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
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
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COMMON INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
PAKISTAN IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

THESIS

Maqbool A. Ranjha
Squadron Leader, PAF

AFIT/GLM/LSM/86S-62

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REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics
of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Logistics Management

Maqbool A. Ranjha
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September 1986

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Lt Col Robert D. Materna, whose sole effort to guide me with patience, was the main source of help in the successful completion of this thesis. I would also like to thank Lt Col Frederick W. Westfall who gave me a free hand to work on this project. Thanks also to Lt Col Wayne C. Guest, for his fruitful discussions which were a great help in leading this research in the right direction. I would also like to thank Ms Jonna Lynn Caudill whose help in typing and correction was invaluable.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Khalida, for her patience and understanding during those many lonely nights which she, along with the kids, spent waiting for me to come back.

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List of Acronyms

CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
IMET	International Military Education Training
MAP	Military Assistance Program
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
PRC	People's Republic of China
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Abstract

Southwest Asia is predominantly a Muslim region and is the birth place of the world's major religions. Its strategic location and petroleum resources make it important and attractive to the major powers. The U.S. has vital interests in Southwest Asia, and Europe and Japan depend on oil from the region.

In the 1950's and 1960's, Pakistan was a close ally of the U.S. and played a key role in containing communism in the region. Pakistan has once again become important to the U.S. after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. needs the support of states in the region to counter Russian advances in Southwest Asia.

This research focused on finding common interests which could become the basis of an alliance between Pakistan and the U.S. in Southwest Asia. Despite differences, both countries do have common interests in the region, for which an alliance with each other could be beneficial. Any alliance should be established on well defined mutual interests, appreciating each other's differences and limitations, so that subsequent frustrations emerging from ambiguities can be avoided.

**COMMON INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN IN SOUTHWEST ASIA**

I. Introduction

General Issue

The relationship between Pakistan and the United States was close during the 1950s and early 1960s, with serious ups and downs in later periods. The revolution in Iran, and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan have given new dimensions to the situation in the region. Today, both Pakistan and the United States appreciate the need for a revival of close relations as Pakistan has become a front line nation directly facing Russia.

There are a variety of factors which influence the political, economic, social, and military situation in the region. First, Pakistan is situated in the backyard of the Persian Gulf, which is a major source of oil for the United States, Europe, and Japan. Because the economies of Western countries depend on oil, Washington is vitally committed to maintaining a secure Gulf and, therefore, cannot stand idly by in the event Gulf security is threatened. Second, there is a lot of good will between Pakistan and the Muslim world. Pakistan has equally good relations with the Arabs, and with Iran, and Turkey; two countries which have tradition-

ally been at odds with each other. Third, the U.S. has consistently supported the state of Israel against the Arabs. Fourth, the Russians have a centuries old desire to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought them very close to fulfilling this desire. The Indian Ocean is now within the striking range of Russian fighter aircraft. Last, Pakistan has very close military, historical, cultural, economic, and religious links with the countries in the Gulf, which are all Muslim countries.

As a result, any outside power, like the United States, which has interests in the area, must cater to the above factors to shape a successful policy. The area is peculiar in nature in the sense that most of the religions which have evolved from this area have had a deep effect on the psyche of the people and have played an important role in the history of the nations of the region. These religions are the source of both love and hatred, and unity and division.

The present and future are largely the result of the past. However radical and revolutionary we may be in some matters much of our life is governed by a conservative instinct. As far as we can, we base ourselves on familiar foundations; we do not love change for its own sake. Today's world is the world which we and our fathers have made in the past. (1:14)

This basic conservatism is reflected in almost every major event which occurs in the region. In summary, it is

necessary for any outside power to be aware of these factors before deciding which policies to follow to achieve their respective interests.

Specific Problem

If the U.S. strengthens its relations with Pakistan, it affects U.S. relations with India. At the same time, Pakistan's good relations with the U.S. antagonizes the USSR, the rival superpower, against Pakistan. As a result of its past experience, Pakistan considers the U.S. to be an unreliable ally. Pakistan, because of its relations with Muslim countries, its effective defense structure and military ties with countries in the Middle East, and its dependence on oil, does play an important role in the region. Thus, there is a need for building mutual confidence between Pakistan and the U.S., based on well-defined common goals and interests between the two countries. The U.S. needs to design its current policies to conform to the history, culture, aspirations and problems of the nations of the Southwest Asia in order to build a lasting relationship.

Investigative Question

What common interests do both Pakistan and the U.S. have in Southwest Asia which can provide the basis for a close and lasting relationship between these two nations?

II. Methodology

Nations are obliged to fulfill the material needs and aspirations of their people. History, religion and other values accepted by society play an important part in the psyche of a nation. Pakistan's emergence as a new state is a unique incidence of its own type in the twentieth century. Pakistan has fought since its birth against the hegemony of regional giants like Russia, India and initially China. Despite extreme economic difficulties, Pakistan has stood fast and is destined to play a key role in the continuing evolution of Southwest Asia.

To reach a conclusion it was necessary to collect information about the past history of Pakistan, the effect of religion, geography, and military and economic factors. Information was collected from literature available in the U.S.; and in particular, relevant books written by competent foreign authors.

III. History

Introduction

Each age is a dream that is dying or the one that is coming to birth". The third quarter of the twentieth century saw the death of two dreams: the British dominion 'over palm and pie', and the supremacy of Western Europe in world affairs. The fourth quarter of this century is watching the birth of a new dream; a dream that is strange, bewildering, and unfriendly. It is the dream of a world dominated by three suspicious world powers, with Africa and the lesser states of Asia playing the part which was played a century ago by the Balkan states; and with western Europe reduced to comparative insignificance. (1:13)

After the second world war, there emerged two main ideologies: capitalism and communism. These ideologies have deeply affected society and are, by and large, reflected in the government and economic structures of the world. The whole world, with few exceptions, has since been divided in two groups. The U.S. has appeared as the leader of the capitalistic society, and the USSR has taken over command of the communist world. (1)

Transportation, communications, and technology have given new dimensions to world politics. Both superpowers try to create their areas of influence through different means for the purpose of political, military, ideological and economic exploitation. Their global macro policies, sometimes do not match with the different political, economic, ideological and historical factors operating in the specific region.

Pakistan, for example, is an Islamic society which is physically located in the Indian Subcontinent, which is one of the oldest and richest cultures in the world. Any study of Pakistan's relations with a superpower, like the U.S., must involve an appreciation of the factors mentioned above. The study of these factors will involve looking into both the history of this newly born ideological state, and the events and environment which lead to the birth of Pakistan in Southwest Asia.

History of Pakistan

Ancient History. The area which now comprises Pakistan is a part of the Indian Subcontinent and has a history which can be traced to 3000 BC. Remains of early civilizations have been discovered at Texila, Harappa and Mohenjodaro in the Indus valley. Grave sites in the south and northwest of Pakistan are similar to those found in Iran and central Asia. Recent scholarship, therefore, suggests a much larger area and longer time frame for Harappan culture than was previously envisaged. The well planned, well constructed cities of that time indicate that the people were highly civilized. (2:4).

Migration of the Aryan. The migration of people into the Indian Subcontinent from central Asia, through mountain passes in the northwest, has been a permanent feature of history. A new era began with the migration of the Aryan tribes which started in the second millennium BC. These

peoples were tribally organized, pastoral and pantheistic. They established the famous "cast system" in the region and divided the society into four groups: "Brahman" the religious group; Khashatry, the fighter; Waish, the laborer; and Shooder, the untouchable. Then came the era of Guatma Buddha who founded Buddhism. Asoka, the most famous emperor of the Mauryan empire (320-180 BC.), did a lot for the spread of Buddhism. This was followed by several different dynasties until the arrival of the Muslim conquerors. (2:8)

Islam in the Sub-Continent

Arrival of the Arabs. By the end of 8th century, the Arabs had extended their domain westward into North Africa and Spain and eastward into central Asia and Iran. In 711 AD, an Arab expedition entered Baluchistan and Sind which are now included in Pakistan. The Arabs, however, did not extend themselves deep into India, and did not, therefore, have a long term affect on Indian society. (2:8)

Arrival of the Turks and Afghans. Almost three centuries later the Turks and Afghans spearheaded the Islamic conquest in India through the traditional invading routes of the northwest. During the period, 979-1030, Mahmood of Ghazni lead a series of seventeen attacks on India. He destroyed the powerful Rajpoot kingdoms along with rich Hindu temples, and established a base in the Punjab (a province of present Pakistan) for his further incursions. Later

on, other Muslim invaders moved deep into India and established a strong empire in Dehli which was taken over by the Mughals. (2:9)

The Mughal Period. Baber, who was a descendant of Genghis Khan and the Timurlane, combined strength and courage with a love of beauty, and military ability with cultivation, and established the Mughal empire in northern India in 1526. The Mughal empire was later extended into most of India, with its capital in Dehli.

As Dehli control waned, other contenders of power emerged and clashed. New leaders from the Iran-Afghan plateau were again attracted, and Nadir Shah of Meshed (present day Iran) sacked Dehli in 1736. Anarchic conditions prevailed in the Punjab and the northwest, enticing Ahmad Shah Abdali of Qandhar. Maratha chieftains used the sentiments of Hindu revival, as well as military expertise, to expand their power beyond the Deccan (present day southern India) in every direction. They reached for Dehli, where the Mughal emperor was distracted by the Abdali's depredations and called in the Marathas. Maratha forces, under the Mughal banners, were defeated by those of Abdali's at the third Battle of Panipat in 1761. But the Afghan's victory was in name only. The real power in the Indian Subcontinent was in the process of passing into the hands of European merchants. The Mughal period extended from 1526 to 1857 AD and was followed by the British. (2:10)

Effects of Islam on India. During Muslim rule, the impetus was given to trade and industry by reestablishing a link between India and civilization elsewhere, as well as by the free spending habits of new courts and armies. Skilled native artisans took to the new patronage with alacrity, often converting to Islam in the process, but they did not introduce any innovation in agricultural techniques. The main achievement of the Sultanate was to defend the Subcontinent from the devastation of the Mangools, the barbarian peoples of the Northern Asia. However, the sack of Dehli by Timurlane in 1398 provided one bitter taste of what a large part of the world suffered. (2:9)

Another achievement was the Indian cultural renaissance as a result of the stimulation of Islam. The Quwwat-ul-Islam mosque in Dehli, and the Taj Mahal (which is one of the seven wonders of the world) are examples of this influence in architecture. Hindustani classical music (both vocal and instrumental) and popular religious practices were influenced by uncompromising monotheism, simple ritual, devout faith and the social equality of Islam. Even if formal conversions to Islam were not many, the acceptance of Islamic influence was significant. (2:9)

A number of castless religious sects arose, based on "bhakti" or devotion to God, and simple rituals. Among these the "Sikhs" of Punjab are the most notable. The influence of Islam brought new people from many remote parts

of the world, which resulted in the development of another language called "Urdu". This language has become very rich in literature and is written in Persian/Arabic script instead of Hindi. (2:9)

British in the Subcontinent

Induction of the Britishers. The Europeans became part of the Indian scene after the Portuguese voyager Vasco da Gama sailed into the thriving Malabar port of Calicut in 1498, and conquered Goa in 1510. Under Admiral Alfonso de Albuquerque the Portuguese successfully challenged Arab power in the Indian Ocean in pursuit of their increasing needs for Indian and Asian goods. The Portuguese dominated the seas for about 100 years, followed by the Dutch and British who founded trading companies. (2:14)

The British first came to India as traders in eighteenth century and occupied the country in 1857. This induction of a third power in the political arena brought many far reaching changes. Now, after the arrival of the British neither the Muslims nor the Hindus were the rulers. As the British snatched power from the Muslims, the Britishers were more concerned about the Muslim's reaction and thus were more inclined toward Hindu population. For the Hindu it was a better deal, as the Britishers, sooner or later, had to leave.

The Muslim's Decay Under British Rule. Between mid-eighteen hundred and mid-nineteen hundred, the British

conquered India and replaced the Muslims as rulers. During this 100 year period, the British were committed, through trade, to the Hindus, who became later on their natural allies against the Muslims. After the final struggle by the Muslims in 1857 (which they lost), the British took every possible measure to remove them from political life. Instead, government positions were filled by the Hindus. Pressed between the upper stone of British colonialism and the lower stone of Hindu exclusiveness, the Muslims were crushed out. Persian, which was the official language during Muslim times, was replaced by English. For the Hindus it was shifting from one foreign language to another, but the Muslims took it as a deliberate attempt to stamp out their culture and to pollute their religion. As a result, by 1880, only 363 Muslim students attended English high school verses 36,686 Hindus. (3:12)

Movement for Freedom. In 1885 the Indian National Congress was formed to step up liberation from the British. Later on this congress became the strongest political party. although it represented both Muslims and Hindus, it was mainly dominated by the Hindus. After experiencing the biased attitude of the Hindu majority, the Muslims formed a separate party of their own in 1906 and named it "The Muslim League". The party delegation poited out to the Viceroy that,

The Muhammadan of India number, according to the census taken in 1901 AD, over sixty-two millions or between one-fifth or one-fourth of the total population of his majesty's Indian domain. Under any system of representation, extended or limited, a community in itself more numerous than any first class European power except Russia may justly lay claim to adequate recognition as an important factor in the state. (3:12)

The delegation demanded that the representation of Muslims be

... commensurate not merely with numerical strength but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they make to the defense of the empire. It is most unlikely that the name of any Muhammadan candidate will ever be submitted for the approval of the government by the electoral bodies as now constituted unless he is in sympathy with the majority in all matters of importance. (3:12)

Hindu Opposition To Separate Elections. The scheme of separate electorate aroused Hindu antagonism. In 1909 the congress announced its disapproval of a separate electorate on the basis of religion and continued its objection in later years. In fact, a separate electorate based on religion became a major issue in the politics of India. The high cast Hindus were in favor of a joint electorate, but the depressed classes of Hindus had everything to gain by a separate electorate. At this stage, the Muslim leader Muhammad Ali Jinah, who led the Pakistan movement later on, was not in the favor of separate elections; however, things kept changing and the two major nations of India moved further away from each other. Some Hindu leaders started the movement of converting the people to Hindu religion by

force. This created very serious friction and distrust between the two communities. Over the next few years, clashes between Hindus and Muslims occurred in many places killing thousands of people, mostly Muslims.

Independence Became Visible. In October 1929, the British government made a two-fold declaration. The Viceroy announced on behalf of the government,

I am authorized by his majesty's government to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the Declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated is the attainment of dominion status.
(3:23)

At this point, it became clear that events were moving toward full independence of the country, but the question of to whom the power should be handed was not clear.

