Survivability of the Hardened Mobile Launcher When Attacked by a Hypothetical Rapidly Retargetable ICBM System.
Abstract
This thesis evaluates the survivability of the hardened mobile launcher system (HML) against a hypothetical enemy ICBM system. The hypothetical system has two key capabilities: it can obtain near real-time intelligence information regarding the HML's location, and it can be retargeted in flight (as necessary) according to the intelligence information. Thus, the hypothetical ICBM threat systems can attack individual HMLs directly rather than rely on a 'barrage attack' against HML bases. Monte Carlo simulation is used to approach the problem. The model is an MBASIC computer program, written and runs on an Apple Macintosh computer. The model simulates the flight of the attacking ICBMs (there may be as few as one or as many as 14 warheads directed at each HML) and the random dispersal tactics of a single HML. The model determines the locations of the detonations and the location of the HML at time of detonation. Based on these locations, probability of kill due to peak blast overpressure is calculated. A key parameter in the model is 'intelligence / retargeting cycle time' -- the time required to obtain intelligence and retarget accordingly. This time is varied from 1-30 minutes. The model also allows variations in HML speed and hardness and threat system CEP. A subroutine for examining the effects of neutron fratricide on the attacking warheads is included (although the effects were found to be negligible). This thesis concludes that very small intelligence/retargeting cycle times are required for this to be an effective weapon system against the HML. Thus, with today's (or near future) technology, the HML can be considered a very survivable system.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA172453
Entities
People
- David J. Gearhart
- Scott F. Merrow
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology