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
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
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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THESIS

SENDERO LUMINOSO: ORIGINS, OUTLOOKS,
AND IMPLICATIONS

by

Frank Thomas Bradford Jones

June 1986

Thesis Advisor:

Paul G. Buchanan

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Sendero Luminoso: Origins, Outlooks, and Implications

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

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I. THE ORIGINS OF SENDERO LUMINOSO

During the Peruvian national elections of 1980, an unknown group of radical militants attempted to disrupt the voting process in a small town of the southern highlands. Several years later, Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, has become a widespread menace throughout the country. The Sendero rebellion has tested the resources and perseverance of the young democratic regime installed in 1985, and has proven resilient against the counterinsurgency effort designed to eradicate it. Dedicated to the use of force and dogmatically swearing allegiance to Maoist theory as interpreted by its leader, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, Sendero has emerged as a guerrilla movement markedly different from other revolutionary movements in modern Latin America. Born in a nation besieged by historical and modern socioeconomic and cultural disparities, Sendero has established itself as an armed vanguard whose professed goals are the violent destruction of the Peruvian state, and the ultimate rise to power of a union of the proletariat and popular masses of Inca descendants.

In order to comprehend the Sendero experience, it is necessary to explore the objective conditions which led to its inception. Within the whole of Latin America, perhaps Peru reigns supreme as the most prominent inheritor, and indeed victim, of the legacy of its colonial past. While one

Peruvian society thrives in the modern cities along the coast, quite another survives in the cordillera of the Andes. Sendero Luminoso sought and established the majority of its constituents among the desperate peasantry of these highlands.

The political evolution of the party initially came from the doctrinal split of Soviet and Chinese factions within the Peruvian Communist Party in the early 1960's. Further splintering of various communist factions along ideological lines led to the emergence of elements that consistently favored the rejection of anything short of armed revolution to achieve their political ends. By the late 1970s, these extremists formed the core leadership of Sendero Luminoso. Moreover, the intellectual evolution of the party closely follows the personal growth and development of Abimael Guzmán, heralded as the "Fourth Sword of Communism" (following Marx, Lenin, and Mao) by his followers. Finally, the renaissance of the University of San Cristobal Huamanga (UNSCH) in the city of Ayacucho provided the vehicle for the spread of Guzmán's revolutionary message among a rural population that, at least initially, was willing to accept the alternative solutions proposed by the guerrillas.

One of the principal reasons for the appeal of Sendero promises for change stems from the calamitous state of the rural highlands. In essence, Peru has been widely divided into two different realities since the arrival of the Spanish conquistadores in the sixteenth century. The nation

remains partitioned by social, economic, racial, and geographic barriers which have stymied the forces of integration and reform. In demographic terms, European or "white" groups constitute fifteen percent of a total population of nearly thirteen million. The mestizo population represents thirty seven percent, while the various groups of Peruvian Indians make up the largest group with over forty five percent of the total.¹ These racial groups are not uniformly distributed throughout the country. The white population, which is also the economically privileged segment of society, is concentrated in urban population centers along the coast. The coast, in addition to providing a haven for the upper class, is also the site of the richest farmland and most advanced agricultural technology. The mestizo element is more diverse, and is situated more evenly throughout the country. While not approaching the white population in terms of material wealth and power, the mestizos are definitely superior in comparison with the oppressed and impoverished Indian population.

Linguistically, seventy percent of the Peruvian population speaks Spanish as a first language, while twenty five percent speak Quechua, the native language of the Inca descendants, as the primary form of communication.² The southern highlands,

¹Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Peru: A Country Study (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. xiv.

²Nyrop, Peru, p. xiv.

in contrast to the coast, are remote and highly isolated from the centers of power. Native Indians represent a large percentage of the regional population, most of whom rely on traditional subsistence farming in an area plagued by high altitude, poor farmland, and a woeful lack of technology. It is in these highlands that Sendero Luminoso maintains its strongest base of support. The movement is centered around the department of Ayacucho. Even when compared to other highlands regions of Peru, Ayacucho and the neighboring departments are isolated, backwards, and impoverished. Essentially, the area is a fourth world enclave within a third world region.

The area surrounding Ayacucho is an ideal site for a revolutionary movement. The area is largely inaccessible, and has a history of being ignored by the governments seated in Lima. People of the southern highlands earn little, die young, are mostly illiterate, and usually exist without basic human services. Based upon a 1972 census, ninety percent of the nearly 500,000 inhabitants spoke Quechua as a primary language.³ In geographical terms, the Andean zone comprises a harsh environment. Forty five percent of the territory is located in the frigid high altitude of the mountains, devoid of any tree vegetation. Twenty four percent is permanently covered by snow. Eighteen percent of the area possesses a

³Nyrop, Peru, p. 255.

subtropical climate or jungle, while only four percent of the land is under cultivation.⁴

The little arable land that is cultivated has steadily exhausted its fertility. While potatoes, the principal crop of the region, were produced at a level of 161 kilograms per capita from the period of 1951-55, the production declined to 110 kilograms between 1971-77. The southern highlands suffered up to a fifty percent drop in agricultural output in 1983 due to the drought caused by the climatic changes associated with the El Niño ocean current. In spite of a decreasing trend in basic food production, the department of Ayacucho has witnessed a population increase of nearly fifty percent since 1940. Average caloric intake for individuals in some of the particularly poor zones has been estimated at as little as 420 calories per day, well below the 850 calorie minimum established by the World Health Organization.⁵

This growing population had little to look forward to in terms of quality of life and basic services. Average life expectancy in the department of Ayacucho is forty five years, compared to a national average of fifty eight years, and well below the life expectancies of many of the most impoverished

⁴Raúl Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por Los Caminos de Sendero," Quehacer, October 1982, p. 42.

⁵Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," World Politics, October 1984, p. 61.

nations of the world. The lack of medical services is indicated by the ratio of one physician per 17,860 people, compared to 1,822 on the coast. The mortality rate has approached thirteen percent, while infant mortality surpasses nineteen percent. In 1972, 93.4 percent of the population in Ayacucho remained without potable water, and 94.4 percent had no access to electricity.⁶ During the period of military rule from 1968 to 1980, little was done to improve the situation. The four highland zone departments of Huancavelica, Cuzco, Ayacucho, and Apurimac received only 6.7 percent of the total national public investment. Ayacucho was the lowest among them, with a total investment of 0.6 percent.⁷

Sendero Luminoso was not the first group to recognize the plight of the ignored Indian peasantry, nor the first to advocate fundamental change through armed revolution. Development of a modern revolutionary concept in Peru began in the closing decades of the nineteenth century in the writings of Manuel Gonzales Prada. Gonzales Prada was part of a group of intellectuals concerned with promoting social as well as political revolution in Peru. During the early nineteenth century, the concept of revolution was primarily concerned

⁶Carlos Amat y León, "La Desigualdad Interior en el Perú," and a 1981 report on world development published by the World Bank, cited in Raúl Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por los Caminos de Sendero," Quehacer, October 1982, p. 71.

⁷Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por los Caminos de Sendero," p. 71, citing 1982 documents of the Prime Minister.

with replacing elites in positions of power and authority with no accompanying transformation of social and economic structures. Originally an aristocrat, Gonzales Prada renounced his upper class heritage and called for a complete restructuring of Peruvian society. He harshly criticized a government ruled by men seeking personal gain while ignoring the fundamental needs of the society they ruled. His writings contained four major themes:

- (1) National integration based on the indigenous heritage of the Inca.
- (2) Land reform and the elimination of the hacienda system.
- (3) Criticism of the ruling elite for their European cultural bias.
- (4) Criticism of the Catholic church for its involvement in politics.⁸

Gonzales Prada was deeply concerned over the condition of the peasantry, and glorified their Inca heritage. His writings provided an intellectual point of departure for José Carlos Mariátegui in the 1920's.

Mariátegui was not a political theorist in the Western European tradition. Born a mestizo, he never acquired a university education. While brilliant, Mariátegui never possessed a highly disciplined intellect. He was initially a journalist who turned to political activism in his later life. Mariátegui was principally concerned with issues of

⁸ John M. Baines, Revolution in Peru: Mariátegui and the Myth (University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972), p. 13.

racial and cultural pluralism, and the problem of how to organize a fragmented society so that economic growth would occur. In his view, none of the fundamental problems of the country could be solved before the establishment of a legitimate political order based upon the desires of the Indian and mestizo masses, and not of the white European minority. Mariátegui sought to develop a truly national ideology of social change through the combination of Marxist and indigenous themes. In his view, political legitimacy in Peru had been absent since the destruction of the Inca empire in the sixteenth century. Hence, his ideology of the new revolution consisted of four major elements. First, a commitment to obtain a better moral and material way of life for the masses through fundamental changes in the social system. Second, a willingness to adopt non-Hispanic, non-Peruvian ideas to explain existing social and political conditions, and to use Marxist explanations to justify changing those conditions. Third, an attempt to create a new sense of national identity through the synthesis of these ideas. Finally, a commitment to obtain the material benefits of a modern, secular, industrialized society while retaining the moral and spiritual purpose of that society. These principles formed the underlying thematic basis for his central ideological work, Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana (Seven Essays of Interpretation of the Peruvian Reality).⁹ Mariátegui

⁹ Baines, Revolution, pp. 3-6.

was the first to grasp the fundamental problems facing his society, and the first Peruvian to propose both Marxist and nationalist solutions to them. His thoughts remain an enduring philosophical force throughout much of Peruvian society to this day.

Mariátegui was instrumental in the re-founding of the Peruvian Socialist Party (PSP) in 1928. Although he intended for it to be a new and vital source for political change, by the time of his death in 1930, the party had been overtaken by members who desired to establish a Communist party. One month after the death of Mariátegui, the Central Committee of the PSP adopted a resolution which changed the name and the direction of the party. Hence, the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) was born under the supervision of the Comintern.

The immediate political origins of Sendero Luminoso stem from the ideological fragmentation which began to occur within the PCP during the early 1960's.¹⁰ In 1962, the PCP departed from its militant stance, choosing to vote for Belaúnde in order to counter the rise to power of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), a political rival offering

¹⁰ The most comprehensive source of information on the early evolution of Sendero is in Rogger Mercado, El Partido Comunista del Peru: Sendero Luminoso (Lima: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1982), p. 22. Sources in English include Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru (Liverpool: Codaprint, 1983), and David Scott Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in Rural Peru," in Latin American Insurgencies, ed. Georges Fauriol (Georgetown University: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), pp. 67-96.

non-Marxist leftist alternatives to the communist vision. During the Fourth Conference of the PCP in January 1964, a pro-Chinese faction split to form the PCP-Bandera Roja (Red Flag). Its adherents charged that the leadership of the PCP was not seriously addressing the issue of armed struggle, and had become pacifist and conciliatory.

During this period, Abimael Guzmán, future leader of Sendero Luminoso, headed the Huamanga command of the Castroite National Liberation Front (FLN) at the National University of San Cristóbal Huamanga in Ayacucho. In the first years of the organization, Guzmán recruited top students for trips to Cuba, and for various university programs which were active in the Ayacucho countryside. By 1964, there were approximately fifty students who regularly participated in these activities.¹¹ The Huamanga command broke with the national FLN organization in 1965 over the issue of opening foquista guerrilla fronts throughout the country. Guzmán and his followers advocated a longer term strategy, based on the Chinese revolutionary experience of rural mobilization. By 1966, they had joined forces with the PCP-Bandera Roja.

The following year, Guzmán assumed responsibility for agitation and propaganda for the party, and was put in charge of producing the newspaper of the organization. Guzmán began to publish fiery editorials, and developed followers among

¹¹Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in Rural Peru," p. 69.

those opposed to the PCP-BR central leadership for not sufficiently overseeing the preparations for the armed revolution. In 1970, Guzmán split from Bandera Roja, forming the party known today as Sendero Luminoso. The name of the party comes from its origins in a student political group known as Frente Estudiantil por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariátegui (the "Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariátegui").

From 1970-77, Sendero Luminoso concentrated on the development of a party apparatus. It was especially successful in garnering support among university students. Though regional committees and cells were formed throughout the country, they were mostly concentrated in the central sierra and the capital city of Lima. In its early propaganda campaign, Sendero criticized the other leftist parties for having abandoned the commitment to armed revolution, and called for a revolution originating in the countryside to topple the Velasco regime, installed in 1968, which it labeled as fascist. In 1977, the party entered the second stage of preparation for the armed struggle it would launch in 1980. Its effort to establish an effective national organizational infrastructure was aided by the incorporation of dissatisfied radicals from other leftist groups. When the Vanguardia Revolucionaria split in 1976, the most militant and Maoist influenced sector formed the Vanguardia-Revolucionaris-Proletaria Comunista (VR-PC). This group found the majority of its membership in

the highland departments near Ayacucho. Similar to Sendero, the VR-PC adopted an ultra-left non-participatory stance regarding the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections, only to do an about-face in 1979. Sendero members had infiltrated the group in 1978, and were able to recruit several of its most important peasant militants in the confusion and disenchantment over the electoral issue. In a similar fashion, Puka Llacta (Red Homeland in Quechua) broke from the Patria Roja (Red Fatherland, a militant faction which separated from Bandera Roja in 1967) in 1979 to join Sendero. The membership of Puka Llacta consisted mainly of miners in the departments of Junin and Pasco.¹² Other small groups and dissatisfied party members from different organizations were drawn to Sendero, sharing a common vision of an imminent armed struggle and fundamental changes in Peruvian society.¹³

Many have speculated that Abimael Guzmán is hardly a likely candidate to have arrived at the position of leading a revolutionary organization. Born on December 4, 1924 to a middle class family near the city of Arequipa, the young Guzmán quickly established a reputation as a gifted and dedicated student. He went on to earn twin degrees in Philosophy and Law from the prestigious University of San Augustin in

¹²Taylor, Maoism, p. 11.

¹³For an elaboration on the evolution and subsequent strategies chosen by Sendero, see Chapter II.

Arequipa, defending dissertations on The Theory of Space in Kant and The Democratic Bourgeois State. In 1962, he was invited to teach at the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho.¹⁴ There, Guzmán became more active in radical politics, frequently inviting his students to join in political debates at his home. These students were later to become many of the leaders of the Sendero movement.

The reopening of the university in Ayacucho in 1959, after its closure in 1886 following the defeat of Peru in the War of the Pacific, was an elemental factor in the rise of Sendero Luminoso in the Andean highlands. The primary purpose of the educational curriculum was to be functional in meeting the needs of the community. Programs such as nursing, education, applied anthropology, and rural engineering were emphasized, while no law school or medical school was established.¹⁵ Quechua was required for those few students not already versed in the language. The vast majority of the students came from the peasant families of the immediate region. Despite an original intent to keep politics out of the educational realm, the university increasingly found its programs and services dominated by the radical thought of the students, professors and administrators. Students came to view professors as

¹⁴ Juan Carlos Alvañaraz, "Guerra Civil en el Peru," Equis X, 18 July 1983, pp. 5-6.

¹⁵ Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in Rural Peru," p. 80.

more than mere educators, but as advisers regarding all classes of problems.

The awakened yearning for education in Ayacucho quickly outstripped the limited services of the UNSCH, and led to the creation of the V.A. Belaúnde University, which was directed to accept the majority of students who had failed to pass the entrance examinations of the other institution. Additionally, the second school offered programs such as law, which addressed issues far from the Ayacuchan reality. After a brief existence (1967-1976), the university was dissolved. The students and academic programs were absorbed into the UNSCH, quickly overcrowding the school well beyond its designed operating capacity.¹⁶ The establishment of these higher educational institutions had a lasting effect on the city of Ayacucho as well. Within ten years, it grew three times in size, and developed a limited commercial activity.

As Peruvian social scientist Luis Millones states, The arrival of the university (locals, methodology, people) was equivalent to an earthquake, not only for its physical presence but for the acceleration of the rhythm of provincial life. Local business grew rapidly, hotels and boarding houses appeared, and the local elite was displaced by the teachers who constituted a new nucleus of conversation and debate.¹⁷

¹⁶ Luis Millones, "La Tragedia de Uchuraccay: Informe Sobre Sendero," in Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay, Carlos Castro et al. (Lima: Impreso en Editora Peru, 1983), p. 98.

¹⁷ Castro, Informe, p. 91.

The University of Huamanga was to have a lasting effect on the students which would ultimately convince some of them to seek the revolutionary change promised by Sendero. Their higher education would make them more aware of the decimated state of development throughout the local region, especially relative to other sections of the country. Furthermore, because the degrees awarded by the university were not held in high esteem by the rest of Peru, the graduates quickly became frustrated by their difficulty in finding employment. This was particularly true when they sought jobs in the coastal cities and were placed in competition with professionals and graduates of more respected institutions (and of a different race and culture). Finally, the radical politicization of the university during the 1960's provided a forum in which students were able to explore alternative solutions to their social problems. As Sendero Luminoso gained strength as a local political force, its message was spread by way of students participating in extension and outreach programs. Being native to the region, these students were able to preach their newfound doctrine to an accepting audience, since the population traditionally viewed outsiders with skepticism.

In summary, the Sendero Luminoso movement has sought to apply the Maoist theory of revolution, based on the mobilization of the peasant masses, to a Peru they classify as semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Their target audience of

highlands peasants is among the most destitute and under-developed in the entire world. Although the present Sendero movement emerged from a series of ideological and political schisms in which its adherents continually chose a hard-line and militant stance, it has avoided following a path to rapid annihilation through unpreparedness. On the contrary, Guzmán and his disciples carefully and painstakingly worked toward the initiation of the armed revolution in 1980. The result has been a resilient movement which has resisted efforts by the authorities to eradicate it during the last six years.

In the following chapters, the Sendero Luminoso experience shall be analyzed from three different perspectives. The strategy and tactics of the guerrillas will be examined in order to shed light on why these militants operating in a remote sector of the world consider themselves to be at the forefront of a world revolution. The counterinsurgency program will be surveyed in order to explore its lack of success in the past, and to suggest modifications to improve it in the future. Finally, the question of Sendero will be viewed from the point of view of the central government in Lima, in order to explain why a host of regimes of varying ideological persuasions did not take measures to alleviate the miserable situation of the highlands peasantry prior to their taking up arms in 1980.

II. ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS

The emergence of Sendero Luminoso as perhaps the most radical and dogmatic revolutionary organization in Latin American history provides a rich case for analysis of its ideological, strategic, and tactical objectives. In contrast to the most recent Peruvian experience of foquista insurgents who were easily defeated during the 1960's, the Senderista armed insurrection launched in 1980 has proven to be tenacious and enduring. The counterinsurgency programs directed by the government have probed and at times exceeded the constitutional limits of a redemocratized republic. Led by the political thought of Abimael Guzmán, Sendero seeks to synthesize the Maoist tenets of a long rural struggle with the Mariátegui principles of a Peruvian reality expressed in the 1930's and still applicable today. According to his disciples, Guzmán is the "Fourth Sword of Communism," follow-Marx, Lenin, and Mao. The revolution in Peru, therefore, is not an isolated experience, but rather, part of a worldwide movement. In this context, Sendero is seen as innovative and takes the lead so that others may follow.

The Senderista model for a successful revolution relies on four requisites. First, the necessity of a directing party based on Marxism-Leninism and the philosophy of Mao Tsetung with a correct line of thought forged previously in the political, theoretical, and organizational realms.

Second, armed struggle is a means to one end: a revolutionary program that answers the fundamental needs of the working class and the people, and that rigorously describes the strategic objective in accordance with the specific conditions of each country. Third, that the party should develop prior to and during the course of the revolutionary war, this comprising a permanent fight against all forms of revisionism and anti-Marxism. Finally, prior to launching the armed struggle, the party should undertake a long, patient, and intense effort to develop the political consciousness and organizational level of the masses.¹

In ideological terms, Sendero adheres to the Mariátegui vision and description of a semifeudal and semicolonial Peru, and justifies these premises for a direct comparison and correlation of modern Peru with prerevolutionary China. The Maoist concept of a protracted revolutionary war beginning in the rural areas and growing to encircle and isolate the cities is a doctrine which, at least at a surface level, would appear to be a logical vision to promote in the underdeveloped regions of the southern Andean highlands. Julio Cotler, a respected Peruvian political scientist, cites three reasons for the success of Maoism as a political ideology. It provides a clear explanation of the environment of the Andean peasant in line with their limited social and political

¹Raúl Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," Quehacer, August 1984, p. 28.

horizons. The ideology fills a void caused by the absence of a varied and democratic party system practiced by diverse social groups. Although Peru currently operates and has functioned in the past under democratic regimes, the political process has primarily only applied in the urban power centers of the coast while ignoring the outlying areas. The political climate of the University of Huamanga as an educational center also greatly contributed to establishment of a Maoist belief system in the region.² Peruvian anthropologist Luis Millones attributes the success of the Maoist logic to the failure of agricultural modernization in the zone during the last ten years. The reforms were not as effective as originally anticipated. Development actions raised the consciousness of the people, and their failed expectations left the peasantry susceptible to seeking alternatives to better their situation.³ English scholar Lewis Taylor adds that the Sendero ideology aligns itself well with a history of Andean messianism. Promises made for a return of Indian power mesh well with a historic vision of a Golden Age prior to the arrival

²Raúl Gonzales, "Una Enquesta Sobre Sendero," Quehacer, January 1983, p. 66.

³Luis Milones, "La Tragedia de Uchuraccay: Informe Sobre Sendero," in Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay, Carlos Castro et al. (Lima: Impreso en Editora Peru, 1983), p. 98.

of the Spanish conquistadores which remains strong among rural peasants and urban mestizos.⁴

In one of its two principal domestic documents, Sendero calls upon the peasantry to join the revolution as a continuation of the historical experience of its existence. In "Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," or "Let Us Develop the Guerrilla War," published in 1982, the pamphlet states,

And what is currently the situation of the people? A peasantry with a fundamental demand going back centuries 'land for those who work it,' which in spite of an unflinching struggle has still not managed to achieve it; a peasantry which during the last twenty years they [the government] have tried to deceive with three purported agrarian reform laws, which after being introduced with high sounding demagoguery, have left the peasants with the same old unsatisfied hunger for land.⁵

The historical demand for land has been accompanied equally by a people with a legacy of armed struggle. The same pamphlet dictates,

The violence of revolution is, then, the same essence as our historical process and if the emancipation of the republic was won with arms on the fields of battle, it is easy to understand that the development and triumph of the Peruvian revolution, of our democratic revolution for the emancipation of the people and of the classes, will be gained only by means of the largest revolutionary war of our people, raising the masses by means of the popular war.⁶

⁴Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru (Liverpool: Codaprint [1983], p. 19.

⁵"Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," reproduced in Rogger Mercado, Algo Más Sobre Sendero (Lima: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1983), p. 38.

⁶Mercado, Algo, p. 40.

Since its beginning, Sendero has been committed to a long and patient preparation toward the armed "popular war" it launched in 1980. The first stage of the party existence took place from 1970 to 1977. This period was dedicated to "Retomar a Mariátegui" or to reassume the political thought of the Peruvian Marxist which had been diluted and lost in the ideological struggles within the Communist Party. During this phase, the party leadership abandoned practical questions and concentrated absolutely on theoretical matters.⁷ Political cells were formed throughout the nation with the main concentrations located in Lima and the southern highlands. Sendero accused the rest of the Peruvian left as being revisionist and attacked the Velasco regime as being fascist. Their version of rural armed struggle was promoted as the only viable strategic alternative. Sendero saw no value in pursuing any type of electoral strategy in future elections, and hence refrained from the political mobilization of the urban proletariat practiced by other leftists throughout the 1970's.

This initial stage was viewed as complete by 1978, and Sendero entered its second stage, that of Reconstructing the Party. The goal of this period was to establish the party as an effective apparatus to carry out the armed struggle.⁸

⁷Rogger Mercado, El Partido Comunista del Peru: Sendero Luminoso (Lima: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1982), p. 22.

⁸Mercado, El Partido, p. 22.

Internal debate over the strategy of the war emerged within the leadership. The prolonged rural war with the eventual encirclement of the cities was advocated by Guzmán. An alternative vision was proposed by Luis Katawa and others on the Central Committee to pursue the Albanian line, which favored equal weight of armed actions in the cities and the countryside. This debate continued throughout 1980-81 with Guzmán eventually achieving majority support.⁹ During this second phase, Sendero went underground. Militants left the university for the rural zones fully prepared to integrate into the communities, learn the Quechua tongue if necessary, establish their training camps, and preach the message of revolution.

Although the party leadership had reached a unanimous decision to proceed with the armed revolution at the IX Plenary Session of the Central Committee in 1978, some factionalization existed over whether the revolutionary situation in Peru was stationary or evolving. This debate was resolved by 1979 in a statement that the outbreak of armed revolution can mobilize the country, even in adverse conditions. In a document published in September 1979 titled "Let Us Develop the Growing Popular Protest!", the leadership professed,

We can say that a stationary revolutionary situation can be converted to a developing revolutionary situation by action of the subjective conditions over the objective condition; that is very important to keep in mind.

⁹Taylor, Maoism, p. 12.

Furthermore, it is necessary to differentiate the unequal development of the revolutionary situation and take into account what can take place in a particular region and that the proper revolutionary action can be generalized throughout the country, and, furthermore, the armed struggle can be initiated in the middle of a general retreat of the revolution as proven by the uprising of the Autumn Harvest during August 1927 in China.¹⁰

In addition to drawing on the theoretical and revolutionary experiences of the Chinese, Sendero has been able to learn from the mistakes of a doomed insurgency in Peru during the 1960's. Following the success of the Cuban Revolution, the Castro regime was actively seeking to export their experience throughout Latin America. It trained future guerrilla officers, as well as providing logistical and financial help. The young Peruvian intellectuals attracted to this revolution were largely from upper middle class backgrounds. This was true of Luis de la Puente and Guillermo Lobaton of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and Hector Bejar of the Army of National Liberation (ELN). These groups were committed to using armed force to secure agrarian reform and nationalization of oil and mining resources. Three main fronts were opened in the virgin forests and the Andean highlands. Although the terrain was difficult, the guerrillas believed that they could use it to their tactical advantage in confrontations against the Army. The guerrillas proved to be naive and unprepared for the task. The background of the

¹⁰"Desarrollamos la Creciente Protesta Popular!", cited by Piedad Pareja Pflucker, Terrorismo y Sindicalismo en Ayacucho (Lima: 1981), p. 86.

leadership left it unprepared to communicate in Quechua and establish any semblance of a recruiting effort among the very elements they struggled to defend. Furthermore, the barren geography of the Andes, in marked contrast to the Cuban terrain, left the insurgents highly vulnerable to detection by military aviation and surveillance patrols. They were routed at the hands of the Army in a matter of months.

Sendero has obviously learned a great deal from the failure of its predecessors, and appears not to be willing to commit the same errors which led to the foquista demise. By declaring adherence to a long term strategy, the Senderistas have avoided the poor organization and preparation that marked their counterparts. Additionally, the coastal urban composition of the foquista leadership and the superficial knowledge of the Andean condition have been replaced by the active Sendero recruitment of militant peasants native to the highlands who are familiar with the language, geography, and customs of the region. Sendero has also criticized the previous guerrillas for not selecting the proper historical moment. They chose to undertake the revolution at a time when the revolutionary correlation of forces had not reached maturity. Finally, the foquista insurgents were open in meeting with the press in an effort to publicize their cause. Sendero has been extremely reclusive, choosing only to publish nationally two slim pamphlets, and granting an occasional clandestine interview.

Having resolved the debate regarding the initiation of a prolonged rural struggle, Sendero chose to commence its actions simultaneously with the presidential elections of May 1980. Their first action was the burning of ballot boxes in the village of Chuschi in the department of Ayacucho. Most Peruvians first heard of Sendero Luminoso when the citizens of Lima were confronted by the sight of dead dogs hanging from utility poles along the principal boulevard of the city. The carcasses were decorated with placards denouncing the "fascist dog of Deng Xiaoping" and praising the Chinese Gang of Four. This scene was repeated some time later in the city of Ayacucho, among illiterate peasants who could only guess as to the significance of the animals. According to a popular Andean legend among the Indians, a dog is a companion who follows or leads his master to the grave. Whenever a dead dog appeared, someone was soon to die or be executed.¹¹ This symbolic myth was to later come true with overwhelming and horrible regularity in the southern highlands.

According to Sendero, choosing the proper moment to begin the revolution is infinitely more complex than merely choosing the moment for the development of the armed struggle. The direction of the Party is equally as important as the objective historical process. A 1982 document states,

It has to do with knowing to discern when the revolutionary situation has matured sufficiently, not only

¹¹ Philip Bennet, "Corner of the Dead," Atlantic, May 1984, p. 28.

by virtue of its own development, but as a result of conscious action by the Communist Party over the objective base, how to be able to launch in time the superior form of the fight of the revolution.¹²

One of the recently published of the rare Sendero documents was circulated in Spain in 1984. It was titled, "The Truth About the People's War in Peru." The pamphlet was primarily written as a revolutionary handbook utilizing Peru as a present case study. The five stages of revolution were presented as follows:

- 1) "Agitation and armed propaganda. First actions and training of the combatants in attacks with limited objectives. This lasted from May 1980 until the end of 1981."
- 2) "Systematic sabotage and initiation of the first regular guerrilla actions destined to destroy the power of the bourgeois landowner in the zones chosen to be bases of support. This lasted all of the year 1982."
- 3) "Generalization of the guerrilla war and the beginning of the creation of support bases, behind the expulsion of the reactionary authorities. This extended throughout the entire year of 1983 and had to face since the first moment the intervention of the Army."
- 4) "Conquest of the bases of support, establishing in them the power of the Popular Committees, and strengthening the militias and popular army. Expansion of the popular army to new zones (including the cities as an auxiliary activity) to obtain the dispersion of the enemy forces. Reorganization of the productive process to place it at the service of the popular army. This fourth stage is long and complex and the PCP has divided it into numerous sub-stages, each with specific tactical objectives. In the final sub-stages the war will probably evolve into movements of large combatant columns."

¹²"La Guerra Popular Es una Guerra Campesina o No Es Nada," reproduced in Rogger Mercado, El Partido Comunista del Peru: Sendero Luminoso (Lima: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1982), p. 41.

- 5) "Generalized civil war. The popular army will depart the liberated zones to surround the cities. It is probable that during this stage imperialist forces will directly intervene. Insurrection in the cities will complement the external siege. Complete destruction of the reaction, and the installation throughout Peru of the Popular Republic of New Democracy as the concrete form of the first stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹³

The initial actions of Sendero Luminoso during the first stage of its revolutionary plan covered a wide spectrum of operations executed in the southern highlands region, particularly in the department of Ayacucho. Sendero was able to take advantage of the lack of a sufficient governmental and security infrastructure to implement its strategy nearly unopposed by the local police forces of the Guardia Civil. Their armory was unsophisticated, consisting primarily of weapons confiscated during attacks on police stations and dynamite stolen from local mining centers. Dynamite was frequently wrapped in balls of mud and slung from a huaraco, a traditional Inca llama-half sling. Grenades consisted of beverage cans filled with gasoline and topped with a makeshift fuse.¹⁴

These initial actions dealt almost exclusively with some type of armed propaganda. The large majority consisted of attacks on local government officials, destruction of

¹³ Raúl Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," Quehacer, August 1984, p. 29.

¹⁴ "Terror-by-night Haunts the Andes," Miami Herald, 15 December 1982.

electrical towers and bridges, and assaults on isolated police posts and small centers of public administration. Destruction and burnings at the local level were particularly targeted against buildings where debt records were held. Generally those debts were owed by the least favored strata of the society. These early operations served a twofold purpose. As the strategic document indicated, these generally uncomplicated maneuvers served as a training ground for teaching militants the use of weapons on easily achievable tactical objectives. Furthermore, the success of these actions demonstrated the advance and consolidation of the Sendero cause in spite of armed opposition from the Belaúnde government and vocal opposition from the political left.

During the early phase, Sendero columns utilized a strategy of surprise, often going on the offensive at night. Following the attack, the militants would take refuge in the towns or return to their daily occupations, making detection and capture difficult by a security force handicapped by the lack of an effective intelligence capacity. Additionally, the Senderistas were able to remain mobile and utilize the geography and difficult terrain to their tactical advantage. They were aided in the rural zones by the clandestine and overt help of local citizens and by the lack of police forces to pursue them.¹⁵

¹⁵Raúl Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por Los Caminos de Sendero," Quehacer, January 1983, p. 46.

Sendero also engaged in methods other than destruction and sabotage to further their cause. They won partisans in the countryside by holding regular meetings at which the guerrillas led indoctrination sessions, distributed food, and established a system of "popular justice." The Senderistas would arrive at a settlement during the night and summon the citizens to the town square to accuse and punish so-called "enemies of the people." Among these were alleged child molesters, petty criminals, wealthy merchants, usurers, and cattle thieves. Sentences meted out to those deemed guilty included public floggings, humiliating haircuts, and even executions. Property was distributed, and debts owed by the peasants were voided. Many peasants regarded these incidents as the first public services they had ever received.¹⁶ The Senderistas passed their revolutionary message by occupying radio stations and forcing transmission of pre-recorded messages. Additionally, schools were occupied while the militants explained the reasons for their struggle to the students before departing.

It is obvious that the extensive preparation by the Sendero Luminoso party prior to 1980 yielded high dividends during the initial phase of the revolutionary process. In the political realm, the Senderist ideology appealed to a mass sector that had never benefitted under a democratic or

¹⁶Bennet, "Corner of the Dead," p. 29.

military regime, and that had equally been abandoned by most of the leftist sector. On a tactical level, this preparation manifested itself in such things as the destruction of electrical towers in places with limited access to normal civilians, indicating a high degree of infiltration into key strategic areas.

It is noteworthy to mention that these strategies were principally employed in the lower elevations of the highlands. The Indian peasants in the more remote villages of the higher and less hospitable terrain rarely had contact with the Senderistas except when the guerrillas crossed the mountain passes in transit to the valleys below. The great isolation, harshness of the climate and terrain, dispersion of the villages, and the primitivism of the people weighed negatively against indoctrination and building of support bases. The high zones were utilized as secure transit corridors where the militants could disappear after carrying out armed actions in Huanta, Tambo, and other locales.¹⁷

A new phase in Sendero strategy was ushered in on March 2, 1982. In a well-coordinated military offensive, several columns of revolutionaries attacked and subsequently held the maximum security prison in Ayacucho. A total of 247 prisoners were set free, including a large number of suspected terrorists. Prior to this incident, President Belaúnde had

¹⁷ Carlos Castro et al., Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay (Lima: Impreso en Editora Peru [1983]), p. 29.

insisted that Sendero Luminoso was principally a group of delinquents and criminals that could be handled by the traditional security forces. In response to the jailbreak, he ordered the Sinchis, an elite counterinsurgency battalion of the Guardia Civil, to Ayacucho. Without proper training, unfamiliar with the local terrain, and lacking knowledge of the Quechua tongue, the Sinchis also proved to be inadequate for its assigned purpose. Numerous abuses of authority were reported, resulting in the deaths of many innocent people. Hostility and tension between the local populace and the security forces increased, garnering support for Sendero. This proved to be the high point of support for the movement. Official estimates placed the number of Sendero militants at approximately 3000.¹⁸

Sendero Luminoso has generally been unforgiving in their operations against the security forces. In the "Let Us Develop the Guerrilla War" document, Sendero specifically addresses their attacks on police.

Actions which decisively blow the reactionary forces, in its own contingent of people who like cannon fodder are used for interests which are not exactly theirs; actions which permit us to seize arms from the enemy, the principal source of our armament, and fundamentally, to deal hard blows to the morale of the state reactionary apparatus and its contingent.¹⁹

¹⁸"Pocket of Terrorism Stirs Among Peruvian Peasants," Los Angeles Times, 20 February 1983.

¹⁹"Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," reproduced in Rogger Mercado, Algo Más Sobre Sendero (Lima: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1983), p. 28.

On at least some occasions when Sendero was able to conduct successful ambushes against police patrols, the insurgents often killed the officer in charge, while they let the troops go free after confiscating their weapons and uniforms, and requesting them to cross over to the side of the rebels. While the officer would represent the incarnation of the reactionary regime, the rank and file were pardoned from execution as a tribute to their oppressed status.

The Sendero political leadership celebrated the second national party conference between March and May of 1982. The initial goals of the revolution were acknowledged as having been accomplished. The nation was notified that a revolutionary group had taken up arms. Claims were made that two companies of the People's Army were formed, and the mandatory conditions had been created for the establishment of future bases of support. Actions were to be taken to clean and burn those areas of the countryside not yet under Sendero control, to rid it of the political and economic authorities of the state. This signified an increase in political executions and the greater use of terror against those peasants found to be oppose the revolution.²⁰

During this time, Sendero controlled vast amounts of territory in Ayacucho and neighboring departments. As the security forces began to increase the systematic use of terror

²⁰ Raúl Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," Quehacer, August 1984, pp. 19-20.

on the local populace, Sendero, somewhat illogically, followed suit. Their use of terror undermined the sense of legitimacy among the populace which they had successfully earned. In terms of overall support for their cause, this change in strategy was counterproductive. Local political authorities were harassed with death threats. Many fled to safer territory; those that remained were often executed. Noted author Mario Vargas Llosa states,

The question is academic as to whether the peasant population thus abandoned by the civilian authorities were sympathetic to the Senderista detachments. They obviously had no other alternative than to seek an arrangement with the de facto power that had replaced the fleeting power and, willingly or unwillingly, to collaborate or at least coexist with it.²¹

Within the peasant communities, the terror instigated by Sendero members became intense. Liberated zones saw a dramatic upsurge in "people's trials" against suspected traitors and informers. Varayoc, or Indian community leaders, were whipped and paraded naked through their villages. Residents were summoned and had their hair shorn, a humiliating gesture within the local culture, as a warning against future resistance. Elections were often disrupted by the burning of ballot boxes. In some districts, Senderistas were known to punish voters by cutting off the tips of fingers marked with indelible red ink at the polling station.²² A female youth

²¹Commission Report on the Murder of Journalists in Uchuraccay. FBIS 6, March 1983, p. J4.

²²David Werlich, "Peru: The Shadow of the Shining Path," Current History, February 1984, p. 82.

who witnessed a band of Sendero militants conducting a "people's trial" offers this,

. . . They stood the boy in the plaza, calling him a traitor and a coward. Then, in front of everyone, they cut off his head with a knife. There was nothing that we could do to save him. Five minutes later, one of them yelled, 'Whoever does the same thing will receive the same punishment!' Then they left, shouting allegiances to comrade Gonzalo.²³

Sendero also took concrete steps which directly came into conflict with the economic survival of the peasantry. The guerrillas attempted to restrict food production by coercing the villages into economic self-sufficiency. Only enough crops were to be grown to meet the needs of each hamlet. The driving theory behind this was an attempt by the revolutionaries to eradicate the money economy, and to strangle the cities by starvation. Additionally, the Senderistas insisted on the closure of local markets where the Indians traditionally sold their meager surplus in order to purchase cocoa, macaroni, corn, and other necessary goods not available to them by other means. The net result was a small shortage in the regional cities of potatoes and local cereals. This was by no means catastrophic, in light of the fact that 80% of the cities' food needs are supplied from the coast. The fact that some shortages of supplies did exist indicates at least some success on the part of Sendero.²⁴

²³ Jeanne DeQuine, "The Challenge of the Shining Path," The Nation, 8 December 1984, p. 613.

²⁴ "Peru's Army Arrives in Guerrilla Area, but Communist Rebels Well Entrenched," Wall Street Journal, 4 January 1983.

True to their word, Sendero embarked on an intensified scheme of political assassinations. By mid-December 1982, following the murder of four more local representatives, President Belaúnde reluctantly dispatched 1,500 Army troops to act as a backup force to the Sinchis and other local police groups. Belaúnde had postponed this action as long as possible. Sending in the military was, in effect, an admission to the public of an ineffective counterinsurgency campaign. The normal state apparatus was unable to effectively deal with the Sendero threat, and the mounting problem was evolving into an internal menace to national security. Having been deposed in 1968 by a military coup, the president also feared the possibility of a future military intervention in the nascent and struggling democracy.

By the end of their second year of armed insurrection, Sendero enjoyed its most widespread support among the highlands peasants. During the first two stages of their campaign, namely armed propaganda and sabotage, Sendero had largely succeeded in convincing a segment of the populace that it represented an alternative to the democratic regime. This was accomplished by cultivating and enhancing an existing negative image of the state apparatus in the minds of the peasantry while simultaneously legitimating its own claim to power by providing what amounted to rudimentary social services to a needy social stratum. Evidence of this support was demonstrated in mid-1982 by the overwhelming public turnout of between 10,000 and 30,000 people in Ayacucho for

the funeral of Edith Lagos, a young guerrilla commander who died while in police custody. Moreover, Sendero was successful in organizing a general strike in the city of Ayacucho on January 8, 1983. Aside from recruiting the support of much of the hinterland peasantry, Sendero was able to build a sizeable arsenal of weapons seized from the security forces while concurrently training young operatives in strategy and tactics.

As Sendero turned toward the increased use of terror and coercion, however, it began to undermine and slowly erode the base it had labored to achieve. Tactics turned from being constructive to destructive in an effort to further demonstrate the inability of the state to act effectively. While this followed a long range political strategy of the party leadership, it did not respond to the actual needs of the peasantry. Although Sendero was successful in achieving the intervention of the military to demonstrate the weakness of the government, this also placed the population in the cross-fire between two diametrically opposed and equally committed institutions using repressive means to achieve their goals. In its efforts to attack symbols of the bourgeois state and capitalist dependency, Sendero was equally as counterproductive, attacking institutions such as the agricultural experimental station of the University of Huamanga and the Nestle Company for their links with international capital. While the university programs directly benefitted certain elements

of the peasantry, many of the international companies indirectly benefitted them as well by providing food for the people during times of subsistence agriculture crises.

The perilous situation in Peru came to the attention of the world in January 1983 with the murder of eight journalists in the Andean village of Uchuraccay. A horrified nation viewed live television coverage as the mutilated corpses were disinterred. As Mario Vargas Llosa illustrates,

The bodies were buried in pairs, face down, in the form of burial used for people the Iquichanos [a local Quechua ethnic community] consider "devils." They were buried outside the community limits to emphasize that they were strangers. (In the Andean beliefs, the Devil merges with the image of a stranger.) The bodies were especially mutilated around the eyes and mouth, in the belief that the victim should be deprived of his sight so he cannot recognize his killers, and of his tongue, so that he cannot denounce them. Their ankles were broken so they cannot come back for revenge. The villagers stripped the bodies; they washed the clothes and burned them in a purification ceremony known as the pichja.²⁵

The investigative commission appointed by the government absolved the local security forces in the matter, and placed the blame of the murders on the Indian villagers who mistook the journalists for a band of Senderistas. The evidence on which these conclusions were based was disputed in the trial of several Indians accused of the murders. Photos taken by one of the journalists prior to his death suggest that the victims were not killed immediately. Furthermore, four of those murdered spoke some degree of Quechua. Judge Hermenegildo Ventura Huaya of the Ayacucho Superior Court believed that

²⁵ Mario Vargas Llosa, "Inquest in the Andes," New York Times Magazine, 31 July 1983, p. 47.

the journalists were seeking and found a secret counterinsurgency operation, and that the armed forces killed them or ordered them killed to prevent disclosure.²⁶ When Cesar Elejalde became Fiscal de la Nación (Prosecutor General), he called in the Ayacucho prosecutor, Oscar Guerrero, for instructions. On March 27, 1985, the local prosecutor withdrew the accusation against the peasant defendants, rendering the proceedings moot. As of September 1985, the case remained at an impasse.²⁷

In March 1983, Sendero Luminoso convened the VIII Congress somewhere in the Ayacucho jungle. Abimael Guzmán was in attendance with other principal leaders including Osmán Morote, Luis Kawata, Julio César Mezzich, and Hildebrando Pérez Huaraneca. A strategic decision was made to deepen the war and carry it into its fourth stage of conquering the bases of support and strengthening the military forces.²⁸ The Sendero vision of its bases of support in the rural areas are explained in a December 1983 interview with a Senderist prisoner at El Frontón prison.

They are zones in which the enemy (Army and police) cannot operate. They cannot even approach them; they are

²⁶"In Peru, A Loss of Human Rights," New York Times, 24 January 1985.

²⁷America's Watch Committee, A New Opportunity for Democratic Authority (Washington D.C.: America's Watch Committee, 1985), p. 22.

²⁸Julio C. Gaitán, "Congreso de Sendero: Abimael Reaparece," Equis X, 11 April 1983, p. 4.

small states controlled and administered by the communities themselves through their organizations, but under the leadership of the Party. As soon as a support base is established, the administrative bodies are created. An educational program is initiated that is based on instruction in the Spanish language, because of its universal nature, on the learning of the four mathematical operations: addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, and on a knowledge of our true situation. A universal literacy campaign is also being launched.²⁹

The VIII Congress included a review of tactical doctrine and the directions of a future course in the revolution. A debate in the leadership emerged regarding the use of summary executions in the dispensation of popular justice. Osmañ Morote proposed a temporary suspension, stating that the communities tended to be victims of revenge waged by the Sinchis. Additionally, the guilt of the executed parties was sometimes difficult to prove. The opposing and victorious position was stated by Guzmán who maintained that the methodology was necessary against traitors to the revolution, and as a sign of the force of the New State.

In its analysis of previous aborted actions, the leadership cited two principal causes. The first was the lack of training and quality of a sufficient qualified operative leadership (platoon leaders, column leaders, etc.). The second reason was the deficient ideological indoctrination of the militants, especially in the liberated zones. This

²⁹ Interview with El Frontón inmates by Carlos Castro, El Diario de Marka, 16-17 December 1983. Translated in Latin America Report, JPRS No. LAM 84-023, pp. 113-121.

had resulted in numerous deserters and traitors to the cause, the outcome of which was a peasantry subject to manipulation by the security forces.

The Party leadership concluded the VIII Congress with five resolutions. First, to retake the reoccupied zones to show the power of the party. This was also justified on a tactical basis in order to allow the "Red Army" free transit in the theater of operations. Second, to extend the radius of action to the departments of Lima, Junín, Cuzco, and Apurímac. This was to create many "Ayacuchos" and begin the fourth stage of the revolution. The third resolution was to develop more active international contacts to evaluate the possibility of external aid. Fourth, to conduct a concentrated and intense indoctrination of militants and sympathizers. Finally, to address the need for an improved communications system to combine modern technology with the more rudimentary and ancestral methods of lights, smoke, and couriers.³⁰

Four months later, in July 1983, Sendero Luminoso convened its Third National Conference to review the success of the movement in the creation of the bases of support. The General Plan of the construction of support bases had been put into effect following the Second National Conference of June 1982. The General Plan was divided into two principal phases of preparing and sowing the land, and realizing the harvest. The

³⁰Julio C. Gaitán, "Congreso de Sendero: Abimael Reaparece," Equis X, 11 April 1983, pp. 4-6.

first stage of the General Plan was subdivided into two waves of Development, Defense, and Construction of the bases of support, DDC 1 and DDC 2. The Third National Conference was called to critique DDC 1 which had just been completed.

The results of DDC 1 were not considered to be entirely satisfactory. This was due in part to tactical errors, but more due to the increased repression of the reactionary forces. The Senderist command was able to count 124 support bases in its clutches, although they had anticipated more in previous theoretical projections.³¹

In a positive retrospect of the success of the revolution in general, the leadership of the party concluded that the old power had been destroyed. The reaction had been caught sleeping, and the Sendero actions had caused national and international repercussions. A new order of power must be constructed to replace the old based on six fundamental principles.

- 1) Giving attention to the problems of the masses.
- 2) Solving the problem of provisions.
- 3) The ability to safely live in a clandestine manner, leaving five commisars (communists) in the communities.
- 4) Defining the priority sectors (poor peasantry) and organizing them. From there will come the militias and popular army.
- 5) Education of the masses, both children and adults, in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to fill the void of

³¹Julio C. Gaitán, "Sendero Cerca Lima," Equis X, 28 May 1984, p. 9.

government abandonment of the peasantry. Emphasis shall be on history, mathematics, and operations and planning.

- 6) Organize the masses so that they will remain healthy and aid the guerrillas.³²

Following the Third National Conference, Sendero became more active in the urban arena, conducting numerous electrical blackouts and bombings in the capital city of Lima and other population centers. In addition to its Popular Schools [clandestine centers for recruiting new militants] and the operative cells, Sendero claims to have established so-called "centers of resistance." These are secret militias in factories, universities, and slums, and originally consisted of weakly trained and equipped urban guerrillas. The initial urban Senderistas were platoons organized by trained insurgents from the countryside.³³ With a new emphasis on urban operations, these guerrillas have become increasingly organized and effective, and now participate in well-coordinated maneuvers. Their recent success in the mass bombings of February 1986 and the subsequent placement of Lima under a state of emergency is a testimonial to their effectiveness and ability to elude security forces in both the rural and urban sectors.

The growing effectiveness of Sendero Luminoso to conduct simultaneous coordinated attacks in different sections of

³²Raúl Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," Quehacer, August 1984, p. 22.

³³Julio C. Gaitán, "Sendero Cerca Lima," p. 8.

the nation points to an improvement in their communications network, a problem that had been addressed previously. It has been reported that Sendero has acquired a powerful radio transmitter which allows it to communicate with commandoes in the north, central, and southern sections of the country. The transmitter is of unknown origin, but is supposedly highly sophisticated. The operatives are able to utilize receivers confiscated in raids against police stations in the Emergency Zone.³⁴

As the military became increasingly involved in the counterinsurgency operations surrounding Ayacucho, Sendero made good its promise to spread the fighting to other rural regions. Although the military has apparently been successful at lowering the capacity of the guerrillas to act in the Emergency Zone, the Senderistas have been successful at opening a second front to the north. The guerrillas have been able to exploit the bad state of landless peasants in the region of Huanuco in a fashion similar to the strategy employed in the south. This has also had the psychological boost of being able to operate successfully in an area considered to be solid APRA supporters under the government of an APRA administration.³⁵ Sendero does not have the benefit of having conducted extensive political work in areas of the

³⁴Jorge L. Aceveda, "Iminente Ofensiva Senderista," Equis X, 17 November 1985, p. 9.

³⁵Aceveda, "Iminente Ofensiva Senderista," p. 9.

north. This has led the Senderistas to adopt more repressive rather than persuasive tactics in order to garner logistic support from the civilian populace.³⁶ Evidence supports the fact that Sendero has recently opened a third front in the department of Puno, located on the Andean plateau on the border with Bolivia in the southeast. Sendero first appeared there in 1982, attacking a local police station. Actions then subsided, but resumed in force in January 1986 with repeated attacks on peasant cooperatives. These cooperatives are the site of nearly all of the productive land in the region while 162,000 families in the department are landless. The Sendero strategy is apparently aimed at pitting the impoverished highlands peasants against those with better land on the plateau. All three fronts are located in neglected and impoverished areas with little infrastructure to allow the effective deployment of police and military forces.³⁷

Theoretically, the Sendero political and decision-making apparatus is structured about a national conference of constituent members. This varies considerably with the actual reality of the party due to the clandestine style of its operation. In practice, all decisions are made by the National Directorate or Central Committee which comprises leaders from

³⁶ Americas Watch Committee, A New Opportunity for Democratic Authority (Washington D.C.: Americas Watch Committee, 1985), p. 27.

³⁷ FBIS 21 March 1986, p. J2.

the five strategic zones. The nation is divided into the southern (Cuzco, Sicuani, Puno, Andahuaylas), central (Ayacucho, Huancayo, Huancavelica, and predominant in terms of members and leaders), southwestern (Arequipa, Tacna, Moquegua), northern (Cajamarca, Piura, La Libertad), and Lima zones. A regional committee composed of province and district representatives exists in each of the zones. Seats on the National Directorate are also reserved for members of the branch responsible for order and discipline (control de cuadros) and the military apparatus (brazo armado).

The Sendero military organization relies on a highly vertical cell structure to carry out the military missions decreed by the political sector. Each cell consists of less than ten members, with five being the optimal strength. There is one commander (responsable político) who directs the militant actions of the cell, and answers to the next highest level of authority. Several members of this intermediate stratum received training in China and North Korea prior to the Senderista leadership fallout with the Chinese leadership over the post-Mao succession and the deposition of the "Gang of Four."³⁸ With the exception of large offensives, there is generally no inter-cell contact between members. Each cell normally contains two explosives specialists, one ideologue for political education, and one person responsible for maintaining physical fitness and instruction in

³⁸Taylor, Maoism, p. 14.

unarmed combat techniques. The cell commander is normally responsible for weapon concealment and maintenance. All members are trained in basic first aid, with one member usually possessing more advanced medical skills.³⁹

The use of a rigid cellular structure as an organizational framework has been successful for Sendero. While the cellular format is often considered a tool utilized by urban guerrillas, Sendero has adopted it well in a rural sector where the resources of the state would be limited and the absolute necessity for secrecy and minimization of communications could be somewhat relaxed. One of the key elements of the success of the movement has been the inability of the Peruvian governmental and military intelligence network to achieve more than superficial infiltration.

The Sendero military organization is headed by a Unified Command. The hierarchy is separated vertically into companies, detachments, platoons, militias, and cells.⁴⁰ The Popular Guerrilla Army is composed of three main bodies. The Main Force is mobile and in constant movement. This is complemented by local forces installed in each town which remain there permanently. Finally, a militia is said to be integrated among the inhabitants of the liberated towns. The

³⁹Taylor, Maoism, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁰Tito Ercilla, "Sendero Se Confiesa," Equis X, 31 August 1982, p. 6.

political sector is represented in the liberated villages by a five-member popular committee supported by the local force and militia.⁴¹

Sendero is highly selective in the recruitment of potential militants. Anyone wishing to join the organization must be approved by at least two members. Sendero instigates the recruiting process in order to avoid infiltration. After selection, the initiate will spend at least one year participating in propaganda actions such as painting walls, publishing pamphlets, and a host of analogous acts. During this phase, the initiate is not permitted to participate in military actions or to come in contact with the military apparatus. Political indoctrination and instruction in guerrilla theory are paramount in the education process. In general, the initiate will begin to participate in low-risk military actions such as the destruction of bridges and electrical towers between the first and second year of training. Training in firearms, explosives, guerrilla strategy, and physical fitness enhance the expertise of the individual. After this second stage, a decision is made regarding final admittance. If accepted, the person will swear an oath of allegiance in front of four hooded Sendero representatives. If not, the training and association with the organization is halted. The new guerrilla is then assigned to a cell with little personal

⁴¹Julio C. Gaitán, "Sendero Cerca Lima," p. 9.

knowledge of the structural hierarchy and knowing few other members. Minimum contact among the members is enforced for security reasons.⁴² Although Sendero is highly selective in its recruiting practices, it is not sexually discriminatory. Women frequently participate in militant activities and several women count among top Sendero military leaders.

The net result of the Senderist organizational structure has been to produce a body that is exceedingly difficult to infiltrate. Because a large proportion of the recruiting is done in the rural areas, the family backgrounds and histories of potential members are easily checked. In addition, Sendero is said to have the active and tacit support of some disenchanted ex-members of the Guardia Civil who are experienced in police matters and know the identity of potential informers. Thousands of policemen have been discharged for disciplinary reasons. It is rumored that Sendero has received inside information that would be invaluable on a tactical level from these elements. Additionally, Sendero is likely to have infiltrated the police infrastructure during the years of preparation prior to 1980.

In the Peruvian highlands, there has existed a traditional rivalry between the peasant populations in the barren and harsh environment of the higher elevations, and the communities situated in the more fertile and hospitable

⁴²Taylor, Maoism, p. 14.

valleys. The highlands peasant tends to view his counterpart as a traitor to the Inca ethnicity by his adaptation and acculturation to western civilization. The lowlands peasant regards his complement as brutish and uncivilized. These sociological tenets have not led to a polarization of interests, however. The highlands Indian relies on the lowlands population to supply him with basic necessary provisions in the marketplace, while the lowlands peasant still looks to his counterpart in the sharing of traditional religious and cultural festivals. The distinction between these two groups, however, is important to emphasize because Sendero Luminoso does not regard the two groups equally in its recruiting efforts.

The clientele that Sendero has traditionally sought to mobilize has generally pertained to urban or peasant sectors related to cities where propaganda cells were active. This group would tend to be more easily rallied because of a greater tendency to view their social problems in terms of pertaining to an exploited class.⁴³ Because of their exposure to a national infrastructure, these peasants of the lower elevations would be more likely to regard their situation from a nationalist point of view rather than allegiance to a particular ethnic identity.

