

AD-A174 238


PRINCIPLES FOR ORGANIZATION OF JOINT AND COMBINED
STAFFS(U) ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT
LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
J W MCELWEE 11 APR 86


1/1

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 5/1

ML





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

AD-A174 238

2

PRINCIPLES FOR ORGANIZATION OF JOINT AND COMBINED STAFFS

by

Major Jerry W. McElwee
Signal Corps

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DTIC
ELECTE
NOV 19 1986
B

11 April 1986

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

FOR THE
DIRECTOR

DTIC FILE COPY

86-3615

86 11 18 102

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

AD-A174238

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No 0704-0188
Exp Date Jun 30, 1986

1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; Distribution unlimited.	
2b DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable) ATZL-SWV	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) PRINCIPLES FOR ORGANIZATION OF JOINT AND COMBINED STAFFS (U)			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) McElwee, Jerry W. MAJOR US Army			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Monograph	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1986, April, 11	15. PAGE COUNT 41
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	Command and Control, Joint Staff	
		Combined Staff, Staff Organization	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)			
Current U.S. military doctrine for organization of joint and combined staffs evolved from World War II. This paper examines military history and the modern business world to derive principles for organization of today's joint and combined staffs and then compares those principles with the current doctrine. Following a cursory review of military staff functions and staff evolution, selected Allied Joint and Combined Staffs of World War II are analyzed in detail to identify the significant factors that contributed to their success. An overriding allied concern during the war was unity of effort. Both American and British leaders strongly emphasized unity and structured and restructured their military organizations to maximize their combined efforts. This paper lists the major factors the allies considered in striving for their unity of effort.			
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL McElwee, Jerry W. Major, US Army		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 913-684-2138	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL ATZL-SWV

Block 19, ABSTRACT (cont.)

The modern business community is faced with many problems similar to those of large joint and/or combined military headquarters and are a good source for managerial ideas and organizations applicable to the military. Organizational lessons learned from the most successful corporations are extracted for subsequent comparison with those from military history. The product of the comparison is six principles for organization of joint and/or combined staffs.


The paper concludes with a comparison of current joint doctrine with the six derived principles for staff organization. While today's doctrine is basically sound, it fails to adequately address several of the principles established in this paper. Recommendations for modification of existing doctrine are provided to correct the shortcomings.

PRINCIPLES FOR ORGANIZATION OF JOINT AND COMBINED STAFFS

by

Major Jerry W. McElwee
Signal Corps

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



11 April 1986

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

School of Advanced Military Studies
Monograph Approval

Name of Student: Major Jerry W. McElwee

Title of Monograph: Principles for Organization of Joint and
Combined Staffs

Approved by:

Lawrence L. Izzo

(LTC Lawrence L. Izzo, M.S., M.B.A.)

Monograph Director

Richard Hart Sinnreich

(COL Richard Hart Sinnreich, M.A.)

Director, School of
Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes

(Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.)

Director, Graduate Degree
Programs

Accepted this 22nd day of May 1986.



Approved	☒
NT	☐
DT	☐
US	☐
SI	☐
RE	☐
DI	☐
AI	☐
BI	☐
CI	☐
DI	☐
FI	☐
GI	☐
HI	☐
II	☐
JI	☐
KI	☐
LI	☐
MI	☐
NI	☐
OI	☐
PI	☐
QI	☐
RI	☐
SI	☐
TI	☐
UI	☐
VI	☐
WI	☐
XI	☐
YI	☐
ZI	☐

A-1

ABSTRACT

PRINCIPLES FOR ORGANIZATION OF JOINT AND COMBINED STAFFS, by Major Jerry W. McElwee, US Army, 41 pages

Current U.S. military doctrine for organization of joint and combined staffs evolved from World War II. This paper examines military history and the modern business world to derive principles for organization of today's joint and combined staffs and then compares those principles with the current doctrine.

Following a cursory review of military staff functions and staff evolution, selected Allied Joint and Combined Staffs of World War II are analyzed in detail to identify the significant factors that contributed to their success. An overriding allied concern during the war was unity of effort. Both American and British leaders strongly emphasized unity and structured and restructured their military organizations to maximize their combined efforts. This paper lists the major factors the allies considered in striving for their unity of effort.

The modern business community is faced with many problems similar to those of large joint and/or combined military headquarters and are therefore a good source of managerial and organizational ideas applicable to the military. Organizational lessons learned from the most successful corporations are extracted for subsequent comparison with those from military history. The product of the comparison is six principles for organization of joint and/or combined staffs.

The paper concludes with a discussion of current joint doctrine juxtaposed with the six derived principles for staff organization. While today's doctrine is basically sound, it fails to adequately address several of the principles established in this paper. Recommendations for modifications of existing doctrine are provided to correct the shortcomings.

Table of Contents

	Page
Section I. Introduction	1
Problem and Purpose	2
II. Military Staffs	3
What They Do	3
Changing Factors	5
Origins of Modern Military Staffs	6
III. Joint/Combined Staff Organization Principles from History	9
Unity of Effort	9
Eisenhower's Principles of Organization	10
Command and Staff Organization in the Pacific	15
MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Command	17
Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas Command	18
IV. Organizational Principles from Business	23
V. Compilation of Organization Principles	27
VI. Modern Joint and Combined Doctrine	29
VII. Conclusion	32
Recommendations	33
Summary	36

I. INTRODUCTION:

Military staffs have existed for thousands of years and have performed with varying degrees of success. The first hunters-gatherers held informal discussions of where and how to hunt their quarry, whether it was man or animal. The first records of more formalized military staffs are found in 1500 B.C. during the Egyptian 18th Dynasty. Thothmes I used spies and an intelligence staff to gather information about his enemies' weaknesses and the best time and place for attack. As Egyptian warfare became more complex and as larger forces were involved, the requirements for staff advisers to the commander increased. In the later dynasties, logistic staffs were developed to support movements of these even greater Egyptian armies. Eventually, a separate logistics agency was evolved with distinct titles, responsibilities, and functions for each officer.¹

One of the best staffs from ancient history belonged to Alexander. His father, Philip of Macedonia, was a master of ordnance and organization, attentive to detail, imaginative and progressive; he developed one of the most efficient forces of fighting men known to the ancient world. Philip created the staff system which was able to support the widespread campaigns of his son. Missile-throwing weapons, siege operations, and fortifications were further developed under what must have been a highly efficient engineer organization. There were also commissary and transport personnel, and there is evidence that Philip instituted a regular hospital organization. Enforcement of regulations and supervision of camps were done by the equivalent of a provost marshal. It seems apparent that, in a number of ways, present-day staff organization is similar to the system established by Philip more than 2,000 years ago.²

Problem and Purpose.

