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
NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM FOR WOMEN HELD ON JUNE 11-12
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
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

National Security Forum for Women



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CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 11-12, 1985

COMPENDIUM

THEME: Challenges to U.S. National Security

Assistant Secretary of Defense,
(Manpower, Installation and Logistics)

Washington, D.C. 20301-4000

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

MANPOWER,
INSTALLATIONS
AND LOGISTICS

Dear Participant:

As promised, enclosed is a compendium of the presentations delivered at the National Security Forum for Women. We believe this document, encompassing an overview of current Department of Defense policies on various national security issues, will be useful to you. This compendium can serve as a resource for continued discussions on American defense issues among concerned citizens at local levels.

We certainly hope that ensuing discussions will be as stimulating as the dialogue held at the Forum. We are pleased that the Forum presented an opportunity for a healthy and spirited debate on these most important issues. Such discussions are the very foundation of our democratic system of government. As Secretary Weinberger said to you in his opening remarks:

"...As we think about U.S. strategy and the future of East-West relations, we should be mindful that there are multiple dimensions to a nation's power: its values and ideals, its economy, its culture, its politics, as well as its military might. We are confident that the future belongs to the democracies of this world, to the market economies, to those who believe in freedom, self-determination, and individual rights."

Thank you for your continued interest in the National Security Forum for Women.

Linda P. Brady

Linda P. Brady
Co-Director
NSFW-1985

Marilyn D. Cobb

Marilyn D. Cobb
Co-Director
NSFW-1985

THEME: Challenges to U.S. National Security

MODERATOR: Honorable Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations and Logistics)

Tuesday, June 11, 1985

8:00 AM REGISTRATION

8:40 AM *Welcome*
Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, USA
President, National Defense University

8:50 AM *Introductory Remarks*
Honorable Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations and Logistics)

9:00 AM *Keynote Address*
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense

10:00 AM *Threat Briefing*
Helene L. Boatner
Director of Management, Planning and Services
Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

10:30 AM BREAK

10:45 AM *National Security Initiatives*
Karna Small, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

12:15 PM LUNCHEON
Officers' Club, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

Speaker
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President
and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters

2:15 PM *Asia*
Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of
Defense (International Security Affairs)

3:15 PM *Africa*
Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (International Security Affairs) and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (African Affairs)

4:15 PM BREAK

4:30 PM *Open Dialogue*
Honorable Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations and Logistics)

6:00 PM RECEPTION
Rotunda, Theodore Roosevelt Hall

Wednesday, June 12, 1985

8:00 AM REGISTRATION

8:30 AM *Europe*
R. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(European and Canadian Affairs)

9:30 AM *Western Hemisphere*
Ambassador Vernon A. Walters
U.S. Representative to the United Nations

10:30 AM BREAK

10:45 AM *Middle East*
Robert H. Pelletreau
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs)

12:15 PM LUNCHEON
Officers' Club, Bolling Air Force Base
Washington, D.C.

Speaker
Ellen L. Shulman, M.D.
Astronaut, NASA

2:15 PM *Terrorism: The Threat to International Diplomacy*
Ambassador Bruce Laingen
Vice President, National Defense University

3:15 PM *Debate: Responding to the Challenge*
Senator Dale L. Bumpers (D-AR)
Member, Senate Appropriations Committee

Honorable Lawrence J. Korb
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations and Logistics)

4:30 PM RECEPTION
Rotunda, Theodore Roosevelt Hall

NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM FOR WOMEN - 1985
"CHALLENGES TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY"

COMPENDIUM
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Per Ms. Jeanne Fites, OSD (FM&P)



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Senator Dale L. Bumpers (D-AR)
Honorable Lawrence J. Korb



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

June 11, 1985

Dear Conferee:

With the increased involvement of women in the national security debate at the local, national, and international levels, the Department of Defense has sought increased opportunity for dialogue on the major issues of defense and national security confronting the United States. The 1985 National Security Forum for Women is designed to stimulate thought and promote discussion about defense and national security among women in leadership positions in government, the military services, and the private sector.

As a result of this conference, we hope that you will leave with a better understanding of the position of the Reagan Administration and the Department of Defense on national security issues. For our part, we expect to learn more about your concerns on major issues of defense and national security. I believe that this kind of exchange will benefit the Department of Defense and the nation as a whole.

I welcome each of you to the 1985 National Security Forum for Women, and encourage you to continue your active participation in the debate on national defense issues.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Samuel W. Huntington", is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".



RICHARD D. LAWRENCE
Lieutenant General, United States Army
President, National Defense University

WELCOME TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

By

Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, USA
President, National Defense University

I am Dick Lawrence of the National Defense University and I'm very pleased to welcome each of you to this University and to acknowledge how delighted we are that once again you've chosen this location as the site for your third National Security Forum for Women. This University, under the aegis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is very pleased to host you at our facilities and to assist you in this very important conference.

I salute each one of you for taking the time to participate in these next two days. Certainly, sharing information and views among women in leadership about the security challenges to this nation is an essential feature in building a consensus for defense and assuming long term stability so that the democratic process will remain viable around the world. I have read the agenda for this forum, and I will tell you it is quite impressive. Your speakers' list would be the envy of any similar high level meeting on politico-military affairs. I suggest you will not soon forget these next two days.

I always appreciate the opportunity to say something about the National Defense University and this is one of those opportunities. Since our mission is to prepare military officers and civilians in government for the challenges of national security, and since Dr. Korb has so graciously given me a few minutes for welcome, I'm compelled to tell you a little about our programs here.

Our educational programs are unique because of their focus on higher defense issues and the role of the government military and civilian executives in that arena. Our methodology is based on advanced educational techniques such as seminars and case study methods, with an emphasis on experiential learning.

We do not grant academic degrees here at the National Defense University, but prefer to tailor the instruction towards clearly defined professional competencies which are needed by our graduates. Our courses are interdisciplinary and require very highly educated and broadly experienced military and civilian faculty. Our students are from all of the military services and from about 20 of the government agencies. The building in which you now meet is named after President Dwight D. Eisenhower and is the home of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Each year, about 220 very highly selected military officers and civilian officials of the federal government spend 10 months here studying about industrial preparedness, about personnel and resource management in the Department of Defense, and about mobilization and logistics.

The other senior college at Ft. McNair is the National War College, which is located in the adjacent building to the south and is named for President Theodore Roosevelt. Each year, about 170 career officers and civilians spend 10 months there studying policy formulation, national strategy, and the employment of military forces in joint and combined operations. In Norfolk, Virginia, the National Defense University has the Armed Forces Staff College, which is devoted to the preparation of mid-career officers for joint and combined staff duty. Each five month course at that college includes about 280 students, mostly in the rank of major or equivalent.

At the Washington Navy Yard, about 2.5 miles from here, we have the Department of Defense Computer Institute, which presents short courses on information resources management to mid-level and senior executives in the DoD. And every year at this campus of the university, we conduct an 8-week program of instruction for 24 newly selected Brigadier Generals and Rear Admirals in strategy and resource issues in the joint and combined arena.

This past year, we began a full curriculum program for International Fellows. Last week we graduated seven International Fellows from National Defense University, and next year we expect 13 more to attend our program.

In addition to its educational programs, the University sponsors a very large number of research activities. Our research topics for students and for the research staff cover issues of cogent concern to the National Security establishment, and many of those studies which have been developed here have been quite useful to defense policy and programs officials.

Throughout our program of education and research we are constantly mindful of the increasingly important roles being played by women in the Services and women in the civil service. We have a number of professional women on our staff and faculty, and, of course, quite a number in the student body. We certainly feel they make a rich contribution to our defense community. If you'd like to know more about the National Defense University, please take one of the University catalogs which are located just outside of this auditorium.

I do thank you very much for the opportunity to talk about the University. We are very proud of its contribution to national security and to its acceptance of the challenges which are extant there. We do hope that your expectations for this forum are fully met, and we certainly will do our best to support you. Have a great conference, and thank you very much.

Richard D. Lawrence
Lieutenant General, USA
President, National Defense University

Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence is the President of the National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., having assumed that post on 30 September 1983. The University is the Department of Defense's senior institution charged with providing excellence in professional military education and research in the essential elements of national security policy formulation, military strategy development, mobilization, industrial preparedness and planning for joint and combined operations. These responsibilities are discharged on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by three major components; the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces located at Fort McNair, and the Armed Forces Staff College situated at Norfolk, Virginia.

General Lawrence is a native of Eastland, Texas. He holds a bachelor's degree from the United States Military Academy (1953) and a master's degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Southern California (1961). His doctor of philosophy degree in engineering (operations research) was earned from Ohio State University in 1968. General Lawrence also completed the Executive Program for National and International Security at Harvard University. His military education includes the Armor School Basic and Career Courses, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

Commissioned a second lieutenant, Armor, in 1953, General Lawrence served as platoon leader, company executive officer and company commander in various armor and cavalry units from 1953 to 1958 at Camp Irwin, California, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Fort Knox, Kentucky.

In 1961, General Lawrence was assigned as the Army Liaison Officer to the US Navy POLARIS Program and US Air Force MINUTEMAN Program in California. He was reassigned to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, in 1962, to be Chief, General Support Section, Future Missile Systems Division, US Army Missile Command.

In 1964, he returned to troop duty as the Squadron S-3 and then Executive Officer, 2nd Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 7th Infantry Division in Korea.

In June 1968, after attending the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Ohio State University, General Lawrence took command of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, attached to the Americal Division in Vietnam. He completed his tour in Vietnam as the G-3 of the Americal Division.

In June 1969, General Lawrence was assigned to Washington, D.C., as a Staff Analyst with the Directorate for Land Forces Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis.

General Lawrence was selected to attend the Army War College in 1970. Following graduation in June 1971, he became Chief of Armor/Infantry Systems, Weapons Systems Analysis Directorate, Office of the Army Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. From February to August 1972, he was the Chief of the Systems Integration Team, Main Battle Tank Task Force at Fort Knox, Kentucky, which conducted the first concept development evolving to the M1 Abrams Tank. He then served as a Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., until October 1973, co-authoring a book on U.S. force structure in NATO.

In October 1973, General Lawrence assumed command of the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas. In May 1975, he became the Project Manager for Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization, serving there until July 1977. He returned to Washington, D.C., to serve as Chief, Tank Forces Management Office, Office of the Army Chief of Staff, until April 1979. During this time period, General Lawrence was assigned two special missions by the Secretary of Defense. He served as the Military Negotiator on the United States Delegation to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Talks. Thereafter, he led a Special Joint Team to Saudi Arabia and North Yemen to assist those countries in defensive planning during the crisis with South Yemen. After his return from the Middle East and until November 1980, he was the Chief of the Army Force Modernization Coordination Office, Office of the Army Chief of Staff in Washington, D.C.

In November 1980, General Lawrence assumed command of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. He served in that capacity until July 1982. He became the commandant of the US Army War College in July 1982.

General Lawrence is a member of the Army War College Alumni Association (Life Member), 1st Cavalry Division Association, the Association of the United States Army, U.S. Army Armor Association, Society of the Sigma Xi (National Research Honorary), Alpha Pi Mu (National Engineering Honorary), and is listed in Who's Who in America.

General Lawrence's decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with 13 Oak Leaf Clusters, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, and several foreign decorations.

Mrs. Lawrence, the former Patsy Ann Wiese, was born in San Pedro, California. She attended the University of Maryland. She is a member of Alpha Omicron Pi and Phi Delta Epsilon (Journalism Honorary). General and Mrs. Lawrence have one married daughter, Anne Roby, residing in Seattle, Washington, and one son, Captain K. Scott, a US Air Force fighter pilot.



LAWRENCE J. FORB
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations, and Logistics)

WELCOME TO THE 1985 NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM FOR WOMEN

by

Honorable Lawrence J. Korb
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations, and Logistics)

Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen. My name is Larry Korb and, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Defense, I'd like to extend to you a very cordial welcome to the 1985 Department of Defense National Security Forum for Women. As General Lawrence mentioned, this forum marks the third in our series of conferences designed to bring together women leaders from government, the military, and the private sector for discussions about critical defense and national security issues facing the United States. This is an event to which I look forward with a great deal of enthusiasm all during the year.

This Forum, the 1985 Forum, represents the largest group of participants to date. As you can see by looking around the auditorium, we are completely booked. As a matter of fact, we had to turn down just about the same number of people as we were able to accept. The attendees this year represent a broad spectrum of American life, and include business women, college and university professors, journalists, scientists, military officers, government employees, and students. In fact, it's the most diverse group we've had to any of these forums. The theme of the 1985 forum is "Challenges to U.S. National Security." We are pleased to have with us speakers who represent the views of many U.S. government agencies and the United States Senate.

During the next two days you will have an opportunity to listen to the views presented by our speakers and to engage in a dialogue with them on important issues of defense and national security facing the United States. I believe that the dialogue will be useful to you and to us. I hope also that you will use the break periods and social gatherings during the next two days to meet one another and to exchange views. I'd like to thank you for joining us in the 1985 National Security Forum.

Lawrence J. Korb
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations, and Logistics)

President Reagan nominated Dr. Lawrence J. Korb as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) on April 1, 1981. He was confirmed by the Senate on April 27, 1981, and sworn in on May 4, 1981. In January 1984, his title was changed to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations and Logistics).

In this position, Dr. Korb administers about 70 percent of the entire Defense budget and has responsibility for: recruiting, retaining, and training the five (5) million Active Component, Reserve Component, and civilian employees of the Defense Department; maintaining this Nation's worldwide military base structure; establishing supply, maintenance, and transportation policies for the land, sea, and air forces of the United States; managing the Department's spare parts program; establishing the Department's mobilization, energy, environment, safety, occupational health and equal opportunity programs; coordinating the Department's involvement in the nation's drug interdiction efforts and the 1984 Summer Olympics, supervising the Defense Logistics Agency; and operating the worldwide Department of Defense Dependents Schools System.

Dr. Korb was born in New York City and educated at St. Johns University (M.A. - 1962) and the State University of New York at Albany (Ph.D - 1969). He served on active duty as a Naval Flight Officer from 1962 to 1966 and is presently a Captain in the Naval Reserve.

Immediately prior to joining the administration, Dr. Korb was Resident Director of Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

He has held several major academic positions, among them: Assistant Professor of Political Science, the University of Dayton, 1969-1971; Associate Professor of Government, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 1971-1975; Professor of Management, U.S. Naval War College, 1975-1980; and he is presently Adjunct Professor in the Graduate Program in National Security Studies at Georgetown University.

Dr. Korb is also a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society (1971-present); a Member, Council on Foreign Relations (1980-present); and a Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1982-present).

In the past, he has served as a Consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; to the Office of Education; and to the National Security Council. Dr. Korb has been selected as an Outstanding Educator of America on two occasions, and in 1983 was named a distinguished graduate of the Rockefeller College of the State University of New York. He also served as the Chairman of the International Studies Association Section of Military Studies (1973-1976), and is listed in American Men and Women of Science and Who's Who in America. Dr. Korb also was a Member of the Defense Advisory Committee for President-Elect Reagan (1980); and a Member of the Transition Team, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1980).

Dr. Korb has published over 100 books and monographs, articles and professional papers on national security issues, including The-Joint-Chiefs-of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years, and the Fall and Rise of the Pentagon. In addition, Dr. Korb has lectured widely on national security policy and has appeared as a frequent guest on such national programs as the Today Show, Good Morning America, Face the Nation, McNeil-Lehrer, "60" Minutes, The Lawmakers, Night Line, Nightwatch, and the Phil Donahue Show.



CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
Secretary of Defense

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
by
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

I am delighted to welcome you to the 1985 Department of Defense National Security Forum for women. Our aim in sponsoring this conference is to bring together women in leadership positions in government, the military services, and the private sector to consider the major issues of defense and our national security.

The theme of this year's forum is "Challenges to U.S. National Security." Today, I would like to address three challenges: 1) The challenge of meeting American's commitments; 2) the challenge of fulfilling these commitments and managing our resources efficiently; and 3) the challenge of the strategic defense initiative.

THE CHALLENGE OF MEETING OUR COMMITMENTS

Defending our peace and freedom requires that we rise to the challenge of meeting America's commitments in the years ahead. In making the case for our worldwide commitments, we must examine our national interest, the threats to those interests, and our response to security challenges we face.

America's overall national security objective is to safeguard the United States, our interests, and our allies and friends from coercion and aggression. To ensure our security, we must use all instruments of our national strength--economic, political, cultural, technological, diplomatic, and military--and apply them through a concerted and coherent national policy.

Underlying our national security policies is a specific Moral imperative. As the most powerful nation in the free world, we must take the lead in promoting peace, human rights, and international stability. We must help preserve freedom for those nations that cherish it and those peoples struggling to achieve it.

Rejecting isolationism, we embrace collective security. After World War II, the free nations of the world realized that we could not maintain peace if any stood alone. Therefore, we built a strong system of alliances and regional cooperation to share common security interests and divide responsibilities. In the process, we learned that defense cooperation could reinforce political cohesion and enhance diplomatic and economic relationships.

Let me point out that while our strategy supports our pursuit of ideals, we have not lost sight or reality. As President Reagan said in his state of the union address:

"We cannot play innocents abroad in a world that is not innocent. Nor can we be passive when freedom is under siege."

Therefore, our defense strategy is based on the harsh realities of this not so innocent world. Our policies and deployments are firmly geared to the threats we face:

- An enormous quantitative and qualitative Soviet military buildup that has produced a major shift in the nuclear and conventional force balance.
- A Soviet military posture that has become increasingly more offensive in orientation.
- The expanded global reach of Soviet forces and their improved capability for power projection.
- Increasing Soviet support for terrorism, insurgency, and aggression that has aggravated instability and conflict in the third world.

And the threat goes beyond the Soviets. In 1984, the military forces of 20 countries were involved in conflicts in 11 areas of the world. Most of these areas involved the interests of free world nations. Vietnam, Libya, Syria, Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua have acted as catalysts for much of this conflict.

Some criticize our defense strategy as "Too Ambitious." I ask them: What treaties should we repudiate? Which allies or friends shall we abandon? From what cause should we retreat? The critics provide no answers.

Under President Reagan's leadership, America is not trying to do too much. We are trying to do what we must--to protect our nation and our interests, and to preserve peace with freedom.

We do not seek territorial gains. We will use our military forces only in response to clear threats to our security and interests. Only if we are strong will we be able to deter attack from a worldwide military power--the Soviet Union.

Moreover, we seek to heal the festering causes of conflict--political, economic, social--before they lead to war. Our goal is to deter, not fight. Military force should be used carefully and only as a last resort. But if deterrence fails, we must be fully ready and able to defend ourselves and our allies.

The keystone of our military strategy since World War II has been deterrence. Deterrence provides security by convincing potential adversaries that the risks and costs of aggression will exceed any conceivable gain. The U.S. seeks credible deterrence through our military strength, political resolve, and diplomacy. All aspects of the Reagan defense program--from our mobility requirements to our readiness needs, to our vital strategic modernization program--are tied fundamentally to that objective!

THE DEFENSE BUDGET CHALLENGE

This leads me to my second subject--the challenge of getting the necessary funding to fulfill our security commitments and then managing our resources efficiently.

While the soviets increase their military might, Congress debates how to freeze our defense budget. Curiously, none of the budget cutters argue that our adversaries have frozen their spending. No one claims that dangers to U.S. interests are diminishing. In fact, very few discuss the threats that ought to drive decisions on defense.

In this atmosphere, it is tempting to base defense budget recommendations on what is achievable politically. You may win applause by telling people what they want to hear: That all will be well with whatever defense funds can be provided from a limited federal budget.

Many people see defense as "just another government program" that must compete for funds. If deficit cutting is needed, defense must absorb its "fair share."

I do not mean to imply that I believe that defense should get all the money it can possibly spend. No matter what you hear, this is not the case. But, the special nature of defense requires that it not be treated as "just another program."

Twice in the past few months, the President has reluctantly agreed to a reduced defense budget from the Congress. However, the President's compromises in no way imply that our earlier proposals were unwarranted. We said that cuts below our original proposal would hurt, and indeed they will. They will increase the costs of eventually achieving adequate security and will delay fulfillment of key defense needs.

Of course, it is nonsense to challenge the administration's credibility by arguing that "we were not attacked last year, so cuts made in the past were not harmful." This is the logic of complacency. The central question in defense spending remains, "how much is needed?" How much Congress will appropriate, does not answer the question of what we need.

Thus, over the past four years, this administration's realistic analysis of America's security posture has guided our budget recommendations to Congress and our decisions within the Defense Department. We have made tremendous progress. Our forces now are stronger in every respect, better trained and better equipped. So say all of our military leaders.

What about all those lurid reports of Pentagon waste?

Well, great progress has been made on that front as well. But success stories will never make headlines. But even the headlines--the absurdly priced hammers, diodes, ash trays, and so on--usually result from discoveries by our auditors as we systematically go about finding and reforming bad practices of the past. It is not easy to change decades-old practices, even in four years, but we are making progress.

We are streamlining and reducing costly requirements, increasing competition, and working with contractors to obtain quality products for the least cost. These facts do not make headlines--but they should! Our citizens must know that the leaders of the Department of Defense are true reformers--attacking root causes of waste from within. Greater efficiency in managing our resources will always be a challenge to drive us upward to greater achievements.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

A third challenge to our security is now receiving the appropriate attention of the Congress.

Two years ago, President Reagan gave America a bold new vision, a strategic defense initiative, or SDI. SDI is research aimed at developing technical options for effective defenses against ballistic missiles, and determining the viability of such options. I believe that an effective defense is, in fact, achievable through man's genius, skill, and will to survive.

As with every other departure from conventional wisdom, SDI has stirred a flurry of resistance...resistance from those who reject any change in the familiar conventional wisdom. But we must explore all opportunities for a safer world, regardless of preconceived ideas. At the top of the list is a need to move beyond offensive nuclear deterrence, beyond a world of mutually assured vulnerability.

An illusion of the 1970's was the belief that the Soviets could be persuaded to adopt America's strategic doctrines, in particular, what Henry Kissinger has called "The historically amazing theory that vulnerability contributed to peace, and invulnerability contributed to the risks of war." The fact is, since the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, the Soviet Union has spent roughly as much on all forms of strategic defense as it has on its huge offensive program. The Soviets have built more than a half-dozen major laser R&D facilities and test ranges. More than 10,000 Soviet scientists and engineers are associated with laser development. In contrast, the United States, until last year, has done only minimal research in the field since 1972. We need urgently to accelerate our program.

Let me review briefly some prospective benefits of the Strategic Defense Initiative:

1. Uncertainty Enhances Deterrence. An effective strategic defense would make an enemy think twice, because it would complicate his ability to calculate the effectiveness of an attack he might be planning. Moreover, an effective defense would not need to be leak-proof to create this uncertainty.
2. Offensive Force Reduction. If a reliable and cost-effective strategic defense technology should prove practical, both superpowers would have powerful incentives to reconsider the value of much of their offensive missile striking power. In short, strategic defense realization might be real catalyst for securing agreements for deep reductions in offensive arms.
3. Avoidance of Technological Surprise. Unless the U.S. pursues a vigorous research program on advanced defense technologies, we could risk a Soviet breakthrough that would put them far ahead of us. Remember, the Soviets have been at this, vigorously but quietly, for nearly 16 years.
4. Prudent Hedge Against Soviet Defense Deployment. If successful, SDI would shorten the time it would take the U.S. to deploy advanced missile

defenses. This is especially important, because the Soviet Union has violated the ABM Treaty in ways that demonstrate their moves toward installation of strategic defenses.

5. Protection Against Accidents. Strategic Defense could be an "insurance policy" against the Soviet Union, or some other nation, accidentally launching a missile against us.

6. Insurance Against Soviet Non-Compliance With Deep Offensive Arms Reductions. The deeper the arms reductions to which we and the Soviets might agree, the greater the risk associated with any Soviet non-compliance--that is, in the absence of a strategic defense capacity. And as we all know, there have been many Soviet violations of agreements they have signed in the past.

7. "Policing" A Nuclear-Disarmed World. In the absence of an adequate defense, it seems unlikely that any American President would sign a comprehensive nuclear disarmament treaty, or that the U.S. Senate would ratify such a treaty. Nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but one we should not casually dismiss--nor one we should legally embrace until Soviet behavior changes drastically for the better.

Finally, one would be more inclined to listen to the SDI skeptics if we had not surmounted seemingly impossible scientific and engineering problems in the past, and if there were not so many technological possibilities open to us.

A new relationship with the Soviet Union may be possible. Together we share the common goal of avoiding nuclear war. Arms reductions and strategic defenses could provide the means to this end.

The Soviets have already cooperated with us to reduce the risk of nuclear war. We have agreed to upgrade the hotline. We are in essential agreement on non-proliferation policy. We both exercise great caution about nuclear arms in many important ways. It should be possible to work with the Soviets to create a new arrangement that offers far more safety to both our societies and to our allies.

CONCLUSION

As we think about U.S. strategy and the future of East-West relations, we should be mindful that there are multiple dimensions to a nation's power: Its values and ideals, its economy, its politics, as well as its military might. By restoring American military strength and confidence, President Reagan has led the United States from self-doubt to self-respect.

We are confident that the future belongs to the democracies of this world, to the market economies, to those who believe in freedom, self-determination, and individual rights. Our adversary is able to compete in only one dimension--the military dimension --and that by virtue of a truly gargantuan effort that consumes more than 16% of the Soviet gross national product. The Reagan administration is determined to demonstrate that we have the capacity and will to prevent the Soviets from gaining a clear-cut military advantage or exploiting their military power.

Our aim is to show the Soviet Union that it cannot win by military intimidation what it cannot earn through the productivity of its economy or the merit of its ideas.

Fundamental differences in values and views will remain. But the peaceful competition of ideas and ideals between East and West is a challenge from which we will not shrink.

One final thought. We must recognize that Soviet claims about the inevitable victory of communism and the futility of our resistance do not confer legitimacy on Soviet leaders and their repressive internal security machinery. For they have been elected, not by their people, but selected by a small number of associates who feel that the inexorable forces of history are on their side.

It is not the military strength of the United States and our allies that offers the greatest challenges to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders know that we do not seek to control our neighbors--or theirs.

No, the greatest challenge is that we too have staked a claim to the future. We believe that political and economic liberty, and individual freedom for all, are the world's best future. We do not try to enforce this on unwilling peoples; we try by our example to demonstrate it everyday.

We hold these beliefs so strongly, so confidently, that we put freedom constantly to the test in our free press, our free elections, and in countless other ways we often take for granted. Together they send a clear signal to people who are denied these basic rights elsewhere. They send a signal of confidence in ourselves, and in our beliefs.

Thank You.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
with
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

DR KORB: Ladies and gentlemen, the Secretary will now answer some questions.

Q: Secretary Weinberger, I wonder if you would take a minute to lay out for us the key elements of the recent President's decision to continue to adhere to a SALT II treaty, and in particular, could you say something about the justification for such a decision in face of alleged violation of that and other arms control agreements.

A: I think the key phrase was used in the briefing following the President's decision, and that was that the President is willing to go one more mile, or the last mile, to see if we cannot get better behavior from the Soviets, to see if we can't get them to recognize certain violations. Some violations first were recognized as irreversible, and to see if we can't get their agreement in Geneva to genuine reduction, deep reductions that are thoroughly verifiable. He has asked us in the Defense Department to report to him by November 15, on not only the violations that we have discussed in the past, but any other violations that we have found. And to recommend the proportionate and measured responses to those violations that can help us maintain our security and our deterrence. I think the essence of the President's decision is that he wants to give every possible chance and every possible opportunity to the Soviets to change behavior which has been very destructive of freedom in the past, and basically very contemptuous of the treaty process. The President is saying, let's try a little longer, let's see if we can't get some change in their behavior. Meanwhile, our own security requires that we know what the violations are, and know what they require on our part to keep and maintain our deterrence. That's the way I read it, and it is fully consistent with the way the President has approached issues of this kind, as well as others, throughout his whole career of public service.

Q: I wonder if you would address the current debate on structural military reform. On the one hand, there are would-be reformers such as Edward Luttwak who suggest that the military staff should be unified, thus eliminating inter-service rivalry and thus giving us a leaner, stronger defense. On the other hand, this kind of structural reform is opposed by such figures as John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, who says there is over-centralization of offices at the top. Then there are such people as Greg Focile of the Wall Street Journal, who blames Congress essentially for some of the problems. Would you comment on the possibility of structural reform, if you see it necessary?

A: Structural reform is a perhaps tempting kind of expression, because it connotes all kinds of improvements that are suddenly going to be made by moving around or giving slightly different titles to the same people. There is a theory that if you move the organizational boxes, that somehow you automatically improve things. It certainly is true that organizational structure can sometimes get in the way, but the essence of it really is the people we have and their approach. The principal complaint that I think some of the people you mentioned have made, although it is not always all that coherent, is that, somehow, the people who are members of the Joint Chiefs are parochial, interested only in their own Service, and neither know

nor care very much about any other Service, or about the security of the country as a whole, and that what is required is to make one of them a kind of head of a German general staff sort of organization, and give him very great powers to command most of the military, and that that will suddenly improve things and remove the parochial nature that the critics find. That is the theory.

I have had the great privilege of seeing the practice for the last 4.5 years, and knowing a little bit about it before then. And the people who achieve these positions as Chiefs of Staff of their Services, are always people, first of all, of great skill. You don't rise to the top of these professions that are very difficult and dangerous, and require many years of application, and a combination of the ability to use changing and very high technology resources, and management of people and all the rest, you don't rise to the top of these professions, unless you have some very special and very fine leadership qualities, and universally the people who are in these positions have those. Some have them in greater degrees than others, but they all have them.

They also all have an experience that is involved in commanding combined forces; Army Chiefs of Staff, the present one is General Wickham, who had the command of the combined forces in Korea, involving Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and working with a number of different countries including, of course, Korea, with certain diplomatic skills. I just pick him out as an example. All of the other members of the Joint Chiefs have had similar command experiences. They, of course, have an interest in their own Service. They have grown up in it. They've spent anywhere from 30-35, sometimes 40 years in that Service. But it's also been in the service of the United States, and they know that no one service is strong enough to win a war or deter an attack and they haven't the slightest interest in weakening America. The assumption that if you pick out one of them, under this theory they're all flawed by this parochialism, and the inability to see the larger picture, the theory is that if you pick out one of them and make him supreme, suddenly all changes and he then becomes able to drop all this parochialism and become a better overall unified commander of the entire force. I think it is certainly open to question, to put it at it's most polite. So that I don't see that is any kind of a panacea.

There is a lot that can be done. We've done a lot. There is very little notice of the fact that the Joint Chiefs have groups and committees of their staff designed to eliminate duplication in programs, programs where the Services may be working on essentially the same program. That's an important thing to do, and it works pretty well. More can be done, of course.

The other fundamental reform that is usually spoken of in articles, and by the same people, and that is that we have too sophisticated weapons. They are too hard to maintain, they are too expensive and what we need are a lot of small, inexpensive, easy to maintain, unsophisticated weapons. I wish that could be done, it would be very nice if we could reduce the budget that way.

Again, this is thinking in a vacuum, because we are not looking at what the nature of the weapons is or what they might have to be used for. And they have to be weapons that, by definition, are at least equal, and preferably superior, to those they have to face, and the Soviets don't have cheap, inexpensive, easy to maintain, unsophisticated weapons. They have very good weapons. So we cannot send people out to do battle, nor can we maintain deterrence if we have weapons or equipment that we know are inferior to those

they will have to face. Again, this is not a decision we can make alone, we have to look at the other factors outside our control.

Q: Mr. Secretary, You have discussed plans for rebuilding the nuclear deterrence, but there is another kind of deterrence, that some say needs shoring up. The Soviets know that we're not going to use nuclear weapons in a situation like Poland or Afghanistan. What plans do we have for attacking that sort of problem?

A: I take it you're referring to the need to maintain and regain conventional strength rather than nuclear, and I agree with you fully. That's why 13% of our budget is devoted to strategic forces and the balance to conventional forces and regaining conventional strength. We have a long way to go. Just take tanks again, I mentioned them earlier, the balance of tanks of Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces against NATO forces is about 44,000 to 14,000. That's at least one argument why our tanks have to be very good, as indeed they now are. We get in our budget, that many people attack as swollen and bloated, about 700 new tanks a year; the Soviets have for 20 years had 3,000 new tanks and improved tanks every single year.

So we are doing the conventional strengthening. We have to do it. We're doing it in conventional tactical aircraft, in artillery, in air and sea lift, because we might have to move our forces very rapidly many thousands of miles. We're regaining naval strength that is designed to improve our conventional ability, and you're quite right, we have to do this too. The problem is we can't have the option of doing one or the other. We do have to do both. The frustrating, difficult thing that we face, particularly when we came in, was this need to deal with all three parts of the triad at once. It would have been obviously much better if over the years, in the 70's, we had indeed replaced the B-52 bombers, which are now 27 years old. The irony to me is to remember that when I was running the budget in 1971, I put into the budget the funds for the B-1 bomber, and it was supposed to be delivered in 1977. It was cancelled. We had to start it over. We're getting it now. The first operational one will be delivered about 18 months ahead of schedule at the end of this month. But all of these things had to be done at once. You can't do one or the other, you have to do both, because that again is a decision that is dictated to us from the outside. It's dictated to us by the Soviet capability if we want to maintain deterrence.

Q: By any measure, the current level of drugs coming into the country is a threat not only to national security, but to the readiness of our armed forces. Within the limitations of posse comitatus, what do you see as the appropriate role for the military in helping the country deal with the importation of drugs?

A: The proper role for the military in dealing with the drug problem is the question; an exceptionally good question. The posse comitatus rules that you mentioned are designed, quite properly, over virtually all the years of our existence as a country, to prevent the military from being used for local law enforcement or as an agent of law enforcement generally. Within the limits of those rules, we try to do just as much as we can, and we are doing a very great deal to interdict the drug traffic coming into the United States. We use our AWACS planes for very early warning of ships that for one reason or another we have suspicions may be drug carriers, and we pass the word on to the Coast Guard, and they've been very successful in intercepting a lot of them. Within areas where we're allowed to conduct maneuvers and exercises, we try to assist governments that are working to eradicate drug traffic in their areas.

There is a limited amount that we can do because of those statutes and because what we do generally has to be done as part of training or very specific forms of maneuvers. To the extent that Congress would wish us to take a far more active role than has been taken by the military in the past in law enforcement, we are of course fully prepared to do it. We have to bear in mind however, that to the extent that we do it even now, it does degrade and reduce readiness of the troops for combat action or defense actions that may be required. But then we look at it this way. We say that a very large part of the subversion and terrorism, and indeed communist activity that causes so much trouble in Latin America and in parts of the Mid-East, is being funded by this drug traffic, and that to the extent we can stop it at its source, with the consent of the host governments and so on, we will indeed be serving the basic purpose for which we exist. But we can't go beyond the limits that are imposed on us by laws that are quite proper, that say the military should not be used for law enforcement purposes.

Ultimately, we can do precisely what Congress authorizes and funds us to do. But we do have to bear in mind that a very large effort is required. We have done, I think, quite a lot, but we also have to bear in mind the fact that these drugs originate, a lot of this drug traffic originates, because of the enormous profit that it brings to groups that enables them to finance their revolutionary, anti-American or anti-freedom activities, and that puts a somewhat different cast on it than just straight law enforcement of expeditions of the past.

Q: Could you address the criticism of the M-X missile that is, because of its accuracy, often considered as a first strike weapon? And on the same line, can you tell us whether the Administration, in assessing conventional wisdom, has considered abandoning what they consider to be a vulnerable leg of the triad, the ICBM forces?

A: The question relates to the M-X missile and the need to continue to have a triad of strategic weapons to maintain deterrence and whether or not the M-X missile is a first strike weapon.

The M-X is essentially a modernization required by the Soviet progress in the area of the ground based portion of the triad -- ground based missiles, airborne missiles, and the submarine carried missile. The M-X is not in any sense, a first-strike missile. First of all, a first strike missile is a missile you use first, and we have no strategy and no plan to do that. What we have, however, is to have a missile that the Soviets know would be able to be used should they launch an attack, and would therefore help deter them from making that attack.

Some people feel that because the M-X is in silos that could be hit and destroyed by the Soviets, that that means we would have to use it first. That is not correct, because the Soviet attack could not destroy all of the M-X silos at once, and when the first portion of a Soviet attack started coming in, a large portion of the M-X missiles would be available to respond, not to go first. The size of the force is based on the number of targets that we have to cover. The Soviets have to perceive that we could retaliate after their first strike. We could retaliate with sufficient force, and sufficient destruction, to the targets they hold most dear--not cities, not people destruction, but specific targets. That's why you need accuracy, and why you need yield. They have to perceive that we could do that, and that, because we could do it, they would know they couldn't profit anything or suffer anything except terrible loss from a first strike. And it's that kind of balance of terror that is preserving the peace now. The deterrent, offensive strike.

The numbers that we have, as I say, has to be based on the targets. As I mentioned, we moved from 200 down to 100 M-X, and we do still think that's necessary because that's the missiles we have now with the accuracy and the yield that can destroy targets of the Soviets that have been greatly hardened in the last few years.

The final part of your question was about the necessity for the redundancy of the triad. Do we really need three legs of the triad, or should we recognize that the M-X is there, and the ground based system is vulnerable and could be destroyed ultimately by a massive Soviet attack, and simply give that up and rely entirely on submarines and airborne missiles. The basic argument for redundancy, which I think is still valid, is that, first of all, you have different types of tasks that can be performed by the different missiles, both ground based and air based. You have, for example, with air borne, an ability to change targets and pick out things you have suddenly discovered have become targets, a flexibility you don't have with ground based, fixed target missiles. With the submarine you have, what is at the moment, our most secure leg of the triad, but we don't know how long it will be, because there is constant research going on with respect to discovery of location and courses of underwater subs. The communications from submarines is not as quick or as effective as the communications from planes, and certainly not from fixed based systems. You have to have a variety of responses, an immediate response from an almost 100 percent ready system, such as the ground based, to a system that can respond after a number of hours of flight, such as the air borne wing, or respond after perhaps not quite as effective a communications system, but in a very safe location, such as submarines. It's a variety of tasks, a variety of different missions, and it is the knowledge that if one system is indeed taken out, that will not mean the end of the country or the end of the free world as we know it. But we will have redundancy, and, if you like, the safety in numbers, but the safety in different kinds of systems. So every time the idea of abandoning the triad has come up, it has been carefully examined. It has been suggested by a number of people, who make very much the same point, that there is a higher degree of vulnerability to some legs than others in the triad. Every time it has come up, the conclusion has been, and I have to say frankly that I share it completely, that we do need the redundancy and the additional safety, the additional deterrence, that you get from having three legs of the triad. But you only get that if they are modern and survivable to a greater extent and can do the task, that they are effective enough to do the task that will indeed deter anything being used against us.

DR. KORB: Thank you very much Mr. Secretary. Thank you for coming.

Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

Prior to becoming Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger held many key positions in both government and the private sector. He was Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare from 1973 to 1975, and before that was counselor to the President and director, Office of Management and Budget. His background also includes 22 years in private law practice, three terms in the Assembly of the State of California, two years as director of finance of California and chairmanship of the Federal Trade Commission. Mr. Weinberger served in the Army during World War II. He was graduated Magna Cum Laude from Harvard University and received a Bachelor of Laws degree from Harvard Law School.



MS HELENE L. BOATNER
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THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE

by

Ms Helene L. Boatner

Director of Management, Planning, and Services

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Central Intelligence Agency

It's a great pleasure to be here today. I want to talk not only about the problems that American intelligence is dealing with these days--or in the parlance used by the defense establishment, the threat to our national security--but also a little bit about how we go about doing that, and a little about what you as American citizens interested in national defense can do to help us out. Needless to say, I'm a bit limited in what I can talk about, but after a fairly short formal presentation, I will do whatever I can to answer your questions as frankly as possible.

The Soviet Union, of course, remains the main focus of our intelligence efforts. It is, after all, the one country in the world that is hostile to our interests and has the capability to deliver a major blow against us. It is also the country that seems most interested in thwarting our efforts to promote peace and stability in the rest of the world. It is the country which appears most interested in undermining the security and stability of our allies. As Kremlin watchers, we've been fascinated to watch the transition process in the Soviet Union. It seems to have gone quite well, although the Soviets are undergoing a period of internal strain. There isn't any question but that Secretary Gorbachev appears to be in control. There is, however, a good deal of doubt still about the direction that things will take in the Soviet Union--that is, there is no question but that the Soviet leaders recognize their problems, but a lot of doubt about what they will choose to do about it. So it won't surprise you to know that we spend a good deal of our time trying to penetrate a very secret decision making process, in order to figure out what the Soviets are likely to do next.

What worries us most about the Soviets, however, you have been hearing about for the last hour or so--a large and building arsenal of nuclear weapons aimed at the United States, at Western Europe and East Asia. New missiles and missile carrying aircraft and submarines are being designed, developed, tested and deployed in very large numbers. This is augmented by the work that the Soviets have carried on over the last decade to improve their own missile defenses. As referred to earlier, we've seen signs of radar deployments which appear to go beyond the 1972 treaty limiting missile defenses, and we've also seen the testing of interceptors and other activities that would give the Soviets a running start if they decide to break the treaty and establish a nationwide missile defense system.

On the European front, the Warsaw Pact forces outnumber NATO units in troop strength, tanks, guns and planes. These conventional weapons are backed up by long-range missiles that can reach the capital cities of Western Europe. All of that sounds enough to concern ourselves with, but, in many ways the threat of the immediate future may be elsewhere.

Krushchev told us in 1961 that communism would win, not by nuclear war, or even by conventional war, but rather through wars of national liberation. It seems quite clear, now, that he meant what he said, and we can see today the results of Soviet support for wars of national liberation around the world.

The Soviets have supported Fidel Castro, who is eager to export his brand of revolution to other parts of the world. Cuban troops and Soviet-supplied weapons have backed revolutionary movements in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Mozambique. After consolidating its hold on all of Vietnam, the Hanoi government has begun to expand its activities in Southeast Asia. The Soviets themselves are an occupying force in Afghanistan.

I don't mean to suggest that the Soviets are ten feet tall; they have certainly suffered their share of foreign policy reversals and setbacks as well. Events in Egypt and Somalia have led to the loss of Soviet bases in both countries. Insurgencies are challenging important Soviet interests elsewhere in the Third World, particularly in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Mozambique. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan involves protracted military operations, mounting casualties, and high costs. In Eastern Europe itself, there are persistent tendencies toward erosion of Soviet control.

Nonetheless, the general trend we're witnessing is one of constant pressure from an imperialist Soviet Union. Such nations as Chad, Honduras, Guatemala, Sudan and Thailand face present or potential threats from the Soviets and their surrogates.

This use of proxies is nothing new in the world. The Romans used men from conquered countries in their legions as they fought to expand their empire. German mercenaries were used by the British during the American Revolution. The Turks used the Janisaries, and the French Foreign Legion is legend.

But the Soviets are using the Cubans, the East Germans, the Libyans, the Vietnamese, and other allies in a somewhat different way. These proxies act for the Soviet Union, or in consonance with Soviet interests, in peace as well as in war. Their role is as much political as military, and they have a wide range of functions. Of the more than 40,000 Cubans in Africa, over 80 percent are soldiers on active duty. Similarly, the Vietnamese role is quite heavily military. The Vietnamese who occupy Kampuchea also make occasional forays into Thailand, and worry the Chinese as well. But countries like North Korea, Libya, South Yemen, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Cuba do other things as well. For example, they train the internal security forces of other countries, teaching governments with whom they are compatible how to protect their regimes from their own people. And these same countries have training camps where they train insurgents and terrorists.

The problem of terrorism is one that Bruce Laingen is going to be talking about to you later, and I won't go into it in any great detail, but you won't be surprised to know that it is another major concern of the intelligence community these days. Terrorism has become a weapon used by sovereign states to destabilize or intimidate other governments. As practiced today, state supported terrorism is obliterating the distinction between peace and war. Major terrorist organizations, and some minor ones as well, are available for hire, and Americans abroad are a target. U.S. officials, businessmen, and facilities are particularly vulnerable, both because they are chosen targets and because we as Americans are accustomed to operating in an open way. We are not accustomed to going around being on the defensive. The result of all of this is that, since the 1960's, some 450 Americans have been killed by terrorists.

Narcotics, which you asked about earlier, is another major intelligence target, because it's a major threat to our society and our way of life. Drug traffic into the United States from South America, the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia, from Afghanistan, from Pakistan, from Iran, is not

slowing, and that is a major concern of the intelligence community, not in the law enforcement sense, but in the intelligence collection and analysis sense.

The methods by which drug smugglers bring narcotics into this country defy the imagination. I heard on the radio in the car as I was driving down here this morning that police officials somewhere, I think in New York, had just stopped a shipment of cocaine which was coming into the country stuffed into yams. Now really! And, as the Secretary said, some of the huge amount of money made in the drug trade in turn is used to finance terrorist groups and revolutionary political groups around the world.

Perhaps the most difficult intelligence challenge we face these days, however, is the assessment of Soviet technology and science, and the Soviet ability to acquire the necessary technology from outside the Soviet Union. Soviet technical capability in some areas rivals our own. We produce periodic estimates in this area. They show that on balance the U.S. remains in the lead in the critical categories under review, but the Soviets are indeed making remarkable progress, and, unfortunately, they are doing it with the help of the West.

The ability of the Soviet military industrial complex to absorb and assimilate Western technology has turned out to be considerably greater than our estimates had given it credit for, and the availability of that information to them is immense. During the late 1970's, the Soviets got ahold of about 30,000 samples of Western production equipment, weapons and military components, and over 400,000 Western technical documents, both classified and unclassified. The majority of this material came from the United States, although significant amounts of it also came from Western Europe and Japan. This truly impressive take was acquired both legally and illegally. We estimate that, during this period, the KGB and its military equivalent, the GRU, and their surrogates among the Eastern European intelligence services, stole from the West about 70 percent of the technology that is now critical to Soviet military equipment and weapons programs.

These acquisitions saved the Soviets hundreds of millions of dollars in research and development costs. They also served to accelerate Soviet development efforts by a number of years. Unfortunately, a large proportion of the most useful technical documents, especially those pertaining to aircraft and space systems design, were and are unclassified and uncontrolled. They were easily obtained. For example, merely by purchasing documents from the Government Printing Office or acquiring documents that were made available to U.S. contractors so that they would be able to bid on U.S. weapon systems, they have used U.S. technology to shave several years off some of their development programs.

Now, how did the Soviets get so much of it? A lot of it is openly available by combing the open literature and by setting up firms which buy materials which are legally available, but which we as a government would not knowingly sell to the Soviet Union. We have identified some 300 firms operating from more than 30 countries engaged in these diversion schemes.

In addition, of course, they obtain such information by means of espionage. Many of you, no doubt, remember the Boyce-Lee case not too long ago, involving two individuals, one of whom was employed by TRW, a major defense contractor. More recently, there has been the case of William Bell, a radar engineer who was recruited by the Polish intelligence service. Bell provided the Soviets, via his Polish contact, more than 20 highly classified

reports on advanced U.S. weapon systems, including documents on the F-15 look-down, shoot-down radar, the Phoenix air-to-air missile, and an all weather radar system for tanks. We expect that U.S. technology is going to continue to contribute to other major Soviet aerospace projects over the next decade. These include two new bombers, six new series of advanced fighter aircraft, ten new ballistic missile systems, six new surface-to-air missile systems, and a program designed to achieve military supremacy in space. Today, military systems account for more than 70 percent of Soviet space launches; only 10 percent are purely scientific projects.

Microelectronics technology is another area where the Soviets have relied heavily on the West. The Zelenograd Science Center is their equivalent of the Silicone Valley. It has been equipped, literally from scratch, with Western technology. Many of their integrated circuits are exact copies of U.S. designs, to extend to occasionally copying the flaws in the original samples that they acquired from the United States.

So it seems obvious to us in the intelligence business that the U.S. and our Western allies are going to have to take steps to protect our military, industrial, commercial, and scientific activities, with two objectives in view. First, we need to maintain our technological lead over the Soviets in vital design and manufacturing know-how, and, second, we somehow have to control the export of manufacturing, inspection, and automatic test equipment, that enables the Soviets to overcome their own deficiencies in military-related industrial production. We've had some successes in establishing programs, in cooperation with our allies, to control this technology loss, but I don't think there's any question but what the Soviets are going to keep trying, and we're going to have to keep coming up with better ways to try to prevent their access to information of this sort.

I'd like to close with a few comments about the system American intelligence has developed to meet this broad array of challenges we face. After CIA was established in 1947, and for the next few years, we relied largely on human intelligence--both via espionage and people willing to share information with us--to provide the basis for our estimates and analysis of what was going on outside the borders of the United States. Since those days, we've added a variety of technological marvels to our bag of tricks--unfortunately you've read more about them in the newspapers than we wish you had, not because we don't want you to know about it, but because there are other people we would rather didn't know too much about it.

But, in any event, today we use photography, electronics, acoustics, seismic readings, and other techniques to gather information. These capabilities have been and are being enhanced as new technologies and new intelligence needs emerge. As a result, in the near future we're going to be pulling in approximately four times as much in the way of intelligence reports and information as we now receive. We will continue, however, to need the insight and the information that only human beings can provide.

We also collect a great deal of information from open sources. Just as I indicated that the Soviets comb our documents for vital information, needless to say, we comb the newspapers, the publications, the radios, the television broad casts of the world, looking for information that is useful to us. We also glean very important information from U.S. citizens--businessmen, technicians, academics--who travel abroad, who have foreign contacts, and who are willing to share this information with us.

For our senior officials, we put information of this sort together into National Intelligence Estimates. Customers for those documents include the President himself, as well as the other senior officials of the government.