Fernando de Trazegnies Granda, the Peruvian legal academician assigned to the Uchuraccay investigative commission,

⁴³Castro, Informe, p. 96.

cites two reasons for the attraction of peasant youth to the Sendero ideology. First, the opposition of the youth to the traditional gerontocracy and difficulties of social ascent within the communal structural hierarchies. This opposition is exacerbated by the growing desire felt by the young for political and societal opening. Because of this, the young tend to abandon their native communities to migrate to the cities to work in low level jobs. This energy generated by frustration is played upon by Sendero to garner support for its revolution, and the geographical reality reflects that the basic centers of Senderista support tend to be in valley and foothill communities which adhere less to the traditional structures of the highland communities.⁴⁴

In marked contrast, Sendero has generally relied on the communities in the higher elevations for nothing more than logistic support to clandestinely transit from one valley to another. The highland villages have been much more reluctant to rally around the Senderist flag. The guerrillas often impose their request for food and shelter by violent means. Senderistas have frequently been known to steal sheep to eat or to give to other communities. In the higher elevations, sheep are viewed by the peasants as extremely valuable possessions. They are normally used solely for wool production,

⁴⁴ Fernando de Trazeguies Granda, "Informe," in Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay, Carlos Castro et al. (Lima: Impreso en Editora Peru, 1983), p. 133.

and are only sold in the severest of economic crises. The reputation of the militants as thieves is magnified by their association with the distrusted inhabitants of the lower elevations. The insistence by Sendero to burden these communities with the closure of local markets and the imposition of economic self-sufficiency has mobilized segments who are often willing to form armed self-defense patrols in cooperation with the government security forces in order to protect their interests.

Enrique Valencia, a Mexican political scientist and sociologist, has written that public documents published by guerrillas can generally be classified into two principal categories. The first is to proclaim the military actions of the guerrillas and to publicize the triumphs of the guerrillas in confrontations with the regular army. The second type is to make political proclamations to gain the sympathy of the people and secure the support of the populace in aiding the armed groups. The purpose of the first category is to show by testimonial that counterinsurgency groups, in spite of better combat preparation and logistic capacities, are not invincible, and that the guerrillas can constitute an efficient self-defense force of the base of support. The purpose of the second type of document is to proclaim in a simple and emotional fashion the reasons that a group has taken up the struggle. It is an attempt to legitimize their use of

violence and subversion in the revolutionary context.⁴⁵ Although Sendero rarely uses published documents for propaganda purposes, the two principal pamphlets produced in 1982, "La Guerra Popular Es Una Guerra Campesina o No Es Nada," and "Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," combine both elements of the Valencia typology.

Although working clandestinely since its beginnings, Sendero managed to maintain a more or less institutionalized contact with university students, urban neighborhoods, and peasant communities through a number of domestic political organizations. These included the Movement of Classist Working Laborers (MOTC), the Feminine Popular Movement, and the Coordinating and Unifying Committee of the Secondary Student Movement (CCUMES). In Ayacucho, Sendero has worked through the Provincial Federation of the Peasants of Huamanga, the Federated Students of the UNSCH, the Front for the Defense of the People (FDP), and the Unique Syndicate of the Workers of Peruvian Education (SUTEP).⁴⁶

In an international context, although Sendero has been accused of being financed and trained abroad, no hard evidence has been produced to support the claims. Due to their

⁴⁵ Enrique Valencia, "Notas Para Una Sociologia de la Guerrilla," in Algo Más Sobre Sendero, Rogger Mercado (Lima: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1983), p. 102.

⁴⁶ Piedad Pareja Pflucker, Terrorismo, p. 81.

ultra-left stance and a dogmatic and purist ideology, unconfirmed reports of such incidents as supposed Libyan assistance and training⁴⁷ can probably be discounted. Sendero has been tied politically to fifteen radical parties of different countries. Most are relatively unknown, but all conform to a common ideology of militancy and orthodox Maoism.⁴⁸ Since 1982, a Senderist International Committee has been active in western Europe directing a publicity system through pamphlets, magazines, and books published clandestinely in France, Spain, and the Netherlands. Several European organizations have been identified, owing to a frequent number of publications, as Sendero political branches. These include the Proletarian Movement of Peru, the Amauta Intellectual Movement, the Movement for Liberation in Peru, and the José Carlos Mariátegui Artistic and Intellectual Front, among others.⁴⁹ The most overt and synchronized network appears to be located in Madrid and Barcelona.

A discussion of Sendero ideology and strategy would not be complete without a brief analysis of how the Senderist tenets are inculcated into a rural peasant population rich in a millenarian and messianic tradition. The Quechua Indian

⁴⁷FIBS 17 December 1986, p. J1.

⁴⁸For more on this, see Raúl Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," p. 25.

⁴⁹Alberto Ku King, "Siguiendo la Pista de Sendero en Europa," Oiga, 30 July 1984, p. 27.

population of the Andean sector, descendants of the pre-Colombian Incas, maintain their cultural beliefs of the past in the modern era as demonstrated by their folklore, unique practice of the Catholic religion, and traditional continuation of the local political system which has been superficially superseded by the imposition of a parallel official state government apparatus.

The Andean conception of history and humanity was divided into three successive eras. The first era, the time of the Pagans, ended in mythical times. Although the Pagans constructed a powerful civilization, they had defied God and were destroyed. The second era coincides with the Inca empire and its destruction and subjugation at the hands of the Christians. When this era is likewise destroyed, the Inca king will return to initiate a third era of paradise and perfect life. This third era is, however, believed not to take place before having a Day of Judgement, preceded by disorder, immorality, rebellion, and fighting among men.⁵⁰ Each humanity coincides with the appearance of a new sun and solar age. Perhaps not coincidentally, a local Quechua nickname for Comrade Gonzalo is puka-inti, or red sun. Millenarist beliefs, with the associated destructive visions, have a rich history in the Andes.

⁵⁰Fernando Fuenzalida and Juan M. Ossio, "Informe Antropológico," in Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay, Carlos Castro et al. (Lima: Impreso en Editora Peru, 1983), p. 62.

Nathan Wachtel, a French anthropologist and expert on pre-Colombian culture, has studied modern Indian folklore and how it relates to the native perception of the Spanish conquest of the sixteenth century. Indian folklore is relevant because it conserves the memory of the past and provides the vehicle for the transmission of a collective memory to future generations. Today's Andean folklore is rich in expressing the agony of the death of Atahualpa, the last Inca king. Four centuries later, the tragedy of the conquest at the hands of an alien culture remains a strong underlying theme in the peasant mind.⁵¹ To a large extent, that foreign culture has remained dominant, never seeking to incorporate the Andean identity into the infrastructure and power centers associated with the Europeanized urban centers of coastal Peru.

A major Andean post-Conquest millenarian religious movement took place during the sixteenth century. The sect carried the name of Taqui Ongoy and coincided largely with a successful Indian rebellion lasting several decades, and ending with the death of Túpac Amaru at the hands of colonial forces in 1572. Taqui Ongoy represented a rebirth of Indian culture transformed and reoriented with a sense of revolt and liberation. The beliefs rejected any cultural interchange

⁵¹Nathan Wachtel, "La Visión de los Vencidos: La Conquista Española en el Folklore Indígena," in Ideología Mesianica del Mundo Andino, ed. Juan M. Ossio (Lima: Grafica Morson, 1973), p. 37.

with the Spanish imperial society and actively sought to terminate the domination. The religious tradition of the Incas had been awakened to battle Christianity and evict the conquerors from the Inca homeland. Millenarianism and mesianism in the form of exalting the successful Inca military leaders emerged when the entire existence of a native society was questioned. The conquest had represented a complete dismantling of the Indian world without a new restructuring. The Taqui Ongoy responded to this crisis by providing a collective mechanism and alternate vision to a threatened existence.⁵²

The Indians of the Peruvian Andes continued their militant traditions well into the nineteenth century, playing important roles in the battles for independence at the side of the royalist forces. The Quechua tribes had an important military hero in the form of José Antonio Naval Huachaca, an illiterate Indian who rose to the rank of General. An important Quechua group, the Ichiquanos, developed a superb reputation as members of the Cavalry of Lancers of Santiago. The troops, under the direction of local chiefs and armed with traditional weapons such as clubs, slingshots, and bolos, proved to be effective warriors. The women won fame as being equally tenacious to men in the field of battle.⁵³

⁵²Nathan Wachtel, "Rebeliones y Milenarismo," in Ideología Mesiánica del Mundo Andino, ed. Juan M. Ossio (Lima: Grafica Morson, 1973), p. 118.

⁵³Fernando Fuenzalida, "Informe Antropológico," pp. 45-47.

Needless to say, many elements of the Sendero Luminoso revolution ring more true to the Andean past than a Communist future. The vision of the complete destruction of the present Peruvian state and the subsequent rise to power of a new and legitimate structure hark back to a millenarian tradition and response of the traditional society to confront a crisis. The descendants of the conquistadores have continued their oppression throughout the centuries. Abimael Guzmán as the charismatic leader of the new order and the chief architect of the movement is revered much in the same way as a rebellious Manco Capac or Túpac Amaru by his followers. Finally, Sendero does not rely on the sophisticated weaponry of the twentieth century to carry out its militant actions. Most are done with nothing more than dynamite accompanied by more traditional arms such as the llama-hair sling. Equally, Senderista women have achieved fame in the same manner as their Ichiquana counterparts.

During the first six years of its proclaimed revolution, Sendero has been highly successful in some ways while failing to achieve its goals in others. In contrast to the ill-fated revolutionaries of the 1960's, Sendero's preparation, organization, impermeability, and clandestine operation have contributed to continued success against a state and military counterinsurgency campaign hampered by a lack of resources. Following the 1982 turn to increased terror and political violence, however, Sendero has eroded some of its recruiting

base by failing to continue the actions which supported its claims to legitimacy among the impoverished peasants during the first two years of the armed struggle.

So far, the movement has not produced any semblance of the worker-peasant alliance so prevalent in the ideological rhetoric. Likewise, Sendero has failed to achieve the polarization of the entire society into two extremes. The vast majority of Peruvians have opted for the democratic alternative to the revolution. The Sendero campaign of sabotage has not severely undermined the economic process, although some inroads have been made. One example is the constant barrage of electrical blackouts that Sendero has enacted on Lima and other major cities. Although electricity is usually restored quickly, long-term effects are beginning to be manifested. The overall electrical system in some parts has been so inundated with circuit cross-ties that the system as a whole might only carry seventy percent of its fully rated capacity. While this is not burdensome to the consumer, the effects on the industrial production process are potentially devastating.

A true revolutionary situation would exist in Peru only if the majority of the society opted for fundamental change while the elites in power remained intransigent to these demands. With the change from military rule to civilian power in 1980, and the uninterrupted electoral transfer to a more liberal administration in 1985, an intransigent political elite has proved to be non-existent. In this context, the

chances for a successful revolution led by Sendero Luminoso appear slim. On the other hand, Sendero has proved itself to be tenacious and impossible to easily eradicate. Its ability to continue to inflict damage throughout the nation on a lower than revolutionary scale appear to be a certainty for a long time to come. This could provoke the government into committing mistakes, such as overreacting or underreacting to the level of threat. An incorrect response to Sendero Luminoso might ultimately culminate in a weakened perception of legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

III. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT

The suppression of Sendero Luminoso by the means available to the Peruvian government, namely the national police services and the military, has proven to be impossible during the six years since the initiation of the armed insurrection in 1980. The counterinsurgency campaign has been hampered by an assigned mission which, in the light of Andean reality (given the nature of the opponent, the operational environment, and a lack of dedicated resources), is exceedingly difficult to perform. In many aspects, the army is deployed in a region that, culturally and linguistically, can almost be considered a foreign territory within the confines of sovereign national boundaries. With the army assuming full responsibility for the counterinsurgency effort in the Emergency Zone, that section of the country remains in a virtual state of war against an internal rather than external power. In the prevailing atmosphere, the ability of the government to act decisively while adhering to the principles laid out in the Peruvian constitution has been a challenge where lack of success has claimed the lives of many innocent victims. Efforts to reform the program and curb these abuses by the García administration have met with some resistance by conservative elements within the military that maintain Sendero can only be eliminated by a more militant program, reminiscent of the Argentine example during the late 1970's.

The counterinsurgency endeavor can be divided into three principal phases. It has evolved in steps of increasing repression, responding to the success of Sendero in the Andean highlands in spite of opposition by the security forces. The first period lasted from the beginning of Sendero militant actions in May 1980 until 26 December 1982, when the Belaúnde administration placed the nine provinces of the Emergency Zone under military rule. During this time, the only forces employed were from the three national police institutions and their corresponding elite counterinsurgency and anti-terrorist units.

When the Army first deployed to the region in late 1982, it was assigned only to perform an occupation function in regions that were not controlled by Sendero. The martial activities involved in regaining lost territory in the rural areas were still left to the police forces and the Sinchis, with the additional support of the marine infantry. As these forces continued to be unsuccessful, the Army increasingly participated in joint operations, with further repression and the use of deadly force becoming commonplace. The third phase of the campaign was ushered in on 20 July 1984, when the police forces were withdrawn to the cities, and the military was given the sole responsibility of combatting the guerrillas in the rural arena.

The evolution of the counterinsurgency effort has been towards the use of greater force to accomplish the objective

of eradicating the guerrilla threat. The dispatch of the Army redefined the Sendero problem from that of a police action in the interest of maintaining internal order to one of a true threat to national security. The emergence of systematic militarized repression came into conflict with democratic principles and freedoms established by the 1979 democratic constitution. The military intervention was undoubtedly welcomed by Sendero, who viewed it as a legitimization of their revolutionary apparatus. Additionally, they believe that the repressive campaign against an already oppressed and somewhat mobilized populace would serve to expand the Senderist ideological appeal. Moreover, although infringements on democratic freedoms would not be considered relevant by a movement with such a radical and militant philosophy, they are critical to the other elements of the Peruvian left who rely on the democratic process as a vehicle to power.¹ For one thing the success of Sendero and the increased role of the military forces to combat it might provide an opportunity for the return of military rule to Peru. Hence, one witnesses the denouncements by the political left of both the revolutionary Senderistas and the forces of order with their associated excesses of constitutional authority.

The responsibilities of the Peruvian security forces are divided between three services that have traditionally been

¹José Maria Salcedo, "Sendero, Conciencia de la Izquierda?" Quehacer, April 1982, p. 20.

distinct and institutionally competitive. The main component is the uniformed Guardia Civil, which is assigned the task of maintaining public order. The Guardia Republicana, another uniformed body, assumes the duty of security in public and penal institutions. The third component is the Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP), a non-uniformed group similar to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, which specializes in criminal investigations and intelligence gathering missions. Additionally, each of the police services contains elite units under their control which have been employed in the anti-subversive struggle near Ayacucho and, more recently, in other areas. The most well known of these is the Sinchi battalion, the anti-subversive unit of the Guardia Civil. The Sinchis were the principal unit employed against Sendero prior to the complete military assumption of power in 1985. The Guardia Civil has also utilized a riot control body to augment the regular police forces in the area. The Guardia Republicana maintained troops from its own counter-subversive squad, the Lllapan Atic (Quechua for all-powerful).² The PIP has employed its own Directorate of Counterterrorism (DIRCOTE).

That Peruvian police forces have a legacy of interservice rivalry is evidenced by the replication of units among the three bodies to perform similar or identical tasks. This

²Amnesty International, Peru Briefing (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1985), p. 6.

has been compounded by tension with the Peruvian military, which has viewed as a threat to their institutional existence the parallel rank structure and requests for, and formation of, such paramilitary items as elite Guardia Civil units of paratroopers. As a result, during the years of military rule from 1968-1980, the national police suffered from a severe lack of allocated resources. This was not rectified under the Belaúnde administration due to the imposition of financial austerity measures, and by the president's desire to placate the military. A noteworthy example of the sad state of the police is evidenced by the fact that when Alan García assumed executive power in July 1985, the police in the capital city of Lima only possessed twenty two patrol cars to service a metropolitan population of over six million.³ Rank-and-file members have been plagued by extremely low salaries which consequently led to a high level of corruption and an extremely poor image in the eyes of the

³Bradley Graham, "Peru's Civilian Ruler Calls in Troops to Calm Lima," Washington Post, 24 February 1986. Other figures citing the problems encountered by the police include a ratio of one policeman to protect 600 citizens, compared to ratios of 300 in Chile and 450 in Colombia. The patrol area average of 43 square kilometers doubles the Chilean figure of 21, and nearly doubles the areas of 25 and 27 square kilometers found in Colombia and Argentina, respectively. It is almost certain that Peruvian policemen share their arms. The Guardia Civil had less than 20,000 revolvers to serve a force bordering on 30,000 in 1982. Furthermore, much of the ammunition was old, and not completely reliable under conditions of live firing. For more, see Gustavo Gorriti Ellenbogen, "La Policía Frente al Terrorismo," Caretas, 19 July 1982, p. 23.

public. Hence, the capability of the police forces to singularly carry out an effective anti-insurgency campaign in the early years of Sendero was seriously handicapped from the outset. The police not only suffered from an unsavory public image, but were more concerned with things other than the performance of their professional duties. This was prominently displayed during the 26 May 1983 mutiny in Lima by several thousand members of the three police bodies. Among other requests, the mutineers demanded higher salaries and the implementation of an eight-hour workday. Additionally, they called upon the government not to summon the military to resolve the crisis, proclaiming, "now we are no longer unarmed as we were on 5 February 1975," when a similar occurrence took place.⁴

By 1980, the capability of the police bodies to maintain order even in times of relative calm was highly questionable. More to the point, in no way was the security network prepared to deal with the crisis situation presented by a well organized Sendero militant threat. The ineffectiveness of the normal Guardia Civil contingent in the Ayacucho region, in concert with the early appeal of the Sendero ideology to the peasantry, allowed the revolutionaries to occupy large tracts of land abandoned by governmental and security representatives. The government declared a state of emergency in five Ayacucho provinces on 11 October 1981. During the first

⁴FBIS, 26 May 1983, p. J1.

sixty days, over 2,000 people were arrested, although few of them proved to be Senderistas. Most were innocent peasants taken into custody during a wide-sweeping dragnet operation. PIP operatives fanned out posing as students, peasants, and travellers in order to gain intelligence. None of the measures were effective, and indeed, the program was more counterproductive than beneficial. Rather than enjoying the protection of the security forces, the population became immersed in the crossfire between the police and the Sendero movement. Many sought the Sendero alternative as the apparent lesser of two evils. Although a state of emergency may only be declared for sixty days under the Peruvian constitution, constant renewal has maintained the region under this condition since the initial declaration. The situation fared no better with the augmentation of the traditional units by the elite counterinsurgency Sinchi batallion. By January 1981, approximately 1,000 Sinchis had been deployed to the troubled area. Further deterioration of the situation led to the dispatch of 400 additional troops by January 1982.⁵ The success of the March 1982 Sendero-led Ayacucho jailbreak is a testimonial to the unpreparedness of the customary institutions to counter a new and committed guerrilla threat.

In a 1982 document, Sendero Luminoso espoused their views on the counterinsurgency operation, and how its obvious lack of success contributed to their revolutionary cause.

⁵Taylor, Maoism, p. 31.

What has the antisubversive operation shown? Simply and plainly that the masses reject and resist the aggression, that the brutality, excessive strength, and reactionary violence does not repress them but, even more, incites their just anger of class confrontation, including unarmed hands against the aggressors armed and protected by the armor of the state. It shows that people help and protect the armed struggle, the guerrilla war, that they sustain and defend it with their own lives and that their understanding, heart, and will exist because the guerrillas advance and serve for their liberation.⁶

Indeed, in the context of 1982, this statement by Sendero cannot be totally dismissed as a fabrication of revolutionary rhetoric. The police had been forced to abandon many of the outlying areas and retire to the cities, leaving Sendero as the only de facto authority. In many instances, the police bore little semblance to a professional force in the performance of their duties. They were often drunk in public, using weapons in a coercive manner to threaten, rather than protect, the local citizenry. Published accounts cited the security forces for such notable and numerous accusations as robbery, extortion, and rape. In essence, the state agents of crime prevention were overcome by their own criminality, leaving little hope for a traditional solution to the growing Sendero menace. Another example of their gross ineffectiveness took place in late 1982, when Sendero attacked and occupied Huanta, a city of 80,000 inhabitants, for twenty four hours.

