


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
WEST EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE
DETERRENCE AND STRAT (U) INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY
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WEST EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE, DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY

Volume V—Chinese Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy

**Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
675 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139-3396
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15 May 1984


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY N/A since Unclassified		3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A since Unclassified		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) DNA-TR-84-109-V5	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Director Defense Nuclear Agency	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Washington, DC 20305-1000	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 675 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139-3396		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER DNA 001-81-C-0198	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM ELEMENT NO 62715H PROJECT NO V99QAXN TASK NO L WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO DH005532	
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) WEST EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE, DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY Volume V—Chinese Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr.; Davis, Jacquelyn K.; Dougherty, James E.; and Perry, Charles M.			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Technical		13b. TIME COVERED FROM 821201 TO 840515	
14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 840515		15. PAGE COUNT 188	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION This work was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency under RDT&E RMSS Code B383081466 V99QAXNL00063 H2590D.			
17. COSATI CODES FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP 8 6 6 16		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Beijing's World View Cultural Revolution China's Decisionmaking Structure Four Modernizations Chinese Nuclear Doctrines East Asian Military Balance	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This study assesses Chinese defense and foreign policy perspectives, especially as they influence, and are influenced by, China's strategic approach to international issues. Special emphasis is placed on China's recent perspectives on the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States, together with other major countries, as well as the Third World. China's views on international and regional security issues are assessed with reference both to Marxist and more traditional Chinese influences, including the perspective of Mao's "Three Worlds" and the revisions that have been made in this view—which might now be called a "unified front strategy at the global level." This study also identifies the principal members of the strategic and foreign policy elite in the PRC and examines their perspectives on such key issues as the U.S.-Soviet strategic equation and its implications for the military balance in the Asian-Pacific region; arms control and disarmament schemes (especially with respect to nuclear weapons); the credibility of the U.S. protective guarantee for allies in East Asia; trends in the regional nuclear power balance (including the question of nuclear			
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☐ UNCLASSIFIED-UNLIMITED ☒ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Betty L. Fox		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (202) 325-7042	
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18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continued)

Mao's "Three World" Theory
People's Liberation Army
Sino-Soviet Split
U.S.-China Relations

19. ABSTRACT (Continued)

proliferation in Asia); and the prospects for future Sino-American cooperation.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the People's Republic of China (PRC), questions of defense and national security are viewed very broadly and in a long-term strategic context. Indeed, China's global outlook and strategy are based largely on the theoretical formulations propounded by Mao Zedong and subsequently expanded or refined by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others. These formulations are rooted both in Marxism-Leninism and in Chinese historical and philosophical traditions.

China's world view, nevertheless, has evolved markedly over the years and has provided a rationalization and justification for sharp changes in Chinese policies. Mao, for example, initially posited a two-camp theory, declaring in 1949 that China would lean to one side, that of the Soviet Union, and that there was no alternative to joining either the Soviet Union or U.S. bloc. By the 1970s, however, China's global outlook had been reordered substantially to fit Mao's "three world" view in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were lumped together as the two superpowers to comprise the "first world"; the developed industrial countries of Western Europe and Japan were the "second world"; and the rest of the world, essentially poorer, less developed countries, comprised the "third world," a category in which China placed itself.

Although seldom if ever publicly stated, the following appear to be the core elements of China's national strategy: maintain China's independence and sovereignty, relying primarily on indigenous resources; combine with others with

parallel interests to combat a common threat, i.e., Soviet expansionism; augment China's conventional and strategic capabilities with a latent "strategic relationship" with the United States to deter Soviet attack; avoid at all costs a multifront, multienemy war; do not initiate military action unless China can control the scope of the conflict; recover territorial claims and unify China as circumstances permit; and gain stable foreign trade partners and access to modern technology.

China purports to view the nuclear weapons equation primarily in global rather than regional terms, and as an element in the rivalry of the two superpowers. Chinese authorities, moreover, have expressed skepticism that U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks actually will slow the nuclear arms race. They have even suggested that both sides sought to make disarmament serve the purpose of achieving military superiority, and carried out bilateral talks merely to work out "rules of the game" and reduce costs.

This "evenhanded" Chinese media treatment accords with Beijing's "independent" foreign policy line and tactical equidistancing of itself from the Soviet Union and the United States, but it does not accord with Beijing's actual assessment of the strategic situation or the implications for its security. On several occasions, China expressed "grave concern" over the buildup of Soviet strategic forces in Asia and indications that the Soviets might redeploy to Asia those SS-20s removed from the European theater under an INF agreement.

Moreover, even though China now refused to join with the United States in warnings about Soviet expansionism, its

concern over the Soviet threat to its security remains a significant element in Beijing's view of the U.S.-PRC relationship. There has been a significant upturn in that relationship since fall 1983. An exchange of visits in 1984 between Premier Zhao and President Reagan underscored the mutual benefits of this relationship and led to agreements concerning nuclear energy cooperation, Chinese access to advanced technology and some weapons systems, and various trade and investment issues.

We conclude from this broad survey that overall the PRC elite consider domestic threats to national security to be primary, closely followed by the external threats posed by the USSR, while a third threat is that posed by U.S. policies toward Taiwan. There are differences within the Party leadership on the priority to be accorded foreign and domestic threats and the appropriate policies that follow therefrom. While these differences in perception are liable to continue under the present leadership, so is their current tendency to compromise their differences and strive for a consensus. There is no argument in Chinese leadership circles, for example, over China's need for a peaceful environment in order to achieve the necessary conditions for modernization. However, after generational succession occurs within the next decade or so, the possible alternative strategies of the new Chinese elite are wide ranging and include even the development of a policy of genuine detente with the Soviet Union, a possibility for which the United States should already be initiating contingency plans.

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SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

In trying to assess the global outlook and strategy of the People's Republic of China (PRC), it is helpful to understand how Beijing approaches these questions and how it defines its national goals. The one-word answer is: broadly.

To the PRC, national security means more than the defense of its borders. One China scholar has defined the PRC's current security concerns as domestic political stability and economic growth.^(6, pp.61-62) Another observer has noted the abiding concern of Chinese leaders with the question of national unity, a concern which embraces not only reunification with Taiwan, but broad spectrum domestic issues, including those related to the national minorities, civil-military relations, and public acceptance of the government/Party apparatus and its policies. But the paramount concern of China's leaders is the central role and vitality of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): any "anti-Party" action that serves to weaken the CCP or challenge its authority will be interpreted as a threat to national security.

Similarly, perceived external threats to PRC security are not confined to the military realm. Soviet "hegemonism" is not considered as much a direct threat to China as it is a threat to other nations' sovereignty, and to world political and economic order, and hence to China's overall security. There are perceived Western threats to Chinese security as well -- U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for example. In recent

years, some Chinese leaders have also warned of the loss of economic independence or the danger of ideological contamination inherent in the import of Western technology and capital, and the concomitant increase in Western bourgeois influence. (40; 53, pp.K6-7)

The Chinese take a similarly broad view toward the concept of deterrence. This view emphasizes the psychological and political dimensions of deterrence, and appears influenced by a confluence of historical, geographic, demographic and ideological considerations. While China evidently hopes to attain maximum deterrence from its minimal strategic arsenal, it downplays its nuclear retaliatory capability and assured destruction levels, and instead stresses its capacity to survive any form of attack and eventually defeat any foe that invades China. On the political and psychological level, until 1982 China played up the deterrent value of the "broadest possible international united front against Soviet hegemonism" and also counted on the U.S.-PRC relationship to restrain the Soviets. Since fall 1982 these themes have been dropped from official statements and by Chinese media, but they probably remain valid concepts within the context of Chinese deterrence strategy. The PRC may well consider that the greatest benefit of the 1979 attack on Vietnam was its challenge to the perceived Soviet military superiority in the region and the subsequent perception in Asia and elsewhere that the Soviets were deterred from retaliating militarily in support of their Vietnamese ally.

In the related area of strategy, Chinese media is replete with strategic assessments of world developments, which

are also reflected in Chinese discussions with foreign officials and visitors and, evidently, at Party and government meetings (judging from documents later reprinted outside China). There is a substantial body of Chinese strategic writing, the substance of which will be discussed later in this study. Currently, the most frequently cited formulations of global strategy are Mao Zedong's theory of the three worlds and Zhou Enlai's principles of peaceful coexistence and views on superpower rivalry and Soviet strategy.(26, 27, 77, 42) Since the deaths of Mao and Zhou in 1976, major PRC foreign policy actions and statements have usually been legitimized in terms of fealty to their views. This has not precluded an evolving and nuanced interpretation of Soviet and U.S. strategy nor a changing assessment of the implications for China's security.(47, pp.54-61) But it does mean that China's policies and actions are asserted to be correct responses to long-term strategic trends and not based on expedient tactical considerations. A statement in the January 11, 1982 issue of Beijing Review illustrates this point:

The Chinese Government always has global strategic considerations in mind in handling its relations with the United States. In the matter of settling the issue of the United States selling arms to Taiwan, it has also given due consideration to global strategy, while upholding its own national sovereignty.(61, p.10)

In contrast to the wealth of Chinese analysis on global and regional strategic trends -- which sometimes treats China as though it were a disinterested party -- there is a paucity of public comment on China's own security concepts and defense strategy. This reticence masks an intense interest in the

subject within military and Party circles. In recent years, China has established several military and strategic think-tanks, reinvigorated its military academy and school system, and prescribed intensive training in military strategy and doctrine for senior officials. Until recently, Mao's military thinking was proclaimed the underlying military strategy for the defense of China.^(51; 7) While Mao has not been discredited, Deng Xiaoping's speeches and instructions are now cited as the basic guide in army-building and military policy.⁽⁵⁵⁾

As a final introductory observation, it is important to evaluate Chinese perspectives on security and strategy at three levels: what the PRC says publicly, for the record; what it says privately to privileged foreign visitors or to elite domestic audiences; and what it actually does. These three elements interact, can be mutually reinforcing, and are usually in rough harmony. If a basic change is made in PRC foreign or defense policy, the strategic and theoretical framework will be modified to accommodate the shift. What the Chinese actually do is not always easy to ascertain since military actions are shrouded in secrecy. The Chinese have been unwilling to discuss their 1979 incursion into Vietnam with foreigners and have apparently provided few details even to elite domestic audiences. Beijing has let some events speak for themselves, as for example the September 1981 military exercises north of Beijing which foreign observers concluded were clearly designed to demonstrate the PLA's determination and capability to resist a major Soviet land attack.

Sometimes the three elements described above may be in

contradiction, perhaps deliberately so. For example, Deng Xiaoping has threatened to play "the Russian card" in "off-the-record" conversations with visiting officials despite Chinese media disclaimers that the PRC would ever do so. (35, p.155; 118, p.W1)

In the past decade, China's military expenditures and defense preparations have been at a lower level than its public estimation of the Soviet threat would seem to warrant. One explanation is that the Chinese believe that public "exposure" of Soviet machinations and designs will itself have a salutary deterrent effect. And the Chinese media will occasionally use historical allusions or allegory to reflect one or both sides of a Party debate on a critical foreign policy or security issue before it has been resolved. For example, in 1981 articles describing alleged policy disagreements between two 19th century Chinese officials suggested current Party debate over (1) whether recovery of Taiwan or resistance to the Soviet Union would have the higher priority, and (2) whether defense of China's far northwest (Xinjiang) should take priority over coastal defense of the PRC. (91, pp.1-2; 6, p.13; 84, pp.306-307)

Before we can speak intelligently about the evolution of Chinese security perspectives, however, we must first acquire a better understanding of the PRC's decision-making process. It is to this task we now turn.

SECTION 2

DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY ELITES: THE CHINESE DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE

2.1 CENTRAL POLICY-MAKING BODIES: SECRETARIAT, POLITBURO AND STANDING COMMITTEE.

In the PRC, all major policy decisions in all areas of policy are made by the central decision-making bodies of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter: CCP). The subsystems of the civilian Party machine, the state administrative machine (including the diplomatic apparat), and the military leadership, as such, are restricted to executive functions. They may, however, suggest policy decisions, which then have to be conveyed to the central Party organs via the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee. Members of the civilian Party machine, the administrative machine, and the military leadership organs, however, do influence central decision-making if they are, concurrently, members of the central organs -- and in that capacity only. As we shall see later, this general rule does not apply to the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee (hereafter: MC), which has direct access to the Politburo, and to its Standing Committee, organizationally, and displays a rather high degree of concurrence with these bodies in terms of its current personnel composition.

2.1.1 The Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee.

The Secretariat, which was first established at the Eighth CCP Party Congress in September 1956, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping as Secretary General (not of the Party,

but of the Central Committee), was then in charge of the day-to-day administrative work of the Party machine. Abolished in late 1966 during the Cultural Revolution, its reestablishment began after the 3rd plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee (December 18-22, 1978) in early 1979, and it was officially reinstituted by the 5th plenum on February 29, 1980.

Since then, the Secretariat

- has served as organizational head of the civilian Party machine;
- has conducted the day-by-day affairs of general Party work;
- has screened all policy proposals and reports submitted to the Politburo by any Party, state administrative, or military organ (with the exception of the MC);
- has established a Policy Research Office as a major policy-planning body;
- has submitted its own policy proposals to the Politburo as well as to the Standing Committee of the Politburo; and,
- has commissioned investigations for the evaluation of policy implementation, which it then submits to the Politburo and its Standing Committee.

The Secretariat seems to convene every Tuesday afternoon for a regular meeting of three to four hours, and it usually holds about one-to-two additional extraordinary meetings per week.

Members of the Secretariat apparently decide as a collective body. Besides this, however, every member has a special area of responsibility, in which he operates with a personal staff of between 15 and 25 persons.

Since the 1st plenum of the Twelfth CCP Central

Committee (September 11-12, 1982), the Secretariat consists of the following members:

(Legend for this and all following tables):

Year of birth; Province of birth; LM - Participant in Long March 1934/35; I.-IV. or NC - Affiliation with PLA Field Armies in 1948/49; K - Participant in Korean War; P - Purged during the Cultural Revolution; S - Survived in office during the Cultural Revolution; A - Advanced in career during the Cultural Revolution; PBSC - Politburo Standing Committee; PB - Politburo; CC - Central Committee full member.

Table 1. Members of the CCP Central Committee's Secretariat, September 1982.

Full Secretaries:

1. Hu Yaobang Secretary General	: 1915 ; Hunan ; LM; II. ; -; P; PBSC.
2. Chen Pixian	: 1912 ; Fujian ; - ; - ; -; P; CC.
3. Xi Zhongxun	: 1913 ; Shaanxi ; LM; I. ; -; P; PB.
4. Hu Qili	: 1929 ; Shaanxi ; - ; - ; -; P; CC.
5. Gu Mu	: 1914 ; Shandong ; LM; - ; -; P; CC.
6. Deng Liqun	: 1920 ; Hunan ; - ; - ; -; P; CC.
7. Wan Li	: 1912 ; Shandong ; - ; - ; -; P; PB.
8. Yao Yilin	: 1917 ; Anhui ; - ; NC ; -; P; PB alt.
9. General Yu Qiuli	: 1914 ; Sichuan ; LM; I. ; -; S; PB

Alternate Secretaries:

1. Qiao Shi	: 1924 ; Hunan ; - ; - ; K; P; CC.
2. Ms. Hao Jianxiu	: 1936 ; Shandong ; - ; - ; -; A; CC.

By the end of June 1983, an entirely clear division of responsibilities between the members of the Secretariat was not yet recognizable. But it seems that Wan Li is responsible for the coordination of the work of the central Party machine with that of the organs of the State apparatus and for Agriculture. Before his death on January 6, 1983, Yang Yong was in charge of Military Affairs, now probably handled by Yu Qiuli. Chen Pixian may deal with Security and Intelligence, Xi Zhongxun with Judicial and Legal Affairs. Deng Liqun is in charge of Propaganda, Education, Culture, and Ideology, and Yao Yilin of Economic Planning. Gu Mu may take care of Finance and Trade, and Hu Qili of General Affairs in the Party machine.

On December 31, 1983 the average age of the Full Secretaries was 66.8, down from 70.5 for the Secretaries before the XIIth Party Congress. If the two alternates are included, the average age will stand at 64.3. Four, or less than half of the whole group of the eleven cadres, participated in the Long March, while two others joined the CCP before the end of 1935 without participating in the Long March. The one remaining military man on the Secretariat had belonged to the I. Field Army, while one each of the civilian members has historic connections with the I., II., and the North China Field Armies. One alternate (Qiao Shi, with a propaganda team in Korea 1951-53) had participated in the Korean War. Eight secretaries and one alternate were purged during the Cultural Revolution, one secretary survived in office, while the career of one alternate significantly advanced during and in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.

2.1.2 The Politburo.

As in all ruling and most other communist parties, the Politburo is the major policy-making body in the CCP. All major policy decisions in all areas of domestic and foreign politics have to be passed by this body, mostly upon recommendations prepared by the Secretariat, and first approved by the Standing Committee of the Politburo (vide infra). This Standing Committee has more and more assumed a number of decision-making powers, particularly since the Politburo seems to convene only about ten to twelve times per year. Yet all decisions of major importance, and of long-lasting influence, as well as all major personnel decisions, are still submitted to the Politburo, which, in early 1984, consists of 24 full members and 3 nonvoting members, as listed below (Nos. 1-6 according to the official "pecking order," Nos. 7-24 and alternates according to customary Western alphabetical order based on a previously used Romanization system).

Table 2. Members of the CCP Politburo, March 1984.

1. Hu Yaobang	: 1915 ; Hunan	LM; II.; -; P; PBS.
2. Marshal Ye Jianying	: 1897 ; Guangdong;	LM; IV.; -; S; PBS.
3. Deng Xiaoping	: 1904 ; Sichuan	; LM; II.; -; P; PBS.
4. Zhao Ziyang	: 1919 ; Henan	; - ; - ; -; P; PBS.
5. Li Xianian	: 1905 ; Hubei	; LM; III.; -; S; PBS.
6. Chen Yun	: 1905 ; Shanghai	; LM; - ; -; P; PBS.
7. General Zhang Tingfa	: 1914 ; Hunan	; LM; III.; -; P.
8. Fang Yi	: 1912 ; Fujian	; - ; - ; -; S.
9. Xi Zhongxun	: 1913 ; Shaanxi	; LM; I. ; -; P.

10. Marshal Xu Xiangqian :1902 ; Shanxi ; LM; - ; -; S.
11. Hu Qiaomu :1908 ; Jiangsu ; - ; - ; -; P.
12. General Li Desheng :1916 ; Hubei ; LM; II.; K; A.
13. Ni Zhifu :1932 ; Shanghai ; - ; - ; -; A.
14. Marshal Nie Rongzhen :1899 ; Sichuan ; LM; NC ; -; S.
15. Peng Zhen :1902 ; Shanxi ; - ; - ; -; P.
16. Song Renqiong :1909 ; Hunan ; LM; II.; -; P.
17. Mme. Deng Yingchao :1904 ; Henan ; LM; - ; -; S.
18. Ulanhu :1906 ; Nei Monggol ; -; NC ; -; P.
19. Wan Li :1912 ; Shandong ; - ; - ; -; P.
20. General Wang Zhen :1908 ; Hunan ; LM; I. ; -; S.
21. General Wei Guoqing :1906 ; Guangxi ; LM; III.; -; S.
22. Yang Shangkun :1907 ; Sichuan ; LM; - ; -; P.
23. General Yang Dezhi :1910 ; Hunan ; LM; NC ; K; S.
24. General Yu Qiuli :1914 ; Sichuan ; LM; I. ; -; S.

Alternative Politburo Members:

1. Ms. Chen Muhua :1921 ; Shandong ; - ; - ; -; S.
2. General Qin Jiwei :1912 ; Hubei ; LM; II.; K; P.
3. Yao Yilin :1917 ; Anhua ; - ; NC ; -; P.

The twenty-four full members of the Politburo have an average age of 73.9 (up from 71.18 for this group before the XIIth Party Congress), and, if one includes the three alternates, the average age stood at 73 at the end of 1983 (up from 71). Eighteen, or almost 75 percent, of the full members are 70 years old or older. It should be noted that the four southern-inland

provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, and Jiangxi, which embrace about 23.5 percent of China's populace, are represented by ten full members (or 40 percent) of the Politburo. Seventeen, or 71 percent, of the full members participated in the Long March, and four others also joined the Party before the end of 1935, while only one became a CCP member after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Twelve full members and two alternates were purged in the Cultural Revolution and later rehabilitated, and ten full members and one alternate survived it in office, while two full members advanced during the Cultural Revolution. Nine full members out of 24, and one alternate out of three, hold a military rank, while one (Li Xiannian, a corps commander in 1949) left the PLA in early 1950.

In terms of Field Army connections, the I. Field Army has three former members on the Politburo, the II. four, the III. four, the IV. one, and the North China Field Army three. With the addition of Marshall Xu Xiangqian, who has long been connected with the central PLA leadership, but has no distinct Field Army connections, this means that 16 out of 24 full members (or two-thirds) were engaged in the PLA as commanding officers or political commissars during the civil war, while only two Politburo members and one alternate (Li Desheng, Yang Dezhi, and Qin Jiwei) participated in the Korean War. In the group of 27 full members and alternates, there are now ten (or 37%) who must be considered military men. Although somewhat down from the 38.5 percent level set by the preceding Politburo group, the significance of this strong PLA representation cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, it is a central characteristic of the CCP, and has distinguished

it -- at least since 1956 -- from all other ruling communist parties.

2.1.3 The Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo.

Different from other communist-ruled countries, yet in accordance with the Soviet practice during the last years of the Stalin era, the CCP, in 1956, established within the Politburo still another organ as the very core of political leadership and decision-making: The Standing Committee of the Politburo. Consisting of between five and eleven members, this group must be considered as the real center of decision-making between 1962 and 1966, in 1969-1970, from 1973-1975, and again since early 1980. Very little information is available concerning its modes of operation, but it definitely substitutes for the Politburo once that organ is not in session. It may convene either once a week or at least twice a month, although we do not have any reliable data about the frequency of its meetings. Currently, the Standing Committee consists of six members, who have been listed above with their major data in the first six places of the Politburo.

After Hua Guofeng was purged from the Politburo at the 1st plenum of the XIIth Central Committee, the Standing Committee included:

- Hu Yaobang, Secretary General of the Central Committee;
- Marshal Ye Jianying, Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Committee's MC;
- Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the CCP Central Committee's MC and Chairman of the CCP Central Advisory Committee;
- Zhao Ziyang, Prime Minister of the State Council;

- Li Xiannian, President of the PRC; and
- Chen Yun, First Secretary of the CCP Central Disciplinary Investigation Commission and Chairman of the CCP Center's Informal Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs.

By the end of 1983, this group had an average age of 75.5 (up from 72.6 for the group before the XIIth Party Congress), with four out of six members older than 70. Five of the six members participated in the Long March, while the remaining one joined the CCP in 1938. Hence, these six leaders have been CCP members for an average of almost 54 years. Ye Yianying, who has longstanding connections with the IV. Field Army system, is the only career military man in this group. Deng and Hu Yaobang, however, served as political commissars in the II. Field Army until 1950-51, and Li had been a commanding officer with the III. and IV. Field Armies until the end of the civil war. Four of the six members of the Standing Committee had been purged during the Cultural Revolution, while two (Ye and Li) survived it in office. Finally, it should be noted that Deng, in his youth, spent almost five years in France and one year in the USSR; Ye spent about ten years in Singapore and Vietnam before 1919, and later three years in the USSR; and Chen spent just under two years in the USSR. Except for brief visits after 1949, the other three have had no foreign experience.

2.2 THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINE: DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY-RELATED INDUSTRIES.

In Marxist-Leninist ideology, the State belongs to the so-called "superstructure," the role and behavior of which is determined by the "socio-economic base." Therefore, it does not exist in its own right, but is only an instrument of the class

or classes which dominate the society at a given historical period. This is why Marxists usually do not speak about the "State," but only about the "State Apparatus." This also holds true for the CCP; hence, the constitutional organs of "state power" in the PRC are nothing more than instruments of the "proletarian dictatorship" exerted by the Party. They are one executive arm among others.

Thus, state organs do not initiate policy, much less do they have political decision-making powers. They may, however, influence political decision-making in two ways:

1. through the concurrent membership of their leaders in the politically decisive bodies of the Party; and,
2. through reports which they prepare for these bodies, as well as through day-by-day administrative decisions which implement policy.

The State Administrative Machine is headed by the State Council or cabinet, which, in March 1984, consisted of 52 members, mostly ministers or chairmen of commissions. This body seldom meets in pleno, but there is a group which resembles an inner cabinet, the Standing Conference of the State Council. It currently consists of the Premier (Zhao Ziyang), four Vice Premiers (Wan Li, Yao Yilin, Li Peng and Tian Jiyun), and ten State Councillors, of whom three have (or have had) to deal with defense and foreign policy issues. In alphabetical order, they are:

- Ji Pengfei: 1909; Shanxi; LM; III.; -; S; Central Advisory Committee (CAC); (former Director, Department of International Communist Party Relations, CCP Central Committee; currently in charge of Hongkong and Macao affairs);
- Wu Xueqian: 1921; Shanghai; -; -; K; P; CC. Minister of Foreign Affairs); and

- General Zhang Aiping: 1910; Sichuan; LM; III.; -; P; CC. (Minister of National Defense).

Still, PRC diplomacy is officially headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a rather large bureaucratic establishment under the leadership of the Minister, one First Vice Minister, and four Vice Ministers, some of whom appear to be responsible for overseeing the diplomatic machine in particular regions of the world. This group consists of the following members:

Table 3. Leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1984.

1. Wu Xueqian : 1921 ; Shanghai ; - ; - ; K ; P ; CC. (Minister)

Vice-Ministers :

2. Yao Guang : 1921 ; Jiangsu ; - ; - ; - ; P ; CC. (First Vice Minister, in charge of U.S. and West European Affairs)

3. Gong Dafei : 1915 ; ? ; ? ; - ; - ; S. (Black Africa)

4. Han Xu : 1921 ; ? ; - ; - ; - ; S.

5. Qian Qichen : 1924 ; Jiangsu ; - ; - ; - ; P. (USSR/Eastern Europe)

6. Wen Yezhan : ? ; ? ; ? ; ? ; ? ; ?.

For those five of the six members of this group whose age is known, the average age stood at 62.6 at the end of 1983. None of them participated in the Long March. Three out of six were purged in the Cultural Revolution, while two survived in office. The background of one is almost totally unknown.