Estimates are produced not by CIA alone, but by what we refer to as the intelligence community, the major intelligence organizations of the United States government. They are reviewed by a board, which we refer to as the National Foreign Intelligence Board, which consists of the heads of the various intelligence agencies. Sometimes they can all agree and can put forth a coordinated position. Often, however, they have differing points of view, and so estimates are prepared which explain that there are several alternative hypotheses, and who believes which of those and what are the evidential bases for these statements.

In order to make the system work, we have to recruit, train and develop a staff of dedicated and talented people--and we have. We have scholars and scientists in every discipline of the social and physical sciences, as well as engineers and specialists in computers and communications. Many of our officers are highly skilled in foreign languages and have mastered the complexities of foreign cultures. Others provide support skills--draftsmen, cartographers, finance specialists, security officers--that make our work possible.

As the defense budget has grown, and particularly as CIA has recovered from the period of the investigations of the mid-'70s--which, in case you haven't heard, gave us a pretty clean bill of health--we've been growing as an organization. We've been out there actively recruiting, and we are still doing that now. One of the changes in the country is that there is an immense body of young folk out there who are interested in coming to work for us. Last year we had 153,000 inquiries about employment. We actually interviewed 23,000 people. We put 4,000 of them through all of the tests--intelligence tests, psychological tests, medical clearances, security clearances, polygraph examinations--and out of that number we hired 1,500. So that should suggest to you that the quality of the people you have manning the Central Intelligence Agency these days is quite good.

Those who come with us spend three years in probationary status, and thereafter have a career which, depending upon how secret their work is, may deprive them of most or all of the public recognition which most of us as human beings crave and desire as a reward for what we do. Certainly we do not go to work for the government for the salaries and financial rewards. But in CIA, you can't even have the psychic rewards. A surprising number of good people are willing to put up with that. You really do have--and it's your intelligence organization, not ours--a group of people doing your intelligence business for you these days of whom I think you and I can be proud.

Now, there are things that you, whether you're in government or outside, can do to help. I mentioned earlier that we talk to U.S. citizens who know something useful in order to glean information and insight from them. If you, or those you know, are approached by people from CIA who are overtly identified as CIA and asked to respond to questions like that, or give us the benefit of your information and expertise, I would urge you to do so.

If you see promising young people who are interested in a career having something to do with foreign affairs or the world, or indeed engineers or computer scientists, think about CIA as a place they might be interested in coming to work, and urge them to get in touch with us.

And when our work and our purposes are maligned, as they sometimes are, you can speak up. Even if you don't know the facts, you can question the access to knowledge and objectivity of the people who are claiming such knowledge, because they quite often do not have it.

The problems of maintaining a secret intelligence organization in an open society are not easily solved. Merely the fact that I stand here before you is one of those anomalies. It would not happen anywhere else in the world. There is no other intelligence service that sends its middle level people out into public gatherings to stand around and talk about intelligence and why we do it and what we do and all of that. It does create certain difficulties and awkwardnesses for us, but it's worth it for us all if we can indeed manage to protect both the necessary secrets and keep the peace.

Thank you very much. We're running late, although I kept my part of the bargain. But perhaps a few questions might be in order and then I'll let you get back on schedule.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

with

Ms Helene L. Boatner
Central Intelligence Agency

Q: I have just heard your description of what the Soviets are doing, and I'd like to know how the CIA administration's response to Nicaragua to the Contras are going to be perceived as any different than what you're describing the Soviets are doing.

The second question, comment is, if the Soviets are as clever, and I might add the Russians, at getting our research as soon as we have it, our best defense might be to stop.

A: I'm not a scientist and I certainly shan't seek to comment upon the desirability of doing or not doing research, although I think all of us as citizens of this country are aware of the many ways in which we benefit from improvements in consumer products and every other kind of a product.

As to the other, the decision as to what the CIA does or does not do is made by the elected officials of the United States government chosen by the citizens--you in this room--and given that proxy. We, CIA, do what we are ordered to do after the decisions have been thoroughly debated at all levels of the United States Government and after your elected representatives in Congress have been fully informed as to what we are going to do. And that's as much as I will say on the subject.

Q: With all of this technology and this equipment going out of the country to the Soviets, it looks like we're giving them more than even the spies are taking. Will you please tell us your ideas of how we can stop this?

A: I don't have any magic solutions, and I don't think anybody else does. If anybody had them, we would have stopped it a long time ago. It's yet another problem or another of the handicaps of being a free and open society. But I don't think anybody in this room would trade the virtues of being a free and open society for eliminating those handicaps. We simply have to live with it, because anything else is inconsistent with our system of government.

Much of what is available is available because, essentially, of the budget process. It is important to communicate to citizens of the United States, who pay their taxes, what it is their tax money is going for. Merely the fact that the intelligence budget is classified has been a huge issue over the years. Think what would happen if we were to seek, as a government, to change the traditional way we have done our business. It simply cannot be done.

I think we can improve security at contractor organizations and within the United States government. There is no doubt that, in order to make information available to the people who need it, we sometimes make it available also to the people who do not need it. But, fundamentally, you're dealing with a problem which is basic to the nature of our political system and our society, and I don't think we're going to cure it. All we can do is try to control it and try to alleviate it.

Q: Has the CIA analyzed the probabilities that communist nations or nations substantially under Soviet influence alter their political institutions over time, away from the Soviet model or the communist model, and the conditions under which those transformations occur? You talked about the Soviets don't always win the game, and you're quite right. I just wondered if you had examined the data to see if there are patterns there that you can discern.

A: We, needless to say, keep a pretty close eye on what goes on all over the world and we're particularly concerned with countries which are in the Soviet orbit, which appear to be, or which are sympathetic to the Soviets. And clearly, we do look at changes. For example, I referred earlier to the Soviets being ejected unceremoniously from Egypt. The search for patterns is a difficult thing. Sure, we look for them and everybody knows that one of the things you'll find anywhere you find large quantities of Soviets, is you will find citizens, senior officers of the host government, who don't like them. The Ugly Russian syndrome, just like the Ugly American syndrome. Large groups of foreigners are not easily absorbed anywhere, and so they're a source of irritation. But, more often than not, you find the factors that are peculiar to the country or the time or the circumstance appear to have played at least as large a role as anything which is common across the board. Trying to find patterns which you can guarantee will be repeated is really very difficult, and we haven't been terribly successful at it. But we do keep trying.

Q: Would you talk about the CIA's position regarding the survivability of the U.S. strategic submarine fleet?

A: No. And perhaps that's the note to quit on.

DR. KORB: I want to thank you very much. I want to thank you for giving us an excellent threat briefing.

Helene L. Boatner
Central Intelligence Agency

As the Director of Management, Planning and Services in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Miss Boatner is responsible for plans and budgets, support services, and product evaluation for the analytic elements of the Agency.

Miss Boatner worked for Booz, Allen and Hamilton International and on Capitol Hill before joining the CIA in 1963 as an economic analyst. She spent over a decade working on the political, economic and military aspects of Near East issues and served a tour in the Office of the Comptroller, where she was responsible for the Agency's budget presentations to Congress. She became Deputy Director of Economic Research in 1978, Director of Political Analysis in 1979, and Director of Near East/South Asia Analysis in 1981.

Miss Boatner holds a Bachelor's Degree in Mathematics from the University of Texas and a Masters' in Economics from American University. In addition, she is a graduate of the National War College.



MS KARNA SMALL
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

NATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVES

by

Ms Karna Small

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

When Larry first called me, he said, "Karna, you believe in free enterprise, don't you?" I said, "Of course." He said, "You believe in free press?" I said, "Naturally." He said, "You believe in free speech?" I said, "Sure." He said, "Then please come over to Ft. McNair and give one." So I thought I'd try to come over today and share some thoughts with you.

First of all, I do want to say that Bud McFarlane was very upset that he could not join you today. He was scheduled to be on the program, as you know. He has been very tied up, of course, yesterday with the announcement on interim restraints for SALT II accord, today with Contra funding. He just was in a meeting in the Roosevelt room with a number of Congressmen, there is a vote tomorrow on that issue. And of course we have the visit of Rajiv Gandhi tomorrow, so there's an awful lot going on and he just couldn't make it this morning.

What I'd like to do today is to talk about and share kind of a broad overview with you of national security issues, issues that Bud and I have talked about a lot lately. You have been hearing some real experts in specific fields, so let me try to give the broad view, and then briefly touch on some of the priorities as we see them in the second administration, priorities that we really need to explain better than we are doing, as we forge ahead.

But before going ahead, first let's just go back a little bit. Let's take 1980 as a benchmark, and if you will, think of it as if you were sitting in the Kremlin back in the late '70s, around 1980, you were sitting there kind of looking over at the West, and what would you have seen? Well, I would say that the '70s were really kind of tough times for the United States and for the West. You might have been able to smile a little bit if you were sitting in the Kremlin, and I say that for three reasons.

Number one, here in the West we lost a war, and whatever your view of that war was, the point was that it was obvious to friends and foes alike, the United States was unable to identify a goal, develop a strategy, and pursue it to a successful conclusion. Now the implications of that created doubt throughout the world--in capitals in London, Paris, Tokyo, Bonn, Moscow--about the reliability of the United States. The effects were really enormous, not only on our friends and our adversaries, but in the Third World countries--countries that were emerging then, were beginning then to hedge their bets.

Number two, our economy. Our economy was in a shambles--you remember the figures, 12% inflation, the first time we'd had two years of back to back inflation in a century, 21.5% interest rates, no growth, unemployment. Again, raising questions about our ability to solve problems, and, of course, from a national security standpoint, would we have the resources not only to protect ourselves and continue to deter, but to help others around the world.

Number three, and in a way important to this audience, there was an enormous change in the military balance. This was allowed in the 1970's. Why is it important? It's important because it affects behavior of powers around the world.

Now think back, between the years 1945 and 1975 the United States was supreme. We had nuclear weapons after the Second World War, we were very,

very strong; no one doubted our superiority at all. The Russians at that time had to look at this country, and they had to say to themselves, if whatever we want to do would lead to possible confrontation with the United States, whether it was in Iran in '46, in Greece, in Turkey, the Cuban missile crisis, if it could possibly lead to confrontation with the United States, they didn't do it.

But, then things changed. In the mid-1970's, they reached approximate parity with the United States. They kept their building program going as you all know. To reach parity they had a lot of missiles, we had a lot of missiles, what difference does it make? Does it mean nuclear war is more probable? No, it doesn't. I do not believe that nuclear war is more probable. However, it is important, not in a bean counting sense, they have this many missiles and we have exactly this number, but the view of approximate parity, of strength, of even more strength, is important because it emboldened the Soviets to take risks.

Examples. First using surrogates--Cubans in Angola, and then absent much of a response from the West, using Soviet generals in Ethiopia, moving on to South Yemen, using Vietnamese in Cambodia, still not much of a response from us. They moved massively with their own troops into Afghanistan, and then of course tried to make inroads on our own continent into Nicaragua.

The major point here is that nuclear war is not more likely, I don't believe it is, but the Soviets are more, were more, willing, to take risks through the use of terrorism and subversion, low order conflict, that the United States had to be prepared to deal with. More on that in a moment.

So in the 1970's, losing a war, having a deteriorating economy, and allowing the military balance to shift dramatically, well here again, if you were a Soviet you might be able to smile a little bit because things were looking pretty good. And if you were a reader of philosophy, you might have determined that Spengler was right, that there were intrinsic flaws in democracy, that maybe we'd succumb to our own materialism, the consumption, and maybe we'd have a decline in defense of our own values.

Well, sorry folks, they were wrong. Because the country indeed had not lost its will. In 1980, things did begin to turn around. The President came in and believed that we did have to do a number of things.

First of all, he believed that we had to restore our economy--very, very important, number one issue. And actually, it does have an awful lot to do with foreign policy, as I said earlier, because you need to have the resources for your own defense, for foreign aid, for security assistance. But, perhaps again, we had to show that we could once again solve problems in this country. So goal number one, restore the economy. And, of course, we've made a pretty good start on that, cutting inflation down to 4%, cutting interest rates in half, creating about 8 million new jobs, trying to begin to lead the rest of the world out of recession--we still have an awful long way to go, of course. Trying to encourage the private sector by giving incentives, cutting taxes, cutting regulations, cutting paperwork here, and, in fact, this reminds me of a story I want to share with you that Jim Baker tells about paperwork and regulations in business.

He said that one of his first jobs in the government, way back, was to be Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and one of his responsibilities was to oversee the Census Bureau. Well if you've ever seen a bureau with a lot of paperwork and questionnaires and all that, it's the Census Bureau. He said they sent out a questionnaire to business people, at one point, asking them to list employees broken down by age and sex. One guy wrote back, "None, but alcoholism is a big problem."

So the first thing was restore the economy, worked on that. The second thing, restore the foundation of deterrence. Restore military strength--we are doing that. I'm sure Cap talked to you about that earlier today. We still have a way to go, but a measure of that success, and a measure of what Secretary Weinberger has been able to do, is that once again we are deterring. It may sound like a cliché when the President says in his speech, as he has many times, "And they haven't taken one more inch of territory," but, you know, it's true. In fact we got a little bit back in Grenada.

The third thing is we needed to renew the strength of our alliances. We do derive an awful lot of strength, and our ability to deter, through alliances from Korea to Japan, to NATO, throughout the world. But, by the late 1970's, a kind of despair had come over many of the alliances. It was born of the U.S. threat to pull troops out of Korea; the on-again, off-again promises of weapons systems in Europe; many other actions that caused the allies, and especially other countries, developing countries in the Third World, to do as I mentioned earlier, to hedge their bets. Take trips to Moscow, cook up arms deals, alter their trading situations, even transfer important technology to the East instead of keeping it in the West.

Now you recall, we've had some pretty big battles over those issues. We tried to alter that situation back in 1982. It was kind of a tough situation for the President. Remember the pipeline situation? We just felt that you couldn't allow countries to make themselves vulnerable to Soviet energy supplies. It was just too much of a strategic vulnerability. And after asserting that position, and having some problems, we were able to work it out. In fact, I think we worked out a much better arrangement, and it's working now.

Among other things, we got everybody to agree that no country would supply subsidized credit more cheaply to the Soviets than they do their own people, which they used to do. Then a committee was formed to oversee East-West transactions, to check on energy vulnerability, and we set up another outfit to set thresholds for the transfer of technology, which is very important.

So today I think I can assert that the alliances are stronger than ever. The President has built up a very warm personal relationship with world leaders as you know, with Thatcher and Craxi and Kohl and Mulroney and Nakasone and so forth. So after restoring the economy and working on our military strength and our alliances, it was time, then, to try to get another important thing happen, and that is real arms reduction. Try to get the Soviets back to the bargaining table.

They're back, but we're also very cognizant that arms agreements just for the sake of agreements are rather useless. Most have simply allowed both sides to build up more and more weapons. That isn't what we want. What we want is a real reduction to verifiable lower levels. But here again, you've got to be mindful in all these long negotiations, and they will be long, you have to be mindful of what works and what doesn't work.

Let me just take a moment on that. I think that as the President looked back, and our arms negotiators looked back at history, they could see very easily what didn't work. And unilateral disarmament in the '70s, very well meaning acts, didn't necessarily work. For example, cancelling the B-1. That was a well meaning idea, perhaps thinking that if we didn't do it the Soviets perhaps might cancel the Backfire or the Blackjack. Well we didn't build, and they did.

In fact there's a story that Senator Tower told the President about a trip that he took some years back over to Moscow. He was talking with some Soviet leaders about this very issue, and said, "Look, wait a minute. We cut back. We tried to restrain ourselves, hoping you all would follow and do the same? Why didn't you?" And the Soviet general looked back at him and said, "Senator, I am neither a pacifist nor a philanthropist." I think that phrase says a lot.

Well, what does work? Some things do work. Think back again in the late 1960's, we tried to get an ABM agreement, the Soviets wouldn't come to the table. Why should they come to the table? We didn't have any program. Why should they negotiate something we didn't have? Then the Congress authorized an ABM system. They appropriated the funds by one vote, as a matter of fact. The Soviets then said, "Hey, wait a minute. Maybe we have something to talk about. Let's go to the table." They came to the table, we got a treaty, and that treaty is on the books today because we had something to deal with.

In short, some things work and some things don't, and it's in that spirit that the President began immediately to shore up the triad, the land-based, sea-based, airborne systems. I won't dwell on that. I'm sure Cap has already covered that territory.

So moving on, finally, the President believed that another fundamental goal of our foreign policy had to be a new basis for dealing with developing countries--Africa, Asia, Central and South America--that were emerging now from colonial rule. In the past, they had been relying on trade, mainly in primary products--coffee, tea, minerals and so forth. Very, very little industry, very little development. So when prices went down, in the recession, for commodities and so forth, they were really in very deep trouble. Big recessions, big unemployment, a lot of economic problems, and they were very vulnerable. Vulnerable to subversion, military influence, and intimidation by the Soviets. Those countries though, even though they had economic problems, were very, very attractive to the Eastern Bloc because of their resources, because of their location and strategic waterways, canals, choke points. What could we do to help them?

We used to rely simply on transferring a lot of money or making a lot of loans. But, of course, you can read the "Wall Street Journal" every other day and see what kind of loans are still on the books and what problems they're having right now paying them off. There had to be a better way, and we think there is a better way. The President has a three-part program that sounds sort of like a commercial or an ad, but it really is true, and that is Aid, Trade and Investment. Certainly, a measure of aid. Trade, yes, we need to open up our markets and have markets for the products of developing countries. An example of that would be the Caribbean Basin Initiative, we're working on it. And then investment, trying to encourage private investment, entrepreneurial skills, go over to countries and encourage businesses to do that. Teach the people so they know what they're doing. Once our people leave they can carry on themselves.

But let me ask you this. Who among you would go down as a private investor and invest, for example, in El Salvador? You might think about it a little bit, but there have been a lot of problems down there. You don't want to put up some kind of a plant or an operation and have rebels come in and attack your workers. That's not very smart. So obviously, in addition to the investment, we needed to do something to help the security situation, which means some logical level of security assistance --not our own troops,

that's not what we're talking about. We're talking about a reasonable level of security assistance so those developing governments can figure out ways to take care of their own problems. That's what we did in El Salvador. In fact, economic-military aid is about a four-to-one ratio down there.

I think we caught the problem in time. We have economic aid, the first payment of the Kissinger Commission money is being spent now. Their military is now out in the field and not holed up in the barracks any more. Duarte is firmly established. They've had several democratic elections. Right wing death squad activity is down.

In short, it's taken time, but it is working. In fact, it's working in many areas of Central America. They've had democratic elections in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras. There still is a big problem, obviously, in Nicaragua. Those other countries, those struggling little democracies, can't very well continue on a democratic course if there is a country in their midst which constitutes a violent threat, which has an open-ended pipeline of military hardware from Cuba and the Soviet Union, which has advisors, trainers, and even terrorists, from the Soviet Union and Cuba, Libya, Iran, the PLO, Vietnam and other Eastern Bloc countries. That is a very big problem that we are trying to deal with. I don't want to take up too much time on a particular country, but it is in the news and I thought you'd be interested, because there is a vote tomorrow, as you know, on aid to the freedom fighters down there.

A lot of controversy here, but let me just observe that these are people whose goal is to bring democracy to their country, to try to recapture the revolution they thought they had, but in fact was stolen from them by the Sandinistas. I believe there is a growing awareness in the Congress that these people do deserve our help. A growing awareness that the current government in Nicaragua betrayed their promises of 1979, their promises of free elections, free press, free trade unions, and all the rest, and a growing awareness that when you have a government down there that breaks promises, that censors the press, that kicks out priests, and that runs drugs to support their revolution, you will have a resistance, and that resistance is growing every day.

We've seen massive defections in the Sandinista army with kids trying to head down to Panama and Costa Rica and all over. We also see a rather massive rallying to the Contras, support in the countryside and so forth. So, hopefully, with a little bit of support, these people can carry on. Here's the key--the current government can be pressured to do what? To talk to their own people, to moderate their behavior, to keep their promises and try to develop a pluralistic society. We do think there's still time for that. It's worth a try, and it's also vital to our own security interests.

To recap now, having worked very hard to try to restore the economy, which takes constant tending, restore the military deterrence, restore the alliances, begin a process of arms control, and encourage democracy. What else are you likely to see on the agenda for the second term? That's a lot, but I think there will be emphasis on all of the above, but expanded quite a bit.

On the economic front, working with our allies, here again to help Europe, they need more help, out of the recession. On the military front, arms control, which will take time. Also an emphasis on the strategic defense initiative. I know you've heard about that, defense systems and how they can be integrated to provide for a more stable world. I think Paul Nitze will be here later. He's an expert, so I won't get into his territory. And alliances, you'll see more emphasis on diplomacy, particularly in

the Middle East as opportunities present themselves, in Southern Africa as well. I've already talked about Central America, a high priority. In South America, working with those countries to try to solve debt problems if we possibly can. And in the Third World, as I mentioned, aid, trade, and investment, as well as a small measure of security assistance, ought to get it all together.

A few other issues that are not geographically oriented exactly, but, nevertheless, are very important on our agenda, are terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, and drug trafficking.

In summary, I'm really quite optimistic right now, much more so than I think we all were back in 1980. I think America is in good shape. I think we have very strong ideals, I think we have a very patriotic people, a very hard working population. We're especially blessed to have so many dedicated people willing to serve their country, not only in the military, wonderful folks who are hosting this conference today, but many in jobs in the federal government. The President needs these hard workers. He needs support. He needs the support of the people. In fact, if Vietnam taught us nothing else, it taught us that no policy can be sustained in this country for very long without the support of the American people. So we constantly need to make our case, which is something that I worry about every day. Maybe we can talk about that, dealing with the press and how you make a case. We can't do it alone, we need a lot of help. And as a matter of fact, I'd like to end with a little story the President often tells about how you do need help, a partnership, to get things done.

It's a story about a couple that had bought an old house out in Rockville. I mean it was really old, it was all run down, and especially out back. It wasn't much of a yard, it was kind of brambles and bushes and thorns and weeds and so forth, but they felt they could do something with that. They really worked very hard. They worked for months--six months. They took out all the brambles and the bushes and cut back all the thorns and gradually when they cleared it they began to plant flowers, and they fertilized and tended and what not. In the spring, the flowers began to come up. The roses came up and the rhododendrons began to bloom, the tulips over on the side, and it really was gorgeous and they were so pleased.

So, they invited their local minister to come by Sunday after church and take a look at the garden. The minister came over and walked outside and he said, "My goodness, what you and the Lord have created is indeed fantastic. I applaud you." The little kid went up and tugged on his sleeve and said, "Yeah, Pastor, but you should have seen what it was like when the Lord had it all to himself."

I'll leave you with that thought, that we do need to work together. Thank you very much. I'll be glad to take your questions.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

with

Ms Karna Small

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Q: This morning Secretary Weinberger talked about the importance and the richness of our cultural life here in the United States. Could you talk about the Administration plans and interests for exchanges of youth and of educational and cultural activities between the United States and the Soviet Union?

A: That's a good point. This is a very important issue, and, in fact, it's something that Charlie Wick over at USIA has had a lot to do with. They have a number of exchange programs where they want to encourage, especially young leaders, young people who they would target, who could eventually be leaders in their country, whether as political leaders, economic, cultural leaders and so forth, to come over, and have ours at the same time go over to these other countries. There are a number of programs, I don't have exact figures off the top of my head that I could share with you, but this is considered a very important issue.

I know in a country, for example, like China, we're talking about more and more exchanges with China as they're beginning to open up their markets and trade, and open up to ideas in the West. I think that our young people and our business people going over to a country like China, emerging and kind of flirting with a little more free kind of systems, I'm not saying they're free, but they're looking for more business interests and so on, could have an enormous effect on their culture, and we learn an awful lot from them.

In other words, I guess what I'm saying is you make an excellent point, and there are a number of people in the Administration who are working on this very issue, and I hope to see more of it.

Q: I'd like to go back to the very first point you made about referring to our loss of the Vietnam war. I think this was really not so much a military failure, although it had its reflection then in our attitudes towards military budgets. This in my view, is a failure in American education, and it may be a failure, in intelligence. But, we escalated in Vietnam very quickly because we had very few people in our country who knew anything at all about Asian languages and cultures. In 1954, when our first advisors went into Vietnam, there were 12 universities in the United States that taught Chinese, and two that had programs in Southeast Asia. It's easier in a situation like that to escalate militarily.

The third problem, and complaint, about this subject, is that having escalated militarily, we then did so in a rather conventional manner, rather than using the techniques which we ourselves had developed during the American Revolution and which were being used in Vietnam at the time, that is guerilla tactics. I'm not saying this is the whole story, but it was a long period when this was part of the story.

And then coming into a later period, when American hostages were taken in Iran, it was rather striking that very few people, if any, in our embassy, even knew the language. In other words, we seem to have a continuous deficit in encouraging people to study the languages and cultures of the countries where we must project our presence and our power. I know when I was a young girl studying in China, this was considered a joke. I don't think it is any more, but we had to learn in a very, very hard way, and I think it is an over-simplification to put this entirely in terms of, well, we didn't know what our national objectives were.

Our national objectives for Vietnam were clearly explained every day in the interior pages of the New York Times. The problem was that nobody could pronounce Vietnamese names well enough to understand what was going on.

A: You make a very good point about that. I think there is, though, a growing awareness of the necessity to understand other countries, and particularly to study languages. I'm not saying that if you go down to Walt Whitman they're teaching as much Chinese, Vietnamese, or Russian maybe as they should, but yet I'm heartened. I'll tell you, I went to my son's graduation last week, he graduated from college last weekend, and just hearing the young people talk about what their plans were, I heard my son and others saying things that I had not told them to say, they were saying things like, "You know, mother, I was thinking maybe I should either study Russian, Chinese or Japanese in graduate school." And I kind of looked at him, and I said "Where did you get that idea?" He said, "Well everybody's talking about the Pacific Basin and more trade, and I think maybe that's where the action is these days. Maybe not so much in Europe." And kids were talking in these terms, they really were. And I was very heartened to see that.

I think that we do need, and all of us in our private activities and business and education and our work with young people, need to encourage, that there is an expanding world out there. We have interests overseas, they have interests in us. I think we are getting away, we're emerging out of this sort of isolationistic philosophy that we were in some years back. I think we realized that we're dependent on other countries for resources and so forth, and they are dependent on us. It is a very interdependent world, and the more we can encourage our young people, the better off we'll be. Good point.

Q: I applaud your sentiment. I do wish you would bring it to the highest reaches of the Administration, because, for the last four years running, the OMB has recommended zero funding for international education programs. In fact, to the dismay of the Secretary of Defense, who in 1983 was led to write a letter to the President asking him to restore funds recognizing, as I think the speaker before me pointed out, the crucial relationship between national defense and understanding other peoples and cultures.

Let me ask you one other question now. One of the complaints made about the way we make our foreign policy goes back to that we are free and open, a messy system of government. We often do things in a messy and inefficient way, and that's the price we pay. Our structure is complicated, with a Department of State, Department of Defense, and a National Security Council. With your experience in government in different places over the last few years, could you comment on what you think the role of the National Security Council is in developing foreign policy, and what that relationship should be with State and Defense and the White House.

A: That's a good question because I think a lot of people don't quite understand. They see different people around the government discussing foreign policy, and they wonder how it does all fit together. I think the first thing is that each President puts his own stamp on his National Security Council and how he wants his government to work. This President is a very firm believer in cabinet government, as you know, and when you have strong cabinet officers, I think most of the initiatives start in those officers' in-boxes, and you do have policy initiatives coming from the Pentagon, or from the State Department, or from Commerce, on a trade issue, or so forth.

Now the role, I believe as we see it, of the National Security Council staff--let me make a separation here. By statute, the National Security Council is the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense; and then as advisors to that are the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the head of the CIA, and of course, the President's National Security Advisor is there, and those are the people that go to NSC meetings. That's over here. Then, the National Security Council staff in the White House works for the National Security Advisor, so let me make that clear.

I think the way Bud McFarlane sees his role is that when you have these initiatives and ideas coming from the Cabinet officers, let's say Secretary Shultz wants to do something perhaps in one way, Secretary Weinberger has some different ideas, perhaps Secretary Baldrige has another idea, and maybe Treasury wades in with something else. It is McFarlane's role to take all of those ideas, and in fact before it really elevates to McFarlane's level, we have a number of what we call inter-agency groups. On a lower level, the inter-agency group gets together and tries to work out the problems, analyze the policy, and work it out at a lower level. Then it eventually filters up for a decision. But when you have a different view at State and Defense and Commerce and so forth, then it is McFarlane's role to fairly present those options to the President, and then the President makes the decision, and then the rest of the government carries it out.

So the National Security Council staff is there to analyze a lot of the foreign policy implications, study them, make recommendations, but work with the agencies in the inter-agency groups as the policies are developed. I'm a little prejudiced, of course, because I work for the man, but I think Bud has tried to do as good a job as possible to be that honest broker, to retain the confidence of the different Cabinet officers and try to present the options. Because you know even if there are different views, and there should be a lot of views, no President wants just one view presented to him. When you have different views, if you know that the NSC advisor is trustworthy and discreet and will present your options, even if the President decides on a different option, you feel you've had a fair hearing and that's okay, and we get along the best we can.

Q: I'd like to give you some statistics that might help you. You were asked about international educational exchange programs --

A: I'm glad you're here. Help me out.

Q: And also, the previous questioner said that the OMB had not supported international programs. She may be talking about the Department of Education programs, but at the United States Information Agency, from FY 1981 to FY 1983, we had a 50 percent increase in the amount of money spent on exchanges. We're hoping by FY 1986 to double the amount of money spent on exchanges, which means there will be more language expertise in this country, there will be more understanding in this country. As far as statistics of students in this country, there are more than 340,000 foreign students studying in this country; only 2 percent of them are funded by the United States government. The rest come because they want to, and we have difficulty getting them to go back home.

Q: I'm a physicist, and I would like to say that in representing many of my colleagues in academia, we are very pleased at the President's decision yesterday to abide by SALT II.

I would like to raise a couple of questions, if I may, about the strategic defense initiative. I am wondering, and in fact have consulted with a couple of acquaintances of mine who have been in Washington as Congressional Science Fellows, they don't know the answer to this--I certainly don't. Are there very many scientists/physicists of substantial reputation who do support the strategic defense initiative, outside of Robert Jastrow, I think Frederick Sites and Bill Nurenburg, and of course George Keyworth. But outside the Administration, do you know of very many eminent scientists who do support it?

A: Yes, and don't forget Teller.

Q: Well, he's pulling away, from what I understand. I heard this from a very reputable Nobel Laureate, who was my group leader and designed the mechanism for the original bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. He himself does not really support SDI, though he has not come out publicly, gives me to understand that Teller does not want to be considered the person who brought about President Reagan's decision and he does not back much of it, or doesn't seem to be.

A: First of all, let me just say that there are many, and I'm not trying to get in too much detail here, but there are many different aspects to the strategic defense initiative, and I think in order to put it into perspective, I think what we have to look at is why are we doing it? You're saying scientists are saying "can we do it?" But there are also some why's, some "why are we doing it?" And let me just take one moment and try to address that, and give you the thinking, at least of my boss and others in the Administration, and I'm sure Paul Nitze will address this, and I hope that you'll raise it with him because he spends full time on these issues, much more so than I, this afternoon.

I think there is a sense that the basic ideas on which our system of deterrence were based, back in the early '70s, had begun to erode. Now what I mean by that is that in the early '70s, when we had the system of deterrence, very simplistically, you've got all your missiles, we've got all our missiles; you've got so many, if you lob some over, we'll lob some back, so nobody is going to lob any. This was based on the idea that we'd each have kind of rough numbers, you know, rough equivalents anyway, rough threat, and neither of us would have too much of a defense, not a major ABM system, whatever. That was the general idea.

Over time, this whole premise has begun to erode. The Soviets now have roughly a three-to-one advantage in ICBM warheads--I don't want to get into the technicalities, but very, very strong, and there are some other things coming up in the '90s, which I'll get to.

Now, if you have a situation where there's no equivalence, you've got a situation like this, you've got really three courses. You can get them to build down, we're trying to do that at Geneva, but it's kind of tough. You can get us to build up, that's even tougher. Congress doesn't want to give us more than 50 M-X's right now, and where are you going to put them? You have to file environmental impact statements, the Russians don't, so that's kind of rough. Or a third idea is to defend yourself against these types of missiles. Something else.

It's going to be a new ballgame in the 1990's. Perhaps Cap mentioned it, perhaps Paul will. The Soviets, as you've seen in the papers in the last few days, are beginning to deploy mobile missiles--MIRV'd mobile missiles. Now, if you just think about it simply, without going into technicalities, if you've got all these missiles running around on race tracks or out on trucks or railroads or whatever, all over the Soviet

Union, it's very, very difficult to know how many they have and where they are, especially if they're MIRV'd. In a time of crisis, our President wouldn't know where they are, how many they had, and would be vulnerable to nuclear blackmail.

Now, it's kind of a tough situation to deal with. So there again, many people in the Administration feel that we have no choice but to at least explore the possibility of being able to defend against those missiles. There's also the idea that a terrorist could get hold of one, or some other country or whatever, and it would be a good idea to have a defense.

Now all we're asking really, is research. We want to research the question and find out--can we do it? Is there a way, particularly in the boost phase, to knock down a missile once it starts to take off from the Soviet Union, before, you know, the MIRV's go off this way, with non-nuclear systems. That's all we're trying to find out. Can we do it?

Now we believe that the Russians have been engaged in research, the Russians do believe in defense. They spend as much on defense as they do on offense, which hasn't been highly publicized. Our fault that it hasn't been. We try. They are moving ahead. They have the only deployed ABM system around Moscow. They are building radar and all the rest of it. They have the only deployed ASAT system. We have a lot of technology that they complain about, but they're moving ahead with defense, and I think it's our belief it would be foolish for us not to. So right now it's a research program, and we'd like to find out whether we can do it, but I think Paul will examine more of that this afternoon. He's the expert.

DR. KORB: Thank you very much.

Karna Small
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Karna Small is Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Public Affairs, for the National Security Council, a post she has held since March of 1984. She reports directly to Robert C. McFarlane, the President's National Security Adviser.

From November 1981 to March 1984, she served as Director of Media Relations and Planning for the White House Office of Communications. From January 1981 to November 1981, she served as White House Deputy Press Secretary.

From 1978 to 1981, Ms. Small was writer and moderator of a television program on economic, political, and foreign policy issues which aired in Washington on WJLA-TV (ABC) and was syndicated in 135 cities nationwide. She also hosted a three-hour radio program on WRC (NBC).

From 1976 to 1978, she anchored the 10 PM News on WTTG-TV in Washington, D.C. From 1972 to 1976, she anchored the early evening news on KGO-TV (ABC) in San Francisco, and from 1968 to 1972, she was featured on three newscasts per day on KRON-TV (NBC). During that time, she also commuted to Los Angeles once a week to appear on the 6 PM News on KNBC-TV (NBC).

Ms. Small received her B.A. Degree, with honors, from the University of Michigan, and studied journalism and television news in the graduate schools at San Francisco State and Stanford Universities.

Ms. Small is a native of Wilmette, Illinois. She resides in Washington, D.C.



PAUL H. NITZE
Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters

ARMS CONTROL AND NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIET UNION

by

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters

Ladies, and one or two gentlemen. Larry's asked me to talk about an impossible subject, and that is the prospects for arms control.

Last Friday I was in London, England, and then went up to Oxford. Three of us were scheduled to have a debate with Mr. Arbatov; Mr. Velikhov, the Vice President of the Russian National Academy of Sciences; and a Mr. Posner. But the morning that we were supposed to debate with them, they backed out--they walked out on me.

But I began our presentation that evening--there were just the three Americans and no Russians--and I said this was not the first time that the Russians had walked out on me. But this makes a point. You will all remember that in November of 1983, the Soviet Union walked out of the INF Arms Control Negotiations, and at that time they said they would not return to the negotiations until the United States had removed from Europe the Pershing II missiles and the ground-launched cruise missiles, which we were about to begin to deploy pursuant to a decision by NATO which had been taken in 1979. They also walked out of the START negotiations at the same time.

I think the reason they had walked out of the INF and the START negotiations was that they hoped that the political protest movement in Europe against our deployment of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles would result in serious difficulties, politically, within the various European countries, particularly in Germany, but also within England, Holland, Denmark, and elsewhere. And it would also result in divisions between the United States and Europe, which they could then exploit.

It turned out quite the opposite. It turned out that this issue having once been resolved, and the missiles going in place, it ceased to be an object that was newsworthy, it went off the front pages of the newspapers, and the protest movement died instead of growing in strength.

Subsequently, by November 1984, it became clear that the Soviets would like to come back and wanted to change their mind, and they wanted to come back despite the fact that we had not acceded to their demand for the prior withdrawal of the Pershing IIs and the ground-launched cruise missiles.

I think, in addition to the fact that they hadn't gained politically as they had thought they would through exploiting what had happened in 1983, was the fact that the President's Strategic Defense Initiative, which I gather Secretary of Defense Weinberger referred to in his remarks to you today, was catching hold and they began to get concerned about it. So I think it was those two reasons that made it possible to resume the talks.

So then we met with Mr. Gromyko, in January, to work out the ways and means of resuming the talks, and the outlines under which those talks should proceed. We'd done a good deal of work prior to the meeting in January with Gromyko, and worked out a consolidated program which we thought was the appropriate one for both our national defense and for arms control.

One of the considerations which we took into account when developing that position was the deterioration of the balance between the United

States and the Soviet Union with respect to offensive weapons which had occurred during the long period from 1972, when we negotiated the SALT I agreements, to the then present time.

The limitations on launchers in the SALT I and SALT II agreements had been lived up to by both the Russians and the United States, but despite that, the number of Soviet warheads increased four-fold. The ability of their forces to destroy hardened targets increased ten-fold. The point being that the limitations which we'd been able to get on offensive systems were really inadequate to do what we wanted to get done in the offensive field. We wanted a reduction in the risk of war through substantial reductions in the offensive military power of both sides and we hadn't been able to gain it.

Beyond that, we were concerned by what had happened with respect to the defensive systems. We'd negotiated the ABM Treaty back in 1972, and we thought, we'd hoped, that that would be effective due to the fact that we'd negotiated very careful constraints on the location and numbers of big phased array radars, which, in the technology of that day, were deemed to be essential to an ABM system.

Some years ago, we found that the Soviets were building one of those big radars in the middle of Siberia, in a location which was quite contrary to the restraints in the ABM Treaty. Not only that, but various other Soviet actions caused us to lose confidence in the reliability of the constraints in the ABM Treaty.

So we wanted to get two things done in the negotiations. One was to get deep reductions in offensive systems, and the other was to see to it that the erosion of the defensive regime provided by the ABM Treaty would be stopped and reversed. Further than that, the Soviets wanted to talk about space systems, and we also wanted to talk about space systems, particularly the inter-relationship of offense and defense.

We finally worked out on January 7th and 8th an agreement with the Soviets for the resumption of the negotiations in Geneva in March. During the first round of the negotiations, I think the whole process was very disappointing to us. The Soviets, in order to cover the fact that they'd reversed themselves and that they'd come back despite their earlier threats not to come back unless we had first removed the cruise missiles and the Pershing II's from Europe, insisted that these must be new negotiations. And in order to make them new they had to develop new positions in both the INF field and in the START field. These new positions were much less attractive than the positions they'd come to at the end of 1983.

They also refused to discuss really seriously with us our proposals with respect to INF and START, unless and until we accepted their proposal with respect to what they call "space strike arms." They insisted not only that we approve of a ban on such arms, but also that we agree to a ban on research with respect to such arms.

Long ago, the Soviets and we had agreed that it is impossible in an arms control agreement to control research and be sure you can monitor it, can verify that it is controlled. All this takes place in laboratories, and in people's minds. You can't have people mind reading every scientist in the country and looking into each laboratory in the country and being sure what people are doing in the laboratories. You just can't do it. So this has made it difficult during the first round.

Then Mr. Gorbachev did make one or two statements which indicated they would take a somewhat more forthcoming position in the second round, but

those have been very minor. There has been some movement forward from the very extreme backtracking positions which their delegation had taken in round one. However, we really don't have any real evidence which would give one confidence that it is possible to make more rapid progress than has been made so far in the various parts of these negotiations in Geneva.

But it is extremely important that we turn over every stone which would make progress possible, and certainly yesterday's decision of the President to be sure that we have gone the last bit in trying to improve the climate of the negotiations is pertinent to this point.

The Soviets have violated both SALT I and SALT II, and we have abided by both those agreements. The real problem was about to arise this fall, as to what we should do when the seventh Ohio-class submarine put to sea. Because then, if we were to continue to abide by the provisions of SALT I and SALT II, we should eliminate and dismantle one of our Poseidon submarines. And should we do this despite the fact that the Soviet Union had violated both of these agreements?

This was seriously debated, but the President decided that we would, in fact, dismantle that submarine this fall, in order to give more time for the Soviets to correct their performance with respect to the ABM Treaty and SALT I and SALT II, and also to improve the climate in the arms control negotiations in order to create further hope that we can make progress there.

At this point I think it would be better to turn to questions.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
with
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters

Q: I was hoping to ask this morning, in reference to the Strategic Defense Initiative, whether very much of that almost 4 billion dollars that was authorized has actually been committed? I've heard that only about 10 percent has been committed

A: I believe it's much more than that. It depends on what you mean by committed. I think the contracts have been signed with contractors. Now, how much of that has actually been spent is another matter. It always takes time for funds under a committed contract to be expended.

Q: Your prognosis for the issue on conventional arms seemed to be very optimistic that there are better chances for confidence building than for real arms control. I wonder if you might comment on what kind of future you see for that kind of measures?

A: With respect to what I'd said earlier about the prospects for the conventional type of arms control, I was talking about the evidence that we had from the positions that the Soviets had taken thus far. I perhaps should have added that it's really very hard to estimate what the Soviets are going to do in the future because they have frequently surprised us by making a radical change in their position without prior indications that they would make such a radical change.

I was referring largely to the evidence we had, rather than to the possibility that they might make a change.

But with respect to the main part of your question, and that is whether there is a better prospect for confidence-building measures than there is for these important measures which would really reduce the risk of war by a reduction of the armaments involved. On that one, of course, it is easier and more likely that we can make progress with respect to confidence-building measures than we can with respect to the really radical reductions in the offensive and the defensive elements of the problem.

I would say that's clear, but I would also say that one has accomplished less through confidence-building measures than if we could really achieve our objectives of achieving radical reductions in the meaningful offensive systems and a radical control over the defenses so that they would be parallel on both sides.

Q: We're talking about the possibility of radical change in Soviet actions. You once took a walk in the woods with your Soviet counterpart during the INF negotiations. Do you see the possibility of a personal relationship again developing for such progress?

A: I had been talking about the possibility of a radical change in Soviet actions, and the question asked, she referred to a time during the INF negotiations when I'd taken a walk in the woods with my opposite number, and the two of us had come up with a package for consideration by the two governments that we hoped would cut through the Gordian Knot and could result in an agreement. And the question was, do I see any prospect for a similar kind of a thing in the future.

My comments would be two-fold. In order to have such an operation where you try to work out something with somebody on the other side in a package form which might lead to a solution to a portion of our problem, one must ask whether that is a good idea and what are the pre-conditions for it being a good idea?

It can only work if the Politburo has come to a view that they really want an agreement within certain parameters. If you're sure that has happened, then you can try to work out something with one of your opposite numbers in a way which could then be considered by both governments, and I think it is a useful technique under those circumstances. But so far there is no indication that I know of that Mr. Gorbachev and his associates really are interested in an agreement which would be within the parameters of what we would see as being of interest to the West.

Q: You implied in your earlier remarks that SDI is what brought the Soviets back to the bargaining table, and implied in that is that the threat of the M-X didn't bring them back. If that's the case, we need your comments on whether we need M-X to help toward arms control.

A: The question at issue is whether or not SDI was the thing that brought them back to the table, and if so, why is it that we need M-X? Does that summarize it?

In the first place I did not say that SDI was the sole factor that brought them back. I said I thought that the first factor was their disappointment in not being able to exploit our deployments of the Pershing II's and the ground launched cruise missiles in Europe, to foster a breaking of our relations with the European countries--those relations strengthened during this period rather than being weakened. Then I added a point about SDI.

But the real objective of the game is not just to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table. The object of the game is to maintain an adequate level of deterrence. We don't want a war. Neither do we want to have our freedom taken away from us. If the objectives are both to avoid a war and to maintain our freedom, we do at all times have to maintain an adequate, credible, and reliable deterrent. And the reasons for deploying the M-X are that in the face of the very large increase in the Soviet prompt hard target kill capability, we don't want to be entirely naked in that field, and the M-X is essential to giving us some measure of power comparable to that of the SS-18s, 17s, and 19s.

It is true that what one wants in one's offensive forces is a degree of survivability, as well as power. But let's assume that we had just one Minuteman III, which was totally invisible and therefore wholly survivable, and that was opposite the entire panoply of Soviet offensive systems. It would be a totally inadequate deterrent. You need both adequate power and adequate survivability in order to have a reliable deterrent.

Q: This morning there was some suggestion about Soviet non-compliance with SALT II. I'd like to know your views on that position, and, in particular, I'd like to know the possibility of verification of Soviet compliance, particularly in light of the problems being encountered in the U.S. versus the Soviet arms negotiations.

A: I take it the substance of the question is whether or not there is any hope of our being able to work out procedures and cooperative measures with the Soviet Union which would make verifiability of an agreement a feasible operation.

It depends in part upon what the provisions of an agreement are. Certain things I think it is possible to verify with a high degree of confidence. We don't have any trouble counting, for instance, the number of large silos that they have for their SS-18s. Nor do we have that much difficulty in having confidence that we can count the number of SLBM tubes that they have. But when it comes to smaller things, when it comes to their mobile systems, then it is more difficult to have confidence that one can really count the number thereof.

But there is the possibility of cooperative measures, some of which they've agreed to in the past. They've agreed, for instance, not to finish the installation of their launching tubes into their submarines except in the open. They won't do it under sheds where you couldn't see what was going on, and we, the same, have agreed to that. Also the provisions for seeing to it that the dismantlement of submarines is confidently verified have been agreed by both sides.

So it is conceivable that you could work out cooperative measures which would extend the range of provisions on which one could have reasonable confidence in verifying whether they're abided by or not.

Q: In the event that SDI produces a defensive system that's survivable, feasible, and cost-effective, by what measures do you perceive us making the transition to a defense-dominated strategy without disrupting the stable deterrent?

A: Let us suppose that the Soviet Union were prepared to cooperate with us in developing a program to achieve those results. And you wanted to have a series of phases, at the end of each one of which the security of both the United States and its allies and of the USSR would be better than it is today, and better than one could expect it to be under any alternative course. Let's say that that was the object of what both sides were trying to achieve. Let us further assume that the effective and cost effective defensive systems have been proven out and are available. Then I think it would be possible to work out a phased program of the concurrent reduction of the more destabilizing offensive systems and the introduction of new defensive systems on both sides so that it would meet the criterion of improved stability, improved security of both sides, at each phase of that transition process.

Now of course underlying that is the question of will the Soviets come to the conclusion that that is the preferred course for them as well as for us? That is a more difficult question to answer, but they do seem to be concerned about SDI. It would seem to me this is one way in which they could relieve that concern. It would, however, end up with a situation of improved stability, a decrease in the risk of war, and a decrease in the political effect which their one-sided superiority and offensive capabilities and their sole ability in defensive systems today gives them. So it would be a shift toward balance and security rather than from a position of growing insecurity due to Soviet offensive and defensive superiority.

Q: Senators Nunn and Warner introduced legislation to establish a permanent joint command center. Would you prefer such a center, and if so why?

A: I think a lot of work has to be done before one can be sure that it would in fact make the contribution that Senators Nunn and Warner hope that it will make. My experience with the Russians is that they are very unapt to let any agent of theirs, anybody subject to their discipline, make any decisions without guidance from Moscow. That certainly is true of the Standing Consultative Commission. They've insisted that their representatives on the Standing Consultative Commission cannot utter a word which hasn't been cleared in advance with Moscow. Of course that is almost as true of our representatives on the Standing Consultative Commission. That is the nature of the way in which these two governments today operate. You operate under instructions from your capitals.

I'm afraid that that would also be true with respect to such a joint command center. I doubt very much whether they would delegate to their people in that command center much freedom of action. But I might be wrong about it. I'm just raising the questions that are in my mind.

Q: It's generally conceded that the people of the Soviet Union are given a rather distorted view of United States culture and so forth from their leadership. Does the Soviet leadership, and also their negotiators, have a true view of what we are and what our real goals and intentions are, or do they too have a distorted view of what we really intend to do and be.

A: Inherently there is a difficulty for us to thoroughly understand the Russians, and even more difficulty in our thoroughly understanding people who are high up in the Communist Party. Their mentality is different than our mentality. One really has to work at it to be sure that one has gotten all the nuances of the things that motivate them and make them tick. They also have difficulty in understanding us.

I used to talk at length with my opposite number, Mr. Kvitsinskiy about American politics, and he was absolutely persuaded and could not be dissuaded from the idea that some place in the United States there was some small group of secret advisors who were nominating and getting elected the various presidents, one after another, and were masterminding the appointments of all the senior officials, and were guiding, from behind the scenes the creation of U.S. policies, and Kvitsinskiy happened to believe that I was a member of that gray group.

I gave him a detailed book about the rise of Huey Long, and I hoped he would read it, and he would see through it that that evolution of the political scene in Louisiana was from the grass roots up, and it had nothing to do with any gray group of Wall Street people, or so forth and so on. It was a thoroughly indigenous development. He would not believe me, that politics of the United States came from various states and from the communities within those states, and that these influences came up, and there was nobody in the Republican National Committee or the Democratic National Committee who could do a thing about it--he just wouldn't believe it.

So there isn't complete understanding, but you do your best to get there. There are some of them that are much more understanding than others.