Two Nations Theory. In December 1930, the Muslim League held its annual session at Allahabad. The Muslim League, at that time, was not remarkable for its activity, but was presided over by a poet named Muhammad Iqbal, who is by common consent, the greatest poet-philosopher that Muslim India ever produced. He surveyed the political scene, and in striking words he indicated the goal toward which the conscious and unconscious strivings of the Muslim community were moving. He said,

I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self government within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of the consolidated North-

west Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-west India. (3:25)

The idea was not all that new, and had been brought forward by many Muslims and even Hindus like Lala Lajpat Ria, who was one of the founders of Hindu Mahasabha (a political party), and had also suggested the partition of India between Hindus and Muslims:

But these earlier tentative proposals did not receive any attention. Now for the first time a person with high intellectual stature and prestige propounded a scheme for the establishment of a Muslim state from an authoritative platform. A new angle of vision has transformed the picture. Instead of looking upon themselves as a minority, desperately needed safeguard for their culture, economic, and political interests, Muslims saw themselves as a nation entitled to build a just social order on the basis of Islam in their own homeland. (3:25)

Choudhary Rehmat Ali, a Muslim student at Cambridge, England, in 1933 coined the word Pakistan, in which 'P' stands for the Punjab 'A' for Afghanistan (Northwest Frontier Province), 'K' for Kashmir 'S' for Sind and 'TAN' for Baluchistan. The word itself means "land of the pure."

Many people by that time had suggested the partition of India. Some of these suggestions were on the basis of religion and other on the basis like language. It is interesting to note that the British statesman John Bright, in a speech in House of Commons on June 24, 1858, had proposed dividing India into five presidencies each of which, "would have its finance, its taxation, its justice and its police department as well as its work and military departments, precisely the same as if it were a state having no connection with any other part of India and recognized only as a dependency of this country. If at any time in future period the sovereignty of England

should be withdrawn, we should leave so many presidencies built up and firmly compacted together, each able to support its own independence and its own government. (3:31)

The Pakistan Resolution. At the start of the Second World War, the Viceroy proclaimed India's participation in the war without prior approval of the major political parties of the country. However, the government later on tried to negotiate the issue with the political leaders. The Congress party demanded independence for India, and an immediate transfer of power. At the same time, the Muslim League made it clear that any future constitution must have the approval of both the Muslims and Hindus. However the Muslim League did not hinder participation in the war. The pro-Muslim League governments in Punjab and Bengal cooperated with the defense authorities, especially Punjab, which was known as the sword arm of India. (3:34)

Negotiations on the issue of participation in the war failed between Congress and the government. As a result, Congress ministers in eight provinces resigned and the government assumed control of the administration. Therefore, the leader of the Muslim League the "Quaid-i-Azam", the Muhammad Ali Jinnah, declared 22 December 1939 as a day of deliverance and thanksgiving as a token of relief from "the tyranny, oppression and injustice" of the congress regime, and the Muslims celebrated the day with acclaim. (3:34)

Three months later, a demand for the partition of India was formally put forward by the Muslim League. In order to understand the course of future actions, it is necessary to understand the strength and weakness of the three parties involved i.e., the Government (the British), the Congress (the Hindus), and the Muslim League (the Muslims). The British were obviously the strongest, but they had been weakened by the First World War, subsequent depression, and the Second World War. Leaving aside their earlier colonial exploitation of the country, they had now committed themselves to bring the benefits of democracy to the people under their rule. This may sound hypocritical, but the Britishers had convinced themselves of its truth. Although accused of "divide and rule" Britain was proud of having given unity to the country. However, if this administrative unity could not produce cultural homogeneity or political harmony, the British felt they were not to be blamed. The second party, the Hindus, formed three fourths of the population and was the next strongest. The Hindus were far ahead of Muslims in wealth, education, political consciousness and social cohesiveness. They had shrewd and mature leaders like Mr. Nehru and Gandhi. The Muslims were the weakest of all. Although they represented a hundred million people, they formed only one fourth of the total population. They had accepted English very late and were, therefore, badly represented in the administration. They were poor and

backward. Their just demand for fair representation was dubbed "anti-national and communal". The Muslims wanted freedom from the British rule more than anybody else, but felt that the common nationalism to which the Hindu beckoned them was an illusion and a snare, and really a ploy for Hindu domination. The Hindus regarded Indian Muslim interests in the Muslim world as an extra territorial sympathy and questioned their loyalty to India. The Muslims, therefore, found their minority status unbefitting their tradition of greatness. A desire for social justice was deeply ingrained in the minds of the Muslims. (3:37)

On March 23, 1940, the historic session of the Muslim League was held in Lahore and the resolution that came to be known as the Pakistan Resolution was passed. This resolution stated that,

... no constitutional plan is to be worked out in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the basis of following principles, namely, geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities...for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative, and other rights. (3:38)

In his presidential address, Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah gave a clear expression to the concept underlying the resolution. He said:

It has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Musalmans are a minority. The Musalman are not a minority by any definition... What that unitary government of India for 50 years has failed to achieve cannot be realized by the imposition of a central federal government... except by means of armed force... The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such... The Hindus and Muslims belong... to two different civilizations, which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions... To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerically minority and other as a majority, must lead to a growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state. (3:39)

This "two nation" theory was rejected by the Indian National Congress; but the facts upon which the two nation theory was based were well known to everyone, including the British. The joint committee of parliament on Indian constitutional reforms had stated in 1934,

India is inhabited by many races...often as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manners of life as the nations of Europe. Two-thirds of its inhabitants profess Hinduism... over 77 millions are the followers of Islam, and the difference between the two is not only of a religion in the strict sense but also of law and culture. They may be said, indeed, to represent two distinct and separate civilizations. (3:39)

The Holocaust. The two nation theory was unanimously accepted by the Muslims of India. In spite of stiff resistance from every quarter, the Muslims got their independent homeland on 4 August 1947. Although the country was taken without any armed struggle, the bloodshed caused at the time of partition was more than any war of independence of

that period. Some idea of how the Muslims were slaughtered in East Punjab at the time of partition can be gained from a following report sent by Ian Morrison, correspondent of the London Times, from Julunder on 24 August 1948.

"More horrible than anything we saw during the war," is the universal comments of experienced officers, British and Indians, on the present slaughter of East Punjab. The Sikhs are clearing East Punjab of Muslims, butchering hundreds daily, forcing thousands to flee Westward, burning Muslims villages and homesteads, even in their frenzy burning their own. This violence has been organized from the highest level of Sikh leadership, and it is being done systematically sector by sector. (3:256)

Outright support for Hindus was the basic reason for most of the killing. The province of Kashmir, an area of Muslim majority was given to India. To provide India access to Kashmir, many changes were made at last moment in the partition plan. As a result, Pakistan and India fought over this province within months of getting independence.

U.S. Concern Over the Independence of the Indian Subcontinent

Background. Prior to WW II, the U.S. had no contact, whatsoever, with what was happening in the Indian Subcontinent; however, she became concerned in the early 1940s. The U.S. was not very aware of the type of problems involved in the typical politics of the Subcontinent. The U.S. wanted to see India and China emerging as two strong western allies. The U.S. seemed to be interested in a united India, but its view was mainly based on an assessment of the situ-

ation provided by the British, which stressed the dangers to Western interests of a partitioned India. (7:35)

Pressuring Britain for early withdrawal, the U.S. frequently irritated the British by pressing hard for their early departure from India. President Roosevelt, during Churchill's visit to Washington in December 1941, discussed with him the the problem of India. The U.S. later on pressed the Britishers on the subject. Mr. Churchill wrote to President Roosevelt on 4 March 1942,

We are earnestly considering whether a declaration of dominion status after the war, carrying with it, if desired, the right to secede, should be made at this critical juncture. We must not on any account break with the Muslims, who represented a hundred million people, and the main army elements on which we must rely for the immediate fighting. We have also to consider our duty towards 32 to 40 million untouchables and our treaties with the princely states of India, perhaps 80 millions. Naturally we do not want to throw India into chaos on the eve of invasion. (7:35)

Mr. Churchill described U.S. pressure in the following words.

The U.S. has shown an increasingly direct interest in Indian affairs as the Japanese advance into Asia spread westwards. The concern of the Americans with the strategy of world war was bringing them into touch with political issues, on which they have strong opinions and little experience. Now that the Japanese were advancing towards its frontiers, U.S. government began to express views and and offer counsel on Indian affairs. (7:36)

Again on 11 March 1942 President Roosevelt suggested to Mr. Churchill that,

... the setting up of what might be called a temporary government of India, headed by a small representative group, covering different casts, occupations, religions and geographies---this group to be recognized as temporary dominion governme . (7:36)

The principle thought of President Roosevelt's scheme was that this temporary government would be charged with establishing a body to consider a more permanent solution for the whole country. The Truman Doctrine was proclaimed on 21 June 1947, a few months before the emergence of India and Pakistan, and was followed by the Marshall Plan to help Western Europe meet the emerging USSR threat. In those days the principle aim of U.S. policy was to contain communism. The establishment of NATO, and aid to Greece and Turkey, were all reflections of this policy. A divided India did not fit in this Western policy. In the words of Mr. Richard P. Stebbin,

The partition of the Subcontinent between these two mutually antagonistic nations had disrupted its economic and politico-strategic unity and aggravated beyond measure the task of governing its discrete fragments. (7:38)

It was agreed that western interests required a united India in order to face the Soviet Union more effectively and to retain a large market for economic exploitation. (7:38)

This was the time of military alliance and getting bases all over the world in every continent. It was, therefore, the desire of the U.S. to obtain the participation of India and China in promoting the interests of U.S. in Asia.

President Truman extended an invitation to Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, to visit the U.S. just after independence. He was given a warm welcome on arrival. In the autumn of 1949 Mr Nehru told the U.S. Congress,

... that India will not remain neutral in a war for freedom and justice". The New York Times wrote with appreciation that "Washington's hopes for a democratic rallying point in Asia have been pinned on India, the second biggest Asiatic nation, and on the man that determines India's policy---Prime Minister Jawaher lal Nehru. (7:39)

China was, however, removed from U.S. influence by a communist revolution headed by Mao Tse Tung on 1 October 1949. This increased the importance of India to the U.S. in Asia. The New York Times, in August 1950, called Nehru "in a sense the counter weight on the democratic side to Mao Tse Tung. To have Nehru as ally in the struggle in Asiatic support, is worth many divisions." (7:39).

India, however, maintained a balanced position between China, Russia and the U.S., which was considered by the U.S. to be contrary to U.S. interests and favorable for Russia and China. On 17 October 1949 Prime Minister Nehru declared,

Inevitably she [India] had to consider her foreign policies in terms of enlightened self interest, but at the same time she brought to it a touch of its idealism. Thus she has tried to combine idealism with its national interest. The main objective of that policies are: the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or a group of power, but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue. (7:40)

Although it was gradually becoming clear that India was determined to pursue its policy of non-alignment, the U.S. did not give up efforts to bring the country under its influence. The U.S. provided liberal support and technical assistance in both the economic and military field, and the following specific steps were taken to promote cooperation between the two countries during the early 1950s.

(7:40),(65)

1. U.S. signed a point four agreement with India in December 1950.

2. Mr Chester Bowels was sent to appraise the Indian situation and to offer generous assistance for India's first five year plan.

3. Both countries signed a mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1951 which enabled India to receive military assistance without any corresponding obligation.

4. An agreement was signed at the beginning of 1952, for the establishment of an Indo-American Technical cooperation Fund, totaling 250 million dollars over a period of five years.

In spite of all U.S. efforts, India remained a neutral country and expressed differences with the U.S. on many issues. For example, (7:40)

1. India refused to join the U.S. in their peace treaty with Japan; made a separate peace treaty with Japan; and sent a note to U.S. informing them of their disagreement.

2. They opposed the U.S. policy of "de-neutralizing" Formosa and condemned it as the military mentality of seizing countries.

3. They opposed the U.S. policy of building defensive perimeters in Asia.

The loss of U.S. influence over China and India resulted in major changes in U.S. policy. Japan became the focal point for American policy in the Pacific region. Political commentator Mr. Richard P. Stebbin wrote,

The refusal of Indian government to accept this country's interpretation of the far eastern crisis and to endorse our various protective actions against communist China had caused lively annoyance in Washington and for the time being destroyed the possibility of coordinated action with Asia's leading non communist government. India's policy mirrored with painful clarity the distrust of the west, the insistence on the rights of Asia's re-born peoples. (7:40)

On 28 August 1951, The New York Times wrote an editorial under the title "The Lost Leader" which stated,

Jawahir lal Nehru is fast becoming one of the great disappointments to the post war era ... to the West, he seemed (a few year ago) a logical champion of a free democratic, anti-communist Asia, and the India he directed was the obvious candidate for the leadership of Asia... Instead of seizing the leadership for Asia for its good, Nehru turned aside from its responsibilities, pro-claimed India's disinterestedness and tried to set up an independent Third Force India, suspended in mid air between the two decisive movements of our day--the communism that Russia heads, and democracy of which the U.S. is the champion. (7:41)

As a result of the growing frustration among the American leadership, President Truman stated on 12 February 1951,

I recognize that there are important political differences between our government and the government of India in regard to the course of action which would most effectively curb aggression and establish peace in Asia. However, these differences should not blind us to the needs of the Indian people. (7:43)

Senator Knowland, the leader of the majority party in the Senate during 1952-54, suggested that India should not be provided same military and economic assistance as our active allies. Similarly, Secretary of State Dulles condemned some Indian policies in the field of international politics. Almost at the same time Vice President Nixon, was supporting aid to Pakistan. (7:43)

It appears very clearly from above facts that the U.S. decided to seek alternatives when she ultimately failed to bring India into the U.S. camp of allies. At that point, the U.S. decided to pay attention to Pakistan and began to focus on Japan to replace China. Although India violently criticized the Baghdad Pact, in May 1953, Secretary of State Dulles promised India the continuation of economic aid to assist in completing their five year plan. The U.S. never took a stand in favor of Pakistan over issues concerning the Subcontinent. When the U.S. did decide to give aid to Pakistan, it also made an offer to provide similar aid to India. The offer was conveyed to India by President Eisenhower in his letter dated 24 February 1954, addressed

to the Prime Minister of India. India received 85 million dollars in 1954-55, which was the largest single allocation for the year to any country. (7:44)

History of Relations Between Pakistan and the United States

Early Conditions. Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947 as the result of a division of British occupied India. This partition was based on the two nations theory having its basis in religion. About seven million Muslims migrated from India to Pakistan and about a million people were assassinated in the course of this population transfer. Britain and India accepted this partition as a last resort. Britain, the ruler, divided the country in such a way that it inflicted a tremendous amount of damage to Pakistan. At the last minute many changes were made and areas of Muslim majority were given to India. Britain helped India to occupy the province of Kashmir which had an 80 per cent Muslim population. The following characterized the general environment in the Subcontinent during those days; (6, 3, 2)

1. Deep rooted hatred between India and Pakistan.
2. Occupation of Kashmir by India became a national issue for Pakistan.
3. War erupted between Pakistan and India within a few months after Pakistan's independence. As a result of the war, Pakistan obtained only one third of the province and the balance remained under control of India. The war

stopped after intervention by the United Nations.

