

AD-A172 157


VARIABLES IN THE GUATEMALAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
THAT AFFECT GUATEMALA. (U) AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL  
MAXWELL AFB AL D C WARRING 86 JUN 86


1/2

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 5/4

NL





AD-A172 157

VARIABLES IN THE GUATEMALAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
THAT AFFECT GUATEMALAN DECISION MAKERS CONCERNING  
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DONALD C. WARING JR., MAJ, USA  
B.S. University of Delaware, 1972

DTIC  
ELECTE  
SEP 24 1986  
S B D

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1986

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

86-3480

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE:  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

86 9 24 015

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

AD-A172 167

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

|                                                                                                                                                                                       |       |                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION<br>UNCLASSIFIED                                                                                                                                    |       |                                                     | 1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS                                                                                                                                                    |                                                       |                    |
| 2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY                                                                                                                                                 |       |                                                     | 3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT<br>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.                                                                           |                                                       |                    |
| 2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE                                                                                                                                             |       |                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
| 4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)                                                                                                                                           |       |                                                     | 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)                                                                                                                                 |                                                       |                    |
| 6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION<br>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College                                                                                                    |       | 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL<br>(If applicable)<br>ATZL-SWD-GD | 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION                                                                                                                                         |                                                       |                    |
| 6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)<br>Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900                                                                                                        |       |                                                     | 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)                                                                                                                                     |                                                       |                    |
| 8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION                                                                                                                                           |       | 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL<br>(If applicable)                | 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
| 8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)                                                                                                                                               |       |                                                     | 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS                                                                                                                                               |                                                       |                    |
|                                                                                                                                                                                       |       |                                                     | PROGRAM<br>ELEMENT NO.                                                                                                                                                      | PROJECT<br>NO.                                        | TASK<br>NO.        |
|                                                                                                                                                                                       |       |                                                     | WORK UNIT<br>ACCESSION NO.                                                                                                                                                  |                                                       |                    |
| 11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)<br>Variables in the Guatemalan Operational Environment that Affect Guatemalan Decision Makers Concerning Relations with the United States |       |                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
| 12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)<br>Major Donald C. Waring, Jr.                                                                                                                                 |       |                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
| 13a. TYPE OF REPORT<br>Master's Thesis                                                                                                                                                |       | 13b. TIME COVERED<br>FROM 1978 TO 1986              |                                                                                                                                                                             | 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)<br>1986 June 06 |                    |
| 15. PAGE COUNT<br>184                                                                                                                                                                 |       |                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
| 16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION                                                                                                                                                            |       |                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
| 17. COSATI CODES                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                     | 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)<br>U.S. Foreign Policy, Economic Assistance, Security Assistance, Influence, Human Rights |                                                       |                    |
| FIELD                                                                                                                                                                                 | GROUP | SUB-GROUP                                           |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
|                                                                                                                                                                                       |       |                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
|                                                                                                                                                                                       |       |                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
| 19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)<br>(See reverse)                                                                                         |       |                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                       |                    |
| 20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT<br><input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS     |       |                                                     | 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION<br>UNCLASSIFIED                                                                                                                        |                                                       |                    |
| 22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL                                                                                                                                                   |       |                                                     | 22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)                                                                                                                                          |                                                       | 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL |

## ABSTRACT

This study is a historical analysis of variables that affected Guatemalan decision makers concerning their relations with the United States, during the period 1970 to 1985. Each variable is examined, based on the current body of literature, to determine their individual and cumulative effects on the reactions of Guatemalan decision makers to U.S. attempts to influence events in Guatemala.

Six important variables were identified: the Guatemalan interaction in the international community; the Guatemalan interaction in the regional community; the Guatemalan economy, interest groups, internal security, and political structure. The study demonstrates that relations between Guatemala and the United States are best, and U.S. influence in Guatemala is enhanced when: both countries exhibit a western oriented, anti-communist foreign policy; communist influence in Central America is reduced and the region is stable; the Guatemalan economy is weak and dependent upon bilateral U.S. assistance; there are internal interest groups in Guatemala capable of challenging the military elite; the level of fighting between Government forces and communist insurgents is low; and the political structure allows greater pluralism.

The study concludes that there have been changes in the variables that have exerted pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to improve relations with the U.S., however, the Guatemalan political structure has not changed. An understanding of the variables that have changed, and the collective pressure from the variables exerted on Guatemalan decision makers, may assist the U.S. in influencing changes to the Guatemalan political structure.

**VARIABLES IN THE GUATEMALAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
THAT AFFECT GUATEMALAN DECISION MAKERS CONCERNING  
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

**MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE**

by

**DONALD C. WARING JR., MAJ, USA  
B.S. University of Delaware, 1972**

**DTIC  
ELECTE  
SEP 24 1986  
S B D**

**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1986**

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.**

**86-3480**

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.**


MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: MAJ Donald C. Waring, Jr.

Title of Thesis: Variables in the Guatemalan Operational  
Environment that Affect Guatemalan  
Decision Makers Concerning Relations with  
the United States

Approved by:

 , Thesis Committee Chairman  
MAJ Edward J. Robarge, MA

 , Member, Graduate Faculty  
MAJ Frederick M. Downey, MA

 , Member, Consulting Faculty  
COL Max G. Manwaring, Ph.D.

Accepted this 6th day of June 1986 by:

 , Director, Graduate Degree  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those  
of the student author and do not necessarily represent  
the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
or any other government agency. (References to this study  
should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

VARIABLES IN THE GUATEMALAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT THAT AFFECT GUATEMALAN DECISION MAKERS CONCERNING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, by Major Donald C. Waring, USA, 184 pages.

→ This study is a historical analysis of variables that affected Guatemalan decision makers concerning their relations with the United States, during the period 1970 to 1985. Each variable is examined, based on the current body of literature, to determine their individual and cumulative effects on the reactions of Guatemalan decision makers to U.S. attempts to influence events in Guatemala.

Six important variables were identified: the Guatemalan interaction in the international community; the Guatemalan interaction in the regional community; the Guatemalan economy, interest groups, internal security, and political structure. The study demonstrates that relations between Guatemala and the United States are best, and U.S. influence in Guatemala is enhanced when: both countries exhibit a western oriented, anti-communist foreign policy; communist influence in Central America is reduced and the region is stable; the Guatemalan economy is weak and dependent upon bilateral U.S. assistance; there are internal interest groups in Guatemala capable of challenging the military elite; the level of fighting between Government forces and communist insurgents is low; and the political structure allows greater pluralism.

The study concludes that there have been changes in the variables that have exerted pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to improve relations with the U.S., however, the Guatemalan political structure has not changed. An understanding of the variables that have changed, and the collective pressure from the variables exerted on Guatemalan decision makers, may assist the U.S. in influencing changes to the Guatemalan political structure.



|                    |                                            |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Accession For      |                                            |
| NTIS GRA&I         | <input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/> |
| DTIC TAB           | <input type="checkbox"/>                   |
| Unannounced        | <input type="checkbox"/>                   |
| Justification      |                                            |
| By                 |                                            |
| Distribution       |                                            |
| Availability Codes |                                            |
| Dist               |                                            |
| A-1                |                                            |

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### CHAPTER I

#### Thesis Intent, Methodology, and Significance of the Study

|                                                    |    |
|----------------------------------------------------|----|
| Section I . . . Purpose . . . . .                  | 1  |
| Section II . . Hypothesis . . . . .                | 6  |
| Section III . . Definition of Terms . . . . .      | 12 |
| Section IV . . Review of the Literature. . . . .   | 18 |
| Section V . . Methodology . . . . .                | 19 |
| Section VI . . Significance of the Study . . . . . | 23 |
| Section VII . . End Notes . . . . .                | 28 |

### CHAPTER II

#### DISCUSSION

|                                                                       |    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Section I . . . Backgroud Information . . . . .                       | 32 |
| Section II . . Carlos Arana Osorio<br>(1970-1974) . . . . .           | 38 |
| Section III . . Kjill Laugerud Garcia<br>(1974-1978) . . . . .        | 45 |
| Section IV . . Romeo Lucus Garcia<br>(1978-1982) . . . . .            | 60 |
| Section V . . Efrain Rios Montt<br>(1982-1983) . . . . .              | 72 |
| Section VI . . Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores<br>(1983-1985) . . . . . | 84 |
| Section VII . . End Notes . . . . .                                   | 91 |

### CHAPTER III

#### CONCLUSION

|                                                                  |     |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Section I . . United States Policy<br>Toward Guatemala . . . . . | 103 |
| Section II . . The Variables . . . . .                           | 108 |
| Section III . . Recommendations for Further Study . . .          | 124 |
| Section IV . . End Notes . . . . .                               | 126 |

## APPENDIX A

### Review of the Literature

|                                         |     |
|-----------------------------------------|-----|
| Section I . . Two View Points . . . . . | 129 |
| Section II . . The Literature . . . . . | 132 |
| Section III . . End Notes . . . . .     | 172 |

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

|                                               |     |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----|
| Section I . . Books . . . . .                 | 178 |
| Section II . . Government Documents . . . . . | 180 |
| Section III . . Other Sources . . . . .       | 182 |

### INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

|                                     |     |
|-------------------------------------|-----|
| Initial Distribution List . . . . . | 184 |
|-------------------------------------|-----|

## CHAPTER I

### THESIS INTENT, METHODOLOGY, AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

#### SECTION I - PURPOSE

United States foreign policy since World War II has been oriented toward Europe and Asia, and the containment of Soviet influence in the world. The Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America points out that the United States has often ignored events in Central America, or has tended to view the region superficially or stereotypically. (1) There are many similarities among the countries in Central America, however, there are also many variables that are unique to one or two of the countries. U.S. foreign policy should adopt a country specific approach (as opposed to a regional approach) to each country in Central America based upon an understanding of the variables that effect the policy decisions of each country. (2) An historical review of relations between Guatemala and the United States, during the period 1970 to 1985, suggests that there are important external and internal variables that have affected Guatemalan decision makers in their relations with the United States. The purpose of this thesis is to determine what variables affect Guatemalan decision makers

in their relations with the United States, as revealed in an historical analysis of the period 1970 to 1985.

A brief historical sketch of the period 1970 to 1985 demonstrates that relations between Guatemala and the United States changed and that several variables may have contributed to the changing attitudes of Guatemalan decision makers. During the period 1970 to 1976, the United States provided \$96.3 million in economic assistance and \$37.3 million in military assistance to Guatemala. (3) The United States, however, was not concerned with internal events in Guatemala, such as the issues of political moderation and democratic reform. The United States was only interested in maintaining the status quo of friendly governments. (4) In 1970, General Carlos Arana Osorio was elected president in an election that excluded all opposition political parties. Arana represented a military elite that controlled the political structure in Guatemala. Arana immediately declared a state of seige that lasted for over a year and used his increased powers to continue the repression of the general population and to conduct a war against communist guerrillas. Relations between Guatemala and the United States were good because both countries were interested in the containment of communism in the international and regional communities, the defeat of communist guerrillas in

Guatemala, and economic development in Guatemala. Moreover, the United States did not protest control of the Guatemalan political structure by the military elite, or the repressive domestic policies of the regime.

During the later half of the decade, the Carter Administration and an active, liberal Congress, adopted a different foreign policy approach to the region. The Carter Administration did not believe that the United States should oppose all leftist movements in Central America. The Carter Administration believed that a Marxist government in Central America could be tolerated, providing it did not enter into military agreements with the Soviet Union. Concerning Nicaragua, the Carter Administration suggested that the United States would work with the Marxist, Sandinista government to keep it out of the Soviet orbit. (5) Moreover, the Carter Administration challenged the traditional foreign policy assumption that the United States should back all friendly governments in the region, regardless of the type of government. The Carter Administration recognized the inherent instability of repressive military regimes, the anti-American attitudes created among the people because of U.S. support of military dictators, and the powerful forces at work against the regimes in the area. (6) The Carter Administration

attempted to change the policies of military dictators, and failing this, to divest the United States from the repressive regimes in Central America. The Carter Administration made adherence to basic human rights, and economic and social reform conditions for continued friendly relations between the United States and the repressive regimes in Central America. To emphasize the benefits of friendly relations with the United States, the Carter Administration tied receipt of U.S. security assistance to compliance with U.S. conditions of political moderation and democratic reform. U.S. economic assistance was to continue as a positive incentive to change.

Guatemala rejected the Carter Administration's foreign policy as gross intervention in Guatemala's internal affairs. Security assistance to Guatemala was suspended in 1977. Relations between Guatemala and the United States deteriorated. The United States continued, however, to pressure Guatemala for political and economic reforms. The Carter Administration publically criticized the Guatemalan government for human rights violations and tried to bolster Guatemalan opposition groups, such as the moderate Christian Democrats. The Guatemalan elite responded to what they considered intervention into the internal security affairs of the country by breaking communications with the United

States and initiating reprisals against opposition groups supported by the Carter Administration. The reaction of Guatemalan decision makers to the Carter Administration's foreign policy was influenced by several variables. They were alienated by Carter's willingness to accept a communist government in Central America, especially since the internal security of Guatemala was threatened by a renewed offensive by communist guerrillas. Additionally, the Guatemalan economy, which was strong and growing in 1977, was a factor in the decision to reject U.S. conditions for receipt of security assistance.

Relations between Guatemala and the United States, during the first half of the 1980's, were less antagonistic, and at times friendly. U.S. insistence on political moderation and democratic reform in Guatemala, as conditions for friendly relations with the United States (and receipt of security assistance), however, remained unchanged. The improved relations between the two countries were due to changes in several variables that exerted pressure on Guatemalan decision makers. The conservative policies of the Reagan Administration were warmly received in Guatemala. The Reagan Administration reaffirmed past U.S. commitments to long term friends. Guatemalan elites credited the Reagan Administration for confronting and containing the Soviet

Union on a global scale. U.S. support of counterrevolutionary operations in Nicaragua, support for El Salvador and the reversal of the communist insurgency in that country, and increased military presence in Honduras were favorably viewed by Guatemala. There were changes in internal variables as well as external variables. The Guatemalan economy had suffered a reversal, Guatemala was in desperate need of additional U.S. economic and security assistance. The military elite was challenged by other interest groups, such as, a young officers reform movement, civilian elites, and business organizations. Also important, was the fact that an intense counterinsurgency operation had defeated the guerrillas and reduced their activities throughout the country.

## SECTION II - HYPOTHESIS

Robert Wesson, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution and professor of Political Science at the University of California-Santa Barbara, is a scholar of U.S. relations with countries in Latin America. Wesson discusses the nature of U.S. relations and influence in Latin America in his books, The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence, and U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980's. Wesson makes the point that the ability of one

country to influence the policies of another country are effected by the interaction of the countries within the international community and the political, military, economic, and other national capabilities of the two countries. (7) The importance of external and internal variables in the operational environment, on the policies adopted by a country's decision making elite, is also discussed by Michael Brecher, a prominent political scientist, in his book, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process. The overall effect of the U.S. attempt to base friendly relations between the United States and Guatemala may be facilitated, or indeed curtailed, by the variables identified by Wesson and Brecher.

This thesis will identify specific external and internal variables in the Guatemalan operational environment and determine the positive or negative affect these variables had on Guatemalan decision makers concerning relations with the United States and the issues of political moderation and democratic reform. The external variables will include Guatemalan interaction within the international community and Guatemalan interaction within the regional community. The internal variables will include Guatemalan interest groups, the political structure, the economy, and internal security. These external and internal variables

are all dependent variables. Collectively they exert pressure on Guatemalan decision makers.

Guatemalan interaction within the international community is an important variable in determining Guatemalan and U.S. relations. It is hypothesized that an historical review of relations between Guatemala and the United States will reveal that relations between the two countries are best, and U.S. influence in Guatemala is enhanced, during periods when (from the Guatemalan viewpoint) both countries exhibit a western oriented, anti-communist foreign policy in the world community.

Regional stability is also an important concern of Guatemala, and is closely associated with Guatemalan internal security concerns. Democratic reforms and adherence to human rights, from a Guatemalan perspective, require risk to the internal security and the status quo. Regional stability is an important factor in Guatemalan policy decisions involving U.S. attempts to tie good relations between the U.S. and Guatemala to conditions of political moderation and democratic reform. If the region is unstable, the risk of experimentation with democratic reform and human rights is too great to be allowed by Guatemalan decision makers. Conversely, regional stability

would be a factor that would permit greater risk in the internal security issues of the state.

Guatemalan interest groups represent an important internal variable that effect Guatemalan decision makers in their relations with the United States. The most powerful interest group in Guatemala is a military elite, composed of senior officers. The military elite resisted U.S. efforts to encourage political moderation and democratic reform in Guatemala. The intransigence of the military elite was a source of friction in Guatemalan and U.S. relations. Because the military elite has protected the economic interest of wealthy land owners and industrialists in Guatemala, a civilian elite is closely associated with the military elite. Arrayed against the military and civilian elites are the middle class (its organizations and institutions) and the lower class (its organizations and institutions). The military elite was unchallenged (because it controlled the military, security forces, and the police) until an element of the junior officer corps recognized that moderate reform was a more effective way of obtaining U.S. assistance, preventing domestic instability, and defeating the growing Marxist insurgency. This belief was shared by many in the civilian and military elite, and the middle class, was to result in the development of a new competing

elite that was capable of challenging the senior military officers. It is hypothesized that the rise of the young officer reform movement represented a change in the stress exerted by interest groups on Guatemalan decision makers, concerning relations with the United States, from a conservative, reactionary pressure to a reformist pressure.

Closely associated with the dominance of the military elite was a political structure operating under a facade of democracy, but designed to protect the influence and power of the military elite. Political moderation and democratic reform requires political pluralism and return of political power to the people. In Guatemala, the political structure must be changed to allow participation of the whole population in the political process. The Guatemalan political structure (a closed and highly stratified system), controlled by the senior military elite, allows political participation only for political parties, and candidates, approved by the military. The unwillingness of the military to surrender their power and to change the political system exerts a strong negative force against political moderation and democratic reform. It is proposed that the Guatemalan political structure is a source of antagonism between Guatemalan and U.S. decision makers.

Another important internal variable is the economy. The economic variable was a limiting factor on the ability of the United States to influence events in Guatemala during the 1970's. The strength of the Guatemalan economy, especially during the Carter Administration, enabled Guatemalan decision makers to reject U.S. conditions for friendly relations between the two countries and the continuation of U.S. security assistance. They believed that it was in their interest (and capability) to buy military equipment and supplies from the international market, rather than accept U.S. assistance that was tied to demands for political moderation and democratic reform. By the 1980's, however, the Guatemalan economy was in a state of crisis. The Guatemalan elite was unable to purchase the needed military equipment and supplies. Therefore, the economic variable changed. The economy exerted a positive pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to improve relations with the United States and accept U.S. demands for social and political reform. It is hypothesized that a strong economy promotes a desire for independence from U.S. attempts to encourage change to the status quo among Guatemalan decision makers. Conversely, a weak economy creates the need for dependence on U.S. assistance and this results in a lesser degree of intransigence on the part of Guatemalan decision makers.

Finally, the internal security of Guatemala is an important variable in determining the attitudes of Guatemalan decision makers toward relations with the United States. Guatemalan decision makers have tended not to experiment with policies of political moderation and pluralism during periods of intense conflict between communist guerrillas and government forces. The unlikelihood of political change during periods of violence was recognized by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America; their report states that, "peace is an essential condition of economic and social progress." (8) Therefore, the variable of internal security appears to exert a negative influence on Guatemalan decision makers to adopt policies of political moderation and democratic reform during periods of high guerrilla activity. The lower the perceived threat to the internal political, economic, and social order in Guatemala, the higher the probability that the internal security variable will exert positive pressure for political moderation and democratic reform.