Q: I'd like to return to the issue of verification measures. You stated during your talk that a research program, such as the SDI is at this stage, is non-verifiable, and implied that the Soviets thought otherwise. However, in the January agreements worked out with the Soviets, there was a certain degree of allowance for progress, and for one aspect of the negotiations to affect progress in all other aspects of the negotiations. If in the American position there is no room for progress on this issue, how is it possible that the negotiations will continue on the other issues?

A: During our discussions in January of this year with Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Gromyko did not say that he thought that research was verifiable. What he did say was that if there were a ban on space weapons, then it would be inconsistent for either side to conduct research with respect to the development of such banned systems. That, however, is not the position that their negotiators are taking today. Their negotiators are saying that there must be a ban on research per se.

Now, you ask what is there to talk about in the event we are not prepared to talk about a ban on research. There is a great deal to talk about. As I said earlier, we would welcome, we wish, and we've offered, to enter into a discussion with the Soviet Union on how new defensive systems might be incorporated into the forces of both sides, were their research to be successful, or were our research to be successful. This could well take a good deal of negotiation and discussion as to how this phased approach that I was outlining could, in fact, prevent an arms race in space and result in a cooperative management of the introduction of such forces into the forces of both sides.

DR. KORB: Thank you very much. We appreciate it. I don't know of anybody who could have given a more conceptual and insightful talk at the same time. We're very much in your debt, and the country is very much in your debt.

Paul Henry Nitze
Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters

On December 5, 1984, Paul Henry Nitze was asked to serve as a Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters. Ambassador Nitze had been head of the United States Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations with the Soviet Union, which convened on November 30, 1981, in Geneva, Switzerland.

During the preceding seven years, Mr. Nitze was a consultant on defense policy and international relations to various government departments and private industry firms. He was also Chairman of the Advisory Council of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; a Director on the Boards of Aspen Skiing Corporation, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, Schroders, Inc., American Security and Trust Company, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, and the Atlantic Council of the United States; Trustee Emeritus of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies and the George C. Marshall Research Foundation; and Chairman of Policy Studies, Committee on the Present Danger.

In the spring of 1969, Mr. Nitze was appointed representative of the Secretary of Defense to the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union, a position he held until June 1974, at which time he resigned.

Mr. Nitze resigned from his duties as Deputy Secretary of Defense on January 20, 1969, a position he had held since July 1, 1967, succeeding Cyrus R. Vance.

Mr. Nitze was serving as 57th Secretary of the Navy when he was nominated by the late President Lyndon B. Johnson on June 10, 1967 to become Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was confirmed by the United States Senate on June 29, 1967.

The late President John F. Kennedy nominated Mr. Nitze to be Secretary of the Navy on October 14, 1963. At that time he was serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), having assumed that position on January 29, 1961. He began his duties as Secretary of the Navy on November 29, 1963.

Graduated cum laude in 1928 from Harvard University, Mr. Nitze subsequently joined the New York investment banking firm of Dillon Read and Company. In 1941, he left his position as Vice President of that firm to become Financial Director of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

From 1942-1943, he was Chief of the Metals and Minerals Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare, until named as Director of Foreign Procurement and Development for the Foreign Economic Administration.

During the period 1944-1946 Mr. Nitze was Vice Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. He was awarded the Medal of Merit by President Truman for service to the Nation in this capacity.

Mr. Nitze served with the Department of State for the next seven years, beginning in the position of Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade Policy. In 1948, he was named Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. In August 1949 he became Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and Director the following year.

Mr. Nitze left the Federal Government in 1953 to become President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation in Washington, D.C., a position he held until January 1961.

Born in Amherst, Massachusetts, on January 16, 1907, Mr. Nitze is married to the former Phyllis Pratt and has four children -- Heidi, Peter, William, and Anina. Mr. Nitze maintains his legal residence in Washington, D.C., and has a residence in Bel Alton, Maryland.



HONORABLE RICHARD L. ARMITAGE
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

ASIA: THE CHALLENGES TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

It's quite a pleasure and a thrill for me to be able to talk about Asia.

My fiefdom now in the Defense Department, as it were, extends to all the countries outside of Europe, but, professionally and personally, I get my greatest joy and my greatest pleasure by following Asian events and participating in Asian policy development. As a matter of fact, I don't know if the Secretary of Defense mentioned it this morning, but we have one of our favorite Asian visitors in the Pentagon yesterday and today, the Minister of Defense for Japan. It's my view there is no more important relationship in the world than the relationship we now enjoy with Japan.

As I've traveled around giving speeches, and observe speakers from other countries, I've noticed that speakers exhibit national traits as they begin speaking. The Soviets, for instance, occasionally begin their speech with bluster, and almost invariably with threats. The Japanese might begin their speech with an apology. And Americans very often begin their speeches with a joke, or try to exhibit some humor. I like jokes as much as the next person, but I think I'd like to tell a story with a point before I get into my prepared remarks. I hope that you'll keep this story in mind as you then ask me questions following the prepared text.

If you will travel with me to St. Peter's Square in Rome, and picture the Pope in the middle of a tremendous rainstorm. The water is swirling up above his ankles and the rain shows no sign of abating. A rowboat comes by, and the fellow in the boat says, "Holy Father, hop in quickly, we'll save you." The Pontiff says, "No, no my child. Go ahead. Heaven will provide." So the boat goes on.

The next time we see the Holy Father, the rain is still coming down, but the water level has risen to his waist. A motor boat comes by and says, "Pontiff, hop in and we'll save you." "No, no my child. Heaven will provide. Go ahead." And the motor boat speeds off.

The next time we see the Holy Father, the water is right up to his chin, and he's holding his head like this on his tip toes and a helicopter is overhead. There's a fellow up there paying out a line to him saying, "Your Holiness, grab hold of the line and we'll pull you up and save you." He says, "No, no. Go ahead. Heaven will provide."

Well, the rain continued, and the Pontiff died. The next time you see him, he's coming in, meeting St. Peter at the Pearly Gates, and he's mad as can be, soaking wet, and he says, "Peter, I had faith and you didn't save me." And Peter just shook his head and said, "Poor man, we sent two boats and a helicopter for you."

So the point I want to make is it's not enough just to have faith in your policies, you have to reach out and take advantage of every single opportunity to improve your position and to improve your policies.

An officer of one of the armed forces of one of our Asian allies recently asked, "How can we rely on the United States treaty commitment?" Many believe that when challenged, the United States will do only what is in its own interest. The question was addressed to one of my staff officers,

who responded as follows, "Your statement is absolutely correct, and that constitutes the best assurance possible that the United States will honor its treaty commitments to your country." U.S. political and economic interests compel us to share with other nations of the region an interest in maintaining the security of East Asia and the Pacific. That shared interest, I will submit, is reflected in five mutual security treaties which ally us with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. U.S. national security is now interdependent with that of our Asian allies and strongly affected by that of other Asian nations with whom we have no treaties.

To understand why U.S. security is interdependent with that of nations of East Asia, we need to begin with a few facts. These are illustrative facts, rather than an exhaustive list of U.S. interests in Asia.

U.S. trade with Japan is the largest sea-borne trade relationship in human history. Japan is second only to Canada in total trade with the United States. Japan is an important worldwide aid donor, and an increasingly important participant in allied consultations and combined actions. If Japan were to disappear tomorrow, every single American household would be affected.

The Republic of Korea is an important trading partner. Indeed, a nation to which we are bound with ties of shared sacrifice, and a place in which renewed conflict would fundamentally alter existing relationships among the four great powers of the region, to the severe detriment of regional security, obviously.

Our fifth largest trading partner is ASEAN, that is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations--Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and most recently Brunei. The total trade with ASEAN is exceeded only by Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Oil tankers from the Persian Gulf transit the strategic straits of Southeast Asia to supply 75% of Korea's and 65% of Japan's energy needs. Over 4,000 ships of all nations pass through the Strait of Malacca each month, well over 130 per day.

The American way of life, the condition of our economy, and, indeed, the strength of our diplomacy would be fundamentally degraded if these key nations were to succumb to external military coercion or if the sea lanes which join us were to somehow become insecure.

Similarly, Australia's and New Zealand's security and well being are inter-linked with the security of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, and of their trading partners in Northeast Asia. Historically, our ANZUS allies have taken a global view of their security, and were always among the stalwart when tyranny threatened.

It is in Asia that the interests of the four greatest powers of the world overlap, and not always has this overlap happened without friction. The dangers of conflagration are heightened by the fact that among the region's nations are those with the world's six largest armed forces. Those are the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, India, North Korea, and the United States. I think it's illustrative to note that five of those six nations have been at war within the last 12 years, and some would submit that the sixth, North Korea, is in a perpetual state of war.

The Soviet Union continues to increase and improve its military posture in Asia. Most significant have been recent improvements in Soviet power projection capabilities. The Soviet forward base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, is now the largest overseas locus of Soviet forces. North Korean forces

remain poised north of the Korean demilitarized zone, even while tentative talks are taking place. Vietnam continues its oppressive colonialist occupation of Cambodia, and even today threatens Thailand.

U.S. strategy in the Pacific is based on forward deployed ground and air forces and a strong naval presence. U.S. military presence in the western Pacific is the key to maintaining confidence of the nations in the region in the face of these growing threats. Confidence in our collective capability to deal with these threats undergirds the will of peace-loving nations to develop needed military capabilities. Together, will and capability yield deterrence, that hoped for condition toward which we strive, and which we hope some day will make unnecessary the use of military force.

The importance to our strategic posture of having the use of facilities at overseas bases adds further to the importance to us of the security of countries like Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. Our strategy of forward deployment also increases the importance of port access and rights of free transit of American warships, and, indeed, lends strategic importance to the U.S. territory in the western Pacific.

Some Americans, especially those on the east coast, don't usually think of the United States as a western Pacific nation, but it is a fact that the United States territory extends well beyond Hawaii. The Aleutian Islands, part of the state of Alaska, span the northern Pacific. U.S. territories include Guam in the western Pacific--3,300 miles west of Hawaii, due south of Hokkaido, Japan, and American Samoa in the south Pacific--2,300 miles south of Hawaii, near Tonga and Fiji.

When the U.S. trusteeship of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands ends, hopefully with Congressional consent this year, the Northern Marianas will become a commonwealth of the United States. The Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and hopefully Palau, will become freely associated states for whom the United States remains responsible for defense. The doorstep to the United States is now over 5,000 miles west of San Francisco's golden gate.

These facts clearly show that the national security of the United States is indeed interdependent with that of the nations of East Asia and the Pacific, as is theirs with one another. We have to take a look at how we're doing.

As we survey the world today, the East Asia area would stand out, I believe, as an oasis of relative security and peaceful progress for the interests of the United States and of its friends and allies. The future appears bright for the dynamic and hopeful countries of the region. Stronger economies and generally more stable governments and diplomatic successes have all bred new confidence--and greater roles in the arena of world politics--for the nations of East Asia.

China's decision in the 1970's to pursue its modernization goals as a responsible member of the international system has made it possible for us to seek an enduring, friendly relationship with Beijing. Such a relationship, however, is not an alliance, but is a relationship which recognizes both our common interests and our differences, and will enable us to participate and to assist each other in complementary actions when our common interests are challenged. The United States, for our part, wants to contribute in a responsible way to China's modernization, including the modernization of selected Chinese defensive military capabilities, in the belief that a secure and modernizing China can be a force for peace and stability in the region.

But there are serious challenges to the security of East Asia, and thereby to the national security of the United States. Among the most obvious challenges are the military threats posed by the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam--threats from outside that group of nations which compose the greater and the vibrant part of the region. But there are also threats from the inside which could erode or could fragment our ability to face the external challenges.

The Soviet Union has taken bold steps over the past 20 years to improve its military capabilities and expand its influence throughout Asia. And it is our expectation that these improvements, these developments, will continue. Soviet ground forces east of the Urals, including those on the Sino-Soviet border, include 53 well equipped divisions. One fourth of the Soviet Union's tactical aircraft are assigned to the Far East theater, including third generation interceptors and fighter bombers. A portion of the Soviet bomber force, including Backfire bombers, supports operations in the Far East. As I said, we expect this modernization of the air and the ground forces to continue.

But the U.S. is especially concerned over the significant growth and modernization of the Soviet Pacific fleet. It is the largest of the Soviet Union's four fleets. It has roughly one-third of all Soviet submarines, a quarter of all principal surface combatants, and one-third of its naval aircraft are in this fleet. Far and away, the most dramatic military development of recent years has been the destabilizing increase in Soviet offensive power in the region. This decade is seeing a buildup of power projection capability clearly aimed at the United States and its regional friends and allies.

The Backfire bombers of the Soviet navy can operate over the sea lanes as far south as the Philippines. The 1985 edition of Soviet Military Power shows Soviet SS-20 missiles capable of attacking targets as far east as Alaska, and as far south as mainland Southeast Asia and the northern Philippines. Additional strategic missile submarines, capable of striking any target in the region without leaving home port, have been deployed to the Pacific during the last three years, as have more of the most modern Soviet surface combatants and attack submarines.

The port and the airfield facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam form a significant element of Soviet power projection capabilities and an important forward base for deployed Soviet naval forces. On any given day, up to 30 Soviet ships, to include submarines, operate in the area, compared to an average of five to eight naval units in 1979. About 20 strike and reconnaissance aircraft, the Badger or the Bear models, are now at the airfield at Cam Ranh Bay, supported by a recently deployed squadron of all weather MIG-23 Flogger aircraft. These aircraft provide the Soviets the capability to interdict vital sea lanes and communications throughout Southeast Asia between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.

The threat in being with these military forces at Cam Ranh Bay is obvious, but so too is the political message, and that is that the Soviets are intending to stay in the region. It also illustrates the extent to which the Vietnamese have mortgaged what they say they fought so hard to attain--territorial and political independence. It's one of those ironies of history that the most quoted statement of Ho Chi Minh was that "There is nothing more precious than freedom and independence," and yet the Vietnamese have ceded away that freedom and independence to the Soviets.

We view the Soviet threat as the most dangerous, in the Pacific and elsewhere, but it isn't the only menace to East Asian security. Tensions on the Korean peninsula remain high, and far to the south, a Soviet-supported

Vietnam continues to threaten the peace in Southeast Asia. In North Korea, an unrelenting buildup of offensively postured military forces continues. With the Rangoon bombing atrocity still fresh in our memories, we cannot be sure of the true intent of the rulers of that grim and closed society. It would be foolhardy, in light of the past, to accept North Korean gestures at face value. Nevertheless, we and our Republic of Korea allies are cautiously exploring North Korean willingness to negotiate seriously.

Now it could be that Pyongyang, North Korea, is carefully seeking to stabilize its security situation so that it can concentrate on internal economic development with help from increased western trade. If so, North Korea will hopefully discover that the prospects for western trade will remain very limited until there are concrete steps undertaken to reduce tensions on the peninsula. But, given its habits and its paranoia, and despite the ongoing talks, North Korea will probably continue its drive for military supremacy and its search for opportunities to accomplish unification on its own terms. Should the North abandon its goal of reunification by force, gradual implementation of measures to build confidence would still be required to overcome the mutual hostility and suspicion between the two Koreas. Meanwhile it is essential that we and our Republic of Korea allies keep up our guard; the need for U.S. and Republic of Korea solidarity and a credible military deterrent will remain for quite some time. We've given the Koreans our strongest assurances at the highest levels, to include the President, that America's commitment will remain firm.

Now in Vietnam, Soviet aid bolsters one of the largest armies in the world, an army of well over one million. Vietnamese refugees continue to flee the tyranny which grips their homeland, posing a major humanitarian burden to Vietnam's neighbors and the international community. About 160,000 Vietnamese troops, almost as many soldiers as Thailand has in its entire army, occupy Cambodia and today threaten Thailand. No reduction of that force is in sight. The Soviets furnish the Vietnamese aid estimated at more than a billion dollars a year to assure Moscow's foothold in Southeast Asia. That aid is what enables Hanoi to continue its occupation of Cambodia.

Vietnam has scored some dry season battlefield successes recently against resistance bases on the Thai-Cambodian border. Still, the non-communist Khmer forces remain intact, with high morale and determination to persevere. The non-communist resistance offers hope for the Khmer people that they need not forever endure the rigid dictates of the Vietnamese-installed puppet government, nor suffer the return of the abhorrent Pol Pot regime. The Vietnamese have found the seeds of Khmer nationalism increasingly difficult to eradicate. For our part, we bear the Vietnamese people no ill will nor implacable hostility. But we can never condone the policies of expansionism and colonialism as practiced by Vietnam against a weaker neighbor. It is tragic to witness a former French colony turn around and pursue those same policies against which she so ardently struggled. It's again, another one of those ironies of history that a Vietnam which fought a guerilla conflict so ably against the traditional military force from the U.S. and the South Vietnamese, now finds herself bogged down in a mirror image of that previous Indo-China conflict.

One of the pillars of our own defense policy in East Asia is our support for the political and the economic vitality of ASEAN, and, bilaterally, for the self defense efforts of its members. As ASEAN's front line state and an important U.S. ally, Thailand deserves and receives our assistance in improving its ability to defend its borders against this Vietnamese aggression. The Thai armed forces are performing credibly against the

Vietnamese incursions into Thailand. Vietnam continues its attacks against resistance bases near the border. It is our intention at present to continue our strong support for Thailand's efforts to improve its own military capability, and the commitment to the security and territorial integrity of Thailand remains firm. This was recently reiterated in a letter from President Reagan to Prime Minister Prim of Thailand.

The President recently ordered expedited a shipment of U.S. military equipment and supplies to Thailand. Included were vehicles, artillery, and other priority items needed to strength the Royal Thai armed forces. We have held, recently, discussions to explore ways to further strengthen an already growing logistics relationship between our two countries.

These logistics initiatives are an appropriate type and level of support at this time for our front line ally, given the current nature of the threat. They help strengthen Thailand's ability to defend itself. They also have the advantage of enhancing the ability of Thai forces to operate with those of the United States should that ever prove necessary.

There is one other serious issue which we have with the Vietnamese and with the Lao. Because of its humanitarian nature, we regard it as separate and distinct from security issues. That is our abiding dedication to obtain the fullest possible accounting for the nearly 2,500 Americans still missing from the Vietnam War. Recent Vietnamese agreements to have more frequent technical meetings and Lao cooperation in the excavation of a crash site are harbingers, we hope, of a more cooperative government to government effort with those countries on this issue of highest national priority.

As I've mentioned, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam, pose growing threats to our vital Asian and Pacific interests and to those of our friends and of our allies. But the United States by itself cannot halt Soviet global expansionism or its regional manifestations in Asia or elsewhere. In the common defense against the growing threats to our security and freedom, our allies and friends are more important than ever. The Soviets can only bluster and glower when confronted by stable nations who are confident in the deterrence provided by their own defense efforts, backed by a reliable American commitment and reliable American military presence. Their otherwise intimidating military power affords the Soviets little political influence outside of Hanoi and Pyongyang. If we are to keep it that way, however, we must recognize that challenges to our ability to act in concert with like-minded nations of the region can be as significant as the magnitude of the external threat.

One such challenge is the threat of internal instability facing some of the region's countries. Economic growth has not always been matched with development of political institutions. Where institutions for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power have not been developed, the prospects of domestic instability increase. Additionally, ethnic, religious, and communal tensions exist in many of the countries of East Asia as potential sources of instability.

The greatest current threat, and, indeed, to my mind, the biggest problem and challenge the United States faces, is the challenge currently presented by the situation in the Philippines. We are increasingly concerned over the deterioration of Philippine economic and security conditions. Political violence, criminal lawlessness, and severe economic dislocations challenge the public order. In particular, the rapidly growing communist insurgency presents a serious threat for the Filipino government and to the health and future of the nation.

We have historically close ties and shared values with the Filipino people. We recognize the importance of the Philippines to regional stability. Our concern for the Philippine situation stems from both those reasons. This is not to deny that we have a compelling need for access to the air and naval facilities at Philippine bases, but we believe just as strongly that the Filipino people deserve much better than the triumph of a communist insurgency, and certainly much better than the continuation of the economic, the social, the political, and indeed the military abuses, which are fueling that insurgency.

Let me speak briefly to the issue of the Philippine bases. It is a fact that those facilities remain critically important to our strategy of forward deployed forces in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean. But that strategy serves more than just American interests. It is important for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region as a whole. Therefore, our use of the base facilities is a mutual security issue, not simply a real estate deal. It is in the Philippine interest, as well as ours, and in the interest of the other nations under ASEAN, that we have our forces there.

With regard to the insurgency, it is our belief that the Philippine government now recognizes the seriousness of the threat it faces. We are somewhat heartened by a new willingness to respond in a positive manner to problems which beset the country. Recent government initiatives in military, political, and economic reform, if diligently executed, hold the promise of progress in the restoration of democratic institutions, revival of the economy, the reinstitution of discipline in the military, and the reduction of domestic violence. But it is absolutely essential that the Philippine government make dramatic and comprehensive efforts that Filipinos can easily recognize as being responsive to their needs and to the conditions of the day, else this destabilizing spiral will continue.

An effective counter-insurgency effort must involve the entire Philippine government in a coordinated program of political, social, and economic measures. It is essential, however, that these programs be protected against the intimidation and the terrorism of the communist New People's Army. Even the most effective political reforms, the most humane social programs, and the most far-reaching economic projects will fail if they fall prey to an unrelenting and virulent insurgency. For our part we shall encourage and assist as appropriate the needed political, social, economic, and indeed military measures necessary to protect them.

The armed forces of the Philippines benefit from a solid cadre of loyal, professional officers who, we believe, are capable of correcting the internal problems of the military, reestablishing discipline, and aggressively pursuing a successful counter-insurgency program. We are heartened by the courage of reform-minded military officers who have called on their leaders to restore professionalism and refurbish the image of the armed forces among the Philippine people. We applaud the willingness of the leaders of the Philippines to listen seriously to this self-critique. In the end, it will be the ability of the Philippine government to heal itself which will determine its survival. We can help, but in no way can we make it happen.

Sometime ago, saloons in San Francisco used to put out sandwich makings at no charge for their noon-time customers. Of course they paid for it by upping the price of the beer or the whiskey, or watering the drinks, or perhaps both. And this led many a tippler to observe that "there ain't no such thing as a free lunch." Likewise in matters of national security and world peace there's no free lunch, and it is no service to our friends and to our allies to imply that there might be. We intend to do our part, but

we look to those most directly affected to carry a major share of the burden for local defense and counter insurgency, and we look to our allies to assist and certainly not to impede our own efforts to maintain a stable, world-wide deterrent.

When we look at the current challenge to our ANZUS alliance with Australia and New Zealand, that discovery of the saloon customers again comes to mind. Truncated and one way security relationships are not appropriate among developed nations who share a common and growing threat. Since that threat is world wide, we must all be global in our focus, even if some countries appropriately remain regional in their contributions to that common effort. Alliance partnership requires a willingness to accept one's share of the risk in maintaining that world-wide fabric of deterrence upon which our security against the greatest threat of all, nuclear war, is based.

Deterrence has worked for almost 40 years, but we dare not take it for granted. The effectiveness of American deterrent forces depends, in part, on the Soviets remaining unable to know for sure which U.S. ships and aircraft are carrying nuclear weapons at any given time. Therefore, we will neither confirm nor deny whether a particular vessel is carrying nuclear weapons. It is our expectation that alliance partners will accept whatever increment of risk is associated with honoring that policy for visiting U.S. ships and aircraft.

That issue of ship visits, which now troubles our relationship with New Zealand, must be seen in that context. The government of New Zealand has, in effect, asked the United States to compromise the policy of neither confirming nor denying the carriage of nuclear weapons by asking for visits only from ships New Zealand can be sure do not carry nuclear weapons. We will not compromise this policy, as the government of New Zealand well knows.

Therefore, the New Zealand policy effectively bans all U.S. naval ship visits. It is this failure to share fully the burdens of an alliance partnership that makes it inappropriate for New Zealand to continue to share the benefits of the special relationship which has developed through our ANZUS cooperation. The United States deeply regrets this degradation of ANZUS and the impact that New Zealand's access denial has on other aspects of our defense relationship. We continue to believe that full participation by New Zealand in ANZUS is important to the security of the United States, to the security of Australia, and indeed to the security of New Zealand.

But the government of New Zealand has altered its operational participation in ANZUS, and frankly speaking, preservation of the effectiveness of our world-wide deterrent is much more important to international security than a half-hearted New Zealand participation. We consider New Zealand as a friend, but a friend that is not performing at present as a good ally. Unfettered port access goes to the core of an alliance like ANZUS, which exists in a maritime environment.

We more than understand the abhorrence of a free and democratic people to the unspeakable horror of nuclear war. We Americans share it. It is our most earnest hope that through negotiations we can bring about real reductions in nuclear arms, and, through research, a day when offensive nuclear weapons will become obsolete. But in the meantime, that which protects mankind from the horrors of nuclear war is deterrence, and deterrence, like freedom, is not free.

There are a few other challenges. Economic negativism and protectionism by the United States and Japan could indeed sour relations between both

countries and Korea, the ASEAN nations, and other Asian friends and allies. Focused on one another, protectionism could trigger political backlash damaging to our essential political and security relationships. The failure of an increasingly prosperous Japan to assume greater defense responsibilities would inevitably make defense a more controversial issue in U.S.-Japan relations.

How China is incorporated into the Pacific Basin trade picture will be extraordinarily important. Further progress in normalization of China's relations with her neighbors, a challenge of great significance to regional security, will be heavily dependent on China's own ability to convince her neighbors that she will not again become a threat to their security.

But on balance, I report today that I am optimistic about the future of the dynamic countries of Asia. But we must work hard to assure that future. A dynamic and forward-looking part of Asia is a rich garden, a garden of vitality and vision. It's a garden of prosperity and progress. It's a garden of diversity and dedication, and a garden--right now--of peace and plenty. But, like any garden, it requires constant care. We must keep divisive issues from becoming weeds which put down roots, and like any confident and alert gardener, we must maintain our vigil to keep out the thieves and the pests.

With that, I'll be more than happy to take your questions.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
with
Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

Q: Should our position in the Philippines really seriously erode, what are the implications for Guam and our other possessions in the western Pacific?

A: The implications for Guam and other islands in the western Pacific are enormous. In fact, Guam, along with the Northern Marianas and Tinian, represent our fall-back position, and give us at least some protection against being totally eliminated from the region.

I've spoken to this in front of Congress. This is one of the questions that Congress quite often asks. They want to know exactly what our fall-back positions are, and I enumerate these for the Congressional members, but I always have to point out that although we have fall-back positions, these will be enormously expensive to us just in sunk costs, not to mention the labor cost, which in Guam and other places would be extraordinarily high. But, at no single location could we have the benefits we enjoy in the Philippines. It is in largest measure to our benefit and to our allies and friends in the Northwest Pacific, and indeed all the way down to the Indian Ocean, that we maintain our ability to use Philippine facilities. But I can't paint a very rosy picture for you today.

Q: I was interested in your comments about New Zealand and wanted to know if you could expand a little bit on what we are doing right now to try to rectify that situation, and what the prospects are for the future on ANZUS?

A: I'll answer the second part first, if I may. The prospects are dim for the near future. Before I answer the first part, I think I'd like to lay a backdrop about our decision concerning New Zealand. First of all, we have enormous regard for the ability of any free and democratic nation to make a choice. Any sovereign nation has the absolute right to make a choice, and this New Zealand has done. Second of all, I pointed out our firm need for a neither confirm nor deny policy on nuclear weapons. Third of all, that our ability to live up to our own security responsibilities regarding ANZUS is directly tied to our ability to work with Australia and New Zealand forces, and also to have port access, so our response has to be seen with that backdrop.

We've engaged in enormous amounts of discussion with New Zealand, and in particular the Labor party, which is the party in power in New Zealand, and I cannot report that we've had much success. They've drawn their line, we've drawn ours. It's important to note, I think, that we have tried very carefully and scrupulously to keep our own response simply in a military vein, and not to let it get into our trade relationships or our political relationships or anything of that nature.

New Zealand altered the operational aspect of a military alliance, and our own response, while it is not totally and completely to cut New Zealand out of all military things, recognizes that since we're unable to call at New Zealand ports and air fields, we're unable to cooperate with them in the same ways as in the past. But we have kept our response totally in a military vein.

I frankly think that we're a long way away from reaching a resolution to this. Our neither confirm nor deny policy is more important, frankly, than access to New Zealand ports. And I don't know that any subsequent government, should this present government go out of power at some future date, could actually turn back the clock. I don't think things will ever be exactly the way they were a year ago. This is not something I welcome, I just have to tell you frankly I think that's the case.

So the prospects are gloomy. We continue our talks both here in Washington, and hopefully we'll be having some visitors from New Zealand in the not too distant future, and indeed in Wellington. But I have again, no rosy picture to paint for you.

Q: I'd like to ask you to comment on any steps the United States might be taking to prevent Pakistan from developing a nuclear weapon. In light of the fact we know India already has a peaceful nuclear explosive, what steps can we be taking with the Pakistani regime?

A: You've taken great liberties with East Asia by slipping us over into South Asia, but I'll field the question anyway.

We have had enormous amounts of discussions with the Pakistanis concerning the development of a nuclear weapon. The non-proliferation principles of the Reagan Administration are quite firm. And one of the ways, in addition to a lot of talk, we can impress this upon different friends, or allies even, who have in the back of their minds the wish to develop a nuclear weapon, is by control of exports. We look very carefully at exports which might have a nuclear capability, and we do this in concert with our allies, we might mention. Pakistan is not the only country who has some aspirations in this regard.

I'm sure, frankly, we'll be hearing a little more about that starting tomorrow with Prime Minister Gandhi's visit.

Q: Japan is concentrating its efforts on consumer goods and doing very well at it, and adding to our trade deficit. Also the companies, with the government, are bidding on a lot of industrial development, and doing quite well at that. In the meantime, we're committing our brightest and best to a lot of military buildup because we're defending them, and we're losing a lot of jobs because of obvious reasons, not only to Japan, China, Taiwan. What do you foresee as a more equitable way for a quid pro quo for us to defend them now, which is ironical, in return for maybe some trade concessions or other?

A: I'll be glad to answer the question. I would submit that our defense, with Japan, of Japan, is in our own interest, first of all. Second, we of the Defense Department have a strong desire to separate trade from defense issues, because if the balance of trade was more favorable this would not in any way obviate the need for Japan to do more on the defense issue. But having said those two things up front, I'll address the question.

We know what appropriate roles and missions for Japan are. Their Prime Minister has agreed with us. Secretary Weinberger first began these discussions with the Japanese in 1981, and subsequently there was a cabinet decision accepting roles and missions. The roles that Japan carved out for themselves, and we felt were most appropriate, were the defense not only of the home island of Japan, and the seas and skies above it, but the sea lanes that run south for the distance of a thousand miles.

The key now is to get Japan with the proper amount of forces, and properly equipped forces, to perform that role. She cannot do it today.

As I mentioned, the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency is in today, and we have listened to Japan's plans for the next five years, a plan which goes from 1986 to 1990, and I'm quite heartened by the procurement plans of the Japan Defense Agency. But ultimately, it will take budget decisions by the government, and we'll see toward the end of this year how serious the Japanese are about it when they make their budget decision.

Q: Back to Pakistan, since the ascendancy of Gorbachev, there apparently has been an increase in military excursions into Pakistan by the Soviet Union. How grave is the situation and would the United States really come to the aid of Pakistan?

A: First of all, since the ascent of Gorbachev there has been an increase of military actions against Pakistan in Pakistan territory. The question of who's driving the airplanes is still one that's problematical. It could very well be their Afghan army puppets.

You're absolutely right, there's been a rather dramatic increase in cross-border bombings, killings of civilians, bombing of buildings, and an attempt in our view to intimidate Pakistan, perhaps, in the largest measure, related to Pakistan's humanitarian efforts in support of the families of the freedom fighters.

The United States will assist as appropriate in an air defense mode. I do not see, right now, the deployment of U.S. troops or anything of that nature, but it is appropriate for us, under our security assistance policy, to try to assist Pakistan to get at the heart of the problem which exists today, and that is the cross-border forays by aircraft, and we're engaged in discussions with Pakistan on just that issue.

DR. KORB: Thank you very much.

Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

Richard L. Armitage was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on June 9, 1983.

Mr. Armitage was born April 26, 1945, in Boston, Massachusetts. He attended high school in Atlanta, Georgia, before entering the U.S. Naval Academy. Upon graduation from the Naval Academy in 1967, he earned a B.S. degree in Engineering and was commissioned Ensign in the United States Navy. Mr. Armitage was initially assigned to a U.S. Navy destroyer engaged in operations off the coast of Vietnam; he subsequently served three in-country tours in Vietnam, including two tours as an ambush team/CI advisor and one as senior advisor to a 20 boat river patrol unit in Tay Ninh. He was also a senior counterinsurgency instructor at the Naval Amphibious School, Coronado, California.

Mr. Armitage resigned from the Navy in 1973 to accept a position with the U.S. Defense Attache' Office in Saigon, where he served in an advisory capacity with the Vietnamese Navy, Marine Corps, and Airborne units. Immediately prior to the fall of Saigon, he was dispatched to the Republic of Vietnam to effect the removal of people and assets. In May 1975, he returned to the Pentagon as a consultant, and subsequently served in Tehran on the staff of the U.S. Defense Representative, Iran. From 1976 to 1978, he pursued business interests in Southeast Asia. In March 1978, he became Administrative Assistant to Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, a position he left in May 1979 to establish a Washington-based consulting firm specializing in Southeast Asian affairs.

Mr. Armitage worked in the foreign policy office of the Reagan presidential campaign and later was named as a member of the National Security Transition Team. He was a senior advisor to the Interim Foreign Policy Advisory Board charged with preparing the President-elect for major policy issues which would confront the new administration. From 1981 until assuming his present position, Mr. Armitage was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, for East Asia and Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Armitage is a member of the Association of Asian Studies and the World Affairs Council.

He lives in Fairfax, Virginia, with his wife, Laura; three daughters, Elizabeth, Lee, and Jenny; two sons, Paul and Chris; and a foster child.



MR. NOEL C. KOCH
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
and
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AFRICA: THE CHALLENGES TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Mr. Noel C. Koch

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

and

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(African Affairs)

In discussing challenges to U.S. national security in Africa, it's first necessary, I think, to discover whether such challenges exist at all. And as we track along that process of discovery, we may find the very concept of security undergoing a sea change, transmuted from a media concern shaped by strategic imperatives to rather larger, long term questions, of fundamental, and perhaps even philosophical import. And by this route, we may find ourselves confronted with challenges for our wisdom and our self confidence, rather than to our security.

Our relations with Africa make an interesting diplomatic history. It's marked by confusion, curiosity and ambivalence. The first nation in the world to extend diplomatic recognition to our fledgling democracy was an African nation--Morocco in 1977. Yet it was not until 1958 that our State Department created a separate Bureau of African Affairs under an Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. It was not until 1982 that the Defense Department itself created a separate Africa Region under International Security Affairs. I am the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs.

We began our own history as a nation with a struggle to become independent of a colonial power. Our relations with Europe and our perceptions of our strategic interests led us variously to support, or at least to tolerate, European colonialism in Africa against the aspirations of the African people, and not incidentally, against the dictates of a part of our history in which we take enormous pride, and one which gives us a unique and peculiar authority among the nations of the world.

I don't mean to offer a history lesson here, I simply want to create a context for the consideration of our real interests in Africa. Although Africa is the ancestral home of one out of nine Americans, we have not been drawn to think deeply about this continent. As we try to do so now, we find that a very considerable part of the protest consists of discarding that which we thought was knowledge and subsequently have discovered to be illusion.

Physically, Africa is immense. About three times the size of the continental United States. Sudan alone is as big as the eastern United States east of the Mississippi. So when we think of Africa in strategic terms, it becomes virtually impossible to deal with it as a single geographical entity. The strategic issues that flow from the east coast of Africa differ very much from those of the West African littoral. The horn of Africa guards the entrance to the Bab el Mandeb, which is the entrance to the Red Sea, and thus to the Suez Canal. On the northern coast you have the Mediterranean, which is the southern flank of NATO, and all this just addresses the crucial coasts of Africa.

Politically, there is Islamic Africa on the so-called northern tier, reaching from Morocco in the west to Egypt in the east. These nations don't come under Africa Region, either at the State Department or the Defense

Department, but under the Near Eastern Region, and so, despite their geographical location and their membership in the Organization of African Unity, they're not even seen here as African nations. Yet this delineation is not definitive either. There are a number of Sahel and sub-Sahel nations in what we consider Africa proper, which are also Islamic nations--Mali, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Somalia are among them.

Intra-national division between Moslems and non-Moslems have had lethal consequences over time. The bloody Biafra secession movement in Nigeria in the late 1960's is a case in point. The Sudanese civil war, which raged from 1956 until 1972, took more lives than we lost in Vietnam in the same period of time, and more recently contributed to the ouster of President Nimeiri.

So one sees the scope or the complexity before we even get into the more familiar problems such as tribalism, racism, ideology, arbitrary borders, and so forth. It may be fair to say that most of the formative events of recent African history, recent in the sense of the history of the United States, have come and gone, or gone on without us. Africa has no experience of American colonialism, as she has with the French, English, German, Spanish, Italian or Portuguese. We did not share in the sanguinary bitterness of the post-colonial period, except as we assisted where and as we could with relief and rescue efforts.

We came innocent to Africa. Innocent largely of experience or deep knowledge. Innocent of exploitation and oppression. Innocent of selfish ambitions towards Africa. Our strategic interests there are limited. We should not wish to have the sea lanes of communication, the so-called SLOC, around Africa -- chiefly access from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea and from the Arabian Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope by which oil comes to America and Europe -- we would not like to see these interdicted from African shores. This is a consideration, it is not a grave concern.

As we look at her mineral riches, we remember Leonid Brezhnev's statement of Soviet global objectives. "Our goal is to control the two great treasure houses upon which the West depends. The energy treasure house of the Middle East, and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa." So these minerals are seen to be of strategic interest. Many in the West, particularly mining corporation executives, hold to that view. But there is a matter of definition. When we say something is strategic, we generally mean that it has some critical utility in a time of war. It's a term we use rather casually in many cases.

Before we can determine the strategic value of Africa's minerals, we need to know in what sort of war they would be critical, what kind of technology would be in use and thus would be affected by their absence, how long the war would last, how prospective consumption rates stack up against what we already have in our strategic mineral reserves. And these questions are not easily answered. The value of the minerals, therefore, is far more commercial than it is military, and far more prospective than real in a mineral market that is severely depressed today.

Nevertheless, we should not wish to have our access to those minerals denied. But there is not presently nor prospectively any serious prospect of denial. Brezhnev's global ambition may be, in Claire Booth Luce coinage, globaloney. So we have an interesting situation--a continent to which, excepting the case of Liberia, we are not drawn by history, by significant economic interest, by political necessity, nor by definitive strategic imperative. With these conventional compulsions out of the way--not to suggest that any of them are totally out of the way, but only that they are

not of paramount, urgent, immediate importance--with these put to one side, we might consider another possibility entirely. Call it the moral dimension.

What perspective of Africa might we gain examining our interests through such a prism? We see first that Africa is fundamentally unengaged as regards great power interests and great power conflicts. She has made no choices of irrevocable, long term consequence, and yet there are choices to be made. These involve the manner of her government, her economic preferences, her political constructs, and the direction in which she turns her collective face. Recognizing we speak here in general terms of some 52 very disparate nations, that direction will constitute a judgment on the political value systems which compete for supremacy in the world today.

Some form of socialism is endemic to most African countries, most African cultures, but as a cultural rather than a social or an economic or political predilection. Socialism as an economic model has been a distinct and abysmal failure wherever it has been attempted on the African continent, and its political concomitant has always been a totalitarianism which sustains itself by brute force and the institutionalization of anxiety.

Over the long term, neither of the great powers, with their alliances and their conflicting values, will exert absolute influence over Africa, nor have an absolute hegemonic position there. Over the long term, Africa will either manifest a receptive, friendly, and trusting attitude toward the industrialized democracies, which is the most desirable outcome for the United States, or she will say a plague on the house of democratic capitalism, as well as that of totalitarian communism, and in a reactionary fashion, pursue some other destiny which will likely result in continued instability, localized opportunism, exacerbated tribalism, and recurrences of the likes of Amin, Bokasa, Macias, and Mengistu. And Africa in turmoil, with or without Soviet sponsorship, with or without the Soviet presence, is a benefit to the Soviets and a problem for the industrialized democracies.

Moreover, if Africa should turn her back on the democracies, what determination will history make of the legitimacy of our own values, the wisdom of our statecraft, or the force of our civilization? In Africa, in a very real way, we are competing for the objective, historical validation of our convictions.

A considerable part of this nation's political philosophy begins and ends with Jeremy Bentham and John Mill, and it is called utilitarianism. It argues simply that if I want to maximize my own interests, I have to be careful how far I act to minimize yours. In Africa, more than in most places, and over the long term, this means we will do the most good for ourselves by a policy which consciously aims at doing the least harm to Africa. Not a particularly grand and sweeping ambition, but after more than 200 years, we may have learned the dangers of grand and sweeping ambitions toward others.

We must not, in a fit of philanthropic fervor, seek to do more for Africa than she can bear. We must not, in a rash miscalculation of the Soviet threat to U.S. interests in Africa, overreact to that apparent threat, nor doubt the capacity of the African people themselves to deal with it. Willy-nilly, without precisely stating it in this manner, this attitude seems increasingly to characterize our dealings with Africa in the present time. I will confine my illustrations to those policies and programs in which the Department of Defense has a major role, chiefly security assistance in one form or another.

Security assistance aims at helping other nations provide for their own defense. It includes loans in the form of foreign military sales credits,

which may be spent to purchase hardware such as tanks, boats, planes and so on; also, it can be used to purchase training. These loans are usually provided at the market rate and the money must, except in very rare instances, be spent here in the United States. Congress frequently balks at voting for these credits because they're included in our Foreign Aid Bill, for which there is very little popular support, and we persist in calling this assistance, which seems to imply aid or help, which most of us have been raised to believe is something freely given.

But, of course, what we're talking about here is money rented at current market rates, which may run to 15% or 16%, and having it routed back to our own defense industry, so we have in fact here a mechanism for engaging others and subsidizing our own defense industrial base, and making money on it in the process, which is fair enough, but it's hardly assistance.

Next, are what we call the Military Assistance Program, or MAP. This is in line with what you and I might call help. It is grant money, or actual hardware that we provide in many cases, which does not have to be repaid. It is much more limited, both as to sums as well as to what it can be used to acquire. And there is our International Military Education and Training Program, which provides training here and abroad. This program, aimed at inculcating our values and sense of non-political military, is dollar for dollar our most successful security assistance program.

As Defense looked at Africa and the security concerns of our friends there, we calculated that most of these nations had little or no external threats, and, except in a few rare cases, none comparable to those internal threats exacerbated by economic instabilities, helped along by debt incurred in the purchase of expensive weaponry. So in the past two-plus years, we have closed all but three African nations off from foreign military sales credits and shifted them into MAP programs. In this fashion, they are forestalled from subsidizing their own destabilization.

To give you an order of magnitude, during the Carter Administration, this country provided \$231 million in FMS credits to Africa, which comprised about 95% of our security assistance or military assistance there. In the first four years of the Reagan Administration we have provided \$126 million in FMS credits, less than one-quarter of it military aid. The trend is even more encouraging. For the fiscal year beginning this October, the Administration's request before Congress is 92% grant and 8% credit, one-third of which would be at concessional interest rates.

We are taking our reasoning one logical step forward with a pilot effort called the Civic Action Program. This is not original. It goes back to the academic concept developed in the late 1950s and very rarely successfully applied. Basically we are trying in selected areas to provide equipment of non-lethal military utility, which can be used in ways that benefit the nation at large. Thus we may equip an engineering battalion so that it can build roads, and even as it links one military camp to another it also provides the means for a farmer to take his produce to market. The engineers acquire skills that are salable on the local economy, or that's the assumption. Sometimes the local economy can't absorb them, but that has to be corrected.

Looking through the eyes of the farmer, he sees that the military is not merely an idle drain on his own resources. He's less interested in joining the next liberation movement aimed at getting the government and the military off his back. But these programs are not without their own difficulties.

The African nations are no less skillful than any other non-aligned nation that's playing the great powers off against each other. It is not unusual, from time to time, for us to have thinly veiled threats that if we do not provide this or that desired weapon system, our friend will look elsewhere for it--elsewhere meaning Soviet or Soviet-surrogate nations. If we mangle a metaphor, we would see this as jumping from the dinner table into the frying pan, and we simply suggest to our friends that as a sovereign nation they have the right to choose their friends and those who are going to help them as they wish.

This does raise the question of Soviet and Soviet-surrogate activities in Africa, however. To be perfectly candid, the Soviet presence does in some measure drive our own perception of our strategic interests in Africa. It would be amazing if this were not so, given that we are a defensive status quo power and that the Soviet Union is an expansionist power. The extension of Soviet imperialism gives rise to concerns of a strategic nature.

Put another way, if the Soviet Union found it possible to live at peace within its own borders, those concerns of a strategic nature for the United States would very substantially diminish. So in that sense, yes, our concerns in Africa of a strategic nature are partly reactive. Notwithstanding, it has occurred to me, from time to time, that if we had a longer familiarity with Africa and so knew her better, we might be more confident that in the end African soil would prove most infertile to Soviet ambitions and the Marxist model for social and economic development. It may be that we need to do little to assure that by the end of this century Africa will have spat out the last residue of Soviet influence on the continent, and thus we might better chart our course in Africa with greater attention to our mutual interests and less concern for the Soviet threat.

For the present, however, the Soviets are there and the nations of Africa have the opportunity to see at first-hand what is the cost of having them there. Comparisons between the Soviet involvement and our own in Africa are instructive. There is a general perception that the U.S. has a large military presence in sub-Saharan Africa, but our military presence in sub-Saharan Africa does not exceed 300. The numbers from the other side are much more impressive. Counting Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces all over the place, Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia, North Koreans in the Seychelles, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere, the bloc presently exceeds 40,000 military, many of them actively engaged in intelligence, police, and combat roles against the Africans.

I have discussed our security assistance policies toward Africa both with regard to efforts to avoid saddling these nations with debt as well as to provide useful, non-lethal equipment. In addition, in all our dealings in the area of security assistance, we seek to make the recipient independent of a continued reliance on the United States. We train them not simply to operate the equipment we provide, but to maintain it as well, to minimize or eliminate any necessity for a large and continuous American presence. The Soviets and their surrogates, by contrast, direct their attention almost entirely to lethal equipment, and deliberately seek to develop a dependency that requires a large presence in the country as well as an umbilical relationship with Moscow directly. This is achieved by providing only the most rudimentary training and maintenance, some of which equipment by design cannot be maintained at all within country, but has to be sent back to the Soviet Union or elsewhere.

It is achieved further by establishing debt which rapidly approximates a relationship analagous to that which exists between the field hand and a country store. Debt is an important part of the Soviet policy, because to cover it the Soviets ask for concessionary agreements in relation to whatever of value the country itself may possess. For a case in point, consider fish.

There's an old story about a Russian worker in Leningrad who would leave the plant each night pushing a wheelbarrow. After six months, the plant manager became suspicious and suspected that the worker might be stealing something. So they mounted a surveillance, but they never caught him stealing anything. The wheelbarrow was always empty. Next they took to stopping him at the gate and examining the wheelbarrow very carefully, eventually cutting off the handles to see if they were hollow, and slashing the tire to see if that contained any contraband. Finally, the manager appealed for help from Moscow, and one of the KGB's finest was sent out. It was a most perplexing case, but within two weeks he solved it. The worker was stealing wheelbarrows.

Now, it used to be, when you heard about Soviet trawlers off George's Banks, and here and there and everywhere else in the world, we wondered what all those fishing trawlers were doing, and then came to the clever conclusion that they were collecting intelligence. No one should doubt that the fishing trawlers have a role in stealing information. But in Africa, what they're engaged in principally is stealing fish.

Using Angola as an illustrative case, this is a country greatly blessed by nature, with excellent natural resources and a long coastline once teeming with sea life. Today, the waters off Angola are dead, destroyed by large Soviet fishing factory boats which take not only the fish and other seafood, but actually scrape the bottom, taking everything which fish and seafood depend upon to live and to regenerate themselves. Replicating that rapacious behavior across Angolan land, the Soviets and the Cubans have managed to reduce the citizens of a once rich land to a chronic state of near starvation.

This depredation against the people of Africa continues all the way up the west African littoral and in areas of the east. We will be attempting to help our friends address this destruction of their vital natural resources through programs that will assist them in policing their waters. The question today is whether that can be accomplished in time.

The people of Africa watch what goes on in Angola, watch the genocidal policies of the Soviet-supported Mengistu regime in Ethiopia; they remember Soviet support for Idi Amin and his murderous regime; they remember President Macias of Equatorial Guinea, also a Soviet client, who murdered about a third of his nation's population, including everybody in it who had any education at all. I remember going into Equatorial Guinea. The blank stares on the faces of the people there reminded me of the pictures of the faces liberated from the death camps after the Second World War. So, increasingly, Africa will make her choices.

When there was drought and starvation in West Africa ten years ago, and West Africa was falling increasingly under the sway of Marxism, it was the United States and the West that helped, and the Soviets did nothing. Today, Soviet influence in West Africa has substantially waned. There is a truer non-alignment. But in that non-alignment, it is the United States and the West that are trusted.

The situation is repeating itself today in Ethiopia and other drought-stricken African countries. It is we who are helping, helping even our adversaries in Ethiopia for example, while their own friends stand by and support actions aimed deliberately at the destruction by starvation of those who President Mengistu has not been able to suppress or destroy with all those weapons at his disposal.

