrorism, but there is no evidence of the Soviets directly planning or orchestrating terrorist acts; although there is evidence that the Soviets maintain relations with groups that participate in or are linked to terrorism. Moscow has provided political backing, funding, and in some cases, conventional arms and military training¹⁶. For example, the Soviets and their East European allies sell large quantities of arms to Libya and Latin America. Part of their strategy involves nurturing organizations and groups that use terrorism in support of their efforts to undermine existing governments¹⁷.

There is a network of states with the objective of undermining the policies of the United States and its allies. During the visit of Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua's Sandinista leader, to North Korea there was a discussion which included putting pressure on and dealing blows at the United States "imperialism in all places where it stretches its talons of aggression"¹⁸. Col. Khadafi of Libya echoed North Korea's Kim Il-Sung's words when he laid out the agenda for the terrorist network: "We must force America to fight on a hundred fronts all over the world."¹⁹.

These countries in different regions of the world have the same goals and objectives, and are working to put pressure on the U.S. in order to impose their will by force - a kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear. President Reagan stated the strategic purpose is clear: "to disorient the United States, to disrupt or alter our foreign policy, to sow discord between ourselves and our allies, to frighten friendly Third World nations working with us for peaceful settlement of regional conflicts, and

finally, to remove American influence from those areas of the world where we're working to bring stable and democratic governments."²⁰.

III. World Reaction

Terrorists and their sponsor-states want people to lose faith in their government's capacity to protect them and thereby to undermine the legitimacy of the government itself, or its policies, or both.²¹ As the number of incidents has increased, terrorism has become more severe. Terrorists have demonstrated a greater willingness to kill. As more governments move not only to support terrorist tactics, but also encourage the terrorist to use these criminal acts openly, the public opinion hardens against them. This is a cause for optimism because only through the support of the people can the fight against international terrorism be won throughout the world.

In the United States, 90% of the population considers terrorism a very serious problem, and according to an opinion survey conducted in 1978 in Great Britain, 85 percent of the British population holds the same view²². However, the international community has moved slowly and failed to impose effective sanctions against the nations which support terrorism. Many experts have concluded that military force may become the only alternative for democratic countries²³.

The willingness of people to give up civil liberties and to endorse solutions that they would not normally endorse in order to put an end to the terrorist threat can be seen in the results of several polls. The introduction of the death penalty for terrorists is favored by a majority of 55 percent in Germany (DMS,1976), 55 percent on the United States (Harris,1977), and 71 percent in Great Britain (SOC,1978). In the Netherlands,62 percent are in favor of placing South Moluccans under strict surveillance, even if the country should somewhat resemble a police state in that case; 73 percent of the Dutch want especially vigorous action taken against terrorists, and 44 percent feel that terrorists are not entitled to the same rights as other arrested suspects²⁴. In another survey in February 1981,the Roper Organization asked U.S. respondents about sending troops to the rescue if another embassy was taken over,64 percent favored the use of troops,24 percent opposed, and 12 percent didn't know²⁵.

When the leaders of a country seem unable to control the spread of terrorism, public perception of government impotence generates support for totalitarian solutions. This is apparent in that most people tend to support severe punishment or military actions against terrorists. By 55% to 31%, Americans polled indicated that they would favor a law providing that "all caught committing acts of terror should be convicted and given the death penalty", and by 55% to 29%, respondents said they would support the organization of a "special world police force which would operate in any country of the world and which would investigate terrorist groups, arrest them, and put their members and leaders to death."²⁶.

Outside of the United States, a 1980 survey of the Israelis showed 93 percent support for the assassination of terrorist leaders; 75 percent supported reprisals even if innocent civilians are hit during the operations²⁷. Dutch respondents favored by 73% to 21% taking especially stern and harsh actions against terrorists, as opposed to dealing with them as ordinary criminals²⁸. In a USA Harris and Great Britain Social opinion poll that proposed solutions as a way of dealing with terrorism, the following results were recorded:

1. Every country should develop special teams of commandos who are experts at capturing terrorists while saving the lives of hostages.

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Opposed</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
USA	89%	5%	6%
Great Britain	85%	5%	10%

2. All airline services should be cut off to and from any country which allows terrorists to use that country as a base of training or operations, or which gives refuge to terrorists or lets them go free.

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Opposed</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
USA	79%	11%	10%
Great Britain	67%	20%	13%

3. A special world force should be organized which would operate in any country of the world and which would investigate terrorist groups, arrest them, and put their leaders and members to death.

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Opposed</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
USA	55%	29%	16%
Great Britain	66%	19%	15%

4. All those caught committing acts of terror should be convicted and given the death penalty.

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Opposed</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
USA	55%	31%	14%
Great Britain	71%	15%	14%

5. Countries should refuse to make any concessions to terrorists, such as paying ransoms or freeing other terrorists from prison, even if this means people who are kidnapped or held hostage end up being killed by the terrorists.

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Opposed</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
USA	51%	31%	18%
Great Britain	65%	18%	17% 27.