### SECTION III - DEFINITION OF TERMS

Power in Guatemala rests with a military elite. There are usually three or four military officers that

exercise power. Ordinarily, these officers are the President, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the Military Council, and the Chief of Staff of the Army. (9) Thomas P. Anderson, a prominent scholar of politics in Central America, points out that most of the authority and power is generally concentrated in the person of the President. This is the case in Guatemala; however, the power of the military elite is demonstrated by the comments of General Efraim Rios Montt, upon being appointed President after the 1982 military coup against the Garcia government, "I am the one who has the power up to this moment, within half an hour they can shoot me without any problem." (10) There is an alliance between the military elite and the Guatemalan civilian elite. Lars Schoultz, in his article "Guatemala: Social Change and Political Conflict," states that "one could spend a lifetime discussing the question of whether the civilian dog is wagging its military tail," or whether the military is the dominate force. (11) However, even Schoultz acknowledges in his essay that "the military enjoys considerable autonomy" in governing Guatemala. (12) The military does not have a political party; however, during the period 1970 to 1985, all official parties nominated military officers or candidates approved by the military elite for the office of President. Most of the officers nominated, and subsequently elected, developed

their power base while serving as a Minister of Defense. Once in power the President was expected to solidify the military elite's control of the government by appointing military officers in key ministry positions. Decision makers, for the purpose of this thesis will be defined as the military elite, acting in the person of the President.

Influence is the ability to obtain desired behavior from others by indirect means; whereas, power is the ability to command desired behavior from others by force or threat of force. Security assistance and to a lesser degree, economic assistance, are indirect methods used by the United States to achieve desired behavior from recipient countries. Security assistance is designed to function as a wedge to open a country for further political penetration. Military sales, training, and education programs, sponsored by the United States, constitute a dependency on the United States as a source of equipment, repair parts, and training by the recipient country. (13) U.S. training programs, the education of foreign officers in the United States, and high level Military Assistance and Advisory Groups stationed in recipient countries have helped to secure U.S. access to the decision makers in recipient countries. In Guatemala, the United States has used security assistance to gain influence with the decision makers since 1954. For the most part,

U.S. influence was used to establish a pro-American, anti-communist government and maintain the status quo. During the later part of the 1970's, the Carter Administration used security assistance, through denial, to influence the Guatemalan elite to move toward political moderation and democratic reform. Influence, for the purpose of this thesis, will be analyzed by the study of historical trends regarding Guatemalan policies of political moderation and democratic reform (as reported in the current body of literature) adopted by the Guatemalan Government.

Political moderation is characterized by an open, plural political system that assimilates new interest groups into the political process to promote political evolution and social and economic changes in society. (14) In Guatemala, the political system is closed and dominated by the military. Attempts by a small, but growing, middle class to enter the political system have been frustrated by government sponsored repression and violence. In November 1979, the Conference on Solidarity of the Human Rights Committee for Guatemala reported that active leaders and members of trade unions, student bodies, peasant organizations, religious groups, and democratic parties were suffering from repression, house searches, kidnappings, persecutions, death threats, torture, and assassination by

the army, police, and paramilitary groups maintained and led by the military dictatorship. (15) In 1982, Amnesty International reported similar findings: "... Guatemalan security services continue to attempt to control opposition, both violent and non-violent, through widespread killings including the extra-judicial execution of large numbers of rural non-combatants, including entire families, as well as persons suspected of sympathy with violent or non-violent opposition groups..." (16) For the purpose of this thesis, political moderation will be judged by the degree of repression and violence exerted by the Guatemalan government (as reported in the current body of literature) to deny the political process to non-violent opposition and potential opposition groups.

Democracy is a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system. Guatemala has conducted regularly scheduled elections since the overthrow of the Jacobo Guzman Arbenz government in 1954. Although there have been assassinations, electoral fraud, and military coups in 1963, 1982, and 1983, Guatemalan elites consider Guatemala a democracy. The fact is democracy ended in Guatemala with the U.S. sponsored overthrow of Arbenz. The military

controls the political process in Guatemala. The only political parties that were allowed to participate in the electoral process, during the period 1970 to 1985, were parties that were approved by the military. Electoral fraud has been common place in Guatemalan elections. Elections are punctuated with violence and political assassinations. Moreover, the Guatemalan people are not participants in the political process. In the five elections during the period 1954 to 1978, the winning candidate was elected by less than 13 percent of the adult population in Guatemala; at no time was more than 63 percent of the adult population registered to vote, and at no time did more than 30 percent of the adult population vote. (17) Democratic reform, for the purpose of this thesis, will be judged by the plurality of the political process, the level of participation by registered voters, the level of violence, and the fairness of the elections as expressed by accounts of Guatemalan elections in the current body of literature.

In his essay, "Guatemala: Social Change and Political Conflict," Lars Schoultz emphasizes the importance to the Guatemalan elite of maintaining the status quo. The dominant political ideology in Guatemala since 1954, according to Schoultz, "has been based upon two pillars: the defense of the existing structure of socioeconomic privilege

and the demobilization of emerging social sectors." (18) Schoultz demonstrates that variables in the Guatemalan domestic and regional environment that threaten the status quo are viewed by the Guatemalan elite as sources of instability; therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, stability from the Guatemalan elite's viewpoint will be defined as the political, social, and economic status quo.

Throughout this thesis, reference is made to the status of the Guatemalan economy. Comments concerning the strength and weakness of the Guatemalan economy, for the purpose of this thesis, during the period 1970 to 1985, are based upon four economic indicators: the percent of real growth in the Gross Domestic Product; the level of gold and foreign exchange resources; the external debt payment burden; and the balance of trade.

#### SECTION IV - REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The events in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and the emphasis placed on Central American policy by the Reagan Administration, has resulted in literature that offers analysis and critique of current U.S. policy in Central America. There is a noticeable lack of literature concerning only Guatemala; most authors are concerned with

events in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and address Guatemala only as part of the regional problem. Sufficient material exists, however, to support this study. Source information used to complete this historical analysis is limited to English language documents, therefore, availability of primary sources is limited. A detailed review of the literature is contained in Appendix A to this thesis. The review does not cover all resources and references, however, the review does include those books and documents that are important to this thesis.

#### SECTION V - METHODOLOGY

This thesis is based upon historical analysis of events in Guatemala during the period 1970 to 1985. For the most part, relations between Guatemala and the United States have been friendly since the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz government; only during the most recent 10 years have relations between the two countries been unfriendly and strained. The period 1970 to 1985 was selected for this historical analysis of the chronological events in Guatemala for several reasons. The period 1970 to 1976 was characterized by friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States, relations were unfriendly and antagonistic during the period 1976 to 1980, and strained,

but improved during the period 1980 to 1985. U.S. foreign policy toward Guatemala was characterized by three distinct periods. U.S. foreign policy, under President Nixon and President Ford, was based upon an East verses West view of events in Central America and Guatemala. Presidents Nixon and Ford assisted Guatemalan decision makers in their efforts to maintain the status quo during 1970 to 1976. President Carter changed U.S. foreign policy toward Guatemala. The Carter Administration adopted a wider, more liberal view of events in Central America and Guatemala, issues were not discussed in terms of East verses West. The Carter Administration tried to encourage change to the status quo in Guatemala, during the period 1976 to 1980, based on the concept of adherence to human rights, political moderation, and democratic reform. During the period 1980 to 1985, the Reagan Administration returned U.S. foreign policy toward Central America and Guatemala to the more traditional East verses West viewpoint; however, the issues of political moderation and democratic reform remained cornerstones in building friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States.

The period 1970 to 1985 witnessed significant political and economic changes in Guatemala. The election of General Carlos Arana Osorio, in 1970, signaled the rise

of the military elite as the dominant interest group in the Guatemalan political structure. In an attempt to discredit the election, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) launched a terror campaign in Guatemala City. Arana's response to the perceived threat to the internal security marked the beginning of a period of government sponsored political repression and violence of such extreme magnitude that Guatemala would be censored by the international community. Describing the rift between Guatemala and the world community in his 1981 essay, "Strategic Guatemala: Next Red Plum in the Hemisphere," Edward J. Walsh wrote, "Guatemala has become a pariah state, a member of a club of internationally disliked countries that include ... Argentina and Chili, as well as South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan." (19) Since Walsh's essay, control of the Guatemalan government, by the military elite, has been shaken by two successful coups (in 1982 and 1983) led by young reform minded officers. The succession of General officers to the office of President, that was begun by Arana in 1970, was ended in 1985 by the election of a civilian President, Vencio Cerezo Arevalo. The transition from military presidents to a civilian president was due in part to a steadfast U.S. foreign policy that tied good relations between Guatemala and the United States to conditions of political moderation and democratic reform. Equally

important, to the transition to a civilian president, were changes in the external environment, the rise of the young officers reform movement, the collapse of the Guatemalan economy, and the defeat of the communist insurgency.

The external variables in this historical analysis include Guatemalan interaction in the international and regional communities. The internal variables include Guatemalan interest groups, the political structure, the economy, and internal security. It is important to note that the set of external and internal variables discussed in this thesis are considered dependent variables. Collectively, the variables exert pressure on the Guatemalan decision makers. Robert Wesson discusses the importance of interaction in the international community, as well as the political, military, and economic variables in his book, U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980's. Michael Brecher includes all of the above variables and several additional variables in a research model developed in his book, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process. Steve C. Ropp and James A. Morris stress the fact that a country's policy decisions are greatly influenced by the interaction of the country in the international and regional communities in their book, Central America: Crisis and Adaptation. Thomas P. Anderson discusses Guatemalan

interaction in the international and regional communities, the Guatemalan political structure, interest groups, the economy, domestic violence, and guerrilla activity (internal security) in terms of "factors making for stability" and "destabilizing factors" in his book, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The set of variables used in this thesis does not exhaust all of the possible variables that could be examined, however, the variables used include the variables most often discussed in the current body of literature concerning Guatemala.

#### SECTION VI - SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

According to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP Per Capita Income (GDP PCI) figures, Guatemala has one of the strongest economies in Central America, but the country has the lowest literacy rate, one of the lowest life expectancy rates, and one of the highest infant mortality rates. These facts tend to suggest that the wealth is not widely distributed among the people. The poor distribution of wealth in Guatemalan society is best described by Gordon L. Bowen in his article, "Guatemala: Origins and Development of State Terrorism." According to Bowen, a superficial review of Guatemala's economic ledger tends to hide the fact

that 80 percent of the rural poor are without safe drinking water, the Guatemalan poor consume only 56 percent of the minimum protein requirements for human life, half of the population over age 10 is illiterate, and 25 percent of the Guatemalan population receives 66.5 percent of the national income. (20)

Politically the country is unstable and the society is polarized between the haves and the have nots. There is an ongoing Marxist insurgency in Guatemala. The high stratification of wealth and power in Guatemala tends to suggest that the crisis in Guatemala is the result of popular forces attempting to redistribute wealth and power in the country, pitted against the efforts of the traditional oligarchies and military elite attempting to maintain the status quo. The government retains power only through control of the military. Because of the threat of revolution and constant insurgency, dissent is not tolerated by the government. There have been repeated reports of government massacres of entire villages in systematic efforts to eliminate opposition. (21) Government repression has served to increase popular support for opposition forces.

The Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America recognized that the exclusion of the Guatemalan people from the economic and political processes are primary contributors to domestic instability and the growing communist insurgency. The report noted that U.S. strategic interests conflict with moral interests, but because of the geopolitical importance of Guatemala, U.S. strategic interests must override moral interests. The report recommended that the United States provide increased levels of economic and security assistance, with the latter providing the essential shield for the achievement of political, economic, and military objectives, to support U.S. national interests in Guatemala. Nevertheless, the Commission recommended that security assistance be "contingent upon demonstrated progress toward free elections; freedom of association; the establishment of the rule of law ... and the termination of the activities of the so-called death squads..." (22) The Commission concluded that security assistance, contingent upon demonstrated political moderation and democratic reform, (increased aid and increased pressure) would improve both Guatemalan security and internal justice. (23)

Critics of the findings of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America believe that the root cause of

the insurgency in Guatemala, which they believe to be the economic and political deprivation of the Guatemalan people, can not be corrected by a program that includes military aid. The view of many critics, that the military is the real culprit in Guatemala and that a basic restructuring of internal political and social institutions is necessary to allow for real pluralism in Guatemala, is expressed in the individual notes of Commissioner Robert S. Strauss to the Commission. (24) The concern, expressed by Strauss, is that deliveries of U.S. security assistance will only support an unpopular, corrupt, and repressive political structure that is controlled by a military elite.

This thesis addresses the reservations expressed by Strauss concerning U.S. foreign policy toward Guatemala. The issue is the ability of the United States to encourage reform and change to the status quo in Guatemala. An understanding of the variables that effect Guatemalan decision makers concerning their relations with the United States may assist U.S. foreign policy decision makers in recognizing favorable factors and key variables that might signal an appropriate time to encourage political moderation and democratic reform. This thesis is significant to the academic community because it is the first historical analysis of variables that effect Guatemalan decision makers

concerning relations between Guatemala and the United States during a period when friendly relations were contingent upon U.S. conditions of political moderation and democratic reform in Guatemala.

SECTION VII - END NOTES

1. United States President, Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America to the President of the United States, (1984): 12.

2. Steve C. Ropp and James A. Morris, Central America: Crisis and Adaptation, (University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p.270.

3. United States Agency for International Development, "Economic Assistance Statistics," as of 28 July 1981, and United States Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts," as of 30 September 1982.

4. Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States and Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American Relations, (The Halstead Press, 1974), p. 270.

5. Richard Newfarmer, From Gunboats to Diplomacy: New U.S. Policies for Latin America, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 7.

6. Ibid., p. 7.

7. Robert Wesson, U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980's, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 3.

8. United States President, Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America to the President of the United States, (1984): 51.

9. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 53.

10. Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson, and Nancy Peckenham, Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, (Grove Press, Inc., 1983), p. 113.

11. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 183.

12. Ibid., p. 183.

13. Robert Wesson, U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980's, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 3.

14. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 22.

15. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 186.

16. Americas Watch Report, Human Rights in Guatemala: No Neutrals Allowed, (Americas Watch Committee, 1982), p. 111.

17. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 192.

18. Ibid., p. 182.

19. Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson, and Nancy Peckenham, Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, (Grove Press, Inc., 1983), p. 306.

20. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 270-272.

21. Americas Watch Report, Human Rights in Guatemala: No  
Neutrals Allowed, (The Americas Watch Committee, 1982), p.  
12.

22. United States President, Report of the National  
Bipartisan Commission on Central America to the President of  
the United States, (1984): 104.

23. Ibid., p. 11.

24. Ibid., p. 130.

## CHAPTER II

### DISCUSSION

#### SECTION I - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

U.S. hegemony in Guatemala was present since the 1823 declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. The degree of U.S. influence in Guatemala was demonstrated in 1954 when the United States participated in the overthrow of the Marxist oriented, but freely elected government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. During the 1950's, U.S. involvement in Guatemalan political, economic, and military affairs intensified. In fact, the United States exercised almost complete control of Guatemalan affairs after the overthrow of Arbenz. Gordon L. Bowen, in his article "Guatemala: The Origins and Development of State Terrorism," points out that during the period 1954 to 1963 the domestic process of Guatemala, to include the economy, government, and foreign policy decisions, were autonomous "only to the degree that compatibility with American geopolitical and economic interest was achieved." (1) U.S. control was achieved and maintained by providing millions of dollars in economic and military assistance. During the period 1954 to 1960, the

United States provided \$162.7 million in economic assistance and \$1.2 million in military assistance to Guatemala. (2)

U.S. foreign policy in the 1950's had a tremendous impact on the internal and foreign policy of Guatemala. The document, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, NSC-68, April 14, 1950", was the foundation upon which U.S. foreign policy was built. NSC-68 placed international issues on an East versus West perspective. The U.S. attitude, during the 1950's, was that a state was either for the West or against the West. After the United States helped to engineer the overthrow of the government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, Guatemala became a willing ally of the United States.

During the 1960's, U.S. emphasis in Guatemala on economic assistance lessened, and greater emphasis was placed on military assistance. The United States provided \$136.9 million in economic assistance and \$19.5 million in military assistance to Guatemala during the period 1960 to 1970. The primary goal of the United States during this period was to maintain the status quo in Guatemala. (3) Due to the past popularity of the Arbenz government, the terrorist activities of small left wing guerrilla organizations, and the psychological impact of the Cuban

revolution, U.S. concern over a possible communist insurgency in Guatemala was high. Due to the concern, U.S. military assistance emphasized internal security programs. By 1965, 72 percent of all military assistance (more than \$1.4 million annually) was programmed for counterinsurgency and internal security operations and training. (4)

Guatemalan emphasis on counterinsurgency and internal security, funded and sponsored by the United States, led to the development of a closed political system dominated by a Guatemalan military elite. Many political scientists argue that after the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz government, a counterrevolutionary model of government was created in Guatemala that was incapable of recognizing the real threat to social and political stability. (5) According to the proponents of this theory, the elements of the model introduced in Guatemala, and elsewhere in Central America in the 1960's by U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Groups, included a government tightly controlled by the military and a security apparatus designed to identify and eliminate all opposition. (6) This government, of and by a military elite, existed to maintain the status quo; any attempt to oppose the government was seen as communist inspired. The U.S. national view, that countries were either friends or enemies of the United States, was adopted

and modified by the Guatemalan elite as a Guatemalan domestic policy. Guatemalans were viewed as either friends of the government or communist enemies, political opposition to the government was violently repressed.

Under Castillo Armas (1955-1957), a secret police force and secret para-military organizations were formed. Armas practiced rule by terror. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes (1958-1963) continued Armas' repressive policies and further polarized the country. After an abortive coup by dissatisfied junior officers on 13 November 1960, a significant guerrilla campaign, known as the Movimiento Revolucionario del 13 de Noviembre, was launched against the government. The campaign did not generate wide spread popular support, so the guerrillas relied on terror to destabilize the government. (7) In 1961, the Kennedy Administration launched the Alliance for Progress. The program was an attempt to prevent another successful Marxist revolution in Latin America by developing peaceful change. The Alliance for Progress was based upon three U.S. initiatives: economic assistance, military assistance, and the promotion of social reform. The United States realized that the situation in Guatemala was bad, the society was polarized and plagued by domestic instability. Politically, the government was in turmoil, Armas had been assassinated

and Fuentes was ousted in a military coup in March 1963, which was led by Enrique Peralta Azurdia. The Johnson Administration increased economic and military aid to Guatemala and put pressure on the Peralta government to institute economic reforms and to return the government to democracy. Motivated by U.S. threats to reduce military and economic assistance, the Peralta government did make some positive steps. Road construction was initiated to open the rural areas of the country, a rural health and literacy program was instituted, and a school lunch program was started to fight malnutrition. A Constitutional Assembly was convened in 1965 and elections under the new Constitution were scheduled for March 1966. (8) Severe repression of the general population, under the guise of counterinsurgency continued; in fact, the first phase of the current Marxist insurgency in Guatemala was born from the repressive policies of Peralta's government. The period prior to the election was marked by increased guerrilla opposition and spectacular acts of terrorism.

The election of 1966 was won by Julio Mendez Montenegro, a candidate of the conservative Revolutionary Party. The election of 1966 was not fair by U.S. standards. The Christian Democratic Party and other middle of the road or left of center parties were banned from the election.

The election of Mendez (1966-1970) was significant because it marked the end to direct military rule; however, it is equally significant that Mendez could assume the presidency only after conceding control of the internal security police to the armed forces. In effect, Guatemala had a civilian president, but the reigns of power were tightly controlled by the military. During the Mendez Presidency, the situation in Guatemala did not improve. After the election, the United States did not try to influence internal political events in Guatemala. In spite of the constraints placed on Mendez by the military, U.S. economic and security assistance policies toward Guatemala did not change. Under Mendez, military action against the insurgency intensified. In addition to the regular army, police and para-military organizations were directed against the guerrillas. Secret, ultra conservative groups (death squads), such as the "White Hand" and an "Eye for an Eye," were organized to identify and eliminate popular support for the guerrillas. The campaign against the insurgency was ruthless, the government responded to guerrilla terror with terror. The government anti-terror tactics resulted in the death of thousands of innocent people, especially among the rural Indians. (9) The military effort was concentrated in the eastern areas of Zacapa and Izabal, under the direction of Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio. Arana was particularly ruthless, an estimated

3000 to 8000 noncombatants were killed in the Zacapa campaign,. (10) The government campaign was successful, by the end of the 1960's guerrilla operations were very limited.

## SECTION II - CARLOS ARANA OSORIO

(1970-1974)

U.S. insistence on democratic reform in Guatemala in the early 1960's resulted in the 1966 Presidential elections, and the surprise victory of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro over two military candidates. The United States demonstrated that U.S. influence in Guatemala was strong; however, failure to insist on Mendez's right to govern independent of the military, demonstrated that the U.S. commitment to stability in Guatemala was greater than the commitment to democracy. The conditions of servitude to the military, under which Mendez took office, foreshadowed the failure of democratic reform.