These are the realities upon which the peoples of Africa must base their choices. Leaders who once embraced Marxism, such as Samora Machel of Mozambique, are trying to break the Soviet stranglehold and find an opening to the West, and we want to encourage them. In the end, we believe that no enlightened leadership will choose to have this yoke placed upon the necks of their people and those who may, like Mengistu, will be making such choices and thus declaring their ambition for power to the detriment of their people before the eyes of the world and the eyes of the African people. But Africa, in her own time, has her own way of dealing with such people.

In the end, without ever confronting the Soviets directly in Africa, the western democracies will prevail there by the force of our values, by helping where help is needed and asked for, and by otherwise stepping back and letting Africa find her own destiny, which she will surely do anyway, whatever policy we here may set, and however we may construe our interests there.

Neither in Asia nor in innocence was mankind born, anthropologists tell us, but in Africa, where his very evolution was a function of the need to be aggressive, to shed blood, in order to survive at all. At this end of the evolutionary chain, all humanity seeks to control those primal instincts that some believe once caused a particular being to become a person. We here today represent the world's oldest republic, the people freer, longer, than any others existing today on the face of the earth. But there is something of Africa in all of us, and something unique in us as well, in our capacity to extend and protect our freedoms. There is too, a shared experience of having struggled for those freedoms.

So we begin fresh in Africa, as history measures time and events. We still have our differences to discover. But, however much we have to learn of each other, one thing becomes clear on early acquaintance, which is the common commitment to a value that we define in like terms, which is simple human dignity. In that this value is not universally held and cannot manifest itself in political systems which place the state before the individual, it is clear that we have an edge in Africa that requires only that we be confident of ourselves and that we be confident of Africa.

Thank you very much.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

with

Mr. Noel C. Koch

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

and

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (African Affairs)

Q: Your presentation was very interesting. I'm sorry it's so late in the day, and I was a little bit fuzzy when I was listening to you, and I want to be sure that I understood you correctly in a couple of points that you made.

On the first point, it's always been my understanding that about 90% of the oil that flows to the West from the Middle East passes through the vital sea lanes that go around the Cape and southern Africa, and that when the Soviet Union completes its pipeline into Western Europe, if the sea lanes are in any way impaired, that could drastically affect the freedom of Western Europe.

I thought you said on that point that if the sea lanes were closed this would not be very important?

A: No, that's not what I said. I said that from the African perspective, as we look at our strategic interests there, the possibility of the SLOC, or the sea lanes of communication, being interdicted from Africa is very remote, and I also said that we should not wish to see those sea lanes of communication interdicted, that it was a consideration, but not a serious concern. At this point, we don't believe that it is. The ocean is a big place, the Indian Ocean is an awfully big place. You can move considerably out from the shores of Africa in order to make that transport without danger of interdiction from Africa itself.

Q: I just wanted to be sure I understood you correctly on that point. The second point that you made also was regarding the minerals in Africa. It has always been my understanding that some of the most important and essential strategic minerals come from the southern part of Africa, and that in some cases they can be obtained nowhere else. You, as I recall, made the statement that this was also not important.

A: No, that's not what I said. I didn't say it wasn't important. What I said was that it's difficult to construe a strategic interest in those minerals. We have always been told these were our two strategic concerns in Africa. One was the sea lanes of communication. When you examine that very closely, that perspective begins to get very fuzzy. The other question is that of the minerals in central and southern Africa. As you look at that, you have to ask the kinds of questions that I was going through here, and one is under what circumstances do these things become of critical importance? It's extremely difficult to make that projection, as it turns out. What we have done always is to simply make an assumption, and one sees, if you read Brezhnev, that that assumption is partly reactive; because the Soviets say we need those minerals, we decide that those are of strategic value. But you have to define why they are of strategic value, and it turns out to be extremely difficult to do, simply because we can't figure out the kind of a scenario in which we're going to need it.

We have these minerals in great numbers in stockpiles today. As I've tried to figure out just how important those minerals are, it's not always easy for our own people to tell us how much they have in those stockpiles, and then what are the consumption rates going to be, in what circumstances and so forth. And as you track through the logical line that you have to take to come to a conclusion, you'll find that the answer there again gets very mushy in your hands.

Today the price of minerals is depressed. The mining companies come to us and say, you know these are awfully important, you've got to have these. What they're really saying is we would like you to subsidize the purchase of these minerals for stockpile. Whether we need them or not is the question, and it's not an easy question to answer.

Q: Sir, you spoke for a need of a moral concern and the moral dimension in our foreign policy with regard to Africa. My question is concerned with constructive engagement and a Reagan policy in South Africa. First of all, Sir, is there any specific evidence that you know of to date, to the extent that economic aid in the industrial sector is now or has ever further advanced the black population in South Africa, and along those lines, Sir, can constructive engagement solve or even address the most fundamental problem of the movement of nine million blacks to the Bantustan, to the homelands?

A: Good--let's look first of all at what preceded constructive engagement --

Q: Can we have some definitions here? I don't think most of us understand that question.

A: The question was I think, if this is not sufficient correct me, but basically, what is the value of constructive engagement, what has it produced, and viewing this thing through the moral prism, which is the term that I used, how is it justifiable. Did we get through the question all right?

DR. KORB: I think they want to know what you mean by constructive engagement.

Q: Sir, my question was more concerned with, can economic aid in the form of constructive engagement, or any type of economic aid, further the standard of living for the black population, and can we address through economic aid the plight of the blacks being moved to the homelands?

A: The relationship between us and South Africa is not one that involves economic aid. There is a great deal of economic investment. The question whether there ought to be that economic investment is one of the things at the heart of whether or not we should pursue constructive engagement, or whether we should withdraw from that initiative and pursue sanctions, among those sanctions being the disinvestment of American industry there.

As we look at it, we think constructive engagement has been generally productive. Now it's not productive overnight, clearly, but, what would be the results of disinvestment, what would be the results of backing away from constructive engagement? Let's look at it from two sides. First of all, what existed under the Carter Administration was an attitude and a policy that assumed we could force South Africa to behave as we wished them to behave. But it assumes that we have power over sovereign nations that in fact it's never been demonstrated that we do have.

It comes up very frequently in the case of Israel. We can not force them to do our bidding. The case of South Africa is even more problematical, because we have so much less leverage over South Africa.

So, in this confrontational state, what South Africa did was simply create, act to create around herself, a zone of instability among her neighbors which created a certain amount of turmoil there, and which gave her some degree of security and safety at home with her own populations, which were extremely restive, and justifiably so.

We saw no progress in continuing to stay in a confrontational position with South Africa, and we looked to see if there was some other way that we could structure a more sensible relationship--one whose objectives were to create some degree of stability in the southern cone of Africa, to produce ultimately a settlement with regard to Namibia, and finally and most importantly, to accelerate the evolution of South African policies away from apartheid.

Out of that we have had the Nkomati agreement between South Africa and Mozambique, which is not perfect, but it's working. There's much less violence along those borders, and South Africa's support for Renamo, which is attacking the government of Mozambique, has been eliminated. We have created a relationship between Angola and South Africa at Losaka. Again, not perfect, but it's a beginning. The only thing now that stands between the realization of Security Council Resolution 435, which is what everything hangs on, is the decision to let the Cubans leave Angola. Once that decision is made, we think everything else can go forward.

Now what would happen in South Africa if we disenfranchised or we forced the disinvestment of American companies there? Practically nothing. Presently those companies that are U.S. companies are operating under the so-called Sullivan Guidelines. Seventy percent of the non-white workers there are under those guidelines. It's a voluntary thing, but it's a very productive thing, and to force disinvestment would be to change the whole complexion and tone of that relationship. And the companies would only be replaced by other investors. Investments are extremely fungible. Our people would be out. Whatever little leverage we have would be out with it, and other people would be in there. So we don't see the value of sanctions.

The question of sanctions comes up again and again and again. Why can't we apply economic sanctions against Libya, for example, to force Quadafi to cease his terrorist activities? Well, as we try to do that, we find that wherever we pull away, somebody else rushes in. These are frequently our European friends. So sanctions themselves don't give you much in the way of leverage. And we think that in the case of South Africa, that it's most sensible to continue along this line of what we call constructive engagement, and we think it's working.

The problem is that it hasn't worked overnight. Therefore, there are those who assume in some quarters that it's a failure.

Q: I have a question in regard to Kenya. I know that we've been told that 10,000 women will arrive in Nairobi in the beginning of July from all over the world, and I would like to know how the Defense Department feels about this from the military, security point of view, or if you have any interest in the fact that women are going to Africa for the last conference to end the UN Decade for Women.

A: I'm not sure how to respond to that. In terms of having an interest in it, since the President's daughter is leading the delegation, I think you may construe that we have a profound and lasting interest in it.

Other than that, I don't know how to answer that. I think it's a very nice place to have a conference. I must have missed some part of the question.

Q: No, you didn't. But I think my point that I didn't make was that, militarily, women are important, and I would think they would be just as important to the Defense Department in Africa.

A: I don't disagree with that, and I think the Department of Defense will have representation at that conference. In fact I know they will.

Q: In comparison to the United States, to what extent do you feel the Soviets are dependent on minerals and other resources in the African region, and do you regard Soviet activity there as a function of aggression, expansionism, disruption if you will, or do you perceive that perhaps they see defensive national security interests of their own in that area that will have to be acknowledged by both countries if a solution is to be worked out?

A: I would have a great deal of difficulty discovering a defensive interest for the Soviet Union in Africa. As I said, to some extent our own interests there we construe to be defensive, but they're also reactive because the Soviets are there. I tried to provide some order of magnitude in terms of the numbers involved, but from our perspective, and the thrust of my remarks was, generally that our interests are very limited. As far as the minerals are concerned, the Soviet Union is a very mineral rich country. We haven't seen any serious effort to move on those minerals in Africa in terms of acquisition. If we saw a move, it would be more in terms of denial. In other words, they would prevent us from having them, and we would be more dependent on those minerals than the Soviets are. So that would be an interest.

The question is how far we ourselves are dependent on them from a purely strategic perspective; but no, I think the Soviet role in Africa is neither defensive nor is it strategic in the sense of a concern for something that exists there that they need that they don't have. It's ideological. It's establishing a position consistent with their support of so-called wars of national liberation, demonstrating that this is a historically determined process, and where they have been and where they are now are part and parcel of regimes that are very much inimical to the interest of Africa itself and the specific countries in which they exist. And typically, these regimes have not come to power through any democratic process, but it's a fact that there is nowhere in the world a single country which has a communist regime which came to power by vote of the people, including the Soviet Union.

So I think the position there is one of pure opportunism, basically. Let me just point out one other thing which is very interesting, take the case of Angola and the Cubans there. The Cubans' position is very remunerative for Cuba herself, because those soldiers are paid for. So you get two things. One you get all the concessional agreements that provide part of the natural resources of Angola to the Soviets; two, for the Cubans, you have a solution to Cuba's employment problems, which are substantial. They just employ them in Angola as soldiers. And, of course, they're paid for this. So it's a very nice arrangement all the way around, except for the people of Angola.

Q: You indicated that the natural resources, the fish, were stolen by the Soviets from Angola, and I believe you indicated that aid was going to be given to Angola from the United States. Has that begun, and, also, what is the monetary amount of that aid?

A: You shouldn't construe that in terms of a sum of money at this point. The plan is called the West African Coastal Surveillance Initiative, and what we are going to try to do is to provide to countries, and presently Angola is not one of those countries, and since they have no fish anyway, it would be pointless, to provide them with a means to police their waters.

In some areas the Soviets do have licensing agreements. Let me give you a little bit of history. Going back a couple of years ago, with the emergence of the whole Law of the Sea, there was a creation of economic zones, 200 mile economic zones, around most countries of the world. And most of the countries of the world are capable of policing those zones. So therefore, it made it, in most cases, non-commercial for the Soviets to be in those waters any more, because of the licensing agreements, because they had to pay in order to take those fish.

Now, the one place in the world where you look where the people don't have that capability, is Africa. So this whole vast Soviet fishing fleet, which is a fundamental part of the Soviet economy itself, has shifted into this area, and they're just fishing these waters out. So what we would like to do is to try to help the Africans police those waters to the extent that they have existing licensing agreements, to be sure that they get the benefit of the revenues from those licensing agreements, and make it much more difficult for the Soviets and the Soviet fishing fleet to take food out of the mouths of the African people, basically. But in terms of a sum of money, we're not giving them X number of dollars to go out and buy a Navy or a Coast Guard. What we're looking at is capacity building, providing technical assistance. In some cases it may be hardware, it may be boats, or it may be an aircraft to do surveillance. This is all rather embryonic. We have a difficulty in that there's a question involved in Congress of whether this constitutes military assistance to a civil function. And there is a law, Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits that. So we're trying to find, A, whether in fact it does prohibit it, and B, if it does, can we get it rescinded or find a way around it?

Ultimately I don't think we're talking about serious sums of money, but we're not talking about serious sums of money from this country into Africa at all, except for things like food aid and other things.

Q: I realize you're an African specialist, but I'd like you to comment on something else. You said something with regard to economic sanctions, that they would be ineffectual. What would you say about the sanctions we just placed against Nicaragua?

A: I would say, first of all, that the economy of South Africa is about 30 times that of Nicaragua. South Africa is, and we hope some day will be, a closer friend. But until the apartheid problem is resolved, she should be construed as a somewhat distant friend. But in no way is she comparable to Nicaragua, which has allied herself with our adversaries. We think that the fragility of the Nicaraguan economy makes her somewhat more vulnerable to these sanctions, so we think it's a more workable proposition there, and it's a useful one.

Q: But isn't the realignment with the Soviet Union more due to the fact that we didn't support their government when they were first developing?

A: Well, I don't think you're right about that. Because, if you go back and look at the termination of the Somoza regime, and the coming of the Sandinista regime, the amount of American subventions to Nicaragua in that period were very substantial. During the Carter Administration it was hoped that this would serve to form a block against Nicaragua moving into the Soviet camp or into the Cuban ambit, and it was not successful. So

there was an extended period of time in which this country was putting money in there and I think it's probably only in this Administration that some of the monies that go to international instruments, over which we have limited control, but a lot of money was still going to Nicaragua. We don't think that made much difference.

Q: I have two separate, but somewhat related questions. One is, I find it rather curious that the Department of Defense never had a desk on Africa until 1982, and I guess you said you're the first one holding that. And I'm wondering why that is? Why there wasn't one before? Why it was started now, and along with that, what the trend is of military spending in Africa between the Carter and the Reagan Administration, and what the current Administration feels are the key strategic interests that warranted creating the desk, and I think increasing the military aid to the continent?

A: First of all let me correct what I said, or what I meant to say, which was that we had not had previously a separate African region. What we had in International Security Affairs was, the acronym was NEASA, and what it meant was Near East, Africa, and South Asia. Now you can imagine in that configuration how much attention Africa got, because everything was drawn on--and South Asia didn't get much either--everything was focused on the Middle East. So as I looked at this, in fact I looked at it as soon as we came into office, and simply wondered whether or not we were losing some opportunities in Africa, and whether or not we ought not to deal with it separately in a way that focused the proper attention on Africa, instead of having all the interests and energies and activities drawn off in another region, so we separated them out. We made two regions. But there was always something there that had Africa's name on it, it just didn't have any attention paid to it.

Let me say if there is any suspicion whatsoever that the reason we created a separate Africa Region was so we could go after Africa, that's not the case, and I think that's reflected in the figures that I gave you that indicated the levels of military support and assistance to Africa. Military activity in Africa was substantially larger, twice as much, under the Carter Administration.

Q: Thanks. And my second question is a follow up on the South Africa policies of the Reagan Administration. I'm wondering, you stated that you think the policy of constructive engagement just needs more time, and that economic sanctions would not be an effective measure against the apartheid regime in South Africa now. I wonder about that, and especially when you say U.S. investments would be replaced by investments of other companies. I'm sorry if this is an offensive parallel, but it does remind me somewhat of the Nazis in the concentration camps who said that, well, if I didn't do it, then someone else would do it, and, in fact, there are members in the South African government who are Nazis. And I just would like to wonder and draw your attention to the vote in Congress last week with respect to the economic sanctions, and clearly there are many members in the House who do believe that economic sanctions would be a viable measure to take, if for nothing else than as a moral stand for what American values are in the world, as a statement to the world of where we stand with respect to apartheid. I don't think the effectiveness of the measures in terms of dismantling the apartheid system should be the only criteria by which we measure our government's policy.

So I wonder if you could comment on the Congressional measures, I think they included the ban of Krugerrand sales in the United States, a ban on loans to companies operating in South Africa, and a ban on loans to the

South African government. And I'm wondering if so many of the Congressional people feel that economic sanctions would be a moral and maybe effective measure, what evidence you have that your --

A: I think I've got the point, if I could just respond. I'm not sure that banning Krugerrands is going to bring Pretoria down, but --

Q: As I said, it's not just merely a question of effectiveness, but moral stand.

A: There's always a judgment call of when to make a gesture which is always gratifying, and I find something that's particularly gratifying in the Congress. Sometimes there's some value in a gesture, sometimes there's greater utility in slogging along and doing the best you can in trying to affect a long term change. I don't think a gesture is going to change apartheid in South Africa. I think that over time, as the government there is encouraged along, pushed a little bit, encouraged a little bit, that we'll see a change. We have seen change.

It might be useful, you might also if you have the names of any Nazis in the government in South Africa, you'd probably do a great public service if you'd provide those names. Let me say, it's probably useful, from time to time, to try to put yourself in, to look at the world from their perspective. Not necessarily that it's defensible, but as they look out around them and they see what has been the results of the enormously difficult transition that so many African countries have had to make from one kind of rule to another, I would think if I lived there, if I were a South African, that I might approach that with some trepidation, a concern to let go. They look at Rhodesia, and they see now what's happening with Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean armed forces running amuck in Matabele Land, slaughtering people wholesale, and wonder whether or not, we want to let go, we know what we're doing is unjust, we know the world doesn't like it, but we don't want to get murdered in the process. How do we make this transition?

Historically, it's an extremely difficult thing to do, and I don't say that out of sympathy for their policies, but simply that it helps as you try to implement a policy, to try to figure out how it looks from the other side, and I think that's a useful enterprise in this case. But, I go back to the essential point that once you have caused this disinvestment, once you have basically taken yourself out of South Africa, where are you? What do you do then? What becomes of the Sullivan principles, and what will be the effect on the people that you're most trying to help? The blacks of South Africa, and the workers and so forth. It would not be a cost-free initiative, not for us, but for them, to undertake. So I think one ought to think about it a little more carefully. If they want to ban Krugerrands, that's fine. I don't own any Krugerrands. I can't afford them. But that makes the Congress feel happy and I don't think South Africa cares anyway.

DR. KORB: You've given us a lot to think about. Thank you very much.

Noel C. Koch
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(African Affairs)

Noel C. Koch was appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs March 31, 1981. Prior to that he was President of Koch Associates, Inc., a Washington consulting firm. He served in the Reagan Campaign as an advisor on International Policy and Public Affairs.

Mr. Koch was a Special Assistant to Presidents Nixon and Ford, serving in a broad range of assignments including the Apollo Space Program, Drug Law Enforcement, Defense and International Affairs, and Energy Policy Development. Mr. Koch came to the White House from the U.S. Post Office, where he was Assistant to Postmaster General Winton M. Blount.

Mr. Koch's public career includes service as Special Counsel to the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, member of the Washington Regional Selection Panel for White House Fellows, and Energy Consultant to the Senate Finance Committee. Mr. Koch was an advisor to Senator Bob Dole in the 1976 Presidential campaign.

Mr. Koch holds a Master's Degree in International Relations from Bryn Mawr College and a Bachelor's Degree in English from Widener University.

He is a veteran of six years in the United States Army, including tours of duty in Europe and Southeast Asia.

Mr. Koch heads the Department of Defense Special Planning Directorate, in which role he has responsibility for all policy matters related to terrorism and special operations, including strategic planning, doctrinal development and force development.

He is the Department's point of contact within the Administration on all terrorism matters. He chairs the Defense Working Group on Terrorism consisting of representatives from DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Special Operations Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant for Atomic Energy. He is also the Administration's principal point of contact with allied counter-terrorist authorities.

In addition to these duties as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), Mr. Koch has responsibility for managerial oversight of all ISA functions, including regional policy development for East Asia/Pacific, Inter-America, Near East-South Asia, and Africa Regions; Policy Analysis including Contingency Planning & Requirements Policy, and the International Economic & Energy Affairs Directorate; and the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

Mr. Koch is also the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Region, with direct responsibility for all Defense policy planning and implementation related to Africa. In this role he works in close coordination with the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs and the Office for Political/Military Affairs. He represents Defense Department views before the Congress, and deals closely with Africa heads of state and Ministers of Defense, as well as other ministerial-level officials.



NANCY L. KASSEBAUM
United States Senator (R-Kansas)

A CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON
CHALLENGES TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Senator Nancy L. Kassebaum, (R-KS)
Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

I've been asked today to give you a congressional perspective on the theme for this year's forum -- "Challenges to U.S. National Security." I'm pleased and honored by the invitation and I'll do my best to fulfill the assignment -- though I make no claim of speaking for my 99 colleagues.

In thinking about this forum's theme, I wondered for a moment whether Secretary Weinberger must not think at times that one of the primary challenges to our national security comes not from the Kremlin, but from the Congress.

I don't mean to be entirely facetious with that remark. In fact, Congress plays a key role in national security, and dealing with it can be a major challenge for anyone, including its own members.

To provide the perspective of one who sits in Congress, I want to talk about national security in broad terms -- which is the way Congress must view it. And, I want to focus primarily on some of the internal challenges we face, particularly the natural tension that exists between the executive and legislative branches of our government.

Let me begin with two points in defense of Congress:

First, national security is by necessity a very broad issue. It involves not only the question of relative military strength -- a critical issue -- but economic and political forces as well. Comparing the total number of Soviet and American tanks, submarines and nuclear missiles can provide one measure of the threat to our security but it cannot provide a definitive picture of superpower competition.

Second, the primary business of Congress is to set priorities on all of the competing demands on our government. Congress does not have the luxury of being single-minded in pursuing any goal. That is why we have a Pentagon, and a Department of Agriculture, and so on.

While national security has always been among our highest priorities, it rarely is exempt from considerations of cost. That means that, barring a national emergency, the Pentagon must argue its case for funding and accept the fact that it will not get everything it wants.

The point is simple: Congress can seldom consider national security in a vacuum. Instead, those of us who sit in Congress must always balance our defense needs against other domestic and foreign policy goals. And, we must decide how to pay for all of this.

Congress is the place where we not only decide how to slice up the pie, we also have to worry about where the next pie will come from.

Congress was not cast in this role because it has a monopoly on either wisdom or foresight. It is simply because Congress has a monopoly on money -- it controls the purse-strings and so it is the ultimate arbiter on any question that requires funding. And national defense requires lots of money. Budget authority in 1986, for example, will be \$303 billion.

This is not a particularly efficient way to govern one of the world's great superpowers, but so far we have not found a better system.

For one thing, it is a trademark of Congress that it never likes to give a flat "yes" or "no" to any question. It frequently replies with a "maybe" and then adds in the fine print that this answer is always subject to change.

In fact, Congress does what most people would do when they are faced with a complicated question that does not have a clear, simple answer. Very rarely do we face a threat that is so clear and present that we can all agree on a response that is simple and direct.

However, it seems excessive to me to debate and vote three or four times a year on controversial defense issues like the MX missile or the Strategic Defense Initiative. Right now, we argue about those issues during the budget debate, then we revisit them when the defense authorization bill comes to the floor, and we go through it all over again when the defense appropriations bill comes up.

This entire process is repeated in the House. Then the House and Senate meet in conference on each bill, and some of the same arguments are rehearsed when the final version of each bill comes back to the floor for action.

This process seems designed to produce a lot of rhetoric, but few firm decisions. Two classic examples are the B-1 bomber and the MX missile. First we were going to build the B-1, then it was killed, now it is back in production. On MX, we began with a plan for 200 missiles deployed on race tracks in the Utah desert. Then we went to 100 missiles deployed in existing Minuteman silos. Now we're talking about 50 missiles.

But the hottest game in town now is the Strategic Defense Initiative, more popularly known as "Star Wars." Right now, we're arguing about whether to provide \$1.9 billion or \$2.8 billion or \$3.7 billion for a research program that no one has even defined.

Public understanding of these issues, and the national defense, would be better served, I think, if we focused our debates on key policy questions and then gave a clear answer that could hold up for at least one year. One way to do that would be for Congress to combine debates on authorization and appropriations bills.

This might have several positive results. For one thing, we might be forced to make real decisions. We might be forced to face budget realities and set clear priorities so that genuinely critical programs receive adequate funding while lower-priority programs are killed or delayed.

For another, we might engage less in so-called micromanagement, where we not only argue about defense programs, but also about claw hammers and toilet seats, and focus our attention more on broad policy issues. I believe we should set policy and then require the Pentagon to produce realistic plans to meet those goals.

That sounds very simple. But the present situation is not at all simple, and some of that is unavoidable. The administration, specifically the Pentagon, has a duty to formulate national defense plans and then submit its request to fund those plans.

Congress has the responsibility of determining the level of funding, and that inevitably leads to all kinds of questions about our plans and the hardware and manpower necessary to carry them out. This is not only necessary, it is essential in a democracy, where every program must have public support.

There is a natural tension between those who spend the money, and wish they had more, and those who provide the money, and always want to provide less. The level of tension rises or falls depending on whether each side is willing to act cooperatively and constructively.

I think we could use a little more cooperation and a lot less hyperbole from both sides. The Pentagon could be a little more forthcoming and candid in providing information to Congress. And, members of Congress could be a little less concerned about scoring political points.

We owe it to our soldiers, sailors and airmen to provide them with the tools necessary to do their jobs. We owe it to all our citizens to provide a sound and secure national defense. We owe it to the taxpayers to do that at a cost we can afford,

Meeting all of those goals is a major challenge. But the task is not insurmountable.

Nancy Landon Kassebaum
U.S. Senator
R-Kansas

Nancy Kassebaum was elected to the U.S. Senate in November 1978, succeeding retiring Senator James B. Pearson. She was re-elected in 1984.

She has served as Vice President, KFJH-KLZS Radio, Wichita, Kansas; is a former member of the, Maize (Kansas) School Board, and served as Deputy Permanent Chairman, 1984 Republican National Convention, and Temporary Chairman, 1980 Republican National Convention.

Her committee assignments in the Senate include:

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

Chairman, Aviation Subcommittee

Committee on Foreign Relations

Chairman, African Affairs Subcommittee

Committee on the Budget

Select Committee on Ethics

Nancy Kassebaum as earned a M.A. Degree in diplomatic history from the University of Michigan, and a B.A. Degree in political science from the University of Kansas.

She is the daughter of Theo Cobb Landon and Alfred H. Landon, Governor of Kansas from 1933 to 1937 and Republican presidential nominee in 1936. She is the mother of four.

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
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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WOMEN AND THE CHALLENGE TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
A Dialogue with
Honorable Lawrence J. Korb
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations, and Logistics)

Q: What does it take to become an arms control negotiator, and why don't we have women in senior positions doing that? It seems that something that vital and important should have female representation.

A: Take a look at the composition of our arms control team; that is a very good cross section of the type of individuals that have been involved in arms control over the years. Ambassador Nitze is the nominal head of the team, he in effect is running that for Secretary Shultz. Ambassador Nitze came to the government, like lots of people, some of whom you've seen here today, from the private sector as a political appointee back in the World War II time frame. He worked for both Democrats and Republicans in State and Defense, and now in arms control, building up his expertise as he went. I think he personifies the type of individual that we've been fortunate to have in government. Ambassador Nitze is similar to Governor Harriman, who also served many administrations. The team is headed by Max Kampelman, who is a Humphrey Democrat, but who has worked in negotiations before, not specifically arms control, but has negotiated with the Soviet Union. He was selected because of his negotiating skills and the fact that he has broad bi-partisan support, because the treaty has to be approved by the Senate. The other member of the team is Mike Glitman, who is a career foreign service officer, not necessarily an arms control expert, but has worked in many places around the world, including NATO, because the Allies are going to have to be part of this. And then, finally, you have Senator Tower, who was Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and this could help get a treaty ratified by the Senate. So those are the types of people you get.

The answer to your second question is one of the reasons we have these Forums, i.e., to get women more involved in this particular area, which as Secretary Weinberger remarked two years ago, at our first Forum, for too long women had been excluded from this area. We're trying to get them involved. There are lots of reasons for that. Many more than I can go into. But I think the way to break it is to make a conscious effort to get women into positions of high visibility in the defense or the national security area. That's the way to do it.

Q: My observation on the answer to the first question that was posed on why women are not included in some of the activities that they are qualified to participate in. I want to repeat to you an observation by Admiral Inman just one month ago. He said I cannot hire my EEO quota of systems engineers because I don't have women applying for consideration to be hired in my corporation. I don't think any of us can gripe about not getting a job if we haven't gone in and made it very obvious, as Dr. Korb has now already said, make it obvious that we are willing to work and to work hard to get a position in that realm. However, I do know from personal experience that behind these negotiators there are lots of ladies who are very fantastic technicians, and without them to back up the negotiators, the negotiators wouldn't be nearly this successful. And thank you very much.

Q: I want to comment a little bit about the status of women in the foreign affairs agencies and the problems we face, and how difficult it is indeed to rise to the top, in especially to get ahead in areas that have

been tradition male bastions. I would say that political military affairs is probably one of those areas. But we have made progress, somewhat. We we have made progress, somewhat. We started a quiet revolution back in 1970, we changed a lot of the rules. We didn't necessarily change all the minds, but I guess what concerns many of the women in the foreign affairs agencies today is the fact is that there is a complacency. The young women who have made it because we were very successful and fought now say, well I don't know what you are talking about. I've never been discriminated against and I can just say, well just wait, you know you're very fortunate. But in the Defense Department is there a problem because women can't really enter into combat? Does that hold you back? I know in the State Department you really can't say that because our combat zone these days is the front line which, as you know, is the entrance to any mission abroad. So we do have equal access and we are in nontraditional jobs, but there are still only two out of 20 career ministers who are women, so we have a long way to go; but I think, we are struggling, and we need all of your help, and I think this is the one thing that I feel very pleased about being a part of this conference today, that I understand that this is your contribution to the Decade on the peace side.

A: That is correct.

Q: So I applaud you for this because I think it is very important that we get together and we share your thoughts as to how can we move ahead. But I guess I'm still troubled because not only in government do you find few women rising to the top, mid level does not seem to be difficult; in academia I hear the same thing, that there are traditional areas that women somehow can't make it, and I suppose that's the real battle. Do you have any answers for these problems?

A: Well, let me answer probably the toughest question that you asked; one that you slid over, that is about the combat exclusion policy for women. It is a problem. And I'll tell you why it is a problem. Particularly with the officer corps, which is most closely associated with the foreign service officer analogy. We have a law that says women can't get involved in direct combat. We also have policies that say that because a woman cannot serve in direct combat jobs, one should not penalize her when it comes to promotion. But the fact of the matter is that as you go up the promotion pyramid, it narrows very drastically as you get to colonel or Navy captain, and then to flag officer, commodore or brigadier. And if women cannot serve in these direct combat areas, she is not part of the essence of the organization. So it becomes very difficult for her to compete equally. I can explain to you why we have the law, it's a cultural phenomena, and if we talk to members of the legislature and you do informal polling, they don't (a) want to take it up, or (b) want to vote on it. There's no secret about that. In fact, the Department of Defense had supported repealing the combat exclusion policy, but it just got no place. We live, in my view, particularly for officers, in the worst of all possible worlds. We tell a young lady that you can't go into combat, and if she asks why, you'll say, well, it is the law. Well, what's the reason for the law? The law is there because we don't want women to be casualties in large numbers, to be exposed to unnecessary danger, to be captured, so on and so forth. But on the other hand, we put women into positions where they are going to be exposed to combat. As you asked, where is the front line. In the Air Force, for example, a woman can serve in AWACS. Well what is the first thing we send these days when there is a sign of trouble. It's become the battleship, almost, of the

1980's. A woman can also serve in a tanker. If you engage in a reductio ad absurdum, a person sitting on the ground has one missile and there is fighter, a bomber and a tanker and you can only fire one shot, which do you shoot down? Well you go for the tanker, because then you don't have to worry about the fighter and bomber. Women can't go into the fighter or bomber, but they can go into the tanker. Now, what happens is you are exposed to danger, but yet are going to have the promotion problem. You are going to see it become an increasing problem in the next couple of years because DoD went from 1-1/2 percent to about 10 percent of the force in the last decade, and those people are coming up through the ranks. And you're going to see, as the pyramid narrows, this tension grow a great deal. And sooner or later the country is going to have to face it. The dilemma. I can explain it to you, but I don't have the answer. I remember during my confirmation hearings, one Senator, who shall remain nameless, said would you let women go into combat? And I said well there is a law; but there is also a case before the Supreme Court now, Roskter versus Goldberg, that will I think settle that question once and for all, because it had to do with registering women for the draft. And this Senator said, well what do you mean. I said, well, if the Court decides that women can go into combat, obviously I'll carry out the law. He said, oh no you won't if you want this job. That particular attitude still exists. What the courts did, the courts kicked it right back to Congress. And sooner or later we're going to have to come to grips with it. But I think in the meantime what we have to do is be honest about it. I mean that's what we really have to do.

Q: But I think that, just as a final comment, now that you've told us exactly what happens in the military, maybe those of us in the foreign affairs agencies are lucky because we do have equal opportunity to terrorism at all of missions abroad.

Q: Couldn't you perhaps resolve that problem by comparable worth pay scale, as Los Angeles did?

A: Well, in the military we do. We do have the comparable worth pay scale in the military. The point I tried to make was it hasn't become a great problem yet because the large number of women are still competing equally, because they are at the wide part of the pyramid, but as they begin to move up then you're going to have problems. You have a directive that says that you cannot penalize a woman when she goes up for promotion by saying she is not qualified for promotion because she didn't have this job, when in fact she can't hold that job. But you know, unless we repeal the laws of bureaucratic behavior, if you don't work in the essence of an organization it's going to be very difficult regardless of how many directives you have to overcome that. And that's the point I am trying to make.

Q: A part of the news release indicates that this is going to be a dialogue. I thought it might be interesting if the group here present might, by a show of hands, indicate whether or not they think that women ought to be permitted into combat.

A: All right, I'm all for that. We're taking a poll. I suggest you write your legislator. You know, it is interesting that you raise that. Two years ago, during the first forum that we had, Defense issues were much more emotional than they are now. That was the time you had many people marching in support of a nuclear freeze. And the audience was polarized on

every issue except that one, that was the one issue that they could come to complete agreement on, regardless of where they stood on the political spectrum or about defense. It was the one issue that they could. Let's see.

Q: Mr. Weinberger, this morning, was very adamant about having a triad of land, sea and air. In star wars and SDI, that's going to be air, what are we going to do about land and sea?

A: Well I think the questions about star wars, in terms of whether it works, are all premature, because, as he indicated and I think several of the questions have indicated so far, if in fact the strategic defense initiative bears fruition, if you can work out the technological problem, obviously you're going to have different strategic doctrine, and if you have a different strategic doctrine, you're going to have to evaluate all of the weapon systems that you have differently.

Q: Well how are you going to test this? You can't test to see if SDI is going to work.

A: Well, I don't think we have even come close to answering that question. We have to find out if in fact the technology works. There have been some experiments. There was a test with a Minuteman last year. A Minuteman missile was intercepted by an Army launched missile from Kwajalein.

Q: But there's a whole book out that Dick Garwin has edited.

A: I understand that.

Q: It says it can't be done so, and the cost is actually going to be a trillion dollars over 10 years, so why are we going ahead with something that can't be tested that costs a trillion dollars?

A: I think that comment would apply to just about everything that you do in nuclear weapons. You simulate launches, but in terms of actual testing, or how this is going to work, it applies to not only defensive, but offensive systems. You may remember a couple of years ago, when Dick Garwin was one of the people talking about the fact that once the bombs started exploding you create these fields, and the other weapons would not work as they were supposed to. You're right, there is a great area of uncertainty there. But what we're talking about, for SDI right now, the so called star wars program, is a three billion dollar program, and it won't come out that high. The Senate voted \$2.9 billion, and the House is down somewhere around \$2 billion, for research into strategic defense. This is less than the effort of the Soviets in the same area.

Q: Dr. Korb, sir, is it still true what the Bureau of Census said a long time ago, that by 1990 we wouldn't have enough males of military age to defend the country, and we're going to have to depend on women?

A: We're going to depend on women because they enhance the readiness of the force. The question you raised is a legitimate question about the declining rate, the declining number of people turning 18 each year, and those of you in the university area are acquainted with the same phenomena. The 18 year old population has been declining since 1979. We are about half way through it now. We've been able to get enough males because of the fact that our retention rates have been high. And as long as our retention rates stay high, we shouldn't have that severe a problem. But I would say this, even if the birth rate of males was going up, one ought to open up the opportunities to the females, which is basically what we've done.

Q: I'd like to ask you to comment a little more on the structure of the program. I'm the one that got burned on the question on Pakistan. And I'm curious why there was no inclusion of, say Southwestern Asia, in light of all the discussion that this Administration has had on Afghanistan, and why we're covering some of the issues that we are.

A: Okay. Any program that you put together, if you've ever put program together, whether it's a course or conference or a program like this, it's dependent on two things; first, the speakers that you want to get, and second, the time that you have. It's a combination of the two. For example, one of the people we tried to get, and she declined kind of at the last minute, was Elizabeth Dole. Now, if we could have gotten Secretary Dole, we would have probably had her talk about maritime strategy, or something dealing with her agency. Then we would have had, in effect, pushed something else off. Similarly, there are other people who are on, and then at the last minute they decline. Finally, not everybody talks about what you asked them to. If you've ever run one of these particular programs, you try to get people to stick to the topic; but it's very hard for a Lt Col Dudley, who has been kind of tracking these things for me, to call up Bud McFarlane and say why didn't you talk about the subject. I'm looking at your text here. Could you change it. Or to Secretary Weinberger, well we wrote a speech for you, why aren't you giving our speech. You see what I mean. That's what happens. It was not inadvertent. There is just so much to cover, and quite frankly we've been running you all day today to get all the things in. So it was not inadvertent at all. And that's why we have the question period and the wrap up session, when Senator Bumpers and I will look at the global issues. But I mean, if we had done that and left out Africa, somebody would have said, well, what about Africa. Two years ago we had an awful lot of about southwest Asia, because it was much more in the news at that particular time.

Q: I'd like to bring the question back to strategic defense initiatives. It seems one of the biggest problems is to catch the enemy's equipment in the boost stage, and that was mentioned this morning by the Secretary of Defense. Would not, if we're considering this SDI as a defense measure, would not the Soviets perceive this as an offensive point if we were successful in getting their weaponry at the boost stage, when it barely leaves their ground bases?

A: I think what you're saying is, would not the Soviets perceive this as neither offensive or defensive, but as destabilizing. Remember, you're talking about with nuclear weapons. You're trying to construct a policy, backed-up by a set of weapons that keeps anybody from even thinking about using them. I mean that's your goal, and I think Ambassador Nitze put it quite well. The goal is not to just get an arms control agreement, the goal is to eliminate, or if you cannot eliminate, limit the possibilities of using nuclear weapons. That's really what you're trying to get at. And yes, theoretically, if that happened it could create an imbalance and lead to some sort of uncertainties. The President has said, and the Secretary of Defense has said, that if they get that technology, they would be willing to share it. Many people say I don't believe you will. I don't know that, but all I know is that I've heard the President say it, and I've heard the Secretary say it. Because their goal is stability. That's what you're doing all of this for, and you would not want to do anything that is destabilizing. And remember, you know that we had a monopoly on nuclear weapons for a period of time vis a vis the Soviets, and we never really threatened them with it. I'm talking about the late 40's and into the early 50's. So there is a precedent. Remember President Eisenhower's willingness to share some of the technology with the Soviets. So there is a precedent for that. But we're a long way from even proving whether that's going to work. We're talking about a relatively modest program that will become even more modest because of Congressional cuts. If we didn't have SDI, or star wars as it has been called, and you took a look at all the programs that existed before

you put together the SDI umbrella, the money would not be that much greater now, because we've been working on defensive technology for a while.

Q: I would like to know the following. You mentioned the 40's and 50's. In the 40's and 50's the argument was that we needed, as terrible as it was, that we needed the bomb because there was no conventional counter-weight to the Soviet forces. Now what has changed in the intermediate and intervening period to change that situation?

A: If you take a look at the conventional balance as it exists today, on active forces, it's better than it was, but it is by no means adequate to guarantee 100 percent defense. If you go back a couple of years, to 1981, a very influential article was written in Foreign Affairs that led to lots of debates that culminated in us having a Forum; it was written by McGeorge Bundy, Robert MacNamara, Gerald Smith, George Kennan. It advocated no first use policy of nuclear weapons in Europe. The authors gave all the reasons why we should come out and renounce or change our policy. But the last paragraph said something that was very interesting, that not very many people paid attention to. It said we're not ready to do it yet because our conventional forces are not strong enough and this is a more expensive policy. Conventional weapons are more expensive than nuclear weapons, because they are more manpower intensive. You take a look at the percentage of the budget that goes to conventional forces and nuclear forces, it is like 80-85 percent to conventional, and 10 to 15 percent to nuclear. Because we have this nuclear power, we can get by with less conventional power because the other side has got to say to themselves, in this case, the Warsaw Pact, before we start this war, are we willing to see this through to its ultimate consequences. That may make them much more hesitant about starting, and so therefore you don't have to have as large an active force. Our active duty force of people today is smaller than at any time since the period between World War II and Korea. We have just about 2 million people on active duty, a comparatively small force. Now its true, because of technology, we're not as manpower intensive as we used to be, but none the less we're holding down the manpower cost because we also have nuclear weapons, and its part of a whole policy. And I think that's where you are now. Your other point was, has the American Government always been consistent in its policies? No. We've changed our minds, weapons have changed, we've been behind technology. You have a change of Administrations, and a change of philosophies. So if you would go back and quote me something from say, Truman or Eisenhower, and compare it to something President Carter or President Reagan said, we'll say they don't track, I'll say well yes, its different people, different times, coming with different philosophies.

Q: Your mention of the active duty manpower made me think of something of something that I read recently, which said that the Reagan Administration cutbacks in the amount of people who are in the government have been more than, something like three-quarters has been made up by additions to the defense department. Is that correct?

A: In civilians, yes. But you must realize how things work with the government. We used to, in the Department of Defense, operate under a ceiling. The Office of Management and Budget would prepare, and Congress would vote, a ceiling, and they would say you can have x many people, say 900,000. Well, what would happen, and lots of the military people here and maybe some of the civilians can tell you how it worked, is on the 30th of September of the year in which the ceiling existed, you would have that many full-time people. You'd get rid of all the temporaries. You'd send them home on the 29th and say come back the first of October, because it's a new

fiscal year. Now what happened was that OMB and the Congress said that's very inefficient. So what they've done is, they've taken off ceilings, so yes we have more people on the payroll than we used to at the end of the year only because we don't have to throw them off any more. In other words, you used to hire temporary workers and then get them off the rolls. I don't want you to get the impression that the Defense Department has gone out and hired all of these extra people. You have a different way of accounting for them than you used to. So you don't have to hire the person temporarily and send them home at the end of the year to make a number.

Q: Does that mean you don't still have those temporaries? They all have been converted to full-time? Is that what you're saying?

A: You hire temporaries, but you don't send them home at the end of the year. You see, when those numbers are given, they are at the end of the fiscal year. Whether the person is temporary or full-time, he or she counts against your number. Previously you took the temporaries and sent them home, and so by and large you just counted the full-time permanent people, and the number looked different.

Q: Well most of arms control is talking about what the United States does and what Russia does, and the concentration has been on the United States and Russia. Personally, I'm not as afraid of Russia as I am Third World countries and radical groups. What is being done to bring them in, especially the third world countries, into the arms control process?

A: Well, when you talk about arms control, particularly in the strategic area, the United States and the Soviet Union are so far ahead of everybody else, I mean in terms of the number of weapons, that they are the ones focusing on it, and until they can solve their problems, their technical problems and the political problems, you don't want to open it up to lots more people. It would just compound the problem. There is some proliferation of nuclear weapons and Ambassador Laingen will talk to you about terrorism. And obviously that's a new phenomenon, it's something with which you have to deal. One of the things we're doing in the Department of Defense is increasing our emphasis on what we would call special operations forces. If you look at the proportion of the budget that goes to that, compared to say five years ago, it's gone up, much more than star wars. Because that is a real problem. And there is a great deal of instability in the world. That's why we have talked about Asia and Africa, instability there could lead to war and possibly a superpower confrontation, that you have to be very, very, very careful.

Q: You hear about all these books, like the Luttwak book that talks about The Pentagon and the Art of War, and the waste in the government. And there are always these studies about reorganizing the Pentagon, and the thing could be more efficient. From your perspective, are there, in fact, things that could be done in the Pentagon decision-making process that would result in more readiness for the dollar spent?

A: You asked the question whether we could get more out of the dollar. Remember, first of all, that the Pentagon, like HEW, HUD, or any of the others, is a government agency. Government agencies do not have as their primary motivation, their primary criteria, efficiency. The founding fathers set it up that way. If you ask me is there waste in the Pentagon, sure. Is there more waste than in other government agencies on a proportion basis, I would think not. But since our budget is so much bigger, probably in absolute terms, the answer is yes. Are there things you can do about waste? Sure. For example, I've been there almost five years now. I have yet to have a budget passed on time. Now, that leads to a great deal of

inefficiencies because you don't know how much money to plan on. My office has responsibility for about 70 percent of the budget. And I mean you know we're running to borrow money from the Social Security account to meet payrolls, and putting people off. It's inefficient. But what is the tradeoff? The tradeoff is popular control. Congress looks at our budget in great detail and they make the decisions. Similarly, we can't do any long-range planning because we can't get long-term commitments. Now, you take a program like the F/A-18 aircraft. A very expensive aircraft. We had originally hoped that by now we would be buying 180 of them a year. We're buying 84 after we have gotten through Congress. So that leads to inefficiencies because we can't get the economies of scale that we would like. Do we need more competition, sure we need more competition. But everybody's for it in the abstract, except when we say, okay, in your district now, you're building this, we want to compete it over here. So they'll say, well, we didn't quite mean it that way. I mean the best example we can give you is the M-1 tank engine. It had lots of problems when it came out. We tried to compete it. The people from AVCO got to the Congress, and there is a law that says we can't compete the M-1 tank engine. Now that's good for you if you work for AVCO, but is it good for the Pentagon or the country. And my favorite example, if you want to talk about waste, is coal. We have 325,000 troops in Europe. We'd like to keep them warm in the wintertime. It gets pretty cold over there. The most efficient way to keep them warm would be to use oil from the Middle East, or from Norway or Great Britain. However, we cannot, by law, convert our coal furnaces to oil. It's a law. The Germans are furious about this situation because we are causing pollution problems. Should we compete the coal? If we competed the coal, where do you think we would buy it from? Europe. But talk about bringing coals to Newcastle, we have to buy it in the United States and then ship it over in subsidized American ships. Now you're talking about \$300,000,000 a year in extra spending to protect the coal industry. Now that's fine, because if the people want to do that, they can.

Q: I don't want to ask a content question, but I want to ask a procedural question. I'm from academia and I guess when I came here I was expecting by the end of today I'd walk away with some new information that I didn't have. I don't think of myself as being terribly knowledgeable in this field, but I feel like I am at a Reagan pep rally with many of the speakers. And I don't mean that as bad. I'm wondering how do we work to focus the speakers to some real substantive subject area, rather than saying I have a list of these four goals, these are our main problems, and to get into some real issues if you're looking to train women, to get them the information. I don't see any real information that is going to be of use to many women here today.

A: Well, we're back to the problem that lead to the first question. We're dealing with a diverse audience. Some people have a rich background in defense, some people do not. This is not the only education program we have. There are lots of other programs in which I've participated, that present different points of view. All of the people who work for the various departments usually support what that department does, or they probably wouldn't be working for them. Not all of the people are Reagan appointees. Ambassador Nitze's been around a long time. In fact I think he is a Democrat. He is, okay. You have Helene Boatner, a career employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. So we haven't gone out and said let's get the most ardent people that we can, we wanted you to be exposed to the people making the decisions. You may not agree with them, any of the people

that have been there, but they're the ones who are giving the advice; we thought you ought to hear what they're saying.

Q: Oh, I understand that, but I guess what I would like, or maybe I'm trying to find out how we can focus on -- somehow we survived the four years of the Carter Administration and lived through it -- how do we get the more historical perspective into how we got to the situation we are in, what led to these being our four goals.

A: Maybe that would be something we might think about, but again, we're back to the what do we do? Do we make it completely contemporary, or what mixture do we have there. It's a dilemma. I agree with you.

Q: I have a question on a different issue. I would like to say that I think you are a very good sport for subjecting yourself to all this. I've not been quite satisfied with the answers that were given by a couple of speakers today with respect to the decision that was just announced on the SALT Treaty. And I understand the rationale that was given, but someone that I respect very much is fond of saying that the behavior which you reward is the behavior that you keep getting more of. And I'm wondering if we're rewarding the Soviets by dismantling a nuclear submarine, whether we're going to get the behavior that we want in the future. The other question I have is, I believe that Ambassador Nitze quoted the President as saying he was going the last mile, and I want to know if there is going to be another mile after that one.