IV. Legislative Support

Terrorism inevitably spreads if it goes untreated. The protection of citizens, official personnel, and facilities abroad requires the close cooperation and support of other governments. The U.S. depends on other governments to provide normal protections of law in their countries for our citizens living and

traveling abroad and for our embassies. The threat of terrorism, however, often calls for extraordinary measures, which the host government may be unable or unwilling to provide.

To deal with this problem, in 1983, the Reagan Administration sent to the Congress legislation to fight the war against terrorism. One bill was to provide adequate protection for foreign officials in the United States and another asked Congress to provide legislative authority for anti-terrorism training, and in some cases, equipment to foreign governments in order to enhance cooperation with governments on whom we must depend for protection abroad. Congress provided a two-year authorization for this program and an appropriation of \$2.5 million in 1984.³⁰

President Reagan continued to be supportive of anti-terrorist legislation. In April, 1984, he sent four separate bills to Congress to combat the spread of terrorism. The first was an Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts. He proposed this because the maximum rewards were inadequate, and terrorism was not specifically included as a basis for paying a reward. Moreover, there was no authority for the payment of rewards for information on acts of terrorism abroad. The second urged Congressional approval of a 1971 Montreal treaty which was ratified by the U.S. in 1972, requiring countries to establish jurisdiction over sabotaged civil air flights. His third request was for implementation of a 1979 U.N. treaty against hostage-taking. The final proposal was that the Secretary of State be given power to designate individuals, groups, or countries as "terrorists" and ban U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or businesses

from providing any training or support to designated terrorists. On September 26, 1984, the administration formally requested an appropriation of \$110.2 million to "beef-up" U.S. embassy security, particularly in the Middle East, however, on September 28, 1984, officials asked the foreign relations committee to authorize \$356.3 million for security of embassies and missions abroad.³¹ A summary of the Congressional committee actions follows:

- * April 26, 1984 - A message from the President transmitting proposed legislation to attack the pressing and urgent problem of international terrorism. These proposals were referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as committees on the Judiciary, and Public Works and Transportation.
- * May 9, 1984 - Two bills - H.R. 5612, to permit the payment of rewards for information concerning terrorist acts, and H.R. 5613, to prohibit the training, support, or inducing of terrorism, and for other purposes - introduced by Representatives Fascell and Broomfield were jointly referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and the Judiciary.
- * May 11, 1985 - H.R. 5612 and 5613 were referred jointly to the Subcommittees on International Security, Scientific Affairs, and International Operations.
- * June 7, 1984 - Joint hearing held by Subcommittees on International Security, Scientific Affairs, and International Operations on the administration's proposed antiterrorism legislation.

* June 13, 1984 - Hearing held by the full Committee on Executive Branch Policy on terrorism and the administration's related legislative requests. Hon. George F. Shultz, Secretary of State, testified.

* June 19, 1984 - Joint hearing held by Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and International Operations continuing consideration of the administration's antiterrorism legislative request.³²

No further action on the antiterrorism proposal occurred until the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Lebanon on Sept. 20, 1984. Then briefings were held by the Subcommittee on International Operations by Assistant Secretary Robert Lamb, Bureau of Administration at the State Department. On Sept. 26, 1984, briefings were held by the full committee on the Beirut bombing by State Department officials. This briefing was immediately followed by a full committee makeup session of H.R. 6311, a bill to combat international terrorism. There was complete bipartisan support for the bill. On Oct. 1, 1984, H.R. 6311 was considered in the House and passed with a unanimous voice vote.³³

On Sept. 28, 1984, Senator Charles Percy introduced a bill (S3037) to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on combatting international terrorism. This bill was placed on the Senate calendar Oct. 2, 1984. On Oct. 5, 1984, S3037 was called up by unanimous consent in the Senate. Sen. Percy on this day urged his colleagues in the Senate to support the passage of H.R. 6311, the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism. He explained that with the exception of some minor technical changes the bill was

identical to the Senate bill. On Oct.5,1984,S3037 was indefinitely postponed in the Senate and H.R.6311 was passed with unanimous voice vote.³⁴

The only House or Senate debate was to rise in support of H.R.6311. The main concern of every Representative and Senator appeared to be ideological in nature. Americans were dying due to lack of security and the Congress intended to repair the damage. The measure was expeditiously enrolled in the House and Senate on Oct.10, and was sent to the President on Oct.12,1984.³⁵

On October 19,1984, the President signed the 1984 Act to Combat Terrorism into law without reservation. The new Public Law (PL 98-533) affected three areas of governmental administration. The Attorney General became responsible for paying up to \$500,000 to an individual furnishing information that led to the arrest or conviction of domestic terrorists. A reward of \$100,000 or more could not be made without the approval of the President or Attorney General personally. A determination made by the Attorney General or President was final and conclusive, and no court had the power or jurisdiction to review it. Five million dollars was authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal limitations.³⁶

The State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 was amended by the new section under this law, which gave the Secretary of State the authority to pay a reward to any individual who furnishes information concerning terrorist acts taking place abroad. He has the same monetary constraints as the Attorney General, but must advise and consult with the Attorney General before making a reward over which there is federal criminal

jurisdiction. To pay the rewards the Department of State was appropriated \$5,000,000 without fiscal year limitations.³⁷

PL 98-533 also gave the State Department \$350,963,000, for the "security enhancement" of embassies and \$5,315,000 to the United States Information Agency for the "security enhancement" of U.S. missions abroad. Additionally, the President was encouraged under Title II to seek effective international cooperation in combatting international terrorism.³⁸

Congress also stated in recognition of the current epidemic of world-wide terrorist activity that danger pay allowances should be more extensively utilized for civilian as well as military employees of United States agencies abroad.