None of the six leading foreign affairs bureaucrats participated in the Korean War, and none has distinct military connections. In fact, all but the Minister, who is a career Party cadre, must be considered career diplomats since the early 1950s. Foreign Minister Wu and Vice Minister Yao are the only

members of the CCP Central Committee. Hence, the leverage of this group as a whole on political decision-making is thought to be rather weak.

This also seems to be the case with respect to the leading institutions of the arms industry, all of which belong officially to the State Council system. Since the administrative reform of May 1982, there are at least four ministries within the State Council which are entirely or partially related to the arms industry, and, hence, to defense concerns. These are:

Ministry for Nuclear Industry (formerly Second Machine Industry):

Jiang Xinxiong : 1922 ; ? ; - ; - ; - ; P. (Party
Bureaucrat)

Ministry for Aviation Industry (formerly Third Machine Industry):

Mo Wenxiang : 1923 ; Shandong ; - ; - ; - ; P ; CC. (Party
bureaucrat)

Ministry of Ordnance Industry (formerly Fifth Machine Industry):

Yu Yi : 1925 ; Shandong ; - ; - ; - ; P. (Industrial
technocrat)

Ministry of Space (and Missile) Industry (formerly Seventh
Machine Industry):

Zhang Jun : 1919 ; Shandong ; - ; II. ; - ; P. (Security
background)

The average age of the four ministers listed above was 60.75 at the end of 1983. None of them is known to have participated in the Long March; yet three joined the CCP before 1949. All were purged in the Cultural Revolution. Three have specialized, since the 1950s, in the area of economic administration and/or science administration, and may be considered, therefore, as industrial technocrats or bureaucrats. One has connections with the PLA security forces.

This fact, it should be noted, constitutes a departure from the situation immediately after the Cultural Revolution, when all defense-related industrial ministries but the Second Machine Industry (nuclear programs) were headed by military men. It appears, therefore, that the present leadership is interested in guarding against too close an association between the military and the bureaucracies guiding the arms industries.

2.3 THE MILITARY ELITE.

The leadership of the People's Liberation Army (hereafter PLA), which forms the military elite of the PRC, consists of the members of the CCP Central Committee's Military Commission (MC), and the leading personnel in the central military organs, together with the Military Area commanders-in-chief and First Political Commissars. Before we discuss the command structure of these groups, it seems appropriate first to list their members. It is important to note, however, that with the recent appointment of the CCP Advisory Commission and the sidelining of several aging cadre, the precise makeup of the PLA elite remains uncertain. Indeed, many informed observers expect a substantial retirement in the PRC's military leadership within the next year, which could lead to significant personnel changes, reaching well beyond the new appointments already announced for Minister of National Defense, Director of the General Political Department, C-i-C of the PLA Navy, Commander of the Missile Forces, Commander of Pioneers, Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Committee's MC, and C-i-C for the Guangzhou, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Wuhan, Nanjing and Fuzhou Military Areas. With these changes, the following list

reflects the military elite structures as of March 1, 1984.
(Military titles are omitted, the acronym "civ" indicates a cadre with a mainly civilian career since 1949-50.)

Table 4. Members of the PRC Military Elite,
March 1984.

4.1 CCP Central Committee's MC:

1. Deng Xiaoping : 1904 ; Sichuan ; LM; II.; -; P; PBSC.
Chairman, civ.
2. Yang Shangkun : 1907 ; Sichuan ; LM; - ; -; P; PB.
Standing Vice-Chairman; Secretary-General,
civ.
3. Ye Jianying : 1897 ; Guangdong ; LM; IV.; -; S; PBSC.
Vice-Chairman.
4. Xu Xiangqian : 1902 ; Shanxi ; LM; - ; -; S; PB.
Vice-Chairman.
5. Nie Rongzhen : 1899 ; Sichuan ; LM; NC ; -; S; PB.
Vice-Chairman.
6. Yang Dezhi : 1910 ; Hunan ; LM; NC ; K; S; PB.
Standing Member, Deputy Secretary-General
7. Han Xianchu : 1911 ; Hubei ; LM; IV.; K; S; CAC.
Standing Member.
8. Wang Ping : 1911 ; Jiangxi ; LM; IV.; K; P; CAC.
Standing Member.
9. Xu Shiyu : 1906 ; Hubei ; LM; III.; -; S; CAC.
Standing Member.
10. Zhang Tingfa : 1914 ; Hunan ; LM; III.; -; P; PB.
Member.
11. Li Desheng : 1916 ; Hubei ; LM; II.; K; A; PB.
Member.
12. Hong Xuezhi : 1913 ; Anhui ; LM; IV.; K; P; CC.
Member, Deputy Secretary-General.
13. Zhang Aiping : 1910 ; Sichuan ; LM; III.; -; P; CC.
Member, Deputy Secretary-General.
14. Ye Fei : 1909 ; Fujian ; LM; III.; -; P; CC.
Member.

Table 4 (4.1) continued:

15. Xiao Hua : 1914 ; Jiangzi ; LM; IV.; -; P; CC.
Member.
16. Yu Qiuli : 1914 ; Sichuan ; LM; I.; -; S; PB.
Deputy Secretary-General.

4.2 Ministry of National Defense:

1. Zhang Aiping : (vide supra: 4.1.13)
Minister.
2. Xiao Ke : 1907 ; Hunan ; LM; IV.; -; P; CAC.
Vice-Minister.
3. Yang Dezhi : (vide supra: 4.1.6)
Vice-Minister.

4.3 PLA General Staff:

1. Yang Dezhi : (vide supra: 4.1.6). C-o-G-S.
2. He Zhengwen : 1912 ; Hubei ; LM; II.; -; S.
Deputy C-o-G-S.
3. Chi Haotian : 1926 ; Hunan ; - ; III.; K; S.
Deputy C-o-G-S.
4. Zhang Zhen : 1912 ; Hunan ; LM; III.; K; P; CC.
Deputy C-o-G-S.
5. Xu Xin : 1925 ; ? ; - ; NC ; K; S; CC alternate.
Deputy C-o-G-S.
6. Su Jing : 1914 ; Fujian ; LM; IV.; -; S.
Chief of Operations

4.4 PLA General Political Department:

1. Yu Qiuli : (vide supra: 4.1.16)
Director
2. Gan Weiha : 1908 ; Jiangxi ; LM; NC; K; P; CAC.
Deputy Director
3. Huang Yukun : 1920 ; Jiangxi ; LM; I.; K; P.
Deputy Director
4. Yan Jinsheng : 1919 ; ? ; LM; I.; K; P.
Deputy Director

4.4 PLA General Political Department
(continued):

5. Zhu Yunqian : 1916 ; Hunan ; LM; III.; K; P; CC.
Deputy Director
6. Hua Nan : ? ; ? ; ? ; ? ; S.
Deputy Director

4.5 PLA General Rear Services Department:

1. Hong Xuezhi : (vide supra: 4.1.12)
Director
2. Li Yuan : 1911 ; Jiangxi ; LM; IV. ; K; S.
Deputy Director
3. Zhang Ruguang : ? ; ? ; ? ; ? ; ? ; S.
Deputy Director
4. Zhang Xiang : 1917 ; Hunan ; LM; III. ; K; S.
Deputy Director
5. Bai Xiangguo : 1914 ; Jiangxi ; LM; IV. ; K; S.
Deputy Director
6. Xu Guangyi : ? ; ? ; ? ; ? ; ? ; A.
Deputy Director
7. Wang Zhengzhu : 1918 ; Jiangxi ; LM; IV. ; K; P.
Deputy Director
8. Wang Ping : (vide supra: 4.1.8)
Political Commissar

4.6 PLA Forces and Services

Commanders-in-Chief resp. Commanders:

Navy

Liu Huaqing : 1917 ; ? ; - ; II. ; K; S; CC.
C-i-C

Deng Zhaoxiang: 1916 ; Shandong ; LM; III. ; -; P.
Vice C-i-C

Air Force

Zhang Tingfa : (vide supra: 4.1.10)
C-i-C

He Tingyi : 1915 ; Jiangxi ; LM; IV.; K; S.
Vice C-i-C.

4.6 PLA Forces and Services (continued):

Commanders-in-Chief resp. Commanders (continued):

Artillery

Song Chengzhi : 1918 ; Liaoning ; - ; IV.; K; S.

Second Artillery

He Jinheng : ? ; ? ; - ; NC ; K; S; CC.

Armored Forces

Huang Xinting : 1913 ; Hubei ; LM; I. ; K; P; CC.

Pioneers

(Currently unknown)

Railway Troops

Chen Zaidao : 1908 ; Hubei ; LM; II.; -; P; CAC.

Political Commissars:

Navy

Li Yao-wen : 1915 ; Hunan ; LM;III.; -; S; CC.

Air Force

Gao Houliang : 1916 ; ? ; LM;III.; K; P; CC Alternate.

Artillery

Jin Rubai : 1914 ; ? ; LM; II.; -; P.

Second Artillery

Liu Lifeng : 1918 ; ? ; - ; II.; K; S.

Armored Forces

Mo Wenhua : ? ; Guangxi ; LM; IV.; K; P.

Pioneers

Wang Liusheng : 1913 ; ? ; LM;III.; -; S; CC Alternate.

Railway Troops

Lu Zhengcao : 1901 ; Liaoning ; - ; IV.; K; P; CAC.

4.7 Commanders of Major PLA Military Schools

Academy of Military Sciences

Song Shilun : 1907 ; Hunan ; LM;III.; K; S; CAC.
Commander

Military Academy

Xiao Ke : (vide supra: 4.2.2).
Commander

4.8 PLA Military Area Commanders-in-Chief

Beijing : Qin Jiwei ; 1912 ; Hubei ; LM; II.; K; P; PB-alt.
Shenyang : Li Desheng ; 1916 ; Hubei ; LM; II.; K; A; PB.
Lanzhou : Zheng Weishan ; 1914 ; Hubei ; LM; NC ; K; P.
Jinan : Rao Shoukun ; 1915 ; Jiangxi ; LM; III.; K; S.
Nanjing : Xiang Shouzhi; 1914 ; Jiangxi ; LM; II.; K; P; CC.
Fuzhou : Jiang Yunghui; 1916 ; Jiangxi ; LM; IV.; K; A; CC.
Wuhan : Zhou Shizhong; 1921 ; Shanxi ; - ; IV.; K; S; CC.
Guangzhou: You Taizhong ; 1909 ; Sichuan ; LM; II.; K; S; CC.
Chengdu : Wang Chenghan; 1914 ; Hubei ; LM; II.; K; S; CC.
Kunming : Zhang Zhixiu ; 1921 ; ? ; - ; NC ; K; P; CC.
Ürümqi : Xiao Quanfu ; 1913 ; Jiangxi ; LM; IV.; K; S; CC.

4.9 PLA Military Area First Political Commissars

Beijing : Fu Chongbi ; 1917 ; Jiangxi ; LM; NC ; K; P.
Shenyang : Liu Zhenhua ; 1918 ; Shanxi ; - ; IV.; K; S; CC.
Lanzhou : Tan Yulin ; 1914 ; Jiangxi ; LM; I. ; K; P; CC.
Jinan : Xiao Wangdong; 1915 ; Hunan ; LM; III.; -; P; CAC.
Nanjing : Guo Linxiang ; ? ; ? ; LM; I. ; -; S.
Fuzhou : Fu Kuiqing ; 1914 ; Hubei ; LM; IV.; K; S; CC.
Wuhan : Li Chengfang ; 1911 ; Hubei ; LM; II.; -; P; CAC.
Guangzhou: Wang Meng ; ? ; ? ; LM; IV.; K; P; CC.
Chengdu : Wan Haifeng ; 1917 ; Shanxi ; LM; NC ; K; S; CC.
Kunming : Liu Zhijian ; 1905 ; Hunan ; LM; II.; -; P; CC.
Ürümqi : Tan Shandi ; 1914 ; Jiangxi ; LM; II.; K; P; CC.

2.4 THE MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

There can be no doubt that the MC of the CCP Central Committee is the single most important body in the realm of military and strategic decision-making in the PRC. For reports and suggestions to the Politburo or its Standing Committee, the MC is not obliged to go through the Central Committee's Secretariat. It has rather direct access to the major policy-making organs. We do not know how frequently it convenes, and we are very short of information about its modes of procedure. However, there are between one and three "enlarged meetings" of the MC every year, in which at least all major military commanders participate, even if they are not members of the commission.

The Military Commission:

- discusses and prepares all major strategy decisions of immediate and medium-range effect;
- sets the guidelines for political work and military training in the PLA;
- oversees the activities of all organs of the central military machine;
- evaluates military operations (as, e.g., at the enlarged meeting of May, 1979, the PLA performance in the Third Vietnam War);
- de facto appoints all military commanders and political commissars at the corps level and above; and,
- discusses the attitudes of PLA representatives in the central policy-making bodies.

Information about the composition of the MC is quite limited. To date, a list of its members has never been published, so we are not entirely sure about its size. Per the Party Consti-

tution adopted in September 1982, MC members are "decided upon" (rather than elected) by the Central Committee, and the MC Chairman must be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. However, membership has been confirmed by the PRC media for sixteen personalities (who are listed above under 4.1), including the Chairman, three old PLA Marshals as Vice-Chairmen, the Secretary-General as Standing Vice-Chairman, four "Standing Members" (for a Standing Committee of nine), and seven additional members. Four of the MC members are also Deputy Secretary-Generals.

Of these 16, 12 are full members of the Central Committee, and 9 of them belong to the Politburo, where they constitute 38 percent of the membership, while one is also a secretary of the Central Committee's Secretariat. From 1945 to 1980, the Chairman of the CCP Central Committee was concurrently Chairman of the MC and, according to the constitutions of the PRC of 1975 and 1978, also Supreme Commander of all Armed Forces. However, in July 1981, the two Party posts were divided up. Hu Yaobang became Party Chairman, and Deng Xiaoping was formally appointed Chairman of the Military Commission (MC). In June 1983, Deng was also named Chairman of the state Central Military Commission (CMC). Deng is clearly the Commander-in-Chief of the PLA, as well, presumably now in his CMC capacity, although the new state constitution does not specifically provide for a Supreme Commander.

At the end of 1983, the 16 known members of the MC had an average age of almost 74.4, 12 of them being 70 years old or older. The oldest member is 86, the youngest is 67. All

sixteen participated directly in the Long March, and four are veterans of the Korean War. In terms of geographic origin, the four southern-inland provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, and Jiangxi (with 23.6 percent of China's populace) are represented by 75 percent of the known members. Except for the I. and II. Field Armies, which have one and two members, respectively, on the MC, Field Army representation is quite balanced: three come from the North China Field Army, five from the III., and four from the IV., with one member coming from the central military machine of the late 1940s. Eight members were purged during the Cultural Revolution, while seven survived it in office and one advanced.

The relationship between the MC and the Ministry of Defense is also not explicitly stated and seems to be an evolving one, with the MC Secretary General position increasing in importance and that of Defense Minister decreasing. From 1954 to 1971, and from 1975 to 1978, the Minister of Defense was always the First Vice-Chairman of the MC, and the Chief of General Staff usually its Secretary General. Since the establishment of the Ministry in September 1954, the Minister of Defense has also been a full member of the Politburo. However, since the appointment of Zhang Aiping in November 1982, this is no longer true. Officially, the ministry forms part of the state administrative machine, which suggests that Zhang, a State Councillor, would report to the State Council, which, according to the PRC constitution (Art. 80, item 10), is responsible for "directing and administering the building (underlining added) of national defense."

Yet, in reality, the Ministry, like the three departments of the PLA (General Staff, General Political, and General Rear Services), comes under the direction of the MC, apparently acting as an executive office of the MC. The preeminence of the MC and the relegation of the defense minister to a status comparable to that of the three PLA department heads (two of whom are senior in Party rank to Zhang) was symbolized by the identification in early 1983 of all four of these individuals as concurrently Deputy Secretaries General of the MC. (131, 107)

At present, the Defense Ministry is headed by the minister and two vice-ministers, one of whom (the Chief of General Staff) is also a member of the MC. These three military leaders had an average age of 74 at the end of 1983. Two come from Hunan and one from Sichuan. All three participated in the Long March, yet only one in the Korean War. Two were purged during the Cultural Revolution, and one survived it in office. Of the three, one each originates from the III., IV., and the North China Field Armies. Two are full members of the CCP Central Committee, and one belongs to the Politburo.

2.5 THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION (CMC) OF THE PRC.

Since the first session of the Sixth NPC in June 1983, the leading role of the Party's MC has been constitutionally legitimized by the establishment of the Central Military Commission within the state administrative machine, as provided for in the Constitution of the PRC, which was promulgated on December 4, 1982. The constitution invests the CMC with

considerable authority, charging it with responsibility to "lead (lingdao) the armed forces of the whole country" (article 93). Its chairman is elected by the NPC, without prior nomination by the President of the PRC, and its members, in turn, are elected by the NPC upon nomination by the chairman (article 94).

The establishment of the CMC by the new constitution was initially interpreted by "China watchers" in the West in two different ways:

- A number of observers suggested that it would become a rather large, and, in fact, merely advisory body without real power, similar to the "National Defense Council" set up by the constitution of 1954; while,
- other observers argued that, with the creation of the CMC, a counterbalance had been established against the Party's MC, which had a slight majority of orthodox Stalinist and Maoist members.

But when the first CMC was inaugurated by the Sixth NPC on June 20, 1983, both these interpretations were proven wrong. The new CMC was nothing less than the core group of the Party's MC, the Chairman of which became the Chairman of the CMC. The "other members" included the Vice Chairmen (including the "Standing Vice Chairman" and Secretary General) and the four Deputy Secretary Generals of the Party's MC. Hence, the CMC is a small and obviously very influential group, but it is essentially the same as the Party's MC, and it even uses the same administrative offices, with just a reception room in the premises of the state administrative organs.

Table 5. The Central Military Commission (CMC) of the PRC.

1. Deng Xiaoping : 1904 ; Sichuan ; LM; II.; -; PL PBSC.
Chairman
2. Ye Jianying : 1897 ; Guangdong ; LM; IV.; -; S; PBSC.
Vice-Chairman
3. Xu Xiangqian : 1902 ; Shanxi ; LM; - ; -; S; PB.
Vice-Chairman
4. Nie Rongzhen : 1899 ; Sichuan ; LM; NC ; -; S; PB.
Vice-Chairman
5. Yang Shangkun : 1907 ; Sichuan ; LM; - ; -; P; PB.
Vice-Chairman
6. Yang Dezhi : 1910 ; Hunan ; LM; NC ; K; S; PB.
Member
7. Yu Qiuli : 1914 ; Sichuan ; LM; I. ; -; S; PB.
Member.
8. Zhang Aiping : 1910 ; Sichuan ; LM; III.; -; P; CC.
Member
9. Hong Xuezhi : 1913 ; Anhui ; LM; IV.; K; P; CC.
Member

At the end of 1983, this group had an average age of 76.8. With all but one member 70 years old or older (the youngest will be 70 in November 1984), the CMC has the highest average of all leadership groups in the Party, the state administrative machine and the PLA. Six, or two-thirds, of its members come from the inland-south provinces, five of them alone from Sichuan. All participated in the Long March, but only two in the Korean War. Two each hail from the IV. and North China Field Armies, and one each from the I., II., and III. Field Armies, while two have no apparent Field Army affiliations. Five of them survived the Cultural Revolution in office, while four were purged during that crisis.

Since its fundamental role is to legitimize the Party's MC within the framework of the state administrative machine, the

CMC has exactly the same functions as the Party's MC. It is, in fact, the Party's MC under a new name within the State Apparatus.

2.5.1 The PLA General Headquarters: General Staff, General Political and General Rear Services Department.

In its capacity as General Headquarters of the PLA, the Ministry of Defense is mainly divided into three central departments: the General Staff, the General Political Department, and the General Rear Services Department. The General Staff is responsible for the drafting of strategic plans, for decisions on troop deployment, and for all the staff work usually done by similar organs in other countries. But since, in the PRC, there is no general headquarters for the land forces, these units also are under the direct command of the General Staff, which works through the Military Area Commands.

There are six senior cadres in the General Staff: the Chief, four Deputy Chiefs, and the Chief of Operations. The average age of these six generals stands at 66.5, and three are 70 years old or older. However, one Deputy C-o-G-S, Chi Haotian, is, at 57, the youngest member of the top military elite. Four hail from the four southern-inland provinces. Five participated in the Long March, and four in the Korean War. Only one was purged in the Cultural Revolution, while five (including the C-o-G-S) survived it without being persecuted. Two each originated from the III. and the North China Field Army, and one each from the II. and IV. Of these six cadres, one is a member of the Politburo, while one is a full member, and one an alternate member, of the Central Committee.

The General Political Department (GPD) is in charge of all political work in the PLA, including all cultural and recreational activities among the troops. With political departments in all units down to the regimental level, and political commissars in all units down to the platoon, the GPD heads a formidable chain of command of its own, and it may be regarded as the second major instrument for securing Party control over the military after the MC. In fact, the new Party charter specifically subordinates the GPD to the MC, a relationship which previously was not explicit.

The GPD is led by a director, who is a full member of the Politburo, and five Deputy Directors. For five out of these six, some biographical information is available, although we only know the home province of four (all of whom came from the southern-inland provinces). The average age for these five directors is 67.6, and one is more than 70 years old. Five are known to have participated in the Long March, and four took part in the Korean War. Four also were purged during the Cultural Revolution and two survived it in office, including the Director himself. In this group, the II. and IV. Field Armies are not represented. However, the I. Field Army has three, the North China Field Army and the III. one each, and the organizational origin of another is unknown. The leadership of the GPD includes two members of the CCP Central Committee, one of whom serves in both the Politburo and the Secretariat.

The responsibility of the General Rear Services Department (GRSD) includes control over the whole area of logistics, weapons and ammunition supplies, transport facilities, and the

military medical services. There is a direct chain of command down to Rear Services Departments at the divisional level, but the political importance of this network appears to be rather limited. The GRSD is led by a Director, six Deputy Directors, and a first Political Commissar. The Director and First Political Commissar are also members of the MC. Of these eight generals, the age of six is known (standing at an average age of 69), and the home province for only six (five of whom come from the southern-inland provinces). Six participated in the Long March and the Korean War. While three were purged in the Cultural Revolution, four survived it without being persecuted, and one advanced during that crisis. The Field Army origin of two generals is unknown. Four, however, are known to have come from the IV. and one each from the II. and North China Field Armies. One of these eight leaders is a member of the CCP Central Committee.

2.5.2 Central Headquarters of the PLA Services and the Military Schools.

As already pointed out, there is no central command for the army, i.e., the ground forces. It is under the direct command of the General Staff, to which the Military Area Commands have to respond. But under the General Staff, there are central headquarters for two types of services:

1. Service Branches: The PLA Navy and the PLA Air Force.

The central headquarters of the Navy has direct command over all naval forces (divided into three "Fleets" -- North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea) at all times in peace and war. The central headquarters of the Air Force, however, assume

direct command over all Air Force units only in times of mobilization, emergency and war. In times of peace, the Air Force units militarily respond to the Military Area Commands, while the central headquarters of the Air Force oversee recruitment, training, general air strategy, the choice of weapon systems, and supplies.

2. The Service Arms: Artillery, Second Artillery (Guided Missile Forces), Armored Forces, Pioneers, and Railway Troops.

The central headquarters of these five "arms" have no direct command at any time. They are responsible only for recruitment, training, the choice of weapon systems, supplies, and general administration.

The Navy and Air Force are led by Commanders-in-Chief with a number of deputies, one of whom serves as First Deputy C-i-C, while the Service Arms are under the control of commanders in their central headquarters. This constitutes a group of seven Service Cs-i-C or commanders, one of whom (Pioneers) is unknown at this moment. Each Service Branch has one First Political Commissar. So, too, each Service Arm has one Political Commissar. Altogether this forms another group of seven members.

The age of seven out of the nine Commanders and First Deputy Commanders is known, and it stands at an average of 68.6, two being older than 70. While the geographic origin of two is unknown, four were born in the four southern-inland provinces from which many military leaders in the PRC originate. Five of the nine Commanders took part in the Long March. Only the Artillery Commander joined the CCP and the Communist Armed

Forces after the Long March, between 1938 and 1941. Four of the seven service Commanders participated in the Korean War. Three were purged in the Cultural Revolution, while three survived it without persecution. Of these six, two originated from the II., and one each from the I., III., IV., and North China Field Armies. The relative importance of this group is demonstrated by the fact that it includes three full members of the CCP Central Committee. One (the Air Force C-i-C) even serves on the Politburo, and he is also a member of the MC.

Data on the nine leading Political Commissars of the service headquarters are somewhat more scanty. The average age of the six whose date of birth is known stands at about 70.2, two of them being 70 years old or older. The geographic origin is only known for three of them, each from a different province, and only one from the southern-inland region. Five of the seven participated in the Long March, and one continued guerrilla warfare in Southern China after 1934. Four took part in the Korean War; four were purged in the Cultural Revolution, while three survived it in office. Three came out of the III., two each out of the II. and IV. Field Armies. In this group of seven, there is only one member and one alternate of the CCP Central Committee.

In the PRC, there are a great number of different military schools, many of them being specialized or regional institutions. For the purposes of this study, two of them should be mentioned:

1. The Academy of Military Sciences, which is responsible for advanced training of the "War College" type, and also

for strategic and other military and politico-military research. It is headed by a Commander who definitely should be counted among the higher military elite.

2. The Military Academy, which supervises all training of PLA officers throughout the entire country and is directly in charge of the training of staff officers. It also runs classes for higher officers, which could be compared to the "Staff and Command College" type of instruction. Its Commander is concurrently one of the Vice-Ministers of Defense.

