Depth at the Operational Level of War: Hitler's Stand Fast Policy and NATO's Forward Defense,

Abstract

This paper examines the contradiction between the use of depth as envisioned in U.S. Army doctrine and NATO's strategy of forward defense. The Eastern Front campaigns of World War II provide a relevant historical setting for the study of the relationship between strategy and operational depth. Hitler's aims and NATO's aims are totally different. His stand fast policy restricted the use of operational depth against the Soviets but it supported his strategy towards the end of the war. NATO's strategy supports deterrence but it does not adequately support the prosecution of war if deterrence fails. Doctrine supporting the use of operational level depth would support NATO's deterrence strategy as well as warfighting once deterrence fails. The mindset created by the U.S. Asrmy's AirLand Battle doctrine will facilitate the use of depth within NATO's strategy. (Author)

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 15, 1986
Accession Number
ADA174077

Entities

People

  • James B. Gunlicks

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Counter WMD
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Classification
  • Europe
  • Force Structure
  • International Relations
  • Military History
  • Nato
  • Nato Forces
  • New York
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Schools
  • Second World War
  • Security
  • Students
  • United States
  • Ussr
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

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  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Strategic Security Studies