The President made a statement that he was grateful that the Congress responded swiftly to his request for authorities and resources. He said the act was an important step in our multiyear effort to counter the pervasive threat international terrorism poses to our diplomatic personnel and facilities overseas. "While none of these steps," he said, "guarantee that terrorist acts will not occur again, we can be certain that the measure made possible by this act will make such attacks more difficult in the future."³⁹

V. America's Response

The Executive Branch, the Congress, and the public must clearly understand that combatting terrorism effectively requires concerted action on many different fronts⁴¹. Secretary Shultz said the Administration is working to apply the whole range of options available to the U.S. to counter terrorism. Ambassador Robert B.

Oakley, the Director for Counter-terrorism, said more than 100 plots against American citizens abroad have been thwarted by a combination of good security, good intelligence, and good cooperation with local governments. This success did not come easily. It required effective coordinated action, both within the Department of State and among all the agencies of the U.S. government involved in combatting terrorism: as well as long-term, cooperative international action. However, because of the political realities facing the U.S., such cooperative action was more effective on a bilateral, rather than a multilateral basis. Finally, intelligence is proving to be clearly the key to an effective counter-terrorist strategy⁴².

As can be expected, it poses a special kind of challenge to the intelligence effort in terms of collection and analysis of terrorist information. In the past, there was a tendency to protect intelligence, but with international terrorism, where lives hang in the balance, the U.S. must rely heavily on other friendly governments, and share information and analyses with them. Therefore, in order to improve intelligence collection and coordination the following actions have been implemented by the Administration:

- * Terrorism has been made a collection priority for the entire intelligence community.
- * A 24-hour terrorism intelligence watch has been established at the Department of State and is in constant contact around the clock with other agencies.

* At State, a special category of cables relating to terrorism with a special message caption now facilitates rapid, controlled distribution to all who need to know in the State Department and other agencies.

* A coordinated interagency alert system has been developed to inform embassies and other U.S. government installations immediately on any threat⁴³.

All the measures described so far are important elements in the comprehensive strategy to combat international terrorism. But they are not enough because they do not provide the deterrent to terrorists and the states that sponsor them. When innocent people are victimized and the guilty go unpunished, the terrorist has succeeded in undermining the very foundation of civilized society, for he has created a confused world where there is no justice. This is a blow to our fundamental moral values and a dark cloud over the future of humanity⁴⁴. Terrorism presents the greatest challenge to the U.S. national leadership since World War II.

The United States is engaged in a low-intensity war. Citizens and U.S. installations have been attacked by known representatives of enemy states, and the threat continues to grow. There must be an active strategy in conjunction with the passive measures already discussed to counter the blow of these aggressive acts against the United States and its National Interests. We must not waiver, but be stronger in our fight by using all the power and resources of this country to combat terrorism. Everything from economic sanctions to military force must be considered when formulating a response to terrorist aggression.

Historically, public response to active American military intervention has been initially supportive. After President Eisenhower sent the Marines into Lebanon in 1958, Gallup International Research Institute asked respondents in several cities around the country if they approved or disapproved. Respondents in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco approved 59 percent to 27 percent⁴⁵. In a Gallup Poll taken shortly after President Johnson sent troops to the Dominican Republic in late-April 1965, respondents approved of the decision 76 percent to 17 percent⁴⁶. Again, shortly after the major escalation of the Vietnam War in the summer of 1965, the Gallup organization found that only 24 percent felt that the United States had made a mistake in sending troops to Vietnam, while 61 percent said it was not a mistake.⁴⁷ During the Mayaguez Incident when Time reporters Vanklovich, Shelly, and White asked if charges that President Ford had overreacted were in order to re-establish American prestige were fair or unfair, 87 percent of the respondents said the charges were unfair⁴⁸.

Support of Americans for positive, forceful action can also be seen in the results of presidential popularity polls taken during periods of crisis. President Roosevelt's popularity rating jumped 12 percent in the wake of his declaration of war on Japan following Pearl Harbor. President Kennedy's rating also jumped 12 percent after the Cuban missile blockade. President Johnson's rating went up 8 percent after the bombing of Hanoi in 1967, and President Ford's rating climbed 11 percent after the Mayaguez Incident⁴⁹. However, when the Iranians first took American embassy

personnel hostage, President Carter's rating as measured by the Gallup organization jumped 13 percent, even though the United States did not intervene militarily at that time⁵⁰. The use of presidential ratings, therefore seems to reflect a rallying around the leader during a crisis rather than an approval of a specific policy⁵¹.

