The Relationship of Depth and Agility: Historical Cases and Observations Relevant to NATO's Present Dilemma.
Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between depth and agility using the historical method, identifies principles which govern those relationships, and seeks to apply these principles to NATO's current posture. Historical cases used include the German defenses at Kharkov (I), Kursk (II) and Normandy, the Soviet defense at Kursk (I), the Allied defense in the Ardennes, and the Japanese defense in Manchuria. The study concludes that the relationship between depth and agility centers on time. The greater the depth the greater the amount of time to respond. It is further evident that, even in cases of greater relative depth, a certain minimum level of agility is required to capitalize on that advantage or it will ultimately be lost. It also follows that a force lacking in relative depth must be more agile in order to respond successfully to potentially decisive breakthroughs. Here, too, there exists a minimum level. When the force reaches a point that, in spite of its agility advantage it can neither hold the shoulders of a penetration nor form a viable operational reserve, it is so lacking in depth that it cannot succeed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 09, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA174162
Entities
People
- Craig H. Pearson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College