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
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
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THESIS

DECEPTION IN SOVIET MILITARY
DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS

by

David L. Hamilton

June 1986

Thesis Advisor:

Jiri Valenta

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Deception in Soviet Military
Doctrine and Operations

by

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Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., Harding University, 1977

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the role deception serves in the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The analysis focuses on the Soviets' mindset, historical application, military doctrine, organization, and current application of military deception. Before addressing the Soviet use of deception, an introduction is provided which includes some definitions and related terms, a historical look at deception, and some basic deception principles. The thesis closes with a summary of the main points concerning Soviet military deception and briefly compares it to past and current application of deception in the U.S. military.



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I. INTRODUCTION

Of all the various elements of military art developed over the centuries, the one that has been the least understood and the most neglected is the art of deception. At times throughout the ages, it has been employed with great success, only to be forgotten in the next war. Deception can almost be considered a human trait or characteristic but, curiously, one which seems so basic to one group's way of life and so alien to another. Indeed, the inconsistency in the use of deception in warfare, both within one group and when comparing one group's style of warfare to that of another, has been conspicuous ever since wars were recorded. On the one hand, we are told by such military strategists as Sun Tsu that "all warfare is based on deception [Ref. 1: p. 66]," but it becomes apparent to the student of military history that, in practice, deception has not been a part of every war. Only the greatest leaders seem to understand its immense potential, and few of these possess the skills to make full use of that potential.

Perhaps the key to unlocking these apparent contradictions surrounding deception lies in a study of its very nature. Is deception a law of warfare to which a formula can be applied to ensure its uniform and consistent employment? To the contrary, deception is, as the previous paragraph implied, an art. Of course, the successful execution of any element of warfare, whether a law of war or military art, requires the cultivation of a certain degree of skill, but it appears that skill alone is not enough for deception. Perhaps more than any other element, the effective use of deception demands a vivid imagination, one which is not bound by conventional thinking but which is accustomed to the unorthodox, the unexpected. Indeed, it is

this unconventional nature which ensures success in deception, while predictability remains its anathema. It is therefore not surprising that deception is often omitted from battle plans. After all, why risk defeat through the use of a military art as nebulous as deception, whose outcome is anything but predictable, when there are safer, more reliable methods of confronting one's opponent?

In studying the historical use of military deception, it becomes apparent that each nation employs it in a different manner and frequency than other nations.¹ A focused study on the Soviet Union's use of deception is of particular interest in light of world political development since the end of World War II. Such a study is especially appropriate for the thesis of a U.S. military officer since the mutual antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States makes it possible at some future date for the two to confront one another under combat conditions sometime in the future. Considering the immense arsenals of these two nations, the political alignment of much of the world within one of the two camps, and the forty-year history of political, economic, and ideological polemics between the two, it is no exaggeration to predict that such a confrontation would be of major military proportions. Every available means, maneuver, trick, skill, etc., both political and military, would be marshaled in order to gain every advantage possible. It has become popular to describe this potential scenario as a "come as you are" war, a description which is quite appropriate in this case since all learning and development of military skills, other than their refinement through combat experience, essentially stops when war begins.

¹I intentionally use the term "nation" here because it is essentially the ethnic nature of a group of people which governs that group's proclivity for the use of deception, not just the legal entity that forms a "state."

The role that deception will play in any military clash between the Soviet Union and the United States is not clear-cut, but a rough idea can be obtained by looking at each nation's historical use of the art and treatment of it in current doctrine and practice. While the focus of this thesis is on Soviet use of the art, U.S. use of deception will also be addressed somewhat, particularly in the concluding chapter. The goal of this thesis is to determine the extent of the role deception plays in Soviet military doctrine and operations, past and present, and then apply that knowledge to develop an estimate of possible future Soviet application of the art in a conventional military confrontation with the United States. However, the goal does not stop there; this paper has been written with the hope that military leaders, decision-makers, and intelligence officers, once aware of the disparity existing between Soviet and U.S. deception capabilities, will make an effort to rectify our shortfalls. Such an effort, however, should not be made simply to "catch up" with the Soviets, but instead, should be made as an endeavor to enrich our way of war-fighting, in order that we may do so more effectively and with a greater likelihood of success. Deception is an art whose inclusion can significantly add to a military operation's chance of success and should be considered for employment on its own merit, regardless of whether the opponent uses it.

A. OVERVIEW

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter is of an introductory nature and includes, in addition to the opening paragraphs and this overview, a section outlining the scope of the paper. The latter is of some importance since it provides the rationale for a somewhat unique treatment of the generally neglected subject of deception.

The second chapter offers a general discussion of the subject. Included is a section with definitions of deception and its related terms, another section which takes a historical look at deception and, finally, a list and discussion of some basic principles which must be applied if deception is to be employed successfully. These principles have been compiled not only through theory and simple logic, but also through practical application in many military exercises and some actual operations.²

The next six chapters constitute the "meat" of this thesis. Chapter III offers an overview of the general Soviet view of and use of deception. Chapter IV looks at the Russian and Soviet mindset and ties the influence of that mindset to the Soviet proclivity for using deception. The historical Soviet military application of the art is examined in the fifth chapter, going all the way back to the influence of the Mongols and then dwelling on the traumatic Soviet experience in World War II. Chapters VI and VII deal respectively with deception's place in Soviet military doctrine and the organization of the Soviet military to accommodate the use of deception. In Chapter VIII, Soviet theory in deception employment (doctrine) is contrasted with their actual practice of it since World War II.

The ninth and final chapter serves as a conclusion for the thesis. The main points made throughout the thesis concerning the role of deception in the Soviet military are summarized and then briefly contrasted with deception's role

²The practical application to which I refer was achieved during my recent assignment as the Command Tactical Deception Officer, from March 1981 to May 1984, at Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. My responsibilities included the establishment and maintenance of a command-wide Tactical Deception Program and Tactical Deception Officer (TDO) Network (with TDOs assigned at every organizational level down to the wing). In addition to real world responsibilities, I gained experience through the planning and incorporation of deception operations in numerous military exercises each year, many of which were joint efforts with the U.S. Army and Navy, South Korea, or NATO.

in the U.S. military. Based on this comparison, the thesis ends with a discussion of deception's possible role in a future clash between the Soviet Union and the United States.

B. SCOPE

The preceding overview is sufficient in offering a very broad view of the major thrust of this thesis, but it is appropriate to outline in detail the scope of this study and, more importantly, the rationale behind this approach. First of all, I have focused my research on military deception, primarily because this is where my expertise and interest lie and because it is most appropriate as the subject of a military thesis. The other most prominent aspect of deception is that of the political realm. This would certainly be an interesting and useful study, but so much of the Soviets' political behavior is based on deception, or can be misconstrued as deception, that such a study would easily become bogged down in minute and tedious detail. The only political deception addressed in this paper is that which is in support of, or in conjunction with, a military operation.

Second, military deception can be divided into two very basic categories: strategic and tactical. While I will spend some time discussing strategic deception, most of the thesis deals with tactical deception. Again, this is where my interest and expertise lie, but more importantly, most studies on military deception have focused on the strategic aspect to the virtual exclusion of the tactical. Consequently, little has ever been written on how deception is conducted on the battlefield.

Third, I have intentionally refrained from delving very deeply into deception theory. While the subject of deception in general has been neglected over time, theory has been one of its more popular aspects in recent literature. The most likely reason for this theoretical focus is probably because

deception, due to little documentation of its use over the centuries and great need for secrecy when it was employed, offers fewer cases for study than other elements of warfare. In short, deception is more easily discussed than implemented. This is not to speak disparagingly of any theoretical works on deception, for such works offer a significant contribution to understanding an art that would otherwise receive even less attention. I will of course refer to some theory, but my intent is to provide a more operational view of deception.

Fourth, this thesis focuses heavily on deception's role in the Soviet military and touches only briefly on the U.S.'s view and use of it. This was done for a number of reasons, the foremost of which is that this paper was written by a student in a Soviet Studies curriculum. Also, the Soviets have been more active in recent decades in using military deception and, quite frankly, offer more cases to study. The problem of unbalanced information also had a bearing on this concentration. Far more information was available on Russian/Soviet deception history and national mindset than on the same issues concerning the U.S., while considerably more organizational and current operational information was available on the U.S. than on the Soviet Union. A comparative study of the two nations' use of deception would be most interesting and appropriate, but such a study, to do proper justice to the subject, would be quite lengthy.

Fifth, I have drastically broadened the scope of my thesis by keeping it unclassified. A considerable amount of specific information on both the Soviet and U.S. deception programs is classified, thus forcing an unclassified study to deal with the subject in fairly general terms.

Finally, very little discussion will be found on the use of deception in naval operations. This is not because there

is little such activity; on the contrary, the U.S. Navy employs deception on virtually a daily basis (mostly in the form of fleet anti-surveillance tactics directed against Soviet naval vessels) and probably understands its potential better than any of the other U.S. military services. However, a number of fine papers have already been produced on the subject and I could add very little to what has already been said. Also, while all the basic principles apply to deception in any situation, naval deception involves sufficiently different actions and responses to warrant a separate study. Therefore, my focus is on deception operations in air and land warfare.

II. GENERAL

A. DEFINITION OF DECEPTION AND RELATED TERMS

Deception is an art which transcends the military realm; in fact, it permeates almost every aspect of any given society. As such, the basic concept is well known to most people. Within American society alone, one needs only to look at the deceptive nature of our games, football and poker in particular, and the secrecy and deceptive maneuvering among much of the business community to realize how commonplace deception is in our everyday affairs. Despite this, many U.S. military personnel (and this is probably true of most other countries) know very little about the subject, much less how it dovetails with other military operations. The prerequisite for any such knowledge, therefore, becomes a thorough understanding of the definition of deception.

Many definitions of deception abound within American literature alone. One dictionary defines it as "misleading by a false appearance or statement; to delude, fool, trick, defraud, betray; a stratagem, ruse, hoax, subterfuge." Roget's Thesaurus continues with the following synonyms: "willful misconception, illusion, dupery, bluffing, misinformation, artifice, feint, masquerade, decoy, beguile." Another source puts it this way: "Deception is a conscious and rational effort deliberately to mislead an opponent. It seeks to create in the adversary a state of mind which will be conducive to exploitation by the deceiver [Ref. 2: p.11]." And yet another source defines deception more succinctly as "the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage [Ref. 3: p. 51]."

So far, the definitions have been broad in scope and can be applied to deception used in any situation, military or otherwise. Focusing now on the military aspect, one author offers the following description:

Deception in war is the art of misleading the enemy into doing something, or not doing something, so that his strategic or tactical position will be weakened A deceptive operation embodies all the signs of a real assault. It makes the enemy believe that pretended hostile activities are genuine. It induces a false sense of danger in one area, forcing him to strengthen his defences there, and therefore to weaken them somewhere else where the real attack is due. [Ref. 4: p. xii]

To sum up these definitions, one can say that military deception is the act of convincing an enemy commander and his staff (or at least offering compelling evidence) that a piece of information is something other than what it actually is. The goal in using military deception is always to cause the enemy to act, or fail to act, in a manner detrimental to his wellbeing and beneficial to the deceiver.

There are a number of terms related to deception which should be addressed here. These related terms are "cover, camouflage, lying, and artifice," all sometimes confused with, or substituted for the word "deception." Drs. Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig, in their portion of a study entitled Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Military Deception, subordinate these concepts to deception and graphically depict the relationships as shown in Figure 2.1 [Ref. 3: p. 7].

Cover is the aspect of deception which involves withholding information, and includes camouflage; it is the security side of deception and is therefore its very core or center. Cover is fundamental to any deception because a deceiver is always trying to hide or protect something. *Lying* encompasses cover because it always involves withholding some information. However, in addition to this,

a liar tries to divert attention away from the truth, a more active measure than simply withholding information. *Lying* and *artifice* are very similar but differ in the fact that lying involves a simple untrue statement while artifice involves "manipulating the context surrounding the statement in order to enhance its veracity." *Deception* encompasses all of these concepts and a little more. While the three subsidiary concepts concentrate on only one side of the deceiver-audience interaction, deception encompasses the reactions of the audience to the lies. To summarize this relationship between deception and its subsidiary concepts:

Someone whose false tale is not believed is still a liar, but he has not deceived. One does not fail at lying because the audience is not convinced, but one does fail at deception if the audience does not believe the lie. [Ref. 3: pp. 6-8]




Figure 2.1 Relationship of Deception to Related Terms.

In addition to these fundamental concepts, deception can be viewed in terms of the means available to implement a deception. These are the methods or measures which a deception planner actually uses to satisfy the objectives of his plan. Deception means can be divided into three basic categories: 1) physical, 2) technical, and 3) administrative.

Generally speaking, physical means are those which the enemy detects unaided with one or more of his five senses. One exception to the unaided criterion would be detection through optical sensors. One of the most common elements of this category is *maneuver* deception; in other words, the maneuvering or placement of troops, equipment, vehicles, aircraft, etc., in such a manner as to mislead the enemy concerning one's true intentions. Under this subcategory fall feints and demonstrations. *Feints* generally involve committing at least a small portion of one's forces in an area removed from the primary axis of attack in hopes of causing the enemy to shift a larger portion of his forces away from that primary axis. *Demonstrations* are very similar to feints except that they usually are not meant to involve direct contact with the enemy, as is the case with feints. *Decoys* or *dummies* also fall under this category, including such things as inflatable aircraft, cardboard or plywood tanks, etc. *Sonic* and *olfactory* deception generally involve, respectively, the amplification of recorded vehicle and equipment sounds such as tanks, helicopters, etc., and the production of bogus smells such as cooking fires, diesel fumes, cordite, etc., to supplement other false indicators. One last element of this category is *camouflage* and all its attendant methods. This includes not only the well-known camouflage netting used to conceal objects, but also the use of natural terrain features and vegetation.

Technical means form a category which has been available to deception planners for only a few decades. The two basic elements within this category are electronic in nature: *communications* deception and all other *electronic* means (usually radar deception). Each of these two subcategories can then be divided once more into their imitative and manipulative aspects. *Imitative* communications or electronic deception involves the active intrusion into an enemy channel or frequency and imitation of whatever form of communication is passing over that line or net. *Manipulative* deception is when the deceiver manipulates his own communications or other electronic signal and passes false information, with the assumption that the enemy is intercepting that particular signal. Under a third minor subcategory of technical means would fall such exotic means as nuclear, biological, or chemical traces, used perhaps to simulate a "special weapons" leak. These means are admittedly somewhat outlandish, but their future use is not unthinkable.

Administrative means involve any kind of paperwork or public declarations by the military which are intended to mislead enemy agents. These can include such things as bogus flight schedules posted in open areas, publication of false orders, misleading press statements, etc. In most cases, this type of deception is targeted at enemy decisionmakers through agents that have been placed in positions allowing them to observe our activities; for example: cleaning ladies, cooks, or any other indigenous laborers. Such people would of course be more prevalent on established, permanent military installations like air bases, but army units in the field can also be vulnerable to scrutiny by agents and should take this into consideration during the development of a deception plan. [Ref. 5]

In studying military deception, it becomes apparent that its employment does not entail a simple application of one or two measures. Deception has many faces, each a different shade, each possessing a different character. Whereas one means of deception may be appropriate in one situation, that same method is not necessarily applicable in another. In other words, there is no set list of ingredients which can be formed into a "recipe for the use of deception" and then used in any scenario. There are several variants of deception (not to be confused with categories of means), each more applicable to certain scenarios. However, for ease of understanding, I will discuss in detail only two very basic variants: 1) the *distracting* variant, and 2) the *disguising* variant.

The *distracting* variant seeks to draw the opponent's attention away from the activity or location being protected. This can be accomplished through many means: establishing dummy positions or equipment in areas where the deceiver has little or no interest; conducting feints or demonstrations in those same areas with small numbers of troops and equipment; or by leaking false intelligence to give the opponent indications that the deceiver's interest is in another area far removed from where his true interest lies, to name only a few.

The *disguising* variant does not seek to divert the opponent's attention but, instead, hides or disguises that which is being protected by making it appear to the opponent as something other than what it actually is. This can be done by simple camouflaging, creation of false damage (bomb craters, artillery damage, etc.) to give the indication of inactivity, erection of dummy buildings or equipment to change the "apparent" mission of the unit being protected, and many more. It should be stressed at this point that any use of the disguising variant must go hand in hand with

basic security measures. This does not mean that security is synonymous with deception; on the contrary, good security can and does stand alone at times. But since any employment of deception, especially the disguising variant, always involves hiding something from enemy intelligence, effective application of security measures is therefore crucial to success in deception.

In order to better illustrate the nature of military deception, the following paragraphs will offer a hypothetical scenario in which deception is employed. The scope in this case is broad enough to allow the use of deception by either a ground commander or air commander. As reinforcement for the previous explanation of deception variants, both variants will be applied in this scenario.