4. Pakistan was the most underdeveloped country in Subcontinent at that time and because of the influx of millions of refugees from India, was facing very serious economic problems.

Emergence of the U.S. as a Superpower. After World War II, the U.S. emerged as a superpower and took on the responsibility for checking the spread of communism in the world. This meant to restrict the two communist giants of the time; the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC). After gaining independence from their colonial masters, many poor countries were in a miserable political and economic condition and thus were suitable for the spread of communism. To restrain this spread, the U.S. wanted to build a chain of allies in Asia and Europe around the USSR and PRC to restrict the communist influence. (7:3)

Pakistan, with its ideological background and common borders with both the USSR and the PRC, was strategically located and thus commended itself to the U.S. for use in its containment policy. Indeed, Pakistan as an ally, visualized augmenting the American capability and the military might of Pakistan was seen as a natural corollary to the U.S. global power equation. Thus being in the right location, at right time, Pakistan emerged to have utility for U.S. policy. Therefore, because of requirements of both

nations, the promotion of mutual relations was a "Marriage of Convenience", but one that both partners sought quite eagerly at first. (7:4)

Development of Relations. Later on events moved fast. President Truman initiated the "Point Four" technical assistance agreement with Pakistan in December 1950. First Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan, along with his newly appointed first Commander-in-Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan (who later on became defense minister and President of Pakistan) visited the U.S. in early 1951. The political importance of the visit was that it was carried out by rejecting an offer from the USSR to visit Moscow. (7:2)

The election of General Eisenhower to the Presidency inaugurated an era of closer U.S. and Pakistan relations. General Ayub Khan, who was very keen to develop the armed forces of Pakistan, visited Washington in September-October 1954. He carried out discussions with Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, who was chief military advisor, to become, for the right price, the West's eastern anchor in an Asian alliance structure. In pursuit of this policy, General Henry Mayers visited Pakistan in March 1954, to survey Pakistan's needs. Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement with the U.S. on 19 May 1954 which was followed by Pakistan joining the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). (7:6)

Pakistan, at that time, was very weak militarily and economically. It also had a security problem with India. Pakistan could have played an important role if her security against India had been guaranteed and she would have had sufficient economic strength to sustain threats from neighboring communist countries. While working out the details of agreement, this factor was not clearly addressed and the U.S. came up with an ambiguous settlement that left the nature of the threat deliberately vague. The Pakistanis, both at the official and private level, have consistently viewed this settlement to have been fairly implicit. They were at the same time cognizant of its studied impression. Accordingly, the same was evident from remarks by Secretary of State Dulles when he visited Pakistan and other front line states and commented:

We are not, in general, in a position to demand specific return for our investment at this stage. The only chance is to proceed with an indication of trust and friendship and hope to obtain results. (7:5)

Although Admiral Radford was impressed with the strategic location of Pakistan and particularly impressed by General Muhammad Ayub Khan, he seemingly shared the views expressed by Secretary of State Dulles. (7:5)

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Horace Hildreth, had established close relations with Sikander Mirza, who was the defense minister in 1953 after having served as Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington. Hildreth's daughter

had married Mirza's son in October 1954, and he continued to represent the U.S. in Pakistan till 1957. (7:5)

During 1953-54, the U.S. applied pressure on Pakistan through their Joint Chief of Staff and Secretary of State for her to join the Baghdad pact (renamed in 1959 to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)). Pakistan bowed to the pressure but asked for additional military assistance. (7:5)

General Ayub Khan visited Washington in October 1954, with the new Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, and discussed the issue of modernization of Pakistan military with U.S. officials. On return from Washington, General Ayub became the Defense Minister and Sikander Mirza was made Interior Minister. Pakistan became member of CENTO in September 1955, following Turkey, Iraq, Britain and later, Iran. The United States did not become a member of this Pact and as a result, the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan was left on a bilateral basis. (7:5)

Show of Concern. In 1956 when Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardi took over as a Prime Minister, both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister continued to say that the U.S., at the highest level, had given assurance of assistance against any Indian attack; but Defense Minister General Ayub Khan was dissatisfied with the state of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Suhrawardi's views were greatly colored by his U.S. political advisor, Charles Burton Martial, who also enjoyed

close relations with Mirza, then Pakistan's President. This resulted in keeping Pakistan's policies in tune with U.S. requirements. Suherwardi did not support Egypt during Suez crisis, and issued statements against the unity of Muslim countries saying "0+0=0". (7:157)

Questions began to be raised in Washington in 1957 about the advisability of large scale U.S. assistance to Pakistan, and the latter's reliability as a northern tier state in meeting any anti-Soviet contingency on behalf of the U.S. Although this debate was conducted in low key, it had substantial and far reaching effects. While no decisions were announced, in retrospect it was clear that at this junction U.S. policy underwent an important modification. The U.S. started asking Pakistan with greater assertiveness for concrete steps to demonstrate its usefulness. (7:7)

General Muhammad Ayub Khan, in October 1958, declared martial law and became the Head of the State. His first major foreign policy act was the conclusion of the bilateral agreement of cooperation with the U.S. in March 1959. This was a balanced agreement for both the countries. Pakistan received assurance from the U.S. for her independence and integrity, and in return the U.S. received access to the Air Force Base of Peshawar for 10 years. A U-2 shot down by the Soviet Union in 1960, had flown from this base. This incident was followed by a threat of serious consequences by

Russia to Pakistan. Russian Prime Minister Khrushchev bluntly warned Pakistan of horrific retaliation, if the U.S. military activities in Peshawar did not cease. He also warned Pakistan of long term dangers inherent in her pro-U.S. policies. (7:9)

Decline in Relations. Later on, circumstances changed. The Eisenhower-Khrushchev get together was an attempt to move U.S.-Soviet relations from a posture of cold war confrontation to one of peaceful co-existence. In a 1959 congressional review on U.S. commitments to Pakistan, the wisdom of Pakistan forces being kept in excess of the requirements for external defense was questioned. The discussion was received unfavorably by Muhammad Ayub Khan, who described it as being totally erroneous and based on an incorrect appreciation of the military requirements of Pakistan. It should be noted that on the 1400 mile border with India, 80 percent of the Indian forces were poised at Pakistan capable of launching an offensive attack with ten days notice. In 1960, the aid bill for Pakistan was dropped substantially. (7:8)

In 1960, John F. Kennedy, who was already against giving preference to Pakistan over India, became the President of the United States. He had a soft spot for India, which meant automatically a hard spot for Pakistan. Along with

this, the development of spy satellites rendered bases like Peshawar obsolete. Thus, the "Marriage of Convenience" began to breakdown. (7:10)

When Ayub visited Kennedy in July 1961 and addressed the Congress, he stressed the need for the U.S. to stand by its allies, and suggested that U.S. military aid to India, in the absence of a solution to the Kashmir problem, would seriously damage Pakistan-U.S. relations. It was agreed that Pakistan would be consulted before providing any military equipment to India. Pakistan was consoled with the grant of one F-104 jet fighter squadron. When the U.S. decided to provide military aid to India after her border clash with China, India was provided enough military aid by the western countries, to raise fifteen aircraft squadrons and six army divisions. Such massive military support to India caused very serious concern in Pakistan, and Pakistan openly started criticizing American policy. Over a period of 10 years (from 1955 to 1965) Pakistan received 2.5 billion dollars whereas India received 10 billion dollars which was four times more than Pakistan, which was a close ally of US. (7:11,155)

Over a period of many years, no open debate occurred in Pakistan which could tell the people that United States did not support all aspects of Pakistani foreign policy. The difficulty of the elite in Pakistan, was that they never explained to the people that the U.S. was looking at Paki-

stan as an "anchor" in defense against the USSR and the People's Republic of China, rather than cooperating in Pakistan's goal of defense against India. It was thus difficult for Ayub Khan to explain the U.S. tilt toward India in plain words which was seen in Pakistan as being tantamount to "American treachery". There was a general consensus in Pakistan, even among the elite, that the United States understood Pakistan's security problems with India and that this fact was subsumed under U.S. concern over regional security issues. The point was repeatedly mentioned by Pakistani leaders, including Muhammad Ayub Khan, that the U.S. has given "assurance at the highest level" against Pakistan's security needs against India and would stand by it. The point which was missed by the Pakistani elite was that the United State was just as concerned with "communist aggression" in 1962, as it was a decade ago when the treaties were signed with Pakistan. In the Indo-China war of 1962 the United States saw an opportunity for achieving the goal which she could not reach in 1952, namely, drawing India closer to the United States. However the Pakistani Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra, who had served as a critical link to the U.S. in 1953, and signed as a Prime Minister of Pakistan the first Mutual Defense Agreement with the U.S. in 1954, admitted the failure of Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policies. He admitted that United States was putting pressure on Pakistan not to take advantage of

Indian vulnerability at the time of her war with China, and admitted that the U.S. was rushing military equipment and supplies to India. He said:

When we entered into these pacts... we did so purely for defensive purposes... We were in a desperate need of arms and equipment and while we were interested in the defense of our region, we were no less interested in boosting the morale of our people. Now with a change in military strategy, the military importance of these pacts has necessarily diminished... Friends that let us down will no longer be considered our friends.
(7:11)

Pakistan then started looking for additional sources of aid and the President of Pakistan started putting out feelers that to the effect that Pakistan has not foreclosed it's diplomatic options. As a result of this turnabout, the Pakistani Foreign Minister announced that "Pakistan would welcome aid from any quarter provided it did not affect the ideaology, integrity, and solidarity of Pakistan." (7:8)

Ban on Military Equipment. Pakistan started improving relations with China in 1963. Pakistan went to war with India on September 6, 1965. Just after the start of the war, the U.S. and Russia stopped all types of military supplies to both countries. Russia resumed her military equipment supplies to India on September 19, 1965, right amidst the war, but the U.S. did not. Most of the Pakistan military equipment was of U.S. origin which, therefore, seriously affected Pakistan and became a main source of

resentment against the U.S. This action ultimately set the course for Pakistan which resulted in major foreign policy changes. (7:19)

When the war was over, Russia offered to mediate issues between Pakistan and India. Heads of State of India and Pakistan went to Tashkent and signed an agreement to formally end the 1965 war. The people of Pakistan did not approve of the cease fire which created a series of internal political problems in Pakistan and resulted in a second martial law in 1969. Pakistan lost her Eastern wing (now Bangladesh) as a result of civil war sponsored by India and Russia. The role played by the Republican government of the U.S. during this crisis was appreciated by Pakistan. At the same time it was felt that the defeat was a result of American ban on arms supplies to Pakistan. Pakistan, in the meantime, had acted as a link in establishing the first secret contact between the U.S. and the PRC and arranged the visit of U.S. foreign minister Dr Henry Kissinger to Beijing on 9 July 1971. (5) The help received by Pakistan was considered its reward for her assistance in providing a link between the United States and China. (7:91)

Situation After 1971 War. After the war, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan (previously West Pakistan). Notwithstanding the support provided by the U.S. to Pakistan during 1971 war with India, the U.S. did not remove its embargo from arms sale to Pakistan. The

new Prime Minister tried to lift the ban but in vain. In this connection he visited Washington during 1973 and was only able to get an opening for spares. Pakistan offered port facilities to the U.S. at Gawader, but the offer was not accepted. (27) However, the embargo was lifted in February 1975, by the Ford Administration. To a certain extent, this change in policy was a result of pressure exerted by Iran and Saudi Arabia, which by that time had become the pivot of American policy in that area. (7:161)

Nuclear Proliferation. In 1974, India exploded a nuclear device which sent a shock wave through Pakistan. Pakistan's first reaction was to seek assurance from the "Big Powers" against any atomic attack or blackmail. In an attempt to achieve this goal, Pakistan's Foreign Minister traveled to France, the UK, Russia, China and the U.S. but did not succeed. Pakistan then signed an agreement with France to buy an atomic re-processing plant in 1976. Almost at the same time Mr. Carter won the election and became the President of the United States. He had already consistently criticized the proposed Pakistan re-processing plant during his election campaign, and later blocked the sale of A-7 aircraft which had been promised by the Ford Administration earlier. (7:77)

Legislation on FMS, subsequently adopted by Congress, infringed heavily on Pakistan's ability to purchase what it wanted from the U.S. The Arms Export Control Act (PL 94-329) was passed on June 30, 1976 and went into effect on

September 1, 1977. It required Congressional notification for sales over one million dollars, as well as other restrictions.

The Symington-Glenn amendment to the Security Assistance Act of 1977 forbade military and economic assistance to any country receiving nuclear enriched equipment. Although Pakistan was not in the category, as a result of its deal with France over the re-processing plant, all assistance to Pakistan was terminated in April 1979, even though aid to Israel and South Africa were not effected. (7:94, 118)

There were several factors motivating Pakistan to acquire nuclear technology.

(1) Pakistan's basic incentive for its nuclear program was its insecurity in the face of overwhelming Indian superiority in conventional weapons.

(2) Pakistan wants to achieve near-autonomy in nuclear energy. The prestige issue, while not being totally irrelevant, was neither basic nor important as a factor.