Military staffs have obviously continued to evolve over the centuries, based largely on the needs and desires of their commanders. Each individual commander strived to make his staff as efficient and effective as possible. However, history is replete with examples of leaders whose failures may be at least partially attributed to their staffs. Therefore, a pertinent question for today's military forces is the adequacy of the command and staff organization supporting modern commanders.

To narrow the topic, the next war in which the United States participates will undoubtedly require the mutual support of the Army, Air Force, Navy and perhaps the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. It also may be conducted in conjunction with one or more Allies. Yet, the very recent history of U.S. military operations is less than exemplary. Grenada, the Iranian hostage rescue, the USS Pueblo incident, and other joint and combined operations point to possible problems. The command and staff organizations of the units involved in these operations were certainly not the principal cause for less than completely successful operations, but they were a major contributor.³

The question of whether or not today's staffs, specifically the staffs for Joint and Combined Forces, are optimally designed can be analyzed from two perspectives. Historically, in this century, the United States has participated in several joint and/or combined military operations. In the business community, academicians and corporate leaders hypothesize and then test organizational theories to streamline their management. While there are distinct differences, the lessons learned from historical military experiences

and modern corporations are potentially applicable to the problem of optimal designs for today's military forces. An analysis of these two areas will form a basis for derivation of organizational principles relevant to joint and combined staffs. These principles will, in turn, be compared to existing doctrine for organization of joint and combined staffs.

II. MILITARY STAFFS:

What they Do.

The staffs of most organizations perform three generic functions: collect information concerning the operation of the organization, analyze the information to provide advice and recommendations to leaders, and translate management decisions into instructions for subordinates. While the functions of military staffs have increased in complexity the essence of their work can be condensed to these three generic activities. The U.S. Army's Field Circular 101-55, Corps and Division Command and Control, breaks these basic tasks down further and describes each one in detail:*

Obtain and provide information.

Estimate and anticipate situation.

Recommend courses of action.

Prepare plans and orders.

Coordinate operations.

Obtaining and providing information is essential to presenting the commander with an accurate portrayal of events occurring on the battlefield.

The commander must work with the staff to identify the key elements of information for each operation. Then the staff must aggressively work to assemble the information required.

Anticipating future situations and preparing estimates is the process by which the staff analyzes the data collected and presents it to the commander. Writing in 1947, James Mooney stated; "There are too many facts and things to think about for the commander. While all decisions rest with the commander, problems must come to him pre-digested with all the thought and research that organized staff can bestow upon them."⁵ The term "organized thought", with an emphasis on organized, is probably the best description of the estimate process.

Upon completion of the estimate, the staff provides recommended courses of action to the commander. The cardinal rule is that courses of action must be thoroughly coordinated among all sections of the staff. It only confuses the situation when one staff section recommends something that is completely divergent from those of other sections. The final product does not necessarily require unanimous staff support, but it should include the careful analysis of every staff section with comments on strengths and weaknesses.

Following the commander's decision, the staff is responsible for preparing plans and orders for distribution to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters as appropriate. Once again, the critical requirement is full and complete coordination of each component of the plan. This insures the greatest possible understanding by the recipients. After all, this is often the primary means of communicating the commander's intent for the operation.

Coordination is perhaps the salient function of the staff. After the orders are issued and the execution has begun, the staff monitors the actions of subordinates to keep the commander apprised of the current situation and to assist him in making changes to the current orders or in making decisions concerning future orders. In accordance with the commander's delegation of functions and authority, the staff takes those actions necessary to coordinate the operations of subordinate units to insure accomplishment of their missions.

Changing Factors.

The generic staff functions noted earlier apply equally well to the staff of Alexander the Great and to that of the Central Army Group Commander in NATO today. However, changes in several factors in the intervening 24 centuries have significantly affected the evolution and organization of modern staffs.

Technology has played an integral part in expanding the role of and need for staffs. Extensive, in-depth analyses are not required to coordinate rock throwing with clubbing for 200 ancient Egyptians. On the other hand, coordinating the landing of invasion forces on a hostile shore, while supported by naval gunfire and ground attack aircraft, requires a substantial planning effort by a large group of people. Hence, current military forces have staff sections and staff experts which deal with a wide variety of technical details. A commander, forced to orchestrate all of the specifics himself, would simply be overwhelmed.⁶ Of course, as experts are added to various sections, the size of the staff grows and the complexity of coordination required increases almost exponentially. More about this enigma later.

A second factor in the evolution of staffs has been the growth of military forces. When a commander could assemble his entire force on a large field and see as well as direct his men from a good vantage point, his staff requirements were minimal. However, as military forces grew, it was no longer possible to lead them without a host of messengers, advisers, and especially logisticians to handle the feeding and resupply of ammunition.

The last substantial feature influencing staff organization was the expansion in scope and size of military conflict. Prior to the First World War, military conflicts were isolated to one or two relatively small areas of the world. The outcomes were normally determined by either naval or ground combat, not both. World War I, as the name implies, included nearly global military hostilities. For the first time nations had fighting forces that included air, naval and ground units fighting with allies against a common enemy in several theaters and on two continents. World War II expanded the range and dimension of military conflict even further. Now a premium was placed on the coordinated actions of air, naval, and ground units. Allied success was achieved through the careful coordination of not just military force components but the coordination of warfare in several different theaters on several continents.

Origins of Modern Military Staffs.

The historical evidence strongly supports the contention that all European staffs stemmed from the system of Gustavus Adolphus, the Swedish Army commander in the early 1600s. As the commander of a multi-national army, he influenced every nation that came into contact with him in their military thought and in the design of their national military staffs. By the time of his death at

Lutzen, in 1632, the transition from the old to the new era of warfare was about complete. Each nation in the following years managed to add its own individual twist to the organization of command staffs, but all changes after Gustavus might well be considered as variations of the basic Swedish theme. Gustavus' Headquarters Staff included a Quartermaster section and lesser staff sections such as Chaplain, Surgeon (also the Barber) and Provost Marshal. There was a Chief of Staff to oversee staff operations and Chiefs of special arms such as Artillery, Scouts and Engineers who not only commanded the special troops but also advised Gustavus on their employment. Gustavus and his Chief of Staff functioned as the operations section.⁷

Within the military forces of the United States, staff organization has evolved from the Revolutionary War. The U.S. Army concept of staff was adopted from the Prussian system as taught by Von Steuben to Washington's Revolutionary Army. Later, in 1901, the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, created the staff college at Ft. Leavenworth and in 1903 Congress passed legislation which established a General Staff for the Army.⁸ While the organization of Headquarters Department of the Army has changed over the years, the staff organization within Army units has paralleled the general staff organization and has remained essentially the same.