⁶"Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," reproduced in Algo Más Sobre Sendero, Rogger Mercado, p. 32.

Throughout the year of 1982, the police forces around Ayacucho were forced into a defense posture by the success of the guerrillas. The tactics employed by the police included the occupation of strategic points such as key electrical towers and microwave transmission points. This proved ineffective, however, as evidenced by the ability of Sendero to sabotage these points seemingly at will. Defensive tactics were employed around police barracks, although Sendero was still able to penetrate and successfully attack them. The police also implemented a system to patrol the department, including the use of combat-equipped helicopters. This, too, proved inadequate at curbing guerrilla actions.⁷

The obvious inability of the police to counter Sendero forced a reluctant Belaúnde on 21 December 1982, as a last resort, to order the army into the area to participate in the campaign. Five days later, an expanded emergency zone of nine provinces of the Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica departments were placed under military rule. A political-military command was created, headed by a general to administer the Emergency Zone and coordinate the counterinsurgency effort by integrating police, military, and civilian irregular forces. The Emergency Zone has been under constant military rule in the interim, and has been expanded to include nineteen provinces throughout the region.

⁷Raúl Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por los Caminos de Sendero," p. 46.

The reasons for the lack of police success in combatting Sendero from 1980 through 1982 are numerous. Lewis Taylor cites five principal causes relating to the failure of the security forces. Foremost was the lack of counterinsurgency training, excluding the Sinchis, given to the bulk of the Guardia Civil. Additionally, the police forces were constrained by the lack of efficient communications and transport systems. This was a legacy of the twelve year period of military rule during which the Guardia Civil was neglected because of institutional rivalry and financial constraints. Furthermore, the resource problem had left the Guardia Civil understaffed nationally by at least 17,000 men. The police forces, as a whole, are victims of poor morale and extremely low salaries. Their discontent has been voiced in such demonstrations as the Lima strike in 1983. Finally, the security forces were hampered by the lack of an effective intelligence network. From 1977-1980 during the transition from military to civilian rule, Sendero was ignored by intelligence organizations who concentrated on investigating those groups creating urban unrest and organizing strikes. Because of its non-participation in the electoral process, Sendero was virtually ignored by the security apparatus. This situation was exacerbated by the military, itself, since they returned to the barracks in 1980 with all documents from the Ministry

of the Interior, and were initially reluctant to share information.⁸

The Uchuraccay commission attributes the police failures to the nature of the struggle and the dilemma of a counter-insurgency program regulated by the rules of a constitution. The police were assigned an immense amount of territory to watch over against an enemy without a defined front. Sendero militants were able to hit and run, then disappear in the midst of a population with which the security services, due to language and cultural barriers, had little or no communication. The security forces were forced to choose between paralysis under democratic law or combatting subversion by violating the law.⁹ Survival dictated the choice of the latter alternative.

The December 1983 creation of the Political-Military command initially headed by General Clemente Noel Moral marked the initiation of the second phase in the counterinsurgency campaign. The proclaimed strategy of the army was to occupy pacified and neutral territory while Sinchi patrols and marine infantry were dispatched to zones that were undeniably under Sendero control. The military participated in a variety of civic action programs, offering food, medical attention, seeds, and protection to many rural villages.

⁸Taylor, Maoism, p. 34.

⁹Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay, p. 34.

The expressed strategy was to relieve the police forces of superfluous duties in order that they would be free to more effectively pursue the guerrillas. Although the initial declaratory doctrine was one of military occupation and non-intervention, the reality of the troop deployment was manifested in the formation of joint army patrols with the police forces, and a tremendous upsurge in the use of systematic terror accompanied by secret detention centers, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions.

Enrique Valencia has written that civic-military action programs, such as the one employed in the Peruvian highlands, are a Latin American invention born out of the counterrevolutionary struggle. The construction of roads, health centers, and other community development projects have been alternatives to revolutionary thought. Nevertheless, the existence of these programs often exacerbates the fundamental problem by exemplifying the better quality of life that is available in the developed cities. These programs assume that equal social and political values will be generated as a natural by-product of the promotion of democracy and egalitarianism. This is anything but automatic, however, and these programs may well be self-defeating by further demonstrating the discrimination and lack of parity of the historical past. Valencia concludes by stating that although the intent of these programs may

be genuine, the results of their implementation are often counterproductive.¹⁰

Sendero expressed its perception of the armed forces in the 1982 document, "La Guerra Popular Es una Guerra Campesina o No Es Nada," in which it states, "The armed forces constitute the spinal column of the state and in our country, furthermore, they acquire--by virtue of the application of yankee neo-colonialism--the connotation of a true 'native army of occupation'."¹¹ In an August 1982 interview, a Sendero militant also explained that Sendero had abstained from attacking military targets to avoid provoking an intervention. However, he went on to state, "If they do, and they will, our combat methods will change radically and qualitatively: mobility, hit and run, spreading out, and multiplying by thousands the actions throughout the country. We are prepared."¹²

It must be emphasized that the decision to deploy the armed forces to the southern highlands was anything but unanimous in the upper echelons of the Peruvian government. Belaúnde put off the decision as long as possible, fearing a

¹⁰ Enrique Valencia, "Notas Para Una Sociologia de la Guerrilla," in Algo Más Sobre Sendero, Rogger Mercado, p. 102.

¹¹ Reproduced in El Partido Comunista del Perú: Sendero Luminoso, Rogger Mercado, p. 30.

¹² Tito Ercilla, "Sendero se Confiesa," Equis X, 31 August 1982, p. 6.

possible repetition of the events which led to his ouster in 1968. Even the outgoing Minister of War, General Luis Cisneros, expressed his doubts in a January 1983 interview. Cisneros stated,

I believe it is very necessary to explore any other possible solution prior to deploying the armed forces: this is the last option that remains to a government to restore order in a country. We are going to assume control of the zone and we are going to act, we are professionals of war and we are prepared to kill: such is war. I cannot tell a soldier, one who is trained to kill: today don't kill. And if tomorrow, a problem exists; then can I tell him? We feel bad enough that it must be done, but this shall not preclude us from doing it once it is decided.¹³

General Cisneros added,

In order for the police to be successful, they would have to kill Senderistas and non-Senderistas, because that is the only form that success can be assured. They kill sixty people and at most there will be three Senderistas among them. And surely the police will say that all sixty were Senderistas.¹⁴

This is a testimonial to the deficiencies encountered by the police intelligence network to accurately infiltrate the Sendero movement, in concert with public pressure to demonstrate successes in the counterinsurgency program.

As the armed forces entered into the counterinsurgency campaign, the words of General Cisneros would prove prophetic. Beginning in 1983, official communiques from the Ayacucho Political-Military Command reported the killings of scores of guerrillas. Figures from the Ministry of the Interior showed

¹³ Raúl Gonzales, "Ayacucho: La Espera del Gaucho," Quehacer, January 1983, p. 56.

¹⁴ Gonzales, "Ayacucho: La Espera del Gaucho," p. 50.

that only two guerrillas were reported killed in 1981. This figure rose to thirty eight in 1982, but skyrocketed to 1,435 in 1983.¹⁵ This is especially noteworthy, because official figures cited the peak strength of Sendero with 3,000 militants occurred at the end of 1982. If both of the government statistics were accurate, one would expect to see a dramatic decrease in the effectiveness of Sendero guerrilla actions. This, however, was not the case, as militant actions continued largely unabated in the Emergency Zone and spread to other sections of the country, especially in Lima. Additionally, there was a parallel rise in figures in civilian deaths attributed to the guerrillas. Three were reported in 1981, fifty six in 1982, and 433 in 1983. Over 1,200 civilian deaths were recorded in the first six months of 1984.¹⁶ While the tactics of Sendero Luminoso became more oriented toward terror following the deployment of the armed forces, it is much more likely that the majority of the civilian deaths reported after 1982 occurred at the hands of security forces. Although civilian executions by the guerrillas continued, these continued to primarily be political in nature. Large scale assassinations by the guerrillas rarely took place, and were generally in response to village cooperation with the security forces. Whereas the use of terror became

¹⁵Amnesty International, Peru Briefing, p. 2.

¹⁶Amnesty International, Peru Briefing, p. 2.

more instrumental within their overall strategy, the widespread upsurge of peasant deaths would clearly have been counterproductive to the Senderist cause by further alienating their potential recruiting base.

In 1983, under the military administration and command of General Noel, many official complaints were filed by citizens of the Emergency Zone, citing the existence of clandestine interrogation centers, extrajudicial political executions, disappeared suspects, and interference of official Public Ministry investigations into these matters.¹⁷ In spite of the declared policy of peaceful occupation by the military forces, elements of the army and marine infantry actively participated in repressive actions with the police and civilian patrols. By early 1983, large numbers of arrests were being made in the principal urban centers of Ayacucho and Huanta. These were often made by groups dressed in civilian clothes travelling in military and police vehicles. In addition to not displaying any rank or official organizational identity, these individuals were often hooded to further conceal their identity. Security officials denied

¹⁷ The majority of the information in the following section was taken from the following four sources. Amnesty International, Peru: Torture and Extrajudicial Executions (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1983); Amnesty International, Peru Briefing, 1985; Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru (Washington D.C.: Americas Watch Committee, 1984), and Americas Watch, A New Opportunity for Democratic Authority.

that arrests were made, and made no disclosure of the existence of detention centers.

Evidence presented to human rights organizations cites the existence of at least eight clandestine detention and interrogation centers in the Emergency Zone. The Guardia Civil and the PIP were reported to cooperate in handing over prisoners to Army and Navy officials for further interrogation. The principal detention centers of the Emergency Zone are the Los Cabitos army headquarters and the navy headquarters at the stadium in Huanta. With the emphasis on a systematic repressive strategy, security officials denied the detention of many people in an effort to circumvent the law. Under the Peruvian jurisprudence, if police acknowledge a detention, the detainee must be released after a specified period. For ordinary offenses, the person must appear before a court within twenty four hours. In the Emergency Zone, as well as throughout other areas where Sendero is active, most prisoners are held under the anti-terrorist Decree Law 46. This allows for a fifteen-day detention of those suspected of committing terrorist acts, although the detention must be acknowledged. Under the Belaúnde administration, neither of these basic tenets were practiced in the reality of the Andean sierra.

Detention victims have denounced the systematic torture employed by the military and police forces at the interrogation centers. Many were blindfolded for long periods and

held without food. Additionally, they were stripped naked, watered down and beaten. Others have reported the use of a tub filled with water in which their heads were submerged repeatedly to the point of near suffocation. The PIP has favored the use of electric shock treatment. The Sinchi interrogators have also utilized this technique, along with forcing the victims to eat sand and near suffocation with plastic bags. Burning with cigarettes, fingernail removal, and the rape and sexual abuse of women have also been documented.¹⁸

In addition to institutionalized torture, the security forces have been active in the executions and disappearances of suspected guerrillas. In 1983, the discovery of mass graves and body dumping grounds became a regular occurrence. Many victims are found naked with visible signs of torture, killed by a single gunshot wound to the head. Furthermore, the army has taken measures to preclude the accurate identification of the victims. Many are unidentifiable, found with their clothing destroyed, their facial features mutilated or burned with acid, their fingertips severed, and the bodies disposed of in locations far from the detention centers where the relatives are generally known not to travel. Furthermore, security forces have participated in coercive

¹⁸ Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru, pp. 139-140.

prevention of families to identify victims until the bodies are too decomposed for accurate identification.¹⁹

These brutal tactics supposedly serve a double purpose. First, because of a similar use of terror by Sendero, the presence of a multitude of victims is designed to raise doubt as to which side committed the abuse, thereby dissuading people to side with the guerrillas. Additionally, the militants will be reduced to their hardest core due to the state security apparatus utilization of greater terror. The strategy of terror, therefore, is applied on both military and psychological levels.²⁰ Most of the disappearances of Sendero suspects occurred during 1983 and 1984. More recently, under the García administration, the armed forces have acted with more restraint due to pressure from the president. From testimony taken from earlier years, in order to disappear a person with army knowledge, the intelligence service had to be at least 90% certain that the suspect was a Sendero member. For the marine infantry, noted for their zeal and excesses in the counterinsurgency campaign, a 5% certainty was deemed sufficient.²¹ Many urban disappearances and executions took

¹⁹Amnesty International, Peru Briefing, p. 2; Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru, p. 116.

²⁰Marlise Simons, "Peru Adopts Severe Tactics to Combat Guerrillas," New York Times, 18 August 1984.

²¹Raúl Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," p. 15.

place among teachers and higher education students, thought to be sympathetic to the Sendero cause.

In spite of the fact that Public Ministry officials are legally assigned the duty of carrying out official investigations of matters involving public protest, since late 1983 these representatives have repeatedly decried the obstruction of their duties by police and military authorities. Although the ministry is a separate and autonomous institution, it is subordinate to the Political-Military command in the Emergency Zone and must legally rely on the command for logistic support. Prosecutors have been denied transport or clearance to enter some rural zones, as well as access to the detention centers. Military authorities have refused to provide regular reports of arrests or prisoner transfers, and formal communications petitioning information on specific prisoners have gone unheeded. Nevertheless, some investigations have been successfully completed, and the implication of the military in severe abuses of constitutional authority has been proven.²²

Another important aspect of the counterinsurgency effort has been the formation of rondas campesinas, or peasant patrols,

²²Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru, pp. 149-153. The situation has improved under the Garcia administration. The military has been held accountable for its actions, as evidenced by the September 1985 dismissal of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the implication of military members in the mass deaths of peasants in the highlands.

which serve as an indigenous community self-defense force designed to augment the military and police security effort. Testimony presented to Amnesty International suggests that these patrols were formed throughout much of the Emergency Zone only after the establishment of the Political-Military Command in Ayacucho. The command ordered community leaders accountable to the regional command to mobilize citizen forces. By June 1983, many of these patrols were acting in conjunction with uniformed security forces in the provinces of Huanta, Cangallo, and Victor Fajardo. By early 1985, a large majority of rural settlements possessed civil defense teams whose members stood guard at night and served as guides for army patrols. Communities refusing to form patrols were subject to close scrutiny by the military. Prior to 1984, the military denied the existence of these patrols. Afterward, the command authorities denied any role of the military in creating the groups, stating that any such participation was not permitted by the Constitution, and that the communities had taken action by their own initiative.

Most membership in the patrols is involuntary. Community members who refuse to join are suspected of being Sendero sympathizers. Males between the ages of twelve and sixty are inducted, and women sometimes join the ranks as well. The patrols, for the most part, are not allowed to use firearms. Members arm themselves with traditional weapons such as spears, clubs, knives, hatchets, and slingshots. The rural

patrols consist of up to 250 members, and the group leaders are generally appointed by the security forces. Established training camps can accommodate several patrols at one time.²³

All eligible community members are expected to share duty in the patrols. They often deploy in periods ranging from three days to two weeks. The encouragement of patrol formation was initially to help the armed forces maintain some type of security presence in the many remote villages accessible only by mule or on foot. Local patrols, however, were soon participating in actions at considerable distances from the base community. They were authorized and instructed by military authorities to detain anyone suspected of guerrilla involvement, and in some cases, to execute them. Using this as a cover, community militants carried out raids against rival villages in an atmosphere of legitimized violence. Immunity from criminal prosecution fostered the growth of bellicose acts between communities with traditional rivalries. Although the army rewarded villages with civil defense forces by distributing such needed items as food and seed, remuneration often came in the form of booty seized during these intercommunal raids. Rather than help counter the guerrillas, the formation of peasant patrols added an additional element of violence to a turbulent situation.

²³Americas Watch, A New Opportunity for Democratic Authority, p. 13.

The mobilization of these security forces added to the escalatory violence already present in the Peruvian sierra. Although government sources frequently claimed that civilian patrols were successful in impeding Senderista attacks, they often accomplished nothing more than to increase community rivalry and violence in a rural population already placed in a crossfire between the government forces and the Sendero guerrillas. 'From a military standpoint, the peasant patrols were designed to counter the guerrilla threat in places where the security forces were not able to maintain a continual presence. The implementation of this program, however, took place without a cultural appreciation of the peasantry and the problems which might occur when violent behavior was semi-legitimized in a region with a tradition of ethnic rivalry. As Simon Palomino, prosecutor for the provincial capital of Huanta, stated,

The violence is feeding on itself. These forces go to another community and start looting and committing abuses. So the other community will organize just to protect itself in these local rivalries. Then the Shining Path will attack both places just for organizing themselves. Then the army comes looking for the Shining path. It goes on and on.²⁴

Indeed, a true sense of neutrality in the Sendero Luminoso rebellion is a luxury that few rural peasants have been able to achieve.

In January 1984, General Adrian Huamán Centeno replaced General Clemente Noel Moral as the head of the Political-Military

²⁴Jackson Diehl, "Villagers Want Out of Conflict," Washington Post, 28 February 1985.

Command of the Emergency Zone. Huamán was more culturally sensitive to the highlands situation, as he was a native Quechua speaker born in the department of Apurímac, in close proximity to the Emergency Zone. During his short tenure, he directed a hurriedly conceived, though ambitious development program. Perhaps his experiences and emotional sympathy with the peasants of the region caused Huamán to overstep his professional bounds and publicly criticize the Lima government for not supporting his initiatives. These declarations would cause his removal from the command a short time later.

In a 27 August 1984 interview with the La Republica newspaper, General Huamán criticized the government for its delay in providing an extra fifteen million dollars in development funds for the Andean provinces. He stated,

I told the peasants that I was going to help them as soon as I received the wherewithal; that I was going to receive 70-100 billion soles [promised by the government], but nothing happened. Perhaps everyone has forgotten about those billions.

Huamán added,

The solution for Ayacucho is not military, but the reversal of 160 years of abandonment. Here the solution is not military, because if it were, if the issue were to kill everyone in Ayacucho, I could solve it in half an hour. . . . We are talking about human beings, about forgotten people who have been making demands for 160 years without getting anyone's attention, and now we are reaping the results.

The general also complained about poor administration, lack of apportioned resources to the region, the centralization

in Lima, and that what small resources are invested in the region go to the urban areas, and not to the rural zones where they are most badly needed.²⁵

The following day, the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces released a communique which relieved General Huamán and named Colonel Wilfredo Mori Orzo as his successor. General Huamán placed the military high command in a situation with no other option. The Belaúnde administration was so economically constrained that allocation of the requested funds to Ayacucho was impossible. Furthermore, Huamán's decision to make his criticism public exceeded the professional criteria of a military officer to obey orders without criticizing his superiors. Finally, Huamán's commentary was an admission of the military failure to overcome the guerrillas. His criticism of the historical legacy in the Peruvian highlands essentially was in agreement with much of the rhetoric of his adversaries.