The jump in presidential approval in times of crisis takes place across all demographic groups, with the rise somewhat more pronounced in the higher socioeconomic groups than in the lower⁵². In any crisis that is not resolved quickly and successfully by military intervention, however, pro-intervention and anti-intervention groups tend to react differently from each other⁵³. In December 1979, three weeks after the Iranians had taken the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the Roper Organization asked whether the Shah should be returned as the Iranians demanded. The lowest socioeconomic groups gave their approval to this option considerably more than the higher socioeconomic groups. The anti-intervention groups, however, were also slightly more likely to favor another extreme position, namely that of bombing Iran. In addition, men favor the more militaristic position more often than women⁵⁴.

Furthermore, a prolonged crisis or war can change the initial strong approval of intervention into disapproval, as the cases of Korea and Vietnam demonstrate. For instance, the percentage of respondents in Gallup surveys to the question of whether or not the U.S. made a mistake in sending troops to Vietnam went up from 24 percent in August 1965 to 53 percent in August 1968 to 61 percent in May 1971⁵⁵.

The poll shows that when hypothetical situations are proposed, people are reluctant to intervene militarily. When an actual crisis occurs, the public tends to rally around the President in the short term, but becomes less supportive if a crisis or war drags on with no resolution⁵⁶. Unfortunately, it would seem that the quicker the response, the greater public support for it. Thus, despite years of attempting to unify public crisis response into a single theory, there is, as yet, no way to predict public response to crisis situations.

One aspect of public response that can be researched is that of assessing risk and the acceptability of risk situations. Vlek and Stallen in 1980 proposed the following: "Acceptability of risk does not necessarily covary directly with the degree of risk perceived. Perceived benefits may make even high risks acceptable."⁵⁷. Perception of risk often appears to be dependent upon the amount of publicity a crisis has received through the news media. This leads to the theory that the news media exaggerates the problem of terrorism, spreads alarm and provokes overreaction, aggrandizes and romanticizes the terrorists, even bestows a degree of legitimacy upon them, and inspires others to become terrorists⁵⁸.

A Gallup poll in April 1977, showed that Americans are divided on the issue of media coverage of terrorism. More definitive in their responses were the police chiefs of 30 American cities. Their responses to the question of media coverage of terrorism showed some interesting results:

1. Ninety-three percent of the police chiefs believed live TV coverage of terrorist acts encourages terrorism.
2. None of the police chiefs of large cities surveyed believed that coverage of terrorist acts should be televised live. Sixty percent thought such TV coverage should be delayed or videotaped, and 27 percent believed terrorist acts should not be covered by television.
3. Forty-six percent of police chiefs considered live television coverage of terrorist acts "a great threat" to hostage safety and 33 percent considered it "a moderate threat". Only 7 percent considered it a minimal threat.
4. More than half of the police chiefs had generally unfavorable judgments of on-the-scene television reporters covering terrorists. Twenty percent of the police chiefs believed television reporters covering terrorist acts were "poor" and 33 percent believed they were "average". Only 20 percent believed that TV journalists covering terrorists were good.
5. Sixty-seven percent of the police chiefs said TV journalists should only communicate with terrorists with official consent. Another 33 percent believed that under no circumstances should TV journalists communicate with terrorists while they are engaged in criminal activity⁶⁷.

Through the media, the public sees the government only in crisis, demonstrably unable to provide security for its citizens, sometimes yielding to the terrorist to save lives, unable to bring its enemies to justice⁶⁸. Such public perception may corrode the links between the governed and their government and contribute to

public support for drastic measures to counter terrorism. This is perhaps the greatest danger posed by terrorism: that it will provoke reactions that imperil democracy.

By giving incidents of terrorism enormous coverage, do the news media encourage acts of terrorism? Research into this area indicates that the public believes (by a margin of 64 percent to 27 percent in one poll) this to be true.⁴¹ Initial research tentatively suggests that heavy media coverage of hijacking, kidnapping, and other hostile seizures carried out by terrorists increases the likelihood that similar incidents will occur in the period immediately following. A recent Rand analysis of embassy seizures during the last decade shows them occurring in clusters, clearly suggesting a contagious effect⁴². The recent spate of airline hijackings implied that they also tend to cluster after a well-publicized terrorist success.

These current theories are extremely important when developing a comprehensive policy on terrorism that will be supported by a majority of Americans.

VI. U.S. Challenge

A national strategy to support our policy in combatting terrorism must include measures that will effectively deter these criminal acts. It will take the political, economic, and psychological powers of the nation, together with its Armed Forces to protect our interest, priorities, and policies. Only by showing the world that America has the will - and that our military forces have the capability - to defend and promote its interest can we hope to thwart and deter the terrorist⁴³.

What actions should the United States government take, or prepare to take, to protect our society against those who would attack it by violence for political purposes? What should be the role of military or paramilitary force or other defensive actions against those that might employ violence or manipulation? When should military intervention or preemptive, retaliatory strikes be exercised, upon what evidence, and against whom? What should be our response when threatened with terrorism? Should we attack terrorist bases or countries that are supporting these groups with arms, materials, and money? **

Since World War I, sanctions have been employed by a number of countries in pursuit of foreign policy goals. The United States has practiced and documented 103 cases of sanctions with 68 of them being the art of economic coercion. The popularity of sanctions has waxed and waned over the years, but they have never quite gone out of style. Policy responses have often involved a combination of diplomacy, political coercion, economic coercion, covert action, and military intervention. However, economic sanctions have emerged as the centerpiece when a balance is needed between actions that seem too soft or too strident. In these situations, sanctions have seldom been regarded as the "ideal" weapon; rather they are seen as the "least bad" alternative⁶⁹.