The Navy concept of staff is an amalgamation of staff for line officers and staff for the civilian managers of the Navy. The Department of the Navy was established in 1798 and at that time consisted entirely of civilians. Naval officers only commanded ships. By 1812, a need for professional advice to the civilians on matters in which the naval officers were expert was recognized and a board of naval officers was appointed. In 1842, the Navy changed to a bureau

system, with separate bureaus for each major function associated with equipping and manning the Navy. However, this system failed to operate well and was recognized as inadequate during the Civil War. Unfortunately, the civilian solution to the Civil War problem was to add more bureaus. At the end of the 19th century, the Secretary of the Navy began to realize the difficulties with controlling the bureaus and suggested a general staff system. Finally, in 1909, a General Board of the Navy was established to serve as an advisory body to the Secretary, with the president of the board serving as the Naval Chief of Staff. In 1915, Congress passed a law which instituted the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, charged with the operations of the fleet and with preparation and readiness of plans for use in war.⁹ Despite the recognized problems of the bureau system dating from the Civil War, the Navy still uses it today.

The Air Force staff, because of its relatively recent origins, did not germinate from an older system, but was created based on the best available organizational concepts of the business world at the time. The Air Force was created by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947. Since its inception, the US Air Force staff has been organized along functional lines. Under the Chief of Staff are five deputies: Manpower and Personnel; Programs and Analysis; Research, Development and Acquisition; Operations, Plans and Readiness; and Logistics and Engineering. All directorates under the deputies remain functionally organized. This same structure is duplicated at each successive level of command within the Air Force. In the Air Staff and throughout the Air Force, decisions are made at the lowest level which has access to sufficient information and which has the requisite authority.¹⁰

III. JOINT/COMBINED STAFF ORGANIZATION PRINCIPLES FROM HISTORY:

Unity of Effort.

The center of gravity of an alliance is the alliance.¹¹ With Clausewitz' dictum as a guide, General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff for World War II, worked incessantly to insure that the various alliances in which the Army participated were as strong and as cohesive as possible. He was concerned not only with the international alliances, but also with the "alliance" between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. Because of their divergent backgrounds and lack of history in joint operations, Marshall felt that it was crucial to insure the unity of domestic military coalitions with the Navy and, to a lesser extent, the Army Air Force. Long aware of the differences in doctrine and training between Army and Navy officers, General Marshall sought in various ways to overcome the obstacles to genuine unity of effort. He constantly impressed upon his staff and on Army commanders in the field the necessity for subordinating service interests to the larger interests of the war. Concessions and compromise were the principles that guided his relations with Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations, and cooperation was a recurring theme in the messages he sent to his subordinates. Marshall realized that the main detriments to unified command were officers with a service point of view. He sought to diminish service orientation by assigning Army officers to Navy staffs and seeking Naval officers for work on Army staffs. He believed that the exchange would result in better understanding by each service and alert commanders to potential areas of disagreement in advance.¹² It is instructive to note that despite General Marshall's continued efforts there was only minor progress in forming fully integrated joint staffs in the Pacific Theater.

General Eisenhower, however, was able more fully to implement this policy but not without several problems along the way.

Eisenhower's Principles of Organization.

General Eisenhower was one of the most successful joint and combined forces commanders of the Second World War. As such, his organization and use of supporting staffs are of interest in the examination of organizational principles for modern military forces. From his appointment as Commanding General U.S. Forces European Theater of Operations through the end of his Presidency, Eisenhower stressed the importance of unity of command and took the actions necessary to achieve that goal.

General Eisenhower's approach to dealing with the diverse interests of two nations and their services was to find the compromise acceptable to everyone, which also made the most sense militarily. This technique was demonstrated very clearly early in the war, during preparations for the landings in Sicily. He was forced to compromise several times in selecting the landing sites, allocating forces to the landings, and in arranging for Naval support. British Air, British Ground and U.S./British Navy components all objected to the various landing proposals. He ultimately selected the plan which was, first of all, militarily sound and which then was most agreeable to the six military force components involved.¹² As history proved, his arbitration succeeded admirably. For some of the compromises that General Eisenhower fostered, there was undoubtedly a degradation in military effectiveness. But the benefits derived from Allied unity of effort were far greater than any costs. Stated another way, military considerations were often subjugated to the political realities of

combined warfare.

The commander in chief also used every stratagem available to engender unified Allied efforts. Among other actions, General Eisenhower corrected inequalities in Allied rations, sought British popular support of U.S. soldiers stationed in England, and constantly monitored the press in both the United States and Britain in an attempt to insure balanced reporting which fairly described the contribution of both nations.¹⁴

While he worked to maintain Allied unity of effort, General Eisenhower was adamant about unity of command. In February 1943, he discovered that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were attempting to issue directives to the British Air, Army, and Naval Commanders under his command. He immediately brought the matter to the attention of the Combined Chiefs and the discrepancy was resolved. During planning for Normandy, similar problems arose concerning control of the Combined Air Forces during the Normandy invasion. General Eisenhower insisted that all bombing directed against the continent must be under the control of the Allied Commander conducting the invasion and he refused to accept any other alternative. Given the strength of his convictions, the Combined Chiefs acceded to his wishes.¹⁵

The answer to unity of effort and unity of command within a joint and/or combined military force starts with organization. After the chain of command is established with a single commander, the structure of the staffs at each level and their operating procedures are critical. The Allied operations in the European Theater presented several staff organization problems for General Eisenhower. Because of the diversity of the three missions for which he was

responsible, he required three separate staffs. As commander of operation TORCH, he needed a combined staff for its planning and execution. As commander of U.S. forces in Europe, he required a joint staff in England. And, finally, as commander of the allied invasion of Europe, he required a full time combined planning staff to work in England.¹⁶

The initial task facing Eisenhower was the planning for TORCH. The Joint Planners for the Combined Chiefs of Staff had done some of the preliminary work, but with Eisenhower's appointment the planning function devolved to his control. He appointed COL Gruenther, U.S. Army, as his Deputy Chief of Staff for TORCH planning and the British put practically all of their experienced planners at his disposal. Not only were they experienced, but, more important, they had the respect and authority of the British government. This allowed them access to virtually any element of the British government at whatever level necessary to coordinate their plans.¹⁷

The preliminary Allied efforts at planning for TORCH were criticized by both the Americans and the British. The overall concept was acceptable, but the details to support it were fragmented at best. In response to these critiques, Eisenhower assigned General Clark to head the planners and requested the best U.S. Navy planners available from Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations. He instructed Clark to form a fully combined and joint staff. The U.S. Navy, however, was very reluctant to participate and General Eisenhower forcefully reiterated the importance that President Roosevelt placed on TORCH and insisted that the Navy cooperate.¹⁸ Surprisingly, he did not request that they come under his command at this point and, in fact, reassured them that all he required of them was their willing cooperation and support.