1. Hypothetical Scenario

A military commander is faced with a choice between two avenues of approach for attacking or counterattacking the enemy. For the ground commander, this could mean two bridges or likely fording spots along a river, two valleys through which his units must traverse, etc.; for the air commander, it could be two "safe" air corridors into the enemy's rear, opened through attrition of the enemy's air defense in these areas. In either case, the commander could divide his forces and attack along both avenues, but manpower and equipment are limited, and besides, it violates the principles and advantages of mass and concentration. Therefore, a choice must be made between Avenue A or B; in this case, the commander chooses A.

However, now that the choice has been made, there is still the likelihood of the enemy detecting the concentration of troops or air power opposite Avenue A and responding with a corresponding buildup of his own to repel the attack. Good security limits some of the indications of massing, but never all of them. Our commander has therefore

decided to make the enemy believe that the attack will come along Avenue B, hoping to cause a concentration of enemy defenses opposite B and away from A.

a. Use of the Distracting Deception Variant

Our commander has many means available to divert the enemy's attention away from the buildup opposite Avenue A. The ground commander may choose to employ some or all of the following means (dependent upon available resources): demonstrations and feints by small numbers of troops in the vicinity of B; amplification of recorded sounds, such as tanks, trucks, bulldozers, helicopters, etc.; campfires and lights; bogus reconnaissance flights and other air activity such as close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) over Avenue B; and many more. The air commander, also probably operating under resource constraints, may develop or "activate" dummy or auxiliary airfields in vicinity of B. This would have to be supported by believable dummy equipment on the airfields and some actual air activity over them such as simulated landing patterns or the "apparent" launching of attack aircraft conducting feints toward Avenue B. Both commanders could also use technical and administrative means to divert the enemy's attention, such as intentional communications leaks showing interest and activity in area B, selective and intermittent jamming of enemy electronic sensors opposite area B to give the impression that something important is being hidden there, and publication and open dissemination of orders indicating significant troop and equipment movement to area B. In summary, it should be stressed that all these deception means are designed to draw the enemy's attention away from Avenue A where our actual interest lies, causing him to concentrate on Avenue B.

b. Use of the Disguising Deception Variant

In protecting and hiding our buildup opposite Avenue A, the commander has another list of means available to him. Many of these means are identical to those employed under the distracting variant, but they now serve the purpose of disguising the buildup in area A instead of diverting attention away from it. Camouflage is the fundamental element in this case, simply hiding the bulk of our buildup from enemy optical sensors, to include the human eye. This entails not only the use of man-made camouflage netting and other such material, but also the judicious use of natural terrain features and vegetation, such as haystacks in which to hide artillery pieces or large trees which hide taxiways or heavy traffic areas. The air commander may order that false bomb craters be painted on the runways of airfields in area A and damaged or destroyed aircraft placed in plain sight. Air activity over these fields should be held to a minimum, with flight patterns established in another area (ideally over airfields in area B if close enough). Again, it should be emphasized that all these deceptive means must be complemented by good security measures since the objective of this deception variant is to make the enemy believe that any indication of the presence of our forces in area A is not worthy of his concern; and the fewer the indications of that presence the better.

The two variants of deception outlined and illustrated above are certainly not the only way of viewing deception. Daniel and Herbig also identify two basic variants which, except for a few similarities, are different from those just listed. The first one they call the *ambiguity-increasing* or *A-type* variant. In their words, it "seeks to compound the uncertainties confronting any state's attempt to determine its adversary's wartime intentions." In other words, the A-type attempts to confuse a target to the

point where he is not sure what to believe and therefore increases his risk of making a bad decision. This variant shares at least one similarity with the disguising variant in that neither one seeks to divert the target's attention away from that being protected.

The second variant Daniel and Herbig call the *misleading* or *M-type*. This one "reduces ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative." A strong similarity can be seen between the M-type and distracting variants since both are intended to focus the target's attention away from the protected object or activity. [Ref. 3: pp. 8-10]

B. HISTORICAL LOOK AT DECEPTION

Despite the fact that the martial application of deception has been neglected at times throughout history, considerable evidence exists that deception is a very old tool of warfare. One of the earliest examples of military deception can be found in Homer's epic The Iliad, dating back to the eighth century B.C. The story chronicles a long Greek siege on the walled city of Troy. Frustrated after years of stalemate, the Greeks built a huge wooden horse, secreted several soldiers inside, gave the horse to the Trojans as a gift, and then acted as if preparing to depart. That night, after the horse had been accepted by the Trojans and taken into the city, and after most of the Trojan citizens were asleep, the Greeks inside the horse climbed out, overcame the Trojan guards, and opened the city gates for the rest of the Greek army, thus successfully ending the long campaign. This deceptive aspect of the tale has, of course, become known as the "Trojan Horse," well-known to most people. Many would correctly argue that the story is apparently a work of mythology (since several Greek mythological figures are mentioned) and that the siege as told by Homer probably never took place. However, the

important point to be made here is that the use of deception to aid in satisfying a military objective was evidently considered as far back as 700 B.C.

One of the earliest known writers who consistently dealt with the subject of deception (and many other elements of warfare) was the Chinese sage and military strategist Sun Tzu who lived in the sixth century B.C. A compilation of most of his works and sayings was developed into a book entitled The Art of War, in which he offered military and political advice, most of it still applicable today. Although Sun Tzu made several references to the use of deception, one in particular stands out and is frequently quoted by contemporary scholars, military leaders, and politicians:

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. [Ref. 6: p. 11]

The sophisticated nature of this quote is surprising when one realizes it was written about 2,500 years ago. Obviously, deception had been developed by that time into a fundamental element of warfare, at least in part of the world.

Specific battles and campaigns in which deception was used can be found among many of the countless wars fought throughout history. As mentioned in the introduction, some nations or states were particularly adroit in its use and employed it quite often; others rarely considered it, if ever. One group of people which stands out as one of the most prolific and successful wielders of military deception is the Mongols. Although their empire remained fairly intact over several centuries, they are best known for their

invasion of Russia beginning in 1241 A.D. Ever since Liddell Hart's treatment of the Mongols in his book The Great Captains, published in 1927, many military historians and scholars have become interested in the Mongol method of warfare, deception included. As will be addressed in more detail in Chapter V, it is now believed that the Mongol invasion of Russia heavily influenced Russian, and even Soviet military strategy and tactics.

1. Overlord: A Classic Example

Since a detailed historical treatment of the application of military deception in general would be rather involved and lengthy, and since it is not within the purview of this thesis, I jump forward in time now to recount only one historical example of a successful deception plan. (Soviet historical use of deception will be addressed in depth in Chapter V.) The plan I chose was called *Bodyguard*, the deception which covered the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944, known as *Operation Overlord*. Although this deception was of a strategic nature and supported an operation of major proportions, it serves as an excellent example of a comprehensive deception plan. It incorporated most of the planning principles outlined in the next section and, most importantly, it was highly successful.

Bodyguard was a plan which encompassed many subsidiary deception plans. The overall objective was to cause the Germans to deploy and/or maintain sufficient troops away from the Normandy beach area in France so as to ensure the minimum resistance possible for the planned Allied invasion in that area (planned for May 1944 but delayed until 6 June 1944). The primary method in achieving this objective was to provide invasion threats in other plausible areas, such as Norway, various parts of France, Italy, and the Balkans. The threats to southern France, Italy, and the Balkans proved to be fairly ineffective, but

those to Norway and especially northern France were highly successful and contributed greatly to the success of the actual invasion.

The subsidiary plan which posed a notional threat to Norway was known as *Graffham* and was more political in nature than the others. To be sure, there were other plans which provided false indications of troop concentrations suitable for an invasion of Norway, but *Graffham* was probably far more effective. The plan essentially called for the visit of a high-ranking British officer to the Swedish Air Force (the SAF was considered pro-Ally while the Swedish Army was still pro-German). The British chose Air Vice-Marshal Thornton who advised the Swedish commander that in the event of an Allied invasion of Norway, the Germans would most likely withdraw, murdering prisoners and destroying important facilities in the process. He then asked for Swedish help in preventing the slaughter and destruction. The Swedish commander was impressed but refused to commit himself. His answer, however, was immaterial since it turned out that the Germans had bugged the office where the conversation took place. Hitler himself received the transcript of the conversation within three hours and promptly ordered two divisions to Norway as reinforcement, thus misallocating 30,000 more troops that could have been used later at Normandy. [Ref. 7: pp. 176-79]

In support of *Graffham*, the Bank of England bought thousands of pounds worth of Norwegian government bonds which were at a very low price at that particular time. This not only proved to be a wise investment but also provided a strong indicator to the Germans that the British intended to reoccupy Norway in the near future.

In the words of one historian, *Plan Fortitude South*, which embodied the notional threat to northern France, was "the largest, most elaborate, most carefully planned, most

vital, and most successful of all the Allied deception operations." It too was a subsidiary plan of *Bodyguard* in its support of the Allied invasion of Normandy. *Fortitude South* (*Fortitude North* was the notional threat to Norway under which *Graffham* fell) was itself divided into six elements code-named *Quicksilver I-VI*.

Quicksilver I was the deception which indicated that the main Allied invasion of the European continent would be directed at Pas de Calais, France, several weeks after the Normandy landings. Pas de Calais is about 150 miles northeast of the Normandy beaches and is the section of French coast closest to England. As such, it was a logical target for the Allied assault. To pose the notional threat, the First United States Army Group (FUSAG), activated in southeastern England (opposite Pas de Calais) in October 1943, was portrayed as the parent unit for all units targeted at Pas de Calais, and General Patton was identified as its commander. As the real elements of FUSAG were transferred to southwestern England for the actual buildup, or to France after the invasion (as Patton was with his Third U.S. Army), fake units and dummy equipment were moved in their place to maintain the FUSAG threat to Pas de Calais. The dummy equipment collected and assembled for this task stands as one of the largest notional equipment concentrations known.

Quicksilver II consisted of the radio deception in support of the FUSAG buildup. This involved extensive communications networks manned by only a few personnel conducting the appropriate routine radio chatter expected in a buildup of that magnitude. *Quicksilver III* was the portrayal of a large concentration of landing craft in harbor areas suitable for launching an invasion to Pas de Calais. There were only about four actual landing craft used, but by overtly moving them by day, then returning them

by night to their point of origin so that they could then make another overt transfer the next day, a concentration of about 250 landing craft was portrayed.³ *Quicksilver IV* and *V* involved, respectively, bombing the beaches of Pas de Calais and bombing German lines of communication in the region. This was important to demonstrate an Allied interest in Pas de Calais and to indicate that an invasion there was imminent. *Quicksilver VI* was the deceptive lighting program and involved the portrayal of large troop and equipment concentrations at night through the erection of elaborate lighting schemes. At the same time, great care was taken to ensure that lighting in the area of the actual buildup was as subdued as possible. [Ref. 4: pp. 177-84]

Although some elements of *Fortitude South* were not judged to be very successful (mainly because it was believed the Germans did not observe some of the deceptions), the overall effect had what can only be considered a decisive influence on the success of *Operation Overlord*. At the time of the invasion on 6 June, approximately 22 German divisions were located in the Pas de Calais area, representing the major portion of the German Fifteenth Army. By mid-July, 30 Allied divisions had landed in France, but the Germans still maintained the 22 divisions in Pas de Calais. [Ref. 4: p. 189] The reason for this was that General von Rundstedt, the German Commander-in-Chief in the West, remained convinced for six weeks after the Normandy invasion that Normandy was only a diversionary operation, admittedly in great strength, and that the main assault was still yet to come in the Pas de Calais area. When it finally became clear that no such assault was forthcoming, it was too late for the 22

³The Israelis conducted an almost identical deception in preparation for their surprise attack on Egypt in 1967. By moving only a very few landing craft up and down the Gulf of Aqaba in much the same manner as the British during World War II, they succeeded in drawing off a sizable Egyptian force to deal with the phantom Israeli force.

divisions to aid in turning the Allied tide. In short, it is no exaggeration to assign great importance to the deception plan *Bodyguard* in its support of the Normandy invasion. Without it, it is quite likely the Germans would have repulsed the assault landings, thus postponing a successful invasion for as much as a year. Such a delay could have changed the political alignment of Europe as it is known today by allowing the Soviets to "liberate" more of western Europe.

In concluding this section on deception in history, it is important to point out that the art has not been completely ignored since World War II. The British appear to have retained their interest and skill in deception, evident in their use of it to support the landing of the Royal Marines on the Falkland Islands in 1982. The Argentines also made use of deception during that conflict by portraying fake bomb damage on the runway at Port Stanley. The many Israeli-Arab conflicts over the years have offered several examples of successful deception. The 1967 war probably provides the richest examples, all on the part of Israel in preparation for its surprise attacks on Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Apparently having learned the value of surprise and deception's potential contribution to its achievement, Egypt made good use of it in 1973 by "conditioning" Israel through several military mobilizations. Israel once again decided on the use of deception in 1982 which resulted in the destruction of all the Syrian SA-6 sites located at that time in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Even the U.S., generally one of the worst offenders in ignoring the employment of deception, has found a few occasions since World War II in which deception could play a role, most notably in Vietnam. Therefore, although the art of deception has generally been neglected over time, it is by no means a dead art. As long as Israel, Britain, the Soviet Union, and

other such states continue to demonstrate the value of effective deception in their military conflicts and interventions, perhaps those other states which traditionally omit the art from their military plans will eventually see the merit in its inclusion.

C. BASIC DECEPTION PRINCIPLES

The final section in this chapter addresses six principles which are fundamental, and therefore crucial, to the planning and successful execution of military deception. Although more than six principles can be applied in deception planning, I have chosen only the most important. Every assertion made in this section can be backed up with considerable and sometimes painful experience. Many points made will seem so fundamental as to be elementary; however, as I discovered in many instances, a deception planner cannot rely on the probability that a particular step in the deception planning process is as obvious to the many with whom he must consult along the way. This especially includes the commander, who must provide final approval to any deception plan. One may ask at this point how a section on deception planning principles applies to a focused study of the role deception plays in the Soviet military. The answer is that these basic principles must be applied by any agency wishing to employ military deception successfully, including the Soviet Union. Therefore we can see that the Soviets must approach the subject in much the same manner as anyone else. The difference, as it turns out, is the style in which they employ the art and the degree of confidence they display in its potential.

1. Applicability

The first and foremost principle in planning deception is that a deception plan must support an operations plan. In other words, deception should not be employed for its own sake, in a vacuum so to speak; it

should have a clear and distinct objective which dovetails with, and directly supports, the objective(s) of a standard operation. A deception plan by itself serves no purpose other than to alert the enemy to the fact that he is a target for deception, thus making future attempts on the deceiver's part more likely to be detected.

Two types of commander are guilty of this mistake: the one who is enamored with the mysterious and exotic nature of deception, but knows little about it and simply wants to use it; and the one who has been ordered by his superiors to incorporate deception into his standard operations and therefore uses it only to "fill the square." Despite any external pressure, if a commander does not want to use deception, it is unlikely to be employed effectively, regardless of the skill of the deception planner.

2. Plausibility

A deception plan must be plausible if it is to have any hope of being believed by the enemy. The planner must ensure that what he is portraying correlates with what the enemy believes he is capable of doing. Simple mistakes, such as conducting a notional buildup too quickly in relation to the deceiver's actual supply and transportation capabilities, or portraying a notional threat in an area where such a threat is obviously impossible (due to terrain features, for example) can totally discredit a deception plan.

A planner does, however, have a good source of deception "ideas" at his disposal which are very likely to be plausible. Most major military operations will have one or more elements which offer multiple courses of action (for example: location of an assault landing). Once a course has been chosen, the deception planner can then use one or more of the discarded courses as the focus of his deception. The Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 offers a striking

example of this. The Allies chose Normandy as the site for the landings over several other alternates, Pas de Calais among them. Once Normandy was identified as the target, the deception planners had many other locations to which they could direct their notional threats. As it turned out, they used virtually all of the alternate locations. Since all alternate courses of action are worthy of consideration at one point, they stand a good chance of being sufficiently plausible as a deception plan (assuming the planner makes necessary adjustments in the deception if the alternate course was originally discarded for a glaring fault).

3. Detectability

It should be remembered that every deception plan plays to an audience; if that audience does not observe the deceptive actions, then there was no deception. Therefore, a planner must ensure that his deception plan is "detectable" by the enemy; that it plays into his various intelligence sensors. A hundred years ago and longer, those sensors were essentially only human eyeballs; then came the balloon as an observation platform and, along with it, aerial photography. With the advent of the aircraft, commanders were able to look deeper into the enemy's territory. Coincidental with development of airborne platforms was the development of electronic equipment, first radio communications and later radar, infrared, and other sophisticated detection devices. Now all these sensors can be used both on the ground and in the air, making it possible for a commander to observe the battlefield through a host of sensors, some offering an almost real-time picture of the situation. This development of sensor technology to such an advanced state poses some interesting problems to a deception planner. Generally speaking, he can view the current sensor "state-of-the-art" from two perspectives: the more pessimistic view, which asserts that there are too many sensors to make deception a

feasible option for commanders anymore, and the optimistic view, which sees a multi-sensor array as that many more channels through which to feed deceptive information to the enemy. I tend to lean toward the optimistic view while many of my military intelligence colleagues and some senior officers adhere to the more pessimistic view. Certainly, there is some middle ground here; a good deception planner would be one who tempers an optimistic approach with the realization that all those sensors make a deception plan riskier.