Perceptions About Pakistan's Nuclear Program. Pakistan's need to acquire nuclear technology was based on its energy and security requirements, but this program is unique in the sense that it has been widely discussed in the international press. The U.S. response, particularly under the Carter administration, was based on the false premise that Pakistan wants to acquire the nuclear technology because of

prestige. There was another interesting notion that got injected into this discussion. This notion is best described by its catchy label: the Islamic Bomb. Washington's inability to comprehend the basic insecurity that Pakistan felt toward its powerful neighbor, India, was reflected in its search for nuclear technology. Therefore the phrase of "Islamic Bomb" was coined to offer a substitute rationale for the Pakistani nuclear efforts. The Washington's self-delusion that Pakistan's quest for nuclear technology was funded by rich but technologically underdeveloped Arab countries, and its identification of the Pakistani effort with the "Islamic Bomb" contributed significantly to solidifying support for the nuclear program in Pakistan. However the Carter administration injected religious fever into a totally secular issue. Of course, once this train of thought was set in motion in Washington, it caught on in the media, both in the U.S. and in Europe, which often finds it easier to sell catchy sensationalism than dull substance to the masses. (7:145) There was a wide difference in perception between the Carter administration and that of Pakistan. The Carter administration made it a central issue. In President Carter's words "the nuclear issue was one of the greatest challenges we are to face in the next quarter of a century." (7:144) President Carter repeatedly declared that Pakistan was a test case in his nonproliferation policy. Accordingly it became the duty of the coun-

tries, who were the member of nuclear club, to curb their export of sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear states. The Carter administration thought that the induction of nuclear technology in the region would cause instability in the area. On the other side, Pakistan felt that it was not the possession of technology itself that threatens international order. Rather it was the underlying problem of national security that force a nation to allocate a disproportionate share of its resources in pursuit of a nuclear option. More specifically, according to the Pakistani view, the United States, an ally of Pakistan, needed carefully to examine the entire context of Pakistani security problems, before it took any policy initiative to Pakistan's nuclear efforts. (7:144)

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan affected, among other things, the Carter Administration's nuclear policy. Senator John Glenn, who had previously taken a very hard line against Pakistan on nonproliferation, made a shift in its approach, seeing that "Soviets would reach the Middle East through Baluchistan province of Pakistan". He acknowledged that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has precipitated a need for the U.S. to review "various strands" of its foreign policy:

On the one hand, the United States has long-standing and highly important nonproliferation interest and objectives which it is seeking to pursue in its nuclear relations with India and Pakistan... On the other hand, long-term U.S.

interests in maintaining stable political and security interests in Southwest Asia have been accentuated by the Soviet aggression and the need for a clear U.S. response to it. The United States has been seeking to revive and strengthen that country's ability to defend its borders against Soviet incursion in Afghanistan. (7:140)

After the invasion of Afghanistan, the nonproliferation issue faded into the background and the U.S. government, including Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) started preparing the grounds for meeting Pakistani security needs in the light of the changed situation. In May 1980, the NRC turned down the new Indian applications for enriched uranium fuel for its Tarapur atomic reactor, saying that they did not meet the statutory criteria since full-scope safeguard requirements applied to any export beginning after March 10, 1980, irrespective of when the shipment had been planned to occur. However when the case was referred to the President, he breached his self-avowed stance on nonproliferation and made a decision in favor of India. The President then authorized a shipment of 200 tons of fuel to India. The President of Pakistan, after his October 1980 visit to President Carter, said that the entire treatment of Tarapure had put the Pakistani nuclear case on a higher plane.

Pakistan, by that time, had become totally dependent for its military supplies on China and France. For political leverage it developed very close relations with rich Islamic countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya) and the PRC

and joined the Non-Aligned Movement. As a result of the Iranian revolution, Khumani had already taken over Iran from the Shah, and the U.S. was left with no reliable ally in the region. Pakistan remained the only country which could be of use to the U.S. under those circumstances. (7)

The Invasion of Afghanistan. On 25 December 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. This action swept away years of U.S. apathy towards Pakistan. President Carter offered, as a first step, \$400 million in economic aid to Pakistan; but this was turned down by General Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, calling it "Peanuts". More distressing for the President Carter was Pakistan wariness toward the reestablishment of a closely coordinated response. (7:xi)

Carter's lack of concern at the widening Soviet stake in Afghanistan had begun to take its toll in Pakistan. The advisors to the President of Pakistan argued that since the U.S. could no longer be aroused to take note of Soviet inroads in Southwest Asia, Pakistan interest would be best served in making peace with the Soviets. Pakistan's Ambassador to United States, Sahibzada Yaqoob Ali Khan, who was very close to the President of Pakistan, was transferred to Moscow. Pakistan's refusal to accept aid was based on what Pakistan saw as a fundamental flaw in Washington's lack of will and inability to stand by its allies. Even after the invasion of Afghanistan, efforts to communicate ran into

difficulties.(7:75) In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Mr. Carter announced a "Carter Doctrine", which stated that any further moves by the Soviets in Southwest Asia would be repelled by force. But the fact remained that Pakistani leaders did not believe that President Carter had the will to act decisively. This lack of trust in American commitment was the main reason for Pakistan refusal to accept the U.S. \$400 million aid package. The government of Pakistan had the opinion that "Americans wanted to give a little aid, let Pakistan burn its bridges forever to the Soviet Union, and then leave it in the lurch." (7:76) Unable to get a firm commitment from the U.S. the President of Pakistan shrugged off the aid offer with the remarks about U.S. policy in the region that, "The U.S. has foreign relations but no foreign policy." (7:76) When Brzezinski visited Islamabad in February 1980, he was told that,

It was not the quantity of aid but the quality of the U.S. commitment that was important. A few planes or hundred tanks were not the issue. What was crucial, however, was whether the United States would give its word to defend Pakistan and keep it. The model cited was that of the Chinese: "They did not give that much aid, but their word is as good as gold with us." (7:76)

However, when the Reagan administration came into power things started changing. The new government offered a five year aid package of \$3.2 billion which included the sale of advanced weapons like F-16 aircraft. Pakistan had also been harboring about three million Afghan refugees, for the

last 6 years which had been a serious burden on her economy. She had not recognized the new Afghan regime, and was facing a serious threat from Russia. Today, Pakistan is a channel for arms delivery to freedom fighters in Afghanistan. Pakistan requested another package deal for \$6 billion for the next five years (1987-1992), however only \$4.09 billion was approved by the Congress.

There is now, when compared to the 1950's, a basic difference in Pakistani perceptions of threats to its security. In contrast to earlier times, Pakistan today accepts the reality of a Soviet threat. The invasion of Afghanistan has put Moscow's troops directly on Pakistani borders. Pakistan sympathy for the Afghan freedom fighters has displeased the USSR, whose daily appeals to the Pakistani government to behave itself, are a constant reminder of the Russian threat Pakistan is facing via Afghanistan. In the 1980's Pakistan does not distinguish too greatly between Indian and Russian threats, because it sees the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty as having important military clauses that tie the Soviets directly into Indian policies. Therefore, the Indian treaty with the Soviet Union and the subsequent Russian occupation of Afghanistan have brought a commonality between the perspective of Pakistan and the United States and removed the exclusively regional verses global view that each respectively held. The regional threat of the Soviets or Soviet-backed moves into Southwest Asia is seen

as being the foremost cause for worry, not only in Islamabad but also in Washington. The latest manifestation of a global policy to shift the "correlation of forces" in favor of the Soviet Union worries both the Soviet Union and Pakistan.

The United States has spelled out in no uncertain terms that its vital interests are involved in Southwest Asia. The threat to these interests is seen as coming from the USSR and in this context, the following statement reflects the seriousness of the commitment:

The Soviets must be continually faced with the certain prospect that a military move against the U.S. or allied interests risks a conflict that could be wider in geography, scope, or violence than they are prepared to deal with. In particular, they must be convinced that infringement on our vital interests in Southwest Asia would trigger a confrontation with the United States that would not be confined to that region.
(7:159)

Renewed interest in Pakistan falls within the framework of a larger commitment to Southwest Asia that allows a new range of possibilities even though it also carries certain risks. Since the United States recognizes that its task of maintaining a favorable security posture requires a degree of cooperation from regional countries with sufficient support capabilities, Pakistan becomes a useful ally. Not only does it have port facilities that could be opened to United States needs, but it also has an evolving military relationship with the country of major concern to Washington policy, Saudi Arabia. Furthermore Pakistan importance is enhanced

because the denial of the same to the USSR is in U.S. interests. U.S. decision makers also count on the highly disciplined, but insufficiently equipped, Pakistani army as one of the few effective regional fighting forces. The old years of MAP/IMET interaction enhanced Pakistani receptivity to U.S. overtures and a resultant willingness to fight, if necessary, alongside U.S. forces. (7:159)

Saudi Arabia has only 50,000 regular troops and 30,000 thousand members of the national guard. The statement made by Prince (now the king) Fahad while on a visit to Pakistan in the early 1980's, "that any interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan would be considered an interference or injury to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia", was welcomed by Washington. Therefore, the United States sees the increasing relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as an immediate chance to augment Saudi defenses.

After the U.S. embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan, after the 1965 war with India, France and China emerged as major suppliers of arms for Pakistan. This trend continued till the late 1970's, but the U.S. is emerging again as a major supplier. The following table shows the dollar breakdown of arms purchased by Pakistan during the period 1979-1983. (9)

TABLE 1

Arms Purchased by Pakistan: 1979-1983

<u>Supplier</u>	<u>In U.S. Dollars (Millions)</u>
France	550
U.S.	550
China	390
West Germany	190
Italy	40
USSR	20
UK	10
Others	80
Total	1830

Pakistan's arms purchases from the U.S. under the FMS program amounted to more than \$2.5 billion from 1950 to 1985. Pakistan also purchased more than \$124.3 million worth of U.S. equipment through commercial channels during same period. A breakdown of recent U.S. arms sales to Pakistan are as follows: (9)

TABLE II

Recent U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan

(U.S. Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
FMS Orders	1,506,977	147,070	206,406	400,000	300,000
FMS Sales	146,407	255,826	502,701	Unknown	Unknown
Commercial Sales/ Deliveries	5,000	5,000	14,893	12,500	13,000
* Estimated					
** Proposed					

Although Pakistan is facing a serious problem from India and Russia, she has announced that she will maintain her nonalignment status (to maintain this image Pakistan has selected to pay a normal interest rate on U.S. loans for the procurement of military equipment); will not provide bases to the U.S. inside the country; and will actively support Palestinian efforts against Israel which is one of the closest allies of the U.S. (7:104). Pakistan also has very close cultural, religious, economic and military relations with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan and other Gulf States. Thousands of military personnel are performing duties in these countries. This is considered an extension of U.S. policy in the Middle East. In addition to this, Pakistan has close relations with Turkey. In fact, Pakistan is perhaps the only country which has close relations both with Iran and the Arab countries. (6:110)

Nature of Political Problems in Pakistan. Pakistan has a unique history of political problems:

(1) Pakistan is unique in having had four constitutions in a quarter of century. (2) No other new state has arranged the crucial relationship of space, power, and culture four times---from five provinces to two...then again to five provinces and, with the secession of East Pakistan, to four provinces. (3) No other state outside the communist system has tried to depart from the colonial heritage of local government and global ideological suasion of community development theory by devising a structure--Basic Democracy--that while not totally original was an ingenious adaptation to cultural content. (4) Pakistan was also the major exemplar of an effort to sedate the participation explosion while building institutional capability. (5) Nor has any other new

state changed its basic structure of government from parliamentary to presidential system, then return to a parliamentary form and simultaneously adjusted from a unicameral to bicameral system. (6) As though these major changes in polity and power were not enough, there was also a long period in which both the legislative and political party process was suspended. (7) These changes occurred within the context of two martial law, three wars with India, including the only successful war of secession among the new states in the post-independence period. (8) Further, few nations... have had such a massive infusion of technological and economical aid from the United States and the allied themselves in foreign policy so closely with that country. Nor have many nations so shrewdly and intelligently adjusted foreign policy to a highly multilateral set of relations couple with renaissance of Islamic connections, once the futility of exclusivity with the United State was realized." (10:45)

The political problems of Pakistan have been explained as the crises of legitimacy, identity, integration, penetration, participation, and distribution. The most important of these crises are the crises of penetration, and participation. The rest of the four crises can be the subsets of these two crises. The penetration crisis involves the problem of government in reaching down into the society and effecting basic policies. This type of gap exists in all types of transitional societies. The ruling class of such societies try to penetrate to win the legitimacy. In a transition society like Pakistan, where the gap between ruler and the ruled is still wide, this is a real problem. This problem was inherited from the class system of Hindu society and the landlord system encouraged by the Britishers, but is contrary to the basic teaching of Islam. This duality in the make up of the society does create friction

and frustration in the society of Pakistan. Many governments tried to achieve penetration in society, but have not been successful either because they were not sincerely committed to the cause and tried to use it for their personal political purposes, or they could not recognize the underlying factors in the social and cultural system of the society. The Ayub Khan system of Basic Democracy and the populist politics and the appeal to "Islamic Socialism" of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, were efforts to broaden the base of political participation, and give the people of Pakistan a greater voice in shaping their own destiny. But both of these efforts failed because the innermost wishes of their sponsors were to use these as an instrument to get the support of the people to lengthen their rule over the country. This was especially true in the case of Bhutto, who used it more to institutionalize his personal rule than to develop a more genuinely democratic system. This problem does have some of its roots in the make up of society. It can be seen as a typical problem of introducing democracy in a less educated society, in which people lack the capability of analyzing the situation objectively and thus can be easily exploited by the politicians by sentimental slogans without any fear of accountability. (10:49) The roots of the political disturbance can be traced to the history of the Pakistan Muslim League, the political party which lead the Pakistan movement. When the Muslim League was established

in 1937, the middle class was too weak in numbers and resources to carry the nationalist movement of Pakistan alone. The Muslim League then decided to take the first step to bring the rural notables into the league. This effort began to gain momentum with the participation of new rural landlords who saw their future in Pakistan. These landlords, who had a tight control over the people of their area through kinship/cast and vast land owning, brought a tremendous victory to the Muslim League; but at the same time blocked the Muslim League from penetrating into the masses. After independence, these landlords kept their strong hold on the political activities in the country. These land owners, the landed ashrafiagentry classes of the Indus plain, were not ones to operate parliamentary institutions in a manner responsible to a citizen electorate. This fact was very visible in the initial years of Pakistan's political life when it experienced four different governments in a period of only ten years. The politicians extensively used the bureaucracy to meet their personnel and party needs. (10:122) (11). This led to making the civil servant a strong force, and they, along with Defense officers corps, became deeply involved in politics. The cycle, once started, has been continued and the people of Pakistan are still far away from being able to elect a government of their own choice. Despite the political turmoil, the wealth earned by the lower echelons of society,

spread of education, and the new generation brought up away from Indian culture will have a wide ranging effect on the future political life of Pakistan.

IV. Interests of the U.S. and Pakistan in Southwest Asia

U.S. Interests in Southwest Asia

Introduction. In a symposium in 1981 on "U.S. Strategic Interests in Southwest Asia" a consensus was reached on the following points. (12:3)

1. It is of imperative importance that U.S. policy makers be educated and well versed in Islamic sensitivities, regional cultures and local traditions.
2. U.S. concern with Southwest Asia should be constant rather than reactive and ephemeral.
3. Short, mid range, and long-term policy planning must be developed in such a comprehensive manner as to integrate the political, economic, psychological and military aspect of U.S. national power into a single comprehensive national security policy in the area.
4. The U.S. highest political leadership must generate multiple options for the area. It must vividly declare U.S. national interests and understand the consequences of deviations therefrom.