Trade and financial controls are a way to demonstrate resolve, to express outrage, and to seek to deter further abuses without risking dangerous confrontation. However, this sanction is most likely to be effective against the weak and helpless

countries because today it is much easier to find alternate suppliers, markets, and financial backers to replace goods embargoed or funds withheld by the enforcing country.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz said the United States strategy must consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts; and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. We should take steps toward carrying out such measures. There should be no moral confusion on this issue. However, what will be required is public understanding before the fact of the risks involved in combatting terrorism with overt power⁶⁶.

Secretary Shultz made the following points:

- * The public must understand before the fact that there is potential for loss of life of some of our fighting men and the loss of life of some innocent people.
- * The public must understand before the fact that some will seek to cast any preemptive or retaliatory action by us in the worst light and will attempt to make our military and our policymakers - rather than the terrorist - appear to be the culprits.
- * The public must understand before the fact that occasions will come when the government must act before each and every fact is known - and the decisions cannot be tied to the opinion polls⁶⁷.

Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger listed six major tests to be applied when weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad, however, there are only two that are applicable to combatting terrorism:

- * There must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
- * The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort^{ee}.

America has the capability to fight terrorism, but does it have the will to use the force required to stop terrorists? Ambiguity in this critical area has the national leadership in a dilemma as to what ways and means should be used to combat terrorism. As of now, the Administration's hands are tied when fighting terrorism because of a greater fear of a negative public reaction when using force than there is fear of opinion about non-action against terrorist acts. There is no easy answer because our leaders who counter the threat must decide which ambiguous targets will be hit - the terrorist, the cell, the organization, or infrastructure in the sponsoring state. Whichever target they decide to hit, there is always a high risk of killing innocent bystanders while striking back at the terrorist outlaws. The responsibility rests with our elected leaders to decide what response and risk is acceptable against those who commit criminal terrorist acts against the United States and its citizens. However, the response must be justified, lawful, and moral.

In each of the international terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and property there was Just Cause to strike back with overt power, so why didn't we? Our leaders faced a most complex challenge because when a decision to respond may be both necessary and morally justified, there were two principles that had to be adhered to: (1) that any intended response be proportionate to the threat; and (2) that it be highly discriminate in its application. Additionally, there had to be an extremely high likelihood of success with a medium to low risk to our forces. Any government that does not apply the "Just War" theory to its response stands a chance of disrupting its foreign policy, hindering cooperation between friendly nations, and turning the public against the government. The terrorist succeeds if a government responds to violence with repressive, polarizing behavior that alienates the government from the people and its allies. However, on the other side of the coin, the price of short-term weakness is an increased long-term risk.

Our goal must be to deny terrorists the political and psychological benefits of their violence by ensuring that our response is both morally justified and fully supported by national consensus.♦♦ The leadership must be conscious of public opinion. President Reagan has said, "When the emotions of the American people are aroused, when their patriotism and their anger are triggered, there are no limits to their national valor or their consuming passion to protect this nation's cherished tradition of freedom. President Franklin Roosevelt once put it this way: 'The

American people are slow to wrath, but when their wrath is once kindled it burns like a consuming flame." "70

The leadership must become aware that there is a growing tension within the society stemming from concern about the threat of terrorism, resulting in a lower level of tolerance to do nothing to ensure American's safety and a greater tendency to approve of drastic measures to respond against terrorism. (Refer to Appendix C [public opinion survey] for a method to measure American attitude and support for combatting terrorism abroad.)

The U.S. must build a strategy to combat terrorism without reverting to indiscriminate retaliation. A response that will result in the wanton destruction of human life must never happen; it would place us in the same category of murderer as the terrorists themselves. However, the United States must have a credible and moral deterrence policy for terrorism, as it does for conventional and nuclear warfare. How do we go about building a strategy that will give us the ways and means to accomplish this goal?

The U.S. must first focus on the threat of the network of terrorist sponsor-states and the historical precedent that has marked the Soviet Union for the past 147 years:

"The Russians wish to rule the world by conquest; they mean to seize by armed force the countries accessible to them, and thence to oppress the rest of the world by terror. The extension of power they dream of is in no way either intelligent or moral; and if God grant it to them, it will be for the woe of the world."