Indeed, the official announcement of the failure of the joint military/police counterinsurgency effort preceeded the replacement of Huamán by one month. Prior to July 1984, the counterinsurgency operations were in the hands of the police or the marine infantry which were subordinate to the authorities of the Political-Military Command. Within the Emergency Zone, all judicial and civil authority came under

²⁵FBIS, 29 August 1984, p. J2.

the control of the military, despite mandates of the Constitution that prohibited such subjugations of civil authority. During the course of the counterinsurgency campaign following the 1983 deployment of the military, the army consistently blamed the police for excesses and atrocities. The police countered by emphasizing their sacrifices and citing the numbers of men that they had lost in the struggle against Sendero. On 20 July 1984, an official government communique not publicly released withdrew the police forces to the cities and left the military forces in complete charge of the anti-subversion effort. The document officially gave the Armed Forces Joint Command the authority to exercise certain functions previously held by the Department of the Interior. Specifically, the military assumed the authority to direct both military and police counterinsurgency forces, and was given the power to "plan, execute, and control" government actions against subversion throughout the country.²⁶

Raúl Gonzales has postulated that a major Sendero escalatory offensive from 23 March to 7 August 1984 was designed specifically to provoke a full intervention by the military. The reasons are threefold. Sendero would obtain a status that it does not actually merit in terms of constituting a true threat to national security. Additionally, the Army is largely trained for a formal conventional war while the

²⁶ Amnesty International, Peru: Torture and Extrajudicial Executions, p. 4.

Sendero militants are trained for irregular military actions. The army, therefore, would not necessarily gain by the physical occupation of territory. Therefore, in order to be effective, the military must intensify the use of indiscriminate repression, disappearances, and summary executions. This is precisely what the Senderistas desired. The government, forced into utilizing increased repression in the absence of other alternatives, would find it difficult to receive support among the peasantry by voicing praise over the rights and guarantees of the individual under a democratic institution. By seeing the disparity between government rhetoric and everyday reality, the peasant would opt for the revolutionary alternative.²⁷

The authority of the military was further strengthened with the passage of Law 24,150 on 6 June 1985 regarding the regulation of the state of emergency. This established the legal criteria for the Political-Military Command held by an officer appointed by the president at the proposal of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. The power to control internal order included: 1) coordination and supervision of government agencies, especially those rendering public services, and 2) the appointment, transfer, or removal of political and administrative authorities due to their impairment or inability to perform specific functions. In a

²⁷ Raúl Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," p. 11.

significant motion, Article 10 of the law specifies that all military and police personnel serving in the region under the state of emergency are subject to the Code of Military Justice. The violation of the code when in the line of duty subjects the party to military rather than civilian jurisdiction. The critics of the law maintained that it merely provided a legal basis for the exceptional powers already employed by the military, and succeeded in preventing its passage during previous attempts in the legislature. It was successful in the final attempt due only to the support of APRA, whose party had emerged victorious in the presidential elections and was waiting for Alan García to assume power in July.

During his inauguration address, the new president called for major reforms in an effort to improve the campaign against Sendero Luminoso. An extensive reform of the police forces would be necessary in order to rid them of corruption and unify them under a single command structure. The new administration would exercise a greater role in funneling needed development funds to deserving areas. The military would be called upon to assume responsibility for its abuses of democratic and constitutional authority. Finally, a Peace Commission would be created in order to seek alternative solutions to the Sendero problem.

Although the proposed reforms were sweeping in nature, their implementation has done little to extinguish the success

of Sendero Luminoso. In September 1985, Garcia dismissed three top military officers because of military involvement in a series of peasant massacres. These included General Cesar Enrico, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Generals Sinesio Jarama and Wilfredo Mori, the two top officers in the Ayacucho Emergency Zone.²⁸ Many ranking police officials have been relieved, although the success of the lower echelons to combat the guerrillas in the urban and rural population centers has remained essentially unchanged. Development funds, although welcomed, are far from sufficient, since President Garcia is strapped by the same financial crisis that plagued his predecessor. The Peace Commission has also been ineffective, as Sendero steadfastly maintains its revolutionary stance of refusing to participate in any political dialogue, and denounces the present administration as a continuation of the previous fascist governments.

Peruvian troops have continued to be trained by the militaries of other nations. Following Garcia's inauguration, a 235-man joint service contingent of United States military units participated in a counterinsurgency training exercise which lasted eleven days.²⁹ In the past, Peruvian officers

²⁸Michael L. Smith, "Andean Peasants Killed, Peru Military Admits," Washington Post, 19 September 1985.

²⁹"U.S. Quietly Trains Soldiers in Peru," Miami Herald, 24 August 1985.

participated in interrogation and intelligence courses in Argentina, complemented by visits to Peru by Argentine counter-insurgency specialists.³⁰

Under President Belaúnde, the government program to combat the revolutionaries of Sendero Luminoso has evolved in three different stages, each more repressive and all-encompassing than the last. From 1980-1982, coinciding with a lower level of Sendero militant actions, the problem was defined as solely a police matter. However, the local forces, due to a lack of resources and professional behavior, soon found themselves on the defensive against a much more prepared and dedicated adversary. The army, therefore, entered the situation in force beginning in 1983, and was assigned the responsibility of administration of the Emergency Zone under the auspices of a Political-Military Command. Although the actual counter-insurgency effort was to be continued utilizing only Sinchi forces and marine infantry patrols, regular army troops were soon participating in clandestine interrogations and extrajudicial executions, as well as in publicized community action programs. The complete failure of the police to control the Sendero threat was officially heralded in June 1984, when the Army was granted full responsibility for the counter-insurgency effort. The program has also taken a new direction under the new administration headed by President Alan García.

³⁰ Marlise Simons, "Peruvian Military Fights Terrorists With Terror," New York Times, 2 September 1984.

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
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
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Rather than continuing the secrecy and denial practiced by his predecessor, García has chosen to enact sweeping reforms in an effort to remove corruption of the police forces, make the military accountable for its actions, and seek alternatives to a total military solution to the Sendero question.

While García's endeavors may be lauded by his appreciation and protection of democratic principles, it is necessary to examine the success, or lack thereof, of the anti-subversion program under his control. Success should entail a decreasing trend of military abuses of authority and Sendero actions in the Emergency Zone. In one respect, the pacification of the southern highlands can be termed at least partially successful after a long and bitter struggle as the Sendero actions have recently shown a steady decreasing trend. On the other hand, Sendero has proven adept at modifying its tactics, and has created severe problems in other sections of the country, including the capital city of Lima. The fact that Lima was placed under a state of emergency in February 1986 for the first time since the democratic transition in 1980 attests to the ability of Sendero to effectively counter the military efforts to eradicate it. Sendero has proven to be resilient in the face of an increasing amount of dedicated resources allocated to control it, and has possessed the foresight to modify its tactics when they have not proven effective. In this context, Sendero will never be a push-over adversary similar to the foquista insurgents of the 1960's.

It is obvious that the Sendero problem cannot be answered by a total military solution, especially under a democratic regime dedicated to protecting the rights of the individual guaranteed by the constitution. The crux of the matter lies in how to rectify the total resource shortage while concurrently modifying a historical tradition of extreme centralization that has left the Peruvian urban power centers virtually isolated from the underdeveloped rural areas of the nation. While the ultimate objective of Sendero Luminoso is the revolutionary assumption of power, and therefore political, the government objective throughout most of the campaign has been eradication, a military solution. García has attempted to rectify the situation, to some extent, in order to place the government on the same political field of battle. Although Sendero does not appear to present a major challenge for power, it has demonstrated the capacity to maintain a militant stance that will continue to extract a painful toll on the country. In order to succeed, García and his successors must ultimately prove to a destitute rural peasantry that a democratic government is a superior alternative to the revolutionary choice juxtaposed against it, and better than the most recent authoritarian experiment.

IV. THE GOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

While the inhabitants of the southern highlands of Peru have suffered from four hundred years of being largely ignored by the colonial and national powers centered in Lima, only in the past twenty five years have the attempts and failures of rural reform projects led to the rudiments of peasant mobilization in the political process. With regard to Sendero Luminoso, it is necessary to briefly review the changing regimes, administrations, and policies from the election of Fernando Belaúnde in 1963 to the present government headed by President Alan García. The past two decades have witnessed both military and civilian regimes covering a wide range of the ideological spectrum. Nearly all of these share one central theme: plans for national development which have been stifled by a scarcity of allocatable resources due to a burdensome foreign debt, and the inability of the existing economic mode of production to generate sufficient earnings to overcome it. The difficulties faced by these Peruvian governments coincided with the emergence of Sendero Luminoso, which declared that regardless of any particular ideological affiliation, they were but a continuum of fascist regimes committed to the eternal subjugation of the Indian peasantry. Hence, from a governmental perspective, the examination of

the past twenty six years provides a framework for analysis of the success of Sendero, the rural development policies and aborted plans of the different regimes, and the possible future course of the Peruvian polity.

President Belaúnde Terry was elected in 1963 on a reform platform with the blessing of the military and with high popular expectations. Throughout much of the country, there existed an atmosphere of optimism for anti-oligarchic and nationalist transformations. Unfortunately, the president quickly encountered obstacles. Belaúnde's Popular Action party did not enjoy a majority in the national congress. His legislative proposals were opposed by a strong coalition led by APRA and the Odría party.¹ Equally important was the question of an acceptable political resolution of the International Petroleum Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil) dispute over subsoil mineral rights in the northern coastal region. In fact, the United States withheld government loans

¹The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, or APRA, is a social democratic party founded in 1924 by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre. Its first electoral success at the national level occurred in 1985 with the election of Alan García. The Odristas, on the other hand, were a conservative party. It was named after General Manuel Odría who assumed power in a 1948 military coup and ruled for eight years. His revolt put an end to the uncertain, but mildly reformist, government of Jose Luis Bustamante and reemphasized the traditional conservative coalition between army officers and wealthy civilian elites. The coalition was initially established in order to elect parliamentary officers, while each party claimed that it would independently pursue its own legislative programs. Nevertheless, the two parties consistently united in efforts to frustrate the administration.

pending a successful conclusion to the problem. These political and financial difficulties forced Belaúnde to reject tactics of popular mobilization and to seek alternative methods to implement his planned reforms.

In response to political opposition to these programs, the executive branch obtained large loans to finance those projects which the Congress would not approve. Unfortunately, this took place at a time when substantial price drops occurred in international markets for traditional Peruvian exports. Inflation and drops in production ensued, followed shortly thereafter by a devaluation of the Peruvian sol against other foreign currencies. Belaúnde had campaigned on promises that the national currency would retain its strength in the international marketplace. The devaluation, therefore, had significant psychological and political impacts, as well as the obvious financial side effects.

Due to these spiraling economic difficulties, the Belaúnde administration found itself unable to finance its various intended reformist and developmentalist campaigns. This resulted in the beginning of a series of disappointments for the disenfranchised peasantry and other groups around the country, and added to the mobilization within Peruvian society of an emergent political left. Moreover, the liberal Apristas lost their traditional political hold on the universities throughout the country, while the "New Left" rose to take their places. Radical ideologies became increasingly

popular, with the Cuban Revolution serving as a model for a series of foquista-inspired insurgencies in 1965. However, these guerrillas, composed primarily of students, proved no match for the military, and were easily suppressed by January of 1966.

The increased politicization of the rural population and the arrival of revolutionary philosophies underscored the need for agrarian reform and the integration of the peasantry into the national society and economy. Although the Belaúnde administration attempted to implement agrarian reform, the results never achieved the level of hopes generated by popular expectations. From 1963-1968, less than 20,000 families throughout the country received title to expropriated land. In the department of Ayacucho, only one expropriation took place, and a mere fifty four families became beneficiaries.²

During the mid-1960's a number of small scale development programs were initiated in the department of Ayacucho. These were funded and staffed by such organizations as the Alliance for Progress, Food for Peace, the United States Peace Corps, and a domestic corollary known as Cooperación Popular. During this time, the first all-weather road connecting Ayacucho to the coastal city of Pisco was constructed. This greatly facilitated the efficiency with which people and materials

²David Scott Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in Rural Peru," in Latin American Insurgencies, ed. Georges Fauriol (Georgetown University: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), p. 78.

could be transported to the southern highlands, thereby bringing the city closer to the mainstream of Peruvian daily life. Telephones were brought to Ayacucho in 1964, and the communication network expanded in the following years to include other urban centers in the region. The result of these actions was to make a large segment of the hinterland population feel that some semblance of modernization and development had at long last come to the area, and that the central government cared something about the rural periphery of the nation.

Even so, by 1968, the military viewed with increasing alarm the political and economic crisis that plagued the nation. Due to political opposition and financial problems, the Belaúnde administration suffered from a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, especially given its inability to deliver promised reforms. Furthermore, the government was viewed as highly corrupt. As a result, the military intelligence establishment became convinced that fundamental problems were being ignored by a weak civilian government unable to act decisively under the political process of a democratic regime. Additionally, the military believed that the Belaúnde government was unable to handle a surge of uprisings which constituted a threat to national security. Within the armed forces, the experiences of the ranking military officers in quickly suppressing the guerrilla insurgencies led to an associated sense of institutional self-esteem

and self-confidence. Yet another incentive for the military to intervene came during the early preparations for the 1969 elections. For the first time, APRA was maneuvering to win both the presidency and a congressional majority. The military and APRA had been traditional political rivals for decades, and the Apristas had frequently sought to undermine the military in an effort to increase its own political power.³

The military was afforded a legitimate opportunity to intervene after a badly mishandled negotiation of the highly volatile IPC issue. Already accused of high-level corruption, the administration publicly bungled the settlement when page eleven of the document, containing the agreement on the sensitive financial arrangements, was reported as missing. A huge political scandal ensued amid speculation that the Belaúnde administration had sold out on an item of national interest. At the invitation of many public sectors, General Juan Velasco Alvarado led a military coup d'etat on 3 October 1968. General Velasco and his supporters proposed a reformist alternative to the civilian elected regime. In expressing its desire to remain in power over an extended period, the Velasco government intended to welcome modern capitalism to Peru at the expense of the traditional oligarchic elites. After a year of transition to establish legitimacy with the general citizenry as well as within the military ranks, Velasco

³David Scott Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 68-98.

embarked on a series of measures which included one of the most sweeping attempts at agricultural reform in Latin American history.

The 1968 coup coincided with a series of United States government aid cutbacks leading to the termination of many of the development projects in the southern highlands. This was to have two important ramifications. First, the rural population found that its hopes and rising expectations of development with the central government and international agency assistance had vanished. More important was the increase in relative importance of the official and unofficial projects of the University of Huamanga in the countryside. The elimination of the federal development programs paralleled the rise of outreach and extension programs of the university. Concurrently, key political positions within the university were coming under the increased control of persons affiliated with radical ideologies, including many future Sendero members. Thus, the efforts of these pre-Senderistas to promote their revolutionary vision among the peasantry was greatly facilitated by an institutional vehicle (the UNSCH) engaged in developmental schemes with a pre-conditioned peasantry. Sendero's success in achieving bases of support in the countryside dates from this period, especially among the Indian communities of the province of Cangallo. As early as 1971, Sendero was able to exert sufficient influence over a group of communities in the Vischongo-Vilcashuaman area of Cangallo

to repel by force, if necessary, agrarian reform representatives of the Peruvian government.⁴

The Velasco regime, from 1968-75, attempted to modernize the country by increasing state participation in the economic process. One of the side effects was a marked decrease in private investment, leading the government to seek capital from foreign banks and lending institutions. The heralded Agrarian Reform Law was passed on 24 June 1969, marking the beginning of the second phase of the military-radical government. Ideally, the results of these reforms would have meant an expansion of agricultural and livestock production, thereby creating a cheap food source for the urban masses. In theory, a reduced reliance on imported food would free additional capital to be invested internally. This would lead to increased demand for manufactured goods, which in turn would create increased revenues for the state and industrial bourgeoisie. The ultimate benefit of these new policies would be the increased integration of domestic agriculture with the industrial market.

Although the intent of the agricultural reforms was grandiose, its net effectiveness was much more limited. There was a spectacular emphasis on the redistribution of property, but not of income. Sixty percent of the population emerged empty-handed, while the fundamental rules of the

⁴David Scott Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in Rural Peru," p. 81.

economy essentially remained unchanged. The government effected the transfer of over 10,000,000 hectares of hacienda land to 340,000 families. Peasant families, however, numbered 1,200,000. Seventy two percent of the peasant families, which included the most destitute among them, therefore received nothing.⁵

The goal of the agrarian reform program was an increased sense of social justice and heightened productivity rather than a redistribution of income derived from land ownership. The only recipients who benefitted significantly were the coastal sugar cooperatives. The large rural haciendas disappeared, but the ingrained power structures remained intact. In the final analysis, the reforms were largely a failure. In Ayacucho, the least benefitted zone, approximately 30,000 families acquired property, though the average value of the property was a mere 4,900 soles per family (under 150 dollars). This pales in comparison to such average values as 162,288 soles per family in the coastal department of Lima, or even the figures of 62,171 soles in Puno and 22,116 soles in Huancayo, other departments located in the highlands.⁶ Effective reform required a profitable dynamic center in

⁵George Philip, The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military Radicals 1968-1976 (London: The Athlone Press, 1978), pp. 114-121.

⁶Estadística de la Reforma Agraria (a 31 de Marzo de 1977), Table 3, cited by Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," p. 67.

order to distribute gains to other peasant members. The haciendas of Ayacucho, however, were not profitable. The minority of haciendas that had been productive were stripped of movable assets before the reforms were implemented. These less prosperous haciendas were associated with many more Indian peasant communities, and therefore more potential recipients, than in other parts of the country. The situation was further exacerbated by the low regional priority granted toward reform initiatives.⁷

International recession, economic mismanagement, and overly ambitious programs spelled doom for the Velasco regime. On 19 August 1975, General Francisco Morales Bermudez took power in a bloodless counter-coup with the full support of the military. The ouster of General Velasco coincided with the worst economic crisis since the War of the Pacific in the nineteenth century. General Morales came to power in order to impose stern solutions to the looming foreign debt problem. His administration responded in an orthodox fashion, implementing austere IMF-approved monetary and fiscal restraints. This capital-accumulation oriented monetarist strategy was employed in order to emerge from the crisis by restricting redistributive schemes, thereby depressing the living standards of the popular masses. Between October 1975 and August 1978, real wages fell by thirty five percent. Prices rocketed by

⁷David Scott Palmer, "Sendero Luminoso: Rebellion in Rural Peru," p. 82.

221 percent between December 1974 and February 1978. In the three years between December 1975 and December 1978, the Peruvian currency was devalued by 446 percent against the U.S. dollar. As a result of the deflationary measures of the Velasco administration, per capita GNP fell by twelve percent between 1974 and 1978.⁸ In addition, Morales drastically curtailed public spending and basic food subsidies.

The economic situation soon led to increases in public unrest and protests, particularly from the urban sector. This, in turn, was countered with government repression. By 1978, the military became convinced that a return to the barracks was necessary. In June of that year, the Peruvian electorate voted for a constituent assembly to draft the new Constitution, which was adopted in 1979. For the first time in Peruvian history, the Left emerged as a significant electoral force, obtaining thirty one percent of the votes at a national level. These results were even more pronounced in the capital. By the summer of 1980, most of the nation anxiously anticipated the upcoming presidential elections with the hope that the return of a democratic regime might provide a solution to the dismal economic and social situation. Few, however, could have predicted the simultaneous launch of

⁸J.M. Caballero, From Belaúnde to Belaúnde: Peru's Military Experiment in Third-Roadism, Working Paper Series No. 36, Centre of Latin American Studies, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 18-19, cited in Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes, p. 3.

an armed insurgency by Sendero Luminoso, much less the ramifications it would have throughout the country in the years to come.

