Employment of Reserves in the Operational Defense,
Abstract
This study is an analysis of how best employ operational reserves to counter an enemy operational offensive and developing penetration. The study addresses the question of whether reserves should be employed as they become available to limit and then reduce the enemy penetration; or whether they should be marshaled and built up, allowing the penetration to continue, and then committed in a decisive counterstroke. Classical theory concerning defensive operational art and employment of reserves is analyzed, including works of Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu. Historical analysis compares and contrasts employment of operational reserves by the Germans in the 1943 Kharkov campaign and the Allies in the 1944 Ardennes campaign. Finally, AirLand Battle doctrine is analyzed in light of conclusions drawn from the theoretical and historical analysis. The study concludes that the optimum employment of operational reserves involves allowing the penetration to develop while marshaling and concentrating one's reserves for a decisive counterstroke against the flanks and rear of successive portions of the enemy forces. Theoretical and historical analysis supports this conclusion. Historical analysis also shows that many factors may be present to mitigate this theoretically correct employment. These include terrain, relative tactical ability, strategic goals, risk, command structure, and command style of the operational commander. The study further concludes that AirLand Battle doctrine for the operational defense is well in line with the theoretical and historical conclusions. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 10, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA174252
Entities
People
- Mark L. Hanna
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College