The Commanding Generals at both Academies were 76 years old at the end of 1983. Both come from the province of Hunan and participated directly in the Long March. One took part in the Korean War. One also was purged during the Cultural Revolution, while the other survived it in office. One came from the III., and one from the IV. Field Army.

2.5.3 The Major Regional Leadership: PLA Military Area Commanders-in-Chief and First Political Commissars.

The Military Areas were formed in the PRC after the end of the Korean War in 1954. Ever since then, their Cs-i-C, First Political Commissars, and Command Headquarters have wielded considerable influence. The Military Area Commands are in direct command of the combat troops, which are divided into 33 corps, one airborne corps, 37 independent divisions and more than 80 independent regiments -- comprising almost 1.8 million men. In times of peace, they are also in direct command of the Air Force units in their respective realms. Moreover, they supervise the territorial and security forces which are directly commanded by the provincial Military Dis-

trict and city Garrison Commands. For the combat forces, the Military Area Cs-i-C suggest people for appointment as Corps Commanders, nominate the Division Commanders, and directly appoint the Commanders of regiments and battallions for all units under their command. Until the early 1970s, the Cs-i-C usually served for long periods in their bailiwicks: between 1954 and the end of 1973, their average term of duty in one area was 8.7 years, with one each having served for 19, 14 and 13 years, respectively. Retirements in December 1973, again during the winter of 1979/80 and in 1982/83, however, have changed this situation drastically, so that the eleven Military Area Cs-i-C who served as of late March 1984 only had an average term of approximately three years.

There are altogether eleven Military Areas in the PRC, each comprising between one and five administrative units (provinces, autonomous regions, or centrally administered cities):

1. Beijing : Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, and Nei Monggol.
2. Shenyang : Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning.
3. Lanzhou : Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia.
4. Jinan : Shandong.
5. Nanjing : Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui.
6. Fuzhou : Fujian and Jiangxi.
7. Wuhan : Hubei and Henan.
8. Guangzhou : Guangdong, Hunan, and Guangxi.
9. Chengdu : Sichuan and Xizang.
10. Kunming : Yunnan and Guizhou.
11. Ürümqi : Xinjiang.

The average age of the eleven Cs-i-C stood at 68 at the end of 1983. (For the current situation in the PLA, this is a comparatively "young" group.) Only four are 70 years old or older. Nine of these eleven participated directly in the Long March. It particularly should be noted that all eleven took part in the Korean War, and that nine of them come from the four southern-inland provinces, though none hails from Hunan. Five originated from the II., three from the IV., two from the North China and one from the III. Field Armies. Nine are full members of the CCP Central Committee; one of the full members serves at the same time on the Politburo and the MC, and another is a Politburo alternate.

Of the eleven First Political Commissars, the age is known for nine, and it averaged at 69.1 at the end of 1983, six of these nine being 70 years old or older. Seven of the eleven were born in the southern-inland provinces. Ten participated directly in the Long March, and seven in the Korean War. Seven were purged in the Cultural Revolution, while four survived it without being persecuted. Four came from the I., two each came from the II. and IV., and one from the III. Field Armies. Seven are full members of the CCP Central Committee.

2.6 DIFFERENTIATIONS AMONG THE PLA ELITE.

Group formations among the military elite of the PRC appear to be determined mainly by two factors: organizational origin, and experience during the "Cultural Revolution." For a long time, origin from different loyalty groups based on the large units of communist forces active during the civil war

provided one of the more important determinents of group formation within the PLA. Most of these units date back in their history to the early 1930s, and were definitely formed by the period of the Second Civil War between 1945 and 1949, taking their final shape -- but always on the basis of much earlier alignments -- when the five major units of the PLA were established in February 1949. These are the Field Armies, so that one can speak about five distinct Field Army systems:

First, the I. Field Army, mostly composed of units which had fought under the Generals He Long and Peng Dehuai, and formed out of the "Northwest Field Army." Its commander was Peng Dehuai, and its Political Commissar Xi Zhongxun. Peng was purged for opposing Mao's mobilization development policy in August 1959. He was arrested in December 1966, died in prison in November 1974, and was posthumously rehabilitated in December 1978.

Second, the II. Field Army, which was formed out of the "Central Plains Field Army" under the command of Liu Bocheng with Deng Xiaoping as Political Commissar. Liu has been ailing since the early 1970s and is now inactive.

Third, the III. Field Army, developed out of the "East China Field Army" and commanded by Chen Yi, who was the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1959 to 1967 (officially until his death in 1972). Its major representatives are now Xu Shiyu, Zhang Aiping, and Wei Guoqing.

Fourth, the IV. Field Army, transformed from the "United Democratic Army of the Northeast" and several other units which had fought under Peng Dehuai and Chen Yi in the 1930s. Its Commander was Lin Biao, who served as Minister of Defense from 1959 to 1971, was Mao's staunchest military supporter during the Cultural Revolution, and became his designated successor in 1969, but was purged and died in 1971. The remnants of the IV. Field Army system today comprise mostly generals who fell out with Lin and were purged during the Cultural Revolution. Its major representative is now Marshal Ye Jianying.

Fifth, the North China Field Army, which was formed in 1948 under the command of Nie Rongzhen, who is still a member of the Politburo and a Vice-Chairman of the MC.

It is not suggested that these loyalty groups are necessarily the decisive element of group formation in the PLA. However, in times of political crisis, they often have become quite important. After the purge of Peng Dehuai in 1959, for example, not one single representative of the I. Field Army system was newly appointed to military office until 1972; and, despite Peng's rehabilitation, the representation of this group is still comparatively weak in the PLA elite.

During the Cultural Revolution, members of the IV. Field Army system were definitely on the upsurge, its representation among PLA command positions rising from 25.5 to 34%. The overthrow of Lin Biao, then, was facilitated by an anti-Lin coalition among the military, which consisted mainly of members of the II. and III. Field Army groups, with some support from

the North China Field Army. Consequently, more than two-thirds of the military leaders who were purged together with Lin Biao or shortly after his demise came from the IV. Field Army, whose share in command positions dropped to 19 percent by late 1972. Nowadays, the representation of the five Field Army systems among the PLA elite appears quantitatively quite balanced, with the I. and the North China group somewhat weaker, and the IV. somewhat stronger, than the other two. The Field Army origin of 68 out of the 70 members of the PLA elite introduced here (97 percent of the whole group) is known and it breaks down as follows: I.: 7 or 10.3%; II.: 15 or 22.1%; III.: 15 or 22.1%; IV.: 19 or 27.9%; North China: 10 or 14.7%; long-standing affiliation with the central military organs during the civil war: 2 or 2.9%. (For the representation on the several organs: vide supra.)

As long as the current leadership generation dominates the PLA elite, Field Army affiliations will continue to play a role in intra-elite group formation. After this generation has left, many other factors -- e.g., controversies between technical and conventional forces -- gain added importance. Yet, straight across the lines of Field Army systems cuts another increasingly important differentiation, which is based on the experience of military leaders during the Cultural Revolution. This is the differentiation between those leaders who were purged and later rehabilitated (the "Purgees"), and those who survived the Cultural Revolution in office, with no or only little experience of persecution (the "Survival Cadres"). While the "Survivalists" remained in office, and even gained influence

when the PLA took over the administration of most provinces, their "Purgee" colleagues were under house arrest, in prisons, or sent to "reform through labor" camps. It appears safe to conclude that at least a certain degree of mutual animosity developed through these different experiences, and one can be sure that Deng Xiaoping gets the strongest support within the military -- as in the civilian realm, for that matter -- from the ranks of the "Purgees."

2.7 THE PLA ELITE: AN OVERVIEW.

So far, we have introduced here the command structure of the PLA, the composition of its major organs, together with some suggestions about the elements of group formation within the PRC defense establishment. To conclude, an attempt now shall be made to present the PLA elite as a whole.

Altogether, the military leaders introduced here number 70, of whom only two have a civilian background. The age of 62 or 88.6 percent of this group is known. On December 31, 1983, it stood at an average of 70.08.

The provincial origin is known for 56 or almost 80 percent of this elite group. It breaks down as follows -- Hunan: 11; Hubei: 12; Jiangxi: 15; Sichuan: 7; Shanxi: 4; Fujian and Liaoning: 2 each; Guangdong, Guangxi and Shandong: 1 each. Hence, only 10 of the 29 administrative units of the PRC are represented in this elite group.

Forty-nine or 87.5 percent are from Southern China, only 7 or 12.5 percent from the North. Inland provinces provide 50 or 89.3 percent, coastal provinces 6 or 10.7 percent of the

group. The four southern-inland provinces alone are the home of 44 or 78.6 percent of the PLA elite. It should again be mentioned that these provinces account only for 23.6 percent of the PRC populace today. This heavy over-representation reflects the fact that the southern-inland provinces were the areas where the civil war was fought between 1927 and 1934 -- yet another indication of the fact that the PLA elite is extremely overaged.

It is still mainly an elite of veteran civil warriors. Of the 70 leaders discussed here, 57 or 81.4 percent are known to have participated directly in the Long March, trained in guerrilla and conventional warfare of Second World War vintage at best.

Forty-four or 63 percent took part in the Korean War. But if one goes for the active and direct command positions in the General Staff, the Services, and the Military Area Commands (excluding, in this case, the Political Commissars), the Korean War share rises to 20 out of 25, or 80 percent. It should be kept in mind that these generals fought in a war against the United States.

In terms of Cultural Revolution experiences, 33 or 47.1 percent of the current PLA leaders were purged and later rehabilitated, while 34 or 48.6 percent are "Survival Cadres." Three or 4.3 percent of the group advanced during the Cultural Revolution.

Political representation of the PLA elite is still rather strong. This group of 70 leaders comprised 34 full members of the CCP Central Committee (including ten members

or alternates of the Politburo and one secretary) -- that is, 16.2 percent of the Central Committee full members, and 42 percent of the Politburo. Ten of the group are members of the CAC.

From these data, one may arrive at a composite personal profile of the PLA leader in the Spring of 1984:

He was born in or about 1913, joined the CCP and the army during the period of guerrilla warfare between 1928 and 1934, participated in the Long March, and already held command or political commissar positions on or above the divisional level in 1949. There is at least a 60 percent chance that he took part in the Korean War (at the division or corps level and above), and about a 50 percent chance that he was purged during the Cultural Revolution. If he was not a purgee, he was most probably in charge of Party and state machine leadership on the provincial level between 1967 and 1973/74. In any case, he was highly involved in intra-elite disputes and conflicts at least since 1964/65, and up until this year. His geographical origin was very likely Southern-Inland China, and he received most of his military training during the civil war, with some additional instruction on the War College level in the mid-1950s. But being 70 years old or so, he will have to leave his post due to biological coercion at some time between now and 1987 or 1988.

By the end of this decade, then, the current Chinese defense elite will no longer be around. An entirely new type of PLA leader will have emerged, and we can also attempt to develop a composite profile for him. If we assume that the average age of the PRC military leader may decrease to between 60 and 65 from 70 today as a result of the unavoidably rapid generational change, the following type of person will be a member of the PLA elite in 1990:

He will have been born between 1925 and 1930, and most probably joined the CCP and the PLA during the

last years of civil war. He took part as a private, NCO, platoon, or company commander in the Korean War, and received most of his professional training in the 1950s under Soviet guidance. Since 1959, now in a command post on the company or battalion level, he was active in a series of political campaigns which imbued him with Maoist theories, while the professional aspect of his further development was tuned down, if not neglected. Since early 1967, now mostly in a regimental command position, he took over political leadership, and sometimes economic management, on the county level, from where he was "withdrawn to the barracks" between 1971 and 1975. Today, he commands a division, in very few cases already a corps, and is engaged again in more professional military exploits, but with outdated weapon systems, using manuals which were copies from Soviet models in the 1950s.

There can be little doubt that this change in the composite personal profiles of the PRC defense elite will bring about a distinct change in defense perspectives.

SECTION 3

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Yet, what, it may be asked, is the precise relationship between foreign and domestic policy within the PRC? What role does foreign and security policy play in leadership debates and power struggles? Are there deep differences or recognized alignments within the leadership on questions of external perceptions and military strategy? What would be the impact of a change in leaders on China's current security policies and strategy? Both space and lack of reliable information preclude definitive answers to these questions. But some sense of the domestic environment in which decisions are made is critical to an assessment of PRC perspectives on defense, deterrence, and strategy.

3.1 PARTY POLICY AND POLITICS.

Since most major security issues tend to have both a domestic and a foreign policy component, Chinese leaders perceive a close interrelationship between the two policy realms, and believe that domestic as well as foreign policies should be sensitive to strategic considerations. For example, to an elite Party audience, Deng Xiaoping in January 1980 defined the three major tasks for the 1980s as: opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace; recovering Taiwan and unifying China; and stepping up economic construction, i.e., the "four modernizations" (of agriculture, industry, science/technology, and national defense).^(10, pp.1-3) Modernization was stated to be the core of these three tasks, central to China's

playing a larger role in international affairs and recovering Taiwan. In turn, China's strategy in foreign affairs was to seek a peaceful environment for carrying out the four modernizations. Deng asserted that in modernization, China should make use of foreign capital and technology, while guarding against the penetration of Western bourgeois ideology.

Another traditional way in which foreign and domestic issues are linked by Party leaders has been their use of an alleged foreign threat to China's security as a tool to unify the country, consolidate CCP control and justify unpopular domestic policies. The imminence or gravity of the foreign threat to China has been overstated, as in the case of the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan for much of that period, and, since 1969, the Soviet Union. Interestingly, on one occasion Mao seems to have used the Soviet menace as a device for reversing his own policy in order to restore order in China. In 1969, in the wake of clashes on the Sino-Soviet border (the first of which may well have been started by the PLA), Mao appealed for national unity and, in effect, called off the more disruptive aspects of the Cultural Revolution. More recently, the alleged threat to domestic security posed by Western bourgeois ideology may have been used by Deng's opponents within the Party and military to criticize his policy of closer links to the West and Japan.

Of course, in Party leadership struggles, the foreign policy issues involved are normally secondary in importance to the domestic ones, but they have been skillfully used by

Party leaders, nevertheless, in order to isolate and discredit opponents. Just as the CCP has employed foreign threats as a unifying device, so has it tended to charge foreign influence or connections with respect to leaders who have been ousted from Party councils. "China's Khrushchev," "revisionist," "capitalist-roader," "foreign lackey" were some of the epithets commonly applied to Mao's foes during the Cultural Revolution. While Party deliberations are normally tightly-held secrets, enough information has emerged to conclude that in most major Party confrontations, there has been an external dimension to the policy debates. Mao in several instances managed to magnify the foreign issue and impugn the loyalty of his opponents. For example, in 1959, Peng Dehuai, then Defense Minister, strongly criticized Mao's Great Leap Forward. He also argued that China needed Soviet support for the development of nuclear weapons and the provision of conventional weapons and, therefore, should tone down its political differences with Moscow, in order to ensure continued Soviet help. (32, pp.8-21) Several years later, as the economic crisis deepened, Wang Jiaxiang, a Soviet specialist, argued as well that during a period of economic difficulties, China should moderate its hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union, the United States, and other potential enemies. (86, pp.13-14) Though many Party leaders, including Deng and Chen Yun, concurred in the criticism of Mao's economic policies, both Peng and Wang were purged, in good part apparently, on the pretext of alleged foreign sympathies and ties.

In the Cultural Revolution, during Deng Xiaoping's

first return to power (1971-1976), he and Zhou Enlai were accused by radicals of advocating a number of anti-Maoist foreign policies, including: increased foreign trade with the West (contrary to Mao's doctrine of independence and self-reliance); a low-key approach to the recovery of Taiwan; and improved relations with the U.S. (37, pp.35-37)

Domestic politics also seem to influence the consistency of China's security perspectives. In the 10 years preceding Mao's death, there were marked differences in global outlook within the Party leadership and sharp fluctuations in PRC foreign policy; but in the post-Mao era, the trend toward collective leadership and decisions by consensus has tended both to narrow and obscure these differences. It can reasonably be concluded, therefore, that periods of internal political instability often seem to bring sharp changes in foreign policy orientation. The Cultural Revolution, for example, spilled over most noticeably into foreign affairs during the first three years (1966-69), and again in 1974 and 1976, when for brief periods radical Maoists prevailed. These periods of radical dominance were marked by a xenophobic turning inward: an anarchic "Red Guard" diplomacy (1966-68) during which all but one PRC chiefs of mission were recalled; crusades against foreign culture and trade with the West; concurrent opposition both to the USSR and to detente with the U.S.; and militant calls for the recovery of Taiwan, by force, if necessary.

Since the death of Mao and the ouster of the "Gang of Four" and their supporters in 1976, Chinese foreign policy

has followed a far steadier course. Differences in strategic perceptions, priorities, and tactics appear to persist, but they are handled in a more orderly fashion and have not led to the recriminations and political fall-out that characterized the handling of foreign and security affairs during the preceding decade.

Nevertheless, shifts in the Party power structure since Mao have had an impact on China's foreign and security policies, just as external developments have continued to affect the standing and influence of top leaders and their supporters. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee in December 1978, of course, represented a major victory for Deng Xiaoping and his supporters. It adopted domestic policies identified with Deng; it authorized a large-scale rehabilitation of colleagues purged during the Cultural Revolution. In foreign affairs, the Third Plenum presumably sanctioned the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States and approved in principle the military foray into Vietnam two months later, an action which was intended to demonstrate PRC willingness to stand up to the USSR and its Vietnamese ally. Both of these latter actions clearly bore Deng's imprint.

Deng's personal negotiation of the normalization agreement with the United States in December 1978 and the peace treaty with Japan in June 1978 no doubt enhanced his Party standing and clout. However, his assertion of a strategic relationship between the United States and the PRC, and his advocacy of the attack on Vietnam -- a potentially high-risk action vis-a-vis the Soviet Union -- represented a significant departure from

previous policy and, at least after the event, appears to have been challenged within the leadership.

By Spring 1979, several of Deng's policies had encountered serious setbacks. The economy was stuttering and in deficit; the Vietnam adventure had proved costly and raised questions about the PLA capacity to wage modern war. In April 1979, a three-year postponement of the "four modernizations" was announced, just when the need for a more modern military had become more apparent. Also in April, the Chinese made a diplomatic gesture to Moscow -- an offer to negotiate outstanding problems -- that seemed the antithesis of Deng's policies even though it occurred in connection with Chinese denunciation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. Some observers conclude that this gesture represented the temporary predominance of a group within the leadership that took issue with Deng's policies, especially his sharp tilt toward the United States and aggressive tactics towards Moscow. (99, pp.4-7; 35, pp.141-142)

According to this theory, Deng was vindicated and his political position strengthened by the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, in reaction to which China again took a hard line toward Moscow.

It is easier to discern which foreign policy issues are under debate than it is to determine which leaders are on what side of the argument. The latter problem is complicated by the secrecy of Party meetings and by the obligation of Party officials to endorse and adhere to approved policy. Moreover, perhaps in the spirit of collective leadership or perhaps as a master politician, Deng Xiaoping has proved adept at shifting

his position, co-opting opposing views, and attracting support by dint of persuasion, compromise, force of personality, and adroit use of his Party connections and power. The evidence for determining which issues are under dispute and who is on which side is admittedly circumstantial, but considerable. It consists of occasional direct comments in the media which imply internal disagreement (e.g., after the 1979 "lesson" to Vietnam); allegorical historical discussions which are said to be currently relevant (e.g., was the Boxer Rebellion xenophobic extremism or a just anti-imperialist struggle?); internal Party speeches which become available outside China (and indicate, for example, leadership concern that civil strife such as that in Poland could occur in China); statements by individual leaders to foreign visitors which demonstrate different emphasis or interpretations on an issue (e.g., the contrasting views in 1979-81 of Deng and Li Xiannian on PRC-U.S. relations and the recovery of Taiwan). (86, pp.3-7)

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the impact of the leadership succession issue on China's foreign and security policies is uncertain, and will depend considerably on the success of present efforts to reform the CCP and to forge a cohesive and representative collective leadership. The differences in strategic outlook and foreign policy are not as striking or disruptive as earlier divisions among the Party elite, but they are substantial nonetheless, and are held in check in large part by the efforts of Deng and other Party elders who may disagree on policy, but agree on the need for unity and stability. This group is committed to the principles of collective leader-

ship, decision by consensus, and the orderly transfer of power to younger leaders. The CCP does not enjoy a rich tradition in any of these areas, and actual practice has often diverged from principle as in the reluctance of aging cadres to relinquish power. A great deal may depend on how much spadework is accomplished before the senior Party officials die off and in what sequence they depart. Also of crucial importance to China's future foreign policy and security orientation is whether the successor leadership will continue to place primary emphasis upon economic reconstruction and to carry on with the present steady and gradual approach toward modernization, an approach which entails an orientation towards the West and Japan in terms of technology, trade and investment.

3.2 DOMESTIC SECURITY AND STRATEGY.

The foregoing discussion noted the close inter-relationship in China between foreign and domestic policy, the broad view taken of such concepts as national security, and the Chinese assertion that its policies are based on long-term strategic trends. Let us look briefly at the economic, socio-political, and military sectors that constitute the domestic environment and examine the consequences for China's strategic perspectives and policies.

Economics. Beijing's leaders start with the proposition that China is economically weak and backward, and that this condition limits its role in international affairs and the achievements of national goals, including ability to resist Soviet "hegemonism" and recovery of Taiwan. In 1980

Deng asserted that economic reconstruction would be the core, underlying task for China for the next two decades at least. (10, pp.1-3)

However, after launching the "four modernizations" with great fanfare in 1977 as an urgent, high-priority goal, China quickly trimmed its economic sails. In June 1979, Beijing announced a three-year "economic readjustment" period which, in effect, superseded modernization and was designed to regularize economic processes and reduce budget deficits. Stringent economies were prescribed. Ambitious capital construction projects were postponed, the budget was reduced -- including defense spending -- and emphasis was placed on a "steady pace" rather than rapid achievement of economic goals.

This economic retreat, needless to say, had a crippling effect on China's previously announced plans for weapons procurement in connection with defense modernization. Until June 1979, it appeared that the PRC was, in fact, prepared to undertake a large-scale modernization of her military hardware, particularly in the areas of jet fighters, armor, anti-tank missiles, and targeting devices. Chinese military delegations went to Western Europe to learn about new developments in weaponry, and during the visit of the then U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown to Beijing in September 1977, the first signals of a growing Chinese interest in a relaxation of American restrictions on arms sales seem to have been sent out. (29, pp.79-88)

Economic readjustment caused a sharp curtailment of spending plans. In relation to total budget levels, military

expenditure developed as follows: *

1979: ¥RMB 22,270 million out of 127,390 million,
i.e., 17.48%

1980: ¥RMB 19,330 million out of 114,290 million,
i.e. 16.91%

1981: ¥RMB 15,249 million out of 97,600 million,
i.e., 15.62%

In fact, the original projection of military expenditures for 1981 stood at ¥RMB 20,170 million. It was then reduced in September 1980 to ¥RMB 19,330 million (i.e., the 1980 level) and again further, in early March 1981, to ¥RMB 15,249 million. This means that the military budget of the PRC was reduced by altogether 31.5% or almost one-third between 1979 and 1981. The drastic cuts of 1980 and 1981 impeded the PLA from further modernization of armament, and, reportedly, even urgent repairs of jet fighters and tanks had to be postponed.

It is not surprising, therefore, that on the eve of the first large reductions in military expenditure, which were announced at the National Peoples Congress (NPC) on September 13, 1980, and which, at that time, amounted to a cut of 13.2% for the fiscal year, major military leaders expressed concern over the impact of these cuts. On September 7, for example, the PLA Chief of General Staff, General Yang Dezhi, while acknowledging that the PLA should try to economize as much as possible, stated:

At the same time we express the hope that the state will increase defense expenditure, and

* U.S. \$1 = c. 1.9 ¥RMB -- Defense figures released by the PRC are not considered to be comparable to Western defense costs because a number of items are excluded. However, for purposes of comparison, the PRC figures graphically demonstrate the sharp downturn in military spending during 1979-81.

will speed up the process of modernization in defense!(110)

Three days later, a Deputy Chief of Staff, General Zhang Aiping, since October 1982 Minister of National Defense, declared that the number of troops should be reduced and the savings spent on modern weapons, emphasizing that defense production should not be neglected.(111)

The change in economic course in June 1979 had important political overtones as well. The previous economic policies promoted by Hua Guofeng, Li Xiannian and Yu Qiuli had emphasized heavy industry, rapid economic growth, and a mobilization-style economic approach. By early 1979 there were substantial budget deficits (to which the costly foray into Vietnam no doubt contributed) and a serious economic crisis. At that point, China's economic policies came under the direction of fiscal conservative Chen Yun and Party administrator/technocrats, such as Premier Zhao Ziyang and Vice-Premier Yao Yilin and Wan Li. In June 1981, the CCP Central Committee criticized ex-CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng for "impetuously seeking quick results in economic work" and declared that the economic readjustment policy of April 1979 was designed to correct the persistent "leftist" influence and errors in economic work of the preceding two years. (7, p.K-22) In December 1980, Li Xiannian apologized to the Party for errors and shortcomings when he was in charge of economic work.(117, p.U-14)

During the 1979-81 period there were also other indications of the interplay between economic policy and internal or external political factors. In Spring 1980, Hua and some military voices deplored a "one-sided emphasis on economic means"

and a deemphasis on ideology. (119, pp.14-16) Some PLA leaders felt that Deng's agricultural policies (designed to spur productivity through decentralization and work incentives) had disadvantaged military dependents and decreased peasant interest in military service. Several senior Party leaders with strong military ties warned of the dangers of "capitalist bourgeois influence" inherent both in pragmatic economic policies and in increased economic contacts and cooperation with the West.^{(40;} 53, pp.K6-10) On the other hand, as noted, military professionals implied that cuts in defense spending impeded PLA efforts to improve defense capability and were presumably privately chagrined that Western, especially U.S., sources of military technology and weapons were presently unavailable due to economic constraints and the strained U.S.-PRC relationship over the Taiwan issue.