An extremely important point should be made here which ties in very closely with the optimistic view just mentioned: the more enemy sensors a deception planner targets, the more likely the enemy will believe the deception. If the enemy receives deceptive inputs through one sensor, say a voice communications channel, but then receives no corroborating evidence through other channels, say radar, infrared, or photography, then he will probably suspect the one input he did receive, or perhaps dismiss it altogether as inconsequential. If, however, he receives indications of a certain activity on the deceiver's part from several sensors, he is very likely to swallow the bait being fed him. This point cannot be stressed too much; too often a deception plan is basically sound except for the fact that the enemy is provided with too few indicators, so the plan fails miserably. Both the British and the Soviets in World War II understood very well this fundamental principle, and they were rewarded for it.

4. Feasibility

This is one of those simple principles which should be painfully obvious but, unfortunately, is often overlooked. A deception plan must be feasible to execute. This involves determining such basic issues as whether there is enough equipment available to execute the deception

(radio sets, jeeps, trucks, decoys, etc.), or whether the deception will draw off troops and equipment from another operation which cannot spare them. In this age of specialization, commanders must often rely on the advice of specialists, and deception is sometimes one of those areas with which a commander is unfamiliar. More than once I have seen a deception plan developed, approved by the commander, and then halfway through its execution it is discovered that not enough resources are available to complete it. This generally results not only in exposure of the deception plan, but sometimes even jeopardizes the main supported operation. A planner must accept the responsibility of researching the availability of resources and informing the commander of same, while the commander must realize that every deception will cost something; deception is never free.

5. Timing

Timing is a crucial element of any operation, but it is especially important to a deception operation since it must be executed in relation to not only the enemy's activities (reconnaissance in particular) but also to the main operation it is supporting. For this reason, it is wise to keep the deception planner informed of any changes to, or major developments in, the main operation, thereby giving him sufficient time to adjust the deception accordingly. The specific time a deception plan, or any of its elements for that matter, is implemented often determines whether it is successful or not. As an example, in one exercise recently, the goal of our deception cell was to indicate an armored buildup in the southern sector, hoping to draw off some of the enemy's armor in the north where our counterattack was to occur. We provided the enemy with considerable evidence of a southern buildup and, as we found out later, succeeded in convincing him to the point where he dispatched an armor

unit to the south. However, he received the indications we were feeding him too late because our counterattack commenced before the armor unit actually got underway. Our tanks therefore had to confront the enemy's full armor contingent. The lesson we learned was that the enemy must be given sufficient time to collect, analyze, and react to the deceptive information he is being fed.

6. Security

Although addressed last here, security is certainly not the least important element to consider in planning deception. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, every deception operation assumes some real operation or location is to be hidden and protected. Therefore, it is correct to say that security and deception go hand in hand; while deception distracts the enemy's attention away from the main operation or disguises it as something else, security hides the main operation. In other words, deception provides false indicators while security suppresses indicators. Also, it is true that security can stand alone, that an operation's indicators can simply be suppressed instead of altered or disguised; but deception generally cannot succeed without good security measures applied to the main operation. One exception to this would be Daniel's and Herbig's A-type, or ambiguity increasing deception which seeks to confuse the enemy by providing as many indicators as possible. In some such cases, it may not be as crucial to hide the true location of the main operation.⁴

⁴*Operation Overlord*, the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944, is a good example of this. Although the buildup in southwest England was hidden as much as possible, the indications that Normandy would be the location of some kind of assault were not completely suppressed. The Germans were fairly certain Normandy would be the site for an Allied diversionary assault, with the main assault coming at Pas de Calais.

Security applies not only to suppression of indicators visible to the enemy but also to the restriction of common knowledge of a deception plan among friendly troops. While this may be true for any operation, the exotic nature of deception tends to pique people's curiosity and generate gossip more than standard operations. With this in mind, it is wise to limit exposure of a deception plan to only those personnel directly involved in its approval and execution.

III. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF SOVIET DECEPTION

In looking at Soviet military history, it is readily apparent that such history reaches back only a few decades and that Soviet military experience in wartime is essentially limited to their four years of participation in World War II from 1941 until 1945. Of course, since their military intervention into Afghanistan in 1979, one could argue that they are now building on that otherwise scanty experience; but it could also be argued that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is providing them with little or no experience in conventional warfare, since most of their effort is expended pursuing the elusive but deadly *Mujahedeen*, or Afghan resistance fighters. The "war" in Afghanistan, therefore, is a guerilla or unconventional war, and it offers few opportunities to fully test Soviet skills and equipment needed to fight a major conventional war against an opponent like the United States.

This is not meant to belittle the Soviet experience in World War II; their contribution in defeating Germany was indeed of major proportion, and the Soviets would say they alone made that defeat possible. Without getting into an argument on that last point, it is no exaggeration to say that the Soviet experience in World War II was significant and that it transformed an army with almost no combat experience, decimated by Stalin's purges, into an armed force which has now become one of the two most powerful militaries in the world. World War II, more than any other event in the almost seventy years since the Russian Revolution, has made an indelible imprint on the Soviet psyche. Even today, forty years after the war, the Soviet people and the rest of the world are constantly reminded of the sacrifice the Soviet Union made. This constant reminder,

plus the fact that the military has no major combat experience to draw from except World War II, means that the Soviet military bases its approach to modern conventional warfare almost exclusively on its World War II experience. Of course, this also means that the Soviet approach to military deception is based on the same experience.

With all this in mind, it is only logical for a study of Soviet military deception to take a close look at how the Soviets employed it in World War II. However, although Soviet combat experience is extremely limited, we do have three cases to study since the war in which the Soviets employed some form of deception: their military interventions into Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). Each of these three cases provides a slightly different example of Soviet-style deception, but they are examples nevertheless; examples which give us an idea of what role deception plays in the Soviet military and how it is likely to be used.

IV. SOVIET MINDSET: PROCLIVITY FOR DECEPTION?

The degree of skill a certain group possesses in employing deception is dependent in part on the group's psychological make-up; specifically, on its historical proclivity for using deception in certain situations. Many factors have a bearing on this proclivity, but by far the most prominent is a state's perceived need for security; is it constantly threatened, or does it feel threatened? If such is the case, the state is likely to increase its security measures to the degree it feels the threat is sufficiently neutralized. Common among such states which maintain high security is the practice of deceiving one's opponents in order to dilute or distract the threatening force. Israel is a good example of this. Constantly threatened by its surrounding Arab neighbors, Israel has become one of the most skillful employers of the art. Although this has not always been the case in Israeli-Arab diplomatic relations, it has become the norm for the frequent military clashes in that region. Deception has played an important, even crucial, role in the more recent of these clashes.

Certainly another very applicable state in this case is the Soviet Union.⁵ Richard Pipes, in his book entitled Survival is Not Enough points out that after the Turks overran Byzantium in 1453, Russia was left as the only state

⁵I use the term "Soviet Union" here because that is the name of the state in question. What I actually mean (not only in this particular instance but also in many future references to the Soviet Union in this chapter) is the Russian nation, which still lives on but now with a different name and somewhat ethnically diluted. However, the Russians still form over fifty percent of the Soviet population, they fill the majority of government positions and, most importantly, it is essentially only Russian history that is recognized by the Soviets before the revolution in 1917 and which we are interested in at this time.

professing Orthodox Christianity. This turn of events tended to produce in Russians a besieged mentality and a feeling of isolation. [Ref. 8: p. 18] Pipes also offers his strong opinion that Russian aggression is not a defensive reflex. It has become popular among many students of Soviet political culture to state that Russian expansionism is a result of the paranoia caused by repeated invasions of Russia over the centuries. In actuality, as Pipes asserts, Russia has been the invader far more than it has been the one invaded. [Ref. 8: p. 38] But one very important point overrides this last point: the Soviets (and before them the Russians) nevertheless perceive themselves as being under siege. Today, this transcends the military and political realms and reaches into the realm of ideology. Therefore, for the purpose of determining the Soviet proclivity for deception, it does not matter so much what actually happened in the past, but instead, how events in the past have contributed to the formation of current Soviet perceptions.

There are several aspects of Russian history which help explain the present Soviet penchant for deception. The first is the development of modern Russian/Soviet society based on the evolution of the Russian peasant village hundreds of years ago (called "Mir" which means both "world" and "peace" in Russian). The Mirs were the lowest unit of society as Russia was in the process of developing into a nation. Each Mir was essentially a self-contained, separate entity, a condition which soon led to distrust of the outside world, paranoia, and xenophobia. Strangers were never welcome and the order of the day was secrecy. A natural outgrowth of this secrecy was the use of deception in everyday affairs (particularly in the rare instances trade was conducted with the outside) in order to protect themselves from any perceived threat. A crude system of government eventually appeared in the form of leadership by the village elders.

This group of men epitomized the overall personality of the Mir: secretive, deceptive, and autocratic. One of the elders would eventually emerge as the most influential and become the village spokesman and mediator with the outside world. Again, his most common means for protecting his village were secrecy and deception.

As Russia continued its development into a nation, a "Princely Court" was formed with the Grand Prince (eventually called "Czar") living in Moscow. This court was the result of the upper class merging into clans; each clan had a leader (prince) who lived in the Kremlin with the Grand Prince (hence the Princely Court). Just as with the Mir, the Princely Court was autocratic, oligarchic, secretive, and deceptive. Contact with the outside world was avoided and any visitors (such as foreign ambassadors) were kept in plush captivity, not allowed to see how Russian royalty lived.

Looking at the current Soviet government, one can easily see the ancestral ties. Just as their predecessors, the Soviet leaders are autocratic, oligarchic, secretive, and deceptive. The outside world (with rare exceptions) is forbidden to see the inner workings of Soviet bureaucracy. Deception is used almost habitually in all realms of Soviet behavior, be it political, ideological, economic, or military, to protect them from any perceived threat.

[Ref. 9]

Reinforcing, and perhaps supplanting, the besieged mentality of Orthodox Christianity days, the Soviets now perceive themselves as the only bastion of true socialism. Realizing that the state of true communism cannot be achieved until all capitalist threats are removed, the Soviets continue to emphasize the external threat, using it as some of the justification for a secretive society and often aggressive behavior. Whether justified or not,

westerners must realize that the result of all this paranoia and xenophobia is a Soviet personality to which secrecy and deception are common tools.

In observing Soviet behavior, one can get the impression that deception has become a Soviet way of life not only in relation to the outside world but also in everyday intra-Soviet relations. One source, in discussing the infallibility of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, describes a process known as "double think" which he feels is used by many individual Soviets:

Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind at the same time, and accepting both of them . . . the essential act of the Party is to use conscious deception while retaining the firmness of purpose that goes with complete honesty . . . to deny the existence of objective reality and all the while take account of the reality one denies
[Ref. 10: p. 28]

One can see, therefore, that the Soviet system encourages, albeit unconsciously, the development of a proclivity for deception in the Soviet citizen. This proclivity is reinforced everyday by the very nature of the system. Dr. Wilhelm Starlinger, a former prisoner of the Soviets, describes how the practice of deception by means of altered public figures (numerical) has permeated the entire Soviet system:

Former workers in the apparatus of the Central Committee and old Party members said to me over and over again: "Never believe any figure that is published. Everyone is either false or correct depending on whether truth or falsehood happens to meet the needs of the moment. Fundamentally, everything in our country that involves figures is outright manipulation, intended to mystify!"
[Ref. 11: p. 32]

Ronald Hingley, in his book entitled The Russian Mind delves deeper into the Russian/Soviet mentality and identifies two forms of Russian deception, or lying:

"vranyo" and "lozh." "Vranyo" is defined as "lies, fibbing, nonsense, or rot," a relatively harmless trait of storytelling present in most societies, not just in Russia. "Lozh," on the other hand, is the much more serious habit of lying to cover something up, and appears to be more common in the Russian culture than in most others. [Ref. 12: p.90] The Marquis de Custine, a visitor of Russia in 1839, describes this Russian trait as "a dexterity in lying, an aptitude for the bogus so effective that it affronts my integrity [Ref. 12: pp. 105-106]."

The picture one gets of the Soviet mentality, therefore, is of a character which embraces lying and deceit. Of course, this is a harsh description and we should not believe that all Soviet citizens do nothing but lie and deceive. But we should realize that because of his Russian heritage, a Soviet finds it easier to use these tools than does the average citizen of most other nations. And in as much as a nation's armed forces are a microcosm of the society in general, the Soviet military has inherited the Russian proclivity for deception. Whether and how the Soviet military has institutionalized this proclivity, so that it can be employed in a consistent and efficient manner, is the subject of the remaining chapters.

V. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought about many changes to their society as a whole. Yet, although Lenin and the other new leaders sought to erase much of their czarist past and push on with the new socialist order, they found it impossible to get away from the Russian heritage. Despite the re-naming of the state and the attempts at departure from the old ways, most Soviet citizens were still Russians at heart (excepting, of course, the various assimilated Turkic, Asian, and Baltic cultures). The new Red Army proved to be no different. Lenin could not afford to erase every vestige of czarist influence from the military because it would have required the disposal of many strategies and tactics fundamental and necessary to any military--western, eastern, or otherwise. The heritage of the Russian Army, therefore, was passed on to the Red Army and can still be seen today in many ways. Since this link between the past and present exists, it is only logical that a historical look at the Soviet military use of deception include a look at the Russian use of the art.

A. THE MONGOL INFLUENCE

As with many armies of the past few centuries, the Russian Army could trace its roots back to the influence of another armed force. In some such cases, the influence was provided by a small section of the culture, an influence which eventually evolved into that society's way of fighting war. The best example of this was the adoption of Prussian methods by the German Army. Other "modern" armies were heavily influenced by their enemies or captors. The Russian case falls in this latter category, with the Mongols providing the influence. The Mongol invasion of what is now

considered the heart of European Russia came in two campaigns, the first in the 1237-38 period and the second in 1240 [Ref. 13: p. 52]. The Mongols retained relatively firm control through the end of the century and then slowly began to be assimilated into the Russian culture through linguistic adaptation, religious conversion, and regional intermarriage. This assimilation was essentially completed by the mid-fourteenth century. [Ref. 14: p. 72] Counting the earlier Mongol conquests on Russia's periphery, their total period of rule amounted to about 250 years. Subjugation of one group of people under another for that length of time is bound to affect the lifestyle of the former, and the Russian-Mongol relationship was no exception. Since the Mongol people formed one of the most military of states, their influence was strongest on the then embryonic Russian military. Steven Stinemetz, in an article on the Mongol military method, points out that even today "the Soviet armed forces display striking similarities to their Mongolian predecessors. They specialize in fast, mobile operations, employ deception on an immense scale, and enforce an unusually rigid tactical doctrine in order to guarantee strategic flexibility [Ref. 14: p. 71]."

In his article, Stinemetz outlines four general themes which suggest themselves in any study of the Mongol military method and which can also be seen in the Soviet method: 1) the interrelationship between tactical capabilities and strategic possibilities, 2) conservation of resources, 3) the danger of misinterpreting culturally inculcated usages, and 4) strategic deception. Only two of the themes are pertinent to this study: *conservation of resources* and *strategic deception*.

Under *conservation of resources*, Stinemetz points out that because of the Mongol numerical inferiority in virtually every engagement, they were forced to appreciate

and make judicious use of the "traditional force multipliers:" terrain, firepower, mobility, and surprise. One of the principle means the Mongols used in achieving surprise was deception. Stimemetz's use of the term *strategic deception* is somewhat inaccurate, at least in the context in which he uses it. The deception to which he refers is the practice of deceiving an enemy commander concerning the "schwerpunkt" or main axis of one's attack, an operation which falls into the realm of tactical or operational deception more often than strategic. The Mongols became particularly adept at this type of deception, continually forcing the enemy to commit the bulk of his forces and even reserves in the wrong area, leaving his flanks exposed to attack. [Ref. 14: pp. 79-80] This same skill can be seen in the Soviet Army today, a skill which has roots reaching back to the Mongols, but which also received strong reinforcement in World War II at the hands of the Germans.

These methods were, of course, copied first by the Russian Army, only with horses instead of tanks. Up until the seventeenth century, the Russian Army remained predominantly a cavalry force based on the Mongol model, using most of the mobile and deceptive tactics learned from the Mongols. Beginning in the seventeenth century, Russia began to look to the West for influence, especially in the military realm. This trend was begun seriously by Czar Aleksey Mikhaylovich and then further advocated by Peter the Great. By the nineteenth century, however, the Asian influence began to be felt again and a conflict developed between two schools of thought in Russia: the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. The former believed the Russian heritage, recognized as being heavily based on Asian culture, was barbaric and of little value. The latter considered their heritage to be unique and, in many cases,

superior to that of the West. [Ref. 13: pp. 55-56] The result of all this was a Russian military which incorporated many of the best aspects of both influences. Considering the relatively poor showing by western armies in the use of military deception, it is logical for one to assume that the Russian, and now Soviet penchant and skill in employing deception has deep roots in the East and not in the West.

B. THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II

Without detracting from the Mongol and Russian influences, it is no exaggeration to state that the Soviet experience in World War II dwarfs all other experiences in its influence on modern Soviet military strategy. It would, of course, be folly to assume that the Soviets have discarded their long heritage and now draw exclusively from that relatively brief four years of war for the source of their military strategy. As the previous section revealed, there are several similarities between the Mongol and Soviet methods of war, but I submit that the Soviets adopted the Mongol methods unconsciously, rather than through research. World War II, however, stands as the only large scale conventional war in which the Soviets have participated and, therefore, serves as their only source of practical experience.

In addition to that more pragmatic reason, there is also a strong emotional reason why the Soviets look back so frequently to the war. World War II represents to them a period of extreme sacrifice and unbelievable human casualties, as many as twenty million according to the Soviets. But most important is the fact that it was a time when the Soviet Union was fighting for its very survival. Although Richard Pipes is absolutely correct in stating that the Soviets and Russians have been the aggressor more often than the defender [Ref. 8: p. 18], the vivid and bitter memory of the Nazi invasion serves to virtually obliterate

the Soviet memory of Soviet or Russian aggression. In short, World War II has left an indelible mark on the memories of those Soviet people who lived through the experience. Only after that generation has passed on will the war fill a less prominent role in the Soviet psyche.

So what does all this mean for Soviet military strategy? It means the Soviets will fight a large scale conventional war in much the same way they fought World War II. Of course, adjustments will be made for newer, more mobile, more powerful, and generally more capable weapons, but the methods used to employ those weapons will be very similar to those used forty years ago. Even today, the Soviets analyze every major World War II battle in minute detail to determine what was done right or wrong. They then play the scenario through again with the modern weapons to see what the outcome would be. The result is that virtually all of their non-nuclear military doctrine (and even some nuclear doctrine) is based on their World War II experience. With this in mind, it becomes apparent that Soviet employment of deception today is likely to be based heavily on their employment of the art in the war; and as it turns out, they used deception a great deal.

Although methods for employing deception, and even regulations governing that employment, had been developed by the Soviets well before the war, they were generally ignored by most commanders. Probably the biggest reason for this neglect was Stalin's view of surprise, deception, and other such elements of warfare as "transient factors." His emphasis was on the "permanently operating factors," such as morale and industrial potential. [Ref. 15: p. 51] Needless to say, Stalin's method of leadership discouraged any argument on the issue and the Soviet military consequently suffered. The opening stages of the war on the eastern front saw the Soviets at a distinct disadvantage due to the German

use of speed, mobility, surprise and, yes, even deception. Both the Soviet Army and Air Force were dealt severe blows and each suffered huge losses, but it did not take long for them to recover and put into practice what they had just learned. One of those lessons learned was the value of deception, and each branch of the service began to use it extensively.

1. Soviet Army Deception in World War II

The Army learned quickly that deception could be instrumental in concealing from the enemy the concept of an operation, troop locations, composition, combat readiness, and combat effectiveness, as well as achieving surprise in offensive operations. Colonel General P. Melnikov, Chief of the Soviets' M. V. Frunze Military Academy in 1982, identifies three stages of development of camouflage, concealment, and deception⁶ skills within the Army throughout the course of the war. He never provides specific dates for these stages and they simply represent broader use of deception at each stage, but they do serve to show the nature of the evolution of deception within the Army.

The first stage was characterized by limited time to prepare for operations due to the speed of the German advance. Specific operations included the battle of Smolensk, the Vyazma defensive operation, the counteroffensive at Moscow, and others. Despite this limitation, Melnikov contends, the Army was still able to implement a number of deceptive measures which greatly contributed to the eventual German halt. The most notable of these measures, in his words, included:

⁶The three concepts of camouflage, concealment, and deception all fall within the purview of the Russian word *maskirovka*. The Soviets use the word *maskirovka* in any literature concerning deception or its subsidiary concepts. However, for the purpose of simplification, I will use only the word "deception," except when it is necessary to make specific reference to any of the other concepts.

... the creation of attack groupings at a considerable distance from the front line or to one side of the planned main axis of attack; accomplishment of troop regrouping only at night and their advance to initial areas for an offensive over a one or two day period; constantly preserving the established routine in areas where attacks were planned; conduct of reconnaissance across a broad front extending beyond the limit of where the main attack was to be delivered; reliable screening of the area for concentration of the main grouping against enemy ground and aerial reconnaissance; and the attack by troops from the move. [Ref. 16: p. 23]

Of particular importance to the Soviets during the first stage was the experience they gained in simulating troop concentrations. They learned that a dummy troop concentration would be successful only if enemy reconnaissance detected at least twenty to twenty-five percent of the amount of troops being simulated. In other words, if the Soviets wanted to portray a concentration of 500 troops, they had to use a minimum of 100-125 and ensure that the Germans saw them all. The personnel, along with appropriate dummy equipment, radio chatter, etc., were usually sufficient to make German intelligence believe the larger figure. Additionally, the Soviets learned that dummy objects must be no closer than twenty kilometers from the actual object and must not be located with them on the probable axis of enemy flights. And, finally, optimum results could be obtained only if the portrayal of the dummy grouping lasted right up until the actual grouping moved into the offensive. [Ref. 16: p. 23.]

It should be recognized that the portrayal of a dummy concentration is one of the most fundamental of deceptive actions. Much deception, as pointed out in Chapter 2, is intended to divert the enemy's attention away from an actual object or grouping. This is usually accomplished by portraying a false object or grouping in the area to which his attention is to be diverted. The Soviets learned this basic skill quickly and with it "under their belt" were soon able to attempt more sophisticated deception tactics.

The second stage in the Soviet Army's development of a deception capability was marked generally by a refinement and expansion of the skills they had learned in the first stage. More specifically, this stage was characterized by a transition from the employment of individual, separate deception measures to the use of a whole complex of measures, orchestrated to support large-scale operations. Of particular importance in allowing this transition was the fact that the Soviets now had more time to prepare their plans which, in turn, became much more detailed and sophisticated. One other important accomplishment during this stage was the creation of special staffs to plan and oversee the implementation of deception operations.⁷ Although Melnikov gives no dates for these stages, it is apparent from the changes made during the second stage that it did not begin much before spring of 1942. Before that time, the Soviets had little time for proper preparation of plans as sophisticated as those described in the second stage. [Ref. 16: pp. 24-26]

The third stage saw a dramatic increase in the overall use of deception and in the scope of the operations, the latter sometimes encompassing more than one front (a front in this case consisting of several armies). The typical objective of a deception plan during this time was concealing preparation of an offensive. This indicates the third stage must have begun sometime after the battle of Kursk in 1943, when the Soviets firmly gained the initiative and began their big offensive. This last stage also saw the new deception tactics, learned since the opening of the eastern front, begin to appear in regulations and manuals, a sure sign that the Soviets had learned a lot about the art.

⁷The Soviet creation of special deception staffs appears to have paralleled the British creation of same. Although there might have been very small deception cells established at the very outset of the war, the larger staffs did not appear until late 1941 or early 1942.

By this time, the Soviets had also learned the value of security in regards to deception plans and operations, and fairly stringent security measures were developed along with, and in support of, each plan. [Ref. 16: pp. 26-27]

Looking back over the three stages of development, one can see a steady progression of skill in planning and executing deception. The Soviets started out with simple tactics and gradually expanded their knowledge and experience until, by the end of the war, they were implementing some rather sophisticated and elaborate deceptions. Starting out simple as they did prevented them from experiencing a particularly disastrous plan, which could have happened had they started with some of the more ambitious ploys used in the latter stages of the war. Once convinced, however, of the value and effectiveness of deception, the Soviets employed it on a grand scale. To give an example of the scope of some of these operations, the commander of the Soviet 18th Army approved, in June 1944, the following resources for use in portraying a tank army concentration: two rifle and two engineer battalions, three artillery batteries, one anti-aircraft artillery regiment, one tank company, one fighter aviation flight, one radio company, one chemical company, 500 decoy tanks, 200 decoy vehicles, 600 decoy artillery pieces, two decoy trains, 100 field kitchen mockups, 5000 smokepots, two sound units (broadcast), four tractors, fifteen vehicles, and ten motorcycles [Ref. 16: pp.28-29]. Keep in mind, all these resources were dedicated to supporting the deception plan and nothing else. Obviously, the Soviets placed a lot of faith in the effectiveness of their deception operations to release that many resources.

Before leaving this section on the Soviet Army, it is interesting to note some of the means the Soviets employed in their deception operations. In addition to the

standard means, such as decoys, feints, dummy concentrations, etc., they also used some fairly unorthodox means. Although in violation of the Hague Convention, it was not uncommon for Soviet soldiers to don German uniforms, sometimes by groups as large as entire battalions. Since the Soviets refrained from doing this too often, the Germans usually suffered higher than normal casualties or prisoners when they encountered these troops. One Soviet soldier made a reputation for himself by occasionally donning a German uniform (usually SS) and either killing or capturing high-ranking German officers. In one such case in 1943, the Russian kidnapped a German general commanding the Rowne Military District, solicited the aid of the general's orderly in loading the body (gagged and wrapped) into a truck and drove away. Another favorite of the Soviets was the release or rigged escape of German prisoners of war after providing them with false information, or arranging the capture of Soviet soldiers who had been fed false information. All in all, the Soviet Army demonstrated considerable ingenuity and skill in using deception throughout the war. [Ref. 17: pp. 30-31]

2. Soviet Air Force Deception in World War II

During World War II, the Soviet Air Force also became an ardent supporter of deception. However, its interest in the art focused heavily, although not exclusively, on camouflage and concealment of airfields rather than active deceptive employment of aircraft. Of course, the Soviet Air Force (SAF), just as any other combatant's air force at the time, employed some deceptive-like aerial combat tactics (usually in the form of feints), but these were at such a tactical level that it is hardly worth mentioning them. Toward the end of the war, the Soviets did begin to deploy aircraft in such a way as to support an overall joint deception operation. A good example

of this was the use of bogus reconnaissance sorties indicating Soviet ground interest in areas where there actually was no interest. Such a tactic served to divert German attention away from areas where primary Soviet attention and efforts were to be directed. However, incidents in which the Soviets employed deception in the air were extremely rare. The bulk of SAF deception in World War II was used to protect airfields and aircraft on the ground.

The Soviets were well justified in their preoccupation with airfield protection since much of the Air Force was destroyed on the ground during the opening stages of the war on the eastern front (eastern from the German perspective). On 22 June 1941, the first day of Operation Barbarossa, the German codename for the attack on the Soviet Union, the Germans used a force of 500 bombers, 270 dive bombers, and 480 fighters to hit 66 airfields containing almost three-fourths of the total Soviet combat aircraft [Ref. 18: p. 11]. By the end of the day, 1,811 Soviet aircraft had been destroyed, 1,489 on the ground and 322 in the air [Ref. 19: p. 15]. In a scene soon to be repeated by the Japanese in December 1941 at Hickam Air Base, Hawaii, German fighters attacked an airfield where more than 100 Soviet aircraft, including bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft, were neatly parked in close rows. After repeated passes throughout the next twenty minutes, the Germans destroyed every aircraft there [Ref. 20: pp. 11-12].

The devastation inflicted on Soviet air units was unprecedented, and still stands as the record for the highest number of aircraft lost by any air force in such a short period of time. The magnitude of the destruction had an immense impact on SAF commanders, and measures were quickly adopted to ensure it would never happen again. One Soviet military writer, Col Simakov, described these measures in the following, rather understated terms:

Having summed up the experience from the war's first days, the VVS (air force) commander issued a special directive in July 1941 concerning the camouflaging of airfields and measures which would ensure lowering aircraft losses caused by enemy air strikes on them. [Ref. 21: p. 3]

The special directive was issued on 9 July 1941, just seventeen days after the eastern front had opened. The fact that the Air Force commander signed the document, rather than having individual unit commanders employ whatever means they saw fit, demonstrates the high level of interest in camouflage and concealment among SAF officers at that time.

The July 1941 directive,⁸ short and to the point, outlined three basic approaches which formed the core of Soviet passive airfield protection measures employed throughout the war: aircraft dispersal, camouflage/concealment, and deception. The hastily adopted measures apparently had some fairly immediate beneficial results, at least in the Soviets' view, for Col Simakov noted that:

Strict observance of camouflage rules gave good results and allowed the enemy to be misinformed and directed to dummy objectives. From 14 to 18 August 1941, enemy aviation attacked from six to eleven times each of six well prepared Central Front dummy airfields on which plywood airplanes and rotting DI-6 gliders were located. During the same time, bombers which were hidden in a forest four kilometers from them were not subjected to a single attack and our aviation had no losses. [Ref. 21: p. 3]

While this quote focuses on only one small segment of time and fails to mention the success of subsequent German attacks in other areas, contemporary Soviet writers on the subject of airfield camouflage, concealment, and deception are virtually unanimous in claiming that such measures, once

⁸A reproduction of the 9 July 1941 directive by General Zhigarev, as cited in FBIS, can be found at Appendix A, page 103.

adopted, made significant contributions to the survival of Soviet airfields.

Drawing from a full year of experience, the SAF commander in June 1942, Lt Gen of Aviation Novikov, issued a directive which stressed the importance of effective camouflage, concealment, and deception. Although Novikov's orders were not particularly detailed in terms of specific measures to be adopted, they did serve to reinforce and support a growing awareness among high-ranking Soviet officers that camouflage, concealment, and deception could be, and was, highly beneficial to SAF airfield survivability. Of particular importance in Novikov's directive was the statement that "air defense and camouflage cannot be made mutually exclusive; on the contrary, camouflage and concealment must supplement the overall system of an airfield's antiaircraft defense."⁹ This is a statement which should be seriously considered by contemporary planners for airbase survivability. Many similar directives were published throughout the war, five of which can be found reproduced in part at Appendix A, pages 103-105.

In analyzing the camouflage, concealment, and deception used by the SAF during World War II, it becomes apparent that it can be easily divided into the two basic variants of deception: disguising and distracting. Many of the methods inherent in these two variants employed by the Soviets are interesting and deserve closer scrutiny since they provide some insight into how the Soviets may employ deception in future military conflicts.

⁹A reproduction of the 22 June 1942 directive by General Novikov, as cited in FBIS, can be found at Appendix A, page 103.

a. Disguising Variant

First priority for the SAF was the basic concealment of airfields in use. As the war progressed, the Soviets began to demonstrate surprising ingenuity in concealment through the use of several methods. Most of these methods were variations in simple camouflage, but several entailed slightly more active means of deception. All such methods, however, served only the purpose of hiding the operational airfields, or at least making them appear less attractive as targets.

A fundamental principle in camouflage is the judicious use of natural terrain features, and the Soviets proved to be quite adept in this. At airfields located in the vicinity of forests, aircraft were parked among the trees, and taxiways to the open runway were concealed. If forests were not readily available, then small coniferous trees, such as firs, were planted throughout the aircraft parking area. Experience showed that this type of natural camouflage for 15-20 aircraft generally required 15,000 young trees per month. Since this sometimes posed transportation problems, not to mention the destruction of forests, mockups of trees were developed which were made out of wood and cloth.

In addition to transplanted or artificial trees, the Soviets also made other natural-looking camouflage. Bushes were used in much the same manner as trees; camouflage "netting" was made out of straw, stalks of corn, sunflowers, or reeds when such vegetation was in season; small, lightweight haystacks were placed on grass runways when not in use. Vehicle and aircraft tracks were concealed by covering them with false patches of vegetation or fake swampy terrain, made out of moss, slag, and grass.

[Ref. 21: pp. 4-5]

The Soviets, of course, also used manufactured camouflage and decoys. This included not only the typical brown and green splotched camouflage netting for use in summertime conditions, but also the solid white material for use in snow. There were also some inflatable decoys of aircraft and vehicles as well as pre-fabricated plywood dummies. But these were generally in short supply and the Soviets were often forced to employ homemade camouflage and decoy equipment. As a result, they became quite good at using anything that was available (especially terrain features and vegetation) and at scavenging. This skill proved to be crucial to any Soviet employment of deception because of limited supplies, and it is a skill that should be cultivated by the U.S. military. Many tales are told of the resourcefulness of World War II American G.I.s, but that resourcefulness appears to have given way to a strong dependence on continuous supply and transportation support, a condition unlikely to last very long in a large-scale conflict.

On the more active deceptive side of protecting operational airfields, the Soviets usually sought to make them appear either unused or abandoned. This was done by a number of means, to include the construction of dummy bomb craters, ditches, and gullies all over an airfield. Sometimes the Soviets used a little double deception in making an operational airfield look like a dummy field, accomplished by intentionally poor camouflage techniques which allowed the rib construction of aircraft decoys to be seen from the air. In support of this, the actual aircraft, when not flying, were covered with wooden casings and cloth painted an unnatural color which gave the aircraft the appearance of poor quality decoys. These measures, in concert with others already mentioned, sometimes convinced the Germans they were looking at a dummy airfield.

b. Distracting Variant

In addition to the deception measures applied to the concealment and disguising of operational airfields, the Soviets began to look for ways to distract the Germans' attention away from those fields. The primary means used to accomplish this were dummy airfields. These fields involved far more than simply mowing a strip of grass in an open area to look like a landing strip. Good quality decoy aircraft and support vehicles had to be built and deployed; dummy buildings and tents were erected; lighting was strung up and operated at night; and many more measures adopted. Even then, an airfield with little or no activity around it was soon suspect to the Germans, so the Soviets had to allocate sufficient personnel to generate some activity (driving vehicles, "refueling" decoy aircraft, operating lights at night, etc.).