The details on Eisenhower's staff organization and its underlying principles were outlined in a message from General Eisenhower to General Marshall in August 1943. Eisenhower explained that he was dual-hatted and in his U.S.-only role, he dealt with supply, discipline, and personnel through a deputy theater commander. As the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, his combined Air, Ground, and Naval components were organized under separate commanders. Heads of major staff divisions were entrusted with coordinating and supervising the corresponding staff divisions of the component commands. In addition, he had a joint planning staff which paralleled the organization of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in organization and membership. This section worked for the G3 and made its recommendations to G3. Staff conferences were held regularly and frequently. Eisenhower met with subordinate commanders at least once a week and more often during operations. His Chief of Staff met three times a week with British and U.S. senior administration and supply officers to coordinate non-operational matters. Coordination was also achieved through the joint planning staff, joint G2 (Intelligence) committee, and daily G3 (Operations and Planning) conferences. Further, there was a Chief of Staff's conference which included his Chief of Staff, G2, G3, and corresponding officers of the Air and Naval Headquarters. It was intended to identify and resolve points of friction before they developed. General Eisenhower followed the Army model in designing his staff with one exception. He fully integrated the British into his staff and he had two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, both British, one for operations and one for supply. Special staff sections, e.g. the French re-armament staff, were filled with experts as opposed to equal representation. Finally, in the staff sections dealing with administration and supply, there was an excessive number of personnel because of the requirement to work directly with two separate nations.¹⁹

Organization of the staff was just the beginning of establishing a cohesive and smoothly operating joint and combined staff. The people that served on the staff and the procedures they used were perhaps the greatest contributor to unity within the staff. From Eisenhower's point of view, the personality of the staff members was of paramount importance. In August 1942, during planning for TORCH, General Clark reported a problem to General Eisenhower concerning the integration of the British and U.S. staff officers. The immediate response from the CG was a dictum to change personnel until the right personalities were found for working together. This was to be a principle of his for the remainder of the war.²⁰

Another principle espoused by the CG was, "...a great amount of informality in staff work." He put himself at the disposition of his subordinates, but told them they were free to solve their own problems and to avoid the habit of passing the buck to him. No set scheme of organization, training, or concept of command was to prevail over common sense.²¹

Reviewing Eisenhower's organization in Europe and his actions, it is clear that his two overriding concerns were to establish and maintain unity of effort among the Allies and unity of command within the armed forces. To accomplish his objectives, he organized his command structure and then his staff with unity as the fundamental principle. He always insisted on having a U.S. Chief of Staff directly under him. But, his Deputy Chiefs of Staff were frequently British as were his subordinate commanders. The individual staff sections were almost always mixed with British and American officers. To summarize Eisenhower's principles:

National and political unity of effort.
Unity of command under a single commander.
Fully integrated and united staff organization.
Change personalities until they fit.
Encourage greatest informality in staff work.
Meet with staff frequently to insure coordination.

Command and Staff Organization in the Pacific.

The command organization in the Pacific during World War II was a compromise. It was forced by the personality and respect accorded General MacArthur by the American public and the refusal of the Navy to place the Pacific Fleet under the command of anyone except a Navy officer. The JCS dealt with this dilemma by establishing two commands in the Pacific, one for MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific and one for the commander of the Pacific Fleet. The naval choice for theater commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas Command was Admiral Nimitz, who was considerably junior to MacArthur.²²

With two commands in the Pacific, control of the theater was vested with the JCS in Washington. Given the nature of the JCS organization, the President was in fact the Pacific Theater Commander. The result was that no single individual within the theater could choose between strategic plans, resolve conflicting claims for troops and supplies, assign priorities, shift forces between commands, or concentrate the resources of both commands on a single objective. The outcome was keen competition for resources, frequent requirements for JCS decisions, and occasionally presidential decisions.²³ Unity of command within the theater, as a principle, was clearly violated.

In a letter to the Chief of Military History in March 1953, General MacArthur was very critical of the decision to establish two commands in the Pacific:

Of all the faulty decisions of the war, perhaps the most unexplainable one was the failure to unify the command in the Pacific. The principle involved is perhaps the most fundamental one in the doctrine and tradition of command. In this instance it did not involve an international problem. It was accepted and entirely successful in the other great theaters. The failure to do so in the Pacific cannot be defended in logic, in theory or even in common sense. Other motives must be ascribed. It resulted in divided effort, the waste of diffusion and duplication of force and the consequent extension of the war with added casualties and cost. The generally excellent cooperation between the two commands in the Pacific, supported by the good will, good nature and high professional qualifications of the numerous personnel involved, was no substitute for the essential unity of direction of centralized authority.²⁴

The Navy had similar feelings about the fractured command structure in the Pacific and would have gladly provided a Pacific Theater Commander.

Unity of command was also a problem for the Allies in the Pacific. The Australians and New Zealanders were concerned that by committing their military forces to a Combined Command, headed by an American, they would lose their ability to defend their homelands. The JCS responded that each national power had the ultimate authority over its military forces and could withdraw them from any operation or campaign which they felt was inadvisable.²⁵ While this satisfied the Allies, it had a substantial impact on the combined commander. He was now required to constantly monitor the concerns of his subordinate Allied commanders and, in essence, get their concurrence on every operation and campaign in which he wanted them to participate.

MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Command.

On 18 April, 1942, General MacArthur officially assumed command of the Southwest Pacific. He immediately organized his forces into Allied Air, Ground, and Naval component commands. General Sir Thomas Blamey (Australian) commanded the land forces, Major General George Brett (U.S.) commanded the air forces, and Admiral Leary (U.S.) commanded the naval forces. He structured his headquarters in accordance with the traditional U.S. Army model. It included a Chief of Staff and four staff sections (Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics) all headed by U.S. Army officers. There was nothing in MacArthur's appointing directive instructing him to select officers of participating governments, as General Wavell had been required to do in the Allied Far East Command. The President and General Marshall both urged MacArthur to include Allies on his staff. He nonetheless declined their suggestions and used only Americans in the senior staff positions, with a few Dutch and Australian officers serving in subordinate positions.²⁶

General MacArthur enumerated the basic factors in organizing his combined staff in a message to General Marshall in July 1943. He emphasized the importance of "complete and thorough integration" of ground, air, and naval elements, close personal relationships, and the close physical location of the various headquarters. All these, he claimed, made possible "a constant daily participation of the staffs in all details of planning and operations" and "an attitude that is without service bias." But he cautioned that the mere assembly of an approximately equal number of officers from the various services would not in itself produce an effective joint staff.²⁷

The operating procedures of General MacArthur's headquarters were also conducive to unity of effort. It was customary for his staff to prepare general plans including missions, forces, and target dates. Detailed operational plans were then developed by ground, air, and naval component commanders and their staffs. Responsibility for the extensive coordination of these plans was normally assigned to the component commander with the largest role to play in the operation.²⁰

General MacArthur's principles for command and staff organization may be summarized as follows:

Complete integration of ground, air, and naval forces.