The symposium agreed to describe Southwest Asia as a region from the eastern border of Pakistan and Afghanistan to the western border of Saudi Arabia, based on the Holy Koran's demographic definition (for Southwest Asia see map at Appendix B).

Mighty are the East and West, and thus we have made you a middle people that you might be witness to the people, and the prophet a witness to you. (12:3)

The people of the area have lived together for centuries. They are alike and share many cultural values and traditions because Islam is all pervading. Living together for such a long time has given birth to internal conflicts which have been carried over to the present time. The U.S., while making long term policy for the area, must keep such factors in mind and must try to understand the interests, traditions, culture and religion that separate and bind the people of the area. One way of doing this is to understand how the people in the region see themselves and how they see their relationship to the West and Soviet Union. (12:4)

The region is the fulcrum of the world's economic power. Without access to its vast oils reserves, the economies of Western Europe and Japan could collapse. The renaissance and expansion of Islam, and the wealth of oil keep Southwest Asia problems from just being regional; and instead thrust them headlong into the global arena, where, like a rubic's cube, sides can change color and become unaligned or re-aligned with the slightest movement or provocation. This can be seen in the fall of the apparently powerful and stable government of Iran; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; war between Iran and Iraq; seizure of U.S. hostages and the

abortive raid to release the hostages; and decline in U.S. credibility when "peanuts" were offered to Zia, the President of Pakistan, after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Russians. (12:5)

The Strategic Process. The military strategy for the U.S. in Southwest Asia can be worked out by answering the following questions. (13:11)

1. What are the political objectives of U.S. national strategy?
2. What policies have been established to guide the development of U.S. military strategy in the Southwest Asia?
3. What are the military factors bearing on Southwest Asian strategy?

In the U.S., military strategy is directed toward the attainment of political objectives. Political policy in the U.S. works at two levels in the strategic process. It establishes the political objectives that the strategic concept must achieve, and it sets the rules that shape and control strategy.

Political Objectives in Southwest Asia. The U.S. national objectives are derived from U.S. national interests in the region. As stated by Dr. Harold Brown, in a major policy address on March 6 1980, the U.S. has the following interests in Southwest Asia. (13:14; 14:51).

1. To assure access to adequate oil on reasonable terms, at a tolerable price.
2. To resist Soviet expansion, but avoid confrontation.
3. To advance the Middle East peace process.
4. The survival and the security of the state of the Israel.

Threats to U.S. Interests. In reality, the interests, objectives and threats must be considered concurrently. Keeping this point in view, there are generally following three types of threats that could disrupt U.S. and Western access to the region, (13:15)

1. Overt Soviet attack on the oil fields.
2. Inter-regional warfare such as Iran-Iraq war.
3. International instability which result in the reduction of oil production.

Potentially the most serious, but perhaps the most unlikely, of these threats would be the Soviet invasion of oil fields in Khuzistan in Iran, and control of the Strait of Hormuz, resulting from the disintegration of Iran. This would give the Soviets strategic advantage over the control of the Strait of Hormuz and could deny the West access to Iranian oil. If this is combined with the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Oman it could be very dangerous to Western interests. This could also result as a consequence of rapid modernization and fundamentalist movements. Each of

these threats needs a strategically tailored response. The threats are mainly to the pipelines, facilities, and oil tankers. Oil supply, once interrupted, can be difficult to repair. (13:16)

Interrelation of Policy and Strategy. There are both military and non-military factors involved in the achievement of national objectives once defined clearly. The military element, as a matter of principle, should be left to the military strategist, and integrated with other constituent elements of national power, including political, economic, technological and psychosocial aspects. Military strategy can be supplemented, in the case of Southwest Asia, by creating a stockpile of petroleum, diversifying oil supplies, implementing energy conservation measures, and developing energy alternatives. The success of these measures will have an affect on the construction of a rational military strategy. (13:16)

The job becomes easy when political objectives, security policy, and military strategy are in agreement. In today's world of democracy and era of nuclear war, this task has become very difficult because the functions of policy maker and chief military strategist are not vested in one person, as it used to be in the past. Military might should not be used to win wars, but its possible use in an appropriate manner to check the start of war should also be kept in view. (13:17)

The declaration by President Carter, in January 1980, that military power will be used to achieve vital U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, was a guide for the military to prepare plans for operating in the Persian Gulf. Overall military strategy translates political objectives into military objectives, broad strategic concepts, and supporting force structure. On the second level the operational strategy takes these objectives and strategic concepts and harmonizes strategic requirements with tactical and logistics capabilities. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the political head of the country to make sure that all the facilities required to implement these plans are made available. This may include the provision of logistics facilities and availability of ports of friendly countries required to implement the military plans at the operational level. Military strategy must be comprehensive enough to cater for all the details of short term (1-2 years), mid term (3-10 years) and long term strategies. (13:21)

The U.S. lacks resources to meet the short term requirement of any contingency in Southwest Asia. In case of multi-theater war, it will not be possible to generate the resources to meet the requirements of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). This shortfall could be met by enhancing the military capability of regional states friendly to the U.S., such as Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, through U.S. Security Assistance programs. However it is

important to note two important factors in this case, i.e. a political factor in the case of Turkey, and a credibility problem in the case of Pakistan. (13:26) Enhancing the military capabilities of Pakistan and Turkey, and getting them involved in the RDJTF, will have the following benefits. (13:26)

1. The U.S. could maintain a naval force presence in the Indian Ocean not only to secure the sea-lanes of communications, but also to demonstrate U.S. military power without requiring a large American military force.

2. Periodic joint exercises would also bolster the naval force presence with the temporary deployment of ground forces in the region.

3. It would not only enhance U.S. war fighting capability in the region, but would also have a deterrent value.

4. Pakistan and Turkey, being strategically important countries, would have a considerable dampening effect on Soviet military plans because of their flanking positions.

The fear of escalation of war, leading to nuclear war, will lead to conflict avoidance on the part of the super-powers. This implies a reduction in the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf; but this concept could drive the Soviets, if they are interested in de-stabilizing the region, to use a strategy that make use of proxy forces, or to foment internal violence within the oil producing states. Given

this assessment of the Gulf scenario, the U.S. policy in the region should be to support indigenous regimes and to provide economic aid and funds for security assistance to enable them to defend themselves. Keeping in view that there is a good chance that all present regimes in the Persian Gulf region will collapse by 1990, the task of such policy becomes difficult. It has also been suggested by experts that the U.S. should

... employ a selective approach, relying on visible but delicate means of activity without over reacting with huge emplacements that will only destabilize the local political balance of forces.
(13:29)

One such approach that uses regional forces, accompanied by a low U.S. military profile, relates to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Using this approach, the U.S. should support the emerging closer military relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, in which Pakistani troops would be stationed in Saudi Arabia. In peacetime, the use of Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia would be less provocative than the forward deployment of American soldiers. The combination of Saudi wealth, Pakistani military power and American technology can serve the national interest of all three nations by providing a measure of stability to Saudi Arabia, by modernizing the Pakistani armed forces, and by helping to safeguard Western interests in the region. Such a strategy would include a peacetime U.S. Navy and Air Force presence in the

region and should be buttressed by periodic U.S. joint ground force military exercises in the region. (13:30)

The U.S. policy toward Israeli security is at odds with the Western need for Arab oil and thus, hampers the development of an integrated strategy for the region. Nevertheless, a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem would not necessarily mean that the problem of continued Western access to oil would likewise solved. Some sort of Arab-Israeli accommodation must be reached to enable U.S. independence of action in the Middle East and to develop an integrated strategic approach, particularly for those crises which do not involve overt Soviet military action. A Soviet military incursion can be expected to rally the more moderate Arabs oil producing states around the U.S.; regardless of the status of the Arab-Israeli relations. Less tractable, however, would be threats to internal stability, stemming in part, perhaps, from a failure to solve the Arab-Israeli dilemma. (13:32)

U.S. Interests, Objectives and Policy Options

Introduction. For the last three decades the Persian Gulf and adjacent area of South and West Asia have taken a key place in American policy. Over time, the significance of the region has increased with an increase in the dependence on oil. Similarly the threat to the region has also increased due to accelerating and destabilizing social

changes, and the increased capabilities and the demonstrated willingness of the Soviet Union to exploit instability and project military power outside its borders. (15:39)

The American interest in the region has been threatened a number of times in the seventies and eighties. The following is a summary of some of the events of interest from an American point of view. (15:39)

1. Oil embargo and the disruption of its supply in 1973 added by the constant increase in oil prices. The price of oil increased 18 times between 1970 and 1981.

2. Iranian revolution of 1979.

3. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which added a new dimension to the security of the region.

The U.S. response to these events has been reactive in nature and predictable. The Iranian revolution, hostages crisis, and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and absence of close political ties with any of the Islamic countries in the region, have undercut the U.S. position. Some basic factors which will influence future U.S. responses include: (15:40,41)

1. For at least the next decade the Western world and Japan will remain highly dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf.

2. After 1985 the Soviet Union, currently the world's largest oil producer, may become somewhat dependent on external sources of petroleum, but it also has massive gas and

coal reserves and a large potential for energy substitution. (Eastern Europe is already a modest importer of Persian Gulf oil).

3. Due to poor export performance, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will be hard pressed to pay for the oil do they import.

4. Radical social changes will continue to affect the Persian Gulf countries, most of which are now the traditional monarchies.

5. The Arab-Israeli dispute is fundamentally insoluble in the mid-term, and will pose a continuous danger to the U.S. interests in the region.

6. The U.S. ability to project ground forces into the region will grow slowly, at best, and will remain dependent on access to onshore logistical support facilities for any deployment beyond the commitment of a marine or an army airborne brigade for a few weeks.

7. Despite Islamic fundamentalist opposition to things Western, the interests of the oil producing countries will remain more compatible with those of the U.S. than with those of the Soviet Union.

For the purpose of this study, Southwest Asia is defined as extending from Turkey to Iran/Pakistan down through the traditional Middle East. But if all the geo-strategic and political factors are considered, the area can be extended to include Egypt, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, Kenya

and India. Using the broader definition, the area embraces conflicts and rivalries that do not relate directly to either the region's oil resources or the Soviet Union. These include the Arab-Israel dispute and the related issue of the Palestinians, the Iran-Iraq conflict, the Pakistan-India rivalry and various ethnic based autonomy movements such as those of the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, and the Baluch in Iran and Pakistan. (15:42)

In this context the U.S. relationship with Israel deserves comment. U.S. support for Israel is an important element of the American foreign policy. For the Arabs, the state of Israel is a symbol of European colonialism. Under the circumstances, this factor must be taken into consideration in U.S. policy. (15:42)

U.S. policy experts have always differed on the most immediate threat to her interests. Generally, there has been a problem of fixing priorities among the following four perceived dangers. (15:43)

1. Soviet threat.
2. Instability in the region.
3. Adverse economic developments.
4. Nuclear proliferation.

Evolution of U.S. Interest. The U.S. interest in the region emerges from its oil, strategic location, and proximity to the southern border of the Soviet Union. These factors contribute a lot toward the physical survival and

economic well being of the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. is interested in the stability of the region. (15:44) To achieve these interests, the U.S. has defined complimentary objectives, which have changed from time to time depending on the situation.

Core Objectives. The following objectives have been constant from the year 1945 to the present. (15:44)

1. Containing Soviet expansionism through collective security.
2. Maintaining uninterrupted access to the region's oil resources.
3. Preserving the self determination and independence of regional states, especially Israel.
4. Preventing the spread of communism and other radical socio-economic doctrines.
5. Deterring regional conflicts, especially a new Arab-Israel conflict.
6. Enhancing U.S. economic and commercial interests.
7. Avoiding war with the USSR.

Other Objectives. In addition to the core objectives the U.S. has been pursuing the following additional objectives.

1. Enhancing human rights conditions within the regional states.
2. Preventing or delaying the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. Limiting the destabilizing transfer of conventional arms.

As will be seen, the objectives given above are complementary, but in certain cases are also contradictory.

(15:45) For example,

1. The policy of containment of Soviet expansion conflicts with avoiding war with that country.

2. Maintaining uninterrupted access to the region's oil supply may conflict with the self-determination of regional states. This applies both to the Arab-Israel conflict, in which the U.S. support of Israel has led to a cutoff in oil supplies, and in some respects, to potential U.S. moves to counter another oil embargo.

3. The goal of limiting destabilizing arms transfers, may conflict with the objective of promoting United States economic and commercial interests.

4. Seeking to prevent or delay nuclear proliferation may conflict with other goals of preserving the independence of states, or containing Soviet expansionism through collective security arrangements.

U.S. Policy Prior to 1979

Postwar Containment Period. After World War II the U.S. was still a net oil exporter. Therefore, her main interests in the region were to contain Soviet expansion and administer the process of de-colonization and, later on, the withdrawal of British forces from the area. (15:45)

The major hallmark of U.S. policy during the cold war period was the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was achieved with comparatively little involvement, and managed through international treaties and mutual agreement with the regional states i.e. SEATO, CENTO, NATO, etc. Under this policy countries like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq were involved and a large sum of military and economic aid was provided. (15:45)

However, from the mid-sixties to the early seventies, U.S. involvement increased because of the increasing stability of the USSR and increasing importance of oil. The U.S., therefore, supported collective security efforts and became actively involved in the orderly development and stability of the region. These actions were necessary to insure the availability of oil to her allies and to make it possible for the swelling revenues of the Gulf to be recycled through the U.S. economy. (15:46)

The U.S., even during the peak period of involvement in the 1950s, kept her physical presence to the lowest possible level. She used mainly political means to achieve her goals; however, U.S. military assistance and involvement in treaties made it clear that the U.S. would play a direct role in the defense of the region against communist aggression. (15:46)

However, by the mid 1960s the U.S. became preoccupied with conflicts in the region and began to cut back its secu-

rity assistance. The trend was hastened by the emergence of basic differences in the objectives of the U.S. and some of its regional allies; for example, the embargo on military supply to Pakistan after Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. Iran, after acquiring swelling oil revenues also started playing a more independent role. The contraction of the U.S. occurred because of a reevaluation of the threat posed by the USSR to the region; but the October War and oil embargo of 1973 gave a non-Soviet orientation to U.S. policy in the Gulf. (15:46,47)

Reliance on "Regional Influentials". American policy in the seventies has been, by and large, to avoid direct U.S. military presence in the region and to secure her interest through the agency of "regional influentials", diplomacy and economic involvement. This policy coincided with a general public aversion to overseas military involvement and with the formulation of detente with the Soviet Union. Moreover when Iran moved from being a recipient of U.S. grant aid to a major cash purchaser, the relationship between the two countries started increasing tremendously and, as per the Nixon doctrine, the U.S. encouraged the Shah's ambitions of becoming a dominant power in the area. (15:48)

New Foreign Policy Objectives. In the 1970's both the Ford and Carter Administration added the following objectives to U.S. foreign policy. (15:49)

1. To check nuclear proliferation.
2. To promote human rights.
3. To minimize the risk of local conflicts fueled conventional arms transfer. This new policy resulted in the following. (15:48)

1. The U.S. leaned hard on Pakistan to stop it from acquiring nuclear capability. U.S. economic assistance was terminated and denied for the purchase of 110 A-7 attack aircraft for it's aging Air Force.