The foremost interest group and competing elite in Guatemala, after the 1966 election, was the military senior officer corps. Powerful general officers are the senior partner in a ruling coalition in Guatemala, comprised of large agricultural planters, cattle ranchers, large

merchants, financiers, bankers, and wealthy landowners engaged in the import-export business. (11) After the economic and social reforms of the Arbenz government were reversed in the 1950's, the civilian sector of the ruling coalition encouraged the military to take charge of the government as a means of repressing the general population and protecting their wealth. The extent of the military elite's independence from the civilian elite is difficult to estimate, however, the military exercises much autonomy. (12) The Guatemalan military senior officer corps is well educated and capable. However, the senior officer corps' first loyalty is not to Guatemala, but to the army as an institution and to the officer corps as a class. The senior officers gained wealth with power. During the 1970's a materialistic "order of the samurai" developed, the most influential military leaders also became economic leaders of the country. (13) The road construction (the Carretera del Norte or simply the Transversal Highway) initiated by the military to open the northern portions of the country became known as "the highway of the Generals," because the senior officers of the officer corps helped themselves (at the expense of the Indians) to the land on either side of the road. (14) Power in Guatemala rests with the senior officer corps; in fact, prior to drafting the 1985 Constitution, the

highest rank in the Guatemalan military was President of Guatemala.

The military banned all political parties, that opposed the military's policy of counterinsurgency, from participating in the 1970 election. Three parties participated in the election. The National Liberation Movement (MLN), an extremist party on the right, was controlled and used by the military to compete with the Guatemalan elite for control of the political process. The MLN's candidate was Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, who was known as the "Butcher of Zacapa" and "the Jackal" because of his fierce repression of the left. (15) Arana was opposed by Mario Fuentes Pieruccini of the moderate Revolutionary Party (PR) and Jorge Lucas Caballeros of the moderate Christian Democrats (DC). The Guatemalan left, denied participation in the electoral process, called for a boycott of the elections. The extreme left, lead by the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in an attempt to discredit the election, launched a campaign of terror in Guatemala City and other urban centers. The turnout for the election was poor, less than 10.5 percent of the adult population participated, the winning candidate, Arana, polled less than 40 percent of the vote. (16) The electoral victory of Arana in 1970 marked the first time the military gained office by electoral

means; previously the military was able to secure power from the Guatemalan elite only by means of coups d'etat or other illegal methods. (17) The election of Arana in 1970 signaled the completion of the military's subjugation of the democratic process in Guatemala.

Arana was inaugurated on 1 July 1970. Arana's reign was marked by violence and new levels of repression against the Guatemalan people. In response to the Rebel Armed Forces' campaign of terror, Arana declared a year long state of seige. During the first year in office, the Arana government fought terror with terror; it is estimated that more than 2000 people were executed by the government or assassinated by leftist terrorists. (18) Arana's tactics were brutal, but effective. Due to Arana's repression of the urban population and the inability of the Marxist guerrillas to mobilize mass Indian support in the rural areas, the leftists were defeated. By mid 1972, nearly all manifestations of anti-government activity had ceased, with the exception a small nuclei of the Rebel Armed Forces all opposition groups were disbanned or destroyed.

The United States did little to object to the violence and human rights violations of the Arana government. In fact, the United States strongly supported

the Arana government. During the first year of the Arana regime, Guatemala received Public Safety Assistance totaling more than \$1.12 million and military assistance totaling more than \$6.6 million (nearly as much as the four year total received by the Mendez government). (19) The total amount of U.S. economic assistance to Guatemala, during the Arana government, exceeded \$78 million, total delivered military assistance exceeded \$21 million. The level of military assistance provided the Arana government exceeded the total for the preceeding decade. U.S. influence, which was great in the 1960's, should have been equally strong during the Arana years; however, U.S. leverage was not used to obtain political and economic reform. Gordon L. Bowen, in his article, "Guatemala: The Origins and Development of State Terrorism," points out that U.S. security assistance facilitated repression under Arana; he states, "rule by institutionalized terror grew directly out of the Guatemalan-U.S. system of military rule established in the 1960's." (20)

The fact that the United States did not pressure the Arana government for political moderation and democratic reform was due to the Nixon Administration's preoccupation with the war in Viet Nam and U.S. domestic problems. A review of the variables during the Arana years, however,

suggests that U.S. influence may have been high, but was not pursued. The external variables were favorable. U.S. foreign policy was distinctly anti-communist, especially with regard to Guatemala and Central America. This had a positive effect on the relations between the United States and Guatemalan decision makers. During the period 1970 to 1974, there were few events in Central America that impacted negatively on the Guatemalan perspective of regional security. The countries in Central America were dominated by conservative governments. The only significant insurgency in the region was in Nicaragua, and there it was believed that the Sandinistas were no match for the U.S. trained and supplied government forces. The absence of a perceived threat to regional security offered positive pressure on the Guatemalan elite, which might have allowed the U.S. to pressure Guatemala for political moderation and democratic reform. Internal variables were mixed. Because political reform can only take place when Guatemala is perceived to be secure by Guatemalan elites, the total collapse of the Marxist insurgency in 1972 may have exerted pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to respond to U.S. urging for political and social change. The power struggle between the military elite and the civilian elite and the internal political structure, however, would have exerted pressure on the decision making elite to resist U.S.

pressure for a change in the status quo. The struggle between the military elite and the civilian elite was due to the use of a civilian political party to elect a military officer to the presidency. Arana's election initiated the power struggle, an internal conflict that would destabilize the established order, accelerate its decay, and deepen the existing crisis. (21) The resulting internal political structure was closed and highly stratified. Democratic reform would necessitate a complete change to the political structure, a change the military was unwilling to allow unless possibly forced to do so by the United States. The United States, however, did not become involved in the political crisis in Guatemala. As a result, the supremacy of the military elite in the Guatemalan political structure was assured. In summary, the external variables enhanced U.S. influence in Guatemala during the Arana years. Economic growth in Guatemala was dependent upon U.S. economic assistance. The percent of real increase, in the Gross Domestic Product, averaged 6.1 percent during the Arana years. Guatemala's gold and foreign reserve increased from \$78.2 million in 1970 to \$202 million in 1974. Although a favorable balance of trade was experienced in 1970, 1972, and 1973, the balance of trade for the entire period was unfavorable due to an extremely bad year in 1971. Government expenditures far exceeded reserves. The foreign

debt increased from \$218.5 million in 1970 to \$409.8 million in 1974. The defeat of the insurgency reduced the perceived internal threat to Guatemalan decision makers, this would facilitate acceptance of political reform in the country. Only the military elite would resist U.S. attempts to encourage political moderation and democratic reform, and it must be pointed out that the civilian elite was challenging the position of the military elite. The positive political, economic, and social variables indicate that the United States, therefore, may have been successful in exerting pressure on the Guatemalan decision making elite, during the Arana years, to return control of the political structure to the civilian elites.

### SECTION III - KJILL LAUGERUD GARCIA

(1974-1978)

Political conditions during the 1974 Presidential election were not unlike conditions during the 1970 elections. Opposition parties were banned from the electoral process, Marxist guerrillas increased urban terrorist attacks, and left wing elements in society staged demonstrations and riots to discredit the elections. The military forged a coalition between the National Liberation Movement (MLN) and the Institutional Democratic Party (PID).

The MLN-PID coalition candidate, General Kjill Laugerud Garcia, was hand picked by Arana. (22) The moderate elements of society supported the Christian Democrats (DC). To appease the military, the Christian Democratic Party selected a moderate military officer, General Efraim Rios Montt, as their presidential candidate. Unlike the 1970 election, the 1974 election was not honest, neither candidate polled a majority of the vote, although the DC candidate polled much greater popular support, the MLN-PID's military candidate, Laugerud, was declared the winner by a subservient congress. (23)

The fact that at the end of the Arana years, external and internal variables were well suited to promote friendly relations between Guatemalan decision makers and the United States (which would in turn enhance U.S. efforts to encourage political moderation and democratic reform) is evidenced by Laugerud's first two years in office. This was a period of little violence, highlighted by limited political and social reforms. Reforms that were initiated without U.S. pressure. Laugerud was concerned with the plight of the peasants, especially the Indians. Encouraged by the fact that the Marxist guerrillas had not been able to mobilize the rural peasants against the government, Laugerud attempted to formally incorporate the peasants into the

military's political base. Laugerud supported and funded the development of rural campesino farm cooperatives and peasant organizations. These organizations were to be controlled by the government in programs designed to develop isolated rural areas. (24) Additionally, Laugerud tolerated a new labor movement and urged peaceful negotiation to end strikes, instead of government sponsored violence. During the period 1974 to 1976, it is estimated that 80 thousand workers were organized into labor unions, almost four times the number that were involved in the labor movement at the end of Arana's reign. (25) Encouraged by the moderation of the Laugerud government, the center and left of center political parties became more open and active in Guatemalan politics. These elements pushed for greater moderation and more reform from the Laugerud government.

Although the United States provided the Laugerud government with \$83.1 million in economic assistance and \$10.4 million in delivered security assistance, the United States did not take a real interest in political moderation and democratic reform in Guatemala until after the election of Jimmy Carter as President of the United States. U.S. interest in Guatemalan reform during the Carter Administration, however, was too late to be effective. U.S. efforts to pressure Guatemalan decision makers to adhere to

basic human rights and institute social, economic, and political reform, were rejected by the Guatemalan military elite because of significant changes in Guatemalan external and internal variables. The pressure exerted on Guatemalan decision makers by the changes in these variables, did not compel them to agree to U.S. demands for political moderation and democratic reform as a condition for friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States.

The perception of Guatemalan decision makers, concerning the international community, had changed. U.S. world esteem was at a low when President Carter was inaugurated in 1976 as a result of the fall of Cambodia and Viet Nam to the communist, the Watergate affair, and the resignation of President Nixon. International organizations were becoming critical of Guatemalan human rights violations and the United States was openly joining in the condemnation of Guatemalan decision makers. Additionally, U.S. Public Safety Training for the Guatemalan security and police forces was discontinued and the U.S. Congress was insistent upon tying U.S. security assistance to human rights. The Carter Administration's approach to foreign policy was viewed with disdain in Guatemala. Not only was President Carter viewed as soft on communism, he was accused of turning his back on long time friends of the United States.

This, at a time when the stability in Guatemala, and elsewhere in Central America, was threatened by renewed communist insurgencies.

The perception of Guatemalan decision makers concerning Central America had also changed. Regional security was an important, if not critical, concern to Guatemalan decision makers. During the period 1970 to 1976, there were few regional events that impacted upon the Guatemalan perspective of regional security. During the period 1976 to 1980, however, Central America entered a period of crisis. U.S. security assistance to Guatemala and El Salvador was suspended and security assistance to Nicaragua was greatly reduced in 1977. By 1979, the insurgency in Guatemala had reached an intensity never before experienced. El Salvador, deeply involved in its own internal war with Marxist guerrillas, was on the brink of total collapse and the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, had been overthrown by the communist Sandinistas; moreover, the Carter Administration made available \$7 million in food, medicines, and other supplies to the Sandinista government. (26) In 1979, the United States entered into a controversy with Cuba and the Soviet Union over the stationing of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. The Soviet forces remained on the island and the whole episode was an embarrassment to

the Carter Administration. During the same period, stridently pro-Cuban and pro-Soviet Marxist elements gained power in the Caribbean countries of Grenada and Guyana. Politically, the situation from the Guatemalan view point was dangerous. Mexico, which had maintained close ties with Cuba since 1959, was openly supporting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the communist guerrillas in El Salvador. British Honduras (Belize), under Prime Minister George Price, was courting Cuban support of the country's bid for independence. Cuba was actively supporting revolutionary movements throughout the area, and the United States, due to human rights considerations, was reducing support for anti-communist countries, according to Guatemalan leaders.

The internal security of the state was a critical concern to the Guatemalan decision making elite. A new guerrilla organization, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) which had begun limited operations in December 1975, had grown strong enough to launch a major guerrilla offensive in the northern state of Quiche in August 1976. The most alarming aspect of the new guerrilla movement to the Guatemalan elite was the participation in the EGP by rural Indians.

Racial stratification in Guatemala is the most important element in the current social structure, the roots of the racial stratification extend to the Spanish conquest. The creoles, Guatemalans born of Spanish parents, and European immigrants form the elite of the Guatemalan societal-pyramid. (27) Interbreeding between creole men and Indian women, created the next layer of the pyramid, the ladinos. The Indians, the largest part of the population, compose the base of the societal-pyramid. Many Europeanized Guatemalans "regard Indians as a breed apart and hardly human." (28) The ladinos and Indians form the bulk of the Guatemalan population, a poor class of campesinos (country people) disfranchised from the economic, cultural, and political structure of the country. The campesinos are an important factor in the Guatemalan political structure, they are the object of exclusion and repression. In Guatemala it is estimated that 2 percent of the population controls over 60 percent of the land. (29) It is not difficult to understand the motive for the Guatemalan elite to exclude ladinos and Indians from the political process. Conversely, it is not difficult to recognize that ladino and Indian campesinos represent a potentially important opposition force, if mobilized by the Marxist insurgents.

To meet the threat of Indian involvement in the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), Laugerud launched a major counterinsurgency operation in the state of Quiche. The rural operations against the EGP involved indiscriminate mass killing of Indians and selective targeting of leaders and members of the rural cooperatives. (30) The level of violence and human rights violations in the later half of Laugerud's reign increased substantially, even surpassing that of the Arana years.

The rural peasant farm cooperatives organized into eight large federations, were having a major impact on Indian political attitudes, marketing strategies, and relations with large estate owners. (31) By 1975, there were more than 132,000 families involved in over 500 agricultural cooperatives. (32) These organizations, assisted by doctors, lawyers, and other professionals, attempted to improve the economic and social well being of the peasants. The rural cooperatives were becoming more militant in voicing the concerns of the peasants. The cooperatives protested against low wages, the system of labor contracting, and the unlawful taking of Indian land by the military, especially along the Transversal Highway. Their interest collided with the interest of the Guatemalan elite, especially in matters concerning agricultural labor

and land ownership. The cooperatives, once supported by Laugerud, became regarded as a political threat.

Events would lead Laugerud to perceive the growing labor movement as another threat to internal security. On 4 February 1976, an earthquake hit Guatemala City and other towns and villages causing enormous damage and the loss of 25,000 lives. (33) In the midst of the clean-up effort in Guatemala City, several important labor unions went on strike. Laugerud charged the unions with irresponsibility due to their lack of self-discipline and self-sacrifice and castigated them for their political delinquency. (34) Because of the irresponsibility of the unions, Laugerud targeted them for repression. In December 1979, Amnesty International reported that "to be a union leader or active member of a trade union in Guatemala today means risking one's life." (35)

The middle class was also perceived by Laugerud as a potential threat to internal security. The middle class was an active participant in political organizations and this class of people aspired to gain political influence and maintain their share of the country's wealth. The middle class helped to organize labor unions, rural cooperatives, and opposition political parties to gain and protect their

influence in the Guatemalan economy. Opposition to the government increased as the middle class failed to meet their expectations. This was especially true among the college educated. The middle class was very much interested in sending their children to schools of higher learning; however, because these institutions stressed the need for social and economic reform, the Guatemalan elite considered universities as enemies of the state. (36) The middle class was a strong force in Guatemalan society, a force that was becoming more militant in demanding political moderation and democratic reform.

The Laugerud government responded to the perceived threats to internal security with force. Leaders and potential leaders of opposition political parties, unions, and rural cooperatives, along with critical journalist, clerics, university professors, and students were targets for murder by right wing organizations and police units. (37)

Political representation for the middle class, labor unions, and peasant organizations had been violently rejected by the Laugerud government. Laugerud would allow no interest group to challenge the supremacy of the military elite. Indeed, there were no interest groups capable of

challenging the military elite in the existing political structure. The status quo had been maintained by economic, political, and military repression of the population; similarly, demobilization of emerging social sectors had been accomplished by a government sponsored campaign of terror against the leaders of possible opposition groups. (38) This polarized the society and closed the political system. The inability to change conditions in Guatemala through the existing political structure increased middle class militancy and increased support for the insurgents. The failure of Laugerud's earlier moderate policies was used by the Guatemalan military elite as a reason to continue to reject U.S. pressure for moderation. The Carter Administration could not penetrate the belief among Guatemala's decision makers that moderation and political concessions lead to militancy and radicalization, not cooperation and stability as touted by the United States. (39) The lack of an interest group capable of challenging the military elite and the closed political system would frustrate relations between Guatemala and the United States throughout the Carter Administration.

The Guatemalan decision, to reject friendly relations with the United States that were tied to conditions of political moderation and democratic reform,

was also effected by the economic variable. Guatemala had the most diversified and strongest economy in Central America. The Guatemalan GDP was well over \$7 billion at constant 1980 prices. The GDP is based upon three main components: agriculture, 25 percent; manufacturing, 16 percent; and commerce, 25 percent. Guatemalan agricultural exports included: coffee; bananas; cotton; sugar; dry beans; maize; cocoa; sorghum; and beef. Manufactured exports included: food; drink; and tobacco products; textiles and clothing; and building materials. Guatemala also exported zinc, lead, and bauxite. Guatemalan imports included: raw materials and intermediate products; fuel and fuel oils; and durable and non-durable consumer goods. The major trading partners of Guatemala were the United States, the Central American Common Market, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Venezuela. Foreign investment in Guatemala was led by the United States. By the mid-1970's over 100 U.S. private investors had entered the Guatemalan economy with investments totaling more tha \$300 million; there were forty other foreign firms in Guatemala with investments totaling more than \$150 million.(40)

The period 1970 to 1977 was a time of steady economic growth in Guatemala, the average percent of real GDP increase was over 6 percent. In 1976 and 1977, the

annual real GDP growth rate was 8.1 percent and 7.8 percent, respectively. Guatemala consistently enjoyed a favorable balance of trade. Gold and foreign exchange reserves were plentiful. Foreign investment continued unabated, international loans for development projects were easily acquired, and U.S. economic assistance during the period exceeded \$150 million (more than the previous ten years).

Guatemalan rejection of U.S. conditions for friendly relations constituted rejection of U.S. security assistance. The total amount of U.S. security assistance approved in 1976 was \$3.4 million, of which \$1.3 million was approved under the Foreign Military Sales Credit (FMSCR) Program and \$.7 million was in the form of Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants. The economy was an important factor in the Guatemalan decision to reject U.S. security assistance in 1977. Guatemalan decision makers must not have believed that termination of U.S. security assistance would create a financial burden. Based upon past performance and favorable economic projections, the Guatemalan decision makers must have believed that the economy could absorb an increased military budget. This is especially true since U.S. economic aid would continue and public services and development projects could be reduced to meet an increased military budget, while U.S. economic aid could be

reprogrammed to other areas to offset increased military spending. Lars Schoultz, in his essay, "Guatemala: Social Change and Political Conflict," supports this conclusion. Schoultz points out that there will have to be several years of no U.S. military aid deliveries to Guatemala before there is any chance of a move to political moderation. (41) Under these conditions, the economic variable exerted little pressure on decision makers to accept U.S. imposed conditions of political moderation and democratic reform for continuation of U.S. security assistance.

During the Laugerud regime, the cumulative effect of both external and internal variables on Guatemalan decision makers prohibited friendly relations with the United States based upon U.S. conditions of political moderation and democratic reform. The international prestige (influence) of the United States with Guatemalan decision makers, which was diminished by the effects of Viet Nam and Watergate, was further reduced by a lack of confidence and trust in the Carter Administration. The stability in Guatemala, and elsewhere in Central America, was threatened by renewed communist insurgencies. Guatemalan decision makers attributed much of the crisis in Central America to U.S. foreign policy in the region. The unwillingness of the Carter Administration to assist the Somoza regime in

Nicaragua, and yet provide aid to the Sandinistas once in power, from the perspective of the Guatemalan elite, encouraged communist insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala. Internal variables also served to frustrate friendly relations between Guatemalan decision makers and the United States. The military elite was unwilling to allow upward mobility for other interest groups. Political representation for the middle class, labor unions, and peasant organizations had been violently rejected by the Laugerud government. This polarized the society and closed the political system. Internal security was threatened by the rise of the EGP; the Guatemalan elite would not discuss moderation while under attack by strong communist forces. Most important, the tremendous economic growth and prosperity in Guatemala led Guatemalan decision makers to believe that U.S. security assistance was not needed if the cost was U.S. involvement in Guatemalan domestic affairs. Furthermore, the attitude among the Guatemalan elite, that U.S. security assistance was not needed, was encouraged by the fact the U.S. economic aid did continue. The Guatemalan elite refused conditional U.S. security assistance and continued the government campaign of murder and repression.