In effect, from 1963 to 1980, three governments of various political persuasions ruled Peru. Although each supported different political ideals, each was burdened by crises stemming from continual debt problems compounded by low export prices and revenues. Rural development projects initiated under Belaúnde were later terminated due to the implementation of national financial austerity measures and a drop in international development funds provided by the United States government. In the Andean highlands, this meant that expectations and faith in the central government were awakened among the peasantry, only to be decimated shortly thereafter. In any event, the agrarian reforms of the 1960's and 1970's brought little change to the Indian communities of Ayacucho. By 1980, the local situation of the peasantry was deteriorating due to the termination of development programs coupled with the ineffectiveness of the military reform initiatives.

The administrations of Belaúnde, Velasco, and Morales coincided with the rise of Sendero and its preparation to launch the rebellion. Sendero was able to capitalize on the degenerating situation, finding its ideology more widely accepted among a mobilized peasantry than the failed revolutionary efforts of 1965. The increased importance of the

University of Huamanga and its development initiatives in Ayacucho, the center of Sendero strength prior to its going underground in 1978, provided a natural vehicle to incite the peasantry. The failure of the government to improve the welfare of the rural population left many in search of a new and promising alternative which Sendero readily provided.

The 1980 election of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry was a specific rebuke to the military, which had ruled the country for the preceeding twelve years. By installing the same person that General Velasco had ousted, the electorate resolutely demonstrated that a civilian elected government, even one with proven flaws, was a superior alternative to military rule. Nonetheless, Belaúnde inherited the overwhelming debt crisis and recession left behind by the Morales administration. He responded by immediately implementing IMF-approved measures such as social spending cuts, wage freezes, and currency devaluation in order to secure necessary bank loans. These policies paralleled those taken by his predecessor in 1975. Additionally, a law was passed in 1980 which halted land redistribution, reduced the legal protection of peasant cooperatives, and lifted the restrictions on the purchase and sale of land. In some areas of the country, this precipitated a return of the traditional landowners and the return of ownership of up to eighty percent of their confiscated land.⁹

⁹ America's Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority, p. 15.

Initially, the new government was unconcerned about the disruptive sabotage and militant actions taking place in the southern highlands. Sendero Luminoso was considered just another inconsequential radical political offshoot presenting no real threat other than annoying the local inhabitants. No special eradication or contingency programs were contemplated, as the local police forces were considered up to the task. The damage inflicted by Sendero was publicly attributed to delinquents and criminals of the region.

In a few short months of increasing guerrilla triumphs, the Belaúnde administration began to see that Sendero Luminoso represented a more serious problem than previously anticipated. By October, moderate and conservative legislators in the Senate proposed a bill defining such acts as sabotage, subversion, and terrorism as being treasonous, thereby carrying a stiffer penalty. The APRA initially opposed the legislation, maintaining that terrorist acts constituted a criminal offense of less severity than treason to the fatherland.

In January 1981, Interior Minister José María de la Jara y Ureta announced that a vast anti-terrorism campaign would be conducted by a coordinated police effort, supported logistically by the armed forces. The military was to provide means of transportation not available to the police, such as the use of helicopters. The principal damage done by the guerrillas up to this point had been the destruction of electrical towers, while most other physical harm had been

relatively minor.¹⁰ The strategy of Sendero Luminoso at this point was centered around agitation and armed propaganda. Their principal goal was the mobilization of the populace, rather than an outright major offensive, since they had an inadequate resource base to accomplish the latter. Even so, although the militant actions of the insurgents were still at a low level, their operations far exceeded the capacities of the normal police forces to control them.

Decree 046, the anti-terrorist law, was successfully passed in March of 1981. Anyone convicted of terrorism was subject to a sentence of twenty five years, and a fine of up to 8,000 dollars. Police were allowed to detain suspects for up to fifteen days without interference from the judicial system. The legal definition of a terrorist was left deliberately vague in order to give the police broad discretion in pursuing the Senderistas. A person could be considered a terrorist if found guilty of:

- 1) Provoking fear or terror among the general population.
- 2) Destroying public or private buildings, communications facilities, or pipelines.
- 3) Committing acts that endanger life, health, or possessions of other people.
- 4) Making, acquiring, or storing firearms, explosives, or their ingredients.
- 5) Adversely affecting international relations or the security of the state.

¹⁰ FBIS, 5 January 1981, p. J1.

- 6) Forming part of a band of three or more people who utilize terror to accomplish their objectives.
- 7) Using the news media to incite people to terrorism.
- 8) Speaking out publicly in favor of an act of terrorism or a terrorist.¹¹

An increasingly concerned Belaúnde began to meet secretly with the ministers of the Interior and Defense, trying to formulate contingency plans in case the new counterinsurgency effort proved unsuccessful. After an escalation of terrorist actions in April, the government began to study in earnest the possibility of military intervention in Ayacucho. Clearly, the president had a right to be concerned. Belaúnde was faced with a national environment that paralleled much of his earlier tenure. A burdensome foreign debt, financial austerity, a lack of resources, and a growing insurgency resounded with a similarity to the mid-1960's. Sending the military to dispense with the new insurgents of Sendero Luminoso might have provided a short term solution, but it was nothing more than a last-chance alternative given the political situation of the nascent and fragile democracy.

By June, Minister of the Interior José María de la Jara y Ureta publicly declared that terrorist actions throughout the nation had been declining due to the diligent efforts of the police. Minister de la Jara praised the work of the Sinchis, stating, "I believe that their efforts have allowed us to thwart and control many terrorist actions which were

¹¹ America's Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority, p. 32.

being planned." He added that there was no need for the reorganization of the police forces, as the present system was in keeping with the new constitution.¹² Such proclamations of antisubversive success were to become commonplace throughout the remainder of the Belaúnde term in office. Although periods of relative calm did occur from time to time, these were more related to the review and revision of tactics by the Sendero leadership than to any great advances on the part of the security forces.

In October 1981, President Belaúnde suddenly announced the first major changes in his cabinet since taking power eighteen months earlier. These changes gave the military a greater voice in the policy process. Although rumors of a military coup continued, these were consistently denied by ranking officers who proclaimed their commitment to upholding the democratic constitution. The ministerial changes appear to have been another attempt by Belaúnde to placate his former adversaries. The two most notable changes took place in the ministries of War and Interior. Retired General José Gagliardi, former head of the Aeronautics Ministry, replaced de la Jara as Minister of the Interior. General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra, a former Minister of Interior in 1976 under the Morales regime, was appointed Minister of War. In other changes, Vice Admiral José Carvajal, the active duty Inspector

¹²FBIS, 6 July 1981, p. J2.

General of the Navy, was designated as Minister of the Navy while Air Force commander General Hernán Boluarte assumed control of the Aeronautics Ministry. Belaúnde maintained that the appointments of active duty officers to ministerial posts were consistent with constitutional law. Whatever the intention, the occupation of these positions by general officers was certain to give the military institution a far greater role in the formation of policy regarding Sendero Luminoso.

Sendero considered the Belaúnde administration no different than those before it regarding the needs of the traditionally oppressed classes of society. In a 1982 interview with a Sendero militant, Comrade Pedro stated,

The Belaúnde government represents the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the same which heads the counterrevolutionary camp, commands the feudal landowners and bourgeoisie, and is tied to yankee imperialism. The crisis of the government, in essence, is the inevitable consequence of deepening and forcing capitalist development in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, such as Peru. It is the necessary derivation of the evolution of the semi-feudal sector, of not destroying it, and the development of the semi-colonial, of not erasing the domination of imperialism.¹³

Beneath the rhetoric, Comrade Pedro echoes the familiar precept that the Belaúnde government must fall in order that the new state, headed by the Sendero vanguard, can rise to power.

Sendero displayed a well organized and executed military plan during the 2 March 1982 attack and occupation of the

¹³ Interview with Camarada Pedro in "Los Reportajes de Manuel Gongora Prado," reproduced in Rogger Mercado, El Partido Comunista del Perú: Sendero Luminoso, p. 41.

maximum security prison in Ayacucho. This action signalled the initiation of regular guerrilla actions and demonstrated to the government that the movement was prepared to up the ante in the course of the revolutionary struggle. At this time, Sendero controlled large areas of territory in the southern highlands, and enjoyed wide support, or at least complacency, among much of the rural population. Rather than continuing his denouncements of the group as criminals and delinquents, Belaúnde attributed its new success to an alliance between terrorists and drug traffickers, adding that Sendero was not an indigenous movement, but instead was derived from revolutionary thought imported from abroad. Although the president was to frequently repeat these charges during his remaining years in office, no firm evidence to prove the denunciations was ever made public.

Throughout the remainder of 1982, Sendero brazenly expanded its presence undaunted by the security forces sent to counter it. By September, the Interior Minister announced that the armed forces would begin to patrol some of the areas affected by terrorism, thus increasing its cooperation with the police forces to more than a logistics role.¹⁴ By the end of the year, the situation had grown sufficiently bad to merit official military intervention in the Emergency Zone. This decision was taken in a secret meeting of 320 high-ranking

¹⁴ FBIS, 9 September 1982, p. J1.

officers on 21 December, during which the joint command tied the military intervention to political and economic concessions by the government. According to military sources, one of the conditions was that Guardia Civil General Juan Belaguer not be appointed to head the Ministry of the Interior.¹⁵ Shortly thereafter, President Belaúnde made a futile plea for those involved in the subversion to lay down arms within seventy two hours. Sendero responded with its own ultimatum, granting the government twenty four hours to remove the military troops from Ayacucho. In response, Belaúnde called upon his field commanders to eradicate Sendero during the sixty-day declared state of emergency. Such a request naturally goaded the military into a "body count" type of strategy in an effort to demonstrate large successes over a short term. Unable to proclaim real success, the military continued this strategy of killing many innocent civilians during the continuous renewal of the state of emergency which followed.

1983 proved even more frustrating to the Belaúnde government, as Peru was devastated by a declining economy and an insurgency that refused to die. Strict fiscal restraints were still in effect to service the fourteen billion dollar foreign debt. Additionally, the drastic climatic changes brought about as a result of the shift in the El Niño current caused much of the nation to suffer tremendous agricultural damage resulting from drought and floods. In the spirit of an

¹⁵FBIS, 28 December 1982, p. J1.

established tradition of the police of publicly displaying their morale problems and specifically the lack of an effective counterinsurgency apparatus, the Guardia Republicana brought in the new year with a twenty-four hour strike in Ayacucho. The strikers protested alleged unfair treatment by certain officers, and complained of not being relieved of their duty in Ayacucho at the specified time. Their communique stated that relief was supposed to occur every three months due to Ayacucho's status as a danger zone, and that replacements had not arrived on schedule. It also asserted that the guardsmen were carrying out their duties in difficult circumstances and were at a disadvantage against the guerrillas, which had claimed the lives of forty police the previous year.¹⁶

President Belaúnde continued to blame the Sendero insurgency on narcotics funding and revolutionary thought, exported by groups outside of Peru. Relations between the Catholic church and the administration were also in a state of decay. Belaúnde accused certain foreign priests of inciting the people to commit acts of violence, stating, "We have serious doubts about the authenticity of certain congregations." He accused these elements of bringing "ideological garbage" into the country.¹⁷ Following this, the official News Agency

¹⁶FBIS, 17 January 1983, p. J1.

¹⁷Caretas, 31 January 1983, quoted by Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority, p. 48.

Andina distributed a report alleging that 120 foreign priests were involved in subversive acts, and that some had helped transfer food from Caritas, the charitable agency of the church, to the guerrillas. The Episcopal Assembly of fifty four bishops firmly denied these accusations.¹⁸

In acting against Sendero, the government encountered its greatest difficulty in the lack of an effective intelligence network. This was due to three principal causes. Sendero had chosen to infiltrate a peasantry completely outside the realm of the Peruvian society of the coastal urban power centers. An effective infrastructure for the gathering of intelligence was, therefore, not in existence in 1980. Such a network is not easily built, and requires a great deal of time to develop. Additionally, the government could not allocate necessary resources due to budgetary constraints and a desire not to upset the military by fueling the buildup of its traditional institutional rival. Moreover, much of the intelligence capacity of the police services had been dismantled during the twelve year period of military rule.

Vice-President Fernando Schwalb addressed these concerns during a 1983 interview in which he said,

The most effective way to fight against this kind of unconventional war is by perfecting the intelligence system, finding out where the terrorists gain support, who the leaders are, what their objectives are and where they plan to act. A well-oriented intelligence service may achieve progress in destroying a terrorist

¹⁸Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority, p. 48.

organization, and anticipate its actions. Moreover, it is necessary to improve transportation and communication means so that joint Army and police actions--this is already a fact--may be carried out simultaneously. Terrorists have the advantage that they perpetrated an attack without us knowing about it.¹⁹

In June, the government announced the formation of an Anti-Subversion Combat Staff at the Interior Ministry. The staff would be composed of police members who analyze reports submitted by the intelligence services of the police and armed forces. The staff would then decide upon the necessary actions, and plan the operations of the three police forces.²⁰ This followed an announcement by Belaúnde the previous month that the armed forces were to be gradually withdrawn and replaced by a modernized police force. This was deemed possible due to the apparent retreat of the guerrillas. In July, the PIP announced the formation of a special Antiterrorism Directorate, assigned to investigate and prepare cases against subversion and terrorist actions throughout the country. The DIRCOTE was to be staffed by specialists in the fight against terror, such as experts in explosives, ballistics, dactylography, and police identification methods.²¹

Beginning in 1983, the Peruvian government came under increasing criticism by international human rights organizations for abuses occurring in the Emergency Zone. Amnesty

¹⁹FBIS, 9 February 1983, p. J3.

²⁰FBIS, 13 June, 1983, p. J1.

²¹FBIS, 20 July 1983, p. J1.

International submitted a letter to President Belaúnde in August calling for immediate investigation of numerous cases of alleged disappearances and political executions. The chief executive responded publicly by stating that he had no respect for the organization, and that all letters from the group were destined for the trash can. He later said that Amnesty International cares only about those who follow communist ideology.²² When the Amnesty letter was published the following month, Belaúnde categorically denied the reports, and maintained that the forces under the command of General Clemente Noel in the Emergency Zone were operating with full respect for human rights, even those of the insurgents. Throughout the remainder of his time in office, Belaúnde was to continue his practice of public denial regarding the abuses of the counterinsurgency effort.

One of the more interesting aspects of the highlands situation has been the broadcasts from Radio Havana in the Quechua language aimed toward audiences in the Andean countries of Peru, Ecuador, and Chile. These broadcasts are heard daily. Broadcasts on Monday through Friday are typically divided into three fifteen minute sections separated by music. The initial section carries two to ten news items, mostly relating to Cuba. The final two sections carry commentaries on a variety of topics, though rarely pertaining to the Andean region. Sunday broadcasts contain fewer items, and

²²FBIS, 23 August 1983, p. J1.

again have traditionally lacked news of local interest. However, beginning in 1982, the broadcasts began to carry more news on Peru. The frequency of Peruvian items increased from one item every three days in 1982 to one every two days in 1983. Additionally, more of the Quechua items were unique rather than a repetition of a prior broadcast item in Spanish.²³ Although the broadcasts had persisted over an extended period, the Peruvian government took steps to protest them in September 1983. Peruvian Deputy Victor García denounced the broadcasts as "clear Cuban interference in our domestic affairs." He termed the broadcasts unfriendly, and criticized their reportage on the counterinsurgency effort of the security forces.²⁴

In spite of continued protests, the Castro regime has refused to modify the broadcasts. As recently as March 1986, Alberto Valencia Cardenas, APRA deputy for Ayacucho, charged that Radio Havana continues to broadcast messages encouraging armed struggle in Peru. According to Valencia, one of the subversive texts states,

Many years ago, we were as poor as you are now. We wanted to live, and we died every day because of the rich. We know that you are ready to fight, and we received that news with joy. The only way to seize power is through armed struggle. Justice is written with blood.²⁵

²³ FBIS, 20 September 1983, p. J2.

²⁴ FBIS, 8 September 1983, p. J1.

²⁵ FBIS, 11 March 1986, p. J1.

In retrospect, 1983 was an especially difficult one for the Belaúnde administration. Severe austerity measures combined with the worldwide recession and low market prices for Peruvian exports wreaked havoc on the national economy. While economic activity had risen nominally in 1981-82, in 1983 the GDP fell by twelve percent. Per capita income decreased by 14.3 percent. This was concurrent with an inflation rate that surpassed 125 percent, and a 130 percent devaluation of the national currency.²⁶ As a result of the reversal of agricultural reforms and the changes in climate brought about by the El Niño current, agricultural production dropped sharply. Amidst this atmosphere of chaos, Sendero Luminoso continued to be elusive and successful.

1984 proved to be no easier for the Belaúnde government in the counterrevolutionary struggle. The administration continued to be restricted by austerity measures which prevented increases in spending to help the neglected southern highlands. The national budget dedicated a full one-third to service the foreign debt. An additional twenty five percent was allocated to the military, while a total of fifteen percent was allowed for all social services, including health, education, and housing.²⁷

The military, backed by the President, continued to deny that any abuses of authority were occurring in the Emergency

²⁶Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority, p. 14.

²⁷Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority, p. 16.

Zone. Official communique 07-84, promulgated in May, declared,

In view of the disinformation campaign launched by a Lima daily, which has been reporting over the past few days on presumed acts of indiscipline and low morale among the forces of order in the Emergency Zone, the Army Command hereby informs the citizenry of the following: 1) The reports disseminated are completely untrue, since the behavior of Army personnel, something which the Army command is always concerned about, is absolutely normal, and the performance of the Political-Military Command is not hampered in any way whatsoever by acts which are contrary to discipline or morale. 2) This is the solid truth, since the Army command, conducting a program of visits to military garrisons--a program that has been underway since February 1984--has just returned from the Emergency Zone and has duly verified that the situation is normal. Therefore, those media reports are bluntly denied.²⁸

The failure of all previous measures to control or eradicate Sendero Luminoso was admitted on 20 July when the police forces were ordered to return to the performance of their regular duties, and the military was given the responsibility of the counterinsurgency operation throughout the nation. The military expanded its control in the Emergency Zone, and assumed many of the responsibilities previously held by the Ministry of the Interior. Given the nature of the Sendero threat and the corruption and poorly equipped status of the police forces, the military was seen as the only actor possessing the resources and developed infrastructure to deal with the insurrection. Additionally, the Armed Forces Joint Command was to be the only organization authorized

²⁸FBIS, 10 May 1984, p. J1.

to inform the public on the results of the counterinsurgency operations. This worried critics, who saw the enhanced authority of the military as a vehicle to maintain the censorship which had permeated the Emergency Zone.

The following month, President Belaúnde announced the creation of an additional specialized corps of the Guardia Civil. The Andean Guard [Guardia Andina] was to be a new police body designed to study and fight subversion throughout the mountainous regions of Peru. The Andean Guard was to be composed of inhabitants of the highlands region, and to be headquartered in the town of Huaytara, department of Ayacucho.²⁹ By establishing a police body of this type, Belaúnde hoped to construct a security agent of the state which would have a true sense of legitimacy among the Quechua-speaking population of the cordillera. The idea was obviously long term in nature, as the recruitment, training, and deployment of such a force would preclude it from being of any immediate help against Sendero Luminoso. Unfortunately, this provides a perfect example of reaction to, rather than prevention of, a set of fundamental problems converted into a widespread crisis.