---The Marquis de Custine (1839)

Although it cannot be proven that the Soviet Union is behind terrorist acts, it condones, supports, and gains the most ground with its use. By supporting terrorism indirectly through surrogates, the Soviet Union hopes to achieve from terrorism the following goals:

1. Waging a "secret war" against individuals considered by the Kremlin as "mortal enemies" of Communism and the Soviet Union.
2. Weakening the political, economic, and military infrastructure of anti-Soviet alliances such as NATO.
3. Initiating proxy operations in distant geographic locations where direct organized conventional military activities are logistically impractical.
4. Influencing developments in neighboring countries.
5. Stirring up trouble for the United States in the highly visible region of Central America, particularly where such a policy entails no serious financial burden and is politically low-risk because of the use of surrogates like Cuba and Nicaragua.
6. Helping to create new states in which it will have considerable influence as a result of its support of those nations' claims for self-determination.⁷¹

VII. Mutual Deterrence Strategy

Combatting terrorism must be a top priority of all democratic nations because their interests are threatened by hostile actions. However, one nation will not unilaterally solve the terrorist problem. International

information-sharing and mutual support agreements must be developed to contain the future spread of terrorism and only through the U.S. leadership, can we formulate a cooperative multinational group of European and Middle Eastern states willing to defeat terrorism. To attain such international cooperation, terrorist actions must be narrowly defined. Measures designed to isolate offenders must be balanced against the need to obtain or maintain the broadest possible international consensus.⁷²

The U.S. and its allies must convey to our opponents a commitment to defend national interest against all terrorist acts. It must closely resemble a fully blown ultimatum. The terrorist and the sponsor states will only understand a specific and clear demand with a threat that is both credible and sufficiently potent. The objective of the group is to deter countries from supporting terrorism and make terrorist acts against the multinational countries counterproductive and costly, so that potential perpetrators will think twice about noncompliance, and view compliance as preferable. This strategy must be backed by nations willing to overcome the threat of terrorism which plagues the democratic nations. Each of the deterring powers must diplomatically through its embassies, and politically through its national leadership, simultaneously convey to terrorist states that it has the will and resolution to defend its interests against terrorism and will do so from this time forward. Responsible nations

must stand together to deter the terrorists and the network of sponsor-states.

The key to this proposal is that each nation must possess the capabilities for carrying out its threat individually or collectively through the means of national economic and political sanctions, the law, and military response. Each nation within the multinational group must, on principle, refuse to negotiate with terrorists or grant concessions. It must also be willing to place its national powers together with the other nations and, if necessary, to cut off all economic dealings with a terrorist sponsor-state. Sanctions must impose the maximum cost on the target country. Ones that bite are sanctions that work.⁷³

Another area that the multinational leadership must agree on are joint targets, specifically those that would cause the absolute minimum loss of life within terrorist sponsor-states. However, they should be ones that consequently would result in a significant loss to the country and its leadership (oil wells, gas and oil lines, electric generating and relay stations, communication and radar sites, etc.) The multinational leadership must look on force as an extension of the political solution for fighting terrorism. The military option would be used as a last resort when deterrence has failed and with the least amount of force necessary to curtail future acts. An example would be a surgical air strike against an approved target.

Only through a deterrence with strength that comes as a viable threat backed by responsible nations will terrorist sponsor-states understand our serious commitment. No terrorist act must go unanswered. Those responsible must be held accountable. Where there is law, there is order. Where there is no order, such as in Lebanon, nor respect for international law, as in Libya and Iran, there is a need for an outside enforcer of the law if there is to be stability within the regions. The U.S. must set the example in the fight against terrorism and serve notice to all who violate international law.

A mutual deterrence strategy will give the U.S., or any other democratic nation, the support and cooperation necessary to strike when all other means fail at an approved target when there is just cause. It will allow the U.S. and its allies to strike in their own time, and from any direction once the intelligence network has definitely determined an attack has come from a terrorist group that was sponsored by an outlaw state. It will place surprise on our side, plus give us a strategy that provides for the ends, ways, and means to counter and defeat terrorism.

As part of the strategy, there must be a policing of the news media to deny terrorists the publicity they seek and require for their cause. The leadership of the media must be encouraged to police themselves through some sort of a National Media Executive Council which is made up of senior

officials from television, radio, newspapers and magazines. Members of the news media must become responsible citizens and help the national leadership to halt terrorism. Racing off to the "big story" and publicizing criminal acts is falling into the terrorist's hands.

If the terrorists are not stopped now, terrorism in the future will most probably escalate to even greater magnitudes of violence and move into the United States. As these outlaw states and the terrorists they sponsor become bolder and not held accountable for their actions, we face a very high risk that may result in the following:

1. A large-scale threat to human life with the use of horrifying instruments of war, such as chemical, biological, or even atomic or nuclear weapons.
2. The occurrence of a threat of significant damage, disruption, or dislocation to public facilities.

These acts must never be allowed to happen because they will lead to a threatened and alarmed public that will likely demand prompt action to remove the threat at whatever cost. Therefore any increases in threats of great magnitude will inevitably result in demands for drastic measures and involve the President even more directly in making decisions, shaping attitudes, and reducing alarm.⁷⁴

Defeating international terrorism must be an important objective of American foreign policy. It should not take a back seat when Americans are the targets and are being kidnapped and

killed. It is a major threat that is like a cancer. If it is left unchecked, it will spread into the United States. It is directed against us, the democracies, against our most basic values and our national interest.⁷⁸ Many Americans have given their lives over the years, enforcing the law that was passed by our Congress of the United States; preserving the philosophies of the Declaration of Independence and making it something of truth and value. Today those rights are threatened and it is time we defend our democratic rights and preserve our freedom.