#### SECTION IV - ROMEO LUCAS GARCIA

(1978-1982)

The 1978 Presidential election in Guatemala was again controlled by the military. The two most popular personalities in Guatemalan politics, Alberto Fuentes Mohr, of the Socialist Democratic Party (PSD) and Manuel Colom Argueta, leader of the United Revolutionary Front (FUR) could not participate in the election because the military denied their parties official recognition. The five official parties all nominated military officers. A coalition between the Revolutionary Party (PR) and Laugerud's Institutional Democratic Party (PID) resulted in the nomination of General Romeo Lucas Garcia. A coalition between the Christian Democrats (DC) and the National Unity Front (FRENU) nominated Colonel Ricardo Peralta Mendez. The National Liberation Movement (MLN) nominated General Enrique Peralta Azurdia. There was very little difference between the candidates; and in fact, voter apathy was such that only 40 percent of all registered voters cast ballots. (42) During the 1978 election only 56 percent of the adult population was registered, the winning candidate, Romeo Lucas Garcia, polled only 262,000 votes (40 percent) which was equivalent to 8.3 percent of Guatemala's 3.15 million adult population. (43)

The situation inherited by Lucas from the Arana government was not good. Relations with the United States were strained. Although U.S. military assistance had been cut off in 1977, military deliveries continued (a total of \$10.4 million of U.S. security assistance was delivered during the period 1978-1982), as did U.S. economic assistance. But, the Carter Administration was constantly applying pressure for political moderation. Political moderation was difficult for the Lucas government to achieve. Leftist guerrilla activity in rural areas, especially in the states of Quiche and Alta Verapaz, and urban terrorist attacks against politicians, industrialists, the police, and the military were common. In Guatemala City massive, and sometimes violent, student and labor demonstrations against the government were frequent. The government's policy of selective repression of leaders or potential leaders of labor organizations, rural cooperatives, student movements, critical clerics, journalists, and teachers continued unabated. The military elite moved to tighten their control of the Guatemalan political structure. In 1979, the Lucas government issued a decree which gave the Chief of Staff of the Army the right to control and register all appointments to the civilian bureaucracy and summon Ministers of State to appear before

the Chief of Staff to answer for policies not to the military's liking. (44) The military elite was also deeply involved in the illegal appropriation of Indian lands, bribery, and other forms of corruption. Wealthy estate owners recruited private armies led by active and retired military officers. These private armies did not hesitate to take the law into their own hands.

Lucas initially responded favorably to continued pressure from the Carter Administration for political moderation and adherence to basic human rights. During the period 1978 through 1979, the Lucas government relaxed political restrictions and granted official recognition to the Socialist Democratic Party (PSD), the United Revolutionary Front (FUR), the Authentic National Center Party (CAN), the National Renovating Party (PNR), and the United National Front (FUN). However, Lucas was too weak to control the reactionary forces of the military and the extreme right. Alberto Fuentes Mohr, the popular leader of the PSD, was assassinated one day prior to the granting of official recognition to his party. Three months later, Manuel Colom Argueta was also assassinated (six days after his party was granted official recognition); in fact, the leadership of the PSD, FUR, DC, and to a lesser extent the other political parties, were decimated by assassination and

exile during the Lucas years. (45) The assassination of popular, moderate political figures such as Mohr and Argueta served to further polarize Guatemalan society, mobilize the left wing opposition (200,000 people marched in the streets of Guatemala City to protest the killing of Argueta), and signaled an end of trying to work within the system for many moderate political organizations. (46) The political system remained closed. The military elite, through the use of right wing death squads, eliminated all interest groups that threatened their power and control.

Guatemala faced a growing insurgency launched by the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP). The insurgency was joined by a new guerrilla group, the Organization of the People in Arms (OPRA), in September 1979. The high threat to internal security precluded Guatemalan decision makers from initiating policies of political moderation and democratic reform. The insurgency, for the first time, enjoyed strong support from the Indian population and, because of increased international criticism of government repression in Guatemala, from the international community. The guerrillas made repeated hit and run attacks and would often occupy rural towns for short periods. The Guatemalan Army was, for the first time, ineffective in the rural areas and the police and internal

security forces could not stop the growing number of leftist terrorist attacks and kidnappings of important people in the urban areas. (47)

The Guatemalan economy continued to experience stable economic growth during the first year of the Lucas regime. Guatemala had sizable gold and foreign exchange reserves. Guatemalan gold and foreign exchange reserves increased tremendously during the period 1976 to 1978 (from \$511 million in 1976 to \$824 million in 1978). Guatemala enjoyed a favorable balance of trade and the foreign debt service burden was minimal. The economic growth experienced by Guatemala during the Carter Administration made it difficult for Carter to gain leverage by withholding security assistance. This situation was aggravated by the fact that Carter continued U.S. economic aid to Guatemala, (\$67.3 million during the period 1974 to 1978) and allowed delivery of military equipment and supplies that had been approved prior to suspension of U.S. security assistance in 1977. This aspect of the Carter policy was counterproductive, and added to the ability of Guatemalan decision makers to reject U.S. security assistance tied to conditions of political moderation and democratic reform. The fact that the Carter Administration included a request for \$250 thousand in military training for Guatemala, in the

fiscal year 1980 budget, suggests that the Carter Administration might have ended the policy of trying to influence Guatemala to adopt policies of political moderation and democratic reform by denying security assistance, had Carter been elected to a second term.

On the global level; U.S. foreign policy failures in Angola in 1976, Ethiopia in 1977, Nicaragua, Iran, and Afghanistan in 1979, confirmed Guatemalan doubts about U.S. leadership under President Carter. Regionally, the deployment of MIG 23 fighter aircraft (which are nuclear capable in certain configurations) and a Soviet combat brigade to Cuba, the fall of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the critical situation in El Salvador (which was under heavy siege by communist guerrillas), and overwhelming international support for the independence of Belize (claimed by Guatemala as its 23rd province), caused the Guatemalan elite to adopt a go it alone, seige mentality. This seige mentality was bolstered by the fact that Guatemala had no strong allies in the region, and the Guatemalan elite felt betrayed by the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Venezuela because these countries criticized Guatemala for human rights violations and supported the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. (48) The external variables further detracted from friendly relations between Guatemala

and the United States. The Carter policy toward Guatemala failed miserably because the Guatemalan elite believed that Carter had betrayed their trust and friendship. In fact, in an essay, "Guatemala: Crisis and Response," Piero Gleijeses contends that "the Guatemalan ruling class - never known for its political sophistication - became increasingly convinced that the [United States] State Department was dominated by Marxists" during the Carter years. (49)

The inability of the Lucas government to restrain right wing political assassinations led to increased hostility toward Guatemala by the Carter Administration. In October 1979 and again in May 1980, the Carter Administration decided not to support multi-lateral development bank loans to Guatemala. The Carter Administration replaced Ambassador Frank Ortiz, who was well liked by the Guatemalan elite, with George Landau, a human rights advocate, in the summer of 1980. By this time the Carter Administration had lost all influence in Guatemala. The cumulative effect of the external and internal variables that existed after December 1979, clearly frustrated relations between the two countries and prohibited the United States from achieving its objective of political moderation or human rights goals in Guatemala. Furthermore, the nomination of Ronald Reagan as Presidential candidate of

the Republican Party, gave the Guatemalan elite a reason to hold out against Carter's pressure for change in hopes of improved relations under Ronald Reagan, a candidate with avowed anti-communist views.

Due to the overwhelming victory of Reagan and other conservative candidates in the 1980 U.S. elections, the Guatemalan elite felt a sense of satisfaction and self-vindication concerning their attitudes toward Carter. The Guatemalan elite believed that the popular U.S. rejection of Carter and a host of liberal Senators would result in revised U.S. policies toward Guatemala; however, the Guatemalan elite overestimated how willing and successful the Reagan Administration would be to provide support once it took office. (50) The Reagan Administration did change U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union to a more East verses West approach and U.S. policy in Central America was reversed. The Reagan Administration further stopped economic aid to the Sandinistas and sought economic and military assistance to anti-Sandinista guerrillas. The Reagan Administration increased economic and military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras, drawing a definite line between communist forces and the western oriented countries in the region. The Reagan policy toward Central America pleased the Guatemalan elite, except for the issue

of Belize. U.S. support for the independence of Belize remained firm; this issue remains a divisive issue, although minor, in U.S. and Guatemalan relations.

U.S. policies and orientation in international affairs, and especially in Central America, encouraged the Guatemalan elite. The Reagan Administration provided moral support to the Guatemalan elite, however, the security assistance anticipated by the Guatemalan elite was not forthcoming and U.S. economic assistance continued to decline. In the fiscal year 1980 budget, for the first time in two years, the Reagan Administration included a request for security assistance for Guatemala. The request, initially included by the Carter Administration, was a modest \$250 thousand in military training; nonetheless, the request was disapproved by the U.S. House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, because of an unacceptable human rights record by the Lucas government. In June 1981, the Reagan Administration allowed the sale of \$3.2 million of military trucks and jeeps to Guatemala by removing the items from the U.S. Government's list of prohibited items. (51) This sale caused much criticism and a strong rebuke of the Reagan Administration's policy toward Guatemala by a Congress that was still very concerned about the human rights issue. But

the sale temporarily improved relations between Guatemala and the United States.

Relations between the Lucas government and the Reagan Administration began to cool after the initial Guatemalan euphoria gave way to the realities of the limitations placed on the Reagan Administration by a reluctant Congress. U.S. emissaries and officials tried to impress on the Lucas government the importance of political moderation, democratic reform, social, and economic change in Guatemala in order for the Reagan Administration to provide security assistance. The Lucas government refused to listen and the regime grew increasingly skeptical of Reagan's commitment to Guatemala. The Lucas government saw in the Reagan Administration, "symptoms of creeping Carterism without Carter." (52) At the same time, the Reagan Administration recognized that the government repression in Guatemala and the corruption and intransigence of the Lucas regime was only creating an even more critical situation in Guatemala. After President Reagan's first year in office, relations between Guatemala and the United States were at a point equal to the hostility between the two countries during the Carter Administration. In fact, rumors of a U.S. sponsored coup against Lucas, that had first

started in the Guatemalan press during the last months of the Carter Administration, again circulated. (53)

During the transition from Carter's policies to Reagan's policies, the variables in the operational environment that effected Guatemalan decision makers remained the same during the Lucas Administration, except two. The 1979-1980 oil price increase, and the resulting worldwide economic recession, greatly altered the Guatemalan economy. The economic recession resulted in a decline in commodity prices for coffee, sugar, and cotton. The increase in oil prices and the decline in commodity prices resulted in a drastic decline in the real GDP annual growth rate. The real annual growth rate was 0.7 percent in 1981 and a negative 3.5 percent in 1982. Guatemala's gold and foreign exchange reserves fell sharply from the high of \$858 million in 1979, to a low of \$279 million in 1982. (54) Due to an increased insurgency in Guatemala and El Salvador, trade within the Central American Common Market fell and Guatemala experienced an unfavorable balance of trade. Foreign investment was also sharply reduced as a result of the insurgency and domestic instability in Guatemala. By the end of 1981, the Guatemalan foreign debt exceeded \$810 million, the debt service burden was nearing a crisis and as a result, Guatemala had difficulty in obtaining foreign

loans. This change in the economy exerted pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to improve relations with the United States. The economy was severely strained by the cost of waging a counterinsurgency war. The Guatemalan elite, the landed oligarchies, and industrialists were being hurt by the economic decline. These groups pushed for some degree of political moderation and democratic reform as a means of improving relations with the United States and acquiring additional U.S. economic and military assistance.

(55)

Another internal variable, interest groups, also changed. A strong element of the military, the junior officer corps, had become dissatisfied with the status quo. The junior officer corps represented, for the most part, children of the middle class. Government attacks on the middle class and on middle class institutions alienated young reform minded officers from the conservative and reactionary military elite. Well educated and dedicated professionals, the young officer corps did not like the corruption, greed, and materialism that infected the senior officer corps. These officers joined other interest groups in voicing their opposition to the Lucas government. The rise of the young officer reform movement represented a

powerful force for change that Guatemalan decision makers could not ignore.

#### SECTION V - EFRAIN RIOS MONTT

(1982-1983)

During the 1982 elections, the military elite was again in control. The military elite forged a coalition of the Revolutionary Party (PR), the Institutional Democratic Party (PID), and the National Unity Front (FRENU) to support the official candidate, Lucas' Defense Minister, General Anibal Guevara. The National Liberation Movement (MLN) nominated an equally conservative extremist, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, who was Vice President under Laugerud. The Christain Democrats (DC) and the National Renewal Party (PNR) nominated Alejandro Maldonado Aquirre, a former leader in the MLN. The Authentic National Center Party (CAN) nominated Gustavo Anzueto Vielman, a moderate. The election generated little public interest, none of the candidates polled a majority of the vote, and the official candidate, Guevara, was declared the winner by an obedient Guatemalan Congress on 9 March 1982. On 23 March, however, a group of reform minded junior military officers staged a bloodless coup against the Lucas government and declared the 1965 Constitution and the election of Guevara invalid. The coup

established an interim military government composed of three senior officers. General Efraim Rios Montt, the reform minded candidate of the Christian Democrats in the 1974 election, was to head the government. Montt was to share power with General Horacio Maldonado Schaad and Colonel Francisco Luis Gordillo Martinez.

To help transition the military junta to democracy and achieve the sought after U.S. economic and military assistance, a six man council was formed, composed of military reformists under the direction of the Minister of Defense, General Mejia Victores. The council was to take an active role in the interim government. The extent of U.S. involvement in the coup is a subject of much debate. The Guatemalan left and U.S. liberals believe that the Reagan Administration was directly involved; the New York Times reported that U.S. officials were aware of preparations for the coup, but most historians and political scientists believe that the coup took the Reagan Administration by surprise. (56) Regardless, the coup was oriented toward the goal of political moderation and democratic reform. The military coup represented the rise of a new competing elite in Guatemala, a coalition between reform minded civilian and military elites supported by a reform minded middle class and junior officers. The coup was aimed at correcting

corruption, human rights violations, and the loss of U.S. support. (57) The officers explained their motives after the coup: "The government ... has used the tactic of disorganizing society, labelling any vocal leadership as subversive, and attempted to use brute force against a political problem." (58) The officers concluded that, "The guerrillas would not be a serious military problem if not for the corruption, inability to govern, exploitation, and violence that provides the guerrillas with recruits and legitimacy." (59)

There is significant evidence that the 1982 military coup was indeed an attempt to bring about political moderation and democratic reform. After the coup the young officers openly advocated Presidential elections within sixty days, the ineligibility of military candidates for office in future elections, and an end to government corruption. (60) Political reform was not the only reason for the coup, there was an alternate motive. The coup was also an attempt to restore U.S. support for Guatemala. The external variables were conducive to friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States. Under President Reagan, U.S. international prestige was high, more importantly, the Reagan Administration advocated a military oriented anti-communist policy in Central America. Internal

variables also exerted pressure for improved relations between Guatemala and the United States. In addition to the change in interest groups, brought about by the rise of the military reform movement, the economic variable exerted strong pressure for closer ties with the United States. U.S. security assistance and military commercial deliveries to Guatemala, at the end of 1981, were less than half of the 1977 totals, U.S. economic assistance was also reduced. The Guatemalan military was in need of U.S. security assistance, especially helicopters and communications equipment, to deal with the growing insurgency. Alternate sources of military assistance, such as Israel, had been severely reduced because of the Guatemalan human rights record. The Guatemalan economy was in a crisis. Gold and foreign exchange reserves in Guatemala had been depleted from \$824.1 million in 1978, to \$279.4 million in 1982; the real annual increase in the GDP had declined from 7.8 percent in 1977, to a negative 3.5 percent in 1982; additionally, a negative balance of trade and a U.S. anti-inflationary policy had created a tremendous national debt (\$360.4 million), and balance of payments problem in Guatemala. (61) Guatemala could no longer afford to purchase critically needed military equipment and supplies. The Guatemalan military perceived that the situation in Honduras and El Salvador was much different. (62) Honduras was receiving millions of

dollars in U.S. economic and military assistance, as was the civilian government in El Salvador, led by Christian Democate, Jose Napoleon Duarte. The military coup of 1982 was intended to change conditions in Guatemala in order to restore critically needed U.S. economic and security assistance.

The military coup in 1982 suggests that the Carter policy of withholding U.S. security assistance, a policy carried forward under the Reagan Administration, was probably an effective tool in the long term for influencing events in Guatemala. Four variables in the operational environment were significantly different in 1982 from the situation in 1977 when U.S. security assistance was terminated. First, U.S. prestige in the international community was greater in 1982. Second, regional security and political stability had improved; El Salvador was no longer on the brink of collapse; and U.S. military presence in the region had increased. Third, a reform minded young military officer movement had evolved as an interest group capable of challenging the military elite. And finally, the Guatemalan economy was in dispair. These variables exerted pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to improve relations with the United States, even though friendly relations were

contingent upon U.S. conditions of political moderation and democratic reform.

The only variables that exerted pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to resist policies of political moderation and democratic reform were internal security and the closed political structure. The Marxist insurgency in Guatemala was growing and experiencing a high degree of success. The counterinsurgency campaign begun under Lucas was considered ineffective and counterproductive. The numbers of active insurgents in Guatemala was estimated at 6000 and the number was growing as a result of widespread Indian support. (63) Additionally, because of the bad reputation of past Guatemalan governments, international support for the insurgency was growing. In February 1982, the four active guerrilla groups, the People's Revolutionary Army (EGP), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), announced the formation of a joint political and military directorate, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). (64) This unification was of more propaganda value to the guerrillas than real political substance. The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), the oldest element of the insurgency in Guatemala, was an independent, Tercerista type organization; whereas, the Popular Guerrilla Army (EGP) was

Cuban oriented, and the Guatemalan Workers Party was associated with Moscow. (65) The distinction between the FAR and the EGP remained, inspite of the political coalition of the four major guerrilla groups into a single united front. Shortly after the formation of the URNG, a group of Guatemalan exiles in Mexico announced the formation of the Guatemalan Patriotic Unity Committee to coordinate the international political work of the left. (66)

The intentions of the military coup; political pluralism, freedom of expression, respect for human rights, and the right of the people to choose their government in free elections were not advanced under Montt. Rios Montt, although considered by many as a moderate, a self-proclaimed Protestant Christian Evangelist, was every bit as ruthless as Laugerud. Montt moved quickly to consolidate his power. The military council was reduced to an advisory role and the three member junta was dissolved in June 1982. Montt postponed elections indefinitely and named himself as President. In July, Montt declared a state of siege and national mobilization. Under the conditions of the state of siege, most civilian participation in the government was ended; all political party, labor union, peasant organization, and student union activities were illegal; all public demonstrations were illegal; newspapers were banned

from publishing any adverse news on the counterinsurgency program; and rural repression and terror increased. Montt replaced government officials, military, and police officers with his own followers; however, he did not bring to trial any of the officials in the Laugerud government for corruption or violations of human rights. (67) The coup resulted in a changing of the guard, but not a change in the political situation.

The national mobilization declared by Montt resulted in a call-up of the reserves and expanded military recruitment and training. Montt waged a successful, but ruthless campaign against the rural insurgency at a time when the insurgency had reached new levels of popular support and political and military success. Montt was Army Chief of Staff from 1970 to 1973, under President Arana, during one of the worst periods of repression in Guatemala. (68) Montt had learned, from Arana, the value of terror in controlling the countryside. Montt initiated a "carrot and stick" program in rural areas that included terror and scorched earth tactics against selected villages, and civic action and self defense programs for others. (69) Montt's self-defense program, referred to as "rifles and beans," was designed to mobilize Indian villages against the guerrillas and reward cooperative Indian villages with food. The

program was very successful. The guerrillas were denied the vital Indian support necessary to operate in rural areas, and the insurgency was temporarily defeated.