Close personal relationships.

Close physical location.

Frequent coordination between combined and component staffs.

Nimitz' Pacific Ocean Areas Command.

Admiral Nimitz assumed command of the Pacific Ocean Areas on 8 May, 1942, and experienced considerable difficulty in establishing a joint command which operated smoothly. As Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC), he exercised considerably more direct control over his forces than did General MacArthur. Like MacArthur, he was prohibited from interfering in the internal administration of the forces in his theater. But as a fleet commander, he remained responsible for naval administration as well as operations. Throughout the war there was frequent confusion as to whether he was acting as the area commander, fleet commander, or the theater commander responsible to the JCS.²¹

Admiral Nimitz organized his command into three subordinate commands: South, Central and North Pacific Area Commands. The North and Central Pacific Areas were almost entirely naval operations, but the South Pacific Area Command was a truly joint command with 60,000 U.S. Army troops, three fighter groups, two medium bomber groups, a marine division, and remnants of the ANZAC naval force. Admiral Ghormely was the commander of the South Pacific Area and organized his command to mirror that of Admiral Nimitz. He established air, amphibious, and service commands all under naval officers, while retaining control of the ground and naval forces under his headquarters. His staff consisted of approximately 100 naval officers and just three Army officers. When he assumed command, the Army forces were spread over a large number of islands throughout his area with a variety of command and support structures. Some of the bases reported directly back to the War Department. Because of this confusing arrangement, General Marshall assigned Major General Harmon to take over the administration and training of all U.S. Army ground and air troops in the South Pacific. He was also to assist Admiral Ghormely in preparation and execution of plans which involved the Army air and ground forces. Paradoxically, Harmon was not in the chain of command between Ghormely and the Army and frequently found that his mission statement conflicted with Admiral Ghormely's. Only through close coordination were serious problems avoided. Ghormely eventually gave Harmon command of Army forces for short periods of time to support specific operations.³⁰ With the conflicting missions and lack of a joint staff, there were numerous disagreements between Ghormely and Harmon on the use of Army forces, especially air forces. The discord abated somewhat after Ghormely was replaced by Admiral Halsey, who insisted on the "one force" principle and gave the Army a greater role in the planning and execution of operations.³¹

One of the most enduring disagreements between the Army and Navy was the dispute over a joint staff for Admiral Nimitz. The Army felt that the Navy was using soldiers inefficiently in the Pacific. Their preferred solution, short of an Army commander, was the creation of a joint staff under Admiral Nimitz with full Army air and ground forces representation. Central to the joint staff argument was the ability of the two services to provide logistics support to their forces. The Army complained that the Navy failed to keep them fully informed on proposed operations and, as a result, adequate logistics planning was impossible. In the summer of 1943, General Marshall received two reports from general officers in the Pacific which severely deprecated the Navy's logistics organization and management. The proposed solution from both officers was the establishment of a joint staff under Nimitz. Marshall passed the letters with his endorsement on to Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). King's response to these letters implied that the two general officers should mind their own business and did not address the issue.²² Later in the summer Marshall provided two messages from the Army's Combined Commanders, Eisenhower and MacArthur, in which each outlined their staff organizations and the rationale behind them. Again, the CNO did not respond.²³

While the Army was working to change Nimitz' staff through the CNO, Nimitz was re-evaluating his position based on input received from his subordinate commanders and staff. It is also quite likely that Nimitz and King discussed the matter privately. In September 1943, Admiral Nimitz announced the formation of a joint staff containing four sections: Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and Logistics. The first two sections were to be headed by Navy officers and the last two by Army officers, with a mix of both Army and Navy personnel within each section. The Chief of Staff, a vice admiral, was dual-hatted as the Deputy

Commander Pacific Ocean Areas. The flaw in the organization which would cause considerable difficulty later was the provision for some officers to serve on not only the joint staff, but also on either the fleet staff or Army staff. By asking these officers to serve two masters, the benefits of a joint staff were lost. However, the Army in the Pacific believed that this organization was superior to the previous staff arrangement and endeavored to make it work.³⁴

The Army in Washington, meanwhile, was still unhappy with Nimitz' organization. They believed that Nimitz should be single-hatted as theater commander and appoint a naval officer as Pacific Fleet Commander. They were concerned that he would get bogged down in the details of fleet command and, therefore, perform theater commander duties inefficiently. They felt that the new staff organization was an improvement, but wanted two Deputy Chiefs of Staff: an Army general to deal with Army matters and a Naval flag officer for purely Navy matters. Finally, they recommended adding special staff sections for administration, services, medical, signal, ordnance, engineer, quartermaster, transportation, civil affairs, and other sections. These would be supervised by one of the four main sections, but coordination would remain the responsibility of the two Deputy Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall liked the idea, but realized that the CNO had been maneuvered as far as possible on the issue.³⁵

Navy acceptance of a joint staff for Admiral Nimitz was a relatively minor topic compared to the dual-hatting of Nimitz as Pacific Ocean Areas Commander and Fleet Commander. Admiral King repeatedly insisted that Nimitz was capable of handling both jobs simultaneously. The hidden agenda was the command link between the CNO and the Pacific Fleet. As long as Nimitz remained the Fleet

Commander, he reported to the JCS as theater commander and to the CNO through naval channels for operations and administration of the fleet. If, however, Nimitz relinquished command of the fleet to a subordinate, his relationship to Admiral King would be significantly altered. Functioning solely as the commander of an active theater of operations under the JCS, he would no longer be directly responsible to King. In these circumstances, King's ability to influence Nimitz would be limited to his authority resulting from his position on the JCS. The CNO would lose his direct control of the Pacific Fleet.²⁶ Vestiges of these same command arrangements still exist today.

In the Pacific Theater the unity of command principle was clearly violated with the establishment of the Pacific Ocean Areas Command and Southwest Pacific Command. Both theater commanders were fighting the same enemy and could not efficiently accomplish their missions in isolation from each other. Their common enemy, however, moved his forces between the two theaters as required and was at least theoretically capable of dealing with them sequentially. Fortunately, Japan chose not to do so.

Within the two theaters, General MacArthur was able to quickly put into place a smoothly functioning combined staff organization using the principles he outlined in his message to Marshall in 1943. Admiral Nimitz' command and staff organization, on the other hand, was the center of controversy throughout most of the war. Prior to adopting a truly joint staff, he and his subordinate commanders suffered through numerous coordination problems. While this is not conclusive proof of the validity of Eisenhower's or MacArthur's organizational principles, it is an example of how not to structure joint or combined organizations.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES FROM BUSINESS:

At the end of World War II, the U.S. demobilized and millions of men left the military to re-enter the civilian work force. As they moved up the corporate ladder and were faced with organizational problems, they drew upon their war experiences for solutions. The resulting organizations were very similar in concept to those used by the Allies in the war. In the succeeding 40 years the flow of management theories and ideas has reversed, with business schools and corporations now doing most of the original thinking on effective organizational structure.

