Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy's Center of Gravity,
Abstract
Central to the design and conduct of campaigns and major operations is the concept of gravity. The purpose of this study is to discern the key considerations the at operational commanders and planners must understand to identify and attack the enemy's operational center of gravity. Following an evaluation of the theoretical propositions of Clausewitz and Jomini that pertain to the concept of center of gravity, the study analyzes in detail two World War II operations- the 1941 Crusader and 1942 Bustard Hunt operations- in to identify insights and lessons applicable to center of gravity at the operational level. The analysis discloses that the enemy's operational center of gravity his source of strength or balance, is always some mass of his overall force - a mass capable of producing a decision that has operational consequences. This mass is a major formation, that is the main element of a larger force's power for undertaking decisive offensive or defensive action within a theater of operations. Additionally, the best way to attack the enemy's operational center of gravity is for commanders to use an indirect approach in which they concentrate combat power at the most decisive points within a theater of operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 14, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA174278
Entities
People
- Myron J. Griswold
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College