The continued violence in the rural areas, and the failure of the Montt regime to initiate a Constitutional Assembly and free elections, did little to improve relations with the United States. After the military coup, the Reagan Administration, encouraged by the stated goals of the coup, attempted to obtain Congressional approval for the sale of \$3.5 million in military spare parts, as well as reprogramming \$50 thousand in IMET funds for Guatemala. (70) A U.S. Congressional delegation was sent to Guatemala to investigate human rights conditions prior to approval of the Reagan Administration's request. Montt, unable to demonstrate significant improvements, alienated the delegation and stated that his government had not requested military aid. (71) This reply was interpreted by the U.S. Congress as yet another sign of the intransigence of the Guatemalan elite. The Reagan Administration continued attempts to convince Congress that U.S. security assistance was required for Guatemala. The Administration's FY1983 budget included a request for \$251 thousand in IMET funds for Guatemala. (72) These funds were not approved by the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. In fact, no new

security assistance funds were approved for Guatemala during the Montt regime, and total security assistance deliveries slowed to a trickle.

The Montt regime was able to accomplish little more than the defeat of the guerrillas. This was accomplished only through increased defense spending, supported by unpopular tax increases. The Montt regime did not improve the Guatemalan economy. Negative growth in real GDP continued into 1983, a negative 2.6 percent; the nation's unfavorable balance of trade continued, a difference of \$120 million in 1983; and the national debt service ratio increased from 7.6 percent in 1982, to 11.7 percent in 1983.

(73) There was little international investment in Guatemala, gold and foreign exchange reserves declined \$176 million in 1983. Montt was not liked by the business community in Guatemala. Business organizations represent a large part of the civilian elite in Guatemala. These business organizations, loosely united in the organization Coordinadora de Asociaciones Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF), and the Chamber of Commerce exert considerable economic and political pressure on Guatemalan decision makers. (74) Business organizations are involved in controlling import and export legislation, labor laws, and taxes, and they play an important part in maintaining

the economic and political status quo. It would be difficult, if not impossible for the decision makers in Guatemala to enact any reforms without the cooperation and consent of Guatemala's business organizations. It is widely believed by most economists that tax increases levied against Guatemalan businesses by the Montt regime to support counterinsurgency operations were responsible for the regime's downfall in August 1983. (75)

Montt, a member of the Church of the Complete Word, a mission of the Gospel Outreach of Eureka, California, alienated the Guatemalan clergy and much of the population, because of his Evangelistic speeches. (76) In March 1983, Montt offended the Roman Catholic Church by executing six men during a Papal visit. Pope John Paul II strongly denounced the Montt regime and conditions in Guatemala.

Finally, Montt upset the fragile relationship that existed between himself and other senior military officers. In June 1983, Montt dismissed General Guillermo Echeverria Vielman, the senior commander in the military. General Echeverria advocated restoration of a democratic government. The six man advisory council was dismissed for similar reasons, and in July, 50 other military officers were dismissed from government positions. On 8 August 1983,

Montt was overthrown in a coup led by his Minister of Defense, General Mejia Victores.

The bloodless coup that installed Mejia Victores in the office of President was due in part to the fact that Montt had failed to improve relations between Guatemala and the United States, and thus, he had failed to obtain badly needed U.S. economic and military assistance. The removal of Montt from power was also due to the fact that Montt had alienated many elements of the Guatemalan elite. Montt had alienated the senior military element of the competing elite by his evangelical beliefs, the poor treatment and lack of respect Montt extended to Pope John Paul II during the Papal visit, and the dismissal of powerful senior military officers from government positions. Montt failed to obtain the support of the landed oligarchies and industrialists, partly because of his religious beliefs, but primarily because his policies continued the country's economic decline. Additionally, Montt financed his counterinsurgency campaign through increased corporate income taxes and export taxes, which alienated the business community. (77) The younger reform minded element of the military, allied with reform minded persons in the traditional military and civilian elite, was very dissatisfied and frustrated by the failure of Montt to institute political moderation and

democratic reform. Moreover, Montt's counterinsurgency campaign, although successful, resulted in tremendous casualties among the junior officer corps. The military, again led by the young reform movement demanded change.

SECTION VI - OSCAR HUMBERTO MEJIA VICTORES  
(1983-1985)

Mejia Victores immediately announced an end to the national state of seige and mobilization declared by Montt. Civil liberties, to include political activities, were restored. Victores declared that elections for a Constituent Assembly would be held on 1 July 1984, and Presidential elections would be held on 1 July 1985.

The elections for the Constituent Assembly were held on 1 July 1984; however, it did not represent a change in the social fabric and political structure in Guatemala. The election for the Constituent Assembly was only a small step toward political moderation and democratic reform. Nine political parties were represented in the election; however, candidates from parties of the political left were not authorized to participate. Voter turnout was estimated at two-thirds of the registered voters, a small percentage of the adult population in Guatemala. Fifteen of the

eighty-eight seats in the Constituent Assembly were won by the Christian Democrats (DC), the remaining were won by right wing or center-right political parties.

The Constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly did not threaten the military's role in the government. The President, was designated Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, however, a Presidential order to the military was required to be transmitted only through the Minister of Defense. The new Constitution also required that the Minister of Defense be a military officer, senior in rank to the President. Another provision of the Constitution designed to insure the prominence of the military in the government provided for the establishment of confidential funds in the budget to be used by the military, free from Congressional approval and public scrutiny. (78) Additionally, the military was authorized to promote senior officers without Congressional approval. (79)

The Presidential elections promised by Mejia Victores were held in November 1985. Twelve political parties represented by eight candidates participated in the election. Parties representing the political left were not authorized to participate in the election. The extreme right, the National Liberation Movement (MLN) and the

Institutional Democratic Party (PID), was represented by Mario Sandoval Alarcon. The center-right, the National Center Union (UCN), was represented by Jorge Carpio Nicolle, a moderately conservative newspaper owner. Also representing the center-right was a coalition of smaller parties led by the Democratic Party of National Cooperation (PDCN). The center-left, the Christian Democrats (DC), supported by the Democratic Alliance (AD) and the Democratic Socialist Party (PSD), was represented by Vincio Cerezo Arevalo. Voting was heavy, even though only 2.7 million of the 8.3 million adult population was registered to vote. The election was not disrupted by guerrilla activity or terrorism, however, the extreme left opposed the election. The election was won by Cerezo, followed by Carpio and Jorge Serrano Elias of the PDCN. The extreme right did very poorly in the election.

The variables in the operational environment that resulted in the overthrow of Montt were the same pressures that compelled Mejia Victores to seek to improve relations with the United States by initiating a plan for political moderation and democratic reform. During the period 1983 to 1985, the Reagan Administration continued a western oriented, anti-communist approach to foreign policy. The Reagan Administration's repudiation of detente with the

Soviet Union, and U.S. support of forces fighting communist regimes in Afghanistan and Nicaragua had improved the U.S. image in Guatemala. The election of Reagan to a second term was also good news in Guatemala.

In addition to the influence exerted on Victores to initiate political moderation and democratic reform by the external variables, all but one of the internal variables exerted pressure. There was a new element within the military which was fast becoming another competing elite. This was a coalition of a few senior officers and young reform minded officers. There has long been a reform element in the military. Young military reformists led a large scale military uprising against Ydigoras on 13 November 1960. The military coups in 1982 and 1983 were initiated by military reformists, and the success fo these coups mark the emergence of a new competing elite. This is important because the young officer reform movement was the only interest group or competing elite that could challenge the power of the senior officer corps. The rise of the young officer reform movement, during the 1980's, represents an important variable in Guatemala. The young officer reform movement is a powerful force pressing Guatemalan decision makers for political moderation and democratic

reform that was not present in Guatemala during the Carter Administration.

The civilian elite and influential business organizations recognized that the Guatemalan economy was collapsing and was further exacerbated by the loss of U.S. assistance, because of human rights issues. It can be reasoned that, these elements, hard hit by the economy and the financial strain created by the slow down of U.S. economic and security assistance, wanted political change. In response to continued human rights violations, U.S. economic assistance to Guatemala was terminated in November 1983. This had a tremendous impact on the Guatemalan economy. After declining in both 1982 and 1983, the percent of real growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased only 0.2 percent in 1984. (80) Commodity prices continued to fall during Victores regime. Due to a continuing unfavorable balance of trade and a massive debt payment burden, the Guatemalan gold and foreign capital reserve fund reached a negative \$459.8 million. Guatemala was unable to pay its debts to international banks, and future loans were in doubt. (81) The only possible source of economic assistance was the United States. Marlise Simons discusses the influence the Reagan Administration might have in Guatemala due to Guatemala's need for U.S. assistance in her

AD-A172 157


VARIABLES IN THE GUATEMALAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
THAT AFFECT GUATEMALA. (U) AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL  
MAXWELL AFB AL D C Waring 06 JUN 86


2/2

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 5/4

NL





article, "Guatemala: The Coming Danger." Based on this article, it is easy to reason that the economic crisis and the need for U.S. aid may have been a major factor in Victores' decision to improve relations with the United States by implementing a plan for transition to an elected, civilian government. (82) Equally important, was the fact that internal security was not threatened, the communist insurgency was defeated and driven underground by the counterinsurgency policies of Rios Montt. Victores profited from the work of Montt. However, to defeat the insurgency, Montt sacrificed the national economy, any hope for U.S. aid, and eventually, his position as President. Victores was not faced by a large scale guerrilla war. The threat to internal security was considered by Victores as minimal, therefore, the risk of political experimentation was considered acceptable. The only variable that exerted a negative pressure on Victores' decision to institute political moderation and democratic reform was the closed political structure which was dominated by the military elite. Victores could not change the political structure without changing the structure and fabric of Guatemalan society. Victores was unwilling, and perhaps unable to take the revolutionary steps necessary to bring about change. Therefore, the degree of democratic reform was limited. Victores allowed more political participation and the

election of a civilian government; however, military control of the government was safeguarded in the new Constitution.

## SECTION VII - END NOTES

1. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 279.

2. United States Agency for International Development, "Economic Assistance Statistics," as of 28 July 1981, and United States Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts," as of 30 September 1982.

3. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 279.

4. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 279.

5. Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson, and Nancy Peckenham, Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, (Grove Press, Inc., 1983), p. 33.

6. Ibid., p. 83.

7. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 25.

8. Ibid., p. 24-25.

9. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 281.

10. Ibid., p. 281.

11. Ibid., p. 26-27.

12. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Panteon Books, 1983), p. 183.

13. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 27.

14. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 9.

15. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 132.

16. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Panteon Books, 1983), p. 192.

17. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 39.

18. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 33.

19. Ibid., p. 278.

20. Ibid., p. 284.

21. Steve C. Ropp and James A. Morris, Central America: Crisis and Adaptation, (University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 146.

22. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 283.

23. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 28.

24. Ibid., p. 29.

25. Ibid., p. 29.

26. Robert Wesson, U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980's, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 157.

27. Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson, and Nancy Peckenham, Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, (Grove Press, Inc., 1983), p. 4.

28. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 51.

29. Ibid., p. 6.

30. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 288.

31. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Panteon Books, 1983), p. 162.

32. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 286.

33. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 29.

34. Ibid., p. 29.

35. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 288.

36. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 9.

37. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 288.

38. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Panteon Books, 1983), p. 182.

39. Richard R. Fagan and Olga Pellicer, The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico, (Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 207.

40. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 9, 1983, Prepared Statement of Caesar D. Sereseres, University of California and the Rand Corporation, p. 42.

41. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Panteon Books, 1983), p. 191.

42. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 32.

43. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Panteon Books, 1983), p. 192.

44. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 37.

45. Ibid., p. 39.

46. Ibid., p. 39.

47. Ibid., p. 39.

48. Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson, and Nancy Peckenham, Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, (Grove Press, Inc., 1983), p. 307.

49. Richard R. Fagan and Olga Pellicer, The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico, (Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 197.

50. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 133.

51. Richard R. Fagan and Olga Pellicer, The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico, (Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 200.

52. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 201.

53. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 46.

54. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, (Economist Publications Ltd., 1985), Annual Supplement, p. 16.

55. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 130-134 and Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 293.

56. Michael H. Erisman, The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 55.

57. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 293.

58. James R. Green and Brent Scowcroft, Western Interest and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin: Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin, (Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain Publishers, Inc., 1984), p. 206.

59. Ibid., p. 206.

60. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 296.

61. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Guatemala, El Slavador, and Honduras, (Economist Publications Ltd., 1985), Annual Supplement, p. 10-16.

62. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 133.

63. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 295.

64. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 297.

65. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 467.

66. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 297.

67. Richard Newfarmer, From Gunboats to Diplomacy: New Policies for Latin America, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 64.

68. Richard R. Fagan and Olga Pellicer, The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico, (Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 205.

69. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 34.

70. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 303.

71. Ibid., p. 303.

72. Ibid., p. 302.

73. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Guatemala, El Slavador, and Honduras, (Economist Publications Ltd., 1985), Annual Supplement, p. 10-16.

74. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 25.

75. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Guatemala, El Slavador, and Honduras, (Economist Publications Ltd., 1985), Volume 3, p. 11.

76. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 299.

77. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Guatemala, El Slavador, and Honduras, (Economist Publications Ltd., 1985), Volume 2, p. 11.

78. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Guatemala, El Slavador, and Honduras, (Economist Publications Ltd., 1985), Volume 3, p. 12.

79. Ibid., p. 12.

80. Ibid., p. 13.

81. Ibid., p. 14.

82. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 134.

## CHAPTER III

### CONCLUSION

#### SECTION I - UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD GUATEMALA

During the period 1970 to 1976, the United States (under President Nixon and President Ford) made no attempt to influence political change in Guatemala. Total economic assistance, during the period 1970 to 1976, exceeded \$140 million, a 33 percent increase over the previous eight years and security assistance deliveries were almost double the total for the previous ten years. (1) In spite of the fact that the U.S. had pressured Guatemala to hold elections in 1966, and the external and internal variables that contributed to this degree of U.S. influence had not changed, economic and security assistance in the early 1970's was provided without regard to events in Guatemala. The lack of interest in events in Guatemala during the Nixon Administration was due to an almost total preoccupation with Viet Nam and Watergate. During the Ford Administration, the U.S. Congress became more sensitive about providing military support to repressive regimes that violated the human rights of its citizens. The Ford Administration, however, influenced by events in Viet Nam and Cambodia, ignored

Congressional legislation that established adherence to human rights as a precondition for receipt of U.S. security assistance. Instead, emphasis was placed on defeating the communist insurgency in Guatemala, not on Guatemalan human rights violations, or the social and economic deprivation that fostered revolution. As a result, the military elite consolidated its power and control of the Guatemalan political structure.

President Carter established compliance with human rights and political moderation and democratic reform as conditions for friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States. The Carter Administration denied security assistance to Guatemala as a method to weaken the resolve of the military regime to resist U.S. pressure for reform. President Carter's attempt to force change in Guatemala failed in the short term. The inability of the Carter Administration to tie friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States to principles of political moderation and democratic reform, and to influence Guatemalan decision makers to adhere to these principles, was due to adverse perceptions of external variables. The Carter Administration's international policies were rejected by the Guatemalan elite. The fall of Somoza and the establishment of a Marxist government in Nicaragua, and the fact that a

communist insurgency was on the threshold of victory in El Salvador, caused the Guatemalan elite to reject Carter's Central American foreign policy and to adopt a siege mentality. Concurrently, Guatemalan internal variables prohibited political moderation and democratic reform. Because there were no moderate interest groups strong enough to challenge the military and because there was no one in the regime willing to listen to Carter or to yield to U.S. pressure for reform, Carter's attempt to force change was unsuccessful. Guatemalan internal security was also a limiting variable. A new and much more intense communist insurgency was growing in Guatemala. The appeal of the new insurgency, led by the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), was broadened by the success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, increased criticism of the Guatemalan government by international organizations, U.S. emphasis on human rights, and the renouncement of the Guatemalan government by the Carter Administration. The economic variable also worked to frustrate Carter's efforts. The tremendous growth in the Guatemalan economy and favorable economic projections enabled the decision makers to reject Carter's conditions for continued security assistance. The psychological impact of the termination of security assistance was strong; however, the economic impact was sharply reduced and very much delayed by the Carter Administration's decision to

continue U.S. economic aid and allow previously approved security assistance to be delivered to Guatemala. Finally, the political structure, which was controlled by the military elite could not be penetrated. Instead of adopting policies of political moderation and democratic reform, the Guatemalan elite became more independent of the United States and more repressive of the Guatemalan people.

Constrained from providing security assistance by an unwilling Congress, the Reagan Administration was forced to continue Carter's policy toward Guatemala. There were significant differences, however, between the Carter and Reagan approaches to Guatemala. The Reagan Administration was staunchly anti-communist. Reagan's policies toward Guatemala and Central America reflected a strong desire to defeat communist insurgencies and reduce Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. The Reagan policies served to change the perception of Guatemalan decision makers concerning external variables. But the influence gained from mutual anti-communist policies and increased U.S. military presence in Central America was insufficient for the Reagan Administration to effect political change in Guatemala. Romeo Lucas Garcia continued to resist conditions for friendly relations with the United States, the implementation of policies of political moderation and

democratic reform. In fact, relations between the Lucas regime and the Reagan Administration (inspite of Reagan's anti-communist approach) deteriorated until they were no better than during the Carter Administration. There were, however, significant changes in two internal variables in the Guatemalan operational environment that would result in the overthrow of Lucas and lessen antagonistic relations between Guatemalan decision makers and the Reagan Administration. The first change was the rise of the young military officers reform movement. The second change in the internal variables was the economic crisis that developed during the 1979 and 1980 world wide economic recession. During the Montt regime, the Reagan Administration would also witness a change in another internal variable, internal security, that would enable Guatemalan decision makers to implement limited policies of political moderation and democratic reform. In so doing, Guatemalan decision makers improved relations between Guatemala and the United States. The Guatemalan political structure, however, remained unchanged. Inspite of the election of a civilian president, power in Guatemala continued to rest in the hands of the military elite.

## SECTION II - THE VARIABLES

This historical analysis of events in Guatemala, during the period 1970 to 1985, indicates that there were variables that effected Guatemalan decision makers concerning their relations with the United States. The variables are dependent variables and all exerted pressure on the Guatemalan decision makers.

Events in Guatemala, during the period 1970 to 1985, indicate that Guatemalan interaction within the international community is an important variable in determining Guatemalan and U.S. relations. Throughout the period 1970 to 1985, Guatemalan foreign policy has been decidedly western oriented and anti-communist. Because of Guatemala's strong orientation to the West, coupled with an extreme fear and hatred of communism, it is a natural assumption that because the United States is the leader of the West, Guatemalan and U.S. relations would be great throughout the period. This is not the case. United States foreign policy was oriented similar to the Guatemalan view point during the period 1970 to 1976. Relations between Guatemala and the United States during the period were in fact good. During the period 1976 to 1980, however, U.S. foreign policy was not oriented on a strictly East verses

West approach. During the Carter Administration, the United States recognized the international non-alignment movement and even became tolerant of Marxist states that were not in the Soviet orbit. United States foreign policy operated under the premise that the existence of a communist state, in and of itself, did not necessarily pose a threat to western interest. An historical analysis of the period indicates that Guatemalan decision makers felt threatened by U.S. foreign policy under the Carter Administration. Moreover, the Guatemalan decision makers became distrustful and suspicious of U.S. motives, eventually leading to a deterioration of relations between the two nations. During the period 1980 to 1985, the Reagan Administration returned U.S. foreign policy to the traditional East verses West approach. The effect of the Regan foreign policy on the Lucas government was almost immediate. The Lucas regime expected relations between Guatemala and the United States to improve. This single variable, however, was insufficient to result in improved relations, especially since the Reagan Administration continued to insist upon political moderation and democratic reform in Guatemala. The historical analysis supports the hypothesis, however, that relations between Guatemala and the United States are normally best, and U.S. influence in Guatemala is enhanced during periods when both

countries exhibit a western oriented, anti-communist foreign policy in the world community.