Beginning in summer 1982, proponents of a higher priority for defense modernization were apparently gaining strength. The trend of the two previous years was reversed and a slight increase (reportedly around 5%) in the 1982 defense budget was announced in June.⁽⁷⁸⁾ Without fanfare, there was also a substantial increase in capital construction for heavy industry in 1982. Except for Hua Guofeng, those previously responsible for economic work in the period for which economic policy was subsequently criticized seem to have retained their Party standing and influence, although they may now have a lesser role in economic matters.

Deng Xiaoping gave further impetus to this trend when, in March 1983, he was quoted as having recently stated: "We must improve our military equipment and speed up modernization

of our defense on the basis of continuous development of our national economy." (56, p.K-2; 121)*

This Deng remark was quoted by Defense Minister Zhang Aiping in an authoritative article on defense modernization in the March 1 Hongqi (Red Flag) theoretical journal.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Zhang, a career officer and defense production expert previously in charge of the military "R & D" program, stated the first task was to develop and produce sophisticated military equipment, a task which will require the "vast involvement" of scientific and technological resources. It is neither "realistic nor possible" to purchase defense modernization from abroad, he stated; the emphasis must be on self-reliance and on the development of only the most important and most urgently needed equipment. Zhang acknowledged that defense modernization must be closely related to the development of the economy, but he also contended that there would be benefits for the civilian economy from the military effort, citing as an example the benefits for nuclear energy development of the fuel production and technology base achieved through the strategic weapons program.

Zhang was clearly delineating a long-term program to unify and focus China's defense modernization effort, but there were also indications of more immediate consequences and reaction. In March 1983, a Special Defense Coordinating Committee was established under the joint direction of the State Council and the Party's Military Commission to speed up modernization

* Deng may have made this statement to a PLA Chiefs of Staff conference in December-January which he attended and to which he gave "important instructions" according to a January 3, 1983 Xinhua report.⁽¹²¹⁾

of the PLA; the Committee will have responsibility for both military research and defense production.⁽¹³¹⁾ In April, in the wake of Zhang's article and PRC cancellation of a contract to purchase Dart missiles from the United Kingdom, a PLA Vice Chief of Staff reassured a West European delegation that China had not changed its policy on importing foreign military equipment.⁽⁵⁸⁾ In early May, an article appeared in the principal economic newspaper which tried to put the above actions and formulations into an economic context.^(49, pp.K5-7) Citing both the Deng statement noted above and remarks by Chen Yun on the relationship between civilian and defense industry, the author cautioned against giving a special priority to the development of defense industry and argued that only with the development of the national economy and a fundamental improvement in the financial sector will there be abundant funds for defense industry and for the acquisition of more advanced defense equipment and materials.

There was insufficient information presented at the Sixth NPC (in June 1983) to judge how much, if any, additional money was allocated to the defense budget in 1983. In July 1983, Yu Qiuli, director of the PLA's General Political Department, contended that military modernization could be achieved in accordance with Deng Xiaoping's guiding principles on army building despite economic readjustment requirements and the reductions in defense spending.⁽⁵⁵⁾ According to Yu, the money saved through administrative and organizational "streamlining" of the PLA (which may be a euphemism for reducing the number of troops), would be used to improve weapons and equipment.

At this juncture, one can conclude that there are differences of opinion within the leadership on military spending and modernization, with each side apparently interpreting Deng's remarks and instructions to serve its own purposes. As to the debate concerning foreign military purchases, China all along has done more "window shopping" than buying. The comments referred to above suggest that China will be even more selective than before in its actual purchases, but will continue to evince an interest in acquiring dual-use and weapons technology from foreign suppliers (both governmental and commercial sources) on the most favorable terms possible. What is difficult to discern is whether this "economic" issue has political overtones, with some in the military opposed to military purchases from the West on ideological and foreign policy grounds.

By late 1983, the regime was indicating satisfaction with the results of four years of economic readjustment and claiming that the previously lopsided economic development had been basically corrected.⁽⁶⁸⁾ As of early 1984 it was stated that investment was proceeding in accordance with the Sixth Five-Year Plan (covering 1981-85) which was belatedly approved at the National Peoples Congress in June 1983.⁽⁷⁰⁾

Social/Political Forces. Political stability and national unity have been both paramount security concerns and political rallying cries in the PRC, but they have meant different things at different times. Moreover, the roles of ideology, the CCP and the PLA in pursuing these goals have varied. During the Cultural Revolution, ideology in the form

of Mao Zedong thought was paramount and was asserted to be the glue that held China together. The Party and military were viewed as instruments to mobilize the masses and "support the left," although, as noted earlier, Mao ultimately used an alleged Soviet threat to China's security to curb Cultural Revolution excesses in the name of national unity in 1969. After Mao's death, the "stability and unity" theme was used, unsuccessfully, by Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng, and his allies, especially within the military, to defend Mao and Cultural Revolution policies, and to maintain Mao loyalists in key Party posts.

Since Deng's victory at the CCP Central Committee plenum in December 1978, the goals of stability and unity have been linked to the reconstruction and revitalization of the Party and government apparatus. In major Party addresses since then, Deng has called for the "democratization" and reform of the CCP.^(10, pp.22-27; 13, pp.W2-9; 14, pp.105-114) Deng has emphasized collective leadership, decision by consensus, the establishment of Party and government rules and systems -- all designed to prevent a recurrence of one-man rule and breakdown of Party authority as took place under Mao during the Cultural Revolution. An important step toward Party unity and stability was the adoption by the Central Committee in June of 1981 of a resolution evaluating the legacy of Mao and other "historical questions." Another fundamental step was the simultaneous launching of three basic reform programs in early 1982: a campaign to eliminate corruption conducted by the Party's Discipline and Inspection Commission

(established in December 1978); an extensive program to streamline the government by reducing the number of ministries and commissions and the number of senior officials; and a drive to replace elderly Party, government and military cadre (who will retire or accept advisory positions) with younger and more qualified successors.

The power struggle and reform process crystallized at the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982. (44, pp.40-44) In terms of leadership competition, the Congress consolidated the dominant position of Deng's reformist coalition, while decisively downgrading and almost eliminating Hua Guofeng and his supporters. In line with the emphasis on collective leadership, a new Party Charter adopted at the Congress eliminated the posts of CCP Chairman and Vice-Chairmen. However, with the exception of Hua who was removed, the composition and rank-ordering of the Party's most powerful body, the Politburo Standing Committee, remained unchanged. Although the Congress also established a Central Advisory Commission to facilitate retirement of veteran cadres, the aging senior leaders of the Party tended to remain in place. This includes prominent members of the military-strategic elite, who constitute an opposition and counterweight to Dengist forces, particularly -- but not exclusively -- in the military/security sector.

However, in most respects, the Dengist forces dominated the Party Congress and have maintained or further strengthened their position subsequently. Secretary General Hu Yaobang, a Deng protégé, delivered a comprehensive report to the Congress,

which included an announcement of a three-year Party rectification, to begin in the second half of 1983 and to culminate in the re-registration of all (40 million) Party members with the intent of removing "those few" not up to standard.

Since 1983, the emphasis has been on reform throughout the Chinese polity -- the economy, Party, government, military, and society in general. The three campaigns launched in early 1982 have continued in effect though generally with less fervor and publicity. One exception was a sharp crack-down on economic and social crimes which, in Fall 1983, led to a number of trials and executions. Most of the provincial Party committees were reorganized in the first half of 1983 resulting, it was claimed, in fewer and somewhat younger leaders in most cases. Hu's personal position seems to have been strengthened since the new leaders include a number of former associates from the Young Communist League (YCL), which Hu headed for many years.

In October 1983, the CCP Central Committee held a plenary session (the first in over a year) and announced plans for the long-awaited Party rectification. The detailed plans hew closely to Hu's original pronouncement at the Twelfth Party Congress and call for a methodical progression from the Party Center to the grass-roots Party branch in stages over three years. Party leaders contended that only a few recalcitrants (primarily those with bad Cultural Revolution records) would be removed from the 40-million-member CCP in the process.

The plenum also served to launch another campaign as well, one which quickly commanded greater press and public

attention. A senior Party figure stated that Deng Xiaoping has raised the issue of "spiritual pollution" in matters of ideology in a speech to Central Committee members.⁽⁶⁹⁾ (This speech was not made public in China, but a copy was obtained and published in a Taiwan journal.⁽¹⁶⁾) Shortly thereafter several prominent literary figures were criticized for peddling bourgeois ideology and causing "cultural contamination."

The "spiritual pollution" campaign enjoyed a brief heyday but abruptly faded from view in early 1984 amid Western press reports of concern by Party leaders, such as General Secretary Hu and Premier Zhao, that the campaign had strayed beyond literary and art circles and the ideological realm and was causing unease among intellectuals and technocrats whose services were vital to modernization. There were also Western press reports of disagreements within the leadership over the handling of the campaign.⁽¹⁰¹⁾

Whatever the exact nature of the political fallout from the "spiritual pollution" episode, there can be little question that the treatment of the intellectual has been a bone of contention within the Party leadership. In summer 1981, in response to prodding from the military, the Party had tightened its guidelines on intellectual expression, revoking the limited license previously accorded by Hu Yaobang (in his former capacity as Director, CCP Propaganda Department).^(43, p.698) There has since been a concerted effort to improve the lot and status of the intellectual, both within and outside the Party. Stress has been placed on improving the cultural (i.e., educational) levels of Party, government

and military cadre and of giving increased responsibility to scientists, technocrats and other intellectuals, who are described as the critical element in the "four modernizations" drive. Protecting and promoting intellectuals within the PLA has received special attention and the PLA's General Political Department, under a new director, has been eased out of its self-appointed ideological and cultural watchdog role for the rest of the population.

However, there are still PLA and other watchdogs and a continuing close scrutiny of any perceived threats, internal or external, to national security. The security apparatus is being reorganized and, if anything, strengthened rather than weakened. Key individuals in this area include Peng Zhen, the new NPC Chairman who was instrumental in establishing the new legal system and State Constitution and had headed the Party's Political and Legal Committee which appears to have broad authority over internal security. A Hu confidante (Chen Peixian) apparently has responsibility for security matters in the Secretariat. The People's Armed Police have recently been transferred from the jurisdiction of the PLA to that of the Ministry of Public Security. And at the Sixth NPC in June 1983, it was announced that an additional security ministry (for state security) would be established to strengthen China's counterespionage work.^(9, p.XXI) In the wake of several recent arrests in China in 1983 for revealing state secrets (including that of a prominent editor of a pro-PRC newspaper in Hong Kong) there is foreign concern that the new ministry may have a chilling effect on future Western and overseas Chinese contacts and access in China.

Mention should also be made of a particularly sensitive area with respect to stability and unity. The Party has espoused flexibility in the handling of the minority nationalities in China's hinterland, expressing regret in the June 1981 Party Resolution that many minority cadres had been unfairly persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and promising regional autonomy and religious freedom to minority nationality areas. The Party is understandably concerned about retaining control and loyalty in minority areas, most of which abut the USSR or the territory of a Soviet ally or friend. In Spring 1980, there were incidents of minority unrest and violence directed at PLA garrison units in remote Xinjiang. (52, p.19) Xinjiang has subsequently received high-level Party attention, including frequent visits by top Party and government leaders, who recognize that the area is virtually indefensible against Soviet attack, a situation that would be further worsened by a disaffected civilian population.

Trends in Chinese Military Policy. The CCP Central Committee in June 1981 announced the appointment of Deng Xiaoping as Chairman of the Party's Military Commission (MC) a post he had been filling since December 1980, when Hua was forced to resign from that position and the Party chairmanship. Deng's appointment, at age 77, underscored the importance and sensitivity of Party-military relations at that juncture. He apparently declined the Party Chairmanship but accepted stewardship of the military. Deng appears dedicated to the consolidation of Party and government control over the PLA, the curtailment of the PLA's traditional role in politics, and

the eventual modernization and reform of the military forces. However, objections have been raised by Deng's military critics to his policies on various grounds: the predominance of pragmatism over ideology to the detriment of troop discipline and morale; the diminished role and prestige of the PLA, reflected in the trial of veteran PLA cadres and the criticism of the PLA's Cultural Revolution role; and the attempted implementation of pragmatic reforms in the PLA, especially the forced retirement of overage cadres. In spring 1980, Hua Guofeng with some PLA backing directed a challenge to Deng's programs and authority; this challenge backfired and contributed to Hua's forced resignation as CCP and MC Chairman in late 1980.⁽⁴³⁾

At the same time, Deng and his supporters have made concessions to the military opposition. As noted above, there has been renewed emphasis on ideological and political work in the PLA, with the PLA serving as a national model of the new morality (known as "socialist spiritual civilization"). The implementation of mandatory retirement, the reinstitution of military rank, and other cadre reforms in the PLA are being carried out, at a slower pace than similar measures in the Party and government.^(104, pp.W3-4) New, more stylish uniforms were introduced in fall 1983, and it has been reported that badges of rank will be restored by Army Day (August 1) 1984.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Concurrently, conspicuous efforts have been made to boost PLA prestige and improve civilian/military relations.

As part of this effort, the PLA has been nominally placed under government rather than Party leadership. As noted above, a Central Military Commission was elected at the

Sixth NPC to "direct the country's armed forces," whose leadership is identical to that of the Party's Military Commission (MC). However, the MC will continue to set military policy and, as one Western observer noted: "Whoever controls the MC controls China." (31, p.175) (The contest for control of the MC is discussed elsewhere in this report.) As noted earlier, information on the workings of the MC is very limited, but circumstantial evidence suggests that an enlarged meeting of the MC was held in late 1982 or early 1983 and made major decisions on military policy and strategy.*

A number of articles and speeches in spring and early summer 1983 suggested that such a review approved or reaffirmed the following: 1) renewed emphasis on defense modernization with presumably some increase in budget allocations but in close coordination with development of the national economy and an improvement in revenue; 2) modernization of defense strategy and military doctrine with an expanded military academy and think-tank program and role; 3) an upgrading of educational and technical qualifications of military personnel both through in-service training and the demobilization/recruitment process; 4) a gradual reduction in total force levels (largely as an economy measure) to be offset by a strengthened militia/reserve force; and 5) the gradual replacement of veteran commanders and cadres with younger, well educated and professionally competent successors. (124, 127,

* The reported attendance of Deng and the four MC Vice-Chairmen at a military conference in Beijing in early January 1983 suggests that a plenary gathering of the Military Commission was held just prior to or following that conference. (121)

128, 130) In early 1983, MC Secretary General Yang predicted the latter process would take three to five years. (125)

It would appear that Deng's proposed personnel reforms for the PLA are inevitable and will ultimately be carried out. There clearly is strong support for these reforms from some elements of the PLA who view them as essential to the development of a modern, professional military force. However, from more traditional, orthodox elements probably buttressed by fiscal constraints has apparently slowed implementation within the PLA. The senior figures in the military establishment are elderly and sometimes feeble, but reluctant to relinquish power. Exemplifying and compounding this problem, since 1981 the three most senior appointments to military policy positions (Chairman and Secretary General of the Military Commission, and Defense Minister) have all been in their seventies. The youngest of the five top leaders of the Military Commission is at least 77.

3.3 CURRENT PLA STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND APPARENT STRATEGY CONCEPTS.

With about 4.2 million soldiers altogether, the PLA is numerically the largest national military force in the world.* This statement, however, requires substantial qualification. First, out of a total of 3.6 million ground force personnel, main force units account for no more than 2.6 million men

* Prior to 1981, the Western estimate was about 4.3 million military personnel in China. The large-scale demobilization in 1981 clearly outpaced recruitment and may have reduced total numbers by several hundred thousand. However, the 1982 census listed total PLA personnel at 4.23 million.

grouped into about 158 infantry, armored and artillery divisions and some 75 independent regiments (including 42 motor transportation, 11 signal, and 10 combat engineer regiments). (31, p.147)

Approximately 122 infantry divisions are combined into some 37 corps with three divisions each. In addition, there are three paratroop divisions combined into one paratroop corps (the XVth, stationed in the Wuhan Military Area), 11 armored and 22 artillery divisions. (31, p.147) Yet out of these 158 divisions, only the 11 tank divisions and perhaps some 25 infantry divisions (together with a few engineer regiments) are fully or partly mechanized. This means that the vast majority of combat ground forces must still be moved on foot. Most of the remaining ground force units are classified as regional and local forces (mainly internal security and border defense troops), or as "Production and Construction Troops," primarily engaged in infrastructural work, farming, and industries, without much combat value.

Second, although there is a rather large amount of hardware available to the ground forces -- 11-12,000 tanks, some 4800 APCs, around 17,000 heavy and medium guns, and over 13,000 mortars -- the most modern artillery systems are those of the mid-1960s, and the most modern tanks copies of Soviet models of the 1950s. This means that the heavy weaponry of the PLA field arms consists -- at best -- of weapon systems developed between 15 and 30 years ago. Light weapons, too, are in no case younger than 15 years old, as far as the basic system designs are concerned.

Third, the same observation -- great numbers but outdated systems -- can be made for the air force and the navy. The PRC has approximately about 4800 combat aircraft, including more than 4000 jet fighters. However, only about 100 fighters are modeled after the Soviet MIG-21, while the rest are designated as MIG-15s, -17s and -19s. (31, p. 293) The most modern of these planes, therefore, are constructed according to models which are twenty years old, and the bulk of the air force hails from 25 to 30 years ago.

For its part, the navy can deploy about 100 submarines, some 25 of which are of early 1970s vintage (including 2 nuclear-powered, and a few missile-launching, boats), while the others were built in the USSR or according to Soviet models of the period between 1945 and 1960. There are about 14 destroyers including 10 Chinese-designed ships, and 4 ex-Soviet ones launched more than forty years ago. To these can be added some 17 frigates (11 newer Chinese ones commissioned between 1963 and 1972, and 6 older ones built in the USSR in the late 1940s and early 1950s). Besides the new submarines, the real strength of the navy lies in the smaller coastal defense ships, which include more than 500 fast-attack craft and over 150 high-speed rocket-launching boats that can deploy rapidly, but mostly only close to the coast and naval bases. (31, p.298) Thus, the navy is primarily a defensive arm of the forces, which has the task of coastal defense, and of safeguarding public security.

The most modern part of the PLA is the Second Artillery, i.e., the nuclear and missile forces. In theory at least,

China now seems capable of inflicting formidable nuclear destruction on large parts of the Soviet Union, especially in a first-strike scenario. China's second strike capability, however, is still very limited, if not nonexistent, and her nuclear arms, so far, cannot reach the continental states of the United States.

Although little is known about the defense planning process in the PRC, the strengths and weaknesses of China's military establishment do reveal much about the strategic concepts which currently dominate national security considerations in Beijing. In particular, combat force deployment provides telling hints. For example, by the end of 1980, 50.4% of the army field units and 50.5% of the air force were stationed in the four Military Areas bordering the USSR and Outer Mongolia (Shenyang, Beijing, Lanshou, and Ürümqi). The front towards Taiwan (the Nanjing and Fuzhou Military Areas) comprised 17.3% of the land combat troops and 15.2% of the air force -- which means a numerical relation of 1.3-to-1 in favor of the forces in Taiwan with the army, and 1.5-to-1 in favor of the PRC with the air force in that particular theater. The front towards Southeast and South Asia -- mainly along the Vietnamese and Indian border lines -- is guarded by 16.5% of the field army and 14% of the air force (the units of the Guangzhou, Kunming, and Chengdu Military Areas), while 15.8% of the field army and 20.3% of the air force form the operative reserves, stationed in the Jinan and Wuhan Military Areas.

This deployment indeed reflects the foreign threat perception which allocates the highest priority after domestic

security considerations (for which the territorial troops are earmarked) to the "Soviet threat." Yet, even along the Soviet and Mongolian borders, the forces are not evenly distributed: 24 divisions are stationed in the Northeast province, 32 in Northern China including Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia), 11 divisions in Northwestern China (Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai), and only 5 divisions of combat troops (to which one may add 4 divisions of public security and border defense forces) in the Far West region of Xinjiang. If we establish a firepower ratio of 1 : 2.3 between the average PRC and Soviet division, and if we further accept the conservative estimate of 49 Soviet and Mongolian divisions stationed on the front facing China, we would arrive at a firepower relation of 1.56 : 1 in favor of the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet theater, which would turn into a Soviet advantage of 2.1 : 1, if the air force is added.

From these estimates, one can draw two fundamental hypotheses:

First, the current Soviet force deployment in the Sino-Soviet theater (the so-called "Eastern Front" of the USSR) is entirely sufficient for defense purposes, and may even suffice for localized offensive actions.

Second, the Chinese strategic concept towards the Soviet Union is a strictly defensive one, and would most probably -- at least according to the balance of forces -- remain so even in a major international crisis.

Before considering the specifics of Chinese military strategy, we should briefly examine the doctrinal base. How much has

China's military doctrine been altered in accordance with the evolution of modern warfare? Categorical answers are not easy. Changes in doctrine may represent rationalizations of current policies more than evolution in military strategy. One specialist in Chinese military affairs has asserted that modernization of Chinese military doctrine must precede modernization of PLA equipment and that the former process may prove both enduring and traumatic. (48, pp.307-310) For the record, the CCP Central Committee and the theoretical journal Hongqi (Red Flag) on two occasions in 1981 gave authoritative support to the continuing validity of Mao's doctrine of people's war, albeit modified to reflect conditions of modern war. There is substantial circumstantial evidence that this thesis was challenged within both the Party and the PLA. (48, pp.304-306; 6, pp.38-44) In August 1983 an authoritative commentary by the PLA's top Political Commissar totally ignored Mao's military writings and instead noted that Deng Xiaoping's instructions on army building provided guidelines for making the PLA a "modern, regular, revolutionary army." (55, p.13)

Since early 1983, as noted above, there has been renewed emphasis on defense modernization, including not only the development and production of more modern equipment but concurrently the upgrading of the military academy and research institute system, and increased doses of schooling both for senior commanders and promising younger officers. MC Chairman Deng has called military education and training a matter of "strategic significance," and MC Secretary General Yang has asserted that PLA regulations now stipulate that

basic-level cadres must be promoted on the basis of training in academies and schools or through examination. (124, p.K-6; 127, p.K-29) There is little mention of Maoist military doctrine in this emphasis on education; instead the stress is on better scientific and general knowledge. (For example, PLA academies studied the military lessons of the Falkland Islands War while the media projected the incident in political terms, strongly supporting Argentina's claim to sovereignty.)

Judging from various sources -- Chinese pronouncements, actual deployments, the current status of mechanization and armament of PLA forces -- the basic elements of a Chinese defense strategy are: the most likely threat is from the Soviet Union and could take the form of a surprise attack, and include the use of nuclear and/or chemical weapons; China, with its dispersed resources and population, can survive a nuclear attack and defeat an enemy invasion on the ground; the ensuing war will be a protracted one, with the PLA blunting the thrust of an enemy offensive through greater numbers of personnel and equipment, higher morale, shorter supply lines, and support of the local population to compensate for deficiencies in weapons and technology; and the population will be mobilized and serve as a manpower reserve and civil defense force through an expanded militia. This strategic concept has been confirmed by a great number of statements by leading PRC politicians and military leaders, mostly in interviews with foreign visitors (e.g., by Deng Xiaoping in his meeting with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis delegation on June 2, 1980).⁽⁴⁶⁾

Within this concept, the aforementioned troop deployment reveals further strategic details. It appears that in case of a major multifront Soviet attack, the PLA is prepared to:

- sacrifice large portions of Sinjiang, and draw the Soviet troops into the vast deserts and grasslands of Ningxia and Gansu while trying to protect the strategic installations in the region;
- put up stiff, but retreating, defense in Northern and Central Manchuria; and,
- try to hold onto the North China Plains as long as militarily possible.

Supporting this interpretation of Chinese strategy, a combined forces military exercises was conducted in North China in September 1981 athwart the logical Soviet invasion route to Beijing. This unprecedentedly large-scale war game became a Chinese media event, and the PLA's determination and capacity to defend China under conditions of modern warfare was touted, both for internal and foreign consumption. At a time of stringent economies in military spending, the resources and effort involved in the military exercises underscored the importance which the leadership attached to the event. This strategy would force a very costly, protracted war upon the USSR, which it probably would not like to wage. In theory, then, the Chinese conventional deterrent well may prove rather effective. Such a strategy comports to China's present circumstances and makes a virtue out of necessity, but the further China proceeds in economic reconstruction and military modernization, the less sense this strategy is likely to make to a new generation of Chinese leaders.

3.4 THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC ELITE.

However, the older generation continues to hold power in China, particularly in the military. The fact that ten out of 24 full members of the Politburo (11 if one counts MC Secretary General Yang Shangkun with the PLA), and almost exactly one-fourth of the full members of the CCP/CC belong to the military, would indicate that the interests of the armed forces establishment are well represented in the political decision-making organs of the CCP and PRC. For those who take a strictly quantitative approach to political analysis, the severity with which military interests were curtailed in the 1979-81 Chinese budgets must have come as a surprise. There are, however, many indications that, for a number of years already, the military-strategic elite in the PRC has not always acted in unison. As noted earlier in this study, there are at least two factors which tend to impede united actions by the military leadership:

- the continuing rivalries between the Field Army loyalty groups, (rivalries which are increasingly difficult to pinpoint, but reportedly exist); and,
- the difference in Cultural Revolution experiences between those military leaders who were purged and those who remained in office or even advanced in power.

Although these two factors are clearly critical, it is still almost impossible to identify with precision the respective lineups within the military elite. The composition of contending groups may change with issues and the groups themselves may modify policy positions in accordance with developments -- or even only in accordance with perceptions of

developments. Further complicating intra-elite group identification is the secrecy which surrounds Party debates and the strict requirement that Party members loyally support policy decisions once made.