A: Well I think, first of all you've got to remember that anybody in an Administration, anybody who accepts a political appointment, whether it is at my level or the Secretary of Defense's, or whatever, makes his or her views known within the policy process. After that they have to support the decision or leave. I don't know what the Secretary's position was. I know what I read in the newspapers, just like you do. Let me try to put your question into context. First, you have a technician that comes up with some sort of solution or way to do things, and then you have the public administrator who takes the technical solution to see if it can be framed into law. Then you have the politician, who is elected and stands before the people, who decides whether or not it can get popular support. And so you have this process. I think what you have here is President Reagan, who is a tremendous politician, and understands all of the factors. He listens to the Defense viewpoint, the State viewpoint, the Allied viewpoint, the arms control viewpoint, whatever, and concludes, at this time that this is the best decision in order to accomplish our goal, which is to bring stability into the arms race. Now history will judge whether he has walked too many miles. Or whether this is the right decision, and it's very hard to judge those things, certainly immediately. And obviously you're going to disappoint some people. If he had taken another decision and had said, okay, what we're going to do is we're not going to dismantle that Poseidon submarine, we're going to leave it out, I never did like SALT, I'm under no obligation, then you would have other people saying, what is your goal? Do you want arms control? But I think what you see here is the political process at work, and you see somebody listening to all points of view. I can assure you that your point of view was communicated. That I know for certain. Okay, and then you have somebody who makes that judgment. And that is what elections are all about. We all make mistakes, and we have over the years, as a country, made mistakes on both sides of the thing. They recently released the papers of the Eisenhower years, and John Foster Dulles, at a Cabinet meeting, announced that he had just told the Japanese Prime Minister, don't ever try to make products that can be sold in the United States. Sell

them out there in Southeast Asia. The Americans will never go for the stuff that you people make. And hence, we have, you know it was a mistake, but in 1953 it seemed like a reasonable point of view.

Q: You alluded to this earlier. Every time economies are discussed, it seems that the question of consolidating the services is broached. Do you feel there is any potential for either a full consolidation, or perhaps a partial consolidation, of some of the functions of the various services?

A: Well let me give you an analogy. If you take a look at our Federal System, the 50 states, you would say, it's kind of an inefficient way to run things. I mean problems are really regional now, and whether you are talking about drinking or banks or pollution, or whatever, it's a regional thing, but yet we have these sovereign states that can make these decisions. And you say, gee, if we had it to start over again, maybe we wouldn't do it that way. You've got a similar situation. You have had long historical traditions of four separate armed services. The Canadians, who are smaller than us, tried to bring them together, and now they are starting to push them back apart again. So, it's not quite clear that one would want to push them together completely, I just think that is completely unrealistic. Now, when we talk about partial consolidation, in effect, that's the way we have been marching since 1947. For example, when they first created the Office of the Secretary Defense, he had three assistants and 50 people in the office. Nowadays, people would say we have about 300 times that, maybe not quite, but lots more people overseeing the Services. We have the Defense Logistics Agency, which has taken over a lot of the logistics functions. You've got the Defense Intelligence Agency, so you have a lot of that. And I think the real question is at this time in our history, given the amount of money we have to spend, given the threat as we see it in the nature of warfare, do we want to go further in that direction. And I think the answer will probably be yes, I think you will see us go along that road, but the way we have in the past, very gradually. At the thirtieth anniversary of the Pentagon, the Public Administration Review asked me to write an article about the 30 years of centralization. And you go back and look over 30 years, you've made a lot of progress in that direction. From year to year, it doesn't look like an awful lot. So I think that's the direction we'll continue to go, primarily for reasons not just of efficiency, because efficiency is not the only thing; it doesn't matter how efficient you are if you lose the war. But the nature of warfare, we do a lot of training in common. You'll see more of those things done.

Q: I think that some of the points that were made about the informational content of this meeting have to go with the fact that the questions being asked now are very different from the questions that were being asked of the speakers. And I think that if you're going to run a Forum like this, I think that this question and answer period, when you're talking turkey, has a lot more value to me than sitting as a passive listener when somebody is just reciting for me.

NOTE: See page 10 for biography of Dr. Korb.



MARK PALMER
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(European and Canadian Affairs)

EUROPE: THE CHALLENGES TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Mr. Mark Palmer

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(European and Canadian Affairs)

It's very nice to be with you this morning. This is the first time that I've come to the National Defense University since I learned to play tennis here as a little boy. My father was in the Navy at the Pentagon, and he taught me to play tennis right in front of this building.

I'm going to try to range a little more broadly than just Europe. My specialty and my current position, and it's been my academic interest back to college, is the Soviet Union and East West relations, which is, of course, at the heart of European security issues.

Those of you who have had time to read the Washington Post this morning know that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the new leader of the Soviet Union, is being proclaimed as a major economic reformer. It reminds me a little bit, this piece this morning, of the pieces that were written about Mr. Andropov when he became the General Secretary of the Party in the Soviet Union, and we were immediately inundated with articles saying that in the evening he took out his copy of Jacqueline Susann, and took out his scotch and his American cigarettes, and sat back and enjoyed the Western world.

Those of us who are conscious of the fact that Mr. Andropov had been head of the KGB for some 15 years had some skepticism about this view that he was really a closet liberal all of his adult life, and was just waiting to become head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to demonstrate his liberalism. And I think that to some extent we are in danger of going through the same phenomenon again, with Mr. Gorbachev, who came from an area not very much bigger than Plains, Georgia; who had not been in Moscow until 1978, except briefly as a student; whose whole career has been as a propagandist and a local party apparatchik. Those of you who have read Arkady Shchevchenko's book, Breaking with Moscow, which I strongly urge us all to read, it's a remarkable book; I think it's the most interesting, insightful, book ever written by a senior defector from the Soviet Union. Shchevchenko was for some time Mr. Gromyko's personal assistant. He was the Under Secretary of the United Nations. He was a man in a unique position, in terms of defectors, to see how the whole system pulled together.

And Shchevchenko, in that book and over some dinner conversations that we have had together, has pointed out that really Gorbachev got his start because in this little Plains, Georgia, that he came from, there was a resort called Mineral Waters, Mineralniodii, and virtually all of the leadership, and more importantly, or at least equally importantly in the Soviet Union, which is not dissimilar from the Mafia in its sociology, not less importantly, the families of the leaders also took their vacations in Mineral Waters, in this little place within his party fiefdom. He was therefore, in an extraordinary position to do favors for people. It is such a system. There was a play at the Kennedy Center a couple of months ago called the "Nest of the Wood Grouse," by a Soviet playwright, a play that is still on in Moscow, which is quite remarkable. But it's a play which, those of you who may have seen it know, was about the third ranking man in the Foreign Ministry, an Under Secretary, and about his life. And he says that his days in the office are easy, that his work really begins when he

comes home at night. And what he means by that, is that's the time when he starts to worry about doing favors to a very elaborate structure of friends and connections.

Many people have puzzled for years about why the Soviet Union works, because at one level it doesn't work very well. If you walk the streets of Moscow or Leningrad, or almost any smaller Soviet city, many Westerners react with just stupefaction that a system that does so little for the people could nonetheless be a superpower. And one of the reasons why it does work is this informal network. And in fact, of course, the system does work very well in some ways. In terms of military power, it is certainly our equal in important indicators, and in some ways our superior. In terms of the situation in Europe in particular, the Soviet Union is ahead of us in very important indicators, in terms of tanks, in terms of divisions, in terms of ready forces, in terms of aircraft. In many, many ways, the Soviet Union outguns us in Europe, both in conventional forces and in tactical nuclear forces, and that has to be a great concern to this country.

We all have been celebrating the 40th anniversary of VE Day. President Reagan, in the speech that he gave in Strasbourg, reminded us all of the great joy 40 years ago when people rushed out into the streets of Paris and sang the Marseillaise, when Churchill appeared at a window in London, and was worshiped and cheered by so many, including many Americans who were in England at that time. It's easy now, 40 years later, when we've had peace in Europe, easy to think that basically the situation is stable there, and in particular, looking at the other regions that you all are covering in this conference, that we should not raise unpleasant issues about Europe. We are accused of trying to destroy arms control when we do. I think their reaction can be explained in a number of ways. First, nobody, of course, likes to hear about violations, but I think they have, to some extent, a guilty conscience. From the third world there have been about 140 wars, conventional wars, since the Second World War, and in Europe, fortunately, there has not been a war. It is easy to sort of say, well, Europe is a lower priority, we should really be concerned about the areas which are manifestly unstable. We should really be concerned about Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Concerned, as we should be about southern Africa, concerned about Kampuchea and Afghanistan, about the places where wars are taking place. About the places that seem on the surface to so socially troubled.

But Europe is still very important. I think that it's critical to remember that the two world wars that have taken place in this century took place in Europe. It's critical to remember that Eastern Europe in particular is not stable. All of us lived through the exciting 18 months when Solidarity in Poland, that trade union which had the vast majority of the adult Polish working force as members, when Solidarity rose and then was outlawed. That was one small indicator of the fact that the political process continues in Eastern Europe. That it is not a stable area. That process still continues in Poland. There are today, for example, 600 underground publications regularly being produced in Poland, which is a remarkable testimony to the courage and the persistence of people striving for sovereignty, for control over their own nation, and for political freedom, for democratic institutions like trade unions, free press, and ultimately, of course, political parties, which so many in Poland want and think is their birthright, think it's natural.

But it's not only Poland that's unstable. The situation, I think, in East Germany for example, is a constant concern, at least to the Soviets and to the East German party. There has not been a rising in East Germany for

some years, but the desire of the German people to be one, to break down the barriers to family contacts, to have more trade, more cultural exchanges, and, fortunately for all of us, the desire to have a single sports team, which has not been allowed, or otherwise they would clearly win every Olympics and every other sport event that ever takes place. That desire is still very much alive.

In a strange way, this is true even in the most backward and isolated country in Europe, Albania, where Hodza, who had been the dictator of Albania, just recently died, and I think not many Albanians wept. Even in Albania there is some dynamism going on; even there in that strange country-- I think, the only country in the world in which no religion is allowed of any kind. There is not a single working mosque, a single church, a single priest, there is absolutely no religion permitted in a country that was deeply religious for most of its history. Even in Albania, there are stirrings again, and things that we're trying to encourage through radio broadcasting and through working with the Italians and others who have relations with the Albanians. We have none.

I would say that even in the Soviet Union there is potential for change, although as somebody who first went there when I was 21, and I've been going back to Russia about every other year now for 25 years, even in Russia there is the potential for change. Many Americans look at Russia and say "Oh it's all hopeless, these are people who basically are apolitical, who are happy if they only have a bottle of vodka, a hot potato, and a warm place to sleep," that that's enough and that they really leave everything else to the leadership. I think that is cruel to the Russian people and historically wrong.

Historically, Russia's history is a history of revolts. First of peasant revolts, and then in this century of a remarkable courage. In 1905, a democratic revolution, and, in February 1917, another democratic revolution which was stolen by the Bolsheviks later that year. It is a country which today has 10,000 political prisoners, and I remember well myself, because I was in the civil rights movement in this country, I remember well myself of how difficult it was in the beginning of the civil rights movement here to get people to take risks, and risks which were in most cases not anywhere near the order of risks that a young Russian has to take to demonstrate his political convictions. But there are today, even with the terrible history of repression and Stalinism and the Czars before that, there are 10,000 people in jail today in the Soviet Union because they do have political courage, because they do have religious beliefs. One of the fastest growing Baptist movements in the world is in the Soviet Union. The Pentacostalist faith is vigorous and alive in the Soviet Union. Catholicism is vigorous and alive in the Baltic republics. Orthodoxy is growing again in the Soviet Union. And one of the reasons why Mr. Gorbachev is quoted in the Washington Post this morning as talking about economic reform so much, and economic reform in the direction really of what we believe in, which is decentralization, giving people the fruits of their labor, increasing the number of private plots, one of the reasons he's doing that is popular pressure.

Most Russians want what most people in most countries in the world want, which is an opportunity to give a better life to their children and that system has not been doing it. It's the only developed country in the world in which the life span is shrinking. There is no other developed country in the world in which people are living shorter and shorter lives. The central reason for that is alcoholism, which is rampant. But it is also

because the hospitals are so grossly underfunded. Many Soviet hospitals, if you walk into the halls you find people lying on gurneys in the hall because there are not enough beds in the rooms. At a public lecture not too long ago in Moscow, somebody asked why is it that we don't convert the beds from psychiatric hospitals into normal regular medical facilities. And the lecturer said with an absolutely straight face, "Go ask the KGB," because most of the psychiatric beds in the Soviet Union are being occupied by political dissidents.

It is therefore, a system which doesn't do well in terms of the people. But I think it's one of the great dangers that we've all faced, and both liberals and conservatives tend to do this, is to believe that because it doesn't work very well for the people, that it won't survive in terms of its military and economic production. We went through a tremendous period in the last few years of virtually everybody predicting the structural crisis in the system. I think that that's wrong. Mr. Andropov was able to shake out an additional 1% of real growth in 1983-1984 by simply introducing more fear, and I think that's precisely what Gorbachev is trying to do now. He is threatening people, and if you look carefully again at the "Washington Post" article this morning, you'll see how much there is talk about firing people, about getting rid of people, about demanding more of people. I think he's a man who is close to Chebrikov, a new Politburo member who is the head of the KGB. He is going to try to be what some people in the party have longed for, a strong leader.

It is a country which in terms of its natural resources is fantastically powerful. It has more gas reserves, and more oil reserves, and more coal reserves, than Saudi Arabia and the United States combined. It has three times as many engineers as the United States. It spans 11 time zones. It is a country which Napoleon and Hitler discovered, two centuries apart, is not easy to conquer, nor easy to bully. It is a permanent, massive super-power and it is growing because of its ideology.

There is another sort of easy belief in this country now, which is that ideology is dead, that we've entered an era of all-out pragmatism, and people point to the experiences in China now with economic reform, and they're rightly, I think, excited by that, as I am excited by it, and by the experience in Hungary, which is a country I spend a lot of time in and a lot of time on. The Hungarians are also doing very interesting economic reforms. People therefore come to the conclusion, really, that, because the system in the Soviet Union is not attractive, and because there are many people who are cynical there, that somehow ideology is dead. I think that's profoundly wrong. If you look at the situation in Nicaragua or El Salvador, or in the jungles in many other countries where you have national liberation movements going on, ideology is very vigorously alive. There are still many young people in the world who believe that Marxism/Leninism is a system not only to bring great justice, but also to bring themselves into power and to sustain power. And it is important to understand, therefore, that we're engaged not just in a military struggle but also a struggle of ideas, a struggle for justice, the struggle for the hearts of people. In that regard, I think frankly that various administrations have not really done a good job, and equally important, the American people have not done a good job.

The League of Women Voters, after the Second World War, went into Europe and did some remarkable work in getting democratic institutions started in Italy and in Germany, and also did that same kind of work in Japan. We were heavily responsible for taking nations that had virtually no

democratic tradition and helping them to become the really vigorous, growing, viable democracies that they are today, rather than right-wing dictatorships, or some form of communist dictatorship. We had that kind of idealism and commitment and activism right after the war and in the early 50's, but we've abandoned it to a substantial extent since then. We're all puzzled when something happens, like Khomeini taking over in Iran, or the problem that we all face now with Pinochet in Chile, or the situation in South Africa. We're all puzzled, and ask ourselves, well, why is it that we have no good alternatives? Why is it that there isn't a democratic option instead of having to live either with racism, right-wing dictatorship, or a communist takeover? I vividly recall when I was Henry Kissinger's speechwriter, talking with him about Portugal when Salazar was about to go. Finally the dictator of Portugal was leaving the scene, and Henry said in that way he had, that there were only three options: anarchy, military dictatorship, or a communist takeover. And I, being an idealistic young American, said that that was rubbish. Why not democracy? Why couldn't there be a better outcome? But, I think the reason Henry and many Americans didn't see that democracy was possible in Portugal was because we had no institutions to help it grow. The League of Women Voters had gotten out of that business, the CIA had gotten out of that business. Our political parties basically don't even exist on the national level, much less on the international level. We have no way, except through our trade unions, of helping democratic institutions grow around the world.

I think the most exciting thing that this Administration has done in the institutional way--and its bi-partisan, it wasn't just the Administration, it was also the Democratic National Committee, Lane Kirkland of the AFL/CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, and a number of other institutions -- was in 1982 with the President announcing it in the British Parliament, we started something called the National Endowment for Democracy, which is designed to give us the capability, the professional capability, to compete in this political realm. To do what the Soviets have been doing so skillfully and so well for so long through front groups, party groups, etc. We now have in a very, still fragile and beginning, form, an organization which gets money from the Congress, but which fortunately the State Department is not able to dictate to--otherwise it would be a disaster if the executive branch could manage it, because every ambassador worth his salt will defend the government that's in power. And the whole purpose of the National Endowment for Democracy is to recognize that politics is the art of leading and managing change. That the world is changing, and should change. That what we as a people stand for is progress not stability. That the highest good is not to go to sleep, it's to try to bring about a better life for people, and particularly in a world which is dominated by right and left-wing dictatorships. The most exciting challenge is to try to bring democracy to all of those countries.

The National Endowment is doing some remarkably good work. It is, for example, in South Africa, funding black trade unions. In Argentina, it helped to fund that remarkable women's group which rose and protested the fact that so many political activists were being secretly murdered by the Army and the Police. In Poland it is helping Solidarity. In China it has founded a journal for \$50,000, which I think dollar for dollar is the best use of government money I have ever seen, a journal designed to get to the 15,000 Chinese students who are in this country today, who are, as many of you know, the children and grandchildren, nieces and nephews of virtually every member of the Chinese leadership. We have in this country, almost

certainly, the next leadership of China, and this journal is a journal of political thought. It's in Chinese and is designed to have them understand a little bit what are the various possibilities for the future political and economic life of China, for \$50,000.

Political action is cheap. That is one of the things the Soviets realized a long time ago. But we, by and large, have not done it, because we haven't understood why it was important to do it, and we've had, as I say, no institutions. In terms of dealing with the Soviet Union I think that sustaining their respect and ultimately winning the struggle of ideas, I think this is as important really as our defense effort.

Let me turn now to what the President and the Secretary are trying to do in the direct relationship with the Soviets. We have been criticized, the Administration has been criticized for taking the nation back to cold war. I think that is profoundly wrong. If anybody brought about the return to the cold war, it was the Soviet Union by invading Afghanistan during Jimmy Carter's Presidency. And the change and the mood in this country came not during this Administration--if you look at the opinion polls, the change came in 1979 and 1980 when all of us recognized there was something basically wrong in the trends that were going on in the world, in what the Soviets called the correlation of forces. If you look at defense spending for example, the United States had reduced its defense spending from 1959 to 1979 by 15% in real terms. During that same period, the Soviets had more than doubled their real defense spending. So whatever the debate is about the absolute size of the Soviet defense budget, the trends were very ominous, and we have gone about correcting those trends.

But we've also gone about engaging them on an extraordinarily wide agenda. I have now about 22 or 23 different items where we are engaged with the Soviet Union trying to work out agreements--everything from the sort of issues that Paul Nitze talked to you about yesterday, the strategic arms talks, which are the most visible, to talks about chemical weapons, conventional forces in Europe, trying to bring about more transparency in Stockholm in terms of our knowledge and our contacts with their forces in eastern Europe, and their knowledge and contacts about our forces in western Europe, to very intense discussions on nuclear non-proliferation, to the talks that we've now had for over a decade between our two navys, which are extraordinarily valuable--I think both of our navys agree about that--to a program we hope will be concluded in the next few months to enliven people-to-people contacts, which the President gave a speech about last June and which he deeply believes. He thinks that part of the problem is that we don't communicate enough with one another as people, and so we are going to try to have a quantum jump in the amount of contacts between our two peoples through an agreement that we're now negotiating with the Soviet government, which would allow, for example, major exhibits to go to the Soviet Union, would allow for the kind of thing which you may have seen on public television, where our students go and debate in Soviet universities and Soviet students come here and debate. There is a whole host of things of that sort.

Mac Baldrige, the Secretary of Commerce, was in Moscow recently talking about an expansion in trade. We have a very precise idea of what we think is legitimate trade. Obviously, grain is important for our farmers to sell to them. We are now selling to the Soviet Union more grain than we've ever sold in history, which is important at a time when we have such a huge trade deficit and when our farmers are experiencing such trouble. So we've been pushing the kind of trade that we think is sensible. At the same

time, we've been working very hard with our allies to stop trade in items which are of strategic significance. It is clearly not in our interests, for example, to sell the Soviets very advanced generation computers, which are immediately usable for defense purposes, and there are a range of other things which we've got to be very careful that neither we nor our allies sell to the Soviet Union or allow to be illegally diverted. And we have a massive program underway to try to stop that.

There is a very active political dialogue. I've just been in Vienna with Secretary Shultz for our sixth, repeat sixth, meeting with Mr. Gromyko in less than a year. I cannot recall, and I've been in this business now for over 20 years, I can't recall a time in which we've had 6 meetings with Gromyko in a single year. So those of you who may be concerned that somehow things are spinning out of control, that we're not in contact, that communications have broken down, that really you shouldn't be concerned about that. I'm not saying you shouldn't disagree with the Administration in other ways about the content of our policies, but Secretary Shultz has developed an extraordinary relationship with Gromyko. They do see one another very intensively. We're going to be seeing Mr. Gromyko twice more in the next three months--at the end of July and again in September. I can't say that I look forward to each of these meetings with great pleasure--Mr. Gromyko is not one of the liveliest and pleasantest men that you'll ever come across. Even Henry, who loved being at the center of the action, and the Soviets are always the center of the action, even Henry really basically couldn't stand him, and was always trying to go see the Chinese so he could get even.

But we are in a period of very intense high level dialogue. You're all aware that the President wants a summit with Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Gorbachev clearly wants one with the President, and we are trying to work out the place and the time for a summit. I am personally quite certain that there will be a summit, precisely when and precisely where isn't yet clear, but I think that both leaders genuinely understand why it's important for them to get together. That we have, and I'm sure Paul Nitze went over this with you, we have really unique capabilities for doing unbelievable devastation and it is therefore, the responsibility of both of the leaderships to try to find ways to try to improve the relationship. But that's not easy, and it requires sophistication on the part of the American people above all.

The one great frustration that I have is what the Soviets have now taken an English term and made it into Russian. My great frustration is the zigzaggy. The Russians now are so used to our oscillations, to our surges of support for defense spending, our surges of realism, which are then followed by a great feeling of we've done enough, let's relax now, war's not imminent, we've got other priorities, which we always do, and they're legitimate priorities, but there is this tremendous oscillation. So the Soviets have gotten to the point where they sometimes think they can manipulate us, playing to, trying to create the atmosphere for an earlier return to a period of passivity again, and wishful thinking. I think that the greatest damage to the relationship really comes from these oscillations. It comes from the inability of professionals like myself to sustain any kind of coherent strategy with the Soviet Union. If we change our policies every week, or every two years, or every four years, we have no strategy by definition. All we have is varying tactics.

The Soviets have a strategy. They are a country that does not change rapidly. They've had Mr. Gromyko as Foreign Minister now for three decades. He is fond of saying to each new Secretary of State, you are the umph

Secretary of State that I've dealt with, 9th, 10th, 11th. I've known every President back to and including Franklin Roosevelt. He was here in the 30's, and dealt with Roosevelt when he, Gromyko, was head of the Soviet Embassy here in Washington. Ambassador Dobrynin has been here since 1962 as the Soviet Ambassador. He knows better than I know where the closet is in the Secretary of State's office to hang his coat in. They are professionals. They have a coherent long-term approach. They put resources into it. They devote a much higher percent of the gross national product to foreign affairs, whether military or political action of the type that I've mentioned. Whatever it is, they are committed, they believe. It is not just cynicism. I am convinced that a man like Gorbachev and his wife, Raisa, that they deeply believe that Marxism-Leninism is right for the future of the world, and they are going about trying to encourage that through subversion, through arming of guerrilla movements, occasionally through terrorism, through a very large military budget, through the fact they have five new ICBM's since we had our last new ICBM, through a range of programs. They are pursuing Soviet interests and their ideas of what the world should be. And unless we understand that, and deal with it, not by just walling them off and getting confrontational and saying we're going to head for war, but by a sophisticated approach that combines realism and strength and a willingness to engage them, and to try to seek agreements. Because we have had agreements in the past, some of them very important and enduring agreements like the Berlin accord, like the Austrian State Treaty which guarantees the freedom of Austria, and which brought about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria. Those are the kinds of things we should be seeking, but we can only get them if we proceed from a basis of strength and stability and seriousness instead of all of this vacillation and naivete, which frankly is what really worries us who have to try to deal from administration to administration with this continuing reality of the Soviet Union.

Well, I think I was only supposed to speak for half an hour and I guess that's about half an hour, so I'd be happy to take questions.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

with

Mr. Mark Palmer

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(European and Canadian Affairs)

Q: You spoke of the dissidents in the Soviet Union, the 10,000 political prisoners, or what not. Can you comment, within the structure, do you see any evidence of pluralism, i.e. trade associations or other groups working within the structure, within the system, making demands upon the system, economical, political demands, and being accommodated?

A: There was a period in the 1960 when a lot of Russian intellectuals believed deeply in that approach, trying to work within the system. For example, there was a whole school of Soviet lawyers who thought that if they could perfect the law and perfect the constitution, that that would be a route to a system based on law and fairness and justice, rather than arbitrary political decisions. There was also in the 60 a major group in the Siberian Academy of Sciences, for example, that believed deeply in economic efficiency and decentralization and reducing the control of Gosplan the central planning organization. But I think they got very frustrated, and cynical, and, therefore, the people now working within the system are, I would say, somewhat fewer. There are still people coming up all the time who have new ideas, but there is no organized, that I'm aware of anyway, and I think we would be aware of it, no organized, coherent sort of force.

One of the most interesting things to speculate about is the military's view of the economy. I've known, and know today, a number of Soviet Generals, and in sort of informal conversations have the sense that they are very frustrated with the inefficiencies of this economic system. For example, very frustrated with the fact that the Soviet Union has to spend so much of its hard currency on food import, when before the revolution, the Ukraine was the breadbasket of Europe, and there's really no reason why they can't feed themselves, no reason in terms of their climate and conditions of soil, etc. I think over time we may find the military is an organized force for economic reform. Another kind of organized force is the scientific community. The only organization in the Soviet Union that really has autonomy, integrity as an organization, is the Academy of Sciences, which elects its members, really elects them, and when political pressures are brought to bear to give somebody membership in the Academy, very often they are resisted. And it is the physicists like, Dr. Sacharoff, Shcheranski, and others, who are the most outspoken political thinkers in the system, which is a kind of interesting phenomena.

Q: I have a two part question, I'd be interested in your opinion of Gorbachev in more detail than you've commented on, and also I'd like to know what areas of the world you feel are particular targets of Soviet expansionism.

A: Well, we're all fascinated with Gorbachev. We had perhaps our best look at him when he was in England. He had that long trip, and Mrs. Thatcher, Prime Minister Thatcher, made what I thought was a rather unfortunate remark, "This is a man I like and can do business with," and Raisa Gorbachev was compared to Jackie Kennedy, which I think does neither one of them very much justice; but anyway, he is a man who clearly works very hard,

and that is, maybe, seems like its not saying anything, but in the Soviet Union it's saying a great deal. He is a man who works on Saturdays, who works very long hours. Ambassador Dobrynin told me that he is the most exhausting Soviet leader that he's ever had to deal with one-on-one, because he asks questions constantly. He's an inquisitive man.

He is at the same time, I find, a slightly ominous man, a man who is very confident of the power of the Soviet Union and of the rightness of the party. His wife's doctoral degree is in Political Philosophy, and he was brought up to his present position in part by Mikhail Suslov, who was the chief ideologist of the party for many decades, and known by everybody to be the toughest, hardest liner, the biggest cold-warrier, if you will, in the whole system. His other major supporter was Andropov, who as I mentioned, was of course the head of the KGB for a long time. So, if you judge by your friends and the men who get you where you are, I think we all should be cautious about where he's trying to take that system.

My view from watching him and seeing a lot of conversations, and we, Americans, have now had some contact with him. The Vice President had an hour and 20 minutes; Tip O'Neill had four hours with him, and Mac Baldridge had two hours, and an American businessman shortly, I won't say who or he'll be mad with me, is going to have another time with him. So we're getting some direct exposure.

He's a man who can deal without a brief, when most Soviet leaders, Brezhnev for example, just sit there and read a piece of paper in a meeting for an hour. They will just sit there across the table and read the piece of paper. One of the reasons why President Reagan understandably was not so keen to meet with Soviet leaders over the last few years was that you had Brezhnev, who was only capable of doing that, and was really getting gaga in his last years. You had Andropov, who started out with a big spurt and then went to bed, literally, was in bed for most of the time he was General Secretary. Then you had Chernenko, who even my Soviet colleagues in the foreign ministry and in the party made fun of constantly, because they thought of him as just a staff aid to Brezhnev, and who also was sick for much of the time. So you've now got a man who's much more active, much younger, physically, as far as we can tell, in good shape, and I think he's going to use his power both domestically by more control and discipline, and internationally.

And now turning to the second part of your question, we've seen for example, in Afghanistan, a much higher level of Soviet military activity. They are using special forces now, much more aggressively than they were a year ago. The level of military shipments from the Soviet Union to places like Nicaragua, for example, doubled last year, and for the first time started moving in Soviet ships, as opposed to proxy ships like the Bulgarians and the Libyans.

I think he's going to lead us a very tough race. One of the Soviets in the Embassy here told me when he took over, "You had your period in '81-'82. You had a new President, Ronald Reagan, he was vigorous, he got you going, he got your economy going, he gave new spirit to the country. Watch us now, because we've got our Ronald Reagan." And I think that there's some truth in that; but, I think in understanding that, we shouldn't think that this is a man who, just because he can get things going, is very attractive. I think he's going to be, in some ways, a neo-Stalinist--frightening in many ways.

Q: You are labeled here as being European and Canadian desks. I'm wondering if you have any time for Canada, and Canada being our nearest neighbor and closest ally and person that we do so much trade with, it's curious to me to see that the State Department still links Canada, which has been separated from Great Britain for some time, but they still link Canada with Europe on that desk. Don't they know and study, give more attention to Canada?

A: Well, I think that's a good question. We are improving in that regard. It used to be just called the Bureau of European Affairs, and Canada was a part of it, but we didn't have their name listed. We've now moved to expand the title, at least, to mention Canada, and in addition, for the first time we have a Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of just Canadian affairs. He works on nothing else. He is a political appointee very close to Jim Baker. An extraordinarily able man. And I think the Canadians, under this government, feel that we are indeed giving them much more attention than we have in previous years.

Q: What's his name? Does he know anything about acid rain?

A: He spends about 40% of his time on acid rain, and his name is Jim Needeth, and I think you'd enjoy talking with him.

Q: Samuel Huntington has referred to this kind of oscillation as light switch diplomacy, particularly in regard to East-West trade. Given the fact that we so often feel the need to respond to particular Soviet actions, such as shooting down of KAL-007, and particular actions in support of national liberation movements, can we develop a consistent policy that will allow us to be flexible enough to respond to those events?

A: I think this is an absolutely fundamental question, and it's the hardest issue we face, because it is, as Secretary Shultz said in his speech, the best speech I think given on Soviet affairs in many years, was the speech he gave last October to RAND. If you all want to read in it specifically, this problem that the whole speech is about. He says in that speech that it is absolutely predictable that the Soviets are going to do things that, as a people, we find justifiably outrageous. Whether it's the shooting of Major Nicholson, and then immediately saying that they were right to have done it, that it was his fault. That's the same thing they said about the Korean Airliner, that it was the fault of the United States that the airliner was shot down. And Afghanistan, and you can go on with a very long list. The thing that is most on my mind and in my heart right now is that there is a man named Yuri Belavlenkov in Moscow, who is married to a wonderful American woman. They've been married for three years. They will not allow Yuri to leave the Soviet Union to join his wife. He is on the 71st day of a hunger strike. He is coughing up blood, and he is likely to die. And it is that sort of thing which does outrage us and should. If we ever loose that outrage, we will be less as a people.

At the same time, we have certain fundamental, long term interests, like trying to control the nuclear arms race and keep it from spinning out of control, like dealing with the situation in Nicaragua, and on and on. So, I think that what we need to do, we need to get a new sobriety and realism about the Soviet Union. Predict in our own minds that they will do these terrible things and try to deal with them on the ground, or as Al Haig used to say, go to the source. We ought to have a good capability for dealing with problems like Nicaragua and Afghanistan and Angola and Ethiopia and so many other countries. One of the tragedies for me is that so many

Americans look at Ethiopia and we pour out our hearts. Now that the money coming from that wonderful song, the goods and the money, is finally arriving in Ethiopia, we all feel terrific about that, and that's absolutely right. I bought the album myself. But the fundamental problem in Ethiopia is the government, it's a Marxist government which does not want peasants to have their own land and to farm in the way the Chinese are finally understanding is the only way farmers want to farm, which is their own land.

And so, the problem that we face is to understand in a longer-term context that whole reality, the ideological reality, and to develop the tools to deal with it. Whether they're political tools, economic tools, or CIA tools, or military tools, diplomatic tools, it's a whole range that we need, and then I think we can feel more comfortable when the Soviets do something terrible that we're doing something about the terrible things they're doing. The frustration is that we frequently don't know what to do and don't have any ability to do it. In Afghanistan today we are supporting the Mujahedin, and so I think that most of us feel that at least we are expressing our outrage there in some way.

Q: I have a question in regard to the Summit meeting that's been mentioned with Gorbachev. The President's been criticized in the press particularly, for appearing to be too anxious to meet with Gorbachev, and I'd like you to comment on that. Second, what do you think the President's goals would be, and what do you think you could realistically accomplish with such a meeting?

A: I think the main period when people felt the President was looking a little too eager to meet with Gorbachev was when he was on vacation at the ranch in California. And in trying to understand that phenomenon in my own mind, I think that because there was a peculiar combination of a lot of sun, a lot of reporters, and no news. So they kept asking poor Bud McFarlane and Don Regan, they kept asking because they didn't know what else, and they got onto this subject. Day after day they kept asking, when is there going to be a summit? So, Bud sitting there, and Regan, had to keep coming up with some kind of answers which the media then played.

Actually nothing at all was happening in terms of summitry at that point. There were no new messages going back and forth, there was nothing new happening, and it was not because anybody on the Western White House staff wanted to deal with these questions, it was because the news media had to be doing something to justify the fact that they were there on the beach.

Now, in terms of what might be accomplished, we have, as I mentioned, an extraordinary agenda. Not only do we have all the arms control issues, we have talks underway now with the Soviets on many regions of the world. We recently had talks on the Middle East, on Southern Africa, I will be co-chairing talks very shortly on Afghanistan with the Soviet delegation. We have a very, very big agenda. I don't know how many items, but it's many, dozens, to talk about. In the Soviet system, as Armand Hammer, who's been going there longer than any living American, he celebrated his 87th birthday recently. Armand Hammer said to me once, it is a system in which everybody is afraid of the man just above him, and the only one who isn't afraid and who can make decisions is the man on the top. So it really is critical for the President to establish a relationship with the man at the top and we now have a man at the top which we really -- (Blank spot on tape)

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Q: If the National Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union is an independent group, do speak for themselves, and they're most concerned and

have expressed it on television in this country as well as elsewhere of the possibility of nuclear winter, which they have also projected, I'd like to know what sort of feeling you have or what sort of feedback you've gotten from that?

A: The feedback from the Soviets or from Americans about nuclear winter?

Q: Well, I think both ways. Are we seriously taking their scientists and using the fact that they are concerned to make our impact, not only there, but here and in the rest of the world?

A: Yes, I think the answer is yes, the Pentagon, and maybe Linda might want to comment on this, but that the Defense Department, the President's Science Advisor, and many others in this country, including the State Department, have taken the nuclear winter question very seriously. We've spent and are spending money on the phenomenon. We have talked to the Soviets, as you mentioned there are some common efforts between our scientists in that field. There are lots of differences, and I'm not an expert on nuclear winter. I know there are various views about precisely what would happen.

As a layman, or semi-layman anyway, in this area, I think all of us understand that if there is an all-out nuclear war, the results are going to be unbelievable. So it's important to try to understand precisely what they would be, but, at least in terms of my own priorities, it's even more important to prevent it from happening. And perhaps nuclear winter, the concept, is helpful in making us all aware of how important it is to prevent it from ever happening.

Q: Given your analysis of Gorbachev, do you see any light at the end of the tunnel for the plight of the Soviet Jewish refusniks?

A: I spend at least as much time on that issue with the Jewish organizations here and with the Soviets, as I do on anything else, and it is at least as frustrating as any other issue that I have to deal with with them. We had in January, February, March, April, as you may be aware, a very tiny, but nonetheless perceptible, steady increase in immigration, and then May was a disaster; it went down to 52 Jews were allowed out of the Soviet Union, which was even lower than the average of 80 a month that we were getting out last year and which is a historically low level.

I was the consul in Moscow in 1970, dealing with this issue there, and we're back down to those kinds of really abysmal levels. I heard from somebody that elements of this leadership are openly, among themselves, anti-Semitic, and that doesn't surprise me because, of course, Russians are, as a people, unfortunately, there is a heavy element of anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism sometimes can express itself in wanting to get them out, which for the sake of the Jews would be the best way of having it expressed, but sometimes also it expresses itself there in resentment about their privilege in being allowed out. Why shouldn't we be allowed out? We Russians, we Georgians, we Ukrainians, etcetera? And that's the way it now seems to be being expressed.

The only thing I can say, I guess, is to quote Dobrynin. Dobrynin says that when our relation to the atmosphere is good, then a lot of things are possible in this area. When the atmosphere is tense and difficult, then nothing is possible, and right now they're not sure what the atmosphere is. It's sort of, in their view, kind of gray. Not necessarily bad, but not yet good either.

So at this point all they're saying to us when we raise it, and the Secretary, George Shultz, is as determined about this issue as any Secretary I've ever worked with, really more than any. And he raises it, Gromyko hates it when he does, but he always raises it in every meeting, and he raises it right up front, which really gets Gromyko's teeth on edge. But anyway, they always say you're interfering, you're trying to interfere in our internal affairs. We will not tolerate it. And that's all they say now, which is like one hand clapping, it's very frustrating. There really is no dialogue now on that subject.

Q: I enjoyed your rather candid talk on the Soviet Union, but since you chose to take the hour that's slotted for Europe and discussed East-West relations, not multilaterally, but bilaterally, between the United States and the Soviet Union, do you think we can solve the Soviet problem ignoring Western Europe?

A: Solve the Soviet problem where?

Q: By ignoring Western Europe, which is what your talk seemed to do.

A: By ignoring Western Europe. No, I'm sorry if I ignored Western Europe. It's partly because my boss, Richard Burt, who was originally going to come here had to be in Europe now, and he's an expert on Western Europe, and I'm an expert on the Soviet Union, so you got what I felt was my expertise.

But anyway, no, we certainly cannot ignore Western Europe. It is, as you have seen from the President's trip there last month, at the center of our foreign policy. Shultz spends more time with our NATO allies than he does with practically all the rest of the world put together. And we again, as you know, have more of our forces there than we have anywhere else, and should, it is our highest priority. When I mentioned our concern should not fade, and we should remember the fact that two world wars broke out there and only there, that should be a sobering reminder that that is our highest priority in foreign affairs. I guess part of the reason I spent as much time as I did on the Soviet Union, other than that I know something about it, is that I think in dealing with the West Europeans, how we manage the Soviet/U.S. relationship and the overall East/West relationship is central, and when you talk to West Europeans that's really almost all they talk about, is the East/West relationship. They are deeply concerned because they're on the front line, that we manage it well, both in terms of strength and in terms in negotiations. At the Ministerial, which just took place last week in Lisbon, for example, virtually all of the time was taken up by the subject that I've just discussed. But I think I also have addressed the West Europeans' concerns.

Q: Yesterday, we had several questions regarding the President's decision on SALT II, and I hope the group bears with me, because I'm still concerned about the President's decision on it. Given the background, you've already provided this morning, and your insights on the personalities of the Soviet and their strategy and so on, how do you see this decision affecting whatever they do, no matter what SALT II requires both nations to do?

A: TASS, the Soviet press agency, yesterday issued a long statement, and you might want to look at it, because they are very unhappy with the President's decision. They feel, or at least they've been writing and the press spokesman for the Foreign Minister, Mr. Lomako, stated yesterday, that this is a trick. That, in fact, the President has made a decision to gradually back away from the SALT II restraints; that he has proclaimed the

right to go ahead with Midgetman and a new ICBM, that they are innocent of any violations of the SALT II and SALT I regime, that we are trying to destroy arms control.

I think their reactions can be explained in a number of ways. First, nobody, of course, likes to be accused of violations. But I think they have, to some extent at least, a guilty conscience. They know very well that, for example, in the area of telemetry encryption of coding data coming from missile tests, that they are violating the SALT II limitations. Because they are encoding virtually all of the telemetry coming from those missiles, and that is a direct and clear and unambiguous violation of SALT II. It is also crystal clear that the SS-X-25, their new single warhead mobile ICBM, that that is a new type of missile. I could go on, but, I think they also resent what they believe is the President setting himself in judgment on them, and in their view giving a certain probationary period between now and November 15, when Secretary Weinberger is supposed to issue his study of the consequences of their violations and what we should do in programmatic terms. Another reason why I think they're very unhappy is because they are used to having their way in the propaganda game. They now find in Ronald Reagan, a man who as the cliché has it, is a great communicator. And because they believe that that is so central to the game of power, they are worried that he is convincing people of things like the possibility of having a strategic defense, which could make offensive missiles less important, and ultimately lead to a world which was less threatened by nuclear war. That is an attractive vision for many people, not by any means for all people, but for many. Therefore, Soviets have said to me that it is worrying to them that he may "fool the masses" into believing his visions, and so to some extent they're playing catch-up ball.

Just one example of this, and then I'll stop. When we were in Vienna for the meeting with Gromyko a couple of weeks ago, the Soviets are so nervous now about our PR abilities in this Administration, that they've gotten to the point where they want to brief as fast as we do, and if possible brief even faster. Now, twice, they have issued press statements before the meeting ended about what went on in the meeting, and made mistakes. In this case they said the meeting went three hours, which was its scheduled time, but, in fact, it went six hours. This should be an embarrassment, but they did yesterday, these TASS statements, I think, were written way before the President's announcement--in fact, don't really jibe with the announcement. They were based on a worst case outcome, but they went ahead with them anyway.

Q: I was in Bulgaria last year for five months on a Fulbright, and I had the occasion to talk to many anti-communists there, and President Reagan has a solid constituency there, by the way, if he doesn't know it. However, they are very frustrated, disturbed and angry that their friend is doing less for them than President Carter with his Human Rights program. Would you comment on that?

A: In Bulgaria? I'm surprised to hear that, because in Poland, for example, we have studies from the Central Committee's own Sociology Institute, where they've done opinion polls in Poland. The opinion polls in Poland, when people were asked who was the most popular man in Poland, they say first the Pope, which was natural, and second Ronald Reagan, which is a little surprising, because he's been very good about Solidarity from their point of view. He's been very good to Walesa. We just saw Walesa last week again in Poland. He again said how grateful he was for what the President has been doing in Poland.

I'm not sure why the Bulgarians would have a different attitude. It could be in part because we haven't spent as much time on Bulgaria as they'd like. I mean it's not a very high priority in our scheme of things. We haven't had high level visitors, I guess I'm the highest level visitor that's been to Bulgaria in the last few years. So maybe they feel a little ignored. But our radio broadcasts, etcetera, certainly have been covering the human rights situation in Bulgaria, very heavily to them. Concern, for example, of the Turkish problem, where they're doing this forced name change of Turks and Turkish villages, and other elements of the human rights situation. Well I'm glad to hear that, we'll see if we can't pick up in some way.

Q: Going back to your statement, that the Soviets have a very clear focus about what they want to accomplish and that we don't. I think that since they don't have free elections, they can stay in power as long as they can control it. Can you comment a little bit about the sort of divisional risks between Commerce, State, and Defense, as being one of the big reasons why we don't have a focus, and the fact, you know, going back as far as Juanita Krebs, anything she tried to do to build up Commerce on non-technical things was always blocked because she had this theory that trade would help make them interdependent. We have these open rifts. Is anything going to be done to help resolve that?

A: Well, it's a constant process, of course, of trying to work together. Sometimes it works well, and sometimes it just doesn't. Having now been part of it for long, and I sense you also are, I'm not sure that I'm optimistic that it will ever really be resolved. There are certain functional interests that different agencies have that are always going to create certain tensions. The one thing, I guess I do feel now, is that I think that the NSC is working well, the staff of the NSC. I have lot of respect for Bud and for his staff. I think they are playing the right kind of role for them, and that there are therefore less problems between State, Commerce, and the NSC, anyway, than there frequently have been in the past. And I don't know, Linda, if you wanted to comment on Defense-NSC relations, and I can't judge that, but I do think that part is working fairly well, as well as I've ever seen it.

Q: Sir, when Gorbachev first came into leadership of the Soviet Union, there was much discussion in the press, etcetera, and in our classrooms, about whether he would be able to consolidate his power. I was wondering if you would comment on whether he has done that, or whether we would know or not.

A: Well, I think the real answer is, we don't know. But that doesn't stop us from speculating. It's interesting that he has brought into the Politburo as quickly as he has, some men who clearly are close to him, three men in particular. Lekachov, who is the head of personnel to the Party, which is the most important Party power, and who probably will be the number two man in the Party; and therefore, if Gorbachev had a heart attack or somehow was killed, would probably take over. So we think that he's brought up to full Politburo status just a month ago a man who's very close to him, and who will be very, very powerful. He has also brought a man named Rechkov in as a full Politburo member, who is the Tsar of the economy, and who is in his 50s (54), who seems to be a very able man. And he has, as I mentioned earlier, made Chevrykov, the head of the KGB, a full Politburo member, and we know that Chevrykov is close to him.

So we now guess, and that's why I say nobody really knows, but we now guess that he has a majority of 8 to 6 in the Politburo. That doesn't mean that he can stop acting within a collective. The one thing that Stalin, the legacy that Stalin left the leadership in that system, was a great fear of the situation in which you had a arbitrary, single, all powerful ruler. Krushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, none of the successors have been able to be all powerful. They have had, as individuals, more power than other members of the Politburo, but they have not been all powerful, and they've all had to take into account the views of the others. I think that Gorbachev will also clearly have to do that for some time. Whether at some point in the future, two, three, four, eight years from now, he may emerge stronger than any of his post-Stalin successors, we'll have to wait and see. I'd be surprised if he ever became as absolutely powerful as Stalin was. But he may approach it, because he has the longer life span and he seems more vigorous and perhaps more ruthless than some of his immediate predecessors.

DR. BRADY: We're going to have to stop there. I'd like to thank you Mark, for joining us today and addressing some of these questions. Thank you.

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Mark Palmer majored in Soviet Studies at Yale University, graduating Phi Beta Kappa in 1963. He worked briefly at the "New York Times" and WNDT-TV. Joining the Foreign Service in 1964, he has served overseas at American embassies in India (1964-66), the Soviet Union (1968-71), and as Counselor for Political Affairs in Yugoslavia (1975-78). In the State Department, he has worked on NATO security affairs (1968-68), and as a member of the Policy Planning Staff and principal speechwriter to Secretaries Rogers and Kissinger (1971-75).

Mr. Palmer was Director of an office in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs dealing with a range of strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional weapons issues primarily relating to the Soviet Union (1978-80). He was given the Department's Superior Honor Award for his work in this area. From 1980-82 he was first Deputy for Policy in the Bureau of European Affairs and then Deputy to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

In his present position, Mr. Palmer is responsible for developing policies and managing our relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. He has the personal rank of Minister-Counselor.



AMBASSADOR VERNON A. WALTERS
U.S. Representative to the United Nations

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: CHALLENGES TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Ambassador Vernon A. Walters

U.S. Representative to the United Nations

I'm here this morning, as I understand it, to talk to you about the challenge to U.S. foreign policy. I'm glad I'm not talking to you about the United Nations, because having been there for two weeks, I am at a peak of ignorance I never expect to reach again during the coming years. I've just been on a trip to Europe to see our principal allies and coordinate with them.

The challenges to our foreign policy exist in many, many areas. I suppose the biggest challenge is in our relationship with the Soviet Union. And I have feeling that Mr. Palmer may have talked to some extent about that. I just think that one of the problems we have with the Soviet Union is the innate expansionist nature of Russia, and I don't say Soviet Union. The expansion did not start with the Soviets, it was going on long before that. They took over a large part of Central Asia, Samarkhan, Bokara, parts of Azerbaijan, and others. If you look at a map 150 years ago, they were all Rumanian or Turkish. So there is something inherently expansionist. It's curious. They have a population only slightly larger than ours, they have a territory three times larger than ours, and they still feel the need for more. So it's a rather curious phenomenon.

Of course, one understands some of their problems. In 1913, the Russian Empire was the largest exporter of grains and cereals in the world. The Soviet Union, after 72 years as an efficient communist organization, is now the largest importer of grains and cereals in the world, and they have farmland three times the size of ours. Their population is only very slightly larger than ours, and they are still unable to feed it. They are laboring along with a political and philosophical concept that was conceived for a Charles Dickens world that no longer exists, and they will not adjust that system. They are the most conservative nation on earth. They won't change anything, where as, in our system, you can change anything as soon as you get enough people to agree with you to make those changes.

One of the things the Russians are laboring on there is this archaic political and social system, which really has very little connection with the last years of the 20th century and how to adapt to it, and who can adapt to it.

Now the Chinese have already begun to make adaptations to their system. They are more pragmatic in the sense that when something doesn't work, they make changes to it. Now to me its absolutely fascinating that Mr. Gorbachev was chosen as the leader of the Soviet Union. He has been intimately associated with the Soviet agriculture program; and, if there is one thing that has not worked over recent years in the Soviet Union, it is the agricultural program. You know, it seems that failure leads to success. Had he been involved in some of their successful things, like space, or some of the other things they do, I could understand it. But to pick a loser to lead you is a peculiar way of doing business. Nevertheless, they have a peculiar way of doing business.