The external variable, regional stability, is also an important concern of Guatemalan decision makers. Guatemalan decision makers attribute the social and political problems of Guatemala to a communist insurgency, similar to the insurgency in El Salvador, inspired by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua. For this reason, Guatemala is keenly interested in events in Central America, especially, events in those countries with contiguous borders with Guatemala. During the period 1970 to 1976, few events in Central America threatened regional security. The period 1976 to 1980, however, was a period of crisis to Guatemalan decision makers. Cuba was actively supporting revolutionary movements throughout Central America, and the United States, due to human rights considerations, was reducing support for anti-communist countries. In 1977, U.S. security assistance to Guatemala and El Salvador was suspended and security assistance to Nicaragua was greatly reduced. Guatemalan decision makers blamed the Carter Administration and U.S. foreign policy for the crisis in Central America. The defeat of Somoza, and the rise of a Marxist government in Nicaragua in 1979, and U.S. support to the Sandinista regime, caused a severe disturbance to the

Guatemalan concept of regional stability. Likewise, the growing communist insurgency in El Salvador in 1979 was a critical concern. If the insurgency in El Salvador succeeded, Guatemala would be confronted with a hostile communist state on its southern border. Many political scientists have stressed the belief that the Guatemalan decision makers think of the Salvadoran civil war as their own civil war. (2) Guatemalan decision makers were concerned about events in Belize for similar reasons. Belize, under Prime Minister George Price, was courting Cuban support of the country's bid for independence. This presented Guatemalan decision makers with another possibility of a Marxist oriented country on Guatemala's border. Because of the growing communist influence in Central America, which was perceived as a direct threat to Guatemala, Guatemalan decision makers adopted a siege mentality. Guatemalan decision makers rejected U.S. conditions for friendly relations and thereby reduced the ability of the United States to influence events in Guatemala. In fact, Guatemalan decision makers became more repressive and reacted more violently to internal opposition because of their siege mentality.

During the 1980's, conditions in Central America changed. Under the Reagan Administration, the United States

actively supported El Salvador's counterinsurgency and the guerrilla's "final offensive" of 1981 was defeated. A conservative Prime Minister, Manual George Esquivel, was elected in the independent state of Belize. Esquivel immediately called for close ties to the United States. More importantly, the United States was very active in the entire region, to include limited moral and political support for Guatemala. During the period 1980 to 1985, there was a shift toward a degree of political moderation and democratic reform. This shift in policy, although not entirely due to the variable of regional stability, as demonstrated in this historical analysis, could not have occurred during a period of crisis in the region.

Democratic reforms and adherence to human rights, from a Guatemalan perspective, required risk to the internal security and the status quo. The stability of Central America is an important factor in policy decisions involving relations with the United States. If the region is unstable, as it was during the Carter Administration, the risk of initiating policies of political moderation and democratic reform was too great. Conversely, regional stability would be a factor that would enhance the ability of the United States to influence Guatemalan decision makers

to risk such policies, as was the case during the Reagan Administration.

Interest groups represent an important internal variable that effected Guatemalan decision makers in their relations with the United States. The most powerful interest group was the military elite. The military elite rejected the Carter Administration's conditions for friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States. Realizing that their efforts to influence the military elite to initiate policies of political moderation and democratic reform, the Carter Administration tried to identify and support possible opposition groups. The Carter Administration provided both direct and indirect assistance to moderate opposition groups. (3) U.S. support of opposition to the military elite in Guatemala was perceived by the authoritarian government as an external threat. Consequently, the middle class and other interest groups were targeted for annihilation. Labor unions were attacked; political parties were disbanded; teachers, clerics, and other critics were silenced. During the period May 1978 to May 1979, 9 union leaders disappeared, 311 postal workers were arrested, the national nurses' union was decertified and made illegal, Alberto Fuentes Mohr (the Socialist Democratic Party leader) and Manuel Colom Argueta (the only

politician capable of opposing the military in the 1982 election) were assassinated, and hundreds of others were similarly eliminated. (4) These tactics insured control of the political process by the military elite. The Carter Administration could find no moderate interest groups that were capable of challenging the military elite. The situation in Guatemala was similar to the situation in Nicaragua. The only force that was capable of challenging the military elite was the communist insurgents.

During the 1980's, there was a significant change in Guatemalan interest groups. Young reform minded military officers joined other interest groups (such as the middle class, labor unions, students, and reform minded persons in the civilian and military elite) in demanding change. The young officers were motivated by a genuine interest in political moderation and democratic reform. The young officers were charged with primary responsibility for conducting counterinsurgency operations. Casualties among the young officer corps were very high, moreover, the reform minded officers realized that the government's strategy of dealing with the guerrillas was counterproductive. Additionally, military operations were severely limited due to the cut off of U.S. security assistance and the tapering off of previously approved security assistance deliveries.

The young reform minded officers believed that the benefits of obtaining U.S. security assistance outweighed the cost in terms of political and social reforms demanded by the United States, as a precondition for friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States. The corruption and exploitation of the people, by senior officers, added to the resentment the junior officers had toward the senior military elite. The military reformists represented a moderate interest group capable of challenging the senior military elite. The power of the military reform movement can best be measured by the success of the 1982 coup that removed Lucas from power, and the 1983 coup that removed Montt from power. The rise of the young officer reform movement exerted strong pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to initiate policies that would result in improved relations with the United States, thus contributing to the ability for the United States to influence events in Guatemala.

The internal security of Guatemala is also an important variable in determining the attitudes of Guatemalan decision makers toward relations with the United States. The Guatemalan military, a small force of approximately 22 thousand, was oriented toward counterinsurgency warfare. The Guatemalan military was a

well trained, highly motivated force. During the period 1970 to 1985, the military (augmented by approximately 12,000 paramilitary forces) was faced with several periods of intense guerrilla fighting. The military lacked the equipment and mobility necessary to totally defeat the insurgency. The military situation in Guatemala became more critical after 1972 because the Guerrilla Army of the Poor evidenced a more sophisticated form of guerrilla warfare. According to the essay, "U.S. Security on the Southern Flank: Interest, Challenges, Responses," by Robert Kennedy and Gabriel Marcella, the strategy of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor contained four elements. These elements included: prolonged popular warfare, popular front organizations, internationalization of the conflict, and maintenance of external support. (5) The inability of the Guatemalan military to totally defeat the insurgency resulted in a stalemate. As this historical analysis has shown, the stalemate was punctuated by alternating periods of intense, violent, guerrilla activity, accompanied by equally violent government counterinsurgency operations. These periods of extreme violence were followed by periods of guerrilla recruitment, consolidation, and mobilization; and intense government repression of the general population. Guerrilla activity and government counterinsurgency operations were at a high level during the period 1966 to 1968, 1970 to 1973,

and 1977 to 1982. Each period of conflict was longer and more violent than the preceding period of conflict.

The Guatemalan elite was unwilling to accept U.S. conditions of political moderation and democratic reform, as a basis of friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States during periods of guerrilla activity and government counterinsurgency operations. Rios Montt's defeat of the guerrillas in 1982, however, enabled Mejia Victores to initiate reform policies. The variable of internal security appears, then, to exert a negative influence on Guatemalan decision makers to initiate policies of political and social reform during periods of intense violence. The lower the level of violence, due to guerrilla activity and government counterinsurgency operations, the higher the probability that Guatemalan decision makers will become more receptive to U.S. influence and take steps to improve relations with the United States.

The economic variable was also important in determining the extent of influence the U.S. might exert over Guatemala and, relations between the two nations, during the period 1970 to 1985. President Carter was unable to influence Guatemalan decision makers to initiate policies of political moderation and democratic reform by terminating

U.S. security assistance. This was due impart to the counterproductive aspects of Carter's policy toward Guatemala, the continuation of deliveries of previously approved security assistance, and the decision to continue economic assistance. The most important economic reason for the inability of the Carter Administration to force change in Guatemala was the strength of the Guatemalan economy.

The economic variable in 1977, which limited U.S. influence and, prohibited the success of Carter's attempts to tie friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States to political and social reform, changed considerably by 1982. Beginning in 1979, the Guatemalan economy steadily declined. During the period 1978 to 1979, there were sharp declines in commodity prices. Higher oil prices, during the 1979 to 1980 time frame, crippled the Guatemalan economy. The percent of real GDP increase fell from 7.8 percent in 1977 to a negative 3.5 percent in 1982. The external debt grew from \$512.2 million in 1978 to more than \$1 billion in 1982 and international loans were extremely difficult to obtain. (6) The gold and foreign exchange reserve declined from \$730 million in 1977 to \$297 million in 1982. The year 1977 was the last year that Guatemala experienced a favorable balance of trade. Increasing intensity in communist insurgencies in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and

Guatemala led to investor uncertainty in the region and a sharp decline in foreign investment in Guatemala. The communist threat to the social and economic order in Guatemala resulted in massive capital flight. The landed oligarchies, manufacturers, merchants, and financiers had transferred more than \$2 billion out of Guatemala by 1979, which contributed to the ruin of the economy. (7) Additionally, U.S. economic assistance was sharply reduced during the 1978 to 1982 time frame. In 1983, U.S. economic assistance was terminated. By 1982, the economic conditions exerted great pressure on decision makers, indeed on all Guatemalan interest groups and competing elites, for economic change. The Guatemalan elite (the landed oligarchies, industrialists, and wealthy businessmen) could no longer afford the economic cost associated with strained relations with the United States and the loss of security assistance. Because of the economic and political crisis, the high national debt, and debt payment problems, the only source of economic assistance was bilateral aid from the United States. Thus by 1982, the economic variable exerted pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to improve relations with the United States and made them more receptive to U.S. influence. To improve relations with the United States, Guatemalan decision makers had to consider U.S. pressure to

initiate policies of political moderation and democratic reform.

This historical analysis indicates that a strong economy in Guatemala promotes a desire for independence from United States political influence. Conversely, a weak economy creates an economic dependence on the United States, and results in increased U.S. influence and a willingness on the part of Guatemalan decision makers to initiate policies that will promote friendly relations between Guatemala and the United States.

The political structure in Guatemala is a limiting factor in relations between Guatemala and the United States. The historical analysis of the period 1970 to 1985 indicates that there has been no change in this variable. Indeed, during the past thirty years, U.S. pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to return the country to democracy has resulted in two feeble attempts at real democracy. The first was in 1966 with the election of Julio Mendez Montenegro, a candidate of the Revolutionary Party. In order to assume office, however, Mendez was forced to make certain concessions to the military. Mendez was forced to agree to not interfere with the military or investigate it. He was to relinquish control of the internal security force

to the military, and he was to name military officers to the to key government posts. The first attempt at democracy failed because the military never relinquished control of the political structure and the United States did not object to the military's involvement. Most political and social scientists believe that the political structure and the political deprivation of the Guatemalan people is so much a part of the Guatemalan society that peaceful change is unlikely.

The goal of the 1982 coup, political moderation and democratic reform, was not obtained because Montt continued to emphasize the policies of the military elite, which was the defeat of the insurgents. The replacement of Lucas with Montt did little to change the Guatemalan political structure. It was a changing of the guard. Montt replaced key positions in the Guatemalan government, held by Lucas followers, with officials and senior officers loyal to Montt. The military elite maintained control of the government. This elite would not permit policies of political moderation and democratic reform while the social order and political stability were threatened by a communist insurgency, regardless of the sanctions and economic consequences imposed by the United States.

The rise of General Mejia Victores from Minister of Defense to President represented the normal progression of a member of the military elite. The coup in 1983 did not change the Guatemalan political structure. The absence of a strong communist insurgency allowed the Mejia Victores regime to initiate a degree of political moderation and democratic reform. His insistence upon keeping power (not allowing an interim civilian government pending the 1985 elections) and reserving the traditional powers for the military in the new Constitution, drafted in 1985, demonstrates the military elites' commitment to military control of the Guatemalan political structure. In spite of this, the election of a civilian government in 1985 suggests that a modicum of political moderation and democratic reform may have been achieved in Guatemala.

The election of Vincio Cerezo Arevalo, the leader of the moderate Christian Democratic Party (DC) in the 1985 Presidential election, was the second attempt at democracy in Guatemala. Cerezo, a long time critic of the military, was inaugurated on 15 January 1986. Elected to a five year term, Cerezo, was the first civilian president in 16 years, the third in 40 years. However, Cerezo's election has to date not constituted a change to the political structure. Cerezo's position is not unlike that of Mendez in 1966. The

new Constitution safeguards the military elites' supremacy in the government. Cerezo acknowledged the difficulty of his task on the eve of his election, "... in the first six months I'll have 30 percent of the power, in the first two years I'll never have 50 percent, and I'll have more than 70 percent of the power during my five year term." (8) The limitations on Cerezo were demonstrated during his first month in office. Cerezo announced that the Guatemalan Secret Police (responsible for much of the right wing terror campaigns) would be disbanded, however, Cerezo did not attempt to restrict or sanction any element of the military. (9) Economic, political, and social reforms will be difficult to accomplish, even for Cerezo. It must be recognized that the military elite have the most to lose (power and wealth) in a democratic government.

The Guatemalan political structure has been a source of antagonism in relations between Guatemalan decision makers and the United States. The current political structure exerts tremendous pressure on decision makers to resist reform. Failure of the United States to continue to insist on change to the current political structure will be a repeat of the mistake made by the United States in 1966, concerning the Mendez government.

Real democracy can not be obtained in Guatemala without a change in the political structure. The success of the Cerezo government and the ability of the United States to influence change in the political structure will much depend upon U.S. policy toward Guatemala. The United States should resist the temptation to reward recent Guatemalan efforts toward political moderation and democratic reform with large amounts of economic and military assistance. The U.S. response should be measured and designed to promote continued reform, especially in the political structure. U.S. policy should be designed to enhance conditions in external and internal variables that exert pressure on Guatemalan decision makers to adopt additional policies of political moderation and democratic reform.

### SECTION III - RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY

There are limitations on the conclusions derived at from an historical analysis of the effects of variables on Guatemalan decision makers, concerning their relations with the United States. These limitations would be reduced, however, in an empirical study. The information and data necessary to conduct an empirical examination of the effect of the economy on Guatemalan decision makers, concerning their relations with the United States, is available;

however, it has not been collected and analyzed. Additionally, there is a void of empirical data necessary to measure the other variables and concepts discussed in the thesis. For example, there is little information on the population and composition of Guatemalan interest groups. There is a void of information, such as the number of insurgents, the amount of financial and logistical support received by the insurgents from foreign sources, or even casualty figures, to measure the level of threat to Guatemalan internal security. It is even difficult to measure the level of state sponsored political violence and the level of violence due to communist terrorist due to the absence of empirical data. This fact makes it difficult to measure the degree of political moderation obtained in Guatemala during specific periods. Finally, the lack of detailed voting information, other than gross figures, makes it difficult to measure the degree of democratic reform in Guatemala. The collection and analysis of data necessary to conduct an empirical analysis of the identified variables and their effect on Guatemalan decision makers concerning their relations with the United States and the ability of the United States to influence events in Guatemala is recommended as an area for further study.

#### SECTION IV - END NOTES

1. Martin Diskin, Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, (Panteon Books, 1983), p. 189.

2. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 58.

3. Richard R. Fagan and Olga Pellicer, The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico, (Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 197.

4. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 239.

5. James R. Green and Brent Scowcroft, Western Interest and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin: Report of the Atlantic Councils Working Group on the Caribbean Basin, (Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1984), p. 205.

6. Steve C. Ropp and James A. Morris, Central America: Crisis and Adaptation, (University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 148.

7. Ibid., p. 278.

8. Time Magazine, November 18, 1985, "Guatemala, the 70% Solution, Opting for Democracy - and Aid," by Hunter R. Clark, p. 60.

9. Kansas City Times, Associated Press Report, 6 February 1986.

APPENDIX A

## APPENDIX A

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

#### SECTION I - TWO VIEW POINTS

Liberal organizations, such as the America's Watch and Amnesty International, and many church organizations are commissioning liberal and leftist historians, social scientists, and political scientists to produce factual articles and papers that oppose U.S. foreign policy. Literature opposing U.S. security assistance in Guatemala usually addresses four main arguments. First, U.S. security assistance, which is usually in the form of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), is nothing more than economic exploitation of Guatemala. Second, U.S. security assistance, as suggested by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, is based upon the Alliance for Progress counterinsurgency model of the 1960's. This model of U.S. economic and military assistance did little to improve the economic and social conditions of the people; the model resulted in increased oppression and exploitation. Third, U.S. security assistance in Guatemala is a continuation of an erroneous and unjust foreign policy. The United States is repeating the mistake made in Viet Nam.

The insurgency in Guatemala is not the result of Soviet and Cuban intervention in Central America. The struggle in Guatemala is a nationalistic struggle of an oppressed people against a corrupt military dictatorship. Fourth, U.S. security assistance will result in increased military oppression of the Guatemalan people. The military in Guatemala is not apolitical, in fact, the military controls the government. A stronger military will tighten controls on the people to ensure the survival of the system. Denied basic human rights, the people will continue to resist, this will result in more violence and oppression by the military. The cycle must be broken by not supporting the military dictatorship.

Much of the available literature concerning the U.S. military strategy of security assistance in Guatemala and the Central American region originates from official U.S. publications and documents, however, there are other sources. Conservative organizations, such as the Tinker Foundation, the George Olmstead Foundation, and the Atlantic Council, commission historians and political scientists to research topics and write articles or papers on subjects such as security assistance. Literature from conservative organizations and official U.S. documents generally support U.S. policies. Literature supporting U.S. security

assistance in Guatemala generally addresses four main arguments. One argument is that the insurgency in Guatemala is a rebellion against poverty, exploitation, and repression. The Soviets and Cubans are taking advantage of the situation to establish another Marxist state in Central America. Failure of the United States to meet the communist challenge will result in a serious threat to the defense of the United States. The threat will consist of possible Soviet bases in Guatemala, and the need for the United States to divert military assets from Europe and elsewhere to a southern defense of the continental United States. A second argument is that U.S. security assistance will demonstrate U.S. commitment to Guatemala and to the whole of Central America. Another reason states that U.S. security assistance will enable Guatemala to contain and subdue the insurgents (without direct U.S. involvement), and will provide time for Guatemala to take steps toward social reform. Finally, U.S. security assistance will increase U.S. influence in Guatemala. The United States can use the influence to push for needed social reform. U.S. security assistance will result in military-to-military relationships between the U.S. and Guatemalan armed forces. The exposure of Guatemalan military officers to U.S. training, doctrine, values, and education may help in reducing military oppression of the Guatemalan people.

## SECTION II - THE LITERATURE

Because much of the literature concerning Central America (and Guatemala) is published by the U.S. government or commissioned by conservative or liberal organizations, much of the literature is extremely biased. This is especially true concerning Guatemala, because of the U.S. role in the overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz Guzman government in 1954, and because of the extreme repression and violation of human rights by subsequent regimes in Guatemala. Examples of biased literature are plentiful. Documents entered into the U.S. Congressional Record can be very biased. In 1983, Congressman Robert Lagomarsino, Congressman Henry Hyde, and Congressman Douglas Bereuter entered into the Congressional Record, and published, a "Report of a Study Mission to Guatemala and El Salvador, February 20-26, 1983, to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives." The report was issued in support of the Reagan Administration's attempt to obtain funding for security assistance to Guatemala and El Salvador. In spite of the fact that the day before their arrival in Guatemala, four Guatemalan citizens (one of whom was working with USAID for the Guatemalan/U.S. Bilingual and Education Project) were kidnapped and most likely killed,

the report was extremely favorable concerning human rights progress in Guatemala. (1) The delegation concluded that reports of mistreatment of Indians, by the military, were unfounded, and the report issued by the delegation criticized Amnesty International's 1982 human rights findings in Guatemala. (2)

Guatemala: A Promise in Peril, written by L. Francis Bouchev and Alberto M. Piedro, is a biased, conservative work, sponsored by the Council for Inter-American Security. More than historical bias is present in the book, there are subtle, derogatory racial inferences concerning the native Indian population of Guatemala. "Fear and Hope: Toward Political Democracy in Central America", by Penny Lernoux, is one of a series of papers commissioned by the liberal Field Foundation. This article is extremely biased, and lacks scholastic value. "Human Rights in Guatemala: No Neutrals Allowed", an Americas Watch Report on human rights violations in Guatemala is an example of less overt bias. The Americas Watch Report, like reports from Amnesty International and many other liberal organizations, ignores the human rights violations, and violence perpetrated by leftist terrorist and guerrilla forces.

Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, edited by Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson, and Nancy Peckenhams, is a much biased account of U.S. involvement in Guatemala. The collection of articles are presented without sufficient references that are necessary to support the views and assertions of the authors. The book is of little scholastic value. The introduction to the book is by Guillermo Toriello, who was Guatemala's ambassador to the United States, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations from June 1952 to June 1954. Mr. Toriello is in exile in Mexico, and is currently Vice President of the Guatemalan Committee of Patriotic Unity, an organization associated with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity is a joint political and military directorate for four guerrilla groups fighting in Guatemala. The Guatemalan Committee of Patriotic Unity was formed to coordinate the international political work of the Guatemalan leftists. Toriello's bias is inescapable. It is difficult to believe his assertion that the barbaric assassination of over ninety thousand people in Guatemala, since 1954 (a figure that, according to Toriello, does not include those people who have disappeared), is directly tied to maintaining favorable economic and political conditions for the United States. (3) This sort of sensational

anti-Americanism permeates throughout the book. The message the editors and contributing authors wish to convey is that the United States has replaced the Spanish conquerors of the region. U.S. economic exploitation of Guatemala has created a system of government that favors a small elite who feed on their own people. To maintain the system, the United States provides military assistance to allow the elite to continue the subjugation of their people.

According to the arguments of this book, the United States is at a cross roads in foreign policy options for Guatemala. The United States is faced with changing its foreign policy direction, because of the revolutionary success of the Nicaraguan people and because of the increased instability in Guatemala. The only realistic option available to the United States, according to the contributors to Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, is to not intervene in the affairs of Guatemala (the course of action favored by most Americans according to the book), and to promote negotiations with the rebels to end the conflict. The editors and contributing authors believe, however, that the United States will continue to cling to an east verses west approach to the conflict in Guatemala. The U.S. Department of State (referred to as "Foggy Bottom" by the editors) will opt to pursue a policy of security

assistance and counterinsurgency programs. This will eventually regionalize the conflict, pitting the military oligarchies of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala against the forces of Nicaragua and Cuba.

The United States and Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American Relations, written by Gordon Connell-Smith, is a critical analysis of U.S. relations with Latin America. Although the scope of the book (which includes the entire history of United States and Latin American relations) is too large for it to be of direct value to the topic of this thesis, the work is important because of the authors critique of U.S. historians. The author claims that his approach to the study of U.S. involvement in the affairs of Latin America is more realistic, and therefore more critical of the United States than are most contemporary U.S. historians. (4) Connell-Smith believes that the view of U.S. historians is tainted with American selfrighteousness. American historians, according to Connell-Smith, have helped to project a self image of the United States concerning U.S. and Latin American relations, and therefore, these authors have helped to shape events in Latin America.

The self image projected by American historians is one that cast U.S. and Latin American relations as different from those normally associated with great state - weak state relationships. The fundamental difference, according to Connell-Smith, is the unique benevolence of U.S. policies. Connell-Smith believes that this false self image of the United States can be maintained by American historians, only by "ignoring or glossing over unpleasant realities". (5) He even accuses liberal and critical historians of fostering the U.S. self image by affirming the "good" or even "noble" intentions when discussing the truth. (6)

Connell-Smith also feels that U.S. historians tend to make false assumptions when studying U.S. and Latin American relations. For example, he believes that most American historians assume that the United States and Latin America share basic economic and political interests. He uses an analysis of the Alliance for Progress to demonstrate the difference in the interests between the United States and Latin America. U.S. interest in Latin America, according to Connell-Smith, is stability; however, Latin American interest is in change. The Alliance for Progress, he says, was designed to insure that change was evolutionary, not revolutionary. The United States believed in an economic development theory, that economic development

would improve the living standards of the people, and thus would produce stability. In reality, however, the Alliance for Progress produced general instability, because there was insufficient distribution of wealth to meet the rising expectations of the people.

Finally, Connell-Smith wants to explode the American myth, which he says is projected by U.S. historians, that the U.S. mission in Latin America is to promote democracy. He accuses the United States of "equating democracy with anti-communism", this in turn is justification for the United States to use security assistance to support cooperative dictators while professing concern for representative government. (7)

The book, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, edited by Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, is an indepth and balanced history and analysis of current institutional and structural causes of instability in Central America and the Caribbean. The basic theme of the book is that U.S. foreign policy toward the region has been, and continues to be, counterproductive. U.S. foreign policy has led to the emergence of military dictatorships that increase the social and economic power of the elite at the expense of the

masses. The editors believe that the United States is currently pursuing a military solution to the social and economic problems in the region. They also believe that this policy is based on the erroneous assumption that the crisis in Central America and the Caribbean is caused by Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan intervention. The book concedes that Soviet and Cuban influence is a destabilizing factor in the region, however, the editors insist that the root cause of the crisis is domestic. They say the United States must stop security assistance and military intervention in the region. The U.S. military strategy will only lead to regional warfare and the possibility of superpower conflict. The editors and contributing authors believe that domestic resistance in the United States, to such a policy, would result in a U.S. withdrawal from the region and a substantial loss of U.S. influence world wide. They believe that United States foreign policy, toward Central America and the Caribbean, should encourage negotiated solutions to the political problems and massive economic aid to help solve the economic problems. The editors and authors of this book are not naive; they recognize, as did the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, that economic development in the region is not feasible under the current crisis situation. Unlike the 1984 Commission, however, this book does not advocate the

use of security assistance and military intervention to insure the survival of governments friendly to the United States. The United States, according to this post Viet Nam revisionist theory, must accept the existence of right wing authoritarian governments, democracies, and Marxist states in the Western Hemisphere.

The principal editor of Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean contributes an article, "Ten Theories in Search of Central American Reality" that is especially note worthy. This article by Schulz provides important insight on how politicians and intellectuals formulate proposed U.S. foreign policy toward the region. For example, Schulz believes the Reagan Administration's military strategy in Central America is a policy driven by the domino theory. The Reagan Administration argues that the current crisis in El Salvador and Guatemala is the result of Cuban and Soviet intervention. The communists were successful in Nicaragua, and communist efforts are now directed at El Salvador. The Reagan Administration claims that should El Salvador fall, Guatemala would be next, then Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama, and even Mexico. (8) Schulz believes that this argument is not without a basis of fact. He criticizes scholars that attempt to discredit the Reagan

Administration's foreign policy, by minimizing or denying foreign communist intervention in the insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala. Schulz cites many examples of proof of foreign communist complicity, however, he realizes that it is an emotional issue. He states, "... to those with a psychological investment in disbelief, reason and evidence and irrelevant". (9) Notwithstanding this, Schulz also believes that the real domino effect may be the realization on the part of the Salvadorans and Guatemalans that, as proven by Nicaragua, it is possible to defeat the repression of authoritarian governments. (10)

Schulz sees the Reagan Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative as a policy formulated from a theory of economic development; the same theory that spawned the Alliance for Progress in 1960. (11) The economic development theory assumes that large amounts of U.S. economic aid will result in economic development and increased Gross National Product (GNP). This increase in wealth will benefit the entire population (the "trickle down" effect) by the creation of employment and higher wages. Schulz rejects the validity of this theory because "it fails to take into account the fundamentally exploitative nature of the socioeconomic and political structure of the region". (12)

Another widely held economic theory, the economic dependency theory, is discussed by Gordon L. Bowen in his article, "Guatemala: The Origins and Development of State Terrorism". This theory postulates that the development of export crops in Central America led to the development of a landowner elite that was dependent upon overseas markets. The native masses were exploited as a source of labor. An interrelated dependency developed; the traditional oligarchy depended upon foreign markets for their export crops, and native Indians and the poor ladinos for their labor force. The campesinos, because they were systematically denied land, were dependent upon the land owners for subsistent wages. Foreign corporations depended upon the exploitative system in Central America for large profits; therefore, it was necessary for the system to survive. Resistance to exploitation by Indians and ladinos, and their demands for land reform, has resulted in government repression. According to Bowen, many scholars, who believe in the dependency theory, argue that human rights violations are a prerequisite for multi-national corporate advantage in the region. (13) Bowen believes that conditions in Guatemala support the economic dependency theory. During the 1970's, peasant land holding in Guatemala decreased by 26 percent and the area devoted to export agriculture increased by 45

percent. During the same period there was an increase in guerrilla activity and government human rights violation. (14)

Related to the economic development theory is the psychoeconomic theory. This theory is sometimes referred to as the frustration - aggression theory. Supporters of this theory believe that programs such as the Alliance for Progress and the Caribbean Basin Initiative do, in fact, have an impact on the Central American economies. The economic development of these countries has created a new middle class. This growing class of people aspire to gain political influence and maintain their share of the countries wealth. The middle class established labor unions, rural cooperatives, and opposition political parties to gain and protect their influence in the Central American economies. If this class of people were economically and politically successful, there was little opposition to the government. If the middle class failed to meet their expectations, opposition to the government was wide spread. Schulz supports this theory with an analysis of average wages for workers employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, services, and agriculture in each of the five Central American countries (Belize is not considered). (15) In Costa Rica and Honduras the average

wage increased during the period 1963-1978. In Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (the countries experiencing guerrilla war and other opposition to the government) the average wage declined.

From Gunboats to Diplomacy: New Policies for Latin America, edited by Richard Newfarmer is a collection of case studies of U.S. relations with countries in the Western Hemisphere. Guatemala is one of ten countries studied in this book. The contributing authors all support and indorse a U.S. policy of multi-polarity with respect to U.S. strategic assumptions concerning the Western Hemisphere, economic assumptions, ideological and political assumptions. A detailed analysis of the Reagan approach to the region (which is markedly bilateral rather than multilateral) is provided. The book criticizes the Reagan Administration's overall performance in the region. It credits the Reagan Administration for the Caribbean Basin Initiative, efforts to resist trade protection against Latin American exports to the United States, and support of the International Monetary Fund. Credit is also given to the Reagan Administration's vocal and real support for the democratic forces at work in Latin America, however, the book makes it clear that this support is not consistently applied. The book suggests that U.S. support for Guatemala and El Salvador should be

discontinued. The United States, according to the thesis of the book, should seek a political solution to the crisis in Central America not a military solution and should vigorously support the peace initiatives of the Contadora Group (Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and Columbia). The United States should accept different (to include communism) forms of government in the Western Hemisphere; however, the United States should not compromise on issues truly vital to the United States, such as Soviet troops, bases, or strategic weapons in the region.

Richard R. Fagen and Olga Pellicer, editors of The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico, present a collection of papers that analyze U.S. and Mexican involvement in Central America, current policies of the two "regional powers" toward Central America, and the implication of the policies toward U.S. and Mexican relations. Special attention is given to Guatemala in this book because of the importance placed on Guatemala by the United States and Mexico. Additionally, the editors state in their introduction that emphasis was placed on Guatemala because the Guatemalan crisis has received little attention from the academic community. The editors conclude that Guatemala "... is the most poorly understood and potentially

far reaching of all the situations of insurgency in the area". (16)

Furthermore as Piero Gleijeses, in his essay "Guatemala: Crisis and Response", and Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, in his essay "Mexico and the Guatemalan Crisis", make clear the problems raised by the Guatemalan crisis are important to the United States and Mexico in different ways. Guatemala is important to the United States because of the country's strategic location (bordering the Mexican oil region), and economic development (the most economically developed country in Central America). Guatemala is a special problem to the United States because the ruling elites of Guatemala have frustrated U.S. attempts to introduce political moderation into Guatemalan politics. Guatemala presents a unique problem to Mexican foreign policy. Mexico has, during the 1970's and 1980's, withdrawn its support for authoritarian governments in Latin America. Mexico was an outspoken critic of the Somoza regime and provided political and economic assistance to the Sandinistas. Mexico supports the guerrilla movement in El Salvador. Mexico remains quiet, however, concerning the insurgency in Guatemala. Zinser suggests, that while Mexico is prepared to accept Marxist governments in other Central American countries, Mexico may find it difficult to have a

communist country on it's southern border. Moreover, Mexican foreign policy toward Guatemala is a cautious one due to the hostility of the Guatemalan military toward the liberal policies of Mexico and due to U.S. pressure.

The contributing authors and editors conclude that in spite of massive repression of the population in Guatemala by the authoritarian elite, social change in Guatemala is inevitable. U.S. policies in Guatemala will force Mexico to increase military forces along the Mexican-Guatemalan border. The insurgency in Guatemala, and Guatemalan incursions into Mexico could threaten the political stability of Mexico. The association of the United States with the oligarchy and military in Guatemala to protect U.S. interest (by insuring stability via the status quo) will work against the United States in the long run. The continuation of the current U.S. policy in Guatemala, according to this book, will result in the eventual evolution of a totally anti-American regime with strong political and economic ties to the Soviet Union.

Central America: Crisis and Adaptation, edited by Steve C. Ropp and James A. Morris, is an important source of information for this thesis because the book examines the regional crisis in Central America on an individual state

basis. The examination centers on the reasons for the crisis in each of six countries (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama) and the ability of the governments in these countries to adapt to the crisis. The editors have compiled, from contributing authors, eight chapters that examine circumstances in each of the Central American countries. The methodology (historical-descriptive) is sound and well balanced. This book is important and contributed to this thesis because it provides a comparative analysis of the six Central American countries and postulates several valid conclusions based upon the comparison. The editors make certain points to establish a basis for their study. First, they point out that the crisis in Central America has become internationalized with several external countries and world organizations playing a major role in events in the region. Second, the editors emphasize the importance of regional players such as the United States and Cuba on events in the area. These factors, as well as the ability of the governments of the region to cope with internal pressures, will impact on the success or failure of each regime.

A close examination of each country reveals several important factors that contribute to the crisis. Some of these factors identified by the editors are unique to one or

two countries, others are common to all countries in the region. Based upon an analysis of the factors that contribute to the crisis, Ropp and Morris classify the crisis in each country as a "regime crisis" or "state crisis". A regime crisis is a crisis that involves "the continued survival of the particular system of relations between the main political institutions and actors". (17) More simply, a crisis of the existing government to include the executive, legislative, political parties, the military, and other political and social organizations. A state crisis is a crisis that "involves" the continued survival of the entire structure of dominant-subordinate socioeconomic relationships. (18)

According to Ropp and Morris, crisis exists in a country to the degree that the country fails to adapt to external and internal pressures. In a regime crisis, it is the perpetuation of the existing regime that is in question. Regime crisis exists, according to Ropp and Morris, in Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, and prior to the overthrow of Somoza, in Nicaragua, (a new regime crisis may well be developing in Sandinista Nicaragua). Countries experiencing regime crisis share certain key factors, low social stratification, institutionalized and plural political systems, and apolitical military establishments. (19) In a

state crisis it is the fabric of the current society that is in question. State crisis exists in Guatemala and El Salvador. Factors associated with a state crisis are high social stratification (in Guatemala this stratification is based on race, in El Salvador it is an economic stratification according to the chapter authors), closed and centralized political systems and military commitment to military rule. (20)

The implication of Ropp's and Morris' analysis can be applied to the application of U.S. security assistance. According to the editors, and the chapter authors for Nicaragua and El Salvador, U.S. security assistance perpetuates inflexibility and intransigence. Although Ropp and Morris leave open the possibility that U.S. security assistance, while it enforces short term rigidity in countries like Guatemala and El Salvador, may lead to long term flexibility due to development of more autonomous militaries (this is the approach recommended by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America headed by Henry Kissinger in July 1983). This possibility, however, is not considered likely because of the extreme stratification of the societies of the countries. Ropp and Morris believe that continued revolutions and the eventual success of the revolution in Guatemala and El Salvador are inevitable.

The United States should adopt a specific country as opposed to a regional approach to the crisis in Central America. The current regional approach is aimed at stabilizing all governments friendly to the United States, regardless of their character and prospects for long term survival. This regional approach will have a very negative effect on U.S. influence in the region once the current socioeconomic system is destroyed in Guatemala and El Salvador. Ropp and Morris believe that unqualified U.S. economic and security assistance should be provided to Costa Rica, however, this support should be carefully measured to insure a continued balance between the civil and military elements in the government. They recommend economic and limited security assistance for Panama and Honduras, but believe that security assistance to Guatemala and El Salvador should be discontinued.

Revolution in Central America, edited by the Stanford Central America Action Network, examines the political, economic, and social contributors to the crisis in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The book demonstrates that the five Central American countries (Belize is intentionally omitted from the framework of this book because of its English history and

tradition) share a common experience of neo-colonialism and dependent capitalistic economic development. The countries are, nevertheless, very different politically. The authoritarian governments of Guatemala and El Salvador represent the extreme right. Honduras and Costa Rica, both with civilian governments, are in the political center of the region; and, Marxist Nicaragua is on the left.

Relying on elements of the "economic dependency theory" and "Viet Nam revisionist theory" the book tends to suggest that the crisis in Central America is the result of popular forces (such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua) attempting to redistribute wealth and power in the region pitted against efforts of traditional oligarchies and the United States attempting to maintain the status quo. The editors believe that current U.S. foreign policy toward the region will eventually result in regional conflict. This argument is based upon reoccurring border disputes between Honduras and Nicaragua. The disputes are the result of U.S. sponsored guerrilla attacks aimed at Nicaragua from bases in Honduras. The editors cite U.S. efforts to support authoritarian regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador with security assistance increases tension in the region. Additionally, the region has assured international importance. In addition to the interest of the superpowers,

other countries have chosen sides. Israel, Venezuela, and Taiwan support Guatemala with arms sales and political support. France and Mexico strongly support Nicaragua. These internal and external pressures could result in a disastrous regional conflict.

Revolution in Central America contains several articles that are of importance to this thesis, two articles are of significant importance. The first is "Guatemala, the Coming Danger" by Marlise Simons. In this article Simons suggests that the Reagan Administration may, in fact, have an opportunity to obtain real economic and social reform in Guatemala. She supports this argument with the following points. First, she believes that the Guatemalan elites must recognize that they have to change conditions if they are to survive. If this assumption is true, the Reagan Administration is the best possible ally to assist in the change. Second, she states that "the Guatemalan establishment overestimated how willing the Reagan Administration would be to provide support once it took office". (21) Thus the Reagan Administration has the leverage it needs to insist on economic and social change. Finally, she points out that, unlike the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration has good contacts with the Guatemalan elites. This ability to influence the

decision makers in Guatemala, and the fact that the Reagan Administration can be trusted to be basically conservative will provide the means to achieve change in Guatemala. Although Simons believes that it is possible for the Reagan Administration to effect socioeconomic changes in Guatemala, she did not believe change to be likely because of the numerous forces against change. Simons' comments on the inability to establish a moderate political force as a reason for her skepticism. Simons' article was written in 1981, it is interesting to note that Vinicio Cerezo was declared the elected President of Guatemala in December 1985. She states: "...the Reagan Administration has quietly started to encourage Christian Democratic leader Vinicio Cerezo to run party candidates, [in the March 1982 elections], yet Cerezo himself receives frequent death threats and has narrowly escaped three assassination attempts ... Washington has done nothing to help create conditions that would make Christian Democratic participation more than an act of political and actual suicide." (22)

The second article that is significant to this thesis is "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions" by Lars Schoultz. In this article, first

published in "Comparative Politics" in 1981, Schoultz examines the relationship between U.S. economic and military assistance to Latin American countries and the human rights records of these countries. Schoultz's methodology included obtaining a measurement of human rights performance for each country and the level of U.S. economic and military assistance provided to each country. Schoultz obtained his measurement of human rights performance for each country by applying a numerical value to each country based upon a questionnaire completed for calendar year 1976 by 91 human rights experts. (23) The results of Schoultz's research were plotted on several scatter charts. The mean evaluation of the level of human rights violations for each country evaluated was the dependent variable; the independent variable was the level of U.S. foreign assistance to the countries obtained from U.S. records. (24)

Schoultz's data indicates that U.S. aid to Latin American countries has tended to favor governments that violate the human rights of their citizens. Schoultz's conclusion includes three points. First, that U.S. foreign assistance during the 1970's was distributed disproportionately to countries with poor human rights records. Second, that his data reflected a pattern, not merely a few isolated cases. Third, that although the

situation improved in a few cases under the Carter Administration, the data does not support the idea that U.S. foreign assistance during the Carter Administration was based solely on the issue of human rights.