The current business community is faced with many of the same organizational problems which exist within the military. Like the military, they have experimented with a wide variety of structural solutions. In recent history, the military has borrowed several management and organizational ideas from the business and academic community. Matrix management, management by objective, and zero based budgeting are just a few of the ideas emulated. Now, as the military and the government consider modifications to the JCS organization, once again the trends in business are being reviewed for application to the military.

One of the most recent efforts to identify attributes of effective organizations was the research and subsequent book by Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman entitled In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Corporations. In their book they assert that along with "bigness" comes complexity and that, regrettably, most big companies respond to complexity in kind by designing very intricate systems and structures. They then hire more

staff to keep track of all this complexity and that's where the mistake begins. The solution is just not compatible with the nature of people in an organization where things need to be kept reasonably simple, if the unit is to "pull together". The paradox is clear. On the one hand, size generates legitimate complexity, and a complex system or structural response is perfectly reasonable. On the other hand, making an organization work has everything to do with keeping it understandable for the tens or hundreds of thousands who must produce results. That means keeping it simple.²⁷

According to Peters and Waterman, simplicity in basic structural arrangement actually facilitates organizational flexibility. It seems that because the basic form is clear, flexibility around the base structure is made easy. The excellent companies do make better use of task forces, project centers, and other ad hoc devices to make things happen. The excellent companies also appear to be reorganizing all the time, but most of the reorganization takes place around the edges. The fundamental framework rarely changes that much.²⁸

The staffs in outstanding organizations also have common traits. It appears that there is only one crucial concomitant to the excellent company's elementary composition form: lean staff, especially at the corporate level. In fact, the attributes of simple organization and lean staff seem deeply intertwined and self-fulfilling. With the simple organizational form, smaller staffs are required to make things tick. Indeed, it appears that most excellent companies have comparatively few people at the corporate level, and that what staff there is tends to be out in the field solving problems rather than in the home office. The bottom line is fewer administrators and more operators. From

these observations, Peters and Waterman developed their "rule of 100": with rare exception, there is seldom a need for more than 100 people in the corporate headquarters.³⁹

Calls for simple organization and lean staff lead to the discussion of span of control. Limiting the number of subordinates has been a prime consideration of American managers for years. The Japanese, however, have taken a different approach and have built many decidedly flat organizations. At one Japanese bank, several hundred branch managers report to the same individual. At Toyota there are five levels of management between the chairman and first line supervisor. There are 15 intervening levels at Ford. Recent evidence indicates that American managers are beginning to reconsider. Former United Air Lines chairman Ed Carlson has an hourglass theory that addresses this topic. He notes that, "Middle management in most organizations really has little role beyond 'make-work' activities, such as stopping ideas coming down and stooping ideas going up." Middle managers, says Carlson, are a sponge. Hands-on management becomes much more workable when there are fewer people in the middle. The number of superfluous middle managers is staggering. Many senior managers currently believe that reductions of 50% to 75% in their staffs and middle management structures would significantly increase their productivity and effectiveness.⁴⁰

Another common principle found in exceptional companies is simultaneous loose and tight control. The companies have a central unifying theme that guides their daily activities at all levels. This theme provides guidance to the senior manager, staff member, first line supervisor and worker. It is stated in a positive vein, e.g. "the customer comes first", "24 hour delivery

anywhere in the world", "new ideas originate here", and so forth. The result is less central direction and more initiative at the lower echelons. Authority and responsibility are delegated as far down the organizational chain as possible. Yet the central theme is maintained as sacrosanct.⁴¹ This is somewhat analagous to Army doctrine, which provides a central theme or direction for staffs and subordinate organizations to follow in executing their missions, but gives them the latitude to develop detailed procedures.

In summary, Peters and Waterman identified a total of four characteristics of successful, innovative companies which dealt with organization. Simple form and lean staff were the first two. None of the many companies they looked at were formally run with a matrix organizational structure, and some which had tried that model had abandoned it. The underlying structural forms and systems in excellent companies were elegantly simple. Top-level staffs were lean; it was not uncommon to find corporate staffs of fewer than 100 people running multi-billion-dollar enterprises. The third principle, increased span of control, is closely related to simple organization. By reducing the number of intermediate levels of management, the flow of information is speeded and the volume is reduced. The final principle called for concurrent loose and tight control. The excellent companies were both centralized and decentralized. For the most part, they had pushed autonomy down to the shop floor or product development team. On the other hand, they were fanatic centralists around the few core values they held dear.⁴² To recap:

Simple organization.

Lean staff.

Increase span of control.

Develop central theme as guidance at all levels.

V. COMPILATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES:

The primary concern of the Allies throughout the Second World War was the unity of their efforts against the Axis powers. In the increasingly complex world of business, corporate managers have the same concern. Just as the Allies were convinced that only through well-organized, combined operations would they be successful, managers are seeking the same fully integrated and synchronized efforts within their businesses.

With agreement on the importance of unity of effort, the underlying organizational principles of Generals Marshall, MacArthur, and Eisenhower in World War II and those of today's modern corporations have several striking similarities. The principles can be summarized as follows:

Establish and maintain a simple command structure with appropriate component representation. In 1942, component representation included air, ground, and naval staffs and personnel. In corporate America, it translates to greater span of control and basic, clean lines of authority.

Create a fully integrated joint and combined staff. The rationale behind fully integrated staffs is the requirement for thorough and knowledgeable advice to support decision makers. In World War II it was essential for the Allies. In good companies today all aspects of operations, i.e. finance, marketing, distribution and manufacturing, are considered before decisions are made.

Insure complete coordination of all plans through frequent exchange of information between all participants. A prerequisite for success in World War II was the coordination and exchange of information achieved in frequent meetings. While numerous meetings were the answer in 1945, communications, automation and "central unifying themes" are slowly replacing them in modern corporations. However it is done, coordination through information exchange is essential to efficient operations.

Insist upon unity of effort within the organization and upon good personal relations between members of the organization. Many times the success of an organization is directly related to the ability of its members to perform as "team players". If they are unable to subjugate their desire for personal gain to the needs of the organization, the organization suffers. Now, as in the 1940s, people's attitudes are critical.

Co-locate component commands (organizations), whenever possible, with the headquarters. In World War II, co-location enhanced coordination and unity of effort. Today, communications and automation are enabling the separation of various elements of a corporation. For the military, however, co-location is still desirable.

Insist upon personal attitudes without service bias. This principle was most important to the joint commanders in World War II and is equivalent to the unifying central theme described by Peters and Waterman. A lack of service bias is normally achieved by establishing a higher objective and/or by installing agreed upon procedures for service cooperation. This corresponds to the loose/tight control that is apparent in the best-run companies.