The relationship with them, I think, is largely based on what they perceive us to be. Lenin did say, "Probe with bayonets. If you find steel, probe somewhere else." So I think with us, they push until they find resistance, and then they try somewhere else. From the day we signed the NATO treaty, they haven't really pushed against the NATO front from the

Mediterranean to the Arctic Ocean. But they've pushed elsewhere in the world, and they've had considerable success. If you look at a map of the areas under their control or allied to them in 1945 and you look at it now, you will find there is an enormous increase. I would simply say that none of that increase has occurred during President Reagan's time. They have not been successful in grabbing a single new country since he became President of the United States, whereas they grabbed them regularly at intervals before.

Of course now they're enmeshed in Afghanistan. If they had an American type public opinion and American media to bring this to the attention of the Soviet people, they would be out of Afghanistan by now. Since they don't, and I think we have to remember what James Reston said, he said, in the end, it was the media who brought the war into the American home and forced the withdrawal from Vietnam. And that isn't a right wing conservative saying that, that's Scotty Reston, the editorialist of the New York Times, saying it. And since they have no pressures on them of this type, no one is telling them about the horrible fate of their boys in Afghanistan, they simply are not subject to the same kind of pressures. I think, however, they are somewhat pragmatic and would like to get out in some respects. I think we have to be firm and patient with them. For 17 years, and this I was well aware of during the time I was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, they were spending twice as much as we were on arms, out of a gross national product less than half the size of ours. That produced a serious imbalance, which President Reagan found on coming into office, and he set about trying to normalize that. Nothing is more tempting than weakness. One of the most provocative things in the world is weakness, especially to a people whose philosophy is "probe with bayonets, and, if you find steel, probe somewhere else." Now I personally, absolutely do not believe in any possibility of nuclear war. It's far too dangerous. They know what it looks like, and we know what it looks like. I am probably one of the senior people now on duty in the U.S. government who has actually seen nuclear explosions. I've seen three hydrogen bombs go off, and I've seen five atomic bombs go off, in 1957, at Eniwetok and Bikini. I've been listening about how terrible it is, and I find it difficult to exaggerate the horrors of nuclear weapons.

Recently, French television asked me what were my thoughts on the V-E day, at which time I was a young Captain. I said my thoughts on V-E day were, "Gee, I'm glad the killing has stopped in Europe, now I hope it will stop in Japan." The Frenchman said to me, "Oh, that's right, for you there was still Japan." I said, "Yes, for me there was still Japan." There were about three million of us waiting to invade Japan, the cost of which was estimated at one million Americans dead and five million Japanese dead, had we not used a nuclear weapon. As one of the ones who might have been one of the one million casualties on our side, I would say that I can not quarrel with Mr. Truman's choice.

Mr. Truman was an extraordinary man. I read his statement before the National Security Council, when he decided to intervene in Korea. He said that he knew that one day he would have to stand before God, and answer for everything that he had done, and for all the young lives that were about to be lost because of what he was about to do, but, nevertheless, in the fulfillment of the oath that he took as President of the United States, he had to intervene in Korea. So there are responsibilities, and there are people who must think of those responsibilities.

Now with the Soviet Union, and as I have said, I do not believe in any possibility of nuclear war. The idea that a nuclear war could occur by mistake or by error is absolute nonsense, if you know anything about how it's controlled, and how the only way the order can be given to use these weapons. It's absurd to think that some Doctor Strangelove situation, or any other crazy movie scenario, could go off by mistake. They can't. It's a very complex business. The most difficult thing about a nuclear weapon is to get it to go off. It's not like an ordinary high explosive bomb. You can drop it, you can set it on fire, you can do all sorts of things to it. It's very hard. The greatest secret is to make it go off. So all these scenarios about some crazy general or admiral or somebody setting off a nuclear war is absolutely bunk, and that has no part in our relationship with the Soviet Union--they know it and we know it--because they know how hard it is to make it go off.

So I think if we are patient, and if they find steel wherever they probe, I think they will find the cost of this just too much for their economy. As I say, they're expending more money than we are on arms out of a gross national product less than half the size of ours. And just before I close on that item, Harold Brown, who was Mr. Carter's Secretary of Defense, said, "We build, the Soviets build. We stop building, the Soviets build."

Right now, they're asking us to give up what some people call very erroneously, Star Wars, and they're making it a precondition for the arms talk negotiations. Now what they're asking us to do is give up something they're already, and have been, working hard on for a very long time, and if they get it first, the world is going to be upside down. This is a purely defensive weapon that will kill nobody, and involves the explosion of no nuclear weapons, unlike their anti-missile defense, which involves the explosion of many nuclear weapons. In fact the only effective anti-ballistic missile system now in operation is the one around Moscow. We don't have one around Washington. They have one around Moscow.

Now what they're saying to us is, you give up research on this program, and then we'll discuss what else you can give us, and that simply is not going to fly. It's the old Russian tactic. You give me what I want, and then we'll negotiate what else you can give us.

Frankly, they're not going to get that. They're going to find out that if they want to reach an agreement with us, nothing is for nothing. If they want us to give this up, first of all they have to give it up, and they have not given it up. They have been working on it for many years.

So, those are some of the aspects of our relations, and I think eventually they're going to realize that we're on to them, and then there may be a hope, because this does represent to them an enormous burden. The Russian people are carrying an enormous burden. In many parts of Russia food is rationed, and other things are rationed. They are paying an enormous price for this lust to be first and to have superiority.

Whether Mr. Gorbachev is a realist or not, I can't tell you, I don't know. All I can tell you is in my opinion the Soviet Union is governed by something like a Japanese company, by a consensus, and if you don't belong to the consensus, you don't get into the Board of Directors, much less become the Chief Executive Officer. Now maybe Mr. Gorbachev is more of a realist, and maybe he will, after he's consolidated his power, and he first has to do that, but he seems to be doing it quite efficiently and quite quickly. I think his principal rival, Mr. Romanov, the party secretary in Leningrad, hasn't been seen for five weeks now. So he's probably having an

extended vacation. He's obviously replacing people in other parts of the government with his own people. Perhaps, when he feels secure enough, he will decide that maybe it's worth talking to us without posing impossible conditions or without asking us to do something and offering nothing in return for it.

You know, they deployed some 400 missiles that could strike Western Europe. The Europeans were terrified, and asked us to deploy something in reply, because our strategic missiles are not targeted on the defense of Europe. So we agreed, and then the Europeans began to get a little bit frightened, and we've had all this shilly-shallying around. The difference is that not a single one of the American missiles we have planted in Europe could strike Moscow, whereas every single one of the Soviet SS-20s can strike any point in Western Europe, as far out as the end of Spain or the top tip of Scotland. Once again they're asking us to accept total inequality. And when they find out that we will not, I think the prospects may be bright for some reasonable talks with them.

The Soviets have gone, in 15 years, from having a coast guard type navy to a blue water navy capable of projecting Soviet power in any part of the world, and they're pushing all over. I would say, however, that the principal purpose of Soviet foreign policy since the NATO treaty was signed is to discredit the United States in the eyes of its allies, and prove to them that the United States is not a reliable protector. They point to Vietnam, they point to the Cambodian holocaust, they point to Laos, they point to the Shah, they point to Haile Selassie, and say that's what happens to the American's friends. Do you know of any case where the Soviet Union has let its friends down the way the Americans have?

If it is now proved that the United States is incapable of preventing the establishment of a bridgehead of Soviet power in Central America, will not some of our allies be tempted to think the time has come for an arrangement with the Soviet Union, or worse still, to develop their own nuclear deterrence?

Let me just give you my own experience. I was at the U-2 conference in Paris in 1960, after our spy plane was down. Khrushchev, after denouncing us, stormed out of the room. DeGaulle took Eisenhower by the arm and I translated what he said. He said, "I don't know what he's going to do, or what's going to happen, but, whatever he does, we are with you to the end."

Now that was a declaration of unconditional support. Six years later, I came back to France as the military attache, to a France which had withdrawn from the military structure of NATO, and which had gone all out on developing its own nuclear capability. I tried to find out what had brought us from that position of unconditional support to distancing themselves from NATO, and going all out on their own nuclear effort. And, as best I can pin it down, it occurred at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy sent Dean Acheson to show DeGaulle the pictures of the Cuban missiles. DeGaulle looked at them, and unlike most other people in Europe, he didn't say, "Oh God, this is the end of the world," he said, "Take them out." When we did not take them out, he said, "If they're not going to fight for Cuba, 90 miles from the United States, why should I believe they're going to fight for France, 3,500 miles away? And if they're not, I have to draw my own consequences." And if we fail in Central America, we're going to have these temptations before many nations, and I personally would not like to live in a world with 35 nuclear powers.

In addition to that, what is going on in Central America is a typical example of how skillfully they use the fact that there has been poverty, hunger, and injustice, to advocate a remedy that is worse than the sickness. In my lifetime, many major right wing dictatorships have been replaced by democracy--in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Venezuela, and in many other countries. No communist dictatorship, once consolidated, has ever been replaced by anything, with one exception. In 1921, a communist regime in Hungary was overthrown when the Romanian army marched to Budapest and overthrew it.

I spent eight hours with Fidel Castro, and he talked to me about wars of liberation. I said "What you call wars of liberation, we call wars to implant an irreversible communist dictatorship." He said, "Everything is reversible, I'm reversible." I said, "When are you reversible?" He said, "When the people no longer love me." I said, "Mr. President, when that time comes, who do you expect to have the courage to break the news to you?" And of course, nobody can.

Now the other theory is that by our harshness we pushed him into the arms of the Soviets, or we're pushing the Marxist-Leninist government of Nicaragua--you notice I do not say Sandinista, and I'll tell you why in a minute--into the arms of Moscow. I said to Castro, "Is it true that you, on the 6th of June, 1950, said 'I became a communist at the age of 17, I am one, and will be one until the day I die.'" He said, "Yes, I did." Well I said, "That does away with the theory that we, by our hostility, pushed you into the arms of Moscow." He said, "Walters, nobody pushed me anywhere. A careful study of history, sociology, and economics convinced me that Marxism-Leninism offers the only logical explanation of all human history, past, present, and future." Daniel Ortega, in Nicaragua, has said, "Marxism-Leninism is the guide of Sandinismo, and, without Marxism-Leninism, there is no Sandinismo." I don't know how clear you have to be to have that understood by people who still believe this is some kind of a benevolent dictatorship, whose only purpose is to do away with feudal opposition.

The reason why I don't call them Sandinistas is simple. Sandino was a Nicaraguan nationalist who hated communists. When Farabundo Martiz, the founder of the communist party in El Salvador, and whose name is borne by the Salvadoran rebels now, fled to Nicaragua, he went to work for Sandino. But when Sandino found out he was a communist, he threw him out of Nicaragua. So to call this government a Sandinista government is like calling the countries in Eastern Europe People's Democracies. It's not. It's a Marxist-Leninist government.

Now, how did they come to power? Two years before Somoza fell, the U.S. was one of the sponsors of a resolution in the Organization of American States calling for the overthrow of the Somoza regime. Why did we do that? Because these people, these commandantes, the Ortegas and the Borgets and others, said they would have a pluralistic society. They would have a mixed economic system. They would have freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of press. Naively, we believed them.

Eventually, we cut off sale of arms to Somoza and he fell. They came to power. What then happened? Two of the commandantes were received in the White House by President Carter. We made available to them almost immediately \$153 million in aid. This is for a country of two million people, the smallest population in Central America, with an army now larger than all of the others put together. An army large enough, not large enough to stop us, but large enough to terrify their neighbors. Nicaragua has twice tried to take over Central America in the past.

What happened? In the next two years we made available a total, to them, of \$258 million. This is twice as much money as we gave Somoza in the 17 years of his rule. People don't know, but the song of that party calls the United States the enemies of all mankind. Anybody who deludes themselves into believing that these people are not communists and do not intend to set up a government like Cuba is dreaming. They've told us so.

For instance, Tomas Borge was asked, "Are you going to have elections" before the last farce they called an election. And he said, "Yes, it's no use, but we're going to have them." They said, "Why are you going to have them?" And he said, "Because of American pressure." They said, "Without American pressure you wouldn't have them?" He said, "Certainly not. They're a waste of time." Anybody who has any doubts about who these people are, are like the people who read Mein Kampf and said, "Oh no, Hitler is not a dictator. He just wants to get the Germans out of the slavery of the Treaty of Versailles and restore their self respect."

You know, when the Pope made the Archbishop of Managua a Cardinal, he did it with some purpose in mind, and he's fairly well informed on what's going on in Central America. He didn't pick the Archbishop of Costa Rica, or the Archbishop of Guatemala, or the Archbishop of Honduras, or the Archbishop of San Salvador, he picked the Archbishop of Nicaragua, because he's been there and he's seen the farce they've turned it into. The disgraceful spectacle, if any of you have ever seen, the Venezuelan, not the American, the Venezuelan film, that was made on this, you will understand how friendly these people are to religion.

Anyway, we've got an extremely tough problem there, and if we lose, if they succeed in establishing this communist dictatorship, the greatest thing these people will do is arm themselves. Cuba today has practically as many tanks as France, which has five times the population of Cuba. Cuba can put into line, in front line in aircraft, approximately the same number of modern fighters as France, which has five times the population of Cuba. Nicaragua has three battalions of tanks, which is more tanks than there are between the Argentine border and Brazil. This year the Soviets have landed 6,500 tons of arms at El Bluf. Now nobody thinks this is immoral or wrong. Yet, when we give a little help to the people who are fighting for the freedom of their country, this is regarded as something highly immoral, because it's covert action.

The Soviets don't resort to covert action, they resort to overt action. They've got about 3,000 Cubans in there. They've got a couple of hundred Soviets, Bulgarians, PLO, Libyans, and others, and people still wonder whether this regime is what it is? It's hard to believe that people can be that naive, and believe this is really a government dedicated to eradicating injustice and securing land for the farmers.

It's like Vietnam. In Vietnam, they told us all these things about our Vietnamese allies, how horrible they were, they didn't have a free press, and they didn't have this, that, and the other. The only thing I would comment is that, in Saigon, under President Hue, there were 21 newspapers. Sometimes they got fined, sometimes they got suspended, but they reappeared. Do you know how many there are now? One. And that is not progress in the freedom of the press. There were three television channels. Do you know how many there are now? One. And do you know who that newspaper is controlled by and do you know who that television channel is controlled by? The Communist Party of Vietnam.

When American bombs were falling all over Vietnam, when they were fighting in every village, and when all the young men were drafted into the

South Vietnamese army, there were no boat people. It took the coming of the communist government to Saigon to drive two million people out to sea in open boats, of which some 200,000 have died. And how much do we hear about them? Not to mention the three million people who died in Cambodia, in perhaps, in relation to the population, the greatest holocaust of all time.

Do we hear any shame or any repentance from the people who told us "bug out of Vietnam? Nothing can be worse than what's happening now." A very prominent columnist said in 1975, people talk about a blood bath--there won't be any blood bath. Nothing could be worse than what's happening now. Well, if any of you have seen "The Killing Fields," you know what happened.

The most immoral thing I know is not to do what is necessary to preserve human freedom. We've had these examples, and we don't seem to learn from them. We keep saying, it's all our fault. Somehow, we did it. A volcano or an earthquake? The general reaction of the American press, quite frankly, is "Did the CIA or the Department of Defense do it?"

General DeGaulle understood us very well. He once said, "The puritanism of the Americans doesn't prevent them from sinning, but it does prevent them from enjoying their sins," and I think that's a particularly accurate comment. As George Santayana, the philosopher, said, "Those who do not learn from history are condemned to live it over again." If we don't learn from some of these lessons, we're going to live them over again. We must learn what's happened.

I didn't mean to get impassioned about this, but I went to Vietnam as a volunteer. I've been to all the wars of our time. I've been to the Second World War, I've been to the Korean War, I've been to the Civil War in Greece, and I've been to the Vietnamese war, and Viet Nam wasn't any different from any others. It was more unselfish. We were not attacked in Vietnam. We were trying to help a small people, in accordance with Mr. Truman's doctrine, defend themselves against the loss of their freedom to communist aggression. Their freedoms were limited, but they were infinitely greater than what they have now.

A million people have come into this country from Vietnam. Two hundred thousand have gone into France. I've been to the camps in Cambodia, where there are hundreds of thousands. Do we want this repeated? Surely, if we lose in Central America, what we're going to get is fifteen million foot people. They don't have to cross the water, they're going to walk here, or rather the Mexican government will probably bus them from the Guatemalan border to the U.S. border so they can get here quicker. We're going to have fifteen million people, we're going to have to find them homes, jobs, housing, social security, schools, and the rest. This is what is at stake.

People are telling us, oh no, what is at stake is helping these poor little peasants retain land. You know, in Vietnam, the big thing was land for the peasants. Vietnam at war was exporting rice. Now the peasants own no land. The state owns all the land. And Vietnam at peace is starving.

We are the way we are. Ethiopia was one of the most hostile countries in the world to us. They're starving. And we are doing the right thing, we're feeding those people. But you know, it's interesting. We are providing one-half of the food to the starving Ethiopians and the whole rest of the world is providing the other half. The Soviet Union's contribution is tanks for the Ethiopian government. The trouble with a tank is, you can't eat it. And you take Cuba, getting some \$3 billion a year in aid from the Soviet Union, most of which is going into weapons, while the people go

hungry and go without their basic needs. Unless you're a member of the upper cadres of the party, in which case you shop in the right stores, where you have everything.

Anyway, these are some of the problems we have. The United States is not looking for fights. We've released our own colonies, the Philippines and everybody else, Puerto Rico can go any time it chooses to go. We are not a predatory people. We are the only people in the world who have ever financed our competitors back into competition with us. I went to Europe in 1948 which was dark and destroyed. The factories were empty. There were no raw materials. We put machine tools in those factories as a gift. We, through off-shore procurement, bought the raw materials to get the heart of Europe beating again.

When I went to Europe in 1948, the gross national product of the nations which now make up the European Common Market, was six percent of that of ours. It is now larger than ours. If that is the act of a selfish nation, if that is the act of a selfish nation guided by monopolies or multilaterals or big business, I don't know the meaning of the words. Walk outside and see how many German, French, Italian, and Japanese cars you see in the streets. They come into our country paying 8% duty. We go into theirs paying 100% duty. Are these the acts of a greedy, oppressive nation?

We have nothing to be ashamed of. We fought a number of great wars this century. We have not annexed one square inch of territory. We have not compelled one single person to become an American citizen who didn't want to. I think we can stand on our record without fear, and this is what I'm doing in the United Nations. We have these outrageous resolutions that say the United States is helping South Africa's nuclear effort, the United States is selling arms to South Africa. We stopped selling arms to South Africa 18 years ago. None of the people who criticized it have stopped until the last two or three years. The United States was specifically named in those resolutions. This is what I call lynching by resolution.

On the other hand, recently the United Nations passed a resolution on the violation of human rights in Afghanistan. It described the horror, the terror, the atrocities that are being committed. But you can search that resolution from beginning to end, and you will never find the name of the country who has committed those atrocities. That is the kind of outrageous injustice that my predecessor Jeanne Kirkpatrick fought and that I will fight. I think we have to be a lot more articulate and worry a lot less about being loved and a lot more about being respected.

I have spent a good deal of the last four years, as you heard, in 108 countries of the Third World, and I intend to maintain very close relations with them. Many of them vote in the United Nations according to a perceived solidarity. Now I'm not talking just about the Arab votes against Israel or the African votes against South Africa. I'm talking about a number of other issues, where these people often vote against what is in their own interest because of some perceived solidarity. I intend to do what I can to make sure that they try and vote in accordance with what is in their interest.

With Japan we have grave trade and economic problems, but Japan is vital to our scheme of things. It has probably the second largest gross national product in the world today. It has either surpassed the Soviet Union, or it is close to surpassing the Soviet Union. And this is achieved in an atmosphere of freedom, not of slavery. So many people in Africa thought at the outset that you have to trade in your freedom for economic development, and the nations that haven't, like Kenya, or the Ivory Coast, or the Senegal, are far ahead of those who have.

So, we have to make plain our commitments to human rights, and not just among the violations that take place among our friends or among neutrals, because we can have some influence on them--but also among our enemies, to show the world who they are for what they are. I think we have to make plain the United States commitment to freedom, and, in Mr. Reagan's time, it's gone from something like 15 dictatorships in Latin America to four, which I would submit is pretty good progress. Of the four, two are communist and have learned how to solve the problem of succession. The right wing dictatorships have never solved the problem of succession with the death of a dictator. The communist dictatorships have, and they know how to do it.

Finally, I'm going to stop, I've been haranguing you for too long. The United Nations was originally created in 1945, in their own words, "To prevent the scourge of war from afflicting the peoples of the world, who twice in the lifetime of the signers have lived with it." It has gotten away from that. It was originally created to resolve conflict. It has become highly politicized. It has become a forum of resolutions for lynching.

Now, I was asked on French television recently, "Don't you think it's a form of blackmail to establish some relationship between the way people vote in the United Nations and American aid?" I said, "Look, America has no obligation to aid anybody." I'm not talking about starving people, I'm talking about other kinds of aid. Nobody is compelled to accept American aid. Now, if people discover that there is in the future no cost in voting against the United States on patently false issues, they will do so. Nobody votes against the Soviet Union because it results in trouble. They make trouble for you economically, politically, internally, and in terrorism or security. To vote against the United States, however, means nothing happens to you. You're perfectly safe.

I can't tell you how many people, during the time of Grenada, came up to me and said, "Of course we voted against you, but thank God you did it." Well I think we have to tell them that time is passing. You've got to stand up and be counted. We're ready to stand up and be counted for the things in which we believe, and they've got to be ready to stand up and be counted for the things that they believe.

Now, in spite of all that I've said to you, I remain an optimist, first of all because I do not believe there will be a major war, because we are strong enough to make it not worthwhile. I'm an optimist because if you look at the whole course of human history since we came out of the caves, the whole flow of that history has been in the direction of greatest dignity and freedom to the individual. Many tyrants have stopped that temporarily. None has ever stopped it permanently.

The Marxist dictatorship -- it's a medieval dictatorship, masquerading under progressive clothing -- is not going to escape from the inexorable laws of history. It is not sunset. The American dream has just begun.

Thank you very much.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
with
Ambassador Vernon A. Walters
U.S. Representative to the United Nations

Q: Ambassador Walters, if you were given a blank check and could do anything that you wanted to do to fix things in Central America, what would you do?

A: I would proceed to explain to the Contadora powers, and to the Central American people, that all we want is for these people to hold a free election. If they win it, we'll accept it. If they will hold a free election, in which they will allow foreign observers in, as we allowed in in El Salvador, we will accept the results. We have to keep pounding on this and holding their feet to the fire, and we have to put economic pressure on them, or they won't feel it. The Soviet Union and Cuba are already costing them \$3.5 billion. Nicaragua is costing them something. We have to make them conscious of the cost, if they want to go on this way.

In Costa Rica, recently, the President of Costa Rica, whose democratic election I don't think anybody challenges, asked for sanctions against Nicaragua. We have to explain to our own public opinion, we have to explain to the Europeans, and I've just been in England, Germany, France, and Spain, and I'm going to Italy and some of the other countries to explain it, in just the same form that I've said it here. We have to explain what it is we want. We don't want any personal gains for the United States.

As a matter of fact, until President Reagan announced those sanctions, the Nicaraguans were selling 90% of their bananas in the United States and deriving \$40 million a year income from it. I think we have to stop letting them do things like that.

Q: Ambassador, it seems very disingenuous to me to claim that all we want is free elections, when there are a lot of regimes we're supporting in this world--Philippines and many other places--that certainly don't have free elections, and we're not supporting counter-insurgency efforts in those countries to guarantee it.

A: When the counter-insurgency effort, as in Chile, is run by the communists, no we're not. In that case the medicine would be worse than the sickness. You say supporting, we haven't sold one single weapon to Chile for many years. Take others, the Philippines. We have a base there that cost \$600 million. Are the American taxpayers prepared to put up \$600 million to establish such a base somewhere else? There are certain considerations you have to take in. I've been to see President Marcos several times to talk to him about the necessity of democratizing his regime. I've been to see President Pinochet on a number of occasions, to tell him the same. None of these so-called dictators that you claim we support are in any doubt about where we stand on this issue. I'm not as ingenuous as you might think.

Q: I would like to have your observations on the Greek election -- why it happened and your feelings for the future of NATO with Greece as it is now?

A: Greece is a very important country to us. It's a member of the NATO alliance. It's a key country. It is the place where democracy originated. Mr. Papandreou, who came to the United States and became an American

citizen and served in the U.S. Navy is now the Prime Minister. But here again, is perhaps an election we might have wished might have ended some other way, but it didn't, and we accept the result of it. We accept the result, and we hope Mr. Papandreou, with the responsibility of four more years in government, will understand where his real interests lie.

But up to now, you see, when you say and do things against the United States there's no bad consequence from it. Greece is a recipient of a very large amount of aid. I think it's the fifth largest recipient of aid from the United States. They're not getting quite as much money as communist Ethiopia, which is getting \$1 billion. We pay rent for the bases in the Philippines, which we would pay to any regime, if it were a democratic regime. But, we accept the result of the Greek election, and we will do our best to convince Mr. Papandreou that his interests lie with the West and with those people who share the same values as Greek democracy. We didn't march in with our troops to change the result of the election. We accepted it.

Q: I would like to follow up on that question. Mine is similar, but I want to know, the American press will have us know that the reason for the defeat of Mitsotakis was due to a great anti-American sentiment in Greece, and what, if anything, we should or should not be doing to allay that.

A: Obviously, the Greeks feel we should be more understanding of their fear of the Turks. They do not like the fact that we give more aid to the Turks than we give to them, even though Turkey has about four times the population of Greece and maintains the largest ground forces in NATO. They blame us for not being more on their side on the issue of Cyprus, and they have a number of legitimate complaints against us. But, if they had that election today, it is because in 1948 we went in, and I also went in, to help them drive out the communists, with whom they would have had no elections.

I think the Greek people are pretty smart people, and I think pretty soon, the emotion will pass, that we're supporting the Turks on Cyprus, which we're not. This allegation that the United States supports anybody that anybody doesn't like is a widely spread allegation, and it's mostly bunk. We don't support these people.

When we do business with Romania or Poland or Hungary, no one says the U.S. is supporting those red dictatorships; but, if we do business with the Philippines or Chile or somewhere else they say, "You see, there are the Americans, supporting their fascist friends." The United States has fought against red fascism, against brown fascism, and against black fascism. I am hopeful that this period of emotional part of Greek politics will pass, and if you look at most of the other countries, you see this passing in some degree also. You see the recession of the communist party in France; you see the recession of the communist party in Italy; you see the recession of the communist party in Spain. These are Mediterranean countries not terribly unlike Greece, much more developed, but not terribly unlike Greece. I think the important thing, as I say, is that we be respected rather than loved. If we want to be loved by everybody, we're never going to succeed. The rich and the powerful are always hated by many, even those they save.

Q: Ambassador Walters, when you spoke about Central America, you spoke about free elections. I'm wondering if you also think, in light of your previous comments at another forum on the significance of the Marshall plan, would you relate that to the possibilities for a multiple year funding and an extensive economic development program for Central America, as a significant force to change the posture of that entire area around?

A: First of all, I would say I don't think you can buy peoples' minds. We do have a billion dollar program under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. We are giving these people access to the American market. We are giving them another favor by receiving the many, many refugees which come in here, which is a sort of safety valve for many of these countries. We are receiving very large numbers of them. We have 500,000 Salvadorans here and a couple of hundred thousand Nicaraguans, which takes a considerable burden off those countries. These people send money home, and these remittances in hard currency are very helpful.

I would simply point out that American aid to Central America, as a whole, is about a billion dollars. Three-quarters of it is economic. Less than a quarter is military. Of all the aid being furnished to Central America, the United States is furnishing 61%. The Europeans are furnishing 7%. So, as I told you, we've given the Nicaraguans \$258 million. That's probably more than the Soviets have given them, in money. So we are conscious of the fact that you cannot build political stability on injustice, on poverty, and on hunger. We do understand that, and we are giving them a billion dollars in aid. It's the President who asks for aid, it's the Congress who votes it and allocates it. We're doing the best we can.

By giving them access to the American markets, we are undoubtedly destroying some American jobs, but we understand the importance of helping them economically, and we are helping them economically.

Q: I want to discuss the long relationship with the UN that my husband and I had. He directed the first Special Fund Technical Assistance Project ever to come to completion anywhere in the world, and this took place in Israel during the '60s. At that time, Israel had a very active program of aid to the African countries. It was rewarded for this program by having the African countries vote against it in resolution after resolution, in public, while stating in private that they were being blackmailed by the Arab states. I thought that Jeanne Kirkpatrick's role in the UN with regard to Israel was a refreshing one, and I wonder what your position is on this and other matters relating to Israel.

The other question I want to raise was, again, something that she said, which is that American political genius tends to express itself best in domestic affairs and not especially in these kinds of international fora. Judging from the sound of what you say, I think we have a lot to look forward to, but I wondered if you'd discuss that.

A: First on the subject of Israel, the policy of the U.S. government has never changed. We support, we are committed to -- we were, we are, we will be -- to an Israel living within free, secure and internationally recognized boundaries. I myself have run into this business of this double standard of we're with you, but we can't vote for you, because somebody will do something to us. With regard to the American genius in domestic affairs, I would simply point out, as I point out to the Europeans who say, well you know you Americans are very naive and ingenuous, and you don't have the long historic political view of these things. I always say, perhaps not, but when you wise, older, more experienced nations ran the world, we had 19 years of peace between World War I and World War II. Since we ingenuous, naive, stumbling Americans have had something to do with running the world, we've had the longest period of peace Europe has known since Waterloo. So once again, I don't share this U.S. breast-beating that we may be good on domestic stuff, but we're not good on foreign stuff.

We've kept nuclear proliferation down to five nations. If anybody had told me 20 years ago there would be only five nuclear powers, I'd have told

them they were hopeless optimists. We have succeeded in that. We have succeeded in keeping the Alliance for Freedom going with a number of free nations. We have in the last five years succeeded in stopping the expansion of communist dictatorship. I just don't think we're doing quite as badly in foreign affairs as all that.

Q: In your career, you have had an unparalleled opportunity to see both war and peace. From your present perspective, which is more difficult? Waging war or waging peace?

A: Obviously, when you're having people killed, that's the most difficult. No matter how bad or how fierce the struggles are in the United Nations or elsewhere, as long as people are not being killed, that's easy.

I can give you an example of my own experience again. I was in Tunisia, and we were attacking a hill held by the Germans. There was a newspaperman there, and he was appalled at the amount of artillery we were firing at this hill. He said to the battalion commander, "Why don't you stop that and let the infantry take the hill?" The battalion commander said, "Between here and Berlin there are a lot of hills. This one is going to be taken by the American taxpayer." As one of the people who would have been involved in the taking of the hill, I kind of appreciated that particular view.

And that's the way it is with peace. We should be prepared to spend whatever is necessary to ensure peace. But paying tribute to those who threaten us is not a form of securing peace. Churchill once said, "You cannot slake the appetite of dictators by throwing them small countries to eat. Their appetite grows as they eat."

Thank you very much.

DR. BRADY: Thank you very much, Ambassador Walters, for an outstanding presentation.

Vernon A. Walters
Lieutenant General, USA (Retired)
U.S. Representative to the United Nations

Vernon A. Walters was born in New York City on January 3, 1917, and lived there until 1923, when he went to Europe with his parents. He remained in Europe for more than ten years, attending St. Louis Gonzaga School in Paris, France, and Stonyhurst College in Great Britain. Returning to the United States, he went into the insurance business until 1941, when he enlisted in the U.S. Army as a private. Following the entry of the United States into the war, he graduated from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, as a Second Lieutenant in 1942. He served with the 85th Division and was then sent to the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. Lt. Walters went overseas in October 1942 and took part in the assault landing at Safi, Morocco. For his part in this operation he was promoted to First Lieutenant and decorated. He served briefly in Tunisia and then returned to the United States to teach prisoner-of-war interrogation at Camp Ritchie. He later went back to Italy, where he served as aide-de-camp to the 5th Army Commander, General Mark W. Clark. Subsequently he served as combat liaison officer with the First Brazilian Infantry Division in combat in Italy, remaining with them until the end of the war.

In 1945, Major Walters was appointed Assistant Military Attache to Brazil. While there, he served as interpreter to Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman. In 1947, he attended the Bogota Pan American Conference, which was disrupted by a bloody revolution. On General Marshall's recommendation, he was decorated for his service during this difficult episode. He was later appointed aide to Averell Harriman at the Marshall Plan in Paris, and returned to the White House with Mr. Harriman. He went to Korea during that war and accompanied President Truman to his meeting with General MacArthur at Wake Island. Lt. Colonel Walters then went to Paris in 1951 with General Eisenhower to set up SHAPE headquarters. He returned to the United States in 1956 and served as special projects officer at the NATO Standing Group in Washington. He attended the Guided Missile School at Fort Bliss, Texas, and the Nuclear Weapons School at Sandia, New Mexico. He was present at a series of nuclear tests at Eniwetok and Bikini in 1957. He served as interpreter to President Eisenhower on all of Eisenhower's foreign trips, and also accompanied Vice President Nixon on his tumultuous trip to South America in 1957.

Subsequently Colonel Walters served as Military Attache to Italy and Brazil. In 1967, he served in Vietnam before going to Paris to become Defense and Army Attache to France. While in Paris, on orders from President Nixon, he conducted secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese for three years. Concurrently, he established contact with the Chinese Communists in Paris and delivered to them President Nixon's first letter to Chairman Mao. For over two years he conducted secret negotiations with them that led to President Nixon's historic visit to China. During this period, General Walters smuggled Henry Kissinger into Paris on 15 different occasions to conduct the secret negotiations.

General Walters returned to the United States in April 1972 to become Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. This appointment carried his promotion to Lieutenant General. General Walters served in this capacity under Directors Helms, Schlesinger, Colby, and Bush. He served as Acting Director for a total of five months. After four and a half years, he retired in July 1976.

After his retirement, General Walters wrote his memoirs, "Silent Mission", published by Doubleday in 1978. He spoke widely on the need for effective intelligence and on international affairs, and he served as a business consultant.

In 1981, Secretary of State Haig called him out of retirement to serve initially as a Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State until his nomination by the President to serve as Ambassador-at-Large. General Walters was unanimously confirmed by the Senate on July 17, 1981, and sworn in on July 22, 1981, as Ambassador-at-Large. His travels as Ambassador-at-large have taken him to some 100 nations on troubleshooting missions.

On February 8, 1985, President Reagan nominated Ambassador Walters to be the United States Representative to the United Nations. Ambassador Walters was confirmed by the Senate on May 16, 1985, and was sworn in by Vice President Bush on May 22, 1985.

Ambassador Walters is fluent in seven foreign languages (French, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, German, Dutch, and Russian). He holds the United States National Security Medal (21st recipient in 33 years), the Distinguished Service Medal (with two oak leaf clusters), the Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster), the Bronze Star, the Air Medal, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, and many campaign medals. He has been decorated by France (Legion of Honor), Italy, Brazil, Vietnam, Spain, Portugal, Morocco, and Peru.



MR. ROBERT H. PELLETREAU
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs)

THE MIDDLE EAST: CHALLENGES TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Mr. Robert H. Pelletreau

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs)

Some of you may know the old story about the lawyer, the doctor, the engineer, and the diplomat, who were arguing about which of theirs was the oldest profession. The lawyer argued that Cain had slain Abel and was brought before the Tribunal of Divine Justice, and must have had a lawyer to represent him. The doctor said, well, if you recall back further, according to the story, Eve was created out of Adam's rib, and there must have been a doctor present for that surgical procedure. The engineer then said, well, if you think back further than that, the Lord created the universe out of chaos, and he must have had some engineering help for that. The diplomat then spoke up and said, "Aha! But who do you think created chaos?"

Actually, it's a bum rap. Everybody knows that chaos originated in the Middle East.

What I'd like to do this morning is spend a few minutes discussing our national interests in the Middle East and then a few words on each of the three major conflicts in the area--Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Arab-Israel conflict. Then, if I can cram all that into a reasonable amount of time, we'll have some time for questions, which can go in any direction that you would like.

In the Middle East, we have a cluster of interests, interlocking and cross-cutting. First of all, we have a deep national interest in the security and survival of Israel. This has been widely supported by the American people and the American Congress, and it has recently been buttressed by the fact that Israel now has enough strength and enough capability so that it provides important benefits to the United States.

We manifest our interest in two ways. One, in providing economic and security assistance to Israel, and secondly, in trying to bring about greater peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and I'll have a lot more to say about that in a couple of minutes.

Secondly, we have important strategic interests in the area and these have two main elements: first, access to the petroleum resources of the area, and second, a denial of deeper Soviet penetration into the Middle East.

Third, we have an interest in the security and stability of all friendly states. This supports our other interests, as I've outlined, and also our broader view of a peaceful world in which nations solve their problems through negotiation and dialogue, and in which political systems reflect the aspirations of those they govern.

Fourth, we have important economic interests. We have an interest in the markets of the Middle East, which have important ramifications for employment in the United States and for our exports. And we have an interest in the international monetary system, and keeping it an orderly, non-disruptive system of international currencies. The Middle East countries who are oil-surplus nations have an important effect on that, so that's also an important interest of the United States.

These interests are permanent. They don't really change much from administration to administration. What does change is the tactical approach that we take, and the conditions that we find in the area.

Traditionally, Americans have approached the Middle East by going across the Atlantic and through the pillars of Hercules, across the Mediterranean, where American ships have sailed since the revolutionary days, and then into the Holy Land or to the Egypt of the pyramids.

Today, more and more our strategic planners are approaching the Middle East in a different direction. That is, going around the Cape of Good Hope or around the southern tip of India, and coming up from the south, from the Indian Ocean. If you approach the Middle East on that axis, it appears as a narrow band of states that separates the vast land mass of the Soviet Union from the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean is about 7,000 nautical miles away from Washington, D.C. Up until very recently, the last four or five years, we saw no need to have U.S. forces in any great number permanently stationed in that part of the world. We relied on the British primarily, particularly after World War II, to preserve our access to the petroleum resources of the area, and to help preserve stability in petroleum-producing states.

In 1968, when the British announced that they were going to withdraw east of the Suez, the United States was involved in the Vietnam conflict. We had neither the capability nor frankly, the national will, to take up a burden which the British had so ably carried out for the first six decades of this century. So we turned, with what today might be considered undue alacrity, to regional surrogates, primarily the Shah of Iran.

The Shah's umbrella, as we are now painfully aware, lasted less than a single decade, and as the decade of the '70s closed, and with the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, we were being faced with two new realizations, two new realities that had become increasingly clear as that decade went along.

The first was the dependence of the Western Alliance and Japan on the oil resources of the area. Despite steadily increasing prices throughout the decade of the '70s, the use, I might even say the addiction, of the West to oil usage, increased exponentially as well. Right now, we are enjoying a welcome respite, a welcome international oil glut, but it is only temporary. All our projections show that in the mid-1990s, or before, our oil dependency, and I'm not talking just the United States, but Europe and Japan primarily, their oil dependency will increase again and will be with us well into the 21st Century. Saudi Arabia alone possesses 25% of the world's known oil reserves.

The second development that was occurring during the 1970s was the development of Soviet military strength. One way to put it that I think represents a very vivid picture and a vivid contrast, is that the over \$200 billion that the United States expended in Vietnam was being invested by the Soviet Union in new military hardware, new military infrastructure, and new military capability. As a result, at the end of the decade, for really the first time, certainly the first time since World War II, the Soviet Union has the military capability to support its political objectives southward toward the Indian Ocean without detracting from its military position on the east and west opposite China and opposite NATO.

It was just five and a half years ago that our intelligence analysts first picked up the signs of a Soviet mobilization on the borders of Afghanistan. On Christmas Eve 1979, the Soviets did invade Afghanistan, and as we know, five years later, they are still there with well over 100,000 troops in the country, and there was nothing that either the regional states, or the western alliance, or the United States, could do in an effective way to

counter this move. The Soviets had shown that they had the military capability to back up political objectives, and they were willing to use that capability.

We've seen that that wasn't just a flash in the pan operation. It has continued right through until today, and they maintain those forces there despite intense national resistance from the Afghans. There is not a single province that the Soviets can claim to have pacified. The Afghans are absolutely dedicated to making the meal as undigestible as possible, but the Soviets continue to bear down. They do not have an internal public opinion problem to worry about, and they have shown that they can carry this burden without detracting from their overall global posture.

What this has woken us up to is the fact that basically in that part of the world the strategic equilibrium has shifted. In the last years of the Carter Administration, followed very strongly by the Reagan Administration, we set out to correct, or to right, that strategic imbalance and reestablish a strategic equilibrium that would prevent further Soviet penetration into that area.

There are a number of things that we have done and are continuing to do in that respect, some of them military, some of them political. The part that we in the State Department are particularly involved in is strengthening the fabric of relations among the moderate states in the area, and between the moderate states and the United States, so that they themselves will develop the capability to resist further Soviet domination, and to develop in ways that are stable, and that protect our interests and protect the interests of the people themselves in the area.

Unilaterally on our part, we keep naval forces in the Indian Ocean much more than we used to. We have built up Diego Garcia, which is the only facility that you could call a military base, as such, anywhere from Suez to Singapore, and we have established a new military command called the Central Command, and developed our projection capabilities and our joint planning with countries in the area. This will remain a challenge of another decade. We've made a good start, but it's going to take a good deal of further consistent work, because the Soviets have in no way relaxed the capabilities that they have; including a permanent fleet in the Indian Ocean; including continuous upgrading of their forces in the trans-Caucasus; and including their persistent, opportunistic, exploitative search for opportunities to undermine our interests in the area, and to undermine moderate and stable states. So that is a challenge for the decade ahead.

One of the things that the regional states are most concerned about, and the single thing that most hinders their ability to cooperate with each other and to develop stronger common ties in the area, is the existence of regional disputes. There are two major regional disputes: the Iran-Iraq war and the Arab-Israel conflict. And to the extent that these disputes can be reduced and lessened, the ability of the countries in the area to develop their own futures peacefully and to resist outside influence will be increased.

The Iran-Iraq war is now in its fifth year. When it broke out in the fall of 1980, the United States found itself having to formulate its policies with the knowledge that we had no influence whatsoever in Iran, or in Qom, and very little influence in Baghdad. So, we really had very little capability to exercise direct influence in the direction of terminating the war. It was important, therefore, that we devote our efforts to containing the war until pressures could be brought to bear to try to terminate it. We

immediately entered some intense consultations with the states most immediately threatened--primarily Saudi Arabia, but also other Gulf states--and as a result of these conversations, decided to take two measures.

The first was to put United States AWACS aircraft in Saudi Arabia, to help provide a protective cover over the Saudi oil fields, and to help deter possible Iranian aggression across the Gulf, which would drag Saudi Arabia and other states into the conflict and make it broader.

The second measure we took was to announce that the United States would help preserve the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, where so much of the world's oil passes every day.

These two measures, taken together, greatly increased the confidence of the Gulf states and gave them enough of a sense of security to stay out of the war. They were able to resist Iraqi pressures to enter as Arab brothers into that war and to continue to maintain an attitude of hoping the war would end, trying to make the war end, but not becoming directly involved themselves. And, of course, this preserved our interest in helping keep the oil resources of the region flowing to the industrial states.

Now here we are five years later; the war continues in a protracted mode, punctuated from time to time by very intense battles, and there has been no indication, on the part of the Imam Khomeini, that he is interested in bringing the war to an end. So the prospects, I must honestly admit, are not terribly bright to see a shift of this war from the battlefield to a negotiating table this year, or in the near future.

At the same time, it's important to keep some kind of international peace effort up and active at all times, so that when a shift in the Iranian position does occur, and there are pressures within Iran to point the government in the other direction, a peace vehicle will be available. They're not at this point definitive pressures, but, they nevertheless exist. When those pressures increase to a point where the government looks for new solutions, there must be some kind of international mechanism out there ready to be utilized in that process.

One of the little recognized facts of that terrible war, which is so poorly reported in the press and on the TV cameras, is that there have been more casualties in that war than in all the Arab-Israel wars combined. It's been tremendously costly and destructive to both countries in terms of the lives of their youth.

Turning now to the Arab-Israel conflict, we have seen over the past eight or nine months some promising developments that open up a genuine possibility that broader negotiations may be possible before the end of this year. I think the first of these promising indications was the election in Israel last summer that brought into power a new Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, at the head of a coalition government. And in his acceptance speech to the Knesset, Peres called upon King Hussein to come enter negotiations without preconditions. Now this was a shift from the position of the previous Israeli government, which had always called for negotiations on the basis of Camp David alone. It was a broadening of it, and this was recognized by Jordan, across the river.

King Hussein has been in the forefront of the various positive measures that have occurred since. He unilaterally took the step to reestablish relations with Egypt. He then invited the Palestine National Council to hold its national council meeting in Amman, and stood up, in an opening address before that council that was televised all over Israel, all over the occupied territory, all over Jordan, even up into Syria, and he told the Palestinians very frankly that time was not on their side, and time might be running out for them. Time might be running out for the possibility of a

peace which would be based on a territorial transfer of some sort. And he called upon them to recognize and accept UN Security Council Resolution 242, which has been the basis of all peace negotiations and efforts thus far, and to enter a dialogue with him, aimed at reaching an Arab position towards such negotiations.

The Palestinians responded by forming a committee and entering such a dialogue. And this led, after several weeks, to what was called the Joint Action Accord between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat of the PLO. This Accord has a lot of uncertainties in it, and a lot of unanswered questions in it, but it does quite clearly establish several principles, the most important of which is that both of them agreed to seek a peaceful negotiated settlement to the conflict.

The latest development in this gradual creep, I would say, on the Arab side toward organizing itself for possible negotiations was King Hussein's visit to Washington a couple of weeks ago. During that visit we had in-depth discussions with him, and after he had met with the President, the President and he came out together into the Rose Garden, and both made statements, and then opened themselves up to a press conference right there, which is contrary to the normal procedure, but they felt confident enough about what they had discussed that it was worthwhile to get it out.

In his statement, the King spoke on behalf of Arafat and the PLO, as well as himself, and said that they were interested in peace, they were interested in negotiations within the context of an international conference and based on UN resolutions, including specifically Security Council Resolution 242 and Resolution 338. He then went on to reaffirm that the objective, from their side, was a confederation with Jordan of whatever land was returned from the occupied territories. In other words, it was not an independent Palestinian state.

Then, in answer to questions, he gave a couple of additional clarifications that helped reaffirm the peaceful intention and the serious intention on his part to proceed toward peace. He was asked the question, "How do you feel about direct negotiations with Israel? Isn't this incompatible with your idea of an international conference?" And he gave a pretty interesting and explicit answer that I think is worthwhile reading. He said, "We need the international umbrella to offer us the opportunity to negotiate, and when I speak of negotiations, I obviously mean negotiations amongst the parties to the conflict. In other words, negotiations between the Arab side, in this case a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, with Israel on the other side." That was a very explicit recognition and acceptance of the idea of direct negotiations with Israel, although he still insists that he needs some kind of an international umbrella as well.

The other statement he made in that press conference was that he wanted and accepted having the process proceed, from now through the course of negotiations, in a non-belligerent environment. Those are the words he used, "in a non-belligerent environment," meaning he is not going to be pursuing warlike or hostile actions at the same time. And that, all together, represented a forthcoming and, frankly, between us, quite an extraordinary development on the moderate Arab side.

Who would have thought, any of us in this room would not have thought a year ago, that we would be seeing a genuine Arab peace initiative. When you stop to think about it, it's quite an extraordinary development. And on the Israeli side, Mr. Peres has given it a cautious and interested welcome. Just two days ago, before the Knesset, he outlined some Israeli proposals, also directed towards peace. He set a time table of roughly three months. The King is seeking a way to build a bridge from his political context and

what he has done so far into some sort of negotiations, and he is anxious to have U.S. help in that. That is what we are currently about, in very close consultation with Israel, first of all, because it is a rock solid commitment of this Administration that Israel and the United States will consult closely and continuously on any important question that affects the security of either country, and with Jordan and with the Egyptians, and with other interested parties.

I've just come back from a week briefing European governments on where we see things at the moment, and soliciting their support.

I don't want to leave it on too upbeat a note, because there are still many obstacles to overcome to actually build a productive negotiating structure, and there are parties and people out in the area who are not in favor of this, and who will try to upset it, using very nasty rules, and it is by no means certain that we'll be able to succeed. But when you have the unusual instance of having three key leaders in the area, Shimon Peres and King Hussein and President Mubarak in Egypt -- all interested in broader peace, it's important that the United States lend its shoulder to this effort and see if we can't get them all to a table that each one can agree upon.

This also represents a basic approach and goal of U.S. policy, that now extends over six or seven administrations, that we will try to take advantage of any occasion, of any opening in the region, to bring about broader peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. And, if there is an opening in 1985, we surely do not want to miss it.

Let me stop here in my formal remarks and say thank you very much, and let's open it up to questions.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

with

Mr. Robert H. Pelletreau
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs)

Q: After Hussein's visit, the State Department issued several statements that declared the U.S. would be interested in some pre-planning meetings with representatives from the Palestinian Council. I would like to know if work is proceeding on generating the format for these meetings, and if indeed a list has been presented to the State Department of members from the Council that would be attending the meeting?

A: Palestinian representation is one of the key questions we have to work on. The PLO really has not established the credentials to come to a negotiating table. You cannot shuck off a history of terrorism and a history of all that's been involved with the PLO like you take off an overcoat. But, what you can do is try to find representative Palestinians that do not have that history, and that is something that the Arab side is engaged in now. And we think that the Palestinian community is rich enough in education, in talent, and in motivation, to turn up people that can be considered genuinely representative of Palestinian interests, that do not have this particular terrorist activity past that would disqualify them from the table.