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
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Appendix A

Graphs of Terrorist Activities

Chart 1


International Terrorist
Incidents, 1980-1985



(From Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984, p. ii)

Chart 2

Global Distribution of
International Terrorist Incidents, 1984




(From Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984, p. ii)

Chart 3

U.S. Casualties Resulting From
International Terrorist
Incidents, 1980-85

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

US CASUALTIES FROM TERRORISM




(From Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984, p. 5)

Appendix B

Map of Terrorist Activity

Appendix B International Terrorist Incidents, 1984



Appendix C

Public Opinion Survey

Survey Questionnaire
Cover Letter

The United States government wishes to know your feelings about terrorism and your attitude toward combatting acts of terror against Americans. Additionally, we would like to know just a little about you so we can see how different groups of people feel about the issues we have been examining. As part of a survey on America's response to terrorism, you have been selected to receive this questionnaire through your passport number and with the concurrence of the State Department.

Please indicate your answer by checking the appropriate box or boxes. Answer all applicable questions. Upon completion of this questionnaire, fold out the panel that reveals the address and then seal it with the adhesive strip running along the edge.

Please mail within fifteen days of receipt of questionnaire. Postage has already been paid. Your assistance and promptness is requested and will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Survey Questionnaire

Please indicate your answer by checking the appropriate box or boxes.

1. Sex

female ☐
male ☐

2. Age

18-24 ☐
25-29 ☐
30-49 ☐
50-64 ☐
65+ ☐

3. Occupation

Professional/Business...☐
Clerical/Sales.....☐
Manual Worker.....☐
Military.....☐
Retired.....☐
Student.....☐
Other.....(please state)

4. Income level

\$40,000 or over ☐
\$30,000-\$39,999 ☐
\$20,000-\$29,999 ☐
\$10,000-\$19,999 ☐
under \$10,000 ☐

5. From which region of the U.S. do you come?

East ☐
Midwest ☐
South ☐
West ☐

6. What type of area are you from?

Center City ☐
Suburbs ☐
Rural/Country ☐

7. What level of schooling have you completed?

College graduate.....☐
College incomplete.....☐
High school graduate.....☐
Less than h.s. graduate...☐

8. What is your political preference?

Republican.....[]

Democrat.....[]

Independent.....[]

Other.....[]

9. How important do you think the threat of international terrorism is to this country today?

Very Important.....[]

Somewhat Important.....[]

Not Very Important.....[]

10. What is the primary source of your information on terrorism?

Newspaper []

Radio []

T.V. []

Magazines []

Friends []

Other.....

11. The numbers on this question go from the highest (+5) -for a very favorable opinion - to the lowest (-5)- for a very unfavorable opinion. Please indicate how you would rate the following people by checking the appropriate box.

Person	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	Don't Know	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Yassir Arafat of the PLO	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
Mosammar Khadafy of Libya	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
Ayatollah Khomeini Of Iran	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

12. Please check the countries that you know support terrorists.

Greece []	Israel []	North Korea []
Iran []	Egypt []	Cuba []
France []	Libya []	Nicaragua []
Lebanon []	Soviet Union []	
Syria []	Saudi Arabia []	

13. Please check the answer which you feel is correct.

A. The embassy hostages in Iran were held for:

30 days.....[]

90 days.....[]

222 days...[]

444 days...[]

B. TWA Flight 847 hostages were held in:

Lebanon []

Egypt []

Iran []

C. What was the Achille Lauro crisis?

- Hijacked airplane ☐
- Hijacked ship ☐
- Hijacked train ☐

D. U.S.Navy F-14s forced down an Egyptian airliner carrying the Achille Lauro terrorists in:

- Israel (Tel Aviv) ☐
- Egypt (Cairo) ☐
- Italy (Sicily) ☐
- Greece (Athens) ☐

15. Have you traveled to Western Europe or the Middle East in the past 5 years?

No ☐

Yes ☐ ,if yes, for what reason:

- Business ☐
- Pleasure ☐
- Military ☐
- Student ☐

16. Have you lived outside the U.S. in the last five years?

No ☐

Yes ☐ , if yes, please indicate location:

- Western Europe ☐
- Middle East ☐
- Other(please state)

17. Are you planning a trip to Western Europe or the Middle East in the next year?

No ☐

Yes ☐ , if yes, for what reason:

- Business ☐
- Pleasure ☐
- Military ☐
- Student ☐

18. Do you plan to live outside the U.S. in the next year?

No ☐

Yes ☐ , if yes please indicate location:

- Western Europe ☐
- Middle East ☐
- Other.....(please state)

19. If you have traveled or lived outside the U.S. in the past five years, please answer the following questions: (If not please skip to question 20)

A. Were you accompanied by your spouse/family?

- No ☐
- Yes ☐

B. How vulnerable to terrorists did you feel while traveling or living outside the U.S.?

Very vulnerable ☐
 Vulnerable ☐
 Reasonable safe ☐
 Very safe ☐
 Not sure ☐

C. How secure do/did you feel about the following:
 (Please answer only those that are applicable.)

Place	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Very Poor
1. Personal safety	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Work place	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Housing area	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Shopping area	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. Schools	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