The above principles worked well in World War II and are still at work in modern businesses. With some adaptation for existing U.S. military forces, they will work well in the next conflict. Regretably, not all of them are being applied by the U.S. military in unified and/or combined commands.

VI. MODERN JOINT AND COMBINED DOCTRINE:


Today's joint doctrine for organization of unified and specified commands is clearly rooted in the experiences of World War II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff struggled with the problems of organizing joint operations and provided their first guidance in a JCS directive on 20 March 1943, entitled "Unified Command for U.S. Joint Operations". It was a brief document, about a page in length. In plain, concise language it defined unified command, fixed the limits of the commander's authority and responsibility, told him what he could and could not do in general terms, and specified how he would organize his forces and exercise his command.^^

From the compact and succinct one page directive, the JCS have expanded their guidance to almost 100 pages in JCS Publication 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)". Within this document Joint Staff is defined as, "The staff of the commander of a unified or specified command or task force, which includes members from the several services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to insure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force."^^

More detailed counsel on formation and organization of the staff is provided in subsequent sections of the UNAAF. It stipulates that:

A joint staff shall be reasonably balanced as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of the members among the Services concerned, with due regard to the composition of the forces and the character of the operations so as to insure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of each component part of the force. When appropriate, the authority which establishes a joint task force should direct its commander to: (1) form a joint staff or (2) augment his own staff by assigning or attaching officers from Services other than his own, to give balanced representation. Since the component commanders have certain Service responsibilities, joint staff divisions, particularly special staff sections, should be limited to those functions for which the joint force commander is responsible or which require his general supervision in the interest of unity of effort. Personnel comprising a joint staff should be kept to the minimum number consistent with the task to be performed. For the staff to function smoothly and properly with due consideration for the policies of the commander, it is desirable that the personnel who comprise the joint staff be detailed therewith for sufficiently long periods of time to gain and utilize the required experience. The authority that establishes a unified command or a joint task force should make the provisions for furnishing necessary personnel for the commander's staff.

Finally, the UNAAF specifies that the joint commander should organize his staff as he deems necessary to carry out the duties and responsibilities with which he is charged, but his staff organization should conform to the model diagrammed below:



U.S. military doctrine for organization of Combined Commands and Combined Staffs is nonexistent. However, the organizational principles for U.S. Joint

Commands is considered equally valid for combined commands. Since combined commands are created as a result of international agreements, there are more inherent restrictions in their design. In addition, Allied organizational questions are more difficult to answer than uni-national ones. The main difficulties are the lack of precedent and an absence of combined doctrine. The task of combined staffs is mainly advisory, whereas staff work in the individual services is both advisory and executive. Combined staff problems are magnified because of their multi-national nature. Further, on a combined staff, psychological and sociological problems are brought about by differences in language, customs, religions, and standards of living. These factors point to the need for a different approach.⁴⁵

Admiral Carney, CINCSOUTH, referred to combined staff problems in the following statement to his newly formed NATO AFSOUTH combined staff in August 1951:

When inter-allied factors are superimposed (on joint and combined staffs), the effects are frequently unpredictable. Politics are politics the world over and many times we encounter difficulties and objections which are illogical from the military standpoint but which stem from political factors that are very real to the office holders, the voters, and the taxpayers of the countries concerned. It is to be expected that we will frequently encounter problems of obscure and puzzling origin, and an awareness of the probability should help to foster the patience and flexibility necessary.⁴⁶

This memorandum, written more than three decades ago, demonstrates the timelessness of certain principles relating to the human element of organizations. The advice is as good today as it was then.

VII. CONCLUSIONS:

The current U.S. military doctrine for organization of a joint staff has evolved from the experiences of World War II. Unfortunately, in many respects, it has gradually moved away from the principles that made it so effective in the 1940s. First, the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has eroded. They no longer are in the chain of command between the President and the unified commanders. The extent of a unified commander's authority has also been reduced vis-a-vis that of the Service Chief. His role in the administration or discipline of the component commands under him has been virtually eliminated. And, finally, the joint staff has lost some of its effectiveness. The unified commander can certainly organize his staff, but he is dependent upon the Service Chiefs to furnish personnel. If a staff member does not perform he can be removed, but there are no guarantees that he will be replaced with a top-notch officer. Also, the staff members received frequently serve for less than the normal three year tour because of other personnel requirements within their service.

While the overall trend has been to weaken the unified command, the environment in which they operate has changed and now requires a stronger joint or combined command structure. The pace at which events can happen, the complexity of the issues involved, and the variety of forces available to the commander demand greater authority and effectiveness than ever. During World War II, MacArthur and Eisenhower had weeks, if not months, to plan and execute their various campaigns. A unified or combined commander in the next war or conflict will be faced with creating or modifying an existing plan and then executing it within days or hours. In the case of Grenada, the unified

commander and his staff had to write and then carry out a plan within days. Not only has the time available to the commander decreased, but the variety and capability of forces available to him have increased dramatically. Time-distance factors for ground, air, and naval forces have grown substantially from World War II. The range and destructive power of modern aircraft are greater by a factor of ten than their WW II counterparts. Intelligence collection assets, communications, and automation have speeded the flow of information to the unified commander and his staff and have given them unprecedented opportunities to outmaneuver enemy forces. If they are organized to use the information effectively, they will succeed.

Recommendations.

Unity of effort is the principle that makes an alliance effective. It has been and must continue to be the overwhelming imperative for nations organizing joint or combined commands. Unity of command is the principle of war absolutely essential to military forces. It is a subset of unity of effort and is just one of the means available to nations seeking unity of effort. Unity of effort and command are achieved through organization of military command structures, their supporting staffs, and the operating procedures within the command. All of the following recommendations are directed towards strengthening the unity of effort:

As demonstrated in modern business and in World War II, the proficiency of a command structure is closely tied to its organization. The structure should be simple and lean. Unified and combined commands should use the existing UNAAF model and then limit the number of staff members as much as possible. Current

doctrine appears adequate.

Like Eisenhower and MacArthur, planning at the higher levels should be general in nature with the detailed planning being developed in component commands. This should be accomplished through close collaboration among the staffs from the component commands and the unified/combined staff. The second proviso from successful combined commanders of World War II is the need for frequent meetings to insure adequate coordination. Modern communications systems and automation can be substituted for some of the meetings and will significantly enhance the planning process. Whatever the medium, meticulous coordination must be accomplished quickly and effectively. This is not stressed adequately in the UNAAF.