This is not something for the United States to do. This is something for the Arab side to do to identify those Palestinians. It's something that they're working on. They have not come to us with a list. We do not have a formal list in hand; but, when we get one, we'll certainly look it over and see what we think of the individuals involved. And if they look to us like productive and acceptable interlocutors, we are willing to hold a meeting with them. But we've made very clear that this meeting is not going to be negotiations. Negotiations have to take place between the Arab side and Israel. Our meeting will be to try to facilitate and improve the prospects of getting to negotiation, and we've made that clear on the Arab side and on the Israeli side.

It's not necessary that those people come from the Palestine National Council. We have said that we will look at such names because we feel there is a distinction between the National Council and the PLO, and all members of the National Council are not necessarily excluded. Some of them are professors in the United States. Others are businessmen from various walks of life throughout the Arab world. But we want to look at the names first. We haven't accepted the category across the board. That's where we stand on it.

Q: Over the past 18 to 24 months, there have been persistent rumors, or stories, coming out that the Ayatollah is trying to develop on the Shah's abandoned, perhaps, nuclear power programs. Would you comment on that, and could you also comment on what the United States' position would be if there were strong indications that the Ayatollah's regime did indeed have some sort of nuclear capability, that it might deploy in the Iran-Iraq war or at any other point in the Near East.

A: We would take a very, very dim view indeed of any effort on the part of either of the belligerents, Iran or Iraq, seriously to try to develop nuclear weapons. Neither side is currently engaged in such efforts. If we happen to pick up anything on the scope in that respect, we would do our absolute utmost to bring international pressure to bear to

keep the expertise needed, the materials needed, and the knowledge needed from getting into their hands. I honestly think that we would have an ally in this effort in the Soviet Union, that we would have a common interest in keeping the development of nuclear weapons out of this conflict.

Fortunately, it does not at this point seem to us at all a realistic proposition. There is a realistic proposition, though, that on both sides they are seeking to develop chemical weapons, and this is also a very negative development. The Iraqi's have already used gas in a conflict, and the Iranians, we know, are very interested in acquiring a similar capability. This is just one of the many reasons why this conflict ought to be brought to an end as soon as it possibly can.

Unfortunately, there isn't anybody in the international community that has influence with Iran or influence with the Ayatollah. His communication lines are solely vertical, and it's very difficult for anybody to get through to him.

Q: I just want to follow up on my previous question regarding the U.S. position on the development of an Israeli nuclear weapon. There have been recent reports of illegal export of critrons, it's a timing device that is used in nuclear weapons, from the United States to Israel, and this is of course an illegal act under U.S. law, and there has been no public response on the part of the U.S. government about this. Does the position that we apply vis-a-vis the nuclear developments in Iraq and Iran also apply to Israel?

A: Yes, it does. We do not want to see any additional nations acquiring nuclear capabilities. The critrons that you mentioned were illegally exported by a U.S. exporter and there is now an investigation going on, and the government of Israel is cooperating in that investigation. Critrons are not utilized solely for nuclear weapons, they're also utilized for laser equipment in the medical field, and for a number of other types of modern technology that require extremely precise timing. Israel is accounting to us for all of those that were illegally exported by an American manufacturer from the United States.

Q: I would like to ask you a question about Afghanistan and the Soviet buildup there. What would happen if Iran is depleted, the Ayatollah is gone? Is the objective of the Soviets to come into Iran and to open up the seaways to themselves and control the Gulf of Hormuz?

A: It has long been a long term Soviet objective to try to have direct access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This goes back to the days of the Czars. The appetite has been whetted by the discovery of rich petroleum resources in that area. Although the Soviets themselves do not need those petroleum resources, their denial to the Western industrial states would be a very interesting proposition for the Soviet Union. It would probably not expect to achieve that objective directly, by direct application of Soviet force, because the entire local populations of the area would rise up against that. But, if there are openings to exploit, to bring into power more friendly governments, I think it's quite realistic to expect that the Soviet Union would support attempts to bring such governments into power, as it has in Afghanistan.

The reason for the Soviet invasion was that a basically friendly government was about to be overthrown and replaced by a basically unfriendly government, an Afghani government, an independent Afghani government, and the Soviet Union didn't want to see that. I don't think the Soviet Union is going to move rashly. Soviet leaders have, by and large, been rather conservative in the way they have moved, but certainly the development of

their military capability and the clear lines of their political policies in the area show that they would like to undermine the states that are friendly to us and achieve a domination of the area. Certainly they have great interest in achieving much greater Soviet influence in Iran. It's a very key state.

Q: Related to that last issue, yesterday we had a speaker, one of your counterparts from the Department of Defense, an expert on Africa, discuss the issue of access to the sea lanes. You have described it this morning as the issue of the coming decade. He described it rather as a red herring, fuzzy at best, and did not describe it as being a critical or strategic issue. I wonder if you would comment on that. Perhaps we need some discussions, department to department.

A: I'm one of the people that is involved in department to department discussions, and I put it in a broader framework than access to sea lanes or protection of sea lanes. I put it in the framework of reestablishing a strategic equilibrium in that part of the world that does not rely solely or even necessarily on the U.S. maintaining a specific military force in the area or patrolling a specific chunk of ocean. As I said, it's an awfully long way away from the United States and it's awfully expensive for us to do that.

But, in the overall of what we do, the combination of our defense policy, of our foreign policy, of our assistance policy, of our monetary policy, we need to establish a security framework in that area, a framework that I would say extends from Pakistan all the way across to the southern part of the Mediterranean Ocean, Egypt, and across to Morocco, that will be more resistant to what the Soviets are interested in doing. And I think we're doing that. We're doing it in lots of different ways, and maybe what the African spokesman was referring to was that at one time some thinkers were giving thought to really having a massive naval presence out in the Indian Ocean, which is awfully expensive, particularly given the limited number of aircraft carriers we have. We think there are probably better ways to do it. I guess that's how I'd try to reconcile it.

Q: Among the many intricacies of dealing with the Middle East, one of them is the role of the women in the Arab world. I'm a tanker pilot, and although I never went to Saudi Arabia to support the AWACS, many of the women in my squadron did, and came back with stories of riding in the back of the bus, and probably more importantly, the fact that Saudi controllers would not speak to them when they were flying in the aircraft.

I'm wondering if this is a slanted view of the problem, and does it exist in diplomatic circles? It is a concern, thinking about deploying our military forces, given the number of women in the military, and working, fighting, alongside each other in the Air Force.

A: That is probably a much broader question than I'm able to do justice to in a short answer. In the Middle East, we are dealing with a number of very traditional societies that have only in this generation come into the world of rapid change, the world of technology, the interaction with other countries. And, as this has occurred, it obviously is having a very broad social effect on those societies, and certainly the role of women is one area in which it is having such an effect.

This is one of the frontiers in a place like Saudi Arabia, and it is, I guess, one of the areas where significant development is going to take place during our generation. We have already seen in Saudi Arabia, for example, women's banks being established, and for the first time, universal women's education, the sort of basic ground building blocks that western societies

have established some time ago. I think we've got to work together to overcome that problem. It wasn't all bleak, the experience of women in our Air Force going to Saudi Arabia. I recall that in one instance, the Saudis, I would say in an effort to be responsive, established appropriate facilities on our side for women and men, even though on their side they had only facilities for men. They've accepted that women are going to be deployed in our Air Force units to Saudi Arabia, just as they would be deployed elsewhere. That has perhaps been something that's difficult to live with. At the same time it may have a very beneficial effect on the Saudis over the long run, as they see the contribution that our women make to the effort.

Other Arab countries have moved quite a bit faster in the whole area of development of women. One of them, quite strikingly, is Iraq, a country that we've had very little contact with over the last 15 or 20 years. When you visit Iraq, you see women in all the Ministries, in all the professions. This is a good development.

I could talk a long time on it, but I think I'd better really stop there and say to you all, thank you so much.

Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
(Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs)

Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., was born in Patchogue, New York, in 1935. He attended Yale University (B.A. 1957), Harvard Law School (LL.B 1961), and is a member of the New York Bar Association. Since joining the U.S. Foreign Service in 1962, his diplomatic career has included service in Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, Director for Arabian Peninsula Affairs in the U.S. Department of State, 1981-83. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, South Asia and Africa during 1980-81 and was awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal in January 1981. Ambassador Pelletreau was appointed to his present position in March, 1983.

Ambassador Pelletreau speaks Arabic and French.

Ambassador Pelletreau is married and has three children.



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THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM

by

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National Aeronautics and Space Administration

It's nice to be here today, and talk to you about something that I find very exciting. Maybe I can tell you what I know about the Space Program and answer any questions you might have.

I think this is an exciting time for our country; we have the world at our fingertips. We can pick up the phone and dial direct to the other side of the world, or we can hop on a plane after lunch today and be in Los Angeles by dinner. Technology just seems to be advancing faster than we can keep up with. For the first time we have the new frontier of space accessible and available to other than just a select few.

I have to admit that when I was a little girl I dreamed of doing a lot of things, but being an astronaut was one of those things I thought little girls never got to do. We have opportunities now that never before have been available.

NASA's achievements in its 26 years are something that we as a nation can be proud of. It's something that's concrete, something we can point to and something we can see and say "Look at that, that's really something. That's something I'm proud of as an American." So much has happened in such a short time. I'd like to go back and run through some of the early history of the space program quickly and discuss the shuttle program a little bit, and answer any questions.

Personally, I can remember the start of the space race. I was in nursery school when Sputnik I went up into orbit, and I can remember how much it caught our attention. It was just a little thing, couldn't have been bigger than a basketball, but it really set the world on fire, if I remember correctly. Not only did it threaten our technical prowess at that time, but it was threatening ideologically as well. We followed closely behind and sent up our first satellite about four months later. That was the Explorer 1 satellite which, by the way, discovered the Van Allen Radiation Belt, something I thought we always knew about. But it wasn't until recent times that we started learning about the atmosphere that surrounds us.

NASA was created as a federal agency shortly after our Explorer satellite went up, and we continued with some of our unmanned projects. We sent up our first communications satellite in 1960. That was the Echo Satellite, which was nothing more than a big mylar balloon that reflected radio signals back and forth. It wasn't until 1962 that we sent up our first relay satellite, which did receive, amplify, and transmit our radio signals. Again I have trouble remembering life before live TV and life before those sort of communication aids were available to us.

We also sent up in the early 1960's our first weather satellites. Again, it's hard to imagine the evening news without a satellite photo of all the clouds marching across the country. It wasn't so long ago that we didn't have these things. But, the most visible goal that came with the creation of NASA and the start of the manned space program was actually that, sending a man into space. At that time, I remember us as being committed and inspired towards reaching that goal. That was something that the thousands of people who worked at NASA, worked for the government, and

worked for the contractors, did with the full support and enthusiasm of the public.

Our first program, of course, as everybody remembers, was Project Mercury. Though we had verified our early rocketry technology with our unmanned flights, there were certain other issues that we had to consider when we thought about sending a human being up. First of all, who should go? Of course, as you know, the military test pilots won out, as I think was a proper choice, but then we had to start thinking about what sort of protection would they need against the hostile environment in space. What kind of life support system? What kind of space suit? These were all things that we had not yet developed, and certainly had not perfected in terms of design.

We had to consider safety and redundancy and absolute precision in ways that we hadn't considered with our early satellite shots. And what I think is maybe one of the more amazing things about the Mercury Program, is that two and a half years after its inception as a concept, and after NASA was created, that includes concept and design and actually building and testing and then executing the program, two and a half years, later Alan Shepherd flew as the first American in space.

I know there's a lot of folks here who work for the government, and I don't think we could do the paperwork today in two and a half years. So that was quite a feat and we were quite committed to reaching that goal.

To refresh your memory about Project Mercury, we had two sub-orbital flights. Our shortest was Alan Shepherd's 15 minute sub-orbital flight; and we had four orbital flights, the longest flight being 34 hours. The prime objective of this program was to verify that not only could man survive in space, but that man could function quite well. We did prove this. There were a few little changes and a few little odd things that happened, but certainly nothing that got in the way of his functional ability.

Following Project Mercury, our efforts were directed in response to President Kennedy's challenge. That is, to get us to the moon and return safely to Earth within the decade. The Gemini Program, which followed Project Mercury, was our early program which paved the way for our lunar landing. We had a series of 10 Gemini flights, two crew persons per mission, and we learned all about orbital mechanics and rendezvous and docking techniques during that phase of the space program.

We had to build a more powerful rocket, and we were going further. We flew a 700 mile orbit during the Gemini Project. That was higher than our previous flights. For the first time we had a crew member go outside the space capsule. Ed White was the first crew member to do a space walk for the Americans. The Russians had beat us to this, but he was our first. And following Gemini, of course, we went into the Apollo Program. The Apollo Program came at what I remember as a bad time for the country. We were involved in Vietnam, there was a lot of unrest and a lot of discontent, and I look at the Apollo flights as a few shining moments in some of those troubled times.

I think we all remember Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin's first trip to the moon; they spent 21 hours there on Apollo 11. I think what we forget is that the Apollo Program didn't stop there. We actually had 11 Apollo missions and six of them landed on the moon. Twelve Americans walked on the moon. Some of us forget that there were really that many folks up there. That chapter of our history was really a true leap for mankind. All of the Apollo missions were fantastic successes and a good testament to what we can do if we really put our minds to it.

I had a biased view of the world at that time. I was in college in the early 70's, when a lot of the protests were going on, and I remember a lot of angry and hostile folks that seemed to be more interested in some short term problem solving than what they considered to be futuristic speculation. Support for the space program dwindled at the end of the Apollo program, but at that time we were given the go ahead for a new endeavor, and that was to build a space shuttle.

Between the end of the Apollo Era and the beginning of the Shuttle Era, we had a space station in orbit for a few years. We had the Skylab Space Station up there, quite a roomy place, did a lot of basic science, a lot of collecting of data during the Skylab Program. We sent three three-man crews up into orbit and the last crew stayed for a total of three months. We also flew a joint Soviet-U.S. mission in those years, 1975, the Apollo-Soyuz program.

But pressing on to the shuttle, the shuttle is what I consider to be a true leap ahead in space travel. And, as is always the case when you approach a complex problem like this, it's a joint effort and teamwork that are the key to success. The prime contractor, who is responsible for making sure that the shuttle comes out properly, is Rockwell, but most of the major aerospace companies in the country also play a part. We have pieces of the shuttle that are made by General Dynamics, McDonnell-Douglas, and Grumman, and Fairchild, and Menasco. Martin-Marietta makes the external tank, and Morton Thiokol makes the solid rocket boosters. The European Space Agency makes the spacelab module that we fly on some of our scientific missions.

And again, this came at a time I remember of low morale. It was not too long after the American hostages had been released from Iran that we launched our first space shuttle mission. That was in April 1981. John Young and Bob Crippin, true heroes, two test pilots, flew the first shuttle the Columbia, up into orbit.

I remember being quite moved by the first mission. I was working in the VA hospital in San Antonio at that time, and we were all gathered around the TV set. Here was something concrete that we could point to and say "I'm proud to be an American." This is really a fantastic machine and nobody else has anything like it. This offers us something as a nation that we've never had before.

So, moving on now, where are we as far as the shuttle program goes? Well, we have three shuttles that have been into space already, veterans of space travel; we have the Columbia, which flew our first several missions, including our first flight test missions. We have the Challenger and the Discovery, and pretty soon, the Atlantis, our fourth shuttle, will join our ranks as a working vehicle. It's scheduled to fly a little bit later this year. Think about how many shuttle missions we've flown. Anybody have any guesses? We've flown 17 and number 18 is due to go up Monday morning at about 7:30; keep your TV's on.

Shuttle design offers capability and opportunity that we've never had before. Just to put in perspective what it is and what it can do, it's about half the size of a 747. Remember what it looks like on the shuttle carrier aircraft that we use to carry it back and forth from Edwards. It weighs about 200,000 pounds without any gas, and it weighs about four and a half million pounds on the launch pad, so it takes a lot of gas to get us up the hill.

We have a payload bay that's about 60 feet long by 15 feet in diameter and we can carry 65,000 pounds of payload. This is a far cry from the 26 pounds of payload that we carried on the early Explorer flights, not so long ago.

We start our launch sequence by lighting our shuttle main engines. There are three main engines on the back of the vehicle and we hold the vehicle down on the launch pad for about 5 seconds while we throttle up to 100%. Then we light the solid rocket boosters. Once you light the solid rockets you're going someplace. There's no holding you back.

They again are a reusable part of the vehicle. They burn for about two minutes. After two minutes, they're all burned out. They look like burned out flares. We go out and pick them up. By then the shuttle is 28 miles down range, about 150,000 feet high, and the only gas we're using is from the shuttle main engines. The large external tank holds one and a half million pounds of liquid oxygen and hydrogen. This feeds into the shuttle main engines through a large umbilical that goes into the belly of the shuttle. We burn up all that gas after about eight minutes, when we're about 68 miles down range. We're going about 17,000 miles an hour and we have what we call MECO, or main engine cut-off. The external tank's all depleted. We jettison that and it falls down into the ocean on the other side of the world. Then we're in orbit.

We're in a low orbit, so we use some smaller engines that we have on the shuttle, the orbital maneuvering system engines, to boost us up into a more stable orbit. We generally fly at about 120-250 miles above the earth.

Well, so what do we do when we get there? The thing that we do that gets the most publicity is that we launch satellites. We've probably launched 15 satellites or so, of varying shapes and sizes and purposes and weights. We can accommodate a variety of different boosters on the satellites, which we deploy from low earth orbit. Their booster system will send them up to geosynchronous orbit, about 22,000 miles up. We have some satellites that we pick up with the remote manipulator arm and plop outside the vehicle. We can leave them there, go back and pick them up later in the mission, or go back and pick them up a year or more later.

Our large payload bay offers us a good opportunity to do some basic science. We have experimental pallets that we put out in the bay. We do sponsor some science endeavors and research projects for college and high school students, and we've flown some of their experiments out in the payload bay. We have some imaging radar and photographic equipment that we've flown out there, and have actually done quite a number of things. I forgot to mention we also have the capability of repairing and retrieving satellites, and we've done both of those things.

Again we went up last April and repaired our Solar-Max satellite. We brought it into the payload bay, did some repairs, redeployed it, and it's working fine a year later. And we did bring back two malfunctioning satellites earlier this year.

One of our more integral parts of the shuttle is the crew member. They're in the crew module, about 68 cubic meters of pressurized, habitable space. We usually carry anywhere from five to seven crew members. We do a lot of earth observations and things like that. You have a whole different vantage point from up there. We've taken lots of photographs and have a new and different understanding of geography and geology. We have looked for minerals, and done some studies on crop production, agriculture, and oceanography as well.

Some other things we do inside the crew module are materials processing. There are things you can make in the absence of gravity that are difficult or impossible to make here on earth. We are experimenting and are in the infant stage of learning about that. We continue to do life science

experiments. Something that I'm excited about as a physician is the way the pharmaceutical industry is interested in processing in zero gravity. There are some drugs that are very difficult or impossible to make here on earth, that we have very good evidence will be very easy and quick to make in space. That's a brand new field and we're excited about that.

So the shuttle's opened a lot of doors; we are, however, limited in a few ways. We can only fly relatively short missions. Our longest mission has been 10 days, and we do fly in low earth orbit. It'd be difficult to get up to an orbit greater than 300 miles for any period of time because we don't carry the fuel to do that and we don't carry the consumables, the oxygen and that sort of thing we need to do that. There's still a big universe out there to explore, and there are still things to learn about. There are things we'll be doing in the next 20 years that we can't even think about right now. It really is a new frontier.

Hopefully, in a few years, we'll have a permanently manned space station. We're directing some efforts towards that right now. The hope is that in the early 1990's we will have a low earth orbiting space station from which we can continue our scientific and research efforts on an uninterrupted basis. We may launch deep space missions from low earth orbit rather than from earth. And we may gain a better understanding of how to utilize space.

In a round about way you can look at the strength of the country and the strength of the nation as having its roots in each individual's pride and commitment and determination. The space program belongs to all of us. It is something that we can be proud of, and the future of the space program is something that we all should look at with a great anticipation and excitement.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

with

Ms. Ellen L. Shulman, M.D.

Astronaut Candidate (Mission Specialist)

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Q: I was just wondering what you can tell us about what we've learned about having people as satellites for up to three months in space. And additionally, if you could go into any of what you expect to do when you're in space, in the medical field.

A: To talk about the findings of Skylab would take a long time. A large part of what we did in Skylab was devoted to life science experiments. We learned a little bit about the physiology of weightlessness. You have to remember, when you do life science experiments in space you're dealing with very small numbers; the studies are generally uncontrolled; you don't have the large population with which you can make true objective observations. So, a lot of what we learned as far as life science went, was somewhat subjective, but we did learn a lot about the physiological changes that happen in weightlessness. I can go into that with you a little bit later, but I don't think that I ought to go into that now.

We did earth observations up there as well. Photographed the world from all angles and all vantage points. And again gave us new insight into geology, plate tectonics, and that sort of thing. They did a lot of experiments in astronomy, in solar physics, and atmospheric science as well. There are a lot of details, and there are several books published on the scientific findings of Skylab, if you'd like to look into that in more depth.

As far as what I'm doing, Mission Specialists all basically train to be flight engineers, and to be well versed in all aspects of the shuttle. It doesn't necessarily matter what your degree is, or what you were trained in before joining the astronaut program, there are certain tasks we all train to do. I may or may not get a mission that gets me medical duties and medical tasks. Last November, Anna Fisher, who's a physician, was on the satellite retrieval mission, and she picked up satellites and put them in the payload bay with the remote manipulator arm. The mission before last, Dr. Rhea Sedden, another physician, worked on that Syncom salvage mission, where they used the remote manipulator arm to try and flip the switch and get the satellite working. We all train to do sort of generic space tasks.

Q: There is something that reminds me of a comment made in San Diego by an astronaut who was going to fly soon and have some research on how can you have some experiment on weightlessness that might have an effect on treating the elderly. Have you heard anything about that?

A: No.

Q: Several of those deep space flights that were sent out to the outer edges or even beyond the solar system, do you still continue to hear from any of those, and, if you do, how much longer will you be able to hear from them?

A: We do still continue to hear from a lot of the planetary probes. Actually the NASA center that's in charge of that is the Goddard Space Flight Center here in Greenbelt. I'm not sure how much longer we'll continue to hear from the one probe that's actually left the solar system. Coming next spring, we're going to send one international solar polar space probe to orbit the poles of the sun, and we are sending another space probe,

the Gallileo Space Probe, to Jupiter. We do still communicate with those probes, but I'm not sure how much longer that will last.

Q: To use a popular cliché, first of all, I'd like to tell you that I think you have a right to shout. My question is, do you see the civilian astronaut programs as being in competition with the President's Strategic Defense Initiative, and secondly, are there an increasing proportion of experiments on the shuttle being dedicated to military as opposed to civilian use?

A: I think there's a lot of room up there for both the civilian and military arenas, and I also believe in pooling resources. I think we have a great thing here with the shuttle, and it would be foolish and a waste of money if we didn't share it with the military. Certainly, there's a lot of things they're doing, that I don't know anything about, but I don't find that the competition is disruptive to NASA. NASA is a civilian agency, but I think we can work quite well with the military as we have in the past.

Q: Would you give us your view of the strategic defense initiative, and -- from a technological and highly technical point of view. What is your view of the latest in research? Are the technologies available, etc.?

A: I don't know anything about it, sorry. That's all classified and I don't have a Top Secret security clearance. I think the feeling of some of us at NASA, I of course can't speak for everybody, is that we believe in a strong defense, and that's about where I have to end that. I'm not involved in that and I don't know any of the details.

Q: I want to say to you that as a little girl, I always wanted to be an astronaut. An astronaut is viewed as a male, macho type thing. Do you find you have to put out 150% more than your contemporaries do? Do you find any sort of resentment.

A: No, we all like to think we're on the same team, and I don't find that the women are competing with the men. I also feel that the work load is pretty evenly divided and everybody gives 150%.

Q: In the stressful situations facing astronauts, and as you have a good medical background, could you discuss some of the problems that astronauts face, and how much that increases physiological problems.

A: I'm not sure I understand what you mean as far as stresses.

Q: I'm speaking perhaps of no gravity, and the internal system working perhaps much more effectively when it's in space, but some of the physiological changes resulting.

A: Actually, there are physiological changes. I like to think of them as normal adaptation to an abnormal environment. But, they're not changes that will render you functionless, or even impair your ability to do anything. You are a little wobbly when you get off the vehicle, and a little bit dehydrated, so you drink a lot of fluids that first day, but I don't think you'd even call them stresses. They are sort of minor inconveniences, they're something everyone's aware of, and so you prepare yourself for them. But it's not really a big deal. Certainly not anything that we anticipated. We had some terrible anticipations and expectations before Alan Shepherd flew his first flight. In reality, they're very minor.

Q: Scientists seem to be concerned about the greenhouse effect. Are you all able to study, or are you studying, anything in the astronaut program about the greenhouse effect?

A: I'm not aware of any particular missions that have particular studies like that on board, although that doesn't mean that they're not there and not on the manifest and not in the program.

Q: I'd like to tell you that my husband and my daughter had the greatest experience of their life when they watched Columbia go off at Cape Canaveral. And I'd like to ask you possibly, if you go down to Cape Canaveral, which you can really do, how you get a good position, I'm waiting for my shot. Can you explain to them how they can accomplish this?

A: It's not that hard actually to get a fairly good seat for a launch. We have car passes for almost anybody who wants it. I'm sure if you wrote to your Congressman, or even wrote to the public affairs office at NASA, you'd be able to get a car pass, just three or four miles from the launch pad, and you'd really get a good view. That's where the general public views it from, and there's actually not much of a better place anywhere on the Kennedy Space Center to watch the launch from.

Q: I would like to know what plans NASA has to cooperate with other countries' agencies in any programs anticipating the fly-by of Halley's Comet?

A: I wish I could answer that but I'm not sure what the answer is.

Q: How about the general subject of cooperating with other nations?

A: As far as cooperation with other nations, we do work fairly closely with the European Space Agency, which is comprised of about a dozen or so European Nations; the Germans, the English, the Scandinavian countries. Coming up this fall we'll be flying our D-1 mission, which is a dedicated German Space Lab Mission; we'll be flying two German payload specialists at that time. In November 1983, we did our first official cooperative mission. We had a German payload specialist on that flight as well.

Q: You mentioned earth observations in relation to mineral deposits, and I was curious as to what you see and do with that?

A: I'm also not well versed enough to tell you the details of that, but I do know that with our various satellites and the various shuttle flights that the geologists and the geophysicists have been able to better predict where we're going to find particular deposits.

DR. KORB: I want to thank you very, very much.

We'll all be anxiously awaiting the next launch, and all be anxiously waiting to see if you're on it.

Ellen L. Shulman, M.D.
Astronaut Candidate
(Mission Specialist)

Ellen Shulman graduated from Bayside High School, New York, New York, in 1970; received a bachelor of arts degree in Geology from the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1974, and a doctorate in Medicine degree from Cornell University in 1978.

After completing medical school, Dr. Shulman trained in Internal Medicine at the University of Texas Health Science Center, San Antonio, Texas. In 1981, after three years of training, she was certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine.

In 1981, following her residency, Dr. Shulman joined NASA as a medical officer at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. That same year she graduated with honors from the Air Force Aerospace Medicine Primary Course at Brooks Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas. Prior to her selection as an astronaut candidate she served as a physician in the Flight Medicine Clinic at the Johnson Space Center.

Dr. Shulman was selected as an astronaut candidate by NASA in May 1984 and, in July, commenced a 1-year training and evaluation program to qualify for subsequent assignment as a mission specialist on future space shuttle flight crews.

She is a member of the American College of Physicians and the Aerospace Medical Association.

Ellen Shulman was born April 27, 1953, in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Her parents, Dr. and Mrs. Melvin Shulman, reside in Beechhurst, New York. She is single.



AMBASSADOR L. BRUCE LAINGEN
Vice President, National Defense University

TERRORISM: THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

by

Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen

Vice President, National Defense University

Good afternoon fellow diplomats. I use that term advisedly--we need all the help we can get in our business. And good afternoon, fellow Minnesotans. There must be some out there. I mention that in the context of terrorism. It's rough to live in Minnesota. It's cold up there, and they've got some politics of their own that seem distinctive as well, sometimes. But we've got a slogan up there--Survive Minnesota, and the rest of the world's easy. It's good training for hostage victims!

You've given me a tough job this afternoon. After a good lunch and the excitement of space, you have to listen to the ugly business of terrorism. It's not very attractive, but that's my job, and that's what I'm going to talk to you about. The threat that it represents to diplomacy, but, much larger in the context of what we're all about, the threat that it represents to humanity. We all suffer from its excesses, its obscenity, its ugliness.

To save time for as many questions and answers as possible, I'm going to make a few introductory remarks, say something about, in particular, the role of family facing up to terrorism, the difficulty of getting multilateral cooperation in fighting it as a government, and then something about the role of force--one of the larger questions in the issue of terrorism. I'm going to do that, dispensing with the rest of my prepared remarks.

A little bit like that fellow--I hazard another story at this point in your sessions--they've probably all been told. Not like Adam, when Adam told a story, he knew it hadn't been heard before. This involves a gentleman who also did something with his remarks.

A fellow went out on the town one night without clearance from his wife, came back in a state of disrepair, hoped to evade her notice by creeping up the carpeted stairs with his shoes in his hands only to find his wife standing at the top of the stairs in her dressing gown looking very sternly down at him, and he looked very sheepishly up at her, reflected for a moment or two and then said, "Well I think I'm prepared to set aside my prepared remarks and proceed immediately to questions from the floor. "

Let me make some provisos. I am not an expert on terrorism. I had one experience and don't intend to have another one, thank you very much. Secondly, I don't profess to have any new ideas on how we cope with terrorism in terms of defense, defending against it. I don't know that there are any answers beyond those that we have already identified and that we are trying to put into place. Terrorism is, after all, a continuing learning experience, where there is no 100% protection ever, unless we cop out and leave, and that's an option that a great power such as we are rarely has. Its public servants serving that government abroad don't have that option either.

What is required, is resolve, a large degree of patience, a capacity for risk taking, and a determination, above all, to learn from experience. We forget too easily.

My focus in these introductory remarks that I will make is on the nature of the threat and what we do about it, not how its victims cope with terrorism when it strikes, even though that's a large subject in itself and we've each got a lot of learning to do because it could strike any of us.

Nor need I, in talking about terrorism, I think, trouble you with any recital of the statistics as to the number of such threats, incidents, victims. We all know that from the evening news. And we should remember as well that Americans are not the only victims of terrorism. The Israelis, Jordanians, Saudis, Turks, even Russians on occasion, are victims of the threat of terrorism. Nor are diplomats alone the targets of terrorism, even though we, because of our visibility and the nature of our profession, are preferred candidates, I suppose, for terrorist attacks. More often in the front lines as we are in peace time than even the military, hunkering down now in our residences and our chanceries overseas, is hardly the way we normally pursue our business, which is to win friends and influence people.

Diplomats are becoming a kind of endangered species in the face of that kind of threat. Indeed, more Ambassadors have been killed by terrorists in recent years than the number of Admirals and Generals, flag rank, killed in Vietnam. But it isn't only diplomats. One need only look at Beirut today, where seven Americans suffer the hostage experience, far worse than ours in Tehran, only one of whom is a government servant. The remainder include a doctor, an academician, a clergyman, special targets of those in the Middle East who seek to remove by terrorist acts that particular dimension of the American presence, the cultural, the educational, the philosophic, the humanitarian presence; our cultural, social, and humanitarian purpose in that part of the world.

I was on a talk show day before yesterday in which the Iraqi ambassador to Washington was also present, and he asked me, in light of the news that very day of the seventh American taken hostage, another professor from the American University of Beirut, he asked me why don't you pull those people out of there? And I immediately responded because that would be exactly what the terrorists want. They want us out. They want to root us out lock, stock and barrel.

Having said that, this isn't to say that we should not remind and warn and counsel Americans in Beirut and Lebanon to leave, but I for one can certainly understand why that small band at the AUB, for example, in Beirut, choose to stay.

Terrorism seeks to destroy all of that kind of presence, and in the larger context of my remarks this afternoon, terrorism seeks to frustrate as well the broader purposes of diplomacy. Terrorism has no tolerance for what is central, indeed essential, to the practice of diplomacy, the pursuit of the peace process, and a willingness to consider compromise, a readiness to seek an accommodation of interests, because not doing so is too costly for both sides in a controversy.

Those who seek to achieve their means through terrorism reject all of that, closed as they are to the views of others, convinced that force and terror is the only means to accomplish their purpose. In other words, terrorism is war--a special kind of war, indeed, but nevertheless a resort to force and violence in the first instance, not the last. Warfare, as someone else has said, on the cheap. A kind of warfare for which we are not, even now, with the experience we've had, sufficiently equipped either institutionally or intellectually. A kind of warfare, violence designed to create fear in the minds and hearts of the entire community where it occurs. To achieve, for example, in the Middle East, the total removal of the American presence by creating conditions and atmosphere broadly among the populace and the apparatus of society and government as well, in which our presence can no longer be sustained.

Terrorism being that kind of warfare, it requires of us as well the same instruments on occasion that war demands, but assuredly, certainly in my view, it also demands of us an intensified reliance on the diplomatic method. An intensified effort to preserve the fabric of law and diplomacy, and to achieve progress in resolving the issues of a given area, particularly the Middle East, which in good part give rise to terrorism.

As I said, I'm going to skip over what I had meant to say about policy, we'll talk about that later, and talk instead about some of the more specific things we're doing in a couple of areas, i.e. the impact on families and the need for greater multilateral cooperation.

We are obviously, I'm sure you appreciate, doing what we can to improve the training of American personnel going overseas to serve in the larger foreign service of the United States. Trying to sensitize them to the appreciation that it can happen to them, no matter where they go; no matter how secure a place looks before they go there. And reminding them as well of the means available to them to cope, and I can say with assurance that Secretary of State Shultz has given this aspect of the problem his highest priority, as he does the larger issue of terrorism, meeting, as this Secretary of State does every day in the morning, no matter what the threat, with those charged in the Department of State to cope with the danger of terrorism.

Let me add a special comment regarding training and sensitizing of the family. They too, although not government employees themselves, must have that kind of preparation, of training, of sensitizing, of readiness, because often the heaviest burden of terrorism is on the victim's family, where fear and uncertainty and doubt and anger and frustration, a lack of knowledge, a feeling that government isn't doing enough, that they're being ignored by government, can also make them hostages to terrorism. Indeed, a major, if not the heaviest burden of terrorism rests on them--those members of the victim's family. The pain and the anxiety and the fear today, for example, that is felt by the families of those seven who sit in darkness in Beirut, or elsewhere in Lebanon. Too easily we forget that.

Too often those in Washington charged with the task of coping with terrorism, a particular incident, hard pressed as we may be, preoccupied by the tasks at hand, see the families more as part of the problem than as partners in trying to resolve it, thus risking making them part of the problem, a problem in themselves.

I can say with assurance that Tehran taught us some lessons in that respect, that we must do better than we have to date -- particularly those of us in the civilian sectors of government. Our colleagues in the military sector did better than we did, during that experience, with family.

Let me say something now about multilateral cooperation. Not that it's an end in itself, but it's an example of how far we've got yet to go in getting greater common effort in coping with what is a common problem. No matter what our commitment and our capability may be, we can't go it alone where the threat is beyond our borders. And here, regrettably, there is far too often more rhetoric than substance.

Existing international agreements, and there are a lot of them, include a lot of rhetoric, certainly in itself important -- the moral force that that rhetoric expresses. But its effectiveness is so often limited by the absence of enforcement mechanisms, or to put it more simply, the absence of teeth, to enforce all of that noble rhetoric.

In 1984, the Summit Seven, meeting in conference, you may recall, expressed some very strong words on the need to work together against terrorism, the need for joint action, in the joint declaration they published at the end of that. Regrettably, there appears to have been little follow through. I know there was no reference to terrorism in the 1985 Summit declaration. Assuredly, the problem hasn't gone away. This again reflects how difficult it is to get the sustained kind of commitment in the multilateral area on actions so essential for the interests of all of us. And in this area one need look no further today than at Tehran.

Today, not only back in 1980-1981, to see how much we lack that kind of sustained effort, and directed effort. You all recall the tragedy of the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner two or three months ago, and the murder in that hijacking of a couple of American government officials, as well as several Kuwaitis. Today, the world seems to have forgotten that. It shouldn't, because that Kuwaiti aircraft, so far as I know, still sits on the tarmac, or somewhere nearby, in Tehran, and the hijackers who committed that murder have not been prosecuted, at least to our knowledge, and could well sit in some comfort in Tehran. And yet commercial air traffic, involving a number of Western European commercial air carriers, continues to transit Tehran airport.

Where, one might ask, is the voice of the international community highlighting that grievance? Indeed, where is the voice of the International Air Pilots Association in refusing to continue flights in and out of that city, where that kind of assault on human decency, and specifically on commercial air traffic, occurred? It is not that some efforts are not underway in other dimensions to get greater international cooperation. They are. Including measures that we are taking with friendly governments to enhance our understanding and knowledge in the areas of intelligence, contingency planning, security, and so on. But we've got an awful long way to go.

Now let me speak plain lastly, keeping a good while for questions, to the most difficult question of all in the context of terrorism, I think that it is at least the most difficult for myself and the rest of the public to understand, and that's the question of the use of force; the direct use of force, in either a pre-emptive or retaliatory fashion, to stop terrorism, or to punish terrorism after it occurs. Tehran posed that problem, and there are still those who argue or debate the merits of its apparent lack of use in that crisis. Today, Lebanon and the tragedies there are illustrative of how complex that issue is; how difficult it is, even with the object lesson of Tehran, to bring our power to bear, and we've got lots of it, against the singularly unconventional threat represented by terrorism in that tormented part of the world.

Surely force cannot be excluded among the options available in dealing with that threat--both one that is foreseen and one that becomes real. I've been in the business of diplomacy, the diplomatic method, for 36 years now. And I can say with assurance, that no one appreciates more than a diplomat the utility of the availability of force as a method, as an instrument, of conducting diplomacy, if you will. It was expressed years ago in one of these colleges, over in the other building, the National War College, by George Kennan, that elder statesman of diplomacy residing today in Princeton, who at that time was the Deputy Commandant of the National War College for International Affairs. He said then, to a group of students at that college in 1946, "You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background." Assuredly that's true.

But in terrorism, it's never easy to apply. As the Secretary of State, however, said in a series of speeches that you may recall last fall and this spring, dealing with the subject; "Our responses to terrorism must go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, pre-emption and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and to deter future terrorist acts, not simply to react to them."

That said, all of you appreciate, and I have no doubt the Secretary of State does too, how difficult it is to translate that kind of resolve into the action that we need to take. His statements, assuredly, in any event, have been a useful warning to terrorists that we have both the will and the ability to act if we choose to do so. On the other hand, there cannot be a precise prescription or definition of how we might respond to each and every terrorist incident. This Administration, as have others, including the Carter Administration, faces the same problem as others do--how to apply force in a messy scene such as the Middle East, where often terrorists swim in a sympathetic sea.

Both Carter and Reagan, as you know, issued warnings about the possible use of force if harm is done to any Americans held hostage, then in Tehran and now, in Beirut. And I for one believe those warnings, preferably diplomatically conveyed, quietly conveyed, are damned useful--and I hope they are today with respect to those seven.

What the Secretary and other spokesmen for the Administration have done essentially in this domain is not to prescribe exactly what we would do, but to call on the American people, you and me, to focus our thoughts, more than we have done to date, on how force can be used, how we can bring ourselves to recognize that force indeed may come to be an essential element in a specific case, and that there is a need for developing some kind of national consensus on how and when that should be used, without necessarily determining specifically in advance what it should be. We've had too much nit-picking after the fact, and not enough of an effort to develop a consensus beforehand on how to cope with this new threat.

And in that area, I need hardly tell you, nothing matters more than intelligence, information as to what the threat is, who they are, where they are, what they want, and what the dimension of our particular interests are in that region, how they may be affected by whatever we do, whatever they may do. Information through intelligence that will make it possible for us to determine before the use of force that the use of force will help us and not them. That we'll come out of it ahead, and not, speaking of that sympathetic sea, risking poisoning the well against us in a particular region.

Plans to use force obviously, must be balanced against the cost of failure. A threat to innocent victims, a possible public outcry, at home and abroad, against our actions, the impact on larger regional interests, the risk that our action may simply poison the well against us. There is inevitably an emotional reaction natural to the obscenity of terrorism, and that can cause us to take action that we will later regret.

I assume all of you will agree as well that the United States, super power that we are, leading free world state that we are, bears a very heavy moral and legal obligation to conform our actions, as much as possible, to the maximum degree possible, to the rule of law, to the diplomatic method, to ensure that any action we take in this respect and others on the international scene strengthens the fabric of that rule of law out there, rather than weakening it. Or to over-simplify, we must always be careful, it seems to me, in dealing with terrorism, that we don't fight fire with fire. In

other words, if you will, a certain regard for rules of engagement on the international scene, with the special obligations that rest on us because of what we are, because of the traditions we stand for, the rule of law that has been ours.

I haven't mentioned in this discussion of the use of force anything about a rescue capability. Having experienced the Tehran affair, I can say with assurance, without reservation, that such capability in the area of terrorism is vital. We didn't have it in adequate measure when the Tehran crisis occurred, but we have learned from the tragedy of Desert One. We can talk about that in the question period if you will.

Let me sum up this way. Terrorism is a serious threat, and it will remain that for the foreseeable future. The threat is particularly real in the Middle East, a region where our interests, as Bob Pelletreau described this morning, are so largely engaged. We are better organized within government, I think, to cope. Our policy guidelines are reasonably clear and consistent. We've got strong support from the Congress for funds to strengthen our defenses, and we are slowly, terribly slowly, gaining some degree of greater international cooperation. We know what we need, or at least need to try to do, to improve our defenses on the ground. We know what better intelligence gives us. We know as well the need for contingency planning for the possible use of force, both in a pre-emptive and a retaliatory fashion.

But let us not forget that progress in reducing the cost of terrorism for the long term requires as well that we keep a focus on some of the root causes of much of the terrorism, at least, that threatens, certainly in the Middle East. For while those who commit these acts against us are zealots, fanatics in the depth of their cause and their commitments, they are not simply crazies or nuts. Most of them are driven by grievances, felt grievances of social, economic, psychological, political dimensions. A product of their experience in their region, both national and individual. Driven as well by commitments to martyrdom, and total self discipline that is so much a part of their religious experience--prepared to risk their lives, give their lives, because they believe their causes are right, and because of the promise of what that martyrdom will give them--and yes, governments too, and the shadows behind them in the area of state terrorism. Governments and individuals who seek in the Middle East to destroy the state of Israel, extremist elements who seek to drive the United States out of the Middle East; to punish other countries such as France for their role there as well. In short, to extend Khomeinism, if you will, throughout the Middle East.

People who believe that they are and have been oppressed by political, economic and military forces, for which they hold the United States, the "great satan," particularly responsible. People in governments who want to destroy progress towards peace--all of which of course is simply another reminder of the importance of what Bob Pelletreau was talking about this morning, and that is a determined and patient pursuit of that peace process in the Middle East toward a resolution of those grievances, and thus gradually changing the atmosphere in which terrorism grows.

An immense task, I need hardly tell you, asking of us among other things a greater, deeper understanding of the cultural and religious components of those causes. Asking of us the most skillful diplomacy we can bring to bear in dealing with governments and leaders of the Middle East to contribute to an atmosphere in which compromise and accommodation is again possible. Working to change the climate of the region, if you will, so that

the legitimate goals of the peoples of the area are identified with the presence and purpose of the United States. An immense task, indeed, given the messy nature of the Middle East and the world generally out there. A world once described by a previous Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in these words: "While Washington sleeps, about two-thirds of the rest of the world is awake, and somewhere, someone, is up to some kind of mischief, prejudicial to American interests."

A world that asks of diplomats in particular the kind of counsel I think that Bobby Kennedy, according to the biography written about him by Schlesinger, once suggested "Keep strong if possible, and in any case keep cool. Have unlimited patience. Never corner an opponent, and always assist him to save face. Put yourself in his shoes so as to see things through his eyes. Avoid self righteousness like the devil--nothing is so self blinding."

Bobby Kennedy didn't refer to one other quality I think that applies in the pursuit of the peace process and in diplomacy and in coping with terrorism, especially if you're coping with it in a hostage cell, and that's a sense of humor, a capacity to laugh.

His brother, John F. Kennedy, while he was President, often quoted from the Ramayana something to this effect, "There are three things in life that are real: God, human folly, and laughter. Since the first two are usually beyond human comprehension, we must do what we can with the third." Laughter, a sense of humor, how important that is!

I've taken too much time. I'll take your questions.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
with
Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen
Vice President, National Defense University

Q: I wondered whether you felt that President Carter did everything that could have been done during the period of your captivity in Tehran? Secondly, at the time, your captors were consistently described in the media as students, and, if so, one wonders what they were studying? And thirdly, I think one of the problems in general about American political science, in looking at the Middle East and the Third World, is that it has made the mistake of thinking that somehow modernization and development go along automatically with secularization--a trend that doesn't appear to have taken place. In fact, we seem to be seeing a reverse trend, not only in Iran, but also more recently in Cairo and other parts of the Middle East. But, most especially, I wondered about your feelings about what President Carter did or might have done, if anything?

A: What the students were studying, they were studying the art of terrorism, I suppose. A case study if you will, on the ground! Let me just say that those students were students by and large, committed, zealous, convinced that their cause was right, and I respect them for that. I don't respect them for what they did to resolve those grievances; they had absolutely no right whatsoever politically, morally, legally, on any count, to take that kind of action to resolve their grievances. But they were students by and large, ranging from 18 to 35, not very activist students at that particular time.

I think myself that Carter did everything he could have done. It's a long story and a long issue and a lecture in itself. We will all have our own views on that subject. You were here closer to it than I was. I was in Tehran.

There's a very good book that just came out written by Gary Sick, who was the National Security Advisor under Carter at that time, it's called All Fall Down, and I commend it to you. It's published by Random House, just very recently. It deals with the Revolution, but also with the hostage crisis. I think it's the best book written to date.

I think I implied in my remarks that there aren't that many options available, easily used, in the use of force--that's where Carter I think is usually faulted. He pursued it through a patient, quiet, plodding, pursuit of pressure diplomacy, putting pressure to bear on the Iranians to give up this obscenity. And in time, of course it worked, but a hell of a long time. But it did work in the sense that all of the 53 were back. It was costly of course, in terms of the duration of that crisis, in the sense of humiliation that Americans understandably felt, perhaps as well the cost in terms of the way other countries, particularly in the region, perceived our capacity to carry out our interests, and to defend our interests and to protect them.

There are things that I think Carter could have done perhaps to shorten the crisis. I would like to have seen us more successful in the area of sanctions--not that sanctions are an end in themselves; they don't resolve things, but they did add pressure and eventually began to hurt to the point where the Iranians were impelled to act, move in that direction, although as well let us not forget, and I mention this in the context of the role of the

press, I think that issue in Tehran had a certain course to run, in the context of Iran's own body politic. We will never know if force could have been used effectively. It might have caused the Iranians to do some things in terms of letting us go earlier, I don't know. I doubt it. I think it would have toughened them, stiffened their back, and I don't know what the cost would have been to the individual hostages. Not that the hostages should ever be on the top of the list of priorities; although I must say, aren't we a fortunate country that we can give that much priority to the human element, as we do often. And as this administration is doing too, essentially. As the President of the United States said in those debates before the election, we must always keep in mind, whenever we consider the use of force, the impact on innocent bystanders.

In your question, recently, you also raise the impact of the modernization process, another big issue. You may have read a profile of Mrs. Sadat in Egypt in the press, how she was struck when she got back to Egypt, after five months here, how far fundamentalism had appeared to move in those five months alone, and specifically as it affected women in Egypt -- their dress, their rights as married persons, and so on. That trend is assuredly abroad in the Middle East, it is there as this process of modernization goes forward.

Q: Did your Iranian captors exhibit any evidence of that saving grace that you talked about, a sense of humor?

A: No, not very much, I'd have to say. But let me say this in their defense, if you will. I felt very strongly from the very beginning that some traditions in Iran, of family, of hospitality to foreigners, would be a factor in the ultimate resolution of that crisis. I also felt, myself, that they would never deliberately kill us. A dead hostage was useless to them, a burden for them, costly as well, possibly, in terms of the way the Carter Administration might have responded to that.

There were times, assuredly, that I felt when a certain human element surfaced on the part of the captors. I was not with the students as much as some of my colleagues were. For much of the time I was held in the Foreign Ministry, until they took me to prison at the end, when I met the students for the last several weeks. In the Foreign Ministry, I met more of the old school Iranian, and I will always remember the way in which some of those old traditions were there and surfaced occasionally to my benefit and the benefit of my two colleagues in the Foreign Ministry.

Q: Before being stationed in Iran, two years before you were there, our family did not receive any training in terrorism and what to expect, and I certainly would agree that it's needed for our military families. We have hundreds of thousands of military families stationed around the world. I was recently in Europe and I found a real apprehension over terrorism among the families there. Would you tell us what training you recommend for these families, and what is the likelihood of getting the funding for that training through Congress?

A: We are currently getting money hand over fist, frankly, from the Congress, a sympathetic Congress, conscious of the hurt, the threat, the dangers that the Foreign Service community, broadly defined, faces overseas. We're getting plenty of money. That's not the question.

As far as what families can do, I would refer you to a publication of the Association of Foreign Service Women. It's just been printed and published, and in that study done by a committee headed by my wife have come up with a series of recommendations as to what can be done.

I don't mean to suggest that you can remake a person. You are what you are when you get into this kind of stress, and you bring to bear what kind

of person you are. You aren't going to remake that particular person at the last minute, and training isn't going to provide some of the strengths in terms of character, faith, family, that were not there before.

I've often used the expression, however, and I quoted it to someone the other day--and Mrs. Reagan uses it all the time now as well--an expression to the effect that human beings are like tea bags. They don't know their real strength until they get into hot water. It's a good expression, and it's an apt expression. We are what we are, and there's a lot more there than we expect.