Even these efforts, however, did not prove to be enough to convince the Germans sometimes. A dummy airfield can be planned out and developed in excruciating detail and then made to appear on the ground as if it is fully operational, but without some air activity at least in its vicinity, all that work can be for naught. The Soviets, therefore, arranged for incoming flights to first circle the dummy fields and then approach the operational fields at low altitude. One problem that continually cropped up for the Soviet pilots was that German reconnaissance aircraft would sometimes follow them home, spot the operational airfield, and then direct bombers to attack it. In the words of Col Simakov:

Various ways to cut (the German reconnaissance aircraft) off began to be used later on: flying over a checkpoint, circling on the flight path, making loops, and simulating a landing at a dummy airfield. [Ref. 21: p. 5]

Simulating air activity over dummy fields, therefore, became important not only to lending credence to the dummy field's authenticity but also to protecting the location of the operational field.

As the war progressed, the Soviets naturally gained considerable experience in developing these fields and soon began to create elaborate complexes of them. Sometimes one operational field would have as many as five to ten dummy fields around it, some in direct line with the probable enemy approach routes in order to serve as screens for the operational one. The Soviets learned that the optimum distance between an operational field and its dummy network was ten to fifteen kilometers. This was sufficiently close to easily simulate air activity over the dummy fields, but far enough to prevent German pilots from spotting the operational field as they bombed the dummies. Quite often, a complex of dummy airfields was created in a certain area where there were no operational fields. In such cases, the Soviets were generally seeking to portray a concentration of air power in support of a false ground main axis of attack. [Ref. 21: pp. 5-7, 9]

Finally, the Soviets constantly moved their air units from base to base, many times vacating an operational field and moving to a dummy field the Germans had discovered was false. In such cases, the former operational field was maintained to appear as if it were still operational. In short, the whole process had the appearance of a giant shell game. Although the SAF continued to suffer aircraft casualties and airfield damage throughout the war, the German pilots and intelligence officers were quite often confused as to which field was real and which was false. The Soviets created so many dummy airfields that it took considerable resources to bomb them all.

In concluding this section on the Soviet employment of deception in World War II, it is appropriate to point out some of the more important lessons they learned in that regard. One should keep in mind that these lessons have been carefully studied in the forty years since the war and incorporated into the Soviet method of fighting a war today. Although undoubtedly many lessons were learned, only the five most important are listed here:

- 1) A deception plan must support the overall operations plan. Col Simakov, in his article on SAF camouflage, concealment, and deception, stressed this point repeatedly, stating that the needed effect was obtained only if this axiom were followed. [Ref. 21: pp. 6, 10, 12]
- 2) Joint services (army/air force) deception operations are more beneficial than single service operations. This ties in closely with the preceding point. Simakov reiterated that SAF deception plans always supported the Front's (army and air force) general surprise and deception plan. This is important because if the army units are portraying a false concentration of forces in one area and the air force is portraying a false concentration of air power in another, the enemy's perception of the opposing force posture could be totally different from what was desired. However, a deception plan coordinated with and supported by both services tends to be more believable, primarily because it provides more deceptive inputs across a broader spectrum for the enemy to analyze; and this last point flows into the next. [Ref. 21: pp. 6, 9, 12]
- 3) A deception plan is much more effective and apt to be believed if a whole complex of deceptive measures is applied rather than only a few. The more inputs provided, the more corroboration the enemy has to acquire the desired perception. [Ref. 16: p. 26]
- 4) The Soviets learned the value of establishing special staffs and units dedicated to planning and executing deception operations. Although of questionable value in peacetime, these groups in wartime greatly relieve the work load of standard planning staffs and engineering units. With such special groups at his disposal, a commander is much more likely to employ and enjoy effective deception. [Ref. 21: pp. 8-9] [Ref. 16: p. 25]
- 5) Finally, the Soviets also learned the importance of good security measures with regard to the planning and implementation of deception operations. These measures were directed not only at the enemy, but also at friendly personnel without a need to know. [Ref. 16: p. 27]

VI. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ON DECEPTION

The issue of military doctrine and all its associated terms is very important to both the military and Party leadership of the Soviet Union. Whereas American military doctrine is discussed in very broad and general terms in the U.S., Soviet military doctrine is scrutinized in minute detail in the Soviet Union and its terms precisely defined. Soviet military doctrine represents the official policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and, as such, is set in concrete and brooks no discussion once adopted [Ref. 22: p. 74]. As one Soviet source puts it, "it is a unified system of views and aims, free from private views and estimates [Ref. 23: p. 74]." Soviet military doctrine itself does not address deception since issues at that level are still fairly broad in scope. Deception does not enter the picture until one looks at the component of military science known as military art. An understanding of deception's role in Soviet doctrine, however, requires an understanding of the relationship between the various subsidiary concepts.

Soviet military science is "a system of knowledge on the nature and laws of war, the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war and the methods of its conduct [Ref. 24: p. 74]." Unlike military doctrine, in some components of military science differences of opinion are permitted and sometimes even encouraged. There are seven components of Soviet military science: general theory of military science, theory of the organization of the armed forces, military geography, military history, theory of training, military-technical science, and military art [Ref. 25: p. 1.3]. The latter component, military art, is sometimes called the "Theory of the Art of War," and it is this component of military science on which we now focus.

Military art is applied by the Soviets at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. These three levels can be readily distinguished in most Soviet combat operations, including the implementation of deception plans. At the strategic level, the Soviet General Staff is responsible for planning and directing two forms of strategic military operations: strategic-global and strategic groupings of operational formations. Global, national, and theater operations are all grouped within this level. The operational level is characterized by operational formations within a theater. These formations consist of fronts and armies; the front is the basic operational formation, the army is the basic combined arms formation. Within the tactical level fall the remaining subordinate levels of organization: divisions (tactical large units), regiments (tactical units), and battalions (tactical sub-units) and below. A summary of the three levels' interdependency can be worded thus: "Strategic success is based on operational results. Operational results are based on the correct application of tactics [Ref. 25: p. 1.3]." In this statement, one can see how a multi-level application of deception could be meshed into one operational or even strategic plan.

A. RELATIONSHIP WITH SURPRISE

Looking at the components of military art, we can begin to see where deception fits into all of this. There are seven components of military art: 1) speed and shock (mobility, maneuver, and high rates of combat operations), 2) concentration of effort (decisive superiority at the decisive place at the decisive time), 3) surprise and security, 4) combat activeness, 5) preservation of combat effectiveness, 6) conformity of the goal, and 7) coordination of forces [Ref. 26: p. 12]. The key component here, in terms of deception's role in Soviet military

doctrine, is surprise. Deception itself is actually never directly addressed in official Soviet treatment of military doctrine, science, and art. However, it is frequently discussed in unofficial articles by Soviet officers in such military publications as Red Star, Aviation and Cosmonautics, and many others. Most of these writers stress the important and sometimes crucial relationship between surprise and deception.

Surprise is not, of course, synonymous with deception. In fact, surprise can be achieved without the use of deception, although the probability of its achievement is greatly reduced without some deception. Surprise refers to "an action or series of actions which are sudden in occurrence, forceful in thrust, completely unanticipated, and decisive with regard to outcome [Ref. 27: p. 51]." Illustrating the importance of surprise to the Soviets, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia provides the following definition:

Surprise is one of the most important principles of military art, entailing the selection of (proper) timing, the mode and manner of military action, allowing strikes when the enemy is least prepared to repel them and, moreover, paralyzing the enemy's will to mount organized resistance. It is achieved by confusing the enemy of your intentions, by keeping secret your intentions for battle, and by concealing preparations for action; by applying new means of destruction and those types of military actions unfamiliar to the enemy; by correctly choosing the direction of the primary strike and time for its initiation; by applying unanticipated strikes by means of aviation, artillery, tanks, and the surprise use of all types of fire; by rapid maneuvering, decisive action, forestalling the enemy's launching of strikes. . . .; by conducting deceptive actions and camouflage; and by adeptly using the area's relief characteristics (i.e. geography), weather conditions, and seasonal variables. [Ref. 28: p. 5]

This emphasis on surprise is seen not only in Soviet treatment of conventional warfare but also in their treatment of strategic (nuclear) warfare. The attainment of strategic surprise through preemptive nuclear strikes is openly discussed in Soviet literature [Ref. 29: pp. 33-39].

It is not surprising to see security go hand-in-hand with surprise in the Soviets' seven components of military art. Every one of the actions mentioned in the quote above requires effective security to achieve the desired element of surprise; otherwise, the enemy could be forewarned and, at the very least, foil the operation. At worst, the surprise could be turned against the perpetrator and wreak havoc on his plans, perhaps even causing significant losses and casualties. The Soviets realize all this and apply stringent security measures to help ensure the element of surprise is achieved, maintained, and exploited. But even the best of security cannot always ensure surprise, so the Soviets also employ deception to disguise preparations for an operation and to distract the enemy's attention away from the preparations.

B. MASKIROVKA

The Soviet view of the concept of military deception is treated with one word: *maskirovka*. As is readily apparent in the spelling, the word is based on the root "mask." *Maskirovka* encompasses three subsidiary concepts: camouflage, concealment, and deception; and U.S. publications quite often translate the word in just that manner.¹⁰ Although each of the three subsidiary concepts is slightly different from the other, the term deception sufficiently describes the overall concept and the Russian word *maskirovka* can be accurately translated as such.

Just as with any Soviet military operation, deception can be applied at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level, the Soviet Supreme Command is responsible for approval of any deception plans.

¹⁰The recent U.S. Air Force focus on airbase survivability (ABS) has included a subsidiary concept using the name "camouflage, concealment, and deception" (CCD). Although most of the emphasis is on camouflage and concealment, the USAF's view of CCD essentially parallels the Soviets' view of *maskirovka*.

Deception plans at this level could support the initial operations of a war (such as a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO) or invasion (such as those seen in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan). The fairly well-known Soviet use of disinformation is also generally done in a strategic nature. At the operational level, deception is used to support broad operations across a wide spectrum of the entire front. This can include operations at the front (organizational), army, and theater level. In such cases, the commander responsible for the operation being supported by deception is responsible for the approval of the deception plan. Because of the risk of possible interference with neighboring fronts' operations, every operational deception plan must be based on a joint or unified plan developed and issued by the Supreme Soviet Command. [Ref. 30: p. 26] Finally, tactical deception is applied at the division level and below. Again, the commander responsible for the supported operation is responsible for the deception plan's approval. Close coordination is required between adjacent units to ensure non-interference. [Ref. 27: pp. 25-26]

Soviet literature on deception reveals an ever growing knowledge in the subject; knowledge based not only on their experience in World War II but also on more recent repeated application of deception in numerous exercises. In the course of such exercises, Soviet planners have been able to develop a number of basic guidelines to follow in the planning and implementation of deception operations. Four of the most notable of these are listed below, and if compared to the basic deception planning principles in Chapter II of this thesis, one will notice a remarkable similarity.

1. Guidelines for Planning

- a. Activeness

The first of these Soviet guidelines is activeness in the application of deception. This term

demonstrates that the Soviets prefer to actively deceive an enemy, to aggressively intrude in the enemy's decision process, seeking to create confusion which results in indecision and mistakes. Keep in mind the Soviet desire for surprise and swift exploitation of its results. Active deception is designed to aid in these goals, and the enemy does not have to stay indecisive very long for the Soviets to reap its benefits. [Ref. 31: pp. 27-28]

b. Plausibility

This guideline is identical to the one by the same name among the basic planning principles in Chapter II. Any deception must be plausible to the enemy. The enemy must believe that his opponent is capable of doing what is being portrayed to him. The Soviets also stress the quality of their decoys and camouflage; the quality must be sufficient to realistically represent the object being copied, or to hide it in the case of camouflage. [Ref. 31: p. 28]

c. Continuity and Timeliness

Again, a similarity can be seen between this Soviet guideline and the principle of timing in Chapter II. The Soviets teach their planners to ensure there are no gaps in the coverage provided by the deception plan. Coverage must be continuous and timing must be precise; if either is compromised, the entire plan is jeopardized, possibly thwarting its plausibility and increasing its risk of detection. [Ref. 31: p. 28]

d. Diversity

This ties in somewhat with the principle of detectability in Chapter II. In order to avoid stereotyped or repeated deceptive measures, the Soviets emphasize the employment of a broad range of means in any deception plan. This ensures the enemy is viewing as many different deceptive inputs as feasible so that no single input becomes suspect. Each input builds on and corroborates the others

being provided, all of which results in a believable false picture. [Ref. 31: p. 28]

2. Categories of Maskirovka

The development of a viable, comprehensive deception plan is made easier when the deception means available to a planner are organized into appropriate categories. Soviet literature on the subject suggest they have identified four such categories.

a. Camouflage Measures

This encompasses all possible camouflage equipment and techniques. What first comes to mind at the mention of camouflage is the typical brown and green material used for concealing objects, and it probably does constitute the greater portion of this category. However, one must not forget the extensive Soviet use of natural vegetation as well as terrain features for concealment, both of which are considered camouflage measures. [Ref. 31: pp. 29-31]

b. Imitation

This category includes the most fundamental forms of imitation, such as decoys or dummies, as well as more sophisticated measures, such as active intrusion into the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum and imitation of his signals (sometimes called radio or radar deception). The manipulation of one's own objects (distortion of installations or force groupings so that they appear different) or electronic signals is also included in this category. [Ref. 31: pp. 31-32]

c. Demonstration Maneuvers

For the Soviets, demonstration maneuvers can mean any kind of deceptive maneuvering of forces. This includes feints, which may involve direct confrontation with the enemy, or demonstrations, which usually involve a show of force (or buildup of force) without confrontation with

the enemy. Essentially, any movement of forces which is in support of a deception plan falls within this category.

[Ref. 31: pp. 32-33]

d. Disinformation

This is a category of deception the Soviets have developed to virtual perfection. It is in fact more commonly used in the political realm than in military operations. Disinformation, or misinformation as it is called in the West, is the deliberate and public misrepresentation of facts. It is very close to the category of administrative deception means described in Chapter II. Disinformation involves the presentation of deceptive information through such media as newspapers, television, or radio. Due to the closed nature of Soviet society and the strict security maintained around any of their military installations, the employment of disinformation through public posting of such things as flight schedules would be very rare. [Ref. 31: p. 33]

To conclude this chapter on deception in Soviet military doctrine, it is apparent through Soviet treatment of the subject in literature that deception is important to the successful conduct of military operations during wartime, at least in theory. Despite the emphasis on deception by military writers, Soviet commanders in the field do not all share the same degree of enlightenment as their intellectual colleagues who write the articles. The reproving tone of many of the more recent articles suggests that peacetime employment of deception by the Soviet military is lacking in alacrity and frequency. Many units which have employed deception in exercises have been judged as being careless and sloppy in its application [Ref. 32: p. 33]. This certainly is not the picture of efficiency provided by articles on Soviet use of deception in World War II. [Ref. 27: p. 33]

So does all this mean we need not concern ourselves with the possible Soviet use of deception in a future conflict? No, it does not mean that at all. The likelihood of a state's future use of deception cannot be predicted based solely on the attitude of some of its military commanders toward the art during peacetime. Deception can be very time-consuming and complicated in both its planning and execution phases, and without a specific, real-time threat, commanders have little incentive to employ it. Realizing this problem of incentive, the Soviet military leadership has approved the inclusion of a requirement in the publication Field Regulation for Staff that all operations plans at division level or higher include a fully developed supporting deception plan [Ref. 26: p. 12]. This requirement, which ensures peacetime practice of deception whether commanders like it or not, coupled with the fact that wartime provides dramatically stronger incentive to any heretofore blasé concept, suggests that Soviet commanders will very likely overcome any indifference to employing the art. One source sums up this train of thought as follows:

It cannot be assumed that the rather casual attitude toward camouflage and concealment displayed by some (Soviet) commanders during peacetime would be evident during combat operations. The Soviets demonstrated in World War II the capability of conducting large-scale military operations concurrently with the employment of a multitude of deceptive practices, including effective camouflage and concealment. In any future war or period of tension, the Warsaw Pact must be credited with the capability of implementing doctrinal guidelines which require effective camouflage and concealment measures. [Ref. 33: pp. 33-34]

VII. ORGANIZATION FOR DECEPTION

It should be stated right up front that little is known about Soviet organization of their combat units and staffs relative to the planning and implementation of deception operations. I am not speaking here about camouflage units; much is known about such units and the equipment and methods they will employ to satisfy camouflage objectives. Considering the thrust of this thesis, the way the Soviets organize to plan deception and then implement that plan is of much greater importance. How is deception planned in the Soviet military? Does the commander assign the task of deception planning to his planning staff, or does he create a special staff to handle it? Although we know little about their present organization relative to this issue, the answer is probably that a special staff is created. The Soviet planning practices in World War II are the best source for this guess. It cannot be emphasized too much that the Soviets constantly scrutinize their actions during World War II and model their current organization and doctrine accordingly. We must also keep in mind the closing statements of the last chapter, that deception is usually neglected in peacetime, even by the Soviets. Therefore, our only way to determine their current deception planning organization is to look at how they did it during World War II.