Eisenhower's dictum to Clark to form a truly integrated combined staff by replacing personnel until the right personalities were found was and is the correct approach to forming effective staffs. Unfortunately, today's joint or combined commander does not have the authority to hire and fire the members of his staff or his subordinate commanders. They are assigned by the Service Chiefs within the U.S. military and by the allied nation in combined commands. Diplomacy is the only solution to changing allied commanders and staff members in a combined command. In a unified command the U.S. should give the commander complete discretion in personnel matters, to include selection of component commanders. Today's CINCs have the ability to fire anyone within their command from the same service, but find it much more difficult to fire staff members and commanders from another service.

A second personnel factor is the length of tour on a combined or unified

staff. Obviously, the longer the tour the more experienced the staff officer and presumably the more competent. A common trait of superlative companies in business seems to be a commitment to rotating personnel between staff and line jobs. At IBM, the management adheres strictly to the rule of three-year staff rotations. Their rationale is that a staff member who knows he is going to become a user within 36 months or less is not likely to invent an overbearing bureaucracy during his brief sojourn on the other side of the fence.⁴⁷ While this practice is also certainly correct for the military within a single service, it is counter-productive when moving personnel between positions on a joint or combined staff and positions within their service. The loyalty of individuals will remain with the service from which they came and to which it is evident they will return. The shorter the tour the less loyalty they will develop for their unified commander. This is especially true as long as the service continues to hold the keys to promotion and future assignments. In order to enhance the loyalty of senior staff and subordinate commanders, their tour lengths should be extended to the same length as that of the commander with sufficient staggering to assure continuity.

The final and perhaps most important recommendation is the need for development of a central, unifying theme within a unified or combined command. During World War II this was done at two levels. The Allies joined together to defeat Hitler and the Axis powers and elevated their common goal above national interests. On a more basic level, joint procedures or doctrines were devised, practiced, and then used in combat. Coordination of air with ground maneuver, of ground maneuver with naval gunfire, and air reconnaissance with naval forces were just some of the joint procedures developed and practiced.

The commander must be responsible for developing the central unifying theme for his theater and, in most cases, it will focus on an enemy or potential enemy. The key is the perceived importance of the central theme compared to the uni-service interests of personnel within the command. Will they be willing to subjugate their personal and service interests to a greater cause?

The second unifying concept is joint procedures and doctrine. They are the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for development and the Unified Commanders for modification and implementation. In the short notice situation anticipated in the next conflict, there will not be enough time to adapt uni-service procedures for use with joint forces. The validity of this principle was amply demonstrated in Grenada. Once developed, joint doctrine and procedures must be exercised regularly and then used.

Summary.

The United States military has the capability to fight and defeat any enemy with the effective support of our allies and the efficient integration of our four services. Failure to win the next war must not be attributed to our inability to submerge uni-service and national loyalties. The preeminent need is for consummate and wise integration of our forces and synchronization of their actions!

ENDNOTES

1. James Donald Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961), pp. 14-16.
2. Ibid. pp. 22-23.
3. Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985), pp. 17-31.
4. Field Circular 101-55, Corps and Division Command and Control (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), pp. 2-6 through 2-10.
5. James D. Mooney, The Principles of Organization (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1947), pp. 41-43.
6. Ibid. pp. 37-40.
7. Hittle, pp. 39-47.
8. Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1984: Armed Forces Staff College, Publication 1 (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1984), p. 1-9.
9. Ibid. p. 1-11.
10. Ibid. p. 1-15.
11. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 596, 597.
12. Louis Morton, The War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command the First Two Years (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1962), pp. 359, 360.
13. Martin Blumenson, Sicily: Whose Victory (New York: Ballentine Books Inc., 1968), pp. 22-25.
14. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), pp. 14, 15, 64, 65, 272-274.
15. Ibid. pp. 258, 259, 498, 499.
16. Ibid. pp. 33, 34.
17. Ibid. p. 42.
18. Ibid. pp. 49-51.

19. Morton, pp. 493-495.
20. Butcher, p. 54.
21. Ibid. pp. 6-7.
22. Morton, p. 244.
23. Ibid. p. 250.
24. Ibid. p. 250.
25. Ibid. p. 252.
26. Ibid. p. 253.
27. Ibid. p. 493.
28. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Command Decisions (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1960), p. 296.
29. Morton, p. 256.
30. Ibid. pp. 257-261.
31. Ibid. pp. 353-356.
32. Ibid. pp. 490-493.
33. Ibid. pp. 491-493.
34. Ibid. pp. 495, 496.
35. Ibid. pp. 359, 360.
36. Ibid. pp. 476-478.
37. Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies (New York: Warner Books, 1984). p. 306.
38. Ibid. pp. 310, 311.
39. Ibid. p. 311.
40. Ibid. p. 313.
41. Ibid. pp. 318-325.
42. Ibid. pp. 12-15.

43. Morton, pp. 642, 643.
44. United Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2
(Washington DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1984), pp. 63.
45. Ibid. pp. 63-73.
46. Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1984, p. 2-33.
47. Peters and Waterman, pp. 312, 313.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Ball, Edmund F. Staff Officer with the Fifth Army. New York: City Press, 1958.
- Blumenson, Martin. Sicily: Whose Victory, New York: Ballentine Books Inc., 1968.
- Butcher, Harry C. My Three Years with Eisenhower. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Cushman, John H. Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Korean Command and Other Cases. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1985.
- Dale, Ernest. Planning and Developing the Company Organization Structure. New York: American Management Association, 1952.
- Drucker, Peter F. Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1974.
- Golembiewski, Robert T. Organizing Men and Power: Patterns of Behavior and Line-Staff Models. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967.
- Greenfield, Kent Roberts. Command Decisions. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1960.
- Hittle, James Donald. The Military Staff: Its History and Development. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961.
- Lemnitzer, GEN Lyman L., Holloway, ADM James L., et al. An Analysis of Proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization. by Committee on Civilian-Military Relationships, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, Inc., 1984.
- Mooney, James D. The Principles of Organization. New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1947.
- Morton, Louis. The War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command the First Two Years. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1985.
- Peters, Thomas J. and Waterman, Robert H. Jr. In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies. New York: Warner Books, 1984.
- Robinson, Richard D. International Business Management: A Guide to Decision Making. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1973.

Van Creveld, Martin L. Command in War. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

Weigley, Russel F. Eisenhower's Lieutenants. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981.

Documents

Field Circular FC 101-55, Corps and Division Command and Control. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985.

Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1984: Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1. Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1984.

NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1983.

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), JCS Pub. 2, with change 4. Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1984.

Articles and Periodicals

Bracken, Paul. "Defense Organization and Management." Orbis. Volume 27, Issue 2, Summer 1983.

Pustay, LTG John S. USAF-Ret. "The Problem is Systemic". Armed Forces Journal International. February 1984.

Nunn, Senator Sam. "Speech on the Senate Floor, 3 October 1985". Armed Forces Journal International. October 1985.

END

12-86

DTIC