2. Persuaded Shah to conciliate with emerging interested groups, and distanced herself from the martial law government of Pakistan.

3. Arms transfers were used as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, but did not bring any solid results because Iran and Saudi Arabia were exempted.

U.S. Policy After 1979. In the wake of the Iranian revolution and Russian invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. interests in the region increased to the levels of the 1950's. However, the difference was that now the Persian Gulf had become important to the U.S.. Therefore, the Carter Administration announced that,

... an attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States and that such action will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. (15:50)

However, by late 1979, the Iranian revolution, hostage crisis, seizure of the great mosque in Mecca, burning of the U.S. embassy and cultural centers in Pakistan raised the specter of complete collapse of American presence in the region and raised questions about her effectiveness to look after interests in the area.

Due to the prevailing uncertainty in the region, the U.S. government did not formulate any solid policy. However when the Russians invaded Afghanistan, the Carter administration began to develop a set of policy responses that had an underlying coherence. Primary objectives of the new policy included the following. (15:51)

1. Enhance U.S. capabilities to deploy forces in the region via the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and the negotiation of access to logistical facilities in Kenya, Somalia and Oman.

2. Rebuild a U.S.-led collective security system in Southwest Asia based on helping local states "to perceive the nature and source of the real external threat to the region."

3. Prevent, if possible, the consolidation of the Soviet position in Afghanistan.

4. Discourage the recognition of the Soviet installed government in Afghanistan.

5. Continuing progress toward defusing the Arab Israeli dispute through fulfilling the U.S. commitments made in support of the 1978 Camp David accord.

6. Stabilize the Subcontinent through a balanced effort to rebuild ties with both Pakistan and its traditional adversary, India.

7. Reduce U.S. dependence on oil from the region through conservation and a strategic petroleum reserve.

As demanded by the new situation, the U.S. subordinated its stress on human rights and nuclear proliferation, to efforts of building a new collective security system. For this reason, the U.S. overlooked Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear capability, and continued the shipment of uranium fuel to India. The reaffirmation of the 1959 bilateral security agreement with Pakistan was an effort to reduce doubts about U.S. intentions in the events of a full scale Soviet attack on that country and gave new assurance to Saudi Arabia. However, the U.S. proved helpless in Iran. (15:52)

Reagan Administration Policy. The policy of the Reagan Administration has been summarized by Paul H. Nitz in the fall 1980 issue of Foreign Affairs.

The principle task of early 1980's must be to check, blunt and so far as possible, frustrate the integrated Soviet strategies while the energy of the many nations similarly threatened have an opportunity to become mobilized and linked so as to reverse the currently adverse trends in the correlation of forces. (15:52)

Later on, Secretary of State Alexander Haig spoke of a need to "forge a consensus of like minded people" which subsequently came to be known as the "strategic consensus" on the Middle East and Southwest region. The concept encouraged the diverse countries of the region to set aside their differences and unite with the U.S. to counter the bigger threat. (15:52)

Richard Burt, Director of Politico Military Affairs of the Department of State emphasized that

We view the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf, as part of a larger politico-strategic theater, the region bounded by Turkey, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa, and we view it as a strategic entity requiring comprehensive treatment to ensure a favorable balance of power. (15:52)

In pursuit of these policy goals, the Reagan administration, went ahead with the sale F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. This was followed by a \$3.2 billion multi-year package of economic assistance and arms credit to Pakistan including the advanced F-16 fighter bomber. The U.S. also decided to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia to guard against the threat to her oil fields emerging from the Iran-Iraq war. However, concern was shown by India and Israel, on the sale of these weapon systems to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; and Congress only approved the sale of the weapon systems to Pakistan with a condition that would have the effect of requiring a cutoff of U.S. aid should Pakistan explode a nuclear device. (15:53)

Policy Options for the Future. The U.S. has three options available to her in the light of new situation in Southwest Asia, i.e. Military Strategy, U.S.-Soviet Condominium and Political Strategy.

Option 1: Military Strategy. This option represents a combination of the present "strategic consensus" and the logical extension of that policy and the Carter Doctrine. As the unstable and weak states of the region represent a danger to the interests of the U.S., it is necessary for the U.S. to demonstrate a physical presence. This can be insured in the following three ways. (15:54,55)

1. Keeping in view the serious logistics shortcomings of the RDJTF and the political limitations of an "over the horizon" presence, the U.S. should acquire the bases of Eitam and Eitzan in the Sinai, and should have a military presence in other countries of the region as well. Or,

2. Have a comprehensive understanding with Saudi Arabia to make the F-15 and AWACS a part of a larger defense system in the region. This should also include the construction of the facilities, according to U.S. standards, to be used by the U.S. during any contingency. However this would involve a large establishment of civilian personnel during peacetime. Or,

3. As advocated by Henry Kissinger and others, an expanded military presence, based on the argument that the RDJTF will have no credibility without logistical facili-

ties. Therefore, several experts have advocated stationing U.S. air and naval forces in Pakistan.

Advantages of the Military Option. This option would have the following advantages. (15:55)

1. Contain Soviet expansionism and maintain access to the region's oil in a direct and concrete way.
2. Clearly demonstrate to the regional states the determination of the U.S. to protect it's interest in the region, and thereby convey a stronger impression of "reliability" and "resolve".
3. Matches the end with the means.

Disadvantages of the Military Option. At the same time this option has the following disadvantages and weaknesses. (15:56)

1. Only nominally addresses, and may in fact compound, other threats to U.S. interests and other objectives such as the regional stability.
2. Under the best of circumstances, U.S. access to the logistical facilities would depend on local acquiescence. This would tend to constrain U.S. policy in regard to regional issues in which U.S. interests are not best served by support of the host country, and could result in the denial of U.S. access in the obverse case.
3. Even assuming assured access, the resources to mount a credible military defense of the Gulf would be likely to reduce U.S. capabilities elsewhere.

Discussion. Some adherents to this school of thought tend to deprecate the significance of the Palestine issue because the Arab countries lack cohesiveness among themselves. Therefore, they place a lot of confidence in U.S. military ties with Israel because that may be the best source of projection of U.S. force in the area. Other schools think that it may be better to have access in Saudi Arabia based on the open support of the Kingdom.

The problem with this approach is that none of the pro-Western Arab countries has really supported the permanent presence of American forces in their country. It is not possible to carry out such a venture without having any permanent onshore facilities and the airfields required to operate and support transport aircraft like the C-5. Therefore, the deployment of force like the RDJTF would not be more than a "trip wire" in case of any Soviet move in the region. Moreover it will become a risky affair in the light of political changes taking place in the region and it may be considered a force in the support of ruling junta by the opposition parties. If, however, the U.S. has to intervene there is the chance of becoming an American Afghanistan. This could only be feasible if a Soviet attack compelled the respective government to enter into some sort of defense treaty with the United States. Keeping all these factors in view, it can be said that the military option has some

benefits, but these may be less than the risks involved and will involve a change in the global deployment of U.S. forces. (15:56,57)

Option 2: U.S.-Soviet Condominium. This is another way of maintaining the U.S. access to the Gulf. An example of this can be seen in Europe, where both the superpowers have mutually agreed on their respective areas of influence. This approach has some backing of the regional states and that of the U.S. Congress. This approach has also been supported by the former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. George Kennan.

As a first step, the U.S. could agree to the proposal made by Mr. Brezhnev during his visit to India to settle the "external aspects" of the Afghanistan crisis, and the problem in the Persian Gulf. This proposal is based on the following five points. (15:58)

1. Not to establish bases in the region (Afghanistan excluded, of course).
2. Not threaten force or interference in the internal affairs of the local states.
3. To respect non-alignment.
4. To respect the "sovereign right" of local states to their natural resources.
5. Not to raise obstacles to normal trade or threaten sea lanes.

Advantages of Condominium. In terms of traditional great power behavior such a settlement could have the following advantages. (15:58)

1. Reduce the risk of superpower conflict that would, as a minimum, probably result in the destruction of very oil facilities that are the object of U.S. interest.

2. Reduce regional instability by eliminating the need for the competition for military bases and Soviet backed subversion of pro-Western governments.

3. Reduce tension between the U.S. and its NATO allies over U.S. efforts to involve them in UN-desired security commitments in Southwest Asia.

Disadvantages of Condominium. Seeking negotiation with the Soviet Union on demarcation of the areas of interest could be considered a leap in the dark and involve the following risks. (15:58)

1. The lack of credible guarantees that the Soviet would not continue to exploit regional instability to the disadvantage of U.S.

2. A severe weakening of U.S. credibility among friends and allies.

3. Possible harsh local reaction at the superpower carving out spheres of influence.

Discussion. Under the present circumstances, giving due regard to the geographical closeness of the USSR, the U.S. is in a better position, politically, than the

Soviets. Therefore the proposal of condominium, by the Soviets, is an effort to use the Afghanistan as a lever for being able to play a larger role in the Gulf area.

The Soviets are generally not welcomed in the region. Even the Soviet's closest allies consider her a source of external help against their local enemies.

There are clear signs that the Soviet economy is not improving and if she becomes a net importer of oil, what is she going to offer in exchange? Therefore under such circumstances, it seems logical to presume that Russia may seek the oil of Iran, as they have done in the case of the natural gas of Afghanistan.

The only inspiration in the option is that it will only be a repetition of the post World War II scenario. If the Red Army marches to the shores of the Gulf then there will be no option but to go to war, or have an agreement with the Soviets on specific areas of influence. This will ultimately result in the physical presence of the U.S. on the western shores of the Gulf. (15:59)

Option 3: Political Strategy. This strategy, like the military option, has a variety of potential meanings. It is based on an appreciation that only political factors determine the actions of Soviet Union. In other words, this option is based on the perspective that the Soviet Union will not go on war with the U.S., even to obtain her traditional ambitions or obtain access to the Indian Ocean.

Therefore as stated by Paul Jabber in a fall 1980 article in Deadalus,

... of all the so called northern tier countries bordering on the Soviet Union from Turkey to Pakistan, Afghanistan only has never been part of any Western sponsored regional security system. Therefore, that the Soviet formulated their decision regarding Afghanistan with a different calculus than would be used in any decision to invade Pakistan or Iran or to threaten with military force any of the oil producing Arab State.
(15:60)

The political option follows the general approach advocated in a 1981 article in Foreign Affairs by Christopher Van Hollen, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Van Hollen in his article "Don't Engulf the Gulf" argued that the search for a strategic consensus,

... evokes memories of the containment policies of the 1950's, but it lacks political coherence or a structural underpinning. The goals of military footholds in the region are politically unfeasible, and therefore, a more sophisticated multilateral approach ... that is better tuned to the most likely threats and to regional sensitivities, and that define's 'security' in other than simply military terms.
(15:60)

Van Hollen and others, argue in the favor of offshore naval presence of the U.S. They oppose the U.S. presence on the soil of any nation because that is bound to weaken the position of that government. (15:60) As an alternative, Van Hollen recommends,

1. Behind the scene support, for the new Gulf Cooperation Council.

2. Encouragement of Saudi-Pakistani ties.
3. Greater economic, military, and economic support for Turkey.
4. The rearrangement of the Arab Israel peace process, including confronting the problem of the West Bank and the Palestinian issue.
5. Greater efforts to involve Europe and Japan more extensively in regional affairs.
6. They also suggest that the USSR is already a factor in the Gulf and, therefore, the sea lines of communications and the oil producing region should be internationalized.

Advantages of Political Strategy. This strategy has multiple advantages flowing from its modest goals and general conformity with regional realities. (15:61)

1. It meets what the local states say they want from the U.S.
2. It avoids bruising domestic political fights to achieve controversial objectives.
3. It is more satisfactory to U.S. allies in Europe and Japan.
4. It allows the U.S. military to concentrate on its overall strategic posture and avoid tying up scarce resources for one or two regional contingencies of doubtful likelihood.

Disadvantages of Political Strategy. The main disadvantages flow from its secondary attention to worst

case scenario and its subtlety, which might be subject to misinterpretation as a lack of will or commitment. (15:61)

Thus

1. It would not adequately provide for the situation of a direct Soviet attack toward the Gulf.

2. An over-the-horizon naval presence might not convey an adequate impression of U.S. military power and willingness to defend Gulf states.

Discussion. The U.S. has not, at present, achieved the kind of agreement with any country of the region which would provide access or logistical support to carry out a major military commitment. The commitment to actually use local facilities in the event of a major contingency is still years away and it is doubtful whether it would be logical to allocate a large amount of resources to building up stockpiles which would only be useful in the Gulf region. Therefore, pressing for the military presence in the absence of these facilities, the U.S. risks much for gains that are largely symbolic and subject to rapid reversal. The political strategy will also provide an opportunity for the U.S. to keep the doors open for their development of relations with those countries of the regions which are either pro-Russians or considered non-aligned, and overall, should contribute to a greater balanced strategy for the whole region. (15:62).

Constraints on U.S. Military Power in Southwest Asia

Introduction. After the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter pledged to defend U.S. interests in the region and make the Persian Gulf open for western nations. The same commitment has not only been endorsed, but has been amplified by the Reagan administration. (16:68)

The Iranian revolution in a "single stroke" finished the "twin pillar" doctrine by which the U.S. depended on two important countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to ensure the stability of the region even beyond the borders of these strategically located countries. The revolution provided a chance for the Russians to take advantage of the chaos which emerged after the revolution, and the resulting weakness in the military power of Iran, which reciprocally increased the ability of the Russians to project military power into the Persian Gulf.

The following three factors have affected the image of the U.S. in the region. (16:69)

1. American failure to stand behind the Shah when compared to Soviet willingness to commit aggression and assume a long term military burden to secure their interest in the Afghanistan.
2. U.S. military inactivity during the Ogaden war.
3. Inability to avert a pro-Soviet coup in Aden in 1978.