Bearing these caveats in mind, a close scrutiny of the pronouncements and attitudes of the 27 major PLA figures over the last three years would suggest that, as of June 1983, three groups had emerged with probable allegiances as follows:

-- Eleven tend to support the policies and the power position of Deng Xiaoping: Yang Shangkun (Executive Vice-Chairman and Secretary General, CCP/CC Military Commission), Zhang Aiping (Minister of Defense), Yang Dezhi (C-o-G-S), Hong Xuezhi (Director, GRSD), Liu Huaqing (C-i-C, Navy), Zhang Tingfa (C-i-C, Air Force), Chen Zaidao (Commander, Railway Troops), Qin Jiwei (C-i-C, Beijing Military Area Command-MAC), Xiang Shouzhi (C-i-C, Nanjing MAC), You Taizhong (C-i-C, Guangzhou MAC), and Zhang Zhixiu (C-i-C, Kunming MAC).

-- Eight now tend to oppose Deng and his policies: Xu Shiyu and Chen Xilian (standing members, CCP/CC Military Commission), Yu Qiuli (Director, GPD), Wei Guoqing (ex-Director, GPD), Ye Fei (ex-C-i-C, Navy), Li Desheng (C-i-C, Shenyang MAC), Yang Chengwu (ex-C-i-C, Fuzhou MAC), Wu Kehua (ex-C-i-C, Guangzhou MAC), and Jiang Yunghui (C-i-C, Fuzhou MAC); while

-- Eight take a neutral position or have an unclear stand: He Jinheng (Commander, Second Artillery), Song Chengzhi (Commander, Artillery), Huang Xinting (Commander, Armored Troops), Rao Shoukun (C-i-C, Jinan MAC), Zhou Shizhong (C-i-C, Wuhan MAC), Zheng Weishau (C-i-C, Lanzhou MAC), Xiao Quanfu (C-i-C, Ürümqi MAC), and Han Xianchu (Standing Member, CCP/CC Military Commission).

Under these circumstances, it is important to consider how the "elder statesmen" of the PLA -- the four old Marshals still alive -- define their position, because, as a rule, the undecided military leaders would respect the prestige of the old Marshals and follow their advice. Of these four Marshals, Liu Bocheng, in the past, usually has supported Deng, his former political commissar. But Liu, who is 91 years old and blind, recently retired from active Party life so his influence is presumably negligible. Ye Jianying, on the other hand, has gone on record as opposing consistently the ascendancy and policies of Deng, at least since May 1978; he also is in failing health and is no longer Chairman of the NPC, so that his degree of involvement in Party and military affairs is hard to ascertain although his prestige and influence remain great. The other two Marshals -- Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen -- have, ever since the early 1970s, given greatest weight in defining their political positions to considerations of PLA prestige, with Xu emphasizing the military and political doctrines of Mao Zedong, and Nie stressing the accomplishments and role of the PLA in science and technology

and advanced weapons developments, areas for which he was formally responsible.

However, contrary to expectations, neither Ye, Xu nor Nie retired or accepted advisory posts at the Twelfth Party Congress. All three have remained both Politburo members and Vice-Chairmen of the Military Commission of the CCP. The other Vice-Chairman is Yang Shangkun, concurrently Secretary-General of the MC, and he is clearly a Deng confederate. It is instructive to note also that at the Party Congress, the three military men who received major promotions were all presumed Deng supporters -- Yang Dezhi, Qin Jiwei, and Yang Yong, who died in January 1983.

In an attempt to rejuvenate the CCP leadership, and to force many of the revolutionary old guard into retirement, or at least semiretirement, the Party Congress set up the Central Advisory Commission (CAC). According to the new Party Constitution, the CAC was supposed to be "the political assistant and aide of the Central Committee." Its members are allowed to take part, without voting rights, in the Central Committee's plenary meetings, and its Vice-Chairmen in the meetings of the Politburo (article 22).

The first CAC of the CCP, appointed at the Twelfth Congress, consists, as of March 1984, of 168 members, 48 or 28.6 percent of whom are representatives of the PLA. It is led by a Standing Committee of 28: the Chairman, Deng Xiaoping (the only politician who holds positions both on the Central Committee and the CAC), three Vice-Chairmen (including Bo Yibo, General Xu Shiyong, and Li Weihan), and 24 members. Of this

group, 11 or 39 percent are military men.

During the last eighteen months, the CAC as a body has not assumed a position of any political importance. It rarely holds meetings of its own, and there is not the slightest indication that it has any institutional influence on policy-making in the PRC, whether in domestic, foreign, or defense politics. This, however, does not mean that its individual members have ceased to exert political influence by force of their own personalities. In fact, very few of the leaders who were transferred from the Central Committee to the CAC have retired from their positions in the Party, or state apparatus, or in the PLA. Among the military appointees to the CAC, only the ex-Cs-i-C of the Nanjing, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and Lanzhou Military Areas appear to have relinquished their former military posts.

On the other hand, a CAC member, Chen Yeping, was newly appointed to the very influential post of Director of the Central Committee's Organization Department in February 1983. Moreover, the four First Secretaries of the Party Committees of Beijing, Liaoning, Hobei, and Honan, who had been transferred to the CAC, have kept their leading positions in their old bailiwicks, and when the "Central Steering Committee for the Party Rectification Work" -- the major body to oversee the newly unfolding rectification campaign -- was established on October 12, 1983, members of the CAC assumed a very important position on that body, accounting for more than one-third -- 8 out of 22 -- of the overall membership. While the Central Steering Committee is chaired by Hu Yaobang, the work of the

Committee actually is directed by the Standing Vice-Chairman, the 75-year old CAC Vice-Chairman Bo Yibo.

Yet, with the concessions to professional military needs so evident in the pronouncements on military modernization in the first half of 1983, there may be a somewhat greater degree of consensus emerging within the Party's military leadership. Organizationally, Deng's supporters appear to control many of the principal operational military positions; with the exception of Yu Qiuli and Li Desheng, those considered opposed to Deng have moved to less active Party or military roles (and it is evident that both Yu and Li have prominently endorsed the prevailing policy lines within the PLA). (103, p.K-2; 122; 41) The top MC leadership (Deng, the three ex-Marshals, and Yang Shangkun) attended military conferences in January and February 1983 at which they gave "important instructions" and were elected to corresponding positions on the governmental Central Military Commission in June 1983 -- all of which may be intended to convey the impression of harmony, unity and stability at the apex of China's military leadership.

But what about the broader area of civilian-military relations? As early as September 7, 1980, Yang Dezhi complained that the "relations between the troops and the people" were not "as harmonious as in the past any more." (110) In October and November, a number of newspapers carried complaints about the special privileges of PLA personnel, such as access to luxury shops, sumptuous dinners, and an "excessive use of private cars." In December, some regional newspapers started to blame the PLA for "illegal actions and rough treatment of

the masses." (81) During the winter of 1980/81, as was briefly noted earlier in this study, it also became evident that the new rural policies enacted by Deng and his associates -- particularly the distribution of land with production contracts to the individual peasant families according to the manpower available in a household -- hurt the families of soldiers. (106; 82; 109) Already in early November, General Li Chengfang publicly admitted that the new rural societal policies had caused "consternation among the rank and file." (112)

As a result of these developments the PLA, in 1981, for the first time in PRC history, encountered difficulties in recruiting soldiers, and in keeping draftees for professional military service (although concurrently, there was a deliberate reduction in total troop strength).

Moreover, as indicated already, there were indications that a number of military leaders have become increasingly uneasy about the relaxation of ideological discipline in the arts and literature -- a relaxation which led in 1979 and 1980 to only thinly veiled attacks on Party and PLA cadres, sometimes ridiculing military leaders, or criticizing the special privileges which army personnel enjoyed -- and are mostly still enjoying. This group in the military focussed on the cultural and ideological front in a systematic counter-attack which began in the first days of 1981. This new political drive was mainly launched and sustained by the press organ of the PLA's General Political Department, the Jeifangjun Bao (JFRB).

This counterattack against liberalizing tendencies was also reflected at a "National Conference on PLA Political Work," which took place in Beijing from January 14 through February 1, 1981. Here, Wei Guoqing, then Director of the GPD, once again introduced the language of Maoist orthodoxy to the Chinese political scene. By April, the new political offensive of the orthodox circles of the PLA had become even more blunt. On April 17, a JFRB editorial revitalized a term which had last been used by the Cultural Revolutionary Group, including Jiang Qing, against supporters of Deng in 1975-76. On April 26, in a major article, the JFRB stated that, in "overcoming the influence of wrong thoughts," one had also to turn against "rightist deviations," another term that in the past had been applied to Deng.

About the same time, this PLA-led campaign had found a specific target: Bai Hua, a member of the Cultural Work Group of the Wuhan Military Region, and the author of a realistic modern drama entitled "Bitter Love," a strong indictment of the Cultural Revolution. On April 20, the JFRB printed a vitriolic attack against the writer and his drama. At that time, however, the article only was reprinted in the local newspapers of Beijing and Zhejiang, and not in the People's Daily. It was only in July that the Party's central organ took up the attack on Bai Hua, sounding the clarion call for a nationwide clampdown on dissenting intellectuals.

In the meantime, the "Resolution on Certain Problems of Party History ...", passed by the Sixth plenum of the Eleventh CCP/CC on June 27, 1981, bore earmarks of a

compromise between the orthodox wing of the PLA leadership and Deng Xiaoping and his associates. The Resolution was supposed to represent a definitive evaluation of Mao Zedong's role in the last 27 years of his life, and of the importance of his ideas for the future of China.

In an early draft which had been circulated among CC members since October 1980, it was stated that while Mao achieved great merit during the struggle of the CCP for power before 1949, and also during the first seven years of PRC history, he had committed "mistakes" in 1957, "grave mistakes" in the Great Leap Forward of 1958-59, and in the early period of the Cultural Revolution, and even some "crimes" during the last decade of his life. A second draft dated November 1980, however, did not mention the word "crimes" any more, and "grave mistakes" were now confined to the Cultural Revolution.

In the final version, Mao's merits were considered more important than his "mistakes," which were said to be now mainly confined to the Cultural Revolution and some decisions of the Great Leap. The final version represented a compromise between the earlier draft and a basically positive evaluation of Mao contained in a November 1980 speech to a military audience by an ex-Chief of Staff, which was billed as a precursor to the formal Party evaluation. This compromise became even more evident in the Resolution's evaluation of the Cultural Revolution. While this movement, in the final version, was still considered "entirely wrong," one aspect of it was considered "at that moment ... entirely necessary" -- namely, the takeover of local and regional power by the PLA in early 1967!

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
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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The June 1981 compromise, then, included the following features:

1. Deng and his associates accepted ideas of the Maoist loyalists in the PLA with respect to the historical evaluation of Mao, moderated criticism of him, and accorded prominence to Mao Zedong thought.
2. While Deng and his associates may have aimed at a total purge of Hua Guofeng, they settled for his demotion to the seventh position in the Party hierarchy, his formal removal as head of the CCP and the Military Commission, and criticism of him by name in the Plenum Resolution, all measures which Hua's supporters in the PLA presumably opposed.
3. Deng and his associates accepted more restrictions on cultural life and a renewed emphasis on ideology, especially within the PLA, as well as an attempt to reimpose tighter discipline within the Party and throughout Chinese society.

The extent to which this Resolution was a fiercely contested, forced compromise or a gradually evolved, genuine consensus is difficult to determine. Suffice to say that it has provided a broad policy platform for Party, government and military programs in the subsequent months.

The major elements of the Resolution were reaffirmed at the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982 and in the new Party Statute and the State Constitution. Immediately after the Congress, Wei Guoqing was summarily replaced as GPD

Director, apparently because of an errant "leftist" commentary in the Jiefangjun Bao (the GPD press organ) on the eve of the Congress which was adjudged to contravene the official Party line.^(44, p.43) His successor, Yu Qiuli, while not a Dengist, has not made the same mistake. Thus, while the military opposition to Deng has been able to defer implementation of his reforms within the PLA to a degree and has been able to move China's global outlook and strategy back to more traditional Maoist lines, as will be discussed in the next chapter, Deng's coalition, which includes a substantial coterie of military leaders, is gaining ground organizationally and operationally, and moving toward Deng's goal of secure Party control over a more professional and less politicized military force.

SECTION 4

THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S WORLD VIEW: THEORY AND PRACTICE

As should be apparent from the preceding analysis, ideology -- which a world view is, or is part of -- plays an important, if not always obvious, role in the PRC decision-making process. If nothing else, it provides a frame of reference or vocabulary for Chinese leaders. One need only be reminded of the impact of the concept of "falling dominoes" upon American leaders during the 1960s and how that kind of thinking influenced U.S. decisions in the prosecution of the Vietnam War, to understand the political significance of national world views. Chinese leaders no doubt are affected even more than their American counterparts by mental concepts that determine their digest or understanding of world events. Certainly this tends to be true of developing nations, where individual decision-makers play a more important role than bureaucratic systems or apparati. It is also generally true of nations that are closed, where all but a few at the top have little access to varied information sources and even top leaders become accustomed to using only certain restricted sources that are usually in some way biased. Finally, one need only witness the importance of geopolitical concepts in the vocabularies of Chinese leaders to see how mental concepts influence or condition their decisions. (28)

Yet, as we shall soon see, the Chinese perspective of global politics has changed frequently in the past three decades. This would not only suggest that there is a conflict between the Chinese application of Marxism-Leninism, or

Chinese communism, and the Chinese experience derived primarily from China's history. It would also suggest that China has had to adjust to changing international milieu. Perhaps even more it reflects the fact that China's role and its opportunities in international politics seem to be largely determined by its relations with the superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union despite public statements to the contrary. This observation, of course, suggests as well the notion that China's world view is not entirely internally generated.

It is the purpose of this section of the study, then, to assess China's global perspective in terms of the evolution of Beijing's global view, the impact of Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations on this global outlook, and the way China's perspective relates to a global strategy. Some other important questions also will be addressed. For example: how much of Mao's global view will survive? Does the pragmatism of China's present leaders discount ideology and thus weaken any conclusions derived from an analysis of China's global perspective? How permanent is China's outlook and strategy? Do Chinese leaders see the structure of international relations as dependent upon specific types of power and influence of national actors? If so, to what extent? Finally, what is China's place in the newly evolving system?

4.1 HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS.

China's view of international politics is founded upon the Maoist notion of contradictions, which posits the necessity

of struggle, usually of a protracted nature.⁽¹⁰⁾ To Mao, the world is characterized by contradictions, which are the essence of life and reality. In Mao's view (though this certainly does not depart from Marx and other communist ideologues), there is no such thing as stability in politics, and the Western dichotomy of war and peace is untrue. Mao, however, was unique among communist thinkers in adding that there are two kinds of contradictions, antagonistic and nonantagonistic, and that contradictions exist even in a communist society. He also noted that at any given time there is a principle -- or major contradiction -- upon which crucial decisions must be based.

Mao similarly argued that the historical process is one of conflicts or class struggle between two major opposing or contradictory forces. The success of any revolution depends upon an understanding of the major contradictions, of the rising forces and the declining forces. Here the dialectic method plays a central role. But the success of the revolution also depends upon one's ability to judge the primary contradiction at any given point in time, and to realize, in this context, who one's friends are, and how they can be joined or united against one's major enemy.

Inasmuch as theory in Mao's view has to be drawn from practice, knowledge of the Chinese Communist experience during the war against Japan and against the Nationalists, especially the latter, is essential to understanding the Chinese view of international politics. Similarly, since Mao was able to overcome what appeared to be tremendous odds, his view of global politics is clouded by an inherent belief that the enemy faces

quite serious latent weaknesses or handicaps. Finally, Mao's view is strongly influenced -- perhaps unduly -- by the super-powers, since they alone constitute a threat to China and they alone can refute the importance of the Chinese experience.

Prior to Mao's defeat of the Nationalists in 1949, his world view was important only to his followers in China. It did, however, play a central role in shaping party attitudes. Mao saw the communist movement in China as part of a worldwide trend, in which the weaker proletariat was rising against the stronger but declining forces of capitalism. A secondary but important contradiction was that between oppressed and oppressor nations, the latter being the imperialist countries which oppressed China. At the onset of World War II, therefore, Mao identified the clash between Western and Japanese imperialism as the major contradiction in international politics. Secondary contradictions existed in the form of conflicts between Japanese imperialism and Soviet and Chinese communism, and between Chinese communism and the forces of exploitation in China represented by the Nationalists.

At the close of World War II, the major contradiction in the world was between the forces of capitalism and socialism. The struggle in China between Mao and the Nationalists was a part or a microcosm of this struggle. This was confirmed for Mao by the fact that the United States -- the leader of the capitalist camp -- rendered arms and other assistance to the Nationalists during the post-World War II Chinese Civil War.

After 1949 Mao officially adopted the "two-camp theory"

then propounded by Stalin. According to Mao's interpretation or rationalization of this "bipolar" view, the principal contradiction was between the forces of capitalism led by the United States, and the forces of socialism led by the Soviet Union. Secondary contradictions included the conflict between imperialist nations and colonial people, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries, and between and among the imperialist powers. Stressing the importance of the major or principal contradiction, Mao charged that China must lean to one side, i.e., that of the Soviet Union, and that there was no third road or alternative to joining the U.S. or Soviet bloc.

Mao recognized that the United States and its allies were superior to the socialist nations in terms of economic and military power. But he also contended that the socialist world was increasing in strength due to the superiority of its economic and social system, international solidarity among socialist nations and the alliance between the socialist nations and the proletariat of the capitalist countries and the oppressed people of the colonial countries. Based on this perspective, as well as the Soviet Union's revolutionary experience and the contributions and writing of Lenin and Stalin, Mao assumed the position of a follower or protégé of the Soviet Union and accepted its leadership in bloc affairs. In 1950 Mao went to Moscow and signed a 30-year alliance to formalize this relationship. In more pragmatic terms, China needed an ally and a source of economic help and it believed that the West had little to

offer that China could accept. Likewise, Mao's style of leadership required an enemy and the United States was well suited to this role, especially since the two countries were pitted against each other in Korea.

By the mid-1950s, China's world perspective showed signs of change. Mao elevated the role of Third World countries, noting the increasing importance of the contradiction between imperialism and the colonial people of the world. Zhou Enlai in 1956 declared that the Asian and African countries are "playing an increasingly important role" in world affairs. In 1957, for the first time, Mao publicly spoke of an "intermediate zone" in world politics -- a zone or bloc of nations that were oppressed by U.S. imper-

but were not socialist in terms of their political and economic systems.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Mao said at this time that "U.S. imperialism interferes in the internal affairs of all nations, particularly the intermediate zone." Thus, Mao gave an important role to national liberation movements in Third World countries in the struggle against the United States.

This concept of an intermediate zone seemed to depart from the "two camp" theory of Stalin, a view that was not altered by Kremlin leaders following Stalin's death in 1953. It seemed to be associated as well with China's past experience with imperialism, an experience quite different from that of the Soviet Union, which saw the West as an enemy for trying to suppress the Russian revolution, but not for its imperialist exploitation. China's view also derived from its semi-colonial status and a fecund experience with economic exploitation.⁽⁹⁹⁾

Similarly, Mao may have seen parts of Asia, especially South and Southeast Asia, as a natural sphere of influence similar to that of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. According to at least one scholar, Mao and Khrushchev would recognize certain areas in Southeast Asia as a Chinese sphere of influence in return for support against his competitors in the struggle for succession.⁽²³⁾ Finally, Mao was apparently taken aback by Khrushchev's decision in 1956 to criticize Stalin. Mao was ruling China in a Stalinist fashion and was not consulted on the matter of dealing with Stalin's memory and his contributions to communism. Thus, the de-Stalinization campaign was a signal to Mao that he should take a more independent stance on ideological matters. Alternatively, Mao may have come to realize that the "two camp" theory, with its secondary doctrine of "no third alternative," was counterproductive in terms of Chinese foreign policy. China's hard-line, enemy-or-friend approach espoused during the early 1950s was too inflexible at a time when China needed diplomatic recognition and ties with uncommitted Third World countries in order to break out of the boycott imposed by the United States after the Korean War.

However, until about 1960, China remained in the Soviet camp, holding to the hope that the Soviet Union might "change its colors" -- despite Moscow's public advocacy of peaceful co-existence and its suggestions that China wished to see a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. But in 1960, after bilateral tensions and ideological differences had increased, Moscow cut its aid to China, withdrew its advisors, and began transferring military forces from Europe to the Sino-

Soviet border. China reacted by criticizing Soviet aid. In ideological terms, Mao advanced the proposition that national liberation struggles were the major weapon against imperialism and called for a broad united front of anti-imperialist forces. In short, Mao was making a bid for bloc leadership based upon the Soviet abandonment of the struggle against imperialism and its shift toward a status quo foreign policy. Similarities may be drawn with Mao's efforts to form a united front against Japan, when his forces were being attacked by the Nationalists. Yet, Mao's view also reflects an effort to broaden China's foreign policy orbit and compete with the Soviet Union and the United States anywhere -- a true global approach to foreign policymaking.

In 1962, following both the Cuban missile crisis, which Beijing perceived as a Soviet retreat, and the Sino-Indian war, which saw Moscow tilt toward India, Mao publicly declared that the three enemy forces were imperialism, colonialism and revisionism. The PRC's anti-Soviet stance continued through the next year and was formalized at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress in early 1963. At this meeting, Kremlin leaders declared that the state was no longer a dictatorship of the proletariat, but a state of all of the working people, and that the Party was no longer a class party, but the vanguard of all toilers. Chinese leaders charged that this amounted to an abandonment of a major tenet of Marxism-Leninism, and left the door open for the formation of new exploiting classes and the restoration of bureaucratic capitalism. (26)

Although the dispute arose primarily from an ideological split on what were essentially domestic matters, Mao proceeded to develop a radically new global perspective. Thus, in 1964, Mao spoke of two intermediate zones. The poor nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America constituted one zone; and the nations of Western Europe, which Mao saw as "falling out" of the U.S. camp (as China was doing in relation to the Soviet bloc) was another. Mao did not say that China was now a member of the Third World, but seemed to suggest it. Or he even may have planned to announce still another zone: a socialist bloc led by China.

The next few years saw some confusion in China's world view.⁽²⁷⁾ In 1965, Mao stated that he didn't know what the major contradiction in the world was; but in that same year, Lin Biao advanced the notion of a "north-south" two camp theory, in which the poor nations (including China) aligned against the rich nations, including the Soviet Union. In announcing this world view, Chinese leaders clearly left the Soviet camp, though they did not yet seem ready to identify Moscow as a formal enemy. The U.S. escalation of the war in Vietnam was, of course, one contributing factor in the Chinese reticence. Mao and other top leaders in the Chinese Communist Party no doubt also faced some difficulties in translating Sino-Soviet differences into a completely new or revised world view. Lin's thesis of the "countryside nations" (the poor countries) surrounding and strangling the "city" nations (the rich nations), however, made it clear that China was a Third World country and reflected the view that the

major contradiction in the world stemmed from the clash of imperialism and the poor, suppressed nations of the world.

In 1968, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine (which the Chinese took to mean that the Soviet Union considered an invasion of China legitimate), led Mao to brand the Soviet Union "social imperialists," thus putting them in the category of enemy. This was even more evident the next year during sporadic but intense fighting on the Sino-Soviet border: China at this time called for a "broad united front against imperialism and social imperialism." Categorizing the Soviet Union as "social imperialist" was justified on the basis of Lenin's law of the uneven development of imperialism, and Stalin's distinction between "more aggressive fascist states" and "more saturated bourgeois democratic states." In other words, in the Chinese view, the Soviet Union had regressed from a system of socialism or communism. (35, pp.137-158) Reflecting this new perspective, Mao referred to four new major contradictions: between oppressed nations and imperialist and socialist imperialist countries; between the bourgeoisie and the proletarian capitalist and revisionist nations; between imperialist nations and imperialist and social imperialist nations; and between socialist nations and imperialist and social imperialist nations.

This was followed in 1972 by Mao's delineation of four zones or blocs in global politics. First were the super-powers; second, the socialist nations; third, the first intermediate zone, or the poor countries of Asia, Africa and

Latin America; fourth, the second intermediate zone, or the developed nonsuperpower nations, which included Western Europe and Japan. This was a view Mao seemed to want to propound in the mid-1960s, when he apparently lacked the motivation he had after the events of 1968 and 1969. It was a view, however, that received little status and was only temporary. Mao, for example, dismissed the possibility of a united front of the socialist countries, together with the two intermediate zones, due to "superpower collusion" in Europe. Moreover, what practical value this theory had is uncertain. It was not given a lot of publicity or acclaim even in China; and Mao was soon to revise it in the form of his famous "three worlds" doctrine in 1974. Evidently, he realized that there was no likelihood that China could win leadership of the communist bloc. Likewise, U.S.-Soviet detente seemed to lessen the likelihood of war in Europe, which the Chinese had predicted for some time would occur.

4.2 CURRENT WORLD VIEW AND EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS.

In April 1974, Deng Xiaoping, in a speech to the 6th Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, announced Mao's "three world view." According to this perspective, the world is divided into three camps: the "first world" comprised of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union; a "second world" made up of nonsuperpower, industrial countries, namely Western Europe and Japan; and a "third world" of the poor, or essentially, the rest of the world. Mao died two

years later, but the Chinese global perspective which was enunciated in his name was unaffected by his demise. In November 1977, China's major newspaper, Renmin Ribao, carried a six-page article on Mao's "three world view" -- referring to it as a major contribution to Marxism-Leninism.

Mao's division of the world into three blocs or camps mirrored his view that the major contradiction in the world was that between imperialism (including Soviet social imperialism) and the oppressed nations of the world and that other contradictions had diminished in importance. It assumed that the Soviet system had degenerated and that the Soviet Union, like the United States, had become an imperialist power. It also assumed second world countries were sick and tired of the superpower dominance of global affairs, and they, like the poor countries of the world, perceived themselves as bullied by the superpowers or ignored when global issues were decided (notably, of course, those relating to strategic weapons and war-related issues).