(including bus)

20. Have you or your family ever received any briefings on terrorism?

No ☐

Yes ☐. If yes, please check which of the following you received:

Type of Info	Terrorist Threat	How to operate in this environment	What to look for
Briefings	☐	☐	☐
Classes	☐	☐	☐
Lectures	☐	☐	☐
Handouts	☐	☐	☐

How helpful was the information you received:
 (Outstanding) (no benefit)

+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

21. Would you prefer to receive information on terrorism and how to prepare for it before traveling abroad?

No ☐

Yes ☐

22. Do you feel terrorist activities against U.S. citizens will:

Decline.....☐

Stay about the same ☐

Increase.....☐

Not sure.....☐

23. How much responsibility should the U.S. government take to protect American citizens who are abroad?

Maximum responsibility ☐

Some responsibility ☐

Little responsibility ☐

No responsibility ☐

Not sure ☐

24. What should the U.S. do when Americans are taken hostage by terrorists?

- Use force to gain their release ☐ ☐
 Negotiate with the terrorists ☐ ☐
 Refuse to negotiate with terrorists ☐ ☐

25. On a scale of +5 to -5, how much risk is acceptable if the U.S. uses force to gain the release of hostages?

	(Great Risk)					(Not Sure)			(No Risk)		
	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Hostages Killed	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Hostage Wounded	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Rescuers Killed	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Rescuer Wounded	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

26. What method should the U.S. use to negotiate the release of hostages?

- Not be too compromising ☐ ☐
 Negotiate and use diplomacy ☐ ☐
 Go along with the demands ☐ ☐
 Refuse to negotiate ☐ ☐

26a. If you answered "refuse to negotiate", what action/actions would most likely change your mind?

<u>Hostages</u> <u>Captivity</u>	<u>Hostages</u> <u>Wounded</u>	<u>Hostages</u> <u>Killed</u>
Days ☐	One ☐	One ☐
Months ☐	Three ☐	Three ☐
Year ☐	Ten ☐	Ten ☐
More than a year ☐	More than ten ☐	More than ten ☐

26b. If you elected to change your decision based on hostages being killed, would you recommend:

- going along with terrorist demands.....☐ ☐
 using force to gain the release of hostages.....☐ ☐

27. What response should the U.S. make against countries that sponsor terrorism? (Please list in order of preference.)

- First choice ☐ A. Economic sanctions
 Second choice ☐ B. Political sanctions
 Third choice ☐ C. Military force
 D. None of the above

28. When should the U.S. use force against a terrorist attack?

- Immediately.....☐ ☐ Never....☐ ☐
 After Other Means Fail...☐ ☐ Not Sure.☐ ☐

29. Do you think the U.S. should retaliate with force against countries that support terrorist acts against Americans?
No ☐ ☐
Yes ☐ ☐
Not sure ☐ ☐
30. Should the U.S. and its allies assign "hit squads" to hunt down hijackers?
No ☐ ☐
Yes ☐ ☐
31. Should the U.S. and its allies offer large rewards for information that reveals terrorist activities and leads to the arrest and prosecution of terrorists?
No ☐ ☐
Yes ☐ ☐
If yes, how much should the reward be:
\$50,000 ☐ ☐
\$100,000 ☐ ☐
\$200,000 ☐ ☐
\$500,000 ☐ ☐
32. Do you want a news media day-to-day account of terrorist hostage-taking?
No ☐ ☐
Yes ☐ ☐
33. Do you think the news media is undermining the U.S. government's position by presenting the terrorist views and demands to the American people?
Yes.....☐ ☐
No.....☐ ☐
Not sure☐ ☐
34. Do you think the news media is being used by the terrorists?
No ☐ ☐
Yes ☐ ☐
Not sure ☐ ☐
35. During a crisis such as hostage-taking, should the news media use more discretion in reporting, rather than rushing to the scene for the "big story"?
Yes.....☐ ☐
No.....☐ ☐
Not sure..☐ ☐
36. Should the news media keep pressure on the government to gain the release of hostages?
No ☐ ☐
Yes ☐ ☐
Not sure ☐ ☐

37. How would you respond to the following actions against terrorism:

	Support Strongly					Not Sure					Disapprove Strongly				
	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5				
a. stronger airport security	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐				
b. personal body search at airports	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐				
c. prohibiting travel to countries with large numbers of terrorist incidents	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐				
d. death penalty for terrorists	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐				
e. a world police force against terrorism	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐				
f. armed guards on all flights to Middle East	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐				
g. suspending the legal rights of terrorist prisoners	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐				
h. restricting news media coverage of terrorist incidents	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐				

38. How would you rate the job the President is doing to control international terrorism?

Excellent ☐
 Good ☐
 Fair ☐
 Poor ☐
 Very Poor ☐

39. Do you have any recommendations that will help the U.S. prevent and deter terrorist acts?
 Please use the space below to list them.

END

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