The foreign affairs community is offering in Washington, through the Overseas Briefing Center over in the Foreign Service Institute, a good many courses dealing with the way in which families can work more effectively, can defend themselves, can strengthen themselves to cope with stress overseas. Ultimately, of course, it depends largely on the mission concerned. Training here in Washington is good, but it's got to be carried on overseas so that people are constantly oriented to, kept informed about, provided information that gives them the capacity to cope.

I can say with conviction myself how important it is that the entire official American community in a given country is well informed about policy, about why they are there, about what underlies our particular policy premises and purposes in that country. Spouses often have to sit at social functions next to Prime Ministers and Presidents, and they need to be able to talk intelligently on things. And in any event, both families and the victims themselves in terrorism are far better equipped to face up to the risk of danger and exploitation by their captors if they are informed, if they understand why they are there. In our case, for example, why our relations with the Shah of Iran were what they were, and why he figured so largely in that crisis.

Q: I was interested in the airplane that just had to return to Beirut because no country would allow it to land. Do you know if those countries decided independently, or if there was any sort of a concerted effort to decide how to handle that particular hijacking, and how do you feel about such an approach to airplane hijackings, having been a victim of terrorism yourself?

A: I don't know, I don't know the specifics of that. I'd like to hope that it does suggest that. I think there is, assuredly, among most countries--occasionally even on the part of Libya, a reluctance to accept that kind of aircraft landing in their midst. I don't want to give that kind of credit to Quadafi very deeply, but there has been an occasion or two, I think, where he has demonstrated some degree of responsibility to obligation under international law and custom and concern.

I don't know the specifics of this particular case, but the fact that airports are refusing them, what these terrorists ask of them, and the governments behind the scene, surely is a good sign.

Q: I'd like to follow up on the previous question. You indicated that there's plenty of money available to give us this training, give some information to families before they get overseas, but you also indicated there's a responsibility once you get over there to know what's going on and know something about it.

Am I to understand that there is some briefing, some training that's going on for military families before they go overseas?

DR. KORB: Yes, there is.

Q: What specifically?

DR. KORB: It's run by each of the Services, and it's becoming more and more pronounced as people become more and more concerned with it. I can get you the details on each one.

I think what Ambassador Laingen was talking about, easy to get money, what he was basically saying was, anything in the name of beefing up security under that rubric these days, like getting more secure embassies, for example, would be easy to get.

Q: When we prepare to select diplomats and their families to send overseas, is there any criteria which includes language proficiency by the family, the kind of learning that would allow people to understand that a broom is used and not a vacuum in that community, that sort of thing, sort of cultural end of the training, that these people are going to need to fit into the culture in which they must live? This kind of thing it seems to me is a necessity. Is there any provision for this?

DR. KORB: Let me speak to the Department of Defense's program. I'm sure somebody else here could speak to the Department of State's program. Normally, for example, when a Service member is selected to be the attache, and he or she goes to the language school, the spouse is also offered the opportunity to go to the language school. I just came back from China, and, in China, both Admiral Ramsey and his wife went to the school run over here, right around this part of town, to learn Chinese. Her Chinese was not as good as his because he had studied and been in Hong Kong before, but it was very, very passable, and she knew quite a bit about the Chinese culture and background, so the opportunity is offered.

The State Department, I'd let somebody here from the State Department speak themselves, but normally I assume the same thing is done with the State Department.

AMBASSADOR LAINGEN: Sure, the State Department is providing it. I'd like to believe that this publication, for example, reflects the fact that a lot more needs to be done. To give sustained and continuing language training to all members of families, of course, requires a lot of time and could cost a lot of money, and I'm not sure that amount of money is available, but I think it is fair to say, and if anyone here from the Department of State wants to contest me, let me know, that spouses who want to spend time learning a language before they go are given far more opportunity today to do that than used to be the case. The Overseas Briefing Center as well, and the other sections of the Foreign Service Institute, make available the Area Studies programs now, not simply to officers, but to their spouses as well, if they've got time to attend such courses before they go overseas.

I want to say in that respect as well, again, how important it is that chiefs of mission overseas reach out themselves to spouses, to families, so that they are kept informed, even on a classified basis often, of what's going on in that country.

Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen

Vice President
National Defense University

L. Bruce Laingen was born on August 6, 1922, in Minnesota. He received his B.A. from St. Olaf College in 1947, and his M.A. from the University of Minnesota in 1949. From 1943-1946 he served with the United States Navy.

Mr. Laingen entered the Foreign Service in 1949 and was appointed Consular Officer in Hamburg in 1951, a position he held until 1953. From 1953-1954 he served as Economic Officer in Tehran, and from September 1954 to February 1955 as Acting Principal Officer at Meshed. Following this assignment, he returned to Tehran, also as Economic Officer, where he remained until 1956. From 1956 to 1960, he served as Deputy, then Officer-in-Charge, of Greek Affairs, in the Department of State.

In 1960, Mr. Laingen was assigned to Karachi as Political Officer, and from 1964 to 1967 served as Officer-in-Charge of Pakistan/Afghanistan Affairs in the Department. He attended the National War College, Class of 1968, after which he was appointed Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul. After this return to the Department in 1971, he served successively as Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (1971-1973), Country Director for India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives Islands (June to August 1973), and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (1973-1975). In February 1975, he was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, a position he held at the time of his nomination as Ambassador to Malta, where he served from 1977 to 1979. During February and March 1979, Mr. Laingen headed the American Delegation at the CSCE Conference on the Mediterranean in Malta.

From June until November 4, 1979, Mr. Laingen served as Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy in Tehran. He was among those held hostage in Tehran from that date until his release on January 20, 1981. In August 1981, he began his new assignment as Vice President of the National Defense University at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Laingen received the Department of State's Meritorious Honor Award in 1967, the Distinguished Alumnus Award from St. Olaf College in 1975, and the Department of State's Award for Valor in 1981.

Mr. Laingen is married to the former Penelope Babcock and they have three sons, William, Charles, and James.



DALE L. BUMPERS
Member of Congress (D-Arkansas)
United States House of Representatives

RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE: A DEBATE
between
Senator Dale L. Bumpers, Democrat, Arkansas
and
Honorable Lawrence J. Korb
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations, and Logistics)

DR. KORB: Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas and myself debated the subject of the defense budget before the Committee on National Security. And, in the course of that debate, I became well aware of the fact that it was no accident that Senator Bumpers was voted by his fellow Senators as one of the three best orators in that body. He's also been named in a poll of Washington correspondents as one of the ten best U.S. Senators. He served two terms as Governor of Arkansas. He is completing his second term in the Senate. He's a graduate of the University of Arkansas, holds a law degree from Northwestern. Please join me in welcoming to the forum Senator Dale Bumpers from Arkansas.

SENATOR BUMPERS: Thank you. Dr. Korb, thank you very much for your introduction.

I'm honored to be with you today, and I first want to applaud all of you. I understand you have come from all over the United States, and I applaud you for your interest in the subject matter today. It would be impossible, even for two brilliant people like me and Dr. Korb, to cover everything that you need to hear today, and I'm not at all sure this is a legitimate debate, because Dr. Korb and I don't disagree on an awful lot of things. We do have some differences, and we're here this afternoon to give you one and sometimes two different viewpoints for your edification, and hope that you'll meditate on it as you go back to your respective homes and think about what is the real challenge to national security.

I know I don't look it, but I served in World War II. I'm 59 years old, and if you go blabbing that, I'll never come back here. But John McCain, who is now in the House of Representatives, used to be the Navy liaison with the Senate, and he came to our house one morning to pick Betty and me up. We were going down to christen a great new ship, a guided missile cruiser called the USS Arkansas. Anyway, later on we became very good friends, before he ran for Congress. He used to be a fine fellow before he got to the House of Representatives. But, in any event, having been in the Marine Corps, and he in the Navy, we both used to banter a lot, because that's like putting two hornets in a jug, getting a Marine and a swabby together.

And one day I said, "John, did you ever hear that old saw about 10,000 gobs laid down their swabs to fight one sick Marine, and 10,000 more jumped up and swore it was the best fight they'd ever seen?" He said, "Yes, I heard that." But he said, "You don't understand, Dale. I wanted to be in the Marine Corps too, but they wouldn't take me because my folks were married to each other."

Incidentally, one of my colleagues the other day called for Secretary Weinberger's dismissal, and that very night he had to sit by him at an Embassy dinner party. And he said, "Dale, I've never struggled so hard with what to say," and he said, "Obviously we were avoiding each other because

there'd been quite a bit of play in the press that morning about it," and finally he looked over and he said, "Mr. Secretary, how do you like the taste of the new Coke?" And Secretary Weinberger says, "I don't like it at all, I used to be on the Board of Pepsi Cola."

One of my favorite expressions comes from Frederick the Great, who was a fairly good general in his day, and he used to say, "If you try to be strong everywhere, you will wind up being weak everywhere. " Now this is the thing that concerns me most about our defense posture. It is not necessarily how much money we're spending, though I think it's excessive, it is how much is enough, what is the threat, and how do you propose to meet the threat?

If you sit in the bowels of the Pentagon and you dream up every scenario you can dream up as to what might happen, and you try to prepare for every conceivable scenario, you will obviously spend a great deal of money. And in all probability, you are going to dilute your forces to the point that you cannot face the real threat that you're most likely to have to face. It's really tragic in our society that to criticize any part of defense spending, indeed criticize much of anything, unless it's a social program, that you're virtually found to be unpatriotic. And that doesn't serve anybody's purpose well.

So, how do you stay strong? How do you develop a lean, mean, efficient military within the limits of your economic resources, and face those threats that you're most likely to have to face? I favor, and most Democrats favor, for example, the Midgetman missile, the D-5 missile, sometimes referred to as the Trident II. I favor the Trident submarine program, I favor the Pershing, I favor the cruise missile, I favor the Stealth bomber, I favor a host of ship and shore weapon systems, but I have never favored the B-1 bomber, and I do not favor the M-X. And yet, despite the fact that I favor strategic modernization and have voted for every single appropriation for those items I just mentioned, if you happen not to favor one, such as the M-X, you're quite often accused of being unpatriotic. And as I say, that's why people when I get home, they say, "Senator, what are you going to do to ameliorate your image as a liberal?" That's like asking have you quit beating your wife.

You see, because liberal is bad in Arkansas, that immediately dampens the debate and shifts the debate to some kind of nonsensical forum where you cannot possibly get people's attention.

In 1981, we were debating a massive tax cut in the United States Senate. \$750 billion over a five year period, and it was very popular in this country. President Reagan was riding a crest of popularity, as he has almost ever since he's been elected. But it never made any sense to me to say that we were going to cut taxes \$750 billion and within three years balance the budget. We were running a deficit at the very time we were talking about it. And eleven of us stood up and squealed like a pig under a gate and said this doesn't make any sense. I said my second grade arithmetic teacher's got to be whirling in her grave.

And so, three years later, as the \$200 billion deficit developed, there we were and here we are. Now my point is this. In my judgment, 80% of the members of the United States Senate knew that what they were doing was wrong from an economic standpoint. Late in 1981, President Reagan said he wanted the M-X missile deployed in silos. Scoop Jackson, John Tower, Sam Nunn, Bill Cohen, all the gurus on defense in the United States Senate stood up on the floor of the Senate and said this is palpable nonsense to build the M-X missile at a cost of roughly \$35 billion and stick it in Minuteman silos which the Soviet Union already had targeted.

Now what was the campaign about in 1980? It was that by 1983 the United States was going to face a window of vulnerability. That there would be a period between 1983 and 1985 when all of our land based missiles would be vulnerable to Soviet attack from some of their especially heavy missiles, like the SS-18. Now incidentally, we know now there never was a window of vulnerability. I didn't think there was at the time, and we know now that there wasn't. But it was popular coffee shop talk, it was popular United States Senate talk.

So those men stood up and said why on earth would we put a fine missile like the M-X in a hole in the ground that the Soviets already have targeted. And it was obvious the M-X missile was going no place, so the President did what all presidents do when they don't get their way, they appoint a commission.

Now this commission was appointed, happily wired before it was appointed to come back and recommend the M-X, and it came back and said, well maybe we ought to build 100, but we should be moving toward the Midgetman missile, the small, single warhead mobile missile. That part of the Scowcroft commission report I agreed with.

But after the Scowcroft commission came back with that report, those same people stood on the floor of the Senate and said, well maybe we should build 100. So, in 1982, we started building the M-X missile, and 42 of us stood on the floor of the Senate and said this doesn't make a bit more sense than it did a year ago to build a fine missile and put it in vulnerable silos. Now the M-X is a good missile. You can put one in the Kremlin dining room. It is as accurate as you will find. It has hard target kill capability, it will do everything it's supposed to do. The only problem is, we're trying to develop invulnerability to Soviet attack, and silos are the worst place to put it.

But in any event, three weeks ago 78 Senators stood on the floor and said, we made a horrible mistake in 1982. No more M-X missiles, we're only going to build 40. And the President said no, I want 50. So they jumped in the tank and said okay you can have 50.

Now the problem is, everybody was saying exactly what some people said in 1982, that it made no sense. Seventy-eight Senators saying now that it makes no sense. But the problem is, we've already spent \$20 billion, and I promise you in 1982, 80% of the members of the Senate knew it was wrong to do it. It is so much easier to go with the flow.

Last week, we appropriated \$2.9 billion for SDI. Have you heard about SDI during this conference? That's like asking is water wet, isn't it. The appropriation for 1985, this year we're in right now, was \$1.4 billion. Now people's eyes glaze over, understandably, when you start talking about billions, but this year the Pentagon has \$1.4 billion for research on SDI, and the President wanted \$3.7 billion for 1986, even though as I stand here talking to you, only 12% of the \$1.4 billion has been obligated and we're almost two-thirds through the year. And now, last week, we appropriated \$2.9 billion, we didn't give the President everything he wants--he's a smart President. I used to be a governor, I know how it works, you ask for more than you hope to get. He asked for \$3.7 billion, we gave him \$2.9 billion. That's 110% above this year.

Now three years from now, 70 or 75 Senators will get up and say enough is enough. We're going to be yearning three years from now in that SDI program, you remember I told you here first, three years from now we're going to be yearning for the good old days of the \$435 claw hammer. There isn't any earthly way.

You know the other day, General Abrahamson, a fine man, I don't mean this to denigrate General Abrahamson, but he said, "We have this consortium at Cal Tech and MIT putting this thing together for us." Two days later, the President of MIT came out and said "What on earth is he talking about? We've got one professor over here with a little \$50,000 contract. And I resent the Pentagon using MIT to try to get Congress to appropriate all this money. We don't know what he's talking about." And so it goes.

Well, I'll tell you, it's so difficult to talk sense. I remember when the President said we're back and standing tall in 1983. At that time we hadn't received a single plane, tank, gun, or missile that wasn't on order the day he was elected President, and that is the truth, and I don't believe even Dr. Korb, who disagrees strongly with me from time to time, will deny that.

And you know another myth? You see, what I'm trying to get across, is that we keep responding to myths--window of vulnerability, got to have the M-X, Star Wars, we'll make this country secure so that no missile will ever interrupt your sleep. That is palpable nonsense. Even the most ardent proponent of SDI will tell you that it cannot possibly be more than 90% effective. The Soviet Union has almost 10,000 strategic warheads right now. If we had that thing in place and they launched 10,000 warheads, 1,000 warheads will hit the United States, and it's absolutely worthless against cruise missiles and bombers. And if we ever break out of SALT II, estimates by CBO is that the Soviet Union by 1995, before we can possibly deploy SDI, will have 35,000 strategic warheads--that means 3,500 would get through, and that's enough to ruin your whole day.

So, we keep dealing with these myths, like this unprecedented buildup in the Soviet Union. When the Vietnam War was over, we did cut a percentage of our spending for military purposes as a percentage of our budget and as a percentage of gross national product. From 1965 to 1976, according to the CIA, the Soviets increased military spending on an annual basis of between 4 and 5%. In 1976, they slowed spending down, and from 1976 to 1982, they cut their military expenditures to 2% growth rate annually.

Now my point is, how many times have you heard about this unprecedented military buildup in the Soviet Union? Now they have built, they have modernized their strategic forces. They built the SS-18 and put ten warheads on each one of them, and they've done a lot of other things, it's true. But what some people have been saying is, we let our guard down while they had this great buildup going.

I want to inject one thing here before I forget it. When I used to be on the Armed Services committee, I used to ask these questions, and when I left the Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin of Michigan started asking the same questions. Every year, we asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would you trade America's military posture for the Soviet Union? And every year the answer is an unequivocal no.

Now we don't have time to go into all that, but I just want to say, in conclusion, because I'm going to let Dr. Korb have his say here too, we're spending more and we're getting less, and we're spending it on the wrong things, we're gold plating our weapons, we have literally invited defense contractors to defraud us, and they have happily obliged. The other thing is we need to learn to fight smarter. Gary Hart, I think said it well. He said, "More is not better. Better is better."

Right now we have almost the same number of generals and admirals, four and three stars, that we had with 12 million men under arms the day I was discharged from the Marine Corps, and today we have about two million men under arms, still the same number of flag officers, and three and four star generals that we had with 12 million men under arms. What we need to do is to become smarter, leaner, meaner, more effective, plan on what we're going to do in those instances where we're likely to have to do something. We need to spend more money on readiness.

Last year we found in an operation in the fall of 1984 that we could not fight a limited war anyplace in the world, including Korea, for more than 30 days because of a shortage of ammunition. Now, thanks to Dr. Korb, that is improving, and I admit that. When he came to office, we had about a 30 day supply of ammunition in Central Europe if we had to fight there. Today, we're probably up to 45. I'll take his word for whatever it is. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff tell us we need 90 days supply, and even as we improve in ammunition and guns, just plain old things like we had to use in World War II, tanks, planes, guns, and ammunition, we are falling further behind in spare parts. We are still having to cannibalize airplanes, we're still having to cannibalize tanks because we don't have enough spare parts.

We need to be more competitive in our procurement and we need to pursue arms control. The President made what I thought was a very correct and courageous decision two days ago when he decided to keep the U.S. within the SALT II treaty limits, but that is the subject of a separate debate which Dr. Korb and I will entertain you with at some future date--we don't have time to do it now.

But I want to tell you one other thing. I have one basic disagreement with President Reagan, and it is that he only sees one threat to the country. And he sees the military threat of the Soviet Union as the only threat, and I agree with him on that, and anybody is naive or myopic not to understand that and to prepare for it. But I think there is a second, internal threat, and that is how we feel about each other, how we feel about our political system, how we feel about our judicial system, how we feel about our educational institutions, and how we treat our people, and I think that is a threat too, and it's much more insidious.

It's difficult for me to support an administration, even though I've supported an awful lot of this defense budget, I think we have overdone it and we're paying a price in a lot of waste. But you know, in the last four and a half years we have doubled the number of millionaires in this country, and I have no quarrel with that, I've been trying to join them all my life. But at the same time, we are the first developed nation on earth to impoverish our children. Twenty-four percent of all the kids in this country under 16 years old are living in poverty, and we are the first developed nation on earth to impoverish by age our children. And defense spending, so much of which has been unnecessary and wasteful, is a part of the cause of that.

Thank you very much.

DR. KORB: I told you he was going to be a tough act to follow.

Let me make a couple of points, and I won't spend a great deal of time because you've basically heard our side here for the last couple of days. Then I'll let the Senator respond to the points I make, and then we'll throw it open to questions.

In my view, we have never, as a nation, fully funded our commitments on our strategy. Now one might argue we ought to get rid of our commitments, we ought to change our strategy, but the fact of the matter is that when Secretary Weinberger goes up on the Hill and he says, are we concerned about Europe, concerned about Southwest Asia, the Western Pacific? People say yes, yes, yes, and yes. And this is not new with this administration.

President Truman wanted a balanced budget, and he hired a Secretary of Defense by the name of Louis Johnson to go over there and clean up the Pentagon and cut it down to size after Secretary Forrestal was literally driven crazy by the mis-match, if you will, between the threat and the resources available. And Louis Johnson went over, and he cleaned it up and he cut the defense budget down to \$11 billion. He proudly announced in June of 1950 that he had done his job, he had cut the Pentagon down to size, they didn't need any more money, they were adequate to deal with the threat. By the end of that month, the North Koreans had invaded South Korea, we had a war on our hands, and defense spending went from \$11 billion to \$60 billion, and people said we would never be in that position again.

Similarly, President Kennedy talked about funding a two and a half war strategy with his budget. With his budget and a slight increment we got ourselves involved in Vietnam, which was certainly not even the major war of the two wars, because one was supposed to be in Europe, one with the Chinese. Vietnam was maybe three-quarters of a war, and that totally consumed all of the resources even of that large a budget.

So we have never, in peacetime, fully funded the cost of our strategy. What we basically do is we take risks. The defense budget in many cases is like buying life insurance. If we bought all of the life insurance that the insurance salesman would have us buy, in many cases we might as well be dead because we would not have any money to do anything else. And it's a political decision that this nation makes as to the level of resources that it wants to put to defense.

But any Secretary of Defense, except for Louis Johnson, who was unceremoniously fired for having done his job and replaced by George Marshall after the North Koreans came in, every Secretary of Defense has said basically, we do not have the resources to carry out the strategy that the nation has given us.

This year, I heard the new Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in an interview with Evans and Novak, Congressman Les Aspin, who couldn't be considered a hawk or a devotee of the Reagan Administration, and Congressman Aspin said, "The Defense Department needs about five percent a year real growth this year to deal with the commitments and the threat, but they won't get it because of political circumstances." And I would argue that, right now, the cut-back in defense is coming for four reasons, none of which have anything to do with the threat we face or the commitments.

First of all, as Senator Bumpers I think has quite rightly pointed out, the deficit. There's no doubt that that's a problem, and it was inevitable that defense would have to pay a part in that, because it represents the majority of controllable expenditures in the federal budget.

Second, I think there have been no international crises around that have captured the imagination of the American people. If you take a look at the opinion polls for support for strong defense, you'll find that after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the seizure of our hostages in Iran, we had tremendous support for increases in defense spending. Those stories have faded from the front pages. The only war stories you see, if you will, that affect Americans, is in Central America, and the Americans don't want

to go there. The American people do not want to go there, and so, in fact, that support for defense spending has gone down.

There's also a concern that our allies are not doing enough. We did an awful lot in the first part of this particular decade to enhance our defense capabilities, our allies were perceived not to be doing enough, our NATO allies. In Japan, people looked around and said, well look at their economy, particularly Japan with the trade balance. If we do less maybe we can make them do more.

And then finally, the organization and management problems that the Department of Defense is having have created a climate in which our enemies are no longer our loyal opposition. In fact, I much prefer dealing with our loyal opposition because we debate strategy and we debate, for example, we could have a debate about whether we need the M-X and what that contributes to deterrence, but to our own party, the Republicans, who are basically saying you're going to waste it. In my view this year, the single biggest event, the main turning point that affected the level of defense resources that we got was not a debate about strategy or commitments, but an article in the "Wall Street Journal" by Senator Grassley, Republican from Iowa, that basically said don't give them the money because they're going to waste it anyway, and what we ought to have is no growth in the Department of Defense.

And remember, Senator Grassley then stood up on the Senate floor, after President Reagan and Senator Dole had worked out a 3% real increase, and beat the President of the United States by three votes primarily because of the organization and management problems.

Now I would say to you, as I mentioned yesterday in some of the question period, yes there is waste in the Department of Defense. But the waste primarily is what I would call political waste. There is certain management inefficiencies, but the waste primarily is political. I was dragged away this morning to go up and testify on base closures. And everybody is in favor of it, except when it comes to their particular district. And we had standing room only because we had lots of people come into the Military Construction Committee, who came in, who were not members, to speak about bases in their district. And when you got to it, even Mr. Robinson came in from Arkansas and said the only reason you people are thinking of closing the base down there is because Mr. Alexander is not a strong supporter of defense. Then we had somebody come up and say the Philadelphia Naval Yard is a marvel of modern technology and why would you even be thinking of, and we went on and on.

Now, we can't have it both ways. I would argue that the waste, for example in extra bases -- I told you the story of buying coal for Europe yesterday, that we have to do every year for our troops in Europe -- far exceeds the so-called management problems that we have.

The big cost in weapon systems is the end item. I agree with Senator Bumpers we ought to debate on whether we want an M-X missile, or whether we want this plane, or we want this ship. It was interesting to me that the year the spare parts scandal broke, and people focused on that in 1983, Congress appropriated money for two aircraft carriers without a great deal of debate, without a great deal of publicity, which in effect locks us into tremendous spending for a long, long period of time. And I would argue that those who look at the organization and management and say that's the reason we're not going to give you the money is a cop-out.

What we need to do is face the fact that we are a government organization. We are not, the founding fathers did not design this to be efficient.

As Congressman Dellums put it to me so eloquently this morning, "We've got to protect our constituents. That is the nature of the system." That's the way the system is designed. Given that, we will never be perfectly efficient, and that if you spend less you are increasing the risks, and this is a political judgement that you have to make.

I would argue that certainly we are better off than we were four years ago, because we doubled the defense budget in nominal terms of 50% real growth over the first Reagan Administration, and that certainly has put us in a lot better shape for a long period of time than the situation we inherited. But the fact of the matter, is if you let it go down, which it seems it will this year, in real terms, because the Senate is at zero, allowing for inflation, and the House is zero without inflation, so probably the compromise will be somewhere between the two, that you are increasing the risks because our commitments have not gone away. The international situation has not stabilized, and while the Soviets may have slowed down in the last five years, they're still going up.

Thank you very much.

Senator, you have a chance to respond if you'd like.

SENATOR BUMPERS: I just want to say two things. Number one, the quality of the personnel in all branches of the service is markedly improved in the last four years. One of the reasons I'm always a little hesitant to get into these things on the Senate floor is because I don't want anybody in any of the branches of the armed forces criticizing our people in uniform. I can remember being a lonely 18, 19 year old over in the Pacific, and I know how I would have felt if I thought some politician was jumping on me.

So I always carefully try to differentiate between what we're trying to do and the effect on personnel. But in any event, the quality of personnel in all branches is markedly improved, and I think a lot of that, incidentally, is for economic reasons, a lot of it is pure patriotism. More and more youngsters, as I go on college campuses these days, I find the students to be much more conservative, much more patriotic, more of them in ROTC and so on. That's a big plus for us.

The other thing I want to mention is that while we froze defense spending in the Senate and only allowed them inflation, if you go back and look for the past four years on how much inflation we've allowed them, you'll find we've allowed them a lot more than the actual inflation rate. We have actually over-compensated by somewhere between \$25 and \$50 billion over the last four and a half years, so they ain't hurting yet.

Another thing happened recently, and this really erodes the confidence that we up there who try to honestly look at this thing, find out what we need and how much we need of it and what it's for. The other day, Secretary Weinberger came up and they were talking about freezing spending, and they said, "Let's cut back on the procurement of this weapon, and let's slow down the procurement of this weapon and everything," and Secretary Weinberger says, "Well, I've got some good news. We just found \$4 billion."

Now what are we supposed to believe when the Secretary finds that he's in a little bit of a bind and then reveals to us that he has just happily discovered \$4 billion that had been missing so far as Congress is concerned?

So we have a credibility problem, because that's not the first time we ever got that. Incidentally, those of us who watch this carefully all the time, we learned that there are some people in the Pentagon that we trust intensely. And we learned that there are some we wouldn't believe under three oaths. You have to sort that out and do the best you can by it.

The other thing I want to say is that when it comes to base closing, which Dr. Korb has legitimately brought up, it's true. I defend the Blytheville Air Force Base, which is a SAC base up in the northeast corner of the state. But my defense of that base is based on a number of things. Scoop Jackson used to say, "I wish I didn't have a single military base in the state of Washington. You get no credit for getting them, you get no credit for keeping them, you only get credit if you lose them." Because it's a big economic item in the area.

But Blytheville Air Force Base is the most interior SAC base in the United States. Missile flying time to Blytheville is three to five minutes more than any place else. We believe, for example, if the Soviets were to launch a pre-emptive strike against us, this is no secret any more, when I came here it was, it isn't any more. But the Soviets keep two Yankee class submarines off each one of our coasts. It puts every major city in the United States within five to eight minutes of their missiles.

I was in the Soviet Union in 1983, Dr. Korb, and they were moaning and groaning about us putting the Pershing missile in Western Europe, another item, incidentally, that there was strong bi-partisan support for. President Reagan never heard a peep out of a Democrat about deploying the Pershing and the cruise missile in Western Europe. But they were moaning the fact that Moscow was going to be eight minutes from those Pershing missiles. And I started telling them, do you realize that most major American cities are less than five minutes from your Yankee submarines off our coast, and there were a couple of high powered generals there, and I could tell by the look on their face they didn't even know it.

But to come back to the point, when it comes to base closing, what Senator Gramm from Texas put in the bill was a carte blanche authority for the Secretary of Defense to close any base he wanted to, and essentially to build a new one anywhere he wanted to. Now I can tell you, I don't like that. I don't mind living with the law now, which was put in place to keep Senators and Congressmen from being chastised by threatened base closings. I'll make the case for Blytheville under existing law, and if the Secretary finds and the Defense Department finds that Blytheville still ought to be closed, I will not squawk. I won't like it, but I'll take my chances. But to give the Secretary of Defense the right to walk into my office and say, "Senator Bumpers, you voted against the M-X and that's a no no. Therefore, Blytheville Air Force Base must go."

Now that's the way it was done in the good old days, and that's the reason the law is now the way it is. So that you just cannot chastise a member of Congress that you happen to disagree with at a moment in time.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
with
Senator Dale L. Bumpers, Democrat Arkansas
and
Honorable Lawrence J. Korb
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations and Logistics)

Q: I'm glad Senator Bumpers is here. We've had two days of defense, so now we've got some reinforcement from the other side.

I just think that everybody believes the the President has got to defend the country, but it's a matter of deciding how much that defense is going to cost and what are the priorities for the United States? And we can not militarize our society by putting all our emphasis on defense. There's got to be some other issues discussed, and we just cannot take this much of our budget and put our brightest and our best only concerned with technology. There's other issues, and I don't think the American public will not support the necessary things for defense, if we get the other things.

It reminds me very much of what Hitler did to Germany, put all the emphasis on defense. There are other issues. And the American public always responds to what is best for the country if we're told and explained and given the whole picture. There are other priorities, education, jobs, and we can create jobs. We've got to look at what are priorities. Dr. Korb's been a very reassuring person from defense.

DR. KORB: Let me make a comment on that, and I'll let the Senator if he wants. I think if you take, there are lots of ways you can measure the emphasis that a society puts on defense. None of them are perfect, but I think there are some things you ought to consider. The Senator was talking about myths. If you go out and you ask the American people what percentage of our GNP, for example, goes for defense, the latest poll I saw said most of the people thought 20% or more. It is six and a half percent of the GNP.

Now you might argue that's too much or too little, but I think that is a fact that one has to consider when looking at the burden that defense puts on the country, and it does put a burden. I would not say it doesn't. But I think if you take a look at the post-World War II period. We've been a great power, we've had these ebbs and flows. As President Reagan came in on the window of vulnerability, President Kennedy rode in on the missile gap and the fact that we had lost Cuba, and defense spending went up in his first administration. So these things do go and you're right, it's the American people that ultimately make the judgment about the insurance that they want to buy.

Q: I have a much broader question here. It has to do both with defense and foreign affairs. I see a dilemma, and I see it mostly through the media because they keep talking about it, is where do you draw the line of where the responsibilities of the executive branch end and the responsibilities of the legislative branch begins when it comes to foreign affairs, defense matters. And you hear some folks say it is the responsibility of the President to make decisions on foreign affairs. However, he does need the corroboration and, let's say, the vote of the Congress for whatever he wants to do.

When it comes to defense policies, again you need to get the money to do it, and I understand all that's involved in the politics and so on. I was just, both of you or just one of you if you want to respond, how do you resolve this dilemma, or is there a concern that there is a dilemma of responsibilities as to where one ends and the other begins?

SENATOR BUMPERS: Let me say as a lawyer, and studying constitutional law we used to have this saying, "The President proposes, the Congress disposes." And so, when the President proposes, for example, a defense budget to us, it is Congress' solemn duty and responsibility to look it over very carefully and get the best advice they can get from inside and outside the Pentagon. And in the past five years the President has received about 95% of everything he's asked for on defense. Foreign policy is a little trickier.

I was one of the people, interestingly enough, Scoop Jackson, Barry Goldwater, and I all objected strenuously to sending the Marines to Lebanon, you recall that. And we all said the same thing, that if you're going over there for this particular purpose, you're not sending enough people. And if you're going for any other purpose, you're sending too many. That was a foreign policy decision the President made, and I personally thought that he violated the War Powers Act in making that decision, because he was supposed to consult with Congress on the War Powers Act, but he didn't, and Congress did what it always does, it makes a lot of speeches. But nobody really tried to do anything about it. It turned out to be fatal.

I will say one thing for President Reagan. He did learn from the Vietnam War. He had enough sense to bring the Marines home. The thing we should have learned from Vietnam is either get in or get out. Get in and win or get out. And in Lebanon, that turned out to be disastrous for us and we got out. We went into Grenada, we did it, and we did it in a hurry. So he has to get pretty good marks for having that kind of savoir faire and understanding.

DR. KORB: If I could respond very briefly, historically it has ebbed and flowed as to which branch has been dominant. I think too many of us were brought up in the immediate post-World War II period, our focus was on when the executive was dominant, and now we're seeing Congress reasserting the authority that it had before, but there is no answer. There's always going to be a tension because our founding fathers, if you read it, basically said, you guys fight it out in many areas between the executive and legislative, as well as between the states and the federal government.

SENATOR BUMPERS: If I may, before you ask that question, let me make one statement, and that is this. You understand the separation of powers in this country, and that we have three branches of government and it works extremely well. De Tocqueville came here from France back in about 1835, and he was so fascinated by our system, and he thought it was by far the best thing he'd ever seen--I think it still is. But I don't resent, I regret, that people feel--and most of my mail reflects that -- I should go along with the President. "Please support the President's tax reform." "Please support the President's defense budget." "Please support the President on this." And yet in their more reflective moments they send me up here to really be a check on the President. Congress is supposed to be a check on the President. And as I say it's worked extremely well, and I trust that it will continue to.

Q: Dr. Korb, as of late there's been a great deal of controversy over the retirement budget, and the benefits both to the government agencies and the military. I was wondering if you could comment?

DR. KORB: There's almost as much controversy over how many generals and admirals we have, as Senator Bumpers mentioned.

First of all, you've got to keep in mind that two years ago we changed the system so that retirement in the defense budget now funds the cost of people who will retire who are on active duty. So what you see in that retirement, or military payroll account, is the full cost of individuals. It used to be that retirement was hidden away.

The second thing, I think that anybody who receives a check from the government --

SENATOR BUMPERS: I get one, be careful.

DR. KORB: -- is not going to be guaranteed full cost of living. The Senate this year, for example, has slowed down the growth, or didn't give full COLA to social security. So the days of saying to somebody, "You will get this particular retirement and you will forever be guaranteed cost of living," the country I don't think can afford that, and I think military retirement, civil service retirement, railroad retirement, and I think eventually social security, will be affected by that.

I think we have been very fortunate this year, the changes that have been proposed, the Senate has told us to cut it 10% and the House 20%, are grandfathered. In other words we won't break commitments to people who have made lifetime decisions. Whether the system was too generous, or not generous, is irrelevant, because people have made decisions on that basis. And it's up to us now in the executive branch to design a system within whatever constraints Congress gives us for new people that will give the taxpayer the force that they want at the lowest possible cost.

What we'll have to do is take a look not just at retirement, but the whole compensation system, to make sure we achieve our objectives. But I have never supported the position that some people in the Department have taken over the years, that you can't change it, or that if you change it, all hell will break loose. I think you can do it intelligently, and I think basically because it's in the Senate and the House bill, we've got to accept the reality and work with the Congress to come up with a system that achieves the force structure that we want.

Q: Can you outline any of that? Any of the program that might be possible?

DR. KORB: Well, I can't outline it because we have to get approval for it. But we only have three things you can deal with. The cost of living allowance, the multiple that you earn for each year of active duty, and at how many years you let people retire. It's got to be some combination of those three to achieve the objective.

Q: I think it's great that you're going to do so much for our military forces who have planned careers and built lives accordingly. I have 33 years in the civil service. What are you going to do for me?

DR. KORB: I'll ask Senator Bumpers what he thinks the prospects of changes are in the civil service retirement system. That's before the Senate.

SENATOR BUMPERS: As you know, the President has proposed some very stringent changes in civil service retirement. However, in my opinion, Congress, as they say, will burrow under every fence they can't straddle, and there are an awful lot of civil service retirees in this country. My guess is that you will be grandfathered in with whatever you contracted for when you went to work in civil service, but new people, new hires, will be under quite a different system.

Q: But the Senate bill, as I understand it, didn't have any grandfather clause in there, and I might point out that those of us who are civil servants think we signed a contract too, and I guess the President did for the air traffic controllers who tried to strike, it seems to me they said we were under contract.

SENATOR BUMPERS: If you'll drop a note to my office, I'm really not an expert on civil service. I should be, Lord knows I've got plenty of them in my state.

Q: I have a question on manpower. I know that you have supported the all volunteer force in the past. With the decreasing number of available young men, the improved economic conditions over the past few years, there has been some reports recently, in the media, saying that the military is going to have some problems in retention, as well as meeting their recruiting requirements. Would you see yourself changing that position and perhaps going to a draft? Or what other remedies would you come up with? And I'd like the Senator to also address that if he would please.

DR. KORB: In my view, one of the most over-played, and I wouldn't call it a myth, because there is a certain factual basis behind it, but over-concern for the declining demographics, because they started declining in '79, so we're about half way through, and we've done very very well. As the Senator pointed out, the economy had something to do with it, but our data shows it's primarily the renewed spirit of patriotism in the country. Because remember, we take a look at where the people come from in the military, and during the depths of the recession, all of our recruits were not coming from Flint, Michigan. They were coming from states in which they were relatively unaffected by the recession. Similarly, retention, the big buildup in the first part of this decade was in the defense industry, where lots of the men and women we have have skills that were in high demand even before the economy turned around.

So I don't think that's going to be a problem. If retention stays high, the proportion of people we need coming into the service will not be that great. The Congress, really the change in defense has also helped us, because manpower is not growing. Compared to where we thought it would be a couple of years ago, it's just not going to grow.

The Army, which is the most difficult service to recruit for, is basically flat. And interestingly enough, we have another problem that's looming on the horizon--retention has been so high among first termers as they come to the end of the first term, the end of the second term, if we let them reenlist, our retirement bill will go very high and we won't be able to keep the smooth flow coming in. We've got about a year or so to play with that particular problem.

So there's no real need unless the respect for the military in the country turns around again. If it does, you won't keep people, and if you can't keep them you're going to have to take more in, and the other thing is that we have a fair and competitive pay system. We use our heads with the type of money we give to people.

Do you want to comment on that, Senator?

SENATOR BUMPERS: The only thing I'd say, I've always been a little ambivalent. I've got two sons, and I wish they'd had to serve a little time just to learn to pick up their clothes, if nothing else. But you know, I do think first of all, that is a very sophisticated argument pro and con on whether we should return to the draft or not. We don't really have time to go into it here. But I think that it could be worked out.

You see, I've always maintained that the Vietnam war ought to be the most productive war we ever fought, if we simply learn from it. And one of the lessons we should learn from Vietnam is that you cannot fight a war with only your poor people. I think military service ought to be spread around. And I think that you could, I'm not saying that I'd favor this, and I hope I don't have to vote on it, because it would be a very difficult question for me, but I will say that you could probably enroll people for the first summer after high school and the second summer after high school without too much trouble, and build your reserves, and probably not cost an awful lot of money to do it.

And finally, I think it's not too much to ask people to do that for their country and be ready, at least that small preparation, in case they were really needed.

Q: I'd like to introduce a question that I hope isn't taken in a partisan sense. I wonder if you could respond to this statement, that both in terms of our elected political leadership for executive positions and in terms of our legislative representatives, that our Congress over the past thirty-some years has made well meaning promises, both in domestic policy and military commitments, that our taxpayers simply cannot afford to bear. And therefore, we are going to have to cut social security and other entitlement programs and all areas of government spending.

DR. KORB: Since I'm the host, I'll take that one.

We have a choice. I had a former colleague, when I was at the American Enterprise Institute, by the name of Herb Stein, and we used to argue about what to spend for defense, and he used to tell me you can spend anything that you want, but you pay the cost in a number of ways. One, you can cut social programs as you've talked about; you can raise taxes; or you can float it, which basically means it impacts on inflation and has a trade deficit. And those are choices that we have to make.

I think we as a people have made those choices in different ways at different times over the years. I think if you go back and you take a look during the Great Society days, we made a choice to fund a lot of programs, not realizing what the ultimate cost would be. And then there was a reaction set into that among both parties, in terms of what the government could do. I refer to the speech that Teddy Kennedy gave this year in Bridgeport, and said we've got to admit we made mistakes. So I think this thing ebbs and flows, and that's what elections are about, that's what the separation of power is about, and that's what debates and forums like this are about, for people to present their views, and for you, if you feel, for example, if you should say I agree with that statement, then maybe we ought to cut back defense and cut back our commitments.

But there are no free lunches. You pay in one way or the other. And I think that's the choice before the people. My boss, Cap Weinberger, was trying to tell you that his job is to tell you what it costs to carry out those commitments. That's what he was trying to say. Not to say we should spend more or less on social programs or taxes, that wasn't his job.

SENATOR BUMPERS: Let me just say, number one, when it comes to social security, social security should never have been put in the general revenue budget. It should have been kept separate. Lyndon Johnson put it in the budget because he had promised the American people he would balance the budget, and the only way he could do it was to put social security, which was running a surplus, into the budget, and use the social security surplus to balance the budget. It was deceitful, it was unfair, and it shouldn't have been done.

Now we are in this posture. You talk about cutting social security, and yet social security is a separate program that people are paying for. There are some inequities. Youngsters 25 years of age now correctly perceive that they probably will never draw out what they're paying into it between now and the time they retire. And people who retired in 1982, within three or four years, will draw out everything they've paid into it. My father-in-law drew a huge sum until his death, and he hadn't paid enough in it to, I don't know, it was just nothing.

But having said that, we just went through a massive revitalization of the social security program in 1983, and, by 1995, the social security program is going to be producing a surplus of \$170 billion, and by the year 2000, the surplus in social security will be over \$200 billion. So social security is really not the problem. Some of the entitlement programs have indeed gotten out of control. But by the same token, don't pick on social security, because it is right now a viable system. I'm going to do my very best to keep it viable; I want to get there myself some day and I want there to be something when I get there.

But my concern about all these programs have been, I do think that there are two basic reasons this country has a \$200 billion deficit. One is that orgy of tax cuts in 1981, and the other is this massive buildup in defense expenditures.

I was prepared to vote for significant increases in defense spending. I was never prepared to vote for these colossal, staggering sums. And the reason for that is because, I mentioned a moment ago, children are being impoverished. If you say to somebody, "Do you favor foreign aid?" "No, Senator Bumpers, I wish you wouldn't vote for foreign aid." "Well, how do you feel about starving children in Ethiopia?" "Well, I think we ought to feed those children."

Well, you're talking about the same thing. It just depends on how you put it to them. "How do you feel about educating your children?" Your children, and I suspect most of you here are parents, there isn't anything even close to being as precious to you as your children. And you have to bear in mind that every parent in this country feels the same way. So I think if we're going to build gold-plated weapons, very sophisticated technology in them, we've got to educate people to use those weapons. And yet the President proposed, happily he didn't get his way, he proposed to virtually eliminate the student loan program.

Now you see I have a really blind spot there. I came up a poor white southern protestant. And my father probably would have stolen, he was so ambitious for my brother and me, but when I got out of the Marine Corps after three years, the GI bill was very caringly waiting for me, and my brother and I were able to go to the best universities in this country, which we could never have done had it not been for the GI bill.

And I make the point that defense is absolutely essential. Deterrence is absolutely essential. But we have overdone it, and we ought to bear in mind that our weapons become obsolete very quickly. But a well-nourished, well-trained mind is a national treasure for a lifetime. So I think that is a priority that we have overlooked.

I want to give you a quote here, incidentally, Ronald Reagan's always quoting Franklin Roosevelt and Jack Kennedy, so I can quote Dwight Eisenhower. Here's what General Eisenhower said in a very great speech he made one time, but this is just a part of it: "Every gun that's made, every war ship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed."

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
 NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963-A

This world in arms is not spending money alone. It's spending the sweat of its labors, the genius of its scientists, and the hopes of its children."

Now the reason you don't hear we Democrats quoting that from Eisenhower, or anybody else, is because it's not very trendy any more. It's just not popular to talk about the issue of fairness. It's not popular to talk about compassion. And I really think there's something corrosive about that in our national character, and it really troubles me.

Q: Isn't it somewhat misleading, though, to pose the issue as so much in the sense that what we're removing from other fields to put into defense, that we're taking away from the mouths of the hungry, in the sense that every penny that's given to defense is actually creating jobs. That there is quite a bit of money that goes into the defense industry and which comes back out of it in new technology, which is then used elsewhere. All of the computers which have been developed have ultimately come through the defense industry. So, isn't it that aspect that we sometimes neglect?

SENATOR BUMPERS: Your point is well taken to a point, and certainly I'm not going to disagree with one of the two people from Arkansas in here very strongly. I mean, a tank doesn't reproduce anything. It just sits and you train in it, but it has no economic value to society. And I'm giving you economic arguments, not military arguments. And it's true that when you spend \$300 billion a year on defense, over \$100 billion of which is procurement, you do indeed create a lot of jobs. As you know, we're building the MLRS system down in Camden, Arkansas, and they employ 1200 people, and I am defensive of that system, because I think it's an excellent conventional readiness item.

(Laughter)

But having said that, there are studies that show that, for the same amount of money in the private sector, you can create three times more jobs than you will in defense, if you take into consideration obsolescence.

I have never frankly thought, I mean I believe in a strong defense and I believe in deterrence and all those things, but I've never really believed that the creation of jobs was a legitimate defense for defense spending.

DR. KORB: I think we're going to have to stop. Senator, if you'd like to make any concluding comments.

SENATOR BUMPERS: You've been a warm audience. I know, like in the United States Senate, there are a divergence of viewpoints here. People have different feelings, sometimes very strongly, and that is the greatness of this country. I applaud it, and I am very honored to be here again with Dr. Korb. We're going to take this show on the road, I think.

Thank you very much.

Dale Bumpers

U.S. Senator
D-Arkansas

When Dale Bumpers announced in June 1970 that he would be a candidate for governor of Arkansas, he appeared to be the longest of long-shots. An unknown small-town lawyer from Charleston (pop. 1,500), Bumpers was only known by 1 percent of the voters in a poll conducted July 1. Fifty-five days later he defeated the speaker of the house, the attorney general and five others to earn a place in the Democratic run-off against Orval Faubus, the six-term governor who had become a legend in Arkansas politics. Bumpers defeated Faubus with 58 percent of the vote and went on to defeat the incumbent governor, Winthrop Rockefeller, with 62 percent of the vote. As governor, he made sweeping changes in reorganizing state government and today is regarded as one of the best and most popular governors in Arkansas history. In 1974, after two terms in the statehouse, he decided to run for the U.S. Senate and defeated the incumbent, who had served in the Senate for 30 years, by a margin of nearly 2 to 1. He was re-elected in 1980 with 60 percent of the vote.

Senator Bumpers did his undergraduate work at the University of Arkansas and later received a Bachelor of Laws degree and a Juris Doctorate from Northwestern University. He practiced law, raised Angus cattle and had several business interests prior to entering politics. He is married to the former Betty Flanagan of Charleston, and they are the parents of three children, Brent, Bill and Brooke.

Senator Bumpers has served with distinction on the Senate Energy Committee, the Senate Appropriations Committee and, formerly, the Armed Services Committee. He is ranking Democrat on the Small Business Committee and the Public Lands and Water Resources Subcommittee. In spite of his Washington schedule, Senator Bumpers has kept in close touch with the people of Arkansas, spending over 100 days and making more than 100 speeches in the state every year since he was elected Senator.

Senator Bumpers favors a strong national defense. He supports the Trident II missile, the cruise missile, the Stealth bomber, and above all, strengthening our conventional forces. But he has been in the forefront of the fight against the B-1 bomber, the MX missile and continued construction of large but vulnerable aircraft carriers. He also opposes the deployment of anti-satellite weapons as long as the Soviets refrain from deployment. "We have maintained a strong strategic and conventional deterrence with our technological superiority, and we should continue a strong research and development program to make sure we keep that edge."

Senator Bumpers has been one of the Senate's leading champions of nuclear arms control. He supported ratification of the SALT II treaty and favors continued adherence to its terms by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He supports a bilateral, verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons and a bilateral, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. He is adamantly opposed to the steadily increasing sale of U.S. weapons, and he has consistently voted against the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. "We should look at all arms control negotiations -- strategic, theater, nuclear forces, ABM, and regional nuclear or conventional arms limitations discussions -- as opportunities for devising means to constrain the Soviets, reduce the economic burden of military spending, and increase mutual understanding."

Senator Bumpers has received numerous awards and honors. He was named in a poll of Washington correspondents as one of the "ten best" U.S. Senators, and by a U.S. News and World Report survey of his fellow Senators as one of the three best orators in that body. Senator Bumpers also was named the "Legislator of the Year" by the National Wildlife Federation for his work to control strip mining, block oil and gas drilling in wilderness areas, protect barrier islands, restrict the sale of federal lands and help enact clean air and water legislation. For their continued interest in health matters, Senator and Mrs. Bumpers were awarded the "Excellency in Public Service Award" by the American Academy of Pediatrics.

NOTE: See page 10 for biography of Dr. Korb

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