It is noteworthy that Mao's categorization was based upon both political and economic criteria: the first world being defined largely in terms of political power or military influence terms, while the second and third world are defined primarily in terms of economic development. It is also interesting (though Mao had already done this in his previously announced four camp theory) that the United States and the Soviet Union were put in the same camp -- apparently reflecting the fact that Mao saw the two superpowers in frequent collusion, as evidenced by U.S.-Soviet detente. Another

salient point was the absence of a socialist bloc: China is categorized as a "third bloc" country, and friendly socialist countries (such as North Korea and Romania) are not seen as constituting a socialist community. Implicitly, Mao had abandoned the thought of China's leading an anti-Soviet communist bloc. Moreover, depending upon one's analysis of Mao's new world view, the placement of the United States and the Soviet Union together in a "superpower bloc" may have reflected either the fact that Mao distrusted both equally, or that he did not want to admit openly that China was aligned -- or wished to align -- with the United States, even though China was tilting toward the United States at this time, and there was little sign or hope of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. Conceivably, Mao may have seen his "three worlds" perspective as a transitional position, and died before he had a chance to revise or update it.

In terms of the theoretical structure of his three world perspective, Mao also saw as the root cause of imperialism the force of monopoly capitalism and the concentration of military and economic power. While the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the superpower category with the United States was based on the notion of monopoly capitalism and, therefore, seems to constitute an economically based view, the three camp idea generally assumes an outlook that focuses much more on global political and military power than upon economic forces. In fact, one might call it a form of realpolitik and/or a theoretical rationalization for the disappearance of a bipolar system consisting of two hierarchically organized

blocs. After all, during the 1960s, China undermined the bipolarity concept through its bitter rivalry with Moscow and the consequent splitting of the communist camp, thereby destroying "monolithic communism." Now it could be seen as endeavoring to further or complete the process.

Similarly, Mao's "three world" view also may be seen as a reflection of China's experience during the 1945-49 period and the Chinese Communists' war against the Nationalists. During that time, Mao's strategy was based upon unifying all anti-Nationalist forces in the countryside, and on surrounding and strangling the cities. In 1965, as already noted, Lin Biao had transformed this experience into a global strategy (although Lin may have been thinking more of a national strategy for China); and the three worlds view seemed to follow or incorporate this model, though it gave greater emphasis to unity against the major enemy, and thereby delineated a second world of nonsuperpower industrial nations. More cynically, Mao may have taken cognizance of the fact that the "second world" was important to China, as well as to most Third World countries, especially in the areas of trade and technology. This symbiotic economic relationship could not be denied or ignored.

When examined in greater depth, Mao's view also contained an element of geopolitics. Although initially Mao put most of the world in the third camp, he noted as well that there was intense superpower competition in certain areas of the world. Thus, some third group countries were seen as especially crucial to superpower contention. Related to this perspective, and elemental to Mao's theory, is the necessity

for leadership among the poor or third bloc countries. Mao saw this role accruing to China -- justified by Beijing's ability to weaken the bipolar system in the 1960s, and by its understanding -- based on its long and rich experience -- of the perfidy of U.S. and Soviet imperialism. Also, of course, China viewed itself as unquestionably a third bloc country (with the elimination of a socialist bloc in Mao's theory) and, in fact, the largest and most powerful nation in this category.

An important element in Mao's three world theory that deserves further attention is the notion of collusion between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mao felt that cooperation between the two superpowers was based upon the fact that they sought to sustain their prerogatives in the bipolar or two camp world. Thus, second and third camp countries had to beware. It should be noted, of course, that Mao also thought that this collusion ultimately would not succeed, because of the basic competitive nature of imperialism. While he spoke of superpower collusion, Mao underscored as well superpower tension and competition as the major impetus toward world war. Mao was able, therefore, to advocate, on the one hand, that second and third world countries should not trust either superpower and should eschew bipolar-type arrangements -- i.e., alliances with either Washington or Moscow -- and, on the other hand, that the two superpowers and the global systems they had created were dangerous and should be changed.

At the same time, Mao was careful to suggest that China was not a source of danger in terms of global conflict,

and his global perspective in some ways seemed to contain the seeds of revision. (35, pp.216-256) For example, China consistently seemed to view the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to world peace and to China's own security after 1969. And while considerable attention was given to U.S.-Soviet collusion up to 1973, Zhou Enlai, at the 10th Party Congress that year, gave greater emphasis to U.S.-Soviet contention -- themes that thereafter appeared to dominate Chinese thinking about the world. Zhou also elaborated on Soviet strategy which he stated involved a feint to the East (China) while actually directed at the West; while Zhou continued to maintain a major conflict was inevitable, his formulation downgraded, at least in theory, the prospect of a Sino-Soviet war. (26, 27)

After Deng Xiaoping consolidated his position in the Chinese leadership hierarchy in late 1978, China's foreign policy shifted in emphasis toward the West, both in terms of China's perspective of the U.S.-Soviet competition and in terms of a temporary deemphasis of the north-south struggle, and of China's role as the leader of third camp countries. In both 1979 and 1980, no mention was made of Mao's "three world" theory in China's so-called "state of the globe" report to the United Nations. In its place was the newly refurbished united front doctrine, an ideological tenet coined by Lenin in recognition of the minority position of the communists, and expanded upon by Mao during his rise to power, as a means of identifying and bringing together all friendly forces to further the revolution.

Now, the united front doctrine was applied to rationalize

or build an alignment against the Soviet Union. Those nations regarded by China as comprising the front included the United States, Western Europe (or the European NATO countries), Japan and China. It was based on the perception that the Soviet Union was an aggressive "hegemonist" power and constituted the main threat to world peace and to China. Meanwhile, in the Chinese view, the United States had learned a lesson from the Vietnam War and was a declining force in global politics as witnessed by its reduced defense spending -- particularly in comparison to that of the Soviet Union.

By 1982, this view had been considerably revised. At the Twelfth Party Congress in September, CCP Secretary-General Hu Yaobang underscored China's adherence to an independent foreign policy based on the principles formulated by Mao and Zhou, with particular emphasis on Zhou's five principles of peaceful coexistence.^(17, pp.29-33) Hu contended that "the main forces jeopardizing peaceful coexistence among nations today are imperialism, hegemonism, and colonialism." The theme of a united front against the Soviet Union has been dropped. Instead, China is re-emphasizing both its identification with the Third World and its desire for friendly, equal relations with all countries and peoples, including the United States and the Soviet Union.

A Chinese analysis of the international situation appearing in summer 1983 updated several of these themes.⁽⁵⁷⁾ It contended that Soviet as well as U.S. influence in world affairs was declining and that the military equilibrium between the two powers, which was expected to continue, had

increased the maneuverability of the Second and Third World nations. Moreover, the article noted, there was a trend toward multipolarization with additional centers of strength emerging such as Western Europe, Japan and China. In consequence of this development and the stand-off in U.S.-Soviet military strength, the outbreak of a new world war could possibly be delayed or prevented. However, the pessimistic side of this strategic analysis was that U.S.-Soviet tensions may aggravate regional problems, leading in turn to increases in localized and regional conflicts and small- or medium-scale wars.

China's world view, then, has undergone numerous changes during the past three decades. During the early 1950s, Mao was apparently in complete agreement with Stalin that the international political system essentially was comprised of two blocs, and that a third world or neutral bloc of nations was only an illusion. The newly independent noncommitted nations were to be neutral only temporarily. They would eventually have to pick sides: capitalism or socialism. China was a protege or junior partner of the Soviet Union and committed to the communist bloc, which China saw as a rising force in international politics and locked in conflict with the West.

Mao's perspective changed, however, as he faced disappointment in China's alliance with the Soviet Union, and as he came to see his tough, inflexible stance toward Third World countries as counterproductive. Similarly, to Mao, the Kremlin did very little to help China break out of the American-imposed isolation China suffered from, and Moscow was patently unwilling

to help China or risk nuclear war with the United States on China's behalf during two off-shore island crises. Consequently, during the late 1950s and through the 1960s, Mao came to see the Soviet Union less as an ally and more as a competitor or enemy. When Moscow cut its aid to China in 1960, the process of alienation seemed to be irreversible. The split deepened in 1962 when Moscow backed down in the face of U.S. pressure over the Soviet presence in Cuba and when it sided with India in the Sino-Indian war.

The Sino-Soviet dispute prompted China to see the world in something other than capitalism versus socialism terms. China had to rethink its view of the world and re-categorize its own place in international politics. This was done by giving the poor countries a more prominent role in China's global perspective and by separating U.S. and Soviet allies from their bloc leaders, giving them a unique position in the Chinese world design. This, of course, had implications for China itself, inasmuch as China was an underdeveloped country and might fit into the intermediate zone category. Also, distinguishing between the United States and its allies meant logically that the Soviet Union's major alliance partner -- China -- also should be put in a separate bloc or camp. Mao at first seemed to approach this decision with considerable caution, apparently because of his reluctance to break openly with the Soviet bloc. One might reason that Mao did not really think of nuclear weapons as "paper tigers" as he had said, and did not want to abandon the Soviet nuclear umbrella which bloc membership and the treaty alliance theoretically

afforded. This suggests, in turn, that then, as now, national security concerns dominated China's global perspective.

China's changing relations with the two superpowers were a serious matter that required not only considerable pondering and leadership discussion but also a theoretical justification for Beijing's altered security policies. An abrupt public reorientation toward the U.S. camp would contradict much of the previous Maoist view of global politics and many of the central tenets of China's foreign policy, and perhaps jeopardize China's perceived role as leader of the poor nations and proponent of liberation struggles in Third World countries.⁽⁶⁰⁾ Mao's articulation of the three worlds view plus elaborations by Zhou, Deng and Hu concerning superpower rivalry, Soviet strategy, and the triad of imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism provided the conceptual framework and rationalization for modifications in Chinese policies that were already under way.

This evolution of China's world view -- and particularly its present global perspective -- reflects several salient points. First, China's world view is more a reaction to actual events than it is an inexorable outcome from Mao's theory of contradictions. Second, China's global view reflects a Sino-centric perspective. In other words, China accords to itself a bigger role in the structure of world politics than its power and influence warrant. Most nations indeed formulate a world view in the context of their own problems and place in the world, thus overemphasizing their own role. Third, China's view of the world seems to weigh security

concerns very heavily, even though there seems to be a constant effort to disguise this emphasis. It is obvious that China's world view is strongly influenced by the two superpowers, as indicated by China's almost constant tension with one or the other, or both superpowers, during the past thirty odd years. Nevertheless, the strategic orientation of China's world view conflicts with the basic communist theory that a world view should be founded upon rising and declining forces, especially economic ones.

Regarding Sino-centrism in China's world view, Mao stressed China's role in bloc affairs by announcing the importance of the struggle of the peoples of the world -- of which the Chinese constituted about one-fourth. Mao also emphasized the geopolitical nature of the world struggle and the advantage accrued to China in the global struggle between East and West, since the communist bloc occupied the center of Euro-Asia. Mao also spoke of the spread of communism in a kind of domino effect with the poor nations of the world being most susceptible. His reference, of course, was to Asia, especially Southeast Asia, which in the past was a Chinese sphere of influence. Similarly, Mao's statement to the effect that China could engage in nuclear war and lose three hundred million people and still defeat the imperialists was a statement exaggerating China's external influence. Admittedly, much of Mao's bluster and exaggeration of China's importance reflected nostalgia for China's past greatness and an effort by Mao to restore China's important position in world affairs. It was also a form of

positive thinking that he deemed necessary to China's economic and political development, which he felt depended much more on human spirit than upon machines and technology. Chinese leaders also have given undue stress to the forces of revolution in the poor countries, trying to apply their revolutionary experience in guerrilla warfare and self-sufficiency to the desire for change elsewhere in the world. In so doing, Beijing overestimated the importance of the forces of revolutionary change, at least in the 1960s, while ignoring the desire of Third World countries for stability and economic growth.

Finally, an evaluation of China's global perspective seems to reveal a search for security, and a reaction to threats, more than Chinese leaders would have us believe. Again, it is not unnatural or unusual for a nation to base its global perspective upon security concerns, and to project a view of the world and of itself which is calculated to deter attack or hostile actions by a perceived opponent. On the contrary, it is to be expected. Some authors, in fact, would argue that it should and can be no other way. Nevertheless, the Chinese world view is supposed to be based upon the notion of a central contradiction in world politics, not upon China's security concerns. The evidence of a strategic imperative to China's world view, therefore, is considerable. Let us now move on to consider the impact of China's evolving world view and strategic perceptions on its policies and relationships at the global, regional and bilateral level.

SECTION 5

CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STRATEGY

To recapitulate the foregoing observations, China has produced a rich body of strategic writings which analyze global and regional trends within a theoretical framework provided by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and, more recently, Deng Xiaoping and others. (47, pp.54-60) A frequent starting point of these assessments is Mao's theory of three worlds and Zhou's formulations on the rivalry between the superpowers. Since the deaths of Mao and Zhou, Deng and others have distinguished between the two superpowers and qualified the inevitability of a third world war.

Currently, these theories can be synthesized as follows: the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers constitute the first world; their rivalry for hegemony and military superiority is increasing and menaces world peace; the power of the United States is declining while the Soviet Union has gone on the offensive and seeks to replace U.S. influence throughout the world; the Soviets may feint to the East but will attack in the West; however, Soviet actions in Afghanistan, in support of Vietnam and along China's borders are a threat to the peace of Asia and to China's security; U.S. hegemonism abets Israeli aggression in the Mideast and infringes on Chinese sovereignty with respect to Taiwan; both superpowers have their weaknesses; and China, together with other Third World countries, by struggling resolutely against the forces of imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism can postpone or even prevent the outbreak of world war.

Several characteristics of this strategic scenario are immediately apparent: Chinese strategic assessments are dynamic and can accommodate sharp changes in PRC policies; in PRC strategic assessments, security interests transcend ideology -- the theoretical framework is increasingly state-oriented rather than ideologically oriented; actual leadership assessments may vary somewhat from the publicly stated version, but the latter offers a framework or set of guidelines for the formulation and implementation of policy; and at the same time the reverse may often be closer to the fact, that is that Mao-Zhou-Deng et al's global assessments reinforce and rationalize policies and actions that are deemed to best serve PRC interests.

In looking at what China has said and done over the years, one can adduce a list of principles which underlie Chinese security perspectives and strategy.

1. Maintain China's independence and sovereignty, rely principally on China's own resources, avoid foreign alliances and commitments. Chinese memories of the rupture in relations with the Soviet Union and the abrupt cancellation of Soviet aid may color Chinese attitudes toward military and economic cooperation with the United States.

2. At the same time, combine with others with parallel interests to combat a common threat, e.g., Soviet expansionism; urge these others to take appropriate political actions and improve their defense capabilities; and form relationships, without formal commitment, which will augment China's security position.

3. Protect China from external attack through a

combination of deterrents: a capacity for nuclear retaliation, large conventional forces, a potential for mass defense and survival against invasion, and external support in a crisis (primarily the United States).

4. Tactically, see how Chinese policy can take advantage of and influence relations between other powers in ways that enhance PRC security.

5. Avoid encirclement and isolation and particularly a multifront, multienemy war. Do not press on one front when another is threatened. For example, before launching the border war with India in 1962, China ascertained that a rumored Chinese Nationalist attack on the mainland was not in the offing. Before attacking Vietnam in early 1979, Beijing normalized relations with the United States, emphasizing common strategic interests, and strengthened defenses on the Sino-Soviet border.

6. As a corollary to the above principles, do not initiate military action unless confident that Chinese forces will prevail and can control the scope of the conflict. The above examples of India and Vietnam are cases in point.

7. Seek recovery of territorial claims and unification of the motherland as priority national goals for which the use of force will not be renounced (that would infringe Chinese sovereignty). However, the time and method by which these claims are pursued will be dictated by other considerations and China will retain the initiative in this regard. For example, superior Soviet force requires a deferral of Chinese territorial claims against the USSR; an array of diplomatic, political, economic, and strategic factors deter China from

seeking reunification with Taiwan by force; and similarly these same considerations will affect its tactics in pressing claims to Hong Kong and Macao, even though it clearly could muster preponderant military force to seize these areas.

8. Gain stable and diversified foreign trade partners and secure access to modern technology in order to facilitate China's four modernizations, and the long-term enhancement of China's security.

5.1 THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE: WASHINGTON-MOSCOW-BEIJING.

With its proclivity for strategic analyses and projections, China has closely studied the workings of the Washington-Moscow-Beijing triangle and sought to gain advantage therefrom. It was the perceived threat to Chinese security posed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 that led China to seek rapprochement with the United States, and in effect to close the triangle. In line with its Sino-centrism noted above, Beijing has studiously endeavored to create the impression that the three sides of the triangle are equal, thus magnifying its own importance and enhancing its bargaining position.

In the past decade, Chinese attitudes and tactics have evolved. PRC media no longer speak of Soviet-U.S. collusion against China; instead it expresses concern over the impact of the rivalry on world peace and notes separately its individual grievances with the two superpowers. China does not want the superpower rivalry to lead to open conflict; on the other

hand it is leery of a U.S.-Soviet agreement that would sell out the security interests of a third country, i.e., itself.(45, p.19) At the same time, China hopes to position itself in the middle and take advantage of the rivalry, as it has already done to a degree. In late 1978, a U.S.-PRC normalization strengthened the PRC in its showdown with Vietnam and the USSR over Kampuchea. In attacking Vietnam in February 1979 without incurring a Soviet military response, China was playing its "American card" for all it was worth.

The opposite tack, that of playing a "Soviet card" in order to gain leverage vis-a-vis the United States, is more complicated and less advantageous for China, although this has not deterred limited Chinese efforts. Deng's "off-the-record" comments to a Japanese delegation in 1980, that China was not automatically tied to anti-Soviet policies and could review its review its relations with Moscow, were presumably geared to the U.S. presidential campaign.(35, p.155) Similarly, in early 1982, when proposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan had evoked strong PRC protests, Li Xiannian commented on the triangular relationship and hinted at a possible improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in an interview not carried in Chinese media.(92, p.61) Li declared that the United States was an imperialist country with which China did not have an intimate relationship and that China wanted to normalize its relations with all countries and especially with the Soviet Union. However, he added conditions the Soviets would have to meet for normalization to occur.

This Chinese position was placed on the record by Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang in his report to the Twelfth Party

Congress on September 1, 1982, which included an extensive review of China's foreign policy.^(17, p.29-33) Hu's remarks on Sino-Soviet relations were markedly less polemical than in the recent past, and he took note of Soviet expressions of interest in normalizing relations and the long-standing friendship of the two peoples. But he added that if the Soviets were sincere in their statements, they should take measures to reduce the "grave threat" to Asian peace and China's security posed by the invasion of Afghanistan, Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and massive Soviet troop deployments along Chinese borders.

Since the Party Congress there have been numerous indications of an improvement in the climate, if not the substance, of Sino-Soviet relations. Agreement has been reached on increases in trade and cultural/sports exchanges. Polemics and recriminations by both sides have decreased, as illustrated dramatically by PRC censorship of anti-Soviet remarks in its domestic coverage of President Reagan's April 1984 visit to China. Four rounds of talks have been held between Chinese and Soviet vice-foreign ministers. The latest, held in Moscow in March 1984, was described by a PRC spokesman as "useful" and conducted in a "frank, calm atmosphere."⁽⁷⁵⁾

Progress in the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations may be slowed, however, by Moscow's sudden postponement in May 1984 of the long-planned visit to China by First Deputy Prime Minister Arkipov, who would have been the highest-ranking Soviet official to visit Beijing in over fifteen years. There are clearly overtones of concern, moreover, in PRC statements on relations with the USSR. In June 1983, Premier Zhao noted it was the desire of

both peoples to normalize relations and called on the Soviets to take the first step by removing the "real threat to China's security."^(9, p.18) This less specific formulation implies that the Chinese are more concerned with Soviet troop deployments along the border and the Soviet military buildup in Asia (especially the SS-20s) than with Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Indochina. Supporting this speculation, Foreign Minister Wu in April 1984, in an apparent reference to the three major obstacles to normalizing bilateral relations, stated that the USSR must remove or reduce its troop levels along the border with China, its eight divisions in Mongolia, and the number of SS-20 missiles in the Soviet Far East.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Yet there may also be limits to Chinese interest in decreasing border tensions, recognizing benefits gained in relations with the West, especially the United States, from tying down substantial Soviet forces and worrying Moscow about having to fight on two fronts should war break out.

While China appears to be interested in a modest decrease in Sino-Soviet tensions, it can be expected to resist Soviet attempts to exploit Sino-U.S. tensions. Brezhnev's March 1982 offer to negotiate with the PRC was coupled with Soviet support for China's claim to Taiwan. But the Soviet Union has no leverage over the United States or Taiwan in this regard; and Chinese media reaction to Brezhnev's linkage of the two matters was distinctly cool.⁽⁶⁴⁾ The current Taiwan "crisis" therefore is unlikely to have much effect on Sino-Soviet relations. However, the obverse may be true: that is, that the PRC would not be contesting U.S. policy toward Taiwan so heatedly if

it felt there was at present an acute Soviet threat to Chinese security.

The broad outlines of Chinese strategy towards the Soviet Union have already been reviewed. However, certain principles or tactics are worth particular note in the context of the triangular relationship. For example, militarily, China takes a cautious defensive stance vis-a-vis the Soviets; however, it was unwilling to risk military action against a deemed Soviet surrogate, i.e., Vietnam, in part because of China's new American connection. Moreover, the United States and its allies play an important role in China's strategy for containing and blocking Soviet expansionism and, ultimately, reducing the Soviet threat to China. (And, conversely, the PRC feels this is a two-way street and that the United States should acknowledge and appreciate Beijing's contribution to the containment of the USSR.) China's strategy against Soviet forces in Afghanistan or Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea is heavily dependent upon complementary economic, political, and diplomatic pressures applied by others. In addition to some limited military assistance to Afghan and Kampuchean rebels, China contributes to an attrition strategy by pinning down substantial Vietnamese and Soviet forces on their respective borders with China. China's strategy seems to call for a state of reduced but continuing tension, not relaxation, in Sino-Soviet relations. The PRC may hope to induce the Soviets to make some tension-reducing gesture in the security areas China has enumerated; publicly, it has downplayed the security aspect of Sino-U.S. relations, even though its evaluation of the long-term Soviet threat to China is likely to remain unchanged.

Turning to the Sino-American segment of the triangle, the perception of a common Soviet threat brought the two parties together and is a fundamental element in their present relationship. China has consistently declared that "in the interests of global strategy" it is necessary for U.S.-PRC ties to develop, even while claiming that U.S. policies toward Taiwan threatened a deterioration in the relationship. (61, p.10; 63, p.10; 120, p.B1) One American observer concluded that in the honeymoon period (1978-80) Beijing deliberately sought to downplay the differences and exaggerate the overlap in U.S.-Chinese strategic interests and global outlook. (35, p.99) The obverse situation now seems to apply. China now contends that the United States benefitted more from the normalization of relations than did the PRC, the inference being that, especially in the triangular context, the United States will stand to lose more than China does from a deterioration in bilateral relations. In effect, China is playing its own "China card" against the United States.

How does China actually view the relationship with the United States? How much weight is accorded the nonstrategic aspects? As argued in various earlier sections of this report, the pros and cons of China's relations with the United States appear to have been the subject of protracted debate within the CCP hierarchy, a debate which has led to an alteration in PRC tactics, if not of strategy. Inasmuch as Mao and Zhou initiated rapprochement with the United States as a strategic response to the Soviet threat, that much of the PRC policy is probably not at issue. However, there may well be disagreement over how

far and fast Mao and Zhou would have carried normalization and whether the tilt toward the West engineered by Deng Xiaoping, a vigorous advocate of normalization, had not proceeded too far, with a mid-course correction now in order.

After normalization, in January 1980, Deng posited the three interrelated goals for the 1980s of opposition to hegemonism, Taiwan reunification, and economic reconstruction. (10, pp.1-2) All three goals were to be approached gradually and steadily; and, at least by implication, a close cooperative relationship with the United States and other Western countries would facilitate the attainment of these goals. Both before and after normalization, Deng stressed to American visitors the importance of the strategic relationship between the two countries, and welcomed a U.S. role in China's modernization, including the provision of weapons and technology. He indicated that recovery of Taiwan was not an urgent matter.

Beginning in 1981, without altering its stated strategic assessment, the PRC appears to have reassessed the Sino-U.S. relationship, giving greater weight to the more traditional, orthodox viewpoint noted earlier. This view presumably argues that the Soviet threat could be contained in other ways and that the price of a strategic relationship with the United States could be the permanent loss of Taiwan. (86, pp.2, 14-15) Following the Central Committee Plenum in June 1981, Beijing distanced itself somewhat from both Moscow and Washington, sending a message to the Soviets via the war games in North China, and making U.S. policy towards Taiwan the litmus test for the future of the Sino-U.S. relationship.

The next two years were marked by growing acerbity in Chinese comments on the relationship. Deng Xiaoping in early 1982 underscored China's dissatisfaction with U.S. policies toward Taiwan, warning that the forward movement in U.S.-PRC relations could be reversed. Chinese media criticism of U.S. hegemonism increased, with the joint U.S.-PRC communique concerning Taiwan in August providing only a brief respite. At the Party Congress a month later, Hu Yaobang asserted that despite the joint communique a cloud hung over U.S.-China relations which would only be dispelled if the United States ceased its infringement on China's sovereignty and interference in Chinese internal affairs with respect to Taiwan.^(17, p.30) Several economic issues plus a celebrated political asylum case further strained bilateral relations and led to Chinese retaliation. Premier Zhao characterized bilateral relations as "unsatisfactory" in Spring 1983.⁽¹³⁶⁾ Visits to China in late spring by the Science Adviser and the Secretary of Commerce signalled U.S. willingness to move forward in scientific, technological and commercial areas of interest to China and improved the climate somewhat. In June, at the NPC, Zhao spoke more in sorrow than in anger, calling on the United States to observe previous agreements and to stop doing anything that "harms Sino-U.S. relations and hurts the Chinese people's feelings."^(9, p.17)

Whether or not the U.S. met Zhao's conditions, a significant upturn in the relationship was evident by fall 1983. In August, Senator Jackson visited Beijing and presented Deng with a letter from President Reagan expressing a U.S. desire

to strengthen relations.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Another key factor was the visit in September of Defense Secretary Weinberger, an event which inter alia led to an agreement for an exchange of visits in 1984 between Premier Zhao and President Reagan. Concurrently, China was placed in a more favorable category in terms of U.S. export controls on high technology products and processes and on weapons sales. In anticipation of the 1984 visits, there were intense activities and negotiations by both sides on related issues such as nuclear energy cooperation, investment guarantees, and tax and trade agreements.

These developments in Sino-U.S. relations appear to conform with China's overall strategic outlook and posture which, as noted earlier, is constantly evolving despite Beijing's claims to the contrary. Sometime in 1982, the Chinese leadership apparently reviewed its overall foreign policy, particularly its position within the strategic triangle. According to one account, the leaders concluded that an "excessive confrontation" with the Soviet Union was not in China's interests and that, henceforth, the United States and Russia should be kept at an equal distance.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ China's new stress on an independent foreign policy was unveiled at the Party Congress in September 1982 as previously noted and was reiterated in the new preamble of the new state Constitution adopted at the NPC in December. (Interestingly, the phrase "China adheres to an independent foreign policy" was not in the original draft of the constitution circulated in April 1982, suggesting that the foreign policy review had occurred subsequently.) Beijing's current orientation is closer to a traditional Maoist

view and to the position articulated by Li Xiannian (the new PRC Chairman) in early 1982 than that previously identified with Deng. (37, 113)

That there may have been leadership differences over foreign policy was implied in an article appearing in early 1982 which asserted that some people felt China needed military protection against the Soviet Union, a sentiment which, the author contended, represented a misunderstanding of the history of Sino-Soviet relations. (114) Hu Yaobang, though Deng's protege, appears interested, like Li, in mending fences with other communist countries and parties and, inter alia, in exploring prospects for reducing Sino-Soviet tensions. According to Japanese news sources, Hu, in 1980, had counselled colleagues not to underestimate either Soviet military might or the increasing difficulties it faced (after attacking Afghanistan); and in early 1983 he took an upbeat view of both the desirability and possibility of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations. (59; 97)

The obverse side of this coin is apparent continuing misgivings among elements of the leadership to a closer relationship with the United States. While the evidence of discord is tenuous, there were, for example, reports of opposition to Premier Zhao's proposed visit to the United States. (90) According to Japanese press reports, Hu Yaobang, while visiting in November 1983 indicated Zhao's visit might be cancelled. (139) It can be argued that this threat and Deng's tough line in meeting Zbigniew Brzezinski in Beijing in February 1984 were tactical moves designed to put pressure on the United States. (72)

Nevertheless, as demonstrated by reports of political casualties from the "spiritual pollution" campaign of winter 1983-84, which was directed primarily at outside (i.e., Western ideological influences, there is a close link between China's internal and external policies, and the political fallout from these policies now appears to be affecting some of Deng's presumed supporters as well as his opponents.

Clearly, Beijing's reversion to a more orthodox Maoist stance will entail a delicate balancing of its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Even though, strategically, Moscow is viewed as the principal external threat and Washington as the ultimate safety net, Chinese propaganda and diplomacy are taking a more even-handed approach. Beijing is lowering its anti-Soviet rhetoric but not its guard. Conversely, towards the United States, while maintaining a high level of rhetorical criticism, China at the same time is seeking to acquire from the United States materials, technologies and investments to support its modernization drive; and also to maintain with the United States a degree of contact and understanding in regard to strategic matters and security concerns. This contrast between rhetoric and bilateral cooperation and agreement was underscored by the Zhao-Reagan visits in 1984. The Chinese Premier stated publicly on several occasions that there could not be strategic cooperation between the two countries because of U.S. policies in Central America, the Mideast and elsewhere which the PRC opposes.^(71, p.19-20) Zhao further contended that China does not follow a policy of "equidistance" in its relations with the United States and the

USSR. (71, p.20) Despite these public disclaimers, from private statements and actions, it is clear that for the Chinese leaders these concepts are very much alive and well.

5.2 TRENDS IN THE MILITARY BALANCE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Since 1969, Beijing has witnessed what it perceives as almost a complete reversal in the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region. Before 1969 China faced a U.S. naval and air threat; it now must content with a Soviet landbased threat, supplemented by air strikes and/or pressures by Soviet allies elsewhere on China's borders. Beijing has adjusted its security strategy accordingly. Its own statements and actions suggest that China views the shifts in military power during the period as disadvantageous to its interests but not immediately threatening; and that only with the accomplishment of economic reconstruction and defense modernization (both extremely long-term goals) will China attain a satisfactory security position.

To chronicle this shift briefly, since the 1969 border clashes, the Soviet Union has engaged in a long-term military buildup and now possesses a pronounced military superiority, both quantitatively and qualitatively, along the Sino-Soviet border. During the same period, Moscow has greatly strengthened its naval and strategic forces deployed to Soviet Asia and upgraded its military forces positioned in Mongolia. In South and Southwest Asia, the USSR strengthened its ties with India and invaded Afghanistan, with whom the PRC shares a narrow, rugged border, thus adding to possible Soviet pressure points against China.

But most conclusive and disastrous from Beijing's standpoint has been the turn of events in Southeast Asia. In the early 1970s, Beijing welcomed U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and supported the Paris Peace Conference; along with the perceived threat to China from the USSR, these events facilitated a Sino-American rapprochement. However, the PRC quickly concluded that the sudden Communist victories in South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 upset the military balance in the region to China's disadvantage. Strategically, China interpreted these developments as evidence of a U.S. military decline and warned of Soviet efforts to supplant American influence. Tactically, China, at first privately and then publicly, reversed its attitude toward the U.S. military presence in Asia and towards the network of treaties and bases that supported this presence. In connection with its own diplomatic offensive in Southeast Asia, Beijing, in the person of Deng Xiaoping, warned Thai and Philippine leaders in the summer of 1975 of impending Soviet efforts to extend its military power into Southeast Asia, utilizing bases in Vietnam. (47, p.59)

Concurrently, China endeavored to get a victorious but war-impooverished Vietnam to take its side in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and failed. In terms of military balance, the consequences for China of the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations could not have been less favorable. Within the space of five years, Hanoi moved from ally to foe of China, expanded its influence throughout Indochina, and closed ranks with the USSR, politically, economically, and militarily, permitting Moscow access to key military facilities in Vietnam in exchange for Soviet support and aid in Kampuchea and Vietnam. Chinese

tactics, especially the costly and inconclusive "lesson" to Vietnam in early 1979, have tended to cement the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and complicate the task of PRC strategists in coping with the possible forms that a Sino-Soviet military confrontation could take.

More broadly, the Chinese see the Soviet geopolitical and strategic gains in Asia and the Pacific as serving Moscow's global strategy.^(46, pp.29-30) Beijing contends that Moscow's strategic goals in respect to Europe and Asia are linked, with the Persian Gulf as the fulcrum. According to this theory, in the event of a war in Europe, the Soviets could be expected to attack U.S. naval forces in the Pacific and to attempt to sever sea lines of communication (especially the flow of Mideast oil to Japan) at strategic choke-points such as the Straits of Malacca. Through an augmented Pacific fleet^(46, p.29) and use of naval/air/communications facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, the Soviets have not only strengthened their military capabilities in Asia, they have also enhanced their bargaining position and their claim to representation in any regional security arrangements or negotiations. China has been quick to sound alarms on the growing Soviet menace in Asia, but there have also been overtones of a self-fulfilling prophecy in that Chinese strategy and actions provided the Soviets a pretext for this buildup at least in Southeast Asia; and one Southeast Asian observer has commented that Soviet use of Vietnamese bases may be regarded by Beijing as having a silver lining, in that it is likely to have a salutary effect on U.S. and Japanese attitudes toward regional and global security.⁽³⁵⁾

5.3 NUCLEAR PERCEPTIONS AND STRATEGY.

While keenly aware that the Soviet buildup in Asia has included increasing numbers of nuclear weapons, China purports to view the nuclear equation primarily in global rather than regional terms and as an element in the rivalry of the two superpowers. Chinese strategists closely follow U.S. and Soviet advanced weapons developments and deployments and weigh their effect on the strategic balance. The Chinese perceive the U.S. deterrence strategy to be based on the principle of mutual assured destruction in contrast to a Soviet strategy grounded in a war-waging capability, which can be used to advance other Soviet interests. In discussions with Western strategists, Chinese leaders have referred to the edge gained by the Soviets in terms of the theater nuclear balance in Eurasia from the deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. (46, p.26) Consistent with their strategic projection of a superpower confrontation in Europe, not Asia, Chinese leaders, in 1980, privately viewed with approval both the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe and the development of British and French national nuclear forces. (46, p.26)

By 1984, however, in the face of what it viewed as an alarming escalation of the U.S.-Soviet arms race, Chinese leaders such as Premier Zhao publicly criticized the U.S. missile deployments in Western Europe, (74, p.10) although privately leaders such as Deng were reportedly less critical of the deployments. (96) However, the second half

of the equation appears to remain in effect. Among the five nuclear powers, China most nearly equates its position with that of the United Kingdom and France. In April 1984, NPC Chairman Peng Zhen told visiting European parliamentarians that China and Western Europe need nuclear weapons if the world is to avoid a war, comments that the visitors inferred indicated Chinese support of the separate British and French nuclear forces.

Publicly, Beijing expresses extreme skepticism that U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks will slow the nuclear arms race; Chinese leaders have indicated they do not oppose the talks,^(20, p.16) although Chinese media has taken an increasingly critical view of U.S. and Soviet motives. An authoritative analysis in May 1983 asserted both sides sought to make disarmament serve the purpose of achieving military superiority, sought to restrain or prohibit other nations from developing nuclear strength, paid lip-service to the concepts of disarmament and negotiations for domestic political and diplomatic reasons, carried out bilateral talks to work out "rules of the game" and reduce costs, and disdained multilateral talks under United Nations auspices.⁽⁵⁰⁾ This analysis continues to characterize Chinese commentary on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear rivalry; and Chinese leaders were not noticeably reticent on this subject even during the Presidential visit.

This "evenhanded" Chinese treatment accords with Beijing's "independent" foreign policy line and tactical equidistance of itself from the Soviet Union and the United States but it does not accord with Beijing's actual assessment of the

strategic situation or the implications for its security. On several occasions in Spring 1983 China expressed "grave concern" over the buildup of Soviet strategic forces in Asia and indications that the Soviets would redeploy to Asia those SS-20s removed from the European theater under an INF agreement. (39; 115) The PRC has acknowledged U.S. opposition to such a move, which, it was claimed, would add a "new complex factor" and "... intensify the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms race in Asia," and has cited U.S. intelligence sources in reporting the burgeoning construction of SS-20 launching sites in Siberia. (134; 126)

In his report to the Sixth National Peoples Congress (NPC) in June 1983, Premier Zhao Ziyang alluded to the continuing Soviet threat to China's security. (9, p.XXIV) China has made direct representations to Moscow, requesting a reduction of Soviet SS-20s in Asia. It has also tried to highlight the threat to Asian security in general, and to let others, particularly Japan, get out in front in bringing pressure to bear on Moscow.

To a degree China has also looked to the United States to restrain the Soviet nuclear buildup in Asia and to prevent any agreement whereby the Soviets would remove missiles from Europe and redeploy them in Soviet Asia. Although China will no longer make joint statements with the United States concerning Soviet "hegemonism," in early February 1983, for the first time and without further elaboration, it listed arms control among the areas in which China and the United States shared similar views. (123, p.B-8) This observation stands in sharp contrast to the aforementioned Chinese critique of both

U.S. and Soviet disarmament proposals and strategic policies.

In its actual military deployments and strategy, China is much less ambivalent about its orientation. Its deterrence strategy consists of a small, developing nuclear weapons capability buttressed by a massive, albeit obsolescent, conventional military force, and a relationship with the United States which would ensure some degree of support in the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict. Both its conventional and strategic forces are deployed preponderantly against the Soviet threat. Despite Cultural Revolution disruptions and the resource constraints imposed by the "economic readjustment" policy inaugurated in 1979, China successfully tested two liquid-fueled ICBM, and successfully launched an SLBM in October 1982.^(46, p.33) Since early 1983 there have been indications of a Chinese decision to give higher priority to defense mobilization ("to cope with international developments" according to Premier Zhao). In a lengthy article on the subject, the Defense Minister implied that strategic weapons programs would get special attention.⁽⁵⁶⁾

China apparently values its nuclear capability both for the international status it conveys and for its limited deterrent effect, even though Beijing recognizes the vast and growing imbalance in Chinese and Soviet nuclear forces. In support of its assertion that its nuclear weapons will be used purely for defense, Beijing periodically reiterates the "no first use" pledge made after China's initial nuclear test. In its perception of the Soviet threat, Chinese strategists evidently plan for possible Soviet use of nuclear or chemical/biological weapons as well as conventional forces in an attack

on China; they feel that the Chinese ability to survive such an attack and to respond effectively is in itself a major deterrent against Soviet attack. (46)

As additional insurance, the Chinese, in normalizing relations with the United States, sought a relationship which would give the Soviets pause before attacking China. Deng Xiaoping in 1979 stressed the strategic interests China had in common with the United States. More recently, at Chinese insistence, the "strategic relationship" has gone underground; and the Soviet threat was not mentioned in the joint U.S.-Chinese communique in August 1982. However, the Chinese clearly continue to regard the Sino-American relationship as mutually beneficial in deterrence terms. As a Chinese analyst of Soviet strategy noted in March 1983, the Soviet Union now has to "worry about fighting on two fronts," thus serving as a deterrent to Soviet attack in either Europe or Asia.

5.4 ARMS CONTROL STATEMENTS AND PRACTICES.

In general, China has opposed most arms control treaties, agreements and organizations, contending that they represent an effort by the two superpowers to maintain a nuclear monopoly and constitute an infringement upon national sovereignty and the right of nations to assure their self-defense. Chinese arms control pronouncements have been of two types: assertions of the defensive nature of the Chinese nuclear weapons program coupled with declarations of no first-use and of non-use against nonnuclear states; and broad, sweeping

disarmament proposals which call for a total ban on nuclear weapons and link disarmament of conventional forces with that of strategic weapons.

The two approaches are frequently used in tandem. For example, following its first atomic test in October 1964, Beijing issued a unilateral "no-first-use" pledge and proposed a world summit conference of all nations for the purpose of totally banning and eliminating nuclear weapons. China has consistently opposed the limited nuclear test ban of 1963 and subsequent proposals for a comprehensive test ban; it has similarly refused to endorse the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Before 1983, the one nuclear arms control convention it had signed was the protocol of a treaty establishing a nuclear free zone in Latin America, a concept which the PRC has long advocated for other parts of the world, including Asia.

Since joining the United Nations in 1971, the PRC has gradually played a more active role in disarmament deliberations there, including the Commission on Disarmament talks in Geneva and the two Special Sessions on Disarmament (SSOD) in May-June 1978 and June-July 1982. In 1963, through an NPC resolution, China declared that it would not abide by any disarmament agreement which it had not negotiated or signed;^(30, p.33) and in 1971 contended that it would never "betray" the nonnuclear nations by joining in nuclear disarmament negotiations sponsored by the two superpowers.⁽²²⁾ Its current position appears to represent a tactical evolution from these extreme positions. China now asserts that, as a Security Council member and the only Third World nation possessing nuclear

weapons, it will play a responsible role in disarmament parleys which are held under U.N. auspices in order to assure proper reflection of Third World views. Moreover, in October 1983, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a special agency of the United Nations.

At SSOD II, PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua presented an arms control proposal which constitutes the official Chinese position on the subject.⁽²⁰⁾ The Chinese proposal represents a reiteration of previous formulas with one new, highly tenuous Chinese commitment. The three principal elements of the plan are: 1) all nuclear states should reach an agreement not to use nuclear weapons and, pending such an agreement, should unilaterally make pledges of no-first-use and non-use; 2) conventional disarmament should be effected simultaneously with nuclear disarmament and states should undertake not to commit aggression against or militarily occupy any country; and 3) the United States and the Soviet Union should first cease testing, improving or producing nuclear weapons and reduce their numbers by 50%, at which point the PRC "is ready" to join with others in working out similar arms control and reduction measures, eventually providing for the destruction of all nuclear weapons.

This proposal evidences very little flexibility or evolution in Beijing's public position over the years. Its posture on arms control at the United Nations for the most part has been political and polemical, blaming the superpowers for the arms race and attempting to divert attention from China's consistent opposition to agreements and measures widely supported by the nonnuclear states.

China, up to 1983, had not been a party to the various conventions, organizations or arrangements which impose controls and safeguards on nuclear transactions, declaring that these represented infringements upon national sovereignty. China has now modified its position. In joining IAEA, the last of the nuclear powers to do so, China pledged to accept the rules and statute of that agency and to fulfill the obligations of membership.⁽¹³⁸⁾ This will entail a significant degree of scrutiny and safeguards. At the same time, China maintained its opposition to the NPT while declaring that "China neither stands for nor encourages the proliferation of nuclear weapons," a formulation which Chinese leaders have subsequently repeated on numerous occasions.

China has recently undertaken an ambitious nuclear energy development program. It has established the Ministry of Nuclear Industry (formerly the Second Ministry of Machine Building, which was under military direction) to oversee this program and has announced plans for the construction of four nuclear energy plants in conjunction with foreign contractors and suppliers. In view of China's straightened economy, and the availability of cheaper alternative energy sources, there are clearly more than economic considerations at stake, and one can surmise there will be substantial military interest and involvement in these projects.

To carry out this ambitious undertaking, China will clearly need extensive foreign capital, assistance and expertise, although it does have the advantage of already being a nuclear power and of possessing rich uranium deposits.⁽¹²⁹⁾

The cooperation of key international agencies and foreign governments will be required, and presumably were instrumental in Beijing's decision to join IAEA.

China has also been conferring with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan and others concerning this program. (87; 133) The PRC has already made considerable headway in commencing negotiations on bilateral agreements which will permit it to deal with commercial manufacturers and suppliers of that country. In June 1983 China and France signed a memorandum on the joint construction of nuclear power plants. During the President's April 1984 visit, the United States and China initialled a nuclear cooperation agreement, under which private U.S. firms can sell nuclear equipment, materials, and technology to China. When Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone visited China the previous month, Premier Zhao expressed the desire for a similar agreement with Japan and observed that Sino-Japanese cooperation in the nuclear energy field should not lag behind China's cooperation with other countries. (18, p.1 In other words, China will seek the best terms it can get and is not above jawboning its prospective suppliers.

Beijing probably also discerns political and security benefits in diversifying its nuclear energy contracts and agreements, and in developing good business connections with the major producers and suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology. Despite its opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it claims is discriminatory, China has a strong vested interest in supporting curbs on nuclear proliferation in practice. For another Asian nation to become

a nuclear power would jeopardize the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific area. In this regard, it was noteworthy that in joining the IAEA, the PRC scored the previous "illegal" representation by Nationalist authorities on Taiwan, but called on the IAEA to rearrange and maintain its safeguard relationship with Taiwan albeit in a nongovernmental form.^(22, p.A-4)

5.5 CHINA'S EAST ASIAN PERIPHERY.

The general principles underlying Chinese defense of its territory and geopolitical strategy have already been recounted. In addition, specific areas may involve special considerations affecting PRC security interests. While Beijing may not make public reference to these considerations, it appears that they are taken into account in Chinese policy decisions and strategy. They are briefly discussed below by geographic area.

1. Northeast and East Asia

Mongolia -- The strain in Chinese relations with the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) became more evident as the result of two apparently related developments. At the Sino-Soviet vice-ministerial talks, China has called for a reduction of Soviet forces in Mongolia as well as elsewhere along the border, a move which the MPR and the USSR strongly oppose. In March 1983, shortly after the second round of these talks, Mongolia began to deport Chinese nationals residing in Ulan Bator who refused relocation to remote areas of Mongolia. Chinese reaction was mild -- consisting of a belated public acknowledgement

and protest and reported diplomatic representations to the MPR -- perhaps in an effort not to jeopardize the talks. Moreover, Beijing appears to recognize the value of a minimal, correct relationship with the MPR, if only to reduce the potential for MPR incitement of disaffection among Mongolians in China. Secondly, a rail line between the PRC and the USSR passes through the MPR. While at present it is of dubious strategic value to China, it presumably will play a major role in the projected expansion of Sino-Soviet trade.

The Korean Peninsula -- the Korean Peninsula represents a complex arena for China, one in which China's improved relationship with Japan and the United States tend to be liabilities rather than assets. Strategically, it is absolutely essential to the PRC to have a close relationship with North Korea (DPRK) in order to stave off Soviet inroads into the area, a development that would nearly complete Soviet encirclement of China. In consequence, China has invested considerable effort in the maintenance of friendly bilateral ties, courting Pyongyang and publicly endorsing its major foreign policy goals, even though realization of them could adversely affect Chinese interests.

Over the years the PRC has enjoyed a definite edge over the USSR in relations with the DPRK, an edge which has entailed benefits as well as costs for Beijing, but which may now be diminishing. One benefit has been that Pyongyang has basically taken Beijing's side in the internecine Communist struggles in Indochina, criticizing the Vietnamese attack

on Kampuchea and sheltering Sihanouk, much to the displeasure of both Moscow and Hanoi. In return China has been a more consistent supporter of North Korea's position on Korean issues than the U.S.S.R. Both Beijing and Moscow now call for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and the subsequent reunification of Korea. In conversation with American visitors, Chinese leaders suggest that a symbolic, limited American withdrawal would facilitate negotiations between the two Korean parties and thus lead to normalization and eventual reunification.^(46, p.31) But the PRC was probably privately relieved when the United States cancelled plans for a partial troop withdrawal from Korea, thus permitting PRC media to wax eloquent in support of Pyongyang, while at the same time alleviating Chinese fears that a power vacuum would be created on the Peninsula which the Soviets would seek to exploit.

Essentially China will be confronted by a series of Hobson's choices in the event of a Korean crisis. How much leverage will China be able to exert in such a situation and in which direction will it choose to do so? Either political instability in North Korea (e.g., a succession crisis) or heightened tensions between the two Koreas would threaten Chinese interests, because of the opening it could provide the Soviets and the strain it could place on China's ties with Japan and the United States. On the other hand, a resolution of the Korean question, in either direction, also has disadvantages for China. Reunification would confront the PRC with a strong, industrializing nation on its borders, while perma-

nent separation of the two Korean entities would create a bad precedent for the reunification of China and Taiwan. (46, p.31)

In the past several years, Beijing has continued to invest substantial capital in its relationship with Pyongyang. The DPRK is customarily listed first among friendly communist countries by Chinese leaders and media. In Spring 1982, Deng and Hu made an unpublicized visit to North Korea (Hu's first trip outside of China as Party Leader), and in September 1982, Kim Il Sung paid a state visit to China where he received lavish red-carpet treatment. This was followed by an unannounced visit to the PRC in June 1983 of Kim's son and heir-apparent, Kim Chong-il. This visit was interpreted by the Japanese press as signifying Beijing's endorsement of the young Kim as his father's successor, despite the obvious contradiction with earlier Chinese statements (intended internally, of course) abhorring personality cults and designated successors. Hu visited Pyongyang again in May 1984, this time with extensive publicity.

At the same time, China has gingerly explored unofficial contacts with South Korea, a development which began inadvertently in 1983 when a Chinese civilian airliner was hijacked and landed in Seoul. The clear evidence of North Korean involvement in the bomb explosion in Rangoon in late 1983 which killed a number of senior ROK figures put the PRC in an embarrassing position and underscored the dilemma it faces in Korea. One Chinese response to this dilemma, reportedly conveyed by Deng to Weinberger before the bombing incident, was to hint at a Chinese willingness to work with the United States and Japan

towards improving relations between the two Korean regimes. China subsequently backtracked -- perhaps at Pyongyang's insistence -- and removed itself as a party to any future Korean negotiations. However, it was reported that Korea was among the topics discussed during both the Zhao and Reagan visits, suggesting that the two countries are at least in closer communication on this matter than previously, even though Beijing media continues to take a strong pro-North Korean stance and call for the removal of all U.S. forces from South Korea.

Japan -- There is, predictably, a close correlation between Beijing's bilateral relations with Tokyo and its strategic perceptions of Japan's role in Asia. China's volte face in its relations with Japan was based on the premise of perceived parallel interests in resisting Soviet expansionist pressures. The major sticking point in protracted negotiations on the 1978 Sino-Japanese peace treaty was China's insistence on including specific reference to Soviet hegemonism. The Japanese demurred on the basis of their "equidistance" policy (with respect to relations with the PRC and USSR) although the resultant compromise language was still deemed highly offensive by Moscow. Subsequent developments (e.g., Soviet military construction and deployments in Japan's former Northern Territories, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet installation of SS-20s in the Soviet Far East) have further strained Japanese-Soviet relations and lessened the credibility of "equidistance." Meanwhile, China has adopted its own undeclared "equidistance" tactic (vis-a-vis the United

States and the U.S.S.R.) and dropped all bilateral statements and references to Soviet hegemonism.

For several years after the 1978 peace treaty, China perceived a greater parallelism of Sino-Japanese interests and a larger regional security role for Japan than Japan seemed willing to accept. China has urged Japan to strengthen its self-defense forces, especially its maritime capabilities, make a greater contribution to regional security, and enter into various limited forms of military cooperation with the PRC. Chinese leaders also assured Japan that they recognized that the special U.S.-Japanese security relationship takes precedence for Japan over all other foreign ties. (35, pp.199-201)

Moreover, for a period, China tried to project the appearance of a Sino-Japanese-American entente embracing this tie which would imply a common alignment or mini-united front against the growing Soviet military presence in the region and would reflect a mutual desire of China and Japan for a continued strong U.S. military presence in the Asian-Pacific region. However, the bilateral segments of the triangle are, in the absence of a major crisis, almost certain to remain more important than the triangular relationship itself. Even the concept of a triangular relationship is no longer referred to publicly by Chinese media.