As shown in Chapter V, during the first few months of World War II, the Soviet Army and Air Force quickly learned the benefits of a well-planned and well-executed operation. But their use of the art also quickly outstripped their planning capability. Any planning staff is usually very busy during wartime and the addition of more tasks can have a detrimental effect on the quality of its output. Although

not specifically stated anywhere, the Soviets undoubtedly found themselves in such a position. Some high-ranking officers at that time felt that the responsibility for planning and execution of camouflage, concealment, and deception should fall solely on the chief of engineer troops [Ref. 30: p. 48]. Most who felt that way saw it as an easy way out of the planning overload. But as Lt. General Dashevskiy pointed out in 1980, the chief engineer does not have the overall picture of the battlefield that the commander has:

Organization and conduct of operational camouflage, concealment, and deception could not be the function of only one field directorate agency of a large strategic formation but were the duty of its commanding general and his staff. In this instance we should note that the reports of some fronts and views held by certain general officers that operational camouflage, concealment, and deception should be organized and carried out solely by the chief of engineer troops of the front (army) were totally erroneous, for in matters of executing deception maneuver, he is only the immediate supervisor of the most technically complex activities. He had at his disposal equipment and specialists for making mockups and dummies, camouflage devices, and other means of misleading and deceiving the enemy. The commander of engineer troops performed all his concealment and deception activities only following the front (army) plan, which had been approved by the commanding general. [Ref. 30: pp. 48-49]

The temptation to push specialized planning responsibilities onto field agencies below HQ staff level is probably felt by many military services even today. But General Dashevskiy was absolutely right in pointing out that the commander must be close to the deception planning process. This does not mean he has to do the planning himself, but his deception planners should be on his immediate staff. Despite the differing opinions among Soviet generals, special staffs were created to handle the planning of deception operations. Col. General Melnikov, Chief of the Soviets' M.V. Frunze Military Academy in 1982, described these staffs like this:

The creation of staffs or operations groups for directing measures for operational camouflage, concealment, and deception began in formations in the second period of the war. The staffs or groups included specialists from the primary departments of a staff and from combat arms and services. A strict limitation of the number of persons participating in drawing up an operation and in correspondence about it played an important part in increasing the effectiveness of camouflage, concealment, and deception. All personnel were familiarized with the mission usually a day or several hours before the beginning of combat operations. [Ref. 16: p. 25]

General Melnikov also brought out an interesting shortfall of these special deception planning staffs. As late as in what he called the "third period" of the war,¹¹ there were no representatives of the intelligence departments on these staffs. Although he did not provide the reason for this omission, he did state that "there were instances where the staffs did not always receive timely data on the enemy and were not able to react swiftly to his actions [Ref. 16: p. 26]." This last statement must fall within the realm of understatement. While intelligence personnel are certainly not indispensable to all staffs, they are to deception staffs. As discussed earlier, for a deception plan to be detected (and thus acted upon) it has to play into enemy sensors, and only the intelligence staff can provide the most complete information on that.

We can see, therefore, that the Soviets created special staffs during World War II to plan and ensure the implementation of deception operations. These staffs were generally appointed by the unit commander, and representatives were drawn from most of the more important staffs (e.g., operations, engineers, artillery, signal, rear

¹¹General Melnikov never specifically identifies the months or years that this "third period" covered, but he does indicate it was after the Soviets were on the offensive. This would mean the third period probably started no earlier than the Battle of Kursk in 1943, a crucial battle after which the Soviets began their long offensive drive to the west. For more on Melnikov's discussion of periods of the war, see pages 49-52 of this thesis.

services, etc.). The deception planning staff would be given an objective and orders for each representative to provide the necessary support from his own staff.¹² It should be pointed out that these staffs were not manned by lieutenants and captains but usually by colonels and generals.

Is this the way the Soviets plan and implement deception now? We can only guess, but it is unlikely such staffs exist in permanent form during peacetime, perhaps only temporarily during exercises. As previously mentioned, the maintenance of such staffs during peacetime can be time-consuming. However, should the Soviets go to war, it is very likely that they will follow their own example in World War II and establish at least a facsimile, if not an exact duplicate of the old special deception planning staffs. They have, after all, proven to be effective in combat, and the Soviets are known for nothing if not sticking to tried and true methods.

¹²For an excellent example of how one of these special deception planning staffs was formed, see the directive at Appendix B, pages 106-107.

VIII. PRACTICE VERSUS THEORY

We have now seen how the Soviets employed deception during World War II and how their doctrine indicates they would employ it in a large-scale conventional war today. This last section looks at the few cases we have to study since World War II in which the Soviets did use deception to support military operations. They represent the only recent Soviet "practice" of deception to compare to the "theory," or doctrine. The problem, however, is that these cases do not present a good example of Soviet military operations as they would unfold in a conventional confrontation with the U.S. The cases in question are the Soviet military interventions into Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. In all three cases, the Soviet Union employed military force, but each time, it was directed at a much smaller state who was militarily poorly equipped in relation to the Soviet Union and whose government and armed forces were distracted by the internal disorder which caused the Soviets to intervene in the first place. This "modern-style" Soviet military operation, however, is still useful to study since it has now become somewhat of a norm for recent Soviet activity and because it provides us with at least some indication of how Soviet forces might be employed in a general war.

The deception employed in these interventions was considerably different from that used in World War II. In all three cases, the deception took on a political or diplomatic character and was generally more strategic in scope. The Hungarian case was essentially a learning experience for the Soviets, and the deception used was very subtle in nature. The Czech case offers an example of deception used on a fairly grand scale, and is sobering in

the fact that the same methods used against Czechoslovakia would be ideal for achieving surprise in an attack against NATO. Finally, the Afghan case demonstrates the continued involvement of deception's role in the Soviet military, especially in the Soviets' periodic exercise of the Brezhnev Doctrine.¹³

A. 1956, INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY

The Soviet use of deception was not as obvious in the invasion of Hungary as in the subsequent invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. It was used nonetheless and undoubtedly aided in placing the Soviet military in a much more advantageous position prior to the invasion than had deception been omitted. The first symptoms of open rebellion appeared in Hungary in the fall of 1955 when prominent Hungarian communist writers signed a paper denouncing the regime's cultural policies and forwarded it to the Hungarian Politburo. The First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party at that time was Matyas Rakosi, a staunch unpopular Stalinist. Two years earlier, in June 1953, the Soviets had forced the Hungarian leadership to appoint Imre Nagy as Premier, and Nagy quickly endeared himself to the Hungarian people by condemning past policies of the government. However, his liberal policies soon resulted in Nagy's label as a "right wing deviant" and led to his dismissal from the premiership, and even the Party. Rakosi continued as First Secretary until forced out by Khrushchev in July 1956 and replaced by Erno Gero, a choice hardly better than Rakosi.

By October 1956, tensions began mounting sharply and, on 23 October, students began demonstrating peacefully, calling for reforms, democratization, and the return of Imre Nagy to power. At the time of the student demonstrations, Erno Gero

¹³The Brezhnev Doctrine is a title given to the Soviet Union's self-proclaimed right to intervene in the internal affairs of certain fellow Socialist states in order to "preserve the gains of socialism."

and several other top communists were on their way home from Belgrade, Yugoslavia, supposedly a day early because of the mounting tensions at home. Gero had allegedly prepared a speech to be given soon after his arrival, but was apparently ill-prepared for the seriousness of the situation he encountered when he finally did arrive. He soon began the task of rewriting the speech which was to be prerecorded and given over the radio later in the day. Confusion must have set in because Gero kept postponing the recording of the speech until finally he had to give it in person over the radio. The speech surprised everyone with its inflammatory nature, most notably the statement that "reminded" the Hungarian people they had received the earlier government resolutions "with approval and satisfaction." In fact, nothing could have been farther from the truth, for it was primarily the government policies which the people were protesting. Adding "injury to insult," Gero showed incredibly poor judgement in his handling of the police, repeatedly putting himself and the police in untenable positions. The police intervention is what eventually caused the demonstration to turn violent. The crowning blow to this day of crisis was Gero's request for Soviet military assistance late in the evening. [Ref. 34: pp. 244-256]

Gero's extremely poor handling of the situation has been perceived by some as being precalculated. There has been speculation that the Soviets fully expected unrest to break out in Hungary and, in order to provide themselves with the justification necessary to intervene, prearranged with Gero his provocative responses [Ref. 34: p. 254]. If this was indeed the way it happened, then the use of deception played a crucial role throughout the entire revolution. Every conciliatory and restrained statement and action taken by the Soviets (and there were several) would basically have been a deception designed to lull the Hungarians into a

false sense of security. However, a closer look at the events of 23 and 24 October, as well as the international situation, tends to refute such speculation. In fact, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets had plans to "invade" Hungary in October 1956.

First of all, the international situation had unfolded in such a way that the Soviets had their hands full elsewhere. Although revolution was not anticipated in Hungary, the country had been identified as the "weakest point in the socialist camp," but as it turned out, Poland erupted in open rebellion before Hungary [Ref. 35: p. 96]. Additionally, the situation in Suez had just come to a head and a very crucial Soviet client, namely Egypt, was facing the combined "aggression" of Israel, Britain, and France. With Poland and Suez to occupy their attention, the last thing the Soviets needed was a crisis in Hungary. Also, a militaristic U.S. response to any Soviet intervention could not be ruled out. It should be remembered, this was the era of our doctrine of "rollback" of communism. Finally, once the Soviets did intervene (the first time on 24 October), their poor military performance made it quite plain that they were not prepared. The primary objectives of Soviet units in the first few days appeared to be safeguarding Soviet diplomatic and military installations and selected Hungarian Party and government strongholds [Ref. 34: p. 256]. These were obviously not the actions of a state which had carefully preplanned a military takeover and the crushing of a rebellion. One last indication of Soviet innocence in this charge was the "tongue-lashing" Gero and the local Soviet military commander received from Mikoyan when he and Suslov (both members of the Soviet Politburo) arrived in Budapest on 24 October to troubleshoot the situation. Mikoyan was reportedly extremely upset at Gero for calling on Soviet assistance so early and at the Soviet commander for providing the assistance [Ref. 34: p. 258].

Until now, the focus has been on the beginning of the revolution and the Soviets' first military intervention. In this regard, there is little reason to believe that the Soviet Union had planned and was prepared to intervene at that time and, consequently, that any deception was intentionally employed. But what about the second and final intervention, the one which succeeded in dashing any Hungarian hopes for democratization? What caused the Soviets to decide to intervene and when was that decision made? What were the Soviets doing between the two interventions? The answers to these questions are important in determining if deception was used. If the second intervention took place immediately following the decision, there was less of a requirement for deception. If there was a significant time lapse (several days) between the decision and its implementation, then deception played an important role in diverting Hungarian and world attention from the Soviet military preparations.

Soon after the revolution began, the Hungarian government began to experience serious upheavals, culminating in the reinstatement of Nagy as Premier on 24 October and the ousting of Gero the following day (to be replaced by Janos Kadar). These important changes took place while Mikoyan and Suslov were in Budapest, and it is very likely the changes were made with their full approval. The situation in Hungary was rapidly deteriorating and its reversal required the installation of a much less controversial figure at the helm. Nagy was well liked by the public because of his lenient policies while he was Premier earlier. His inability to work with Rakosi and his leniency had led to his dismissal then, but now he was considered the best hope in defusing the situation while retaining sufficient "pliability" at the same time. When Mikoyan and Suslov returned home on 26 October, they probably reported

that the rebellion could be controlled and after careful monitoring would soon quiet down.

For Nagy, the burning issue quickly became a cease-fire with the revolutionary forces and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary; and the Soviets, at least initially, demonstrated some willingness to comply (although probably more to alleviate tensions than to abide with Hungarian wishes). But the revolutionary forces and even members of Nagy's government began to call for, in addition to the troop withdrawal issue, democratization, Hungarian neutrality, and withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organization (commonly referred to as the Warsaw Pact). Nagy's first step toward addressing these demands came on 27 October when he announced the formation of a new government and appointed a few non-communists as members [Ref. 36: p. 82]. This must have stirred some concern in the Soviet Union, but was in no way a "bridge-burning" move.

The next day, 28 October, Nagy made an announcement which essentially granted many concessions to the revolutionaries' demands, but at the same time was somewhat vague in its presentation. It is possible that Nagy could feel control slipping through his fingers and used the vagueness to hide his collapse of political control (a situation which would invite Soviet intervention). At any rate, his announcement promised progress in Soviet troop withdrawals but wisely made no mention of Hungarian neutrality or withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact [Ref. 34: pp. 274-276]. On the same day, the Soviet paper Pravda published an editorial which was quite conciliatory in nature. Although it condemned the "counterrevolution" in Hungary, it was otherwise upbeat and optimistic [Ref. 34: pp. 320-332]. Was this the first sign of a Soviet deception? It is not likely since there was still no reason to believe the situation was unsalvageable except through

military intervention, and there would be no other reason to employ deception at that time.

Nagy's 28 October announcement served to draw the revolutionaries and government closer together, resulting in a cease-fire and sharp decline in violent occurrences. However, the calls for Hungarian neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, as well as withdrawal of Soviet troops, did not abate and, in fact, reached a crescendo on 30 October [Ref. 34: p. 318]. Nagy continued to resist the first two but took another step closer to the "precipice" by announcing the abolition of the one-party system of government and recognized "democratic organs of local autonomy [Ref. 34: p. 286]." This was undoubtedly a step too far for the Hungarians to take since it struck at the very heart of the Soviet political system. A few non-communists in the government could be tolerated, but not a multi-party system in a country openly calling for democratization. If Khrushchev is to be believed, it was at this time (30 October) that the Soviet Politburo was discussing the possibility of military intervention. Khrushchev's account reveals that the Politburo was not in unanimous agreement on the issue. The impression developed when reading the account is that initially the consensus was towards non-intervention, but that when the matter was brought before the Soviet Presidium, more dangers were highlighted which led to the decision to "lend a helping hand to the Hungarian working class before the counterrevolutionary elements closed ranks [Ref. 37: pp. 417-419]." Khrushchev gave no date for these deliberations but indicated that Mikoyan and Suslov were gone. The two men had returned to Budapest on 30 October and then returned to Moscow on the night of 31 October-1 November. It is quite possible that the decision to intervene was made very soon

after their return to Moscow and report on the situation, i.e., late on 31 October or early on 1 November [Ref. 38: p. 151].

This course of events provides an interesting background to the publication of another Pravda article, this time an official government declaration on the issue. Published on 30 October, the declaration surprised many with its highly conciliatory tone, which included the admittance of past mistakes (referring to the Stalin era) and offered negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It made no direct mention of the neutrality and Warsaw Pact withdrawal issues, but those had not yet appeared in official Hungarian statements anyway. One noted scholar on the Hungarian Revolution, Bela Kiraly, Commander of the Hungarian National Guard during the revolution, contends that this declaration was a deliberate attempt to deceive the Hungarian people while preparations for an invasion quietly continued [Ref. 36: p. 107]. To be sure, no big step was taken to actually withdraw the troops since the declaration referred only to negotiations on the subject. A lot of forethought and deliberation is apparent in the text of the declaration, which means it was probably prepared either the day before (29 October) or at least very early on the 30th. That means it was probably written before Nagy announced the abolition of the one-party system. If this is true, then it appears the Soviets had not yet been pushed to the brink of decision and that they still believed a peaceful solution was possible. That would account for the lack of aggressiveness in tone, but what about the issue of troop withdrawal? Were the Soviets really serious in their willingness to consider withdrawal? The answer involves some second-guessing of their intentions, but it is unlikely the Soviets would ever have completely withdrawn their troops from Hungary, at least for several years. The very fact that they eventually

did invade proves that keeping Hungary firmly within the Soviet camp was of extreme importance. How could the Soviets withdraw their troops from a crucial "ally" that had demonstrated such a strong desire to break away from Moscow's clutches? The bottom line in this particular case is that the most important statement within the declaration (from Hungary's perspective), that of a willingness to negotiate on the issue of troop withdrawals, was most likely a deliberate lie designed to placate Hungarian fears while maintaining a Soviet advantage. As will be seen momentarily, the Soviets continued to perpetuate this lie, even after the decision to invade had certainly been made.

On 1 November, Nagy took the final, irrevocable steps toward breaking away from Moscow. After numerous meetings with the Soviet ambassador, Yuri Andropov, in which the subject of troop withdrawals was repeatedly broached, Nagy declared Hungary's neutrality (which automatically meant withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact) and requested assistance from the United Nations' "four great powers" in defending that neutrality [Ref. 34: pp. 326-328]. This must have been the final straw for the Soviets. If the decision to invade had not already been made, it was not long in coming.