The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region is a collection of works that examine U.S. policy in the Caribbean Basin, with case studies of U.S. policy toward Cuba, El Salvador, Mexico, and Jamaica. This book is applicable to this thesis because it concentrates on the policies of the Reagan Administration toward the Caribbean Basin. Additionally, Josefina Cintron Tiryakian contributes an article, "The Military and Security Dimensions of U.S. Caribbean Policy" that impacts directly on the subject of this thesis. The editor, H. Michael Erisman contributes a chapter, "Contemporary Challenges Confronting U.S. Caribbean Policy", that discusses major challenges to U.S. policy in the region, the Reagan Administration's response to the challenges, and an evaluation of the Reagan response with respect to the long term interest of the United States. Erisman invisions three distinct challenges to U.S. Caribbean policy. The first is a developmental challenge. The region is in an economic crisis due to high energy costs, debt payments, falling prices for the regions export crops, and inflation. Moreover, the greater part of the

population is excluded from sharing in existing wealth. The second challenge is a growing regional nationalism fed by strong anti-American sentiment. The final challenge is from a growing number of insurgencies. What was once isolated guerrilla movements are becoming organized, unified, popular movements. The insurgents not only enjoy broad popular support, they are receiving support from the church and international assistance from countries such as Mexico and France. Erisman characterizes the policies of the Reagan Administration as cold war policies. He criticizes the Reagan Administration for not comprehending the real crisis in the region. The Reagan response to the developmental challenge, according to Erisman, is the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Erisman says this program is doomed to failure because it does not provide enough economic assistance. The major economic element in the program is one way free trade, however, Erisman points out that 87 percent of all Caribbean exports entered the U.S. market duty free before the initiative. Erisman believes that the security assistance element of the Caribbean Basin Initiative is counterproductive because it will reenforce the power base of the traditional oligarchies. Moreover, the program relies on a trickle down effect to assist the masses. In the Caribbean, according to Erisman, the greed of the oligarchy is so great that there is no trickle down effect.

The wealth in the Caribbean must be redistributed. Erisman supports the New International Economic Order (NIEO) initiative developed by the Third World as the answer for Latin American development. Erisman believes that the Reagan Administration has confused the growing nationalism in the region with an idea of outside agitation and intervention. The Reagan Administration's "surrogate thesis" will, says Erisman, lead to the kind of political disaster experienced by the United States in Viet Nam. The same analysis holds true for the Reagan Administration's response to the insurgency challenge. The tendency of the Reagan Administration to expand security assistance to the Caribbean region, according to Erisman, is clear. What is not clear is the real motive. The Reagan Administration states that the security assistance is necessary to buy time in order to effect socioeconomic change. Erisman, however, believes the real motive to be a complete military victory for government forces in El Salvador and Guatemala. To Erisman this is an impossible task, a course of action that will lead to regional conflict.

Josefina Cintron Tiryakian supports Erisman's conclusion in her contribution, "The Military and Security Dimensions of Caribbean Policy". Tiryakian describes the Reagan Administration's policy toward the Caribbean as a

militarist policy. The organization of the U.S. Forces Caribbean Command is proof to Tiryakian that the Reagan Administration is determined to obtain a military resolution to the regional crisis. Additionally, the Reagan Administration has refused to pursue the Contadora Group's peace initiatives and has relied on security assistance as the principle foreign policy tool. The Reagan Administration's militaristic approach to the Caribbean is the principle difference between Reagan and Carter. Tiryakian states that the Reagan and Carter Administrations both used security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy. The Carter Administration found security assistance an effective tool to weaken, through denial, military regimes that failed to adhere to human rights. Reagan uses security assistance, according to Tiryakian, to bolster governments supportive of U.S. policies, regardless of their human rights record. (25) According to Tiryakian, the Reagan Administration wants to recapture the arms market that was lost in the 1970's (in the mid-1960's the United States accounted for 40 percent of the total arms sales in the Western Hemisphere, by 1976 the United States was providing 15 percent). (26) Tiryakian states that the Reagan Administration's desire to recapture the arms market is not economically motivated, but rather, it is politically motivated. She states that "establishing a [weapons] supply

relationship constitutes a major decision that entails not only the transfer of equipment, but, more importantly, extensive personnel exchanges". (27) These personnel changes have in the past enabled the United States to acquire considerable influence with decision makers in foreign governments. Tiryakian sees this as the Reagan goal in the Caribbean. A key indicator of superpower influence in a country, according to Tiryakian, is the country's voting behavior at international forums. (28) To demonstrate the effectiveness of arms sales in obtaining influence, Tiryakian points to the case of the Dominican Republic, a major recipient of U.S. arms sales and a consistent supporter of the United States in the United Nations. (29)

The International Crisis in the Caribbean, by Anthony J. Payne presents an analysis of U.S. policy in the Caribbean to include the Central American region during the last two decades. Although Payne does not specifically address U.S. policy in Guatemala, his book is relative to this study because of his analysis and comparison of the Carter Administration's approach to foreign policy with the Reagan Administration's foreign policies. According to Payne two major events, Viet Nam and Watergate, reshaped American thinking. American politics and American foreign

policy were reevaluated, and revised. Jimmy Carter was elected President, and the United States was committed to universal moral values. These values included rejection of the cold war mentality, rejection of interventionist policies in the affairs of other nations, rejection of support for authoritarian governments that violate the human rights of its citizens, and a rejection of the sphere of influence approach to international politics.

The Carter Administration, as Payne sees it, based U.S. foreign policy toward the Caribbean on five principles. The United States would provide significant support for economic development in the Caribbean. The United States has a firm commitment to democracy and human rights. The United States would accept ideological pluralism in the region, to include Marxist governments. The United States would not intervene in the affairs of other countries in the Caribbean and the United States would work toward regional cooperation. (30) These principles, according to Payne, represent the best policy options for the United States toward the Caribbean. The United States must recognize that under this policy there will be a loss of influence; however, this loss of influence does not automatically represent a threat to the U.S. national interest. Payne argues that the United States should remove Latin America

and the Caribbean from the east versus west conflict. To do this the United States should provide economic assistance but not security assistance. Security assistance, according to Payne, is designed to support the status quo, it does not address the basic socioeconomic problems of the region. Payne believes that a liberal policy toward the Caribbean is difficult to initiate and maintain because of the powerful influence of the Pentagon, the armed services, the intelligence services, and other bureaucracies. (31) Because of the influence of these forces, and events such as the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Fall of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, American public opinion demanded a more conservative approach to foreign policy.

According to Payne, the election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 was a return to the cold war era in American foreign policy toward the Caribbean. Payne postulates that the Reagan Administration has based U.S. foreign policy on three principles. First, the United States must reject policies of isolationism and exercise hemispheric leadership. Second, U.S. foreign policy must be designed to contain and eliminate communist governments in the Caribbean. Third, U.S. foreign policy must be designed to limit Soviet economic, political, and military influence in the region. (32) These principles have tended to

militarize the U.S. approach to the region. This has exacerbated the existing tension and conflicts in the region. U.S. influence has not been increased under Reagan Administration policies, according to Payne; rather, the "atmosphere of suspicion and hostility" toward the United States exhibited by the countries in the Caribbean Basin has intensified and U.S. influence has diminished.

Lars Schoultz is a prolific writer on U.S. and Latin American relations. Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy Toward Latin America, was written by Lars Schoultz during the years 1975-1980, the human rights era in U.S. foreign policy. Schoultz presents an excellent study of an emotionally charged issue in an unbiased, factual work. Schoultz attributes the current crisis in Guatemala to events in the 1960's. He feels the Alliance for Progress and the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the United States and Guatemala during the 1960's fostered a cold war mentality that led the traditional oligarchies to view all popular movements as communist inspired. Opposition to the status quo in Guatemala, due to the rising expectations of the new middle class and the inability of the middle class to acquire wealth, was perceived by the authoritarian governments of the 1960's as an external threat. This led to increased repression. The goal of the

traditional power base was to destroy the perceived threat to the existing structure. Consequently, the middle class was targeted for annihilation. Labor unions were attacked, political parties were disbanded, educators, clerics, and other critics were silenced. Unabated repression continued in Guatemala and throughout Central America into the 1970's. In fact, the only force for moderation in the region was the human rights policy of the Carter Administration. According to Schoultz, the fall of the Somoza dynasty, and the U.S. role in forcing Somoza out of Nicaragua, represented a major victory for liberal progressive values in foreign policy. The human rights policies of the Carter Administration had profound effects in Guatemala too. Schoultz believes that the Carter human rights policy helped create opposition to the traditional power base. (33) The Guatemalan government renounced U.S. intervention in Guatemala's domestic affairs and rejected conditional military assistance following publication of a U.S. State Department report on human rights. A hostile U.S. Congress later prohibited Foreign Military Sales to Guatemala.

Schoultz admits that the Carter Administration's withholding of security assistance had profound effects in Guatemala, however, the goal of moderation was not achieved. Faced with the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the

faltering situation in El Salvador, and the termination of U.S. military assistance, the Lucas government in Guatemala adopted a siege mentality. During the Lucas regime the guerrilla war increased in intensity as did government repression. Schoultz's conclusions are in consonance with the findings of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, that economic development, social, and political reform can not take place in the midst of the existing insurgencies. (34) Schoultz states, "in summary it cannot be said that greater respect developed for the physical integrity of the person in much of Latin America during the human rights years of the 1970's". (35) According to Schoultz, violations of citizen's human rights declined when threats to the established structure declined. In Guatemala, the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the strength of the insurgency in El Salvador, and the Carter Administration's cut off of security assistance resulted in the worst period of repression in the country's history. Schoultz states, "the positive correlation between increased threats and increased violations was perfect; there was not a single deviant case". (36)

In his book, Politics in Central America; Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, Thomas P. Anderson presents a very balanced and scholarly analysis of political

events in Central America. Anderson avoids bias, he is not proposing or supporting a theory concerning the socioeconomic and political situation in Central America. Anderson suggests that any analysis of politics in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, or Nicaragua must be performed with the knowledge that the social and economic systems of these countries are corrupt. Additionally, it must be understood that the people in these countries are death oriented. Therefore, Anderson sees political corruption and violence as expressions of social and cultural reality rather than the cause of the political crisis in the region. It is indeed difficult to imagine a culture that views corruption, violence, and murder as the norm, however, this is the context in which Anderson performs his analysis.

Anderson studies the cause and effect of U.S. policy in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua; however, he avoids a critique of the policy. He also provides an analysis of future U.S. policy options in the region. Anderson discusses various carrot and stick approaches to reform the current governmental system. He admits that these options are limited because of the difficulty in curbing death squad activities, extracting the military from politics, and obtaining land reform and other economic

opportunities for the masses at the expense of the landed oligarchies. Another policy option discussed by Anderson is the hands off approach of the Carter Administration. This option, based on the poor human rights record of Guatemala, would let the traditional power base in Guatemala sink or swim on it's own. Anderson does not recommend this option because if the left wins they will consolidate their power with an anti-American policy. This was the method used by Castro in Cuba and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. If the traditional elites continue to hold power the United States will have alienated itself from the power base. In either event, U.S. influence is reduced. Anderson does not include negotiation with the leftist guerrillas as an option in Guatemala. He sees the most realist option for the United States is to ignore human rights violations in the near term, and assist Guatemala in defeating the current insurgency. This option is the most realistic because it recognizes the fact that there is little likelihood that the current governmental system can be reformed while engaged in internal war.

U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980's is a study of the ability of the United States to influence events in ten Latin American countries. These countries include Cuba in the Caribbean region, Mexico, Nicaragua, El

Salvador, and Panama in Central America, and five South American countries. Although Guatemala is not directly considered by the editor, Robert Wesson, or other contributing authors, the book is relevant to this study because the implications of the U.S. ability to influence events in Latin America apply equally to Guatemala. According to Wesson and the contributing authors, U.S. influence in Latin America was at it's greatest at the end of World War II. The ability of the United States to influence events in Latin American countries has steadily declined. This decline was inevitable due to the economic and political development of the Latin American countries; however, Wesson sees the failure of U.S. policy in Viet Nam and numerous changing and unsuccessful policies in Latin America as having hastened the process of decline.

The thesis of the book is that with the exception of security assistance to countries involved in guerrilla wars, the United States has little or no ability to influence events in Latin America. This thesis is supported by the contributing authors in each of the ten countries analyzed in the book. The necessity of the United States to accept the reality of Cuba is the single most important indicator of the loss of U.S. influence in the region. Latin American countries adopt foreign policies designed to counter and

frustrate U.S. foreign policy in the region. The United States has had to make repeated concessions to countries in the Western Hemisphere, such as renouncing all claims to sovereignty over the Quita Sueno Reefs to resolve a dispute with Columbia in 1972 and the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties in 1978. As the Latin American countries assert themselves in the region, U.S. influence declines. In bilateral negotiations with the United States, the Latin American countries drive hard bargains and succeed in protecting their own interest. This is because of the idea accepted by both the Latin Americans and the United States that "the richer power should assist in the development of the poorer". (37) The Latin American countries want more than equal treatment from the United States, and they get it. Wesson discusses the fact that Latin American countries insist that the United States owes it to them to admit their products into the U.S. market duty free, and that prices of various commodities important to the economies of the Latin American countries, such as coffee and sugar, be supported. (38) The Latin American countries, however, do not allow free entry of U.S. products into their protected economies.

Wesson and the contributing authors do point out the importance of U.S. security assistance to Latin American countries, especially those involved in guerrilla wars. In

the case of El Salvador, Thomas P Anderson, in his article "El Salvador: Influence in Trouble," points out the singular importance of security assistance in obtaining U.S. influence. Prior to the current crisis, the United States rarely attempted to influence events in El Salvador. This was because there was little U.S. economic interest in the country, and for this reason, what attempts were made by the United States to influence events in El Salvador were usually unsuccessful. According to Anderson, the ability of the United States to influence events in El Salvador now is greater than ever before because of the guerrilla war that has consumed the country since 1979. (39) This fact has important implications for U.S. policy toward Guatemala, however, caution is warranted. Anderson and the editor point out the limits of security assistance in influencing the events in a country, even a country under siege. In El Salvador in 1980, the United States was providing \$41 million in security assistance and an additional \$61 million was programmed for 1981; however, the United States could not influence the Salvadoran government to investigate the murder of three American nuns and a fourth American missionary woman, who were all believed to have been killed by government security forces. (40) Even in Nicaragua, U.S. use of security assistance as a political tool could not influence Somoza to observe human rights and incorporate

more moderate elements into his government. In fact, Wesson points out that Somoza never did much for the United States in return for support, "he [Somoza] gave economic privileges to Somoza-held enterprises, not generally speaking, to U.S. corporations; and he stiffly resisted efforts to impel him toward more observance of human rights". (41) U.S. influence in Latin America will continue to decline according to Wesson; however, there are interests that are shared by the United States and most Latin American countries, such as political and economic stability. The proper application of security assistance may further attainment of these goals.

### SECTION III - END NOTES

1. United States House of Representatives, "United States Policy Toward Guatemala and El Salvador: Report of a Study Mission to Guatemala and El Salvador, Feb. 20-26, 1983 to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives", (1983): p. 2.

2. Ibid., p. 7.

3. Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson, and Nancy Peckenham, Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, (Grove Press, Inc., 1983), p. xv.

4. Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States and Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American Relations, (Halstead Press, 1974), p. xii.

5. Ibid., p. xiii.

6. Ibid., p. xiii.

7. Ibid., p. 12.

8. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 35.

9. Ibid., p. 37.

10. Ibid., p. 36.

11. Ibid., p. 4.

12. Ibid., p. 9.

13. Ibid., p. 270.

14. Ibid., p. 5.

15. Ibid., p. 17.

16. Richard R. Fagan and Olga Pellicer, The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico, (Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 2.

17. Steve C. Ropp and James A. Morris, Central America: Crisis and Adaptation, (University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 262.

18. Ibid., p. 262.

19. Ibid., p. 264.

20. Ibid., p. 263.

21. Stanford Central America Action Network, Revolution in Central America, (Westview Press, 1983), p. 133.

22. Ibid., p. 132.

23. Ibid., p. 271.

24. Ibid., p. 271.

25. Michael H. Erisman, The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 51.

26. Ibid., p. 66.

27. Ibid., p. 58.

28. Ibid., p. 58.

29. Ibid., p. 59.

30. Anthony J Payne, The International Crisis in the Caribbean, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 44.

31. Ibid., p. 47.

32. Ibid., pp. 51-53.

33. Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America, (Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 363.

34. Ibid., p. 88.

35. Ibid., p. 355.

36. Ibid., p. 356.

37. Robert Wesson, U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980's, (Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 220.

38. Ibid., p. 220.

39. Ibid., p. 167.

40. Ibid., p. 180 and p. 219.

41. Ibid., p. 219.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### SECTION I - BOOKS

- Anderson, Thomas P. Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.
- Brecher, Michael. The Foreign Policy Sytem of Israel: Setting, Images, Process. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1972.
- Bouchey, L. Francis and Piedra, Alberto M. Guatemala: A Promise in Peril. Washington, D.C.:Council for Inter-American Security, Inc., 1980.
- Connell-Smith, Gordon. The United States and Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American Relations. New York: Halstead Press, 1974.
- Diskin, Martin. Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties. New York: Pantheon Books, 1983.
- Erisman, H. Michael, editor. The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1984.
- Fagen, Richard R. and Pellicer, Olga, editors. The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1983.
- Fried, Jonathan L., Gettleman, Marvin E., Levenson, Deborah T., and Peckenham, Nancy, editors. Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1983.
- Green, James R., and Scowcroft, Brent. Western Interest and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin: Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin. Boston, Ma.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1984.

Immerman, Richard H. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Inter-vention, Austin, Tx.: University Of Texas Press, 1982.

Hayes, Margaret Daly. Latin America and the U.S. National Interest: A Basis for U.S. Foreign Policy. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1984.

Lernoux, Penny. Fear and Hope: Toward Political Democracy in Central America. New York: The Field Foundation, 1984.

Newfarmer, Richard, editor. From Gunboats to Diplomacy: New U.S. Policies for Latin America. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Payne, Anthony J. The International Crisis in the Caribbean. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Ropp, Steve C. and Morris, James A., editors. Central America: Crisis and Adaptation. Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1984.

Schoultz, Lars. Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Schulz, Donald E. and Graham, Douglas H., editors. Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1984.

Stanford Central America Action Network, editor. Revolution in Central America. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1983.

Wesson, Robert, editor. U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980's. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

## SECTION II - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

- U.S. Congress. House. "Arms Trade in the Western Hemisphere, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on International Relations," 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978.
- U.S. Congress. House. "Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy: A Review of the Administration's Record, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations," 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977.
- U.S. Congress. House. "Human Rights in Guatemala, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Human Rights on International Organizations and on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs," 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981.
- U.S. Congress. House. "Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations," 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976.
- U.S. Congress. House. "New Directions in Development Assistance: Implementation in Four Latin America Countries, Report of a Staff Survey Mission to Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic," 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, H. Res. 267.
- U.S. Congress. House. "United States Policy Toward Guatemala, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs," 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983.
- U.S. Congress. House. "United States Policy Toward Guatemala and El Salvador, Report of a Study Mission to Guatemala and El Salvador, February 20-26, 1983, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs," 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983.

U.S. Congress. Senate. "Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, A Staff Memorandum prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations," 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971.

U.S. Department of Defense. "Annual Report to the Congress." Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

U.S. Department of Defense. "Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Programs, FY85," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

U.S. Department of Defense. "United States Military Posture FY 1986: A Report by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense. "The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

U.S. Department of State. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate," 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980.

U.S. Department of State. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives," 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981.

U.S. President. "Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America to the President of the United States." Henry A Kissinger, chairman. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

### SECTION III - OTHER SOURCES

\_\_\_\_\_. Human Rights in Guatemala: No Neutrals Allowed.  
New York: The Americas Watch, 1982.

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
2. Colonel Max G. Manwaring  
Consulting Faculty Member  
USAWC - Carlisle Barracks  
Box 516  
Carlisle, PA 17013
3. Defense Technical Information Center  
Cameron Station  
Alexandria, VA 22314
4. Major Edward J. Robarge  
Thesis Committee Chairman  
Department of Joint and Combined Operations  
Low Intensity Conflict Committee  
USACGSC  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
5. Major Frederick M. Downey  
Second Reader  
Department of Joint and Combined Operations  
Strategic Studies Committee  
USACGSC  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

END

10-86

DTIC