In 1983, as Sino-American relations cooled and Sino-Japanese ties remained cordial, China emphasized the latter sector of the now unmentioned triangle and declared, in the words of Premier Zhao, that Sino-Japanese friendship and

cooperation is "conducive to peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region." (135, p.D-2) In reality, Beijing is far more interested in the economic and technological benefits of its relations with Tokyo and, in fact, may be having second thoughts about a larger security role for Japan. For example, in 1982 there was a minor diplomatic contratemps concerning the revision of Japanese textbooks to gloss over previous Japanese aggression and atrocities in China. Hu alluded to this and to efforts "by some forces" in Japan to revive militarism in his report to the Party Congress. More recently, in testimony to the present harmony in relations, there have been a series of high-level visits between the two countries, including Hu's visit to Tokyo in November 1983 and a return visit by Prime Minister Nakasone to the PRC in March 1984. These occasions provided an opportunity for leaders of both countries to wax eloquent about the closeness, cordiality and future prospects in Sino-Japanese relations.

In passing, it should be noted that there is a territorial dispute between Japan and the PRC. It involves the Senkaku Islands, believed to contain important oil reserves, which Japan controls and China claims. Despite an awkward incident in 1978, Beijing has put aside its claims, apparently in the interest of improving bilateral ties and other considerations.*

* In April 1978, armed Chinese fishing boats converged on the Senkakus causing an uproar in Japan just as the terms of the bilateral peace treaty were being agreed upon. Some observers have interpreted the incident as a ploy to embarrass Deng by Party opponents who feared the treaty would undercut PRC claims to the islands. (86, pp.4-5)

Taiwan -- China's long-term security interests figure importantly in PRC policies and strategy toward Taiwan. Beijing does not consider that the armed forces on Taiwan constitute a serious military threat to Chinese security, and it has averred that that is not the basis for its objections to military sales to Taiwan. (60, p.3) Moreover, the PRC has drawn down its forces opposite Taiwan while reinforcing those along the borders with the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

But Beijing is intensely concerned with the reunification of China. Recovery of Taiwan is held to be absolutely essential to national self-respect and to PRC international standing and credibility. In Beijing's mind, the underlying issue and principle is sovereignty. There are two mutually reinforcing dimensions to this issue: acceptance of this principle on Taiwan and by those countries with whom the PRC has diplomatic relations. China's paramount concern at the moment is that backsliding may occur in one or both of the dimensions, and that, in consequence, the eventual recovery of Taiwan may be further delayed and complicated or even permanently foreclosed. Thus sovereignty, more than the enhancement of Taiwan's military capabilities, was the main sticking point in Beijing's objections to the sale of Dutch submarines and proposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. It is the alleged violation of this sovereignty that underscores Beijing's objections to the Taiwan Relations Act and U.S. arms sales as well as any indications that the United States seeks to restore in any form an official relationship with Taiwan, or to strengthen those forces which might move toward an independent Taiwan.

Earlier private assertions to the United States by Mao and Deng notwithstanding, Taiwan reunification has been made a priority issue, due at least in part to factional Party differences; and it has been related to the larger strategic issues of PRC relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. The PRC has hoped that its American connection could be used to facilitate, or at least not obstruct, the recovery of Taiwan. This desire is often expressed by Chinese leaders in conversations with American dignitaries and other visitors (including Japanese and Overseas Chinese), who are asked to use their good offices to get Taiwan to respond to the PRC proposals. Assertedly, Deng made a similar request to President Reagan in April 1984. However, the PRC leadership professes to have concluded that the opposite is occurring, and that despite the August 1982 joint communique the United States is maintaining a level of arms sales and contacts that violate that agreement and previous ones as well and will tend to encourage Taipei in its recalcitrance.

Beijing is also concerned that strategically situated Taiwan -- the quintessential unsinkable aircraft carrier -- not be used by a foreign power for military purposes. In very recent Chinese memory, it has been. For a period of time, bases on Taiwan were used to support American military operations in Vietnam and were viewed as a serious potential threat to the PRC, then a staunch ally of the DRV. A basic PRC condition to normalization of relations with the United States was termination of the U.S.-Republic of China (ROC) security treaty and permanent removal of all U.S. forces from Taiwan. Similarly,

Beijing has been hypersensitive to any reports or rumors of contacts between Taipei and Moscow. A cardinal tenet of Chinese strategy, as noted earlier, is to avoid encirclement; clearly, access to military facilities on Taiwan by the Soviet Union or a potential ally of the Soviet Union -- however unlikely that now seems to be -- is to be avoided at all costs.

Hong Kong -- Another sovereignty question with important security ramifications is the status of Hong Kong. In conjunction with a September 1982 visit by Prime Minister Thatcher, China made clear its intention to recover sovereignty at the latest by 1997, when the lease on the New Territories expires. Chinese leaders have proclaimed an intention to be flexible on administrative arrangements and to maintain Hong Kong's prosperity but already there has been a nervous adverse reaction by the Hong Kong economy and population.

Chinese commentary frequently links the recovery of Hong Kong and Taiwan in discussing the reunification of China and points to a provision for special administrative regions in the new state Constitution (Article 31) as applicable to both. (45, p.16) Almost certainly the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese authority will occur first, and if handled smoothly will be cited by the PRC as a precedent for Taiwan. The Hong Kong question, not surprisingly, is a highly charged domestic political issue. It is apparent from their comments, contacts and activities that both Deng and Hu are directly involved in this issue, although Deng has asserted that the top two governmental figures, President Li and Premier Zhao, have primary responsibility for the Hong Kong

negotiations. (23, p.W2) In May 1983 a full member of the CCP Central Committee was assigned to Hong Kong as the senior Party representative.⁽¹³⁷⁾ If negotiations with Great Britain are not successful and a crisis develops, China may find itself opposed by the United States, Japan and others as well as the United Kingdom, with adverse consequences for its security position and for its modernization program as well. Needless to say this would add further strain to the U.S.-PRC relationship.

2. Southeast Asia

A particularly complex situation exists for China in Southeast Asia, far more so than its published strategic assessments of the region indicate. China's policies in Southeast Asia reflect a mix of geopolitical, ideological, traditional and national security interests and a blend of long-range strategy with short-term tactical actions. It is hard to gauge how China actually evaluates the evolving Southeast Asian picture in terms of its own interests and goals and whether the CCP has debated and questioned the sharp changes in its policies there in recent years. But it is clear that within the region, as noted below, China must now contend simultaneously with: the hostility of a Soviet-backed militarily strong neighbor to its south; the reservations of the non-communist countries who suspect its future aspirations and policies; and a common perception in Southeast Asia, by friend and foe, that a close U.S.-Chinese relationship will not benefit the region and may, in fact, affect it adversely.

Space does not permit a detailed recounting of the

deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations, but it is important to view this critical event from the Southeast Asian perspective as well as the larger strategic context noted earlier. The dramatic and traumatic volte face in PRC-SRV relations appears essentially rooted in bilateral and regional causes, acquiring the larger strategic coloration in the later stages of the dispute and being aggravated by ethnic and historic animosities. The post-Vietnam War period accentuated rather than lessened the wartime strains in the relationship. China, preoccupied internally with the succession to Mao and Cultural Revolution damages, limited its aid to Vietnam to various joint economic projects. Moreover, it retained those Paracel Islands which it had seized from South Vietnam in 1974, blocking Hanoi from leasing the area for oil exploration and drilling. Meanwhile, the PRC sided with and supplied arms to the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea in its controversy with Vietnam, and maintained a toehold in Laos through a long-standing road-building project.

During this period, both China and Vietnam tried to repair their relations with the ASEAN countries,* and to improve their positions vis-a-vis the superpowers. By late 1977, Hanoi had abandoned its balancing act between Beijing and Moscow in favor of the latter, and sought to normalize relations and obtain economic aid from the United States. In 1978 there was a rush of critical and related events: sporadic fighting between Vietnam and Kampuchea; Sino-Vietnamese border

* The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

incidents; controversy over Vietnamese treatment of its Chinese nationals, with over 150,000 departing for China; Beijing's abrupt withdrawal of Chinese advisers from Vietnam and cancellation of joint projects there; conclusion of the USSR-SRV Friendship Treaty in November and the U.S.-PRC normalization agreement in December; and the late December Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (followed, of course, by the February 1979 Chinese "lesson" to Vietnam).

To go from the specific to the general, one can infer from the above a Chinese strategy and tactical approach that remains relevant as of 1984. China has traditionally and consistently sought to retain influence in areas proximate to its southern borders and to prevent the formation of a strong and unified Indochina not responsive to its direction. Beijing has moved progressively from impeding Hanoi's consolidation of power and economic recovery to strong sanctions designed to punish Vietnam severely, isolate it diplomatically, threaten it militarily, and bleed it economically in order to force it to change course.

The PRC, through its "lesson" to Vietnam, its support (with Thai assistance) of the continuing Khmer Rouge resistance, and its threat to administer a "second lesson" if Vietnam attacks Thailand, has sought to demonstrate the ability to restrain Vietnam and counter the Vietnamese threat to the security of ASEAN members. (Periodically, China will increase the pressure on its border with Vietnam and create incidents in obvious but unstated retaliation for Vietnamese military operations in Western Kampuchea that spill over into Thailand.)

ASEAN as a whole, and Thailand in particular, has valued the overall restraining effect which Chinese policies have had on Vietnam, while recognizing Chinese involvement was far from disinterested and was in some respects a mixed blessing. The Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1979 did not ease the fighting in Kampuchea or cause a reduction in Vietnamese deployments to either Kampuchea or Laos. ASEAN nations feared the Chinese "lesson" might lead to Soviet involvement and were thus privately relieved when Chinese forces withdraw, reducing the prospect of a wider conflict. Moreover, the subsequent flood of Vietnamese refugees (mainly ethnic Chinese) to ASEAN shores was viewed as an unwelcome fallout from the Sino-Vietnamese conflict.

China, in turn, has clearly supported and benefitted from the ASEAN-led initiatives to obtain a negotiated international agreement on Kampuchea and to block diplomatic recognition of the Vietnam-backed Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh. There has been cooperation between the PRC and ASEAN on Indochina matters and a complementarity in their strategies, as in the formation of a coalition of anti-Heng Samrin Kampuchean forces. However, in the long run, the ASEAN nations will be more interested in containing and co-existing with Vietnam than in punishing it, and do not fully share Beijing's concern with a global, strategic Soviet threat.

Chinese efforts to parlay the Vietnamese/Soviet threat into closer bilateral relations with the several ASEAN nations has had limited and differentiated results. Each bilateral relationship is a separate case, but there are common categories

of issues. One significant obstacle to closer relations has been China's effort to separate state relations from Party relations, and to maintain contacts, albeit increasingly tenuous and clandestine, with communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. Deng Xiaoping refused to renounce these ties publicly on his 1978 visit to several ASEAN capitals, although he gave private assurances to the Thais that the link between the Chinese and Thai Communist Parties would be of a moral nature only.^(93, p.5) In a speech to Party leaders in 1980 that was not made public until 1983, Deng gave guidelines for handling relations with other communist parties and although these instructions were directed mainly at communist parties in Europe, the sober and restrained tone of Deng's remarks complemented and reinforced his reassurances to the Thais.⁽²⁴⁾ Hu Yaobang's remarks to the Party Congress that China would never export revolution nor would it stir up or direct a communist insurgency elsewhere also played to these Southeast Asian sensitivities.^(17, p.30,32) Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian was even more explicit on the subject on a tour of several Southeast Asian countries in February 1984. According to PRC media, Wu assured Malaysian leaders that communist party issues in various countries should be handled by the governments of the countries concerned.⁽²⁵⁾ China considered this to be an internal affair in which it would never intervene. Wu added that China's relations with the communist parties of Southeast Asia have basically been solved through consultations with the individual countries.

Another impediment has been Beijing's view of its responsibilities and ties toward the large Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia. This issue flared during the height of the Cultural Revolution and then subsided; ASEAN fears were rekindled when Beijing asserted its right to protect Chinese nationals in Vietnam in 1978. In the case of Indonesia, Jakarta suspended diplomatic relations in the mid-60s because of Chinese support for both the Indonesian Communists (PKI) and the overseas Chinese there. These relations have not been reestablished, as of 1984, despite Beijing's efforts to do so.

Although there is little present concern about a Chinese threat to the security of an ASEAN nation -- and a belief that the Chinese play a useful role in restraining a greater and more active Vietnamese threat -- there are abiding reservations about future Chinese policies in the region. As noted at the outset of this paper, Deng and the Chinese leadership envision the modernization program as enabling China to play a more prominent and independent international role. Some ASEAN leaders are concerned that normalization of U.S.-PRC relations and a developing bilateral military relationship, while directed at the USSR, will work to Southeast Asia's disadvantage by gradually lessening American interest and presence in the region and giving a resurgent China the opportunity to pursue its interests more aggressively if it chooses.

Moreover, at this juncture, there is a greater possibility of some form of Chinese military involvement in the Indochina region than anywhere else in the world. The reasons are several. Even though China, at present, seems unlikely

to administer a costly second "lesson" to Vietnam, it is following an aggressive, punitive, attrition strategy toward Vietnam which entails a high state of tension and could conceivably lead to renewed military action. China is supporting Kampuchean insurgents, encouraging minority dissidence in Laos, provoking occasional incidents on the Sino-Vietnam border, and retaining Vietnamese-claimed Paracel Islands.

In accordance with its global assessments and strategy, Beijing probably sees little chance of reaching a satisfactory negotiated solution of its differences with Hanoi. Beijing's new, more positive approach toward Moscow has had no discernible effect on China's tactics towards the SRV. And China, in fact, may see benefits in occasionally challenging a putative Soviet surrogate in a way that does not risk escalation of Sino-Soviet tensions. In the process, the PRC delays the day that it is confronted on its southern flank by a militarily strong, economically viable, and unified Indochinese enemy. Finally, Beijing's response to Soviet overtures may be calculated in part to unsettle Hanoi, which viewed Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the early '70s as highly inimical to its interests and, similarly, would fear that any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations could be at its expense and lead to decreased levels of Soviet support.

Thus, despite whatever lip-service Beijing may pay to the concept, it is questionable whether China's future actions and strategy in Southeast Asia will be conducive to the attainment of the cherished ASEAN goal of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia.

SECTION 6
OVERVIEW AND PROSPECTS

From this broad survey, it appears comparatively safe to assume that as of 1984, and at least for the immediate future, the priority catalogue of threat perceptions held by the PRC decision-making elite runs as follows:

First, domestic threats in the fields of discipline, social order, the effects of indoctrination, and the attitudinal response of the youth, intellectuals, minority nationalities, and others;

Second, the threat perceived from the international policies and strategies of the USSR; and increasingly but, as of 1984, still

Third, U.S. policies toward Taiwan which threaten security in the sense that they obstruct reunification.

These findings support -- as far as "foreign threats" are concerned -- the impressions of almost all West European and American political and academic visitors to China over the past five years. As such, they are nothing new. Yet, one should not overrate Chinese statements made for foreign consumption. They tend to present to the visitor what he wants to hear or what the PRC wants him to hear. Hence, for visitors of conservative-to-moderate political persuasion, the PRC elite has had a propensity to indulge in anti-Soviet remarks. To most American visitors, Beijing stresses the Taiwan issue and U.S. interference in China's internal affairs, although, interestingly,

a somewhat softer, more conciliatory approach seems to be taken toward Chinese-Americans. If such statements are corroborated by policy declarations, meant mainly for domestic consumption, they gain in weight. However, as noted in the Introduction, the real thoughts and strategy of the elite may still be difficult to discern as the Chinese disclose very little of their own military strategy and intentions.

It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that all anti-Sovietism and calls for the resistance of "hegemonism" notwithstanding, the primary concerns of the current leadership of the PRC -- including the strategic and military elites -- are still directed towards domestic politics; and barring a major external crisis, this preoccupation seems likely to last as long as the policies of the current elite remain in effect.

Based upon all the evidence presented in this study, it appears equally safe to conclude that the major groups within the Chinese Communist political and military-strategic elite agree on at least four points:

1. In terms of foreign threat perceptions, the Soviet threat to the national security of the PRC still takes priority over any other foreign threat, in particular over the American one.
2. The Chinese armed forces are struggling with outdated equipment, which cannot be replaced by adequate modern weapon systems in a short-term perspective.

3. Offensive actions to ensure national security interests as defined by the leaders of the PRC could only be conducted against weaker enemies -- such as the ASEAN countries, Vietnam, India, or Taiwan -- and then only if such actions are so limited in scale that they do not provoke great-power (i.e., Soviet) intervention. Even so, offensive actions against a smaller, but well-equipped enemy could prove too costly to pursue at the moment, as the PLA learned the hard way in its foray into Vietnam in February/March 1979.
4. In countering the "Soviet threat," offensive action is deemed to be out of the question, even in the possible context of a major Soviet-American confrontation, although the Soviet concern of perhaps having to fight on two fronts is viewed as an important deterrent which should not be abandoned by making gratuitous assurances to Moscow. On the other hand, a conventional Soviet ground offensive, even on a large scale, can be blunted if not deterred by the comparatively credible PRC ability to wage protracted defensive battles, "trading territory for time," a strategy that would make offensive operations very costly for the Soviet side.

However, while there is apparent consensus on these propositions, disagreement seems to prevail with respect to the priority to be accorded foreign and domestic threats,

and to the policies which should be pursued in order to alleviate the military weaknesses of China. In approaching these problems, it appears that there exists two major schools of thought in the PRC, although a considerable number of Chinese elites are probably uncommitted, and thus may exert pressure for compromise between the two schools. As noted earlier, it is impossible to identify with precision either the membership or the policy positions of these groups, and there may be considerable fluctuation in both respects.

With these caveats in mind and for the purposes of comparison, we will label one group the "Deng/Hu/Zhao coalition" and the other the "orthodox wing." The first school, headed by Deng Xiaoping, CCP Secretary-General Hu Yaobang, and Premier Zhao Ziyang, probably includes at least two-thirds of the CCP Secretariat, half or more of the Politburo, and a significant portion of the PLA elite. Deng has been the dominant figure in this coalition and is clearly the senior military policymaker in China as Chairman of both the Party's Military Commission (MC) and the governmental Central Military Commission and as de facto Commander-in-Chief. On the military side, the coalition leaders include a veteran Party administrator, Yang Shangkun (MC Vice-Chairman and Secretary General) and PLA Chief of Staff Yang and Defense Minister Zhang. Hu and Zhao (neither of whom has close military ties) would be the leading figures on the civilian side.

The other school, the "orthodox wing," seems to rally around Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, and is now represented by

only two of the ten CCP/CC Secretaries, by perhaps eight Politburo members, and by a significant number of aging but influential military leaders, including three MC Vice-Chairmen and the Director of the PLA General Political Department. This school presumably has taken into its fold the remnants of those leaders who advanced to prominence during the Cultural Revolution and who have retained their leadership positions following the Twelfth Party Congress, despite the downfall of their former ally Hua Guofeng.

The "Deng-Hu-Zhao school," in its threat perception, still appears to accord the "Soviet threat" a slightly higher priority than "domestic threats" to the stability of the regime, and, hence to national security. In order to overcome the military weaknesses of the PRC, the Deng-Hu-Zhao school seems to advance the following prescriptions:

1. Stabilization of the economy through a strictly fiscalist budget policy, which for several years included reductions in military expenditure;
2. Acceptance of the fact that this will mean a delay in the pace of "modernization of national defense" until a resurgent economy may be able to sustain a major defense buildup, although selected areas such as advanced weapons technology may be given immediate attention.
3. In the meantime, as deterrents against the Soviet Union, ultimate, though unstated, reliance on the American nuclear shield and military power, with

primary reliance on indigenous military capabilities and -- to a lesser extent -- on Soviet reluctance to bear the costs of either a conventional or nuclear action against China. As a corollary tactic, engage the Soviet Union in dialogue, seek to lower the level of tensions somewhat, and probe for ways to persuade the U.S.S.R. to make concessions and to reduce its threat to China.

4. For these reasons, avoidance of any alarming open and other direct threat to other areas in Asia such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, or the ASEAN countries, at least as long as the American nuclear shield in particular and Western assistance in general is necessary; and
5. In domestic politics, stabilization of the political system by a combination of measures to reorganize the Party/government structure, reimpose Party discipline, suppress dissidence, and harness the talents of intellectuals and technocrats.

The "orthodox wing," on the other hand, while also perceiving the "Soviet threat" as a major foreign challenge to the PRC, is convinced that both domestic threats to the system and U.S. policies toward Taiwan are, at the moment, the more dangerous for the national security of the country. The domestic threats, in the view of this school, are exacerbated by foreign social influences, particularly on the minds of educated urban youth and the "liberalizing" tendencies inherent

in the pragmatic policies of the Deng-Hu-Zhao school, such as a greater role for intellectuals.

As a blueprint for more effective safeguards of national security, the "orthodox wing" would tend to propose:

1. Stabilization of the economy by re-introducing austerity in the consumer's goods sector, a return in emphasis from light to basic and heavy industries, and more budget reductions in civilian, as opposed to military, expenditures;
2. An immediate turn towards a limited and controlled "modernization of national defense," which should be accelerated from 1984 or 1985 on, and, in general, greater attention to military requirements;
3. Reliance "on one's own strength" as the first and foremost deterrent for the "Soviet threat," a type of "self-reliance" which also includes a guarded return to Mao's theory of "People's War" (89, pp.10, 12) and only secondarily -- and for a limited period of time -- inclusion of the American nuclear shield into the defense consideration of the PRC;
4. An increase in pressures on Taiwan to accept the PRC's "reunification" offers, and, for that reason, unmitigated opposition against American arms sales to Taiwan and other U.S. policies concerning Taiwan which are said to interfere in China's internal affairs; and
5. In domestic politics, stabilization of the political

system by a combination of suppression of dissidence, a crackdown on critical intellectuals, greater emphasis on ideological indoctrination, and a renewed strengthening of collective forms of production in agriculture, as well as in the service and repair industries.

It seems fairly safe to predict that the confrontation between these two coalitions will dominate the Chinese political scene for the next several years and, hence, the defense and national security considerations of the ruling elite. Yet, because neither school commands an absolute majority in elite affiliation, and because neither side is interested in a new great upheaval (like the Cultural Revolution), the next few years probably will be characterized as well by a period of compromise between the two schools of thought. These compromises will be affected by several other considerations: resource constraints, external developments, and changes within the leadership (most senior figures in both coalitions are in their seventies or older). Deng has exerted a powerful cementing influence on his coalition. After he passes from the scene, the coalition may become less cohesive, with government leaders like Zhao concerned with the economy and with access to Western trade and technology, and Party figures like Hu interested externally in improving relations with fraternal Communist parties, possibly including the CPSU, while internally maintaining control of the creaky Party machinery in a CCP which now numbers 40 million members.

Whatever the outcome of this internal debate and competition, there are only slight indications that American policy towards China, in particular, or Western/Japanese policy in general, could significantly influence the outcome. Whatever the Western governments decide, as far as their China policies are concerned, Chinese political decision-making will mostly, if not entirely, follow the patterns of power relations within the PRC elite and their perceptions of global strategic trends and where China's interests lie.

But what about the projections beyond 1986, i.e., for the end of this decade and beyond? Once the present gerontocracy has left the political scene, the long postponed problem of generational succession will have to be resolved. Will this succession result in a new elite disposed to rule through consensus and compromise, or in a new, rather turbulent struggle for power and the re-emergence of a single charismatic leader? In either event, three possible alternative projections for future policy strategies of the PRC could emerge:

1. A return to a previous Maoist policy of simultaneous opposition to both the Soviet Union and the United States, backed up by a revival of "People's War" doctrines, a posture of "self-reliance" in production of military hardware and an emphasis on China's third world status in foreign relations. This could combine with increasing militancy towards Taiwan and Hong Kong, support for a hard-line North Korean policy towards South Korea, and a more aggressive pursuit of Chinese interests in Southeast Asia.

2. Anticipation of a protracted Soviet-American confrontation, at present or increased levels of tension, during which the PRC would try to effect the "modernization of national defense," in part through Western arms deliveries and technological assistance, but only in conjunction with the overall modernization of the Chinese economy. The tactics of using U.S.-Soviet tensions to China's advantage and of pursuing an unstated policy of "equidistance" in relations with the two superpowers would continue in effect. The recovery of Taiwan would be put on hold, provided there was no backsliding in acceptance of the principle of one China, either by foreign countries or on Taiwan, and China would press its claim to Hong Kong cautiously and gradually. Under this strategy, the PRC would continue to hold down some 45 to 50 Soviet divisions, but would not actively join the West in a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union.
3. The development of a policy of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, which could be greatly advanced if Moscow would reduce its links with Vietnam and, in particular, its military deployments in Soviet Asia and Mongolia. Provided this process stopped short of full rapprochement, this could increase China's leverage vis-a-vis both the United States and the Soviet Union, a circumstance which China could use in various ways: to facilitate the recovery of Taiwan, Hong Kong

and other territory claimed by China; and to gain external assistance on favorable terms for China's "four modernizations." Such a policy would be constrained by Chinese suspicions of long-term Soviet intentions toward China and by the security concerns that a genuine Sino-Soviet entente would evoke elsewhere in Asia and in the West.

At present, it is plainly impossible to allocate precise probability ratings to any one of these projections, although there is evidence that publicly China is embracing an approach to foreign policy containing elements of the first projection outlined above (opposition to both the United States and the Soviet Union), while actually pursuing a strategy that is closer to the second and third projections. Policymakers in the West are well advised to prepare contingency plans for all three projections. If the composite profile of the new military leadership of China presented earlier in this study has any validity for the years ahead, and we believe that it does, the third projection is by no means beyond this realm of possibility.

It is not the function of this study to prepare specific recommendations on U.S. policy towards China. Very recently, there has been a thorough examination of this subject by a group of distinguished experts and scholars, many of whom had extensive government experience in this area.* It is suggested

* This review was conducted by The Atlantic Council's Committee on China Policy under the chairmanship of Amb. (Ret.) U. Alexis Johnson. The highlights and recommendations of this review were contained in a monograph published by The Atlantic Council; the full report is scheduled for publication in May 1984. (36; 34)

that the foregoing analysis and conclusions concerning Chinese security perspectives will be a helpful adjunct to a careful consideration of the policy report and its recommendations.

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