The activities of the Soviet military for the next few days were confusing to the Hungarian leaders. At times it seemed some of the troops were being withdrawn, others appeared to be moving in great circles, and sometimes it was apparent that some were entering Hungary [Ref. 38: p. 16]. Nevertheless, from 1-3 November, Soviet units quietly sealed off every major airport, railway station, and railway, while publicly announcing that it was to "ensure the orderly withdrawal of troops." Nagy would have been blind not to read through such a blatant deception. Jiri Valenta, in his contribution to the book Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, suggests that Nagy probably read through the deception as

early as 1 November, making his neutrality announcement after its detection [Ref. 35: p. 101]. If such was the case, it must have been apparent to him that he had already gone too far, thus prompting the appeal to the United Nations. However, the appeal was to no avail because the hands of the U.N. were procedurally tied and no tangible assistance could be offered. Even the U.S. had to limit its reaction to simple rhetoric. Hungary's isolated location (surrounded by communist or neutral states) and the Suez crisis served to deter the U.S. from any conventional military response. Finally, on 4 October, Soviet troops numbering 120,000 [Ref. 35: p. 102] formally executed the invasion. Undoubtedly, most of the Hungarian leaders by this time expected the invasion, but exactly when and with how many troops was probably not known. This achievement of surprise is not completely attributable to the deception, but it owes much of its success to the optimistic and naive atmosphere prevalent in Hungary during the preparation phase for the invasion, a direct result of the continued Soviet lie concerning troop withdrawals.

In conclusion, it can be said that deception did indeed play a role in the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956. However, it should be pointed out that there was little Hungary could have done to repel a Soviet attack. Therefore, the Soviet declaration of 30 October was probably not a complete sham. The bulk of the text probably represented an honest Soviet position. The troop withdrawal issue was used to buy time while the situation was monitored and a decision was made as to what should be done. In short, the opportunity to deceive presented itself, it was cheap, and some good could be derived from it, so the Soviets employed it.

B. 1968, INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The deception employed in the Czech crisis was much more clear-cut in comparison to the Hungarian case and more directly supported Soviet military objectives. Of course, there were undoubtedly many examples of political intrigue throughout the crisis, a portion of which could be construed as deception, but since political deception is a secondary interest in this study, it will be addressed very briefly. Of particular interest in this case is the deception employed by the Soviets in the form of military maneuvers on the Czech borders. Of the three cases addressed, this one is most applicable to NATO concerns.

Essentially two types of discernible deception were employed by the Soviets in 1968; or, to put it another way, the Soviets used deception to serve two distinctly different objectives. One objective was to provide justification for the possible use of military force. The target in this case was twofold: the communist world (primarily those states under Soviet influence, especially the Warsaw Pact states) and the non-communist world (the western powers, as well as the Third World). The former was targeted in order to ensure that the legitimacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and correctness of Soviet Politburo decision-making was not eroded; the latter, to discourage western intervention and to minimize damage to the reputation of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement. This "legitimacy" function is a logical manifestation of the Soviet proclivity for deception. Without getting into Soviet motives for justification, it is easy to see this as an ideal role for deception, one which very likely will be seen in any future Soviet exercise of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The key player in laying the deceptive groundwork for this justification in the Czech case was the KGB. As "proof" of the "counterrevolutionary" nature of the Czech reformist

movement, the KGB produced caches of secret weapons supposedly discovered on the Czech-West German border in July 1968, allegedly placed there by imperialist forces. Other KGB ploys included attempts to create the impression of widespread opposition to the movement among "healthy elements" in the Czech Party, and document falsification to indicate both a "Zionist" and CIA conspiracy in the affair [Ref. 39: p. 54]. Clear indication of KGB complicity in all this is offered by Ladislav Bittman, a former deception officer himself in the Czech intelligence service until his defection during the Soviet invasion in 1968:

The active role of the Soviet intelligence service in the events of 1968 and 1969 in Czechoslovakia centered on the systematic implementation of political provocation, disinformation and propaganda campaigns aimed at influencing Czechoslovak public opinion, terrorizing a selected group of liberals, and creating supportive arguments for the legitimization of the Soviet invasion. [Ref. 40: p. 209]

This KGB role of providing legitimization has become fairly commonplace whenever the Soviets perceive that their actions, military or otherwise, may elicit undesirable or even dangerous reactions from either communist or non-communist nations. Although the ubiquitous Soviet accusations of CIA and other western agency plots are often not believed, the lack of hard evidence to refute the accusations generally aids in moderating adverse reactions directed against the Soviets. As long as this remains true, the use of deception to provide justification for Soviet actions will continue to be seen.

The second, and by far the more interesting and effective deception used in the Czech crisis was that seen in the Soviet military maneuvers which were conducted throughout the last few months of the crisis. The military nature of this deception makes it much more applicable to the objectives of this thesis and provides us with the most

valuable lessons available on modern Soviet military deception operations.

Apparently having learned from their experience in Hungary, the Soviets began military contingency planning for a possible intervention into Czechoslovakia as early as February or March 1968 (five or six months before the actual invasion). Czech intelligence officers arrived at this estimate after the invasion, basing it on, among other indications, the fact that this was about the same time that Czech linguists and specialists from Leningrad universities were mobilized [Ref. 41: p. 14]. Military intervention remained a viable option to the Soviet leadership throughout the crisis, although its implementation was seen as a worst-case scenario. By May 1968, a Soviet military buildup was well underway in the vicinity of Czech borders, and by late June or early July, it was fairly well completed [Ref. 42: p. 169]. The interesting aspect of this buildup is that it was accomplished through the conduct of a series of military exercises, not through the overt stationing of troops on the border with the stated purpose of waiting to invade Czechoslovakia. The Soviets were more subtle than that, even though the exercises were highly advertized.

Jiri Valenta identifies two purposes for this military buildup: first, as psychological pressure on the Czech reformists, and second, as a logistic preparation under the cover of military exercises [Ref. 41: p. 14]. The Czech leadership could certainly observe the increase of military activity on their borders and undoubtedly felt the pressure. On the other hand, the Soviets had conducted similar exercises in the past and could therefore parry any accusations of coercion by pointing out their past history of frequent exercises. Events appeared to come to a climax on 23 July when it became known that the Soviets had agreed to negotiations with the Czech leadership at Cierna.

Coincidental with this revelation was the Soviet announcement of exercise *Nemen*, the largest logistic exercise held to date by Soviet ground forces. Although the exercise began in the western portion of the Soviet Union, it was extended to East Germany and Poland during the conference [Ref. 39: p. 54]. On top of this, exercise *Sever* started up before the conference, involving Soviet, East German, and Polish fleets. When *Nemen* ended on 10 August, exercise *Sky Shield*, an air defense exercise, as well as a communication exercise, began the next day in the western Ukraine, Poland, and East Germany [Ref. 41: p. 113]. Finally, on 16 August, Hungary was brought into the fray when the exercises were extended for the first time into her territory.

The result of all this was the conditioning, or desensitization, of the Czech leadership to the Soviet threat. On the one hand, the threat was quite apparent since the Soviets made no attempt to hide it; on the other hand, the threat had been present long enough (several months) to become a customary condition to the Czechs. The danger was still felt but the urgency had receded. Therefore, when the invasion finally took place on 20 August, it still came as a surprise to the Czechs and even to many western leaders. The crowning blow to this deception was when the Soviets succeeded right before the invasion to talk the Czech military commanders into transferring significant amounts of fuel and ammunition to East Germany, supposedly in support of one of the exercises. In reality, the move was designed to lower Czech fuel and ammunition stores, thus further hampering any possible Czech resistance.

At this point, a side-track is appropriate in order to discuss the use of military exercises as a means to cover more sinister intentions. Any country with a moderately capable intelligence apparatus, and which faces an opponent

of equal or superior military force, will have developed a list of indicators (actions, or lack thereof, on the part of the opponent) that will be present should the opponent decide to attack. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, facing each other now for about thirty years, have both developed the compilation of such indicators to a fine art. Military exercises trigger many of the alert mechanisms built into these lists, but since exercises are conducted on a regular basis by both parties, many indicators must be ignored, or at least allowed to pass with no significant response for the length of the exercise. Of course, any exercise conducted is closely monitored by the other side, but the only alternative in terms of reaction would be to mobilize in response to every major exercise conducted by one's opponent. Such responses would be not only extremely expensive, in light of the fairly high number of exercises conducted by both sides, but could escalate into a full-blown crisis. Therefore, NATO generally only monitors any Warsaw Pact exercise and offers little other observable reaction.

It can therefore be seen that military exercises could be used to mask a Soviet buildup in preparation for an attack against NATO. A situation such as the one in 1968, where Soviet attention and threatening posture appeared to be directed at a fellow Warsaw Pact member instead of to the West, is not necessarily cause for the relaxation of vigilance on the part of NATO. In fact, Soviet attention could easily swing to the West and NATO would find itself facing a semi-mobilized foe. Of course, any Soviet military activity coinciding with an apparent intra-Pact crisis would be accompanied by repeated assurances that such maneuvers were strictly in response to the local crisis, which is exactly what happened in 1968. Faced with such a scenario, NATO leaders would find it difficult to marshal sufficient

political support to mobilize their armed forces. Contributing to NATO's flaccid response in 1968 was the fact that the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) was not moved before the invasion. Due to GSFG's reputation as the best trained, equipped, and prepared Soviet forces in Europe, its movement was high on NATO's list of indicators of an impending Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia [Ref. 43: p. 161].

P. H. Vigor, in his book Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory, provides a name for the method of achieving surprise through conditioning: the *dead volcano* method. Just as people living on the side or at the base of a supposedly dead volcano begin to accept it as a benign part of the landscape (even though it may smoke at times), so will a state become accustomed to the continuous maneuvering, semi-mobilization, or reposturing of a neighboring state's military. [Ref. 43: pp. 163-165] This can be seen even when the mobilized state is focusing its attention on its wary neighbor, as was the case with the Soviet Union (with Warsaw Pact assistance) and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

One of the most discernible examples of successful use of the *dead volcano* method was Egypt's attack against Israel in October 1973. Oddly enough, it appears Egypt's deception was not intentional, at least not initially, but its success on Israel was almost disastrous. Still smarting from the drubbing handed out by Israel in 1967 (who used deception quite successfully herself) and still seeking her own solution to the Arab-Israeli problem (as well as undoubtedly seeking revenge), Egypt went through a number of mobilization periods before her actual attack in October 1973.

Chaim Herzog, a prominent Israeli statesman who has held several significant government positions (to include Israeli Director of Military Intelligence, Israeli Defense Attache

to the U.S., and Israeli Ambassador to the U.N.), identified four such mobilizations during Anwar Sadat's presidency. The first two occurred at the end of 1971 and in December 1972. Both times, Sadat actually intended to attack Israel or Israeli military positions but cancelled his plans for various reasons. Therefore, exercise of the *dead volcano* method apparently was not intended at that stage. The third and fourth mobilization periods occurred in April-May 1973 and September-October 1973, the latter obviously in preparation for the actual attack. Sadat's intentions in the third mobilization are less clear, but it is quite possible he recognized the value of the first two and began intentionally conditioning the Israelis before the October attack.

The Israelis, of course, were not blind to the four periods of mobilization. All four were observed and closely monitored. Many Israeli intelligence personnel predicted each time that war would break out, while many of their compatriots predicted otherwise. At any rate, the "cry wolf" syndrome certainly set in as did, undoubtedly, a certain amount of complacency due to Israel's obvious qualitative military superiority over her Arab enemies. The result was that despite the warning of several prominent Israelis, insufficient precautions were taken to counter a full scale Egyptian onslaught and Israeli troops were caught by surprise at the opening of the war. The surprise was not complete by any means, but sufficient to give the Egyptians an early advantage; an advantage they failed to properly exploit, leading to Israel's eventual triumph. [Ref. 44: pp. 255-262]

Some people have pointed to Egypt's deceptive maneuverings prior to the 1973 war and suggested that perhaps they were a result of Soviet involvement in the planning stages, or at least Soviet influence. The first is

highly unlikely since Sadat purged, in 1971, all those in the Egyptian military and politics who had close ties to Moscow and, in 1972, expelled all Soviet military advisors [Ref. 45: p. 53]. The latter is possible, but there is no particular difficulty in recognizing the value of the *dead volcano* method and the Soviets have no monopoly on its use. Therefore, it is very likely that Sadat, or one of his subordinates, conceived of and planned the mobilization deception, if indeed it was deliberately employed.

My purpose in describing the Egyptian *dead volcano* maneuvers is to point out the potential success in utilizing such a method. Whether the Soviets intentionally used the maneuvers around Czechoslovakia in the months preceding the invasion as a conditioning tool cannot be positively confirmed. However, the result of the maneuvers was that Czech leaders became desensitized to the danger on their borders and were caught unawares on 20 August when the Soviet invasion commenced. Again, the surprise was not complete, but the Soviets moved with great speed and effectively neutralized Czech resistance while the advantage gained in the surprise was still theirs. Dubcek, the reformist Czech leader during the crisis, described the extent of the surprise he felt:

I declare on my honor as a communist that I had no suspicion, no indication that anyone would want to undertake such measures against us . . . that they should have done this to me after I have dedicated my whole life to the Soviet Union is the tragedy of my life. [Ref. 39: p. 56]

C. 1979, INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

The events in Afghanistan in 1979 reveal a slightly different Soviet approach to intervening in a sovereign state's internal affairs. Although contiguous to the Soviet border, Afghanistan was not as indisputably in the Soviet "camp" as either Hungary or Czechoslovakia before their

crises. This put the Soviets in an uncomfortable position when it became evident in September 1979 that they might lose what gains had been made toward establishing a pro-Soviet socialist regime in Afghanistan. An unfavorable reaction from the U.S. was likely in the event of a Soviet military solution to the problem, and the Soviet leaders undoubtedly recognized the danger this could pose to the U.S. Congress' approval of the SALT II treaty. Obviously, the importance of Afghanistan to Soviet interests won out over SALT II, because in December 1979 approximately 80,000 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan.

In light of the different Soviet relationship with Afghanistan in comparison to their relationship with Warsaw Pact states, it is somewhat surprising that deception was not used more than it was. Of course, the Soviet military superiority over Afghanistan was even more pronounced than that over Hungary and Czechoslovakia, so deception's role in the actual invasion was not all that crucial. The prime target for deception should have been the West, specifically the U.S. and Europe. The Soviet surprise and shock at the vehement American reaction proves that the extent of that reaction had not been accurately predicted. It is quite possible that judicious Soviet use of political deception directed at the western nations, in concert with effective operational and tactical military deception designed to achieve surprise and bring the invasion to a speedy conclusion, could have saved the Soviet Union considerable trouble and embarrassment. Such was not the case, however, since the use of deception was on a much smaller scale than that used against Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the continued evolvement of deception's role in modern Soviet military actions is apparent, and its use against Afghanistan is worthy of mention.

Soviet deception before and during the invasion falls into two categories: political and military. The political deception was directed partly at Afghan President Hafizullah Amin and partly at world opinion. Amin came to power in September 1979 when he apparently turned the tables of an assassination plot against him (he was deputy to President Taraki at the time), planned by the Soviets and President Taraki. The victim instead turned out to be Taraki.

[Ref. 39: p. 55] Although a professed communist, Amin was distinctly unpalatable to the Soviets since they blamed him for instituting measures which caused nation-wide unrest that the Afghan government had yet to bring under control. Additionally, first-hand reports from Soviet military and security officers on Amin's activities only served to heighten Soviet distrust. [Ref. 45: p. 255] Despite this, the Soviets put up a facade of support for Amin, even going as far as to send Lieutenant General Viktor Paputin, First Deputy Minister of the Interior (Soviet), to Kabul to assist Amin in security affairs, counter-insurgency, and possibly personal protection. As it turned out, Paputin's real mission was to organize an anti-Amin coup among the former supporters of Taraki and Babrak Karmal, Amin's eventual successor. [Ref. 39: p. 55]

The coup against Amin took place 25-27 December 1979, concurrent with the Soviet invasion. It is interesting to note the timing of the invasion. Although not really classified as deception, the choice of the Christmas holidays for an invasion ensured a delayed western response since most government leaders were on vacation. This Soviet practice of beginning an invasion at inopportune times for the western nations is certainly not a new concept (e.g., summer invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which took place while the U.S. Congress was in recess). The Egyptian timing of their attack against Israel in 1973 during the Jewish Yom

Kipper holidays is a classic example of this ploy and it can be seen in countless other wars throughout history as well. But it should be recognized that the Soviets are adept at effective timing of invasions and western leaders should keep this fact in mind during periods of heightened tensions.