All these factors indicated very clearly that the United States is no longer a "player" in the affairs of the region and increased Soviet power and influence must be recognized and appreciated. To improve the United State's position in the region, the U.S. government has taken the following steps: (16:69)

1. The immediate response was "over the horizon" to strengthen the U.S. force's position in peacetime, by positioning two carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean, along with amphibious ships and 1800 Marines.

2. Pre-positioned ships carry munitions and supplies sufficient to support a Marine brigade of 12,000 men for two weeks of combat.

3. Increases in patrols by P-3 ASW aircraft.

4. The deployment of B-52s for the first time, for maritime reconnaissance of the Indian Ocean.

In the worst case, a Soviet invasion, would be encountered by the newly created RDJTF, with a maximum strength of 200,000 men drawn from all four services of the United States. However the projection of military power will have the following problems. (16:70)

1. Insufficient combat capability to deal with a major war in the Europe and Southwest Asia at the same time.

2. Hostile physical environments in which the U.S. has no experience to operate, combined with insufficient facilities to support high technology armed forces.

3. Long lines of communication.

4. Inhospitable political environments in which to operate.

The above constraints will limit the military options for the U.S. to operate in the area. As acknowledged by Mr. Weinberger in a 1981 hearing on U.S. defense posture:

I don't think we are ready with the forces, we have now, to resist any and all types of aggressions or any and all types of threats or incursions that could be made. (16:70)

Current Drawbacks. Since the U.S. allies in Europe and Japan are more dependent on Persian Gulf oil, they should make greater contributions to U.S. efforts to increase Western military capability. Although France has increased its force level in the region, and the UK and Australia have also increased their financial contribution, they have not done anything to increase their forces in the region. The allies should do what is necessary to meet this deficiency, and look after the common interest before it is too late, and the American public starts thinking that the allies are just enjoying a free ride without meeting their share of obligations. Public support for Southwest Asia related military programs can erode. Limited shipbuilding ability is another constraint on military planning and force projection in the area.

Environment Related Problems. United States forces have not fought any desert war since World War II. Much of the equipment held by the U.S. forces is ill suited to de-

sert warfare. Although the problems caused by sand to the M-16 Rifle and to the rotor blades of the Black Hawk helicopter have since been corrected, there are many problems which have yet to be solved. For example, greater quantities of water will be required to meet the needs of soldiers deployed in the region. According to one Defense Department estimate, a 50,000 men Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) will require 750,000 gallons of water every day. The United States does not even have the capability to meet the water requirements for full deployment of RDJTF.

Also, new tactical doctrines must be developed to suit the requirements of desert conditions since many of the present doctrine are not suitable for the job.

Bad visibility and the high waves during monsoon season seriously effect navigational capabilities. Also the water in the Persian Gulf is too shallow to risk carrier operations except in extreme emergencies. This will, therefore, require refueling carriers stationed in the upper reaches of the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Oman. This will definitely put a lot of strain on their capability.

The rudimentary state of ports and airfield facilities in the region will also impede U.S. ability to project and sustain combat forces there. The situation is likely to

improve by the end of 1980's. The situation will further improve with the acquisition of air cushioned landing craft (LCAC), and C-17 transport aircraft.

To overcome the geographic disadvantages which will be faced by the U.S. in projecting its military power in the region, may prove much more difficult than developing its capabilities in Southwest Asia. The Persian Gulf is approximately 1000 miles from the Soviet border, whereas the same is about 8000 and 7000 miles from United States by sea (through the Suez canal) and by air respectively. The vital point, the Strait of Hormuz, is 2400 miles from Diego Garcia, the only U.S. military installation in the region. Unlike Europe and the Far East the United states can not compensate for lack of position by stationing combat forces and equipment ashore to sustain defensive positions till the time reinforce arrives by sea or by air. Therefore, the U.S., under present circumstances, is bound to depend on the projection of military force from over the horizon.

Future Difficulties and Solutions. In case of a Soviet attack on Iran, the United States should be in a position to stop or slow down Soviet advances by deploying forces in the south as quickly as possible, until logistic supply support from the United States is established. Presently the United States is capable of stopping but not dislodging the Soviet

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
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
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troops already if they move into Iran. This could be done with the use of B-52 operating from Diego Garcia and carrier based aircraft if available. (16:73)

Presently United States seriously lacks the capability to move strategic assets. A congressionally-mandated Defense Department mobility study revealed that the U.S. could move only half of the combat forces and support equipment prior to the arrival of sea lift. Currently, U.S. long range military transport is composed of 70 C-5 and 234 C-141 aircraft, and the C-5 is the only aircraft which can accommodate abnormal size equipment. There are also serious limitations on the availability of runways suitable for the C-5. Seven hundred C-141 sorties, or their equivalent, are required to move the 82nd Airborne Division and its equipment to the Gulf, which still takes 15 days. Exercises conducted in the air have proven that United State does not really have the capability to sustain such a force until reinforcements arrive. Suggested improvements in strengthening the wings of C-5 and development of new version of C-141 (C141B) and availability of the C-17 transport aircraft by late 1980s will improve United States airlift capability. However, the Navy is planning to add eight commercial type ships and four other roll-on/roll-off vessels for use as Marine pre-positioning ships. Moreover the Navy is planning to add four cargo ships and two oil tankers to its contingent of near term pre-positioning ships, which will

increase the ability to support a Marine brigade from 15 to about 33 days. The Navy is augmenting its sea lift capabilities with the purchase of 8 high speed SL-7 container ships, each capable of carrying 27,000 tons. These ships can reach the Persian Gulf within 15 days through the Suez canal. (16:74)

Regional Images. To an appreciable degree the need to increase the U.S. strategic mobility is a function of its inability to station combat forces and equipment in Southwest Asia. The U.S.: (16:75)

1. Lacks a military posture supported by alliance system or by time tested bilateral security arrangements.
2. Is trying to develop a military presence in generally inhospitable political environments.
3. Is confronted with the strong perception of the Third World countries for whom the presence of foreign military forces on their soil smacks of colonialism and stand as a contradiction to their recently acquired and hard won independence.

The problems noted above may be common to both superpowers, but the following are the type of the problem specific to the United States: (16:75)

1. U.S. military power in the region is still regarded as Israel's strategic reserve, and it is Israel and not the USSR that is regarded by many as the main threat.

2. There are also fears among the regional states that the purpose of the RDJTF is not to defend the Gulf but to seize the oil fields--an objective that could be more easily accomplished with a U.S. military presence ashore.

3. There is also the belief that U.S. involvement would make it more difficult to remove the Soviets from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. To keep both superpowers out of the region is to deny facilities to both of them; but will prove to be a a tougher constraint on the U.S. than to the Soviet Union because the latter's geographic proximity to the region.

4. Besides all these factors, it is widely considered that the United States is an unreliable ally and is not a suitable partner for establishing a long term security relationship. U.S. efforts to strengthen its power projection capabilities, while a step in the right direction, are not in themselves, evidence of United States resolve to defend the mutual security interests in the region over a period of time. That resolve is still to be tested in practice. The refined use of United State military power, including the well-publicized deployment of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia to limit the Iran Iraq war, represents only a start toward restoring the damaged credibility of the United States in the region. As observed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense Mr. Frank Carlucci,

Improving the American image could conceivably make our friends in the area more receptive toward United States requests for shore-based support. (16:76)

The Reagan Administration Strategy. The Reagan administration is considering a reduction in the United States naval presence in the Indian Ocean by reducing its strength from two aircraft carriers to one. This will result in the saving of about \$100 million; but would also mean that if the carrier is on visit to Australian ports there would be no carrier-based aircraft available for missions in Southwest Asia. (16:82)

Since it will take years to overcome the political and technical problems of military power projection in the area, the United States has resorted to a deterrent strategy of containing the threat of horizontal escalation of the conflict should the deterrence fail. As Mr. Weinberger has stated,

If Soviet aggression against our vital interest occur in an area where they have significant advantages, it is not axiomatic that United States response will be confined to that region. Our deterrent capability is linked with our ability and willingness to shift or widen the war to other areas. (16:83)

Sweeping the Soviets off the seas is mentioned often as a Soviet vulnerability that should be exploited in such circumstances. However, war widening options carry the seeds of vertical escalation without achieving the United States political objectives of securing access to the Persian Gulf. (16:83)

Present dependence on the RDJTF is based on two assumptions: (16:83)

1. The force will be invited into the country and will operate initially in UN-contested environments.

2. It would have and use advance warning to preempt Soviet attack.

In the case of Iran, in the presence of the Khomeni regime, it is not likely that any U.S. forces would be invited, even in the event of Soviet attack. If the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division tries to capture local facilities it will delay, critically, the influx of other combat forces and supplies. (16:83)

In the case of the second assumption, the problem is not so much of detecting a Soviet mobilization but rather of knowing what it means. Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, high ranking advisors to President Carter believed that the Soviets intended merely to increase the number of their advisors, and not intervene on a massive scale. And if the President commits the forces in the absence of clear cut information about the intentions of the Soviet Union it may result in the following. (16:83)

1. Justify the Soviet intervention which United States is trying to stop.

2. If it turns out to be a false alarm then the United States will be considered as reckless. Since the Arabs think

that the pre-emptive strategy could be used to seize the oil fields, it may also adversely affect U.S. credibility.

The most sweeping criticism has come from Jeffery Record. He finds its flaws

... attributable in part to the inherent political obstacles to successful intervention in the Gulf, and in part to the structural, technological, and the doctrinal unsuitability of the rapidly deployable United States forces for the likely combat environments they would confront in the region. (16:84)

However an opposite view, as advanced by Albert Wohlstetter, argues that the United States has no options but to develop the capability to meet the conventional Soviet threat in the region. In his opinion "to declare a bare trip wire policy does not register a determination to use nuclear weapons in a time of crisis; rather it registers a lack of will to prepare before the crisis to meet a non-nuclear threat on its own terms." (16:85) However, he says that to acquire a "high standard of confidence" the United States can handle the Soviet attack requires the military cooperation of our allies in the region. (16:85)

Game Plan for the U.S.

Introduction. What the U.S. must do to prevail in the contest with the Soviet Union? It must stop veering between utopian dreams of peace and apocalyptic fears of war. It must settle on a geopolitical strategy and stick to it over

decades. These are the views of Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski who was national security advisor from 1977 to 1981. In Mr. Brzezinski's book, Game Plan, he unfolds a set of long term policies for the area. (17)

Guard the Soft Underbelly. The most urgent and difficult priority for the United States, is the region southwest of the Soviet Union, where the linchpin states are Iran or the combination of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Long the object of Great Russian imperial designs, the region is vulnerable to Soviet political and military pressure. A dominant Moscow would sever the direct link between the far western and the far eastern Eurasian allies of the United States. It would be able to control access to oil from Persian Gulf, and it would provide a direct warm water oceanic window to the world. That goal is coming ever closer to being within the Soviet grasp.

Left to their own resources, the countries in the region cannot in the long run stand up to the Soviet Union. Iran is fatigued with its long war with Iraq. Its internal condition is made fragile by the fundamentalist reaction to the Shah's policy of the rapid modernization. The Soviet might well calculate that prospect for political and ethnic violence are high. And Iran's international isolation--with it's simultaneous hostility to the U.S., the Soviet Union

and the adjoining Arab countries, except for Syria, increases its vulnerability. Pakistan also faces a similar, though less acute problem. (17:220)

Five Point Building. There has to be a comprehensive five point effort building on the Carter Doctrine, and reaffirmed by President Reagan. (17:222)

1. To reinforce the anti-Soviet resilience of the region key countries, notably Pakistan and Iran, and to cooperate with China to improve Pakistan security.

2. To increase the U.S. capacity to mount a prompt military response should the Soviet attack.

3. To keep the Afghan issue alive by sustaining the resistance by probing the Soviet willingness to restore neutrality and self determination to Afghanistan.

4. To engage India in at least in the diplomatic efforts for the resolution of the Afghanistan problem, and to promote a less tense Pakistani-Indian relationship.

5. To help stimulate a more distinctive political consciousness among the Soviet Muslims as a deterrent to the further Soviet absorption of Islamic people.

Aid to Pakistan. To reinforce the resilience of Pakistan against Soviet pressure, the United States would have to provide substantial military and economic aid. Pakistan has already requested approximately \$6.5 billion for 1982 to 1983, of which 55% would be economic development assistance and 45% would be military aid. As large as this

sum is, it is considerably less than the United States commits to Israel or Egypt. With the saving that would result from lower U.S. expenditures for the defense of Europe, the United States should be able to go a long way meeting Pakistan's needs; and Pakistan should also receive funds from an enlarged Japanese strategic economic assistance program. (17:222)

Pak-China Link. The U.S. should support China's plan to revive the ancient "Silk Road" which would link China and Pakistan more tightly. This physical link would have obvious strategic consequences. It would improve China's access to the West and enhance cooperation between two Asian countries most directly interested in containing Soviet hegemony. The route would expand China's control of exposed and strategically important Xinjiang province, and would fortify Pakistan's hold on territory to the south of the Soviet Union across the Wakhan corridor, a small strip of land separating Pakistan from Afghanistan. Such a project would yield political and military benefits, and a by-product of the Pakistan-Chinese link would be a contribution to regional stability. (17:223)

U.S.-Iran Relations. A more difficult, but no less important task, is to restore some degree of U.S.-Iranian cooperation. Despite the official cultivated hostility of Iran toward the U.S., in the long run Iran needs at least indirect U.S. support to sustain its independence and

territorial integrity. After Khomeni's death and the inevitable political turmoil, a gradual normalization will probably take place. (17:223) These efforts on behalf of regional stability must be reinforced with a credible American deterrent against Soviet invasion.