While the Military-Political Command began to report success in curtailing Sendero actions in the Emergency Zone, the guerrillas were successful in spreading their operations to other rural areas of the country, as well as making their

²⁹FBIS, 25 July 1984, p. J1.

presence felt in Lima and other cities. Their success in previous years inspired other radical groups to take up arms. In September 1984, a new urban guerrilla group known as the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), or Tupacamarus, became active. In contrast to the clandestine style of Sendero, the Tupacamarus publicly take credit for their attacks. Initially it was speculated that the Tupacamarus were an urban element of Sendero operating under a new name and format in order to convince the government that two different threats existed when, in actuality, there was one.³⁰ Further study, however, indicates that the Tupacamarus are a descendant of the radical Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR-Venceremos) radicals of the 1960's with a close ideological affiliation to Fidel Castro. The Tupacamarus, as well as Sendero, have continued to carry out numerous actions in the urban theater, although their mutual coordination has not been publicly revealed.

By 1985, the Peruvian electorate was clearly ready for a change in political leadership and national direction. In the April 14 elections, Alan García and APRA garnered forty seven percent of the vote, double that of the runner-up Marxist United Left. The conservative and moderate factions which had dominated the political life for decades suffered

³⁰FBIS, 21 September 1984, p. J2.

a major setback, receiving less than twenty percent.³¹ The youthful and energetic García assumed office committed to action and reform. His rise to the presidency took place at a time when half of the population was unemployed or underemployed. The purchasing power of the average wage earner had declined forty percent in the last ten years. Two percent of the population controlled sixty percent of the wealth, while thirty-eight percent lived on less than two percent of the annual GDP.³²

During his July inauguration, President García announced a series of sweeping reforms that would aid in the struggle against Sendero. In contrast to the policies of his predecessor, the military would be held fully accountable for any excesses and abuses of authority in the counterinsurgency campaign. A dramatic purge and structural reorganization of the police forces would occur in order to make them a respected and effective instrument of public order. A Peace Commission would be ordered to explore alternative solutions to the Sendero Luminoso problem, coupled with an increase in public expenditures and development programs for the rural areas. In order to help finance these initiatives, President García boldly announced that Peru would dedicate no more than ten percent of its annual foreign exchange earnings towards the

³¹Riordan Roett, "Peru: The Message from García," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1985/86, p. 282.

³²Roett, "Peru: The Message from García," p. 280.

service of the foreign debt. While some pointed out that the ten percent figure would surpass the amount paid by the Belaúnde administration the previous year, the political impact of García's announcement had repercussions among the other Latin American debtor nations, as well as on the international financial community.

The President wasted little time in taking on the military. Following the implication of military troops in the mass deaths of at least forty peasants in a counterinsurgency operation, García dismissed General Cesar Enrico, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the two ranking officers in the Emergency Zone were relieved of their posts. To expand its capacity to monitor the situation, the administration announced the formation of a General Human Rights Bureau headed by the office of the Attorney General. President García went on to modify the once sacrosanct military budget. In November, the decision was made to reduce the order of French Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft from twenty six to twelve, thereby saving hundreds of millions of dollars.³³

Even more remarkable were his rapid and comprehensive actions regarding the police forces. One of the first laws passed by the APRA government authorized the executive branch to fully reorganize the police forces under the direction of a commission headed by the Interior Minister. The legislation

³³Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Peruvian Leader Launches Anti-Armaments Crusade," Financial Times of London, 28 November 1985.

was intended to provide the basis for complete overhaul and restructuring of the security network. Civil Guard General Antonio Nuñez Vidalón, in a report to the Inspector General of the Interior Ministry, reported on the sad state of his organization.

I have confirmed in the majority of the units visited, from the posts to the regions, with honorable exceptions, a supine ignorance in the exercise of the functions and duties of the respective commands; a disconcerting lack of the most elemental juridical principles that are the legal foundations of our regulations; a profound relaxation of discipline. Officers and troops are gravely involved in drug trafficking, smuggling, etc. Officers exist that oblige their subordinates not only to consume alcohol, participate in games of chance, and other degrading vices, but also oblige them to collect money, extorting the public, to fill their wallets with dirty money counting, without doubt, on the complacency of unscrupulous superiors that will take no action.

He added that excellence and professionalism are discouraged because,

there exist no rewards for good actions nor sanctions for the incorrect ones, to the extreme that the excellent, the regular, the good, and the bad receive the same treatment and almost the same evaluations.³⁴

One of the principal causes of the lack of professionalism among the Guardia Civil cadres was the lack of training in the police academies. In previous years, the length of training at the GC Academy lasted a period of three years. By the time that Alan García took office, accelerated courses decreased the time to graduate to a mere three months.³⁵

³⁴ "Radiografía de las F.F.P.P.," Equis X, 12 August 1985, p. 9.

³⁵ "Reorganización de la Policía," Equis X, 18 August 1985, p. 6.

It was simply not possible to train any semblance of a professional force in such a short time. The lack of training among the younger personnel, combined with the poor leadership of the middle and upper echelons, created an overall condition of abysmal organization for maintaining domestic order, especially when that order was disturbed by something as proficient and committed as the Sendero guerrillas.

By February 1986, the García administration had purged 1,700 men from the three police forces, including seventy generals. The fired policemen, however, now represent another dimension in the security problem. They are bitter and unemployed, and many still possess their badges and weapons. Lima has recently seen a huge increase in kidnappings for ransom, many of which have been attributed to disenchanted ex-policemen. In order to arm the new forces effectively, the García administration has recently purchased 10,000 assault rifles from North Korea at the low price of ninety two dollars per weapon. South Korea, meanwhile, has donated fifty patrol cars, and the Peruvian government has announced the expenditure of 2.75 million dollars for the purchase of 250 new cars assembled in Peru.³⁶

With Supreme Justice Resolution 221-86, the administration officially created the Peace Commission that García had

³⁶William D. Montalbano, "Lima Prefers Army's Order to None at All," Los Angeles Times, 26 February 1985.

mentioned in his inaugural address. Article Three of the resolution defines the functions of the commission as the following:

To examine the legal situation of the persons who have been detained for terrorist actions and who profess to be innocent; propose to public organs how to distinguish between terrorism by acts or complicity and political acts; coordinate with the judicial branch, without detriment to its independence, ways to speed up the prosecution of citizens charged with terrorist crimes; establish channels for dialogue intended to persuade those who resort to violence and terrorism to return to social coexistence under democracy, in accordance to the Constitution and the laws of the Republic; process denunciations that have been made or will be made regarding violations of human rights--through deaths, executions without due process, disappearances, torture, or abuse of authority--by public organs; review legislative decree Number 046 and propose modifications deemed appropriate; report on the situation and condition of detention centers; report on the situation of victims of acts of violence and that of their families, proposing measures that should be adopted; and advise the President of the Republic on questions when he requests its counsel regarding subversive and human rights problems.³⁷

In spite of President García's popularity and sweeping reforms, Sendero Luminoso continues to maintain pressure throughout much of the nation. Following a series of bombings in February, García placed the capital under a sixty day state of emergency. Although the Army claims to have limited Senderist militant actions in the Emergency Zone, the guerrillas have opened two new fronts in similarly depressed regions of the north and south. García was particularly distressed when the members of his Peace Commission

³⁷FBIS, 17 September 1985, p. J2.

offered their resignations in February, citing a lack of presidential support in the accomplishment of their mission. He refused the resignations, and publicly reemphasized the necessity for such an organization. Although the reforms may have succeeded in making the military more responsible for its actions and in purging a corrupted police network, there is little evidence that García is any closer to resolving the Sendero Luminoso problem than his predecessor.

With regard to the objective factors and conditions which led to the development of Sendero, the five administrations over the past twenty three years have been plagued by the same resource constraints regardless of the nature of the regime or particular ideology of the participants. During the first tenure of Belaúnde, the peasants of the southern highlands had their hopes raised by promises of agricultural reform and needed development projects. In Ayacucho, the populace benefitted the least from the land distribution program, while developmentalist endeavors by domestic and international organizations were quickly terminated. The expectations of the people for a new and beneficial relationship with the central government were destroyed, leaving many exasperated and seeking an alternative solution to their problems. This was concurrent with the rise of the regional importance of the University of Huamanga, and the spread of a radical ideology and message which dominated the prevailing political environment of the institution.

Under the leadership of General Velasco, the peasantry again hoped for major changes with the implementation of a major agricultural reform program. As was the case under Belaúnde, the inhabitants of Ayacucho were the least benefitted group in the nation. During the administration of General Morales, few resources were allotted to the development of the region because of the low priority of the highlands, and due to the fiscal austerity measures imposed during a time of severe recession. From 1968-1980, the four departments where Sendero maintains its strongest hold (Huancaavelica, Cuzco, Ayacucho, and Apurimac) received only 6.7 percent of the total national public spending. Ironically, this was the area where the need was greatest.³⁸

Not only was the total percentage extremely low. The total amount of national funds for public expenditure has been at a low level since the string of economic crises began during the first term of Belaúnde. Each successive administration has had to contend with a large foreign debt, compounded by the inability of the nation to generate foreign earnings due to low market prices in the leading exports of petroleum and copper. Moreover, large portions of the budget have traditionally gone toward military spending. Perhaps President Alan García has taken a first important step to improve the situation by his announcement of debt servicing at an annual maximum of ten percent of accrued

³⁸Raúl Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por Los Caminos de Sendero," p. 61.

foreign earnings. The final solution, however, rests much more heavily on the whims of the international economy.

When Sendero Luminoso took up arms in 1980, it did so at a critical juncture in the Peruvian political history. Doubly hampered by the tenuous state of a nascent democracy and an ineffective security apparatus to deal with the guerrillas, Belaúnde sought to deny the gravity of the situation for as long as possible. Plagued by many problems reminiscent of his first term in office, he was reluctant to dispatch the military until no other alternative remained. His progressive steps of dispatching the military were indicative of the respect and fear he felt for the military institution, as well as his commitment to see democracy survive. While some of the conservative military officers might have called for a more heavy-handed approach early in the struggle, Belaúnde managed to placate them by including active duty officers in the cabinet, and allowing them more say in the political process. The weakness of the police forces, however, dictated the eventual assumption of all anti-subversive operations by the military hierarchy.

Although Alan García has attempted to rectify many of the problems that plagued his predecessors, there is, at present, little that attests to an improved effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations under his leadership. Indeed, the state of emergency imposed on the national capital demonstrates the capability of Sendero Luminoso to modify strategic methods

and objectives. While the Senderistas pose no immediate threat to assume power, their revolutionary struggle has created additional problems for a central democratic authority already overburdened with responsibilities. The grim situation in the highlands has been worsened by the flight of much of the young population to the cities in order to avoid the hostilities. Not only has this reduced the available labor supply in a place where it is desperately needed, but it has also exacerbated an already critical situation of urban migration which has increased the population of Lima from several hundred thousand to nearly six million in less than forty years.

Perhaps the greatest cause for concern lies in the future. The election results of 1985 show that the Peruvian electorate has opted away from the traditional powers in favor of a social democratic alternative. If Alan García cannot overcome the problems confronting him, of which Sendero plays a significant role, two situations become possible. With the electoral success of the Marxist United Left in the 1985 elections, the public might well choose a Marxist candidate in 1990. Whether or not the military would allow such a candidate to assume power remains to be seen. Given the sound defeat of the moderate and conservative parties in the last election, it is unlikely that the public would vote in favor of the failed policies of the past. The other possibility is the direct intervention of the military, and the

subsequent return of a right-wing authoritarian solution to the problems which plague the nation. With the recent failure of the military to effectively rule from 1968-80, however, its desire to again enter the political realm must be questioned. Regarding the Peruvian future, one thing is sure. Sendero is willing to undermine the existence of any regime, and while the chances for its quick eradication at present appear slim, the ability of the guerrillas to maintain a conflict of low intensity remains a certainty.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The Sendero Luminoso experience in Peru stems from a historical process beginning with the conquest of the Inca empire by the Spanish conquistadores in the sixteenth century. Since that time, the Indian populace has been relegated to the lowest level of the social strata, and has been virtually ignored by the central government in Lima, which is oriented towards the needs of a Europeanized minority. While the Indian peasants remain in a desperate situation, hardly representative of anything remotely resembling a twentieth century lifestyle, their impoverished condition alone is not sufficient to create a revolutionary situation. Added to their calamitous state was the frustration of aborted development plans in the 1960's and the associated hopes for a new relationship with the central government, the exasperation felt after the lack of change despite numerous agricultural reform movements, and the spread of a radical message via the University of San Cristóbal Huamanga in Ayacucho. The faltering promises of change finally led some elements of the peasantry to seek the revolution promised by Sendero as the only alternative possible for effecting fundamental change in the social, economic, and political processes.

During the initial period of the rebellion, from 1980-1982, Sendero enjoyed its widest support in the region

surrounding Ayacucho. This corresponded to an early strategy which placed less emphasis on military actions, and placed more importance on propaganda and cultivating a favorable image in the eyes of the peasants. By implementing their own brand of popular justice, the guerrillas often provided the first semblance of public services many of the peasants had ever received. Near the end of 1982, however, the Sendero leadership changed strategy and adopted a much more violent form, thereby alienating many of its supporters and undermining much of the sense of legitimacy it had established. The revolutionary strategy has never returned to its earlier form, and Sendero continues to impose its will by terror rather than by more subtle means. Although the military has been successful in curtailing some of the guerrilla activity within the declared Emergency Zone, the Senderistas have made good on promises to spread their actions to other areas of the country. The recent upsurge of terrorist activity in Lima and other cities could well signal a change in course due to a less than anticipated success of rural mobilization.

While Sendero has not raised their Red Army of thousands, neither have they been eradicated by the forces available to the state. Prior to 1983, the guerrillas were far more dedicated and purposeful than the weak and corrupt police forces ordered to oppose them. This left the Peruvian Army as the only institution with the sufficient resources to engage them in a counterinsurgency effort. President Belaúnde,

reluctant to use the military because of its role in his earlier downfall, ordered the Army to assume control only when all other means had been exhausted. Although countless abuses and widespread loss of innocent lives took place at the hands of government security forces, recent evidence indicates that the Army has become more responsible under the García administration. Even so, the ability of Sendero Luminoso to survive the eradication efforts emphasizes that the solution to the problem is not merely a military one. Due to the radical stance of the Sendero leadership and its lack of interest in political dialogue, an effective counter-insurgency program must therefore seek to reduce the appeal of the radical ideology at the grass-roots level. In essence, the political avenue must be utilized not with the Senderistas, but with the peasantry they seek to mobilize.

By 1980, the Sendero leadership believed that the revolutionary correlation of forces was sufficiently advanced to merit the initiation of the armed struggle. At present, all indications seem to point to an error in their assessment of the situation. Although certain sectors of the rural peasantry have been sympathetic to the Sendero cause, widespread armed mobilization has failed to materialize. Likewise, the revolutionary alliance between the peasants and their proletarian counterparts has not been realized, as the Peruvian working class has chosen to support the democratic process. While Sendero maintained that the political

right had no room to maneuver and would rely on increased repression to restore the status quo, this was contradicted by the successful 1985 transition from Belaúnde to García, and an APRA administration dedicated to more liberal policies. One cannot deny that the government has a long road ahead in trying to repair the disparities fostered by the historical past, but, in spite of these conditions, the Peruvian situation appears far from revolutionary.

Charges of foreign assistance to the Sendero insurgents have been levied in the past, although the proof of these allegations has never been publicly revealed. It should be emphasized though, that many of the traditional supporters of subversive movements would have a great deal to lose by an association with the Senderistas. Since 1968, the Soviet Union has worked hard to establish a favorable relationship with Peru, and presently furnishes the Peruvian military with large amounts of hardware. The risks associated with supporting a revolutionary group with little hope of gaining power, and jeopardizing a worthwhile political and economic relationship, can therefore be considered to be far too great for the U.S.S.R. to offer its support to Sendero. Moreover, with Sendero maintaining strict adherence to Maoist philosophy and harshly criticizing the present Chinese leadership, neither is it likely that China is providing aid. In addition, though Radio Havana has been active in Quechua broadcasts, any additional Cuban involvement has not been proven. As a result,

the most plausible theory regarding outside assistance is a link with the drug traffickers prevalent throughout the region. In each case, the Peruvian government acts as the enforcing agent opposing a challenge to its authority. Both groups, therefore, would have a common interest in the occupation of the security forces. If this were the case one would expect to see the presence of high quality weapons on the part of the guerrillas. However, at present, Sendero militants maintain their use of dynamite, confiscated weapons, and traditional arms to accomplish their military objectives, thereby lessening the likelihood of this relationship.

In looking towards the future, how can the interests of the United States be best served in its policy toward Peru and the problems of Sendero Luminoso? The rise of Sendero is part of a larger issue, the manifestation of a host of complex problems stemming from a long history of ignoring the basic needs of the rural peasantry. During the last two decades, while the government has at times attempted to improve the situation, its efforts were frequently impeded by a lack of resources resulting from a state of economic crisis. Due to this and other factors, the overall situation remains bleak today. Consequently, the United States government must support the Peruvian efforts to pragmatically deal with the problems of its looming debt, and recognize that such a supportive policy will be far better in the long run than seeking to penalize the present regime for errors

committed by previous administrations. Given the present economic situation, the Baker Plan is a step in the right direction, although it is not enough, as it continues to impose IMF-approved lender guidelines that fail to account for Peruvian realities. By maintaining positions such as these, we can expect to see the continued exacerbation of the fundamental problems facing the Peruvian government and society since the 1960's.

The national interest of the United States is best served by the maintenance of a democratic regime in Peru. This calls for a relaxation or liberalization of previous policies, particularly in the economic sector, in order to help the administration of Alan García in stabilizing the national economy. Regarding the insurgency, the United States should maintain the practice of joint military training programs to demonstrate our continued support for the regime as well as our concern regarding the guerrilla problem. By utilizing avenues such as increasing the frequency of exercises and providing counterinsurgency training at the School of the Americas, the United States can reaffirm its support for a fellow democratic state in a positive manner. Increased military participation, such as additional permanent military advisors, is undesirable. Such a measure would serve to overcommit our forces in the light of an uncertain political future, and would certainly be utilized for negative propaganda purposes by the guerrillas.

If Alan García is unable to show substantial improvement in the fundamental problems facing his administration, including the Sendero Luminoso rebellion, two possibilities become likely. With the resounding defeat of the politically moderate sector in the last elections, the voters could opt for a Marxist candidate to rectify the woes of the nation. The position of the military on this possibility remains unclear, as to whether it would continue to uphold the democratic constitution or decide to intervene. If Sendero Luminoso was to increase its true threat potential, and the García or a successor administration failed to respond effectively, the military might once again intervene in politics on the grounds of preserving national security. Neither of these potential occurrences are as favorable to the United States as the present status quo. A liberal democracy headed by a non-Marxist executive is preferable to either a Marxist or military regime on economic and political grounds. Hence, the United States will benefit by assisting the present Peruvian government and military in their effort to combat Sendero as part of a larger overall policy.

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