Another apparent deception in the political realm was the situation surrounding the Soviet entry into Afghanistan. I have already discussed the Soviet propensity for using deception to justify such actions as invasions and this practice was seen again in the case of Afghanistan. Considerable attention has been given in the general media to the Soviet claim that they were "invited" to come into Afghanistan and assist Karmal in quelling his opposition. Since Karmal was a communist fighting for the preservation of socialist gains in his country, the Soviets claimed to be completely justified in their intervention. The controversy lies in Karmal's arrival in Afghanistan. After Taraki's succession to power in an April 1978 coup, Karmal fled to Czechoslovakia and remained there until sometime in 1979 [Ref. 45: p. 255]. The Soviets claimed that Karmal returned to Kabul several weeks prior to their invasion, but as both Jiri Valenta and Adam Ulam suggest, it is much more likely that Karmal arrived at the same time as the Soviet troops and was able to commence the coup against Amin only with Soviet assistance [Ref. 42: p. 232] [Ref. 45: p. 255]. Little of this can be proven, however, so western nations had to be content with expressing disbelief of Soviet contentions and little else.

The tactical deception employed against Afghanistan was reminiscent of that employed against Czechoslovakia. Just before the invasion, Soviet advisors persuaded the commanders of two Afghan armored divisions to turn in some of their tanks for "technical modifications," all of their

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DECEPTION IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS
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
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XEROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

tank batteries for winterization, and their ammunition and antitank weapons for inventory. The result was that two crucial Afghan armored divisions were out of commission when the invasion began, thus ensuring the Soviets encountered less resistance. [Ref. 39: p. 56]

In conclusion, the overall Soviet use of deception before and during the invasion was much less grand than that used against Czechoslovakia. Although a Soviet buildup was apparent on the border, it was limited in scale because of geopolitics (Afghanistan was not surrounded by Soviet client states) and because of the lack of need for a large invasion force. However, the deception used was effective. Amin apparently was sufficiently deceived so as to allow a successful coup against him, the western leaders were unable to present proof that the Soviets were not invited into Afghanistan, and two Afghan armored divisions were neutralized because of deception.

The three cases of Soviet conventional military involvement since World War II, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979, offer us considerably different examples of Soviet deception than that seen in World War II. But they are examples nonetheless, and they demonstrate the important role deception plays in achieving that critical element of surprise. Although a conventional confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. is unlikely, we can be assured that in the extreme chance such a confrontation should occur, the Soviets will prove to be adept and energetic in employing deception against us. We need only to look at their contemporary writings on the subject and their use of the art during and after World War II to understand its relatively high priority in the Soviet military and political communities.

IX. CONCLUSION

Since the 1970s, there has been a tendency among western intelligence analysts, especially in the United States, to at least emphasize and sometimes exaggerate the capabilities of the Soviet military and the threat it poses. Certainly the Soviet military is a world-class armed force--in strictly numeric terms (personnel and equipment) the largest in the world. The question now, after many pages of discussing Soviet deception, is how good are the Soviets at planning and executing military deception operations and how dedicated are they right now to maintaining what skill they possess? How likely are we to see them use deception in their next military operation? And how likely are we to see deception used against us should the U.S. ever find itself in direct combat against Soviet troops? The answers should be apparent in the previous pages. The Soviets have proven themselves to be quite good at planning and executing deception operations; they continue to be dedicated in maintaining their skill; and they will very likely use it in any future combat situation, including and especially against the U.S. With this latter point in mind, a useful conclusion to this thesis would be to summarize the main points brought out concerning Soviet deception capability and compare them to the American view and use of military deception.

The Soviets have shown a distinct proclivity for using deception and they have a long Russian history in which this proclivity is deeply rooted. The development of Russian society started in their villages where secrecy and deception were used in response to a deep mistrust of outsiders. This mistrust and xenophobia was carried over into the crude monarchic leadership established in Moscow

(Princely Court) and is present even today in the communist government. One of the chief tools used to satisfy this mistrust has always been deception.

The location of Russia, and now the Soviet Union, has also had an impact on the development of a proclivity for deception. Russia is, in effect, landlocked. Sure, she has thousands of miles of seashore and many ports, some warm water, but most of these ports are either frozen most of the year or have access to the open ocean only through narrow straits, channels, enclosed seas, or offshore islands, all held by foreign and usually hostile powers. This has had an enormous effect on Russian/Soviet trade and remains as one of the strongest reasons for Russian introversion. Also, Russia has always been surrounded by nations she considered hostile, and this is just as true today for the Soviet Union. All these conditions have bred a people who are introverted, mistrustful, secretive, and deceptive.

In contrast, the United States is a very young country, reaching back historically only a few hundred years. Our ancestral roots reach out to many nations, making it difficult to trace a specific American trait beyond the founding of our nation. Our people have, in general, developed into an open and honest, but often naive people, willing to reveal almost everything about ourselves. Although our society today is full of deceptive machinations, particularly in the business community, we almost view overt deception as a sin. After all, we are the nation who produced a secretary of state (Henry L. Stimson) who stated that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail" and "the surest way to make a man trustworthy is to trust him [Ref. 46: p. 1071]." Of course, Stimson was referring to the preservation of American goodness as we ventured into the international arena around the time of World War I, but his statements typify our view of ourselves, as if we are above deception.

Unlike Russia or the Soviet Union, the United States has unlimited access to the oceans. We are almost surrounded by relatively warm bodies of water. This has made us a trading nation from the very beginning and the greatest sea power for several decades. With the exception of Britain in the War of 1812, we have never been seriously threatened by any armed force, nor have we ever been invaded by any foreign power. After the American revolution in the 1770s, we have never been subject to any foreign power. Except for the short period when we were at war with Mexico, we have always been bordered by friendly nations. All of this has given Americans a very secure feeling, so that we have little to fear in being open and honest with the rest of the world. Therefore, speaking strictly in terms of national traits, the Soviets have a strong proclivity for using deception while Americans have very little.

In looking at the historical use of military deception by the two nations, the Soviets can trace their history back to the Mongol invasion of Russia in the thirteenth century. The Mongol methods of waging war, which included the heavy use of deception, were adopted by the Russian Army and then eventually handed down to the Soviet military. The devastation wreaked on the Soviet Union in the opening weeks of World War II, after the German surprise attack, reminded them of the value of surprise, while the four traumatic years of the war forced them to develop an expertise in the planning and execution of deception. In general, the Soviets have approached the art in a much more institutional manner than the United States.

With such shallow historical roots as a whole, Americans have very little precedent for even considering deception. What few skills we possess in using deception were slowly adopted and have always been neglected. Our economic power during and since World War II, which has allowed us to field

impressive numbers and quality of men and equipment, has discouraged any use of deception. We have much more recent combat experience than the Soviets, but we hardly used deception in those conflicts. Despite the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, we still do not seem to fully understand the crucial role surprise plays in combat success. Except for very recent efforts (since the late 1970s and early 1980s), our approach to deception has never been institutionalized.

In the realm of doctrine, the Soviets still have an edge on us. While the Soviets are frequently criticized for their rigid command and control doctrine, their emphasis on doctrine can also be considered a strong advantage in their favor. In focusing heavily on military doctrine, a subject such as deception tends to receive more attention than if the doctrinal emphasis did not exist. Surprise receives particularly heavy emphasis in Soviet military doctrine, the effect of which overlaps into the field of deception. This is due to the close link the Soviets see between surprise and deception. To them deception has a clearcut goal of achieving surprise, which in turn leads to combat success. Soviet military commanders are required to include a deception plan in support of every major operations plan. While some commanders meet this requirement in a less than enthusiastic manner, the mechanism to ensure reinforced deception skills is there nevertheless. The Soviets also place considerable emphasis on joint cooperation, not only between contiguous ground units but also between services (i.e., Army and Air Force).

Military doctrine is certainly discussed, developed, and followed in the U.S. military, but it does not receive the focused emphasis as in the Soviet Union. The principle of surprise is also addressed in American military doctrine, but again, much more lightly than in Soviet doctrine. Also,

the crucial link between surprise and deception appears to be hardly recognized. Deception plans are sometimes drawn up with no apparent goal than to "fill the square," rather than directly supporting the achievement of surprise. Although I have personally been involved in some successful joint service deception operations during exercises, service parochialism has so far prevented this practice from becoming a healthy and beneficial trend.

The organization of Soviet planning staffs to specifically aid in developing deception plans cannot readily be seen during peacetime. We can only assume that they will do much as they did during World War II where they created special staffs dedicated solely to planning deception operations. Considering the Soviets' close adherence to principles established in World War II, the assumption that such special staffs will be created is a fairly safe one.

In terms of deception organization, the U.S. military is better off than in the areas just discussed. There has been a recent resurgence of interest in deception that has been translated into some much needed organizational changes, albeit minor ones. The U.S. Navy is the farthest ahead with two sizeable units dedicated to planning and implementing deception during both peacetime and wartime. The U.S. Army has recognized the need for dedicated deception staffs at its field headquarters. And the U.S. Air Force has given its commanders the leeway to place at least one deception officer on their immediate staffs within the Tactical Air Control System. In addition to these wartime slots for the Army and Air Force, both services have a few peacetime assigned deception officers to maintain the modest programs that have been established. All this will be for naught, however, if commanders are not taught that deception is a highly effective combat tool and then required to incorporate it in their operations plans.

In closing, it should be apparent that there is a considerable difference in the way the Soviets view and employ deception and the way the U.S. treats it. We can be assured that the Soviet military will use deception in any major conflict. They will prove to be quite skilled in its employment and the effect could be disastrous for their opponent. The United States military is currently in the initial stages of a "rediscovery" of the value of deception. The momentum is there and it should be maintained. Our goal in emphasizing deception should not be to simply counter a Soviet emphasis, but instead, to increase our chances of success in combat. However, even if we do nothing to change our capability to employ deception, we must realize that we may one day face Soviet soldiers in combat, soldiers who will be ready, willing, and skilled in the use of deception.

APPENDIX A

SOVIET WWII DECEPTION DIRECTIVES

1. DOCUMENT NUMBER 1

This is a directive of the Soviet Air Force Commander on "Airfield Camouflage and Concealment and Measures Helping to Reduce Losses," dated 9 July 1941:

1. When basing aviation at airfields, station not more than 9-12 airplanes at each.
2. After airplanes land, immediately disperse them among temporary parking pads, camouflage them, and taxi them into shelters. Dig trenches for flight technicians.
3. Establish the strictest camouflage and concealment discipline at airfields; prohibit overt walking on the landing strip, driving in motor vehicles, and so on.
4. Implement deceptive measures at airfields which are already known to the enemy, making them appear destroyed and abandoned

Signed by Soviet Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General of Aviation Zhigarev. [Ref. 21: pp. 59-60]

2. DOCUMENT NUMBER 2

This is from an order of the Soviet Air Force Commander, dated 22 June 1942:

1. The commanders of frontal air forces, the commanders of air armies and the commanders of frontal district air forces are to draw up, within three days, measures to develop camouflage and concealment of operating airfields and create dummy airfields; they are to plan the work that must be performed, the materials required for this purpose, the amount of manpower, its source, the officials responsible for the work, and the deadlines for completing the work.
2. All free personnel of airfield maintenance battalions and line units are to be employed in efforts to camouflage and conceal airfields and the airplanes stationed at them, and to build dummy airfields. Creation of dummy airfields and erection of airplane models at operating airfields is to be practiced broadly The issue of allocating manpower and resources with which to camouflage and conceal airfields is to be brought up for discussion by frontal military councils...

Signed by Soviet Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General of Aviation Novikov. [Ref. 21: p. 60]

3. DOCUMENT NUMBER 3

This is from an order from the Rear Services of the 8th Air Army on "The Status of Camouflage, Concealment and Deception in Aviation Base Areas," dated 7 January 1943:

1. The chiefs of aviation base areas are to create one dummy night airfield next to each real airfield by the end of the day after their arrival at a new base of operations.
2. In the first day of its operation, a dummy airfield must possess one hut, two or three slit trenches to shelter four or five persons of a maintenance squad outfitted with a flare pistol and flares, and rifles or machineguns with tracer rounds, a lit "T" with marker lights, and two or three aircraft mock-ups. In the following days, the dummy night airfield is to be reoutfitted as a 24-hour airfield.

Signed by 8th Air Army Deputy Commander for Rear Services, Major General of Aviation Ryabtsev. [Ref. 21: p. 61]

4. DOCUMENT NUMBER 4

This is from a directive of the Commander of the 15th Air Army to the Chiefs of Aviation Base Areas on "Preparations to Support Summer Combat Activities," dated 5 May 1943:

1. The chiefs of aviation base areas are to ensure regular aerial inspection of the effectiveness of camouflage and concealment of real airfields, and of the operation of dummy airfields, for which purpose a U-2 airplane is to be allocated to the chief of the camouflage and concealment service not less than three times a month. The inspection is to be conducted from an altitude of 800-1000 meters. The inspection results are to be reported immediately to the rear services staff

Signed by 15th Air Army Commander, Major General of Aviation Pyatykhin. [Ref. 21: p. 61]

5. DOCUMENT NUMBER 5

This is an order to the Rear Services of the 16th Air Army on "Camouflage, Concealment and Deception Measures in an Offensive," dated 26 March 1944:

1. Mock-up workshops in the 21st, 56th, 75th and 80th aviation base areas are to be reorganized as forward camouflage and concealment squads. Two motor vehicles are to be allocated to each squad: one GAZ-AA to provide transportation to the squad personnel, and one ZIS-5 to transport a maximum quantity of prefabricated mobile mock-ups.

2. The squads are henceforth placed under the subordination of the army chief of the Army Camouflage and Concealment Service, from whom all appropriate assignments to build dummy airfields will be received. The squads are to maintain communication with ground troops and advance behind them
3. The squads have the mission of not only building dummy airfields but also operating them. All work is to be performed covertly
4. I turn the attention of aviation base area chiefs to the fact that when they move forward, all prefabricated mobile airplane mock-ups must be immediately transported and rebuilt at newly opened dummy 24-hour airfields, one for each airfield maintenance battalion

Signed by 16th Air Army Deputy Commander for Rear
Services, Major General of Aviation Kirillov. [Ref. 21: p.
62]

APPENDIX B

SOVIET WORLD WAR II DECEPTION STAFF ORDER

This was an order signed by the commander of the 18th Army, by order of the 1st Ukrainian Front Commander, to establish a special deception planning staff.

1. Perform simulation of tank army concentration in vicinity of Vinograd, Kolomya, Zabolotuv in the period from 4 through 20 July 1944.
2. For immediate direction of all simulation measures, assign an operations group made up of the following: chief of operations group--deputy chief of army staff operations department Col Soloveykin, Col Stopog from engineer troops staff, Lt Col Yakovlev from artillery staff, Col Pisarikhin from staff of BT and MV (armored and mechanized troops), Lt Col Fiktor from communications department, Lt Col Shcherbak from political department, Engr-Maj Nikulchenko from VOSO (military transportation) department, and Lt Col Bartenyev from the chemical department.
3. Subordinate operations group directly to army chief of staff and provide it with means of transportation from the 201st Motor Transport Platoon.
4. My deputy for engineer troops, Col Zhurin, is to ensure the building of 500 tank mockups, 200 vehicle mockups, 600 gun mockups, and 100 field kitchen mockups using resources of two engineer battalions and two rifle battalions from the 66th Guards Rifle Division by 20 July 1944, placing them in areas according to the plan
5. The artillery commander is to place three gun batteries on mechanical traction and one AAA regiment for screening assembly areas at the disposal of the chief of the operations group.
6. The commander of BT and MV (armored and mechanized troops) is to place two batteries at the operations group chief's disposal from the 1448th Self-propelled Artillery Regiment and five motorcycles for use in unloading and assembly areas.
7. Army signal officer, Maj General Muravyev, is to arrange a dummy radio link according to the plan of the front signal officer for deception of the enemy, having the army RSB in Soroki and corps RSBs in the areas of Vinograd and Kobylets.
8. Political department chief, Col Brezhnev, is to place one MGU (powerful loudspeaker) sound broadcasting station at the disposal of the operations group chief and, together with the chief of the army staff intelligence department, organize deception of the local populace with respect to the concentration of major tank forces and offensive being prepared in the army sector. Use 15 officers for spreading false information among the populace.

9. VOSO (military transport) chief, Col Zelenin, is to support through the front VOSO the measures being carried out by rolling stock (a locomotive, 30 flatcars, and 3 boxcars). Arrange the train's progress according to the schedule of the operations group chief.
10. My deputy for rear services, Maj General Baranov, is to support uninterrupted operation of motor transport for the entire period of the activities, releasing fuel on requisitions of the army chief of engineer troops with my approval.
11. Chief of the army chemical service is to provide blanketing in vicinity of Stefanesti Station, Yasunuv Polny Station, 1-2 kilometers west of Dzurkuv and 1-2 kilometers south of Venyava, assigning the chemical company of 66th Guards Rifle Division and 5,000 smoke pots for this purpose.
12. Engr-Maj Momotov, representative of the 1st Ukrainian Front staff, provides consultation on matters of operational camouflage, concealment, and deception.
13. Report daily to operations group chief on progress of simulation work

Signed by Commander of 18th Army, Lt General Zhuravlev.

[Ref. 16: pp. 29-31]

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