Credibility is Crucial. Ambiguity about U.S. intentions contributed to the North Korean decision to attack South Korea in 1950, and perhaps even to the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979. Soviet uncertainty about how the United States would react to a military move in Southwest Asia could be just as dangerous. With the further development and enlargement of the Rapid Deployment Force, the United States is gradually acquiring the capability to react strongly to a Soviet invasion of Iran or Pakistan, especially if the local forces also oppose the intruders. (17:224)

Unexploited Opportunity. Perhaps the best deterrent to a continued Soviet push Southward exist within the Soviet Union itself--an opportunity the United State has so far failed to exploit. Muslims in the Soviet Union now number approximately 55 million, and they have been subdued or Sovietized--on the surface. It should be recalled, however, that local resistance to the Soviet (in reality the Great Russian) domination took more than a decade of fighting to suppress, ending only in the 1930's. Soviet Muslims have doubtless been affected by the worldwide resurgence of

Islamic culture and religion. Contained in this is the potential for a serious religious and ethnic challenge to Moscow's control of Soviet Central Asia. The holy war against the Russian in Afghanistan, the fundamentalist revolution in Iran, the strong support for the Afghan Mujahidin and the institution of the Islamic law in Pakistan, all reflect a similar phenomenon--a widespread awakening of a more self assertive orientation based on ethnic and Islamic faith. The United States could accelerate this with greatly intensified radio broadcasts beamed at Soviet Central Asia. (17:226) Washington already has plans to set up one new broadcasting facility, Radio Free Afghanistan. It should be used to this end, with special programs targeting Soviet Muslims and stressing the anti-Islamic policies of Soviets in Afghanistan. In addition, the U.S. must support efforts by other Islamic countries. The Kremlin leaders are more likely to exercise restraint if they become convinced that regional unrest will inevitably spill over to Soviet Union itself. (17:227)

The East European Aspirations. The suppressed aspirations of the East European nations as well as the internal national contradictions of the modern day Great Russian empire provide the springboard for seeking two central and independent goals: the first is to weaken the Kremlin's offensive capacity by increasing its domestic preoccupations. The second is to promote the pluralization of the

Soviet block, and eventually of the Soviet Union itself, by cautiously encouraging national self assertiveness. To promote the re-emergence of more genuinely autonomous Eastern Europe, the existence of an independent minded and increasingly self assertive East Europe public opinion is essential. The most important and perhaps the least recognized service that the United States has rendered over the years to the preservation of a European identity in Eastern Europe has been it's sponsorship since 1950 of Radio Free Europe (RFE). These broadcasts are beamed in national language to the peoples of Eastern Europe, and have focused their programming specifically on these countries internal dilemmas. Though it's broadcasts have been frequently jammed, RFE has almost single handedly prevented Moscow from accomplishing a central objective: the isolation of Eastern Europe from rest of the Europe and the ideological doctri- nation of it's peoples. Today, according to systematic polling undertaken Eastern European travelers to the Western Europe RFE audiences in Eastern Europe include 66% of the adult population in Poland, 63% in Romania, 59% in Hungary, 40% in Bulgaria and 38% in Czechoslovakia.

Avoid Fads and Obsessions. For the U.S., not losing in American-Soviet rivalry means prevailing; for the USSR not prevailing means losing. That asymmetrical U.S. advantage is inherent in the one dimensional character of the Soviet challenge. For Russia, no longer truly competitive ideolo-

ideologically and falling further behind technologically, the proclaimed "inevitable triumph of socialism" has been narrowed to the attainment of clear cut and politically decisive military superiority. Failing to meet that goal means lagging behind in every way.

Endless Game. Thus, the American Soviet rivalry can be compared to an endless "game" in which each side seeks to prevail by increasing its lead in points. Each may surge ahead or fall behind in some dimensions of the struggle, but it must stay even in one--military competition. A point loss here could become decisive and suddenly terminate the game. While the game goes on, certain rudimentary rules have come to be shaped. They are in effect, a code of reciprocal behavior guiding the competition and lessening the danger that it could become lethal. But in this protracted rivalry the Soviets have an edge and the U.S. has a liability: Soviet persistence against U.S. impatience and lack of constancy. The American public and even its foreign policy elite, tend to alternate between utopian expectations of a permanent peace and apocalyptic fears of a terminal war; between historically ignorant belief that politically American and Russians are basically like-minded, and the manichaeian obsession that no accommodation of any sort is possible with the "evil empire".

American Weakness. Divisionary fads are special American weakness. Awareness of history and geopolitics is

limited in the U.S. and Americans are prone to personalize international affairs, periodically seizing on this or that dictator as the major threat to their security. For several years Fidel Castro, the demagogic ruler of a small Caribbean island, was perceived by the public as posing almost a mortal danger to the world's premier superpower. More recently national anxiety and hostility has focused on Moammar Qaddafi, the bizzare dictator of a distant and under populated North African country. The consequence in both cases, has been to divert public attention from the larger Soviet geo-political designs in which Castro and Qaddafi were no more than useful bit players.

Russian Policy. In contrast, Moscow policy toward the U.S. is geared to the long haul. It is patient and persistent and designed to exhaust its rival by attrition. Moscow's strategy counts on the cumulative consequences of Soviet military power and of regional turbulence to displace the U.S. as the world principle power and the supreme stabilizer.

Pakistan's Interests in the Southwest Asia

Pakistan, after the invasion of Afghanistan, has become a front line state. It is also located in the backyard of the Persian Gulf. This has made Pakistan and the U.S. the nations with greatest interest in the Middle East. Pakistan, because of its location, is strategically important

to the United States; but has its own interests in the region which can be subsumed in four specific areas: The Indo-Pak subcontinent, territorial integrity, Islamic solidarity, economic and military assistance. All these interests are in a way interrelated with each other. (18:105)

Pakistan has fought three wars with India. Therefore, its basic interest is to secure independence against any Indian attack in the future. Pakistan believes that India has not accepted the partition of sub-continent which gave birth to Pakistan and the Indians are always trying to reestablish a united India. (18:106)

However the arrival of Russian forces in Afghanistan has changed the whole scenario. Pakistan thinks that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is one of the first steps taken to dismember the country and divide it among India and Russia, which will give the Russians a route to the Indian Ocean and superiority in Southwest Asia. Pakistan has an outstanding dispute with the India over the province of Kashmir, bordering with China. (18,19,20)

Another Pakistani interest is to maintain and develop relations with the countries of Islamic world beyond the Persian Gulf. Pakistan did oppose efforts by Libya and Syria to use the Organization of Islamic conference for Arab purposes only. Pakistan also opposed the Egypt Israel Camp David accords, as almost every Islamic country did. Pakistan, as a result of the Iranian revolution, does not have

good political relations with Iran but economic relations have been improving. Pakistan has also improved relations with Bangladesh. Pakistan, as a matter of policy, is always neutral in internal disputes between Arab or Islamic countries, as in the Iran-Iraq war and Lebanon problem. This approach does not save damaging relations with any of the parties involved in disputes, but it does provide her with the opportunity to be a mediator, and thus contribute to her credibility among Islamic countries. (18)

Pakistan's final interest in the Middle East is to obtain the resources for economic development and military supply. Pakistan, in addition to receiving support from Western and Eastern blocks, is getting substantial monetary support from the oil producing Arab countries. (18)

The Middle East plays a vital role in meeting the national interests of Pakistan. Even the security of Pakistan within the Subcontinent is aided by her involvement in the Middle East. It gives Pakistan vast opportunities for civil and military employment, and training of the armed forces. Economic assistance provided by the Arab countries also generates hard currency for Pakistan to purchase weapons and equipment from non-credit sources. Pakistan's interests in the Middle East revolve around three areas which are trade, employment and religious ties. (18)

There has been a quantum jump in the 1970's in trade between Pakistan and the Middle Eastern countries. Trade

volume which was 5,972 Millions of rupees in 1974/75 increased up to 25,986 millions in 1981/82. Pakistan imports all of its petroleum requirements from the Gulf region which is mostly supplied on concessional basis, where the short distance from the area make it possible for Pakistan to export its perishable food stuff to these countries. Should Pakistani food, grain, and textile production keep increasing, the importance of the area will increase proportionately. It is believed that Pakistan may be able to use its new found influence from her supply of food and military manpower, to calm passions in the highly inflammable area of the world. Pakistan had contributed to the banking, commercial, and air systems of the Gulf region, and is well placed in terms of geography, personnel, and religion to take advantage of the opportunities presented by increasing commercial activity in the Gulf. (18:114)

Although there were a considerable number of Pakistanis working in the Middle East, their number increased many times after the increase of oil prices in mid seventies. Before the increase in oil prices, mostly highly skilled Pakistanis (doctors and engineers) were employed in the Arab countries. However, with the increase in prices, the proportion of unskilled labor has increased. Today, the numbers of Pakistanis working in the Gulf are more than any other non-Arab country in the world. They are second to Egypt only, but the number of Egyptians working in the oil

rich countries is gradually declining. During the same period there has been 2 percent reduction in the overall share of Egyptian workers, whereas the Pakistanis share has gone up by 2.5 percent. The following factors make the Pakistanis, including military personnel, more attractive. (21:41, 18:115,123)

1. Pakistanis are Muslims, but usually of Sunni sect, but non-Arab.

2. They are non-Arab and thus are less likely to be involved in the intra-Arab disputes.

3. Pakistan has a reasonable pool of skilled and non-skilled workers.

Employment in the Gulf is the main source of reducing the unemployment in Pakistan. The Pakistani working in the Gulf were estimated to be sending back 3 billion dollars in foreign exchange. In addition to this official channel, remittance is sent to Pakistan through informal bills of exchange, merchandise imports, cash on visits home, and through postal system devices. Although there is no record available, it is estimated that this system of remittance accounts for 25 to 50 percent of the total, making the total remittance roughly 4 billion dollars. This increase in the income of the lower class, in mostly rural areas, has put a heavy demand on educational systems since they demand better

educational facilities. Furthermore, the increase in the import of electric goods has put a burden on the consumption of electricity.

Pakistan provides training facilities in Pakistan, to many countries of the region. In addition to this, there are about 30,000 military personnel working in the Middle East. Out of this about 20,000 are working in Saudi Arabia only. Pakistani soldiers are considered loyal, disciplined and unlikely to get involved in local issues. When relations between the U.S. and Pakistan deteriorated and the threat to the region from the Russians increased, Saudi Arabia moved to improve her ties with Pakistan, and promised Pakistan financial aid in return for Pakistani ground troops and technicians. It is also worth mentioning here that Pakistan already supports Arabs vigorously on the Palestine issue. (21:41)

Pakistan is establishing its credentials as an Islamic state, and improving her ties with the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Pakistan wants the support of the Islamic nations, and supports them in return without involving herself in the intra-Arab or intra-Islamic rivalries. The President of Pakistan has served as a mediator in the Iran-Iraq war and has been trying to bring back Egypt and Iran into the OIC. It is important to note that relations between Pakistan and other nations of the region are primarily religious and economic, and only secondarily political.

V. Pakistan and the Region

Background

To understand the situation which affects the formulation of Pakistan's policies and future planning, it is necessary to understand the nature of Pakistan's involvement in regional affairs, i.e., the situation in Afghanistan, the Arab-Israel war, and the conflict between Pakistan and India, and between India and China. To some extent the U.S. has also been playing an active role in all these regional affairs. Therefore, an appreciation of the situation in the region will help to assess the impact of these major conflicts on the society and national policies and planning of Pakistan; and will also help in understanding the depth of involvement by the people in these affairs and thus their reaction to the factors affecting these matters.

Pakistan Since the Invasion of Afghanistan

Security Choices for Pakistan. The importance of Pakistan to both superpowers has increased dramatically because of the following factors: (18:103) (20:133)

1. By the virtue of its strategic location and historical ties to both countries, the invasion of Afghanistan and revolution in Iran have made Pakistan the target of, and an obstacle to, Soviet ambitions in Southwest Asia.

2. Since the loss of its eastern wing, Pakistan has been orienting herself toward the Middle East and the Northern Africa, in both economic and military terms.

3. Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear capability have added a new factor to the importance of security in the region.

The decisions taken by Pakistan in the coming years will have far reaching effects on the whole region. At present, it is not clear what course of action Pakistan is going to take; but it is possible to describe, in broad terms, Pakistan's emerging response to this new found attention, and to point to some of the major uncertainties that lie in the future. (20:183)

Pakistan's Security After Afghanistan. Pakistan is now facing a more advanced enemy in India. In the 1970's, with Soviet help, India increased its margin of conventional weapon superiority, and at the same time began developing a nuclear weapon option. Furthermore, after the invasion of Afghanistan, armies of a superpower are now operating at her Western border. Today, Soviet objectives toward Pakistan are as follows: (20:184)

1. To control and, if possible, eliminate threats to its own position in Afghanistan arising from Pakistani territory.

2. To block the emerging relationship between Pakistan and the U.S., and to prevent the former's possible inclusion in a larger Western security system for the Persian Gulf.

3. Over the longer term, to gain direct naval and air access to the Arabian Sea through the Balkanization of Pakistan.

Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP), bordering with Afghanistan, has the biggest tribal belt in the world which crosses the border with Afghanistan. These tribal agencies are governed by a special set of laws; a tradition inherited from British times. Federal and provincial governments are represented by the political agents in each district who work through the tribal chiefs. Day-to-day enforcement of law is left to the tribes themselves and regular Pakistani law is applied only on the highways in order to keep vital lines of communications open. Three major tribes have their branches on the other side of the border also. In addition to this, another group of nomads called Pawindahs, numbering one to three million, migrate every year to Pakistan in winter and go back to Afghanistan in summer.

There are more than three million refugees who have taken shelter in Pakistan after the Russian invasion. It is, therefore, virtually impossible for Pakistan to seal the border and stop this free movement of people. The tribes of the borderland are too numerous and heavily armed, and Pakistani forces are stretched too thin over the rugged terrain to ever effectively seal off the frontier. (20:184) But Pakistan has taken very strong military action in the

area to check a few tribal chiefs sponsored and financed by the Afghan and Russian governments. In one action 24 heroin laboratories were destroyed and, although somewhat non-traditional, this action was supported by the vast majority of tribal people.

Since the Soviet invasion, attacks by air and cross border shelling by the Afghan army have become an almost daily routine, which conveys a clear signal to Pakistan. The Soviet Union has also delivered a number of direct and rather bluntly-worded warnings to Pakistan not to support the Afghanistan freedom fighters (Mujahidin) or to develop a security relationship with the U.S. (20:185)

Although the Soviets initially avoided attacks on Pakistani and rebel positions along the border, attacks by Soviet backed Afghan forces are now on the increase. (20:185). In one such encounter, the Pakistan Air Force shot down two Afghan aircraft during May 1986.

Another Soviet option would be to increase pressure on Islamabad, to exploit suspicions and antagonisms between India and Pakistan. This seems to be more likely because a direct attack by the Soviets would generate a lot of sympathy for Pakistan throughout the world, particularly on the part of the United States and the moderate Islamic countries; whereas an attack by India would be less likely to do so for obvious reasons. Russia has the capability to encourage and shape hostilities toward Pakistan which India,

for her own reasons, would be more than willing to accommodate. Another alternative for the Soviets involves the creation of an independent Baluchi State, which would provide the Russians direct access to the Arabian sea. There are reports that Baluchs are being trained by the Russians in Afghanistan, which could be used at anytime in the future to work for a separatist movement in Baluchistan. (20:186, 187; 22:137)

Pakistan's Choices. Pakistan, in the past, has been meeting her security requirements in one of the two following ways. (20:187)

1. By seeking support of the superpowers. Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO in the mid-1950's and signed a mutual agreement with the United States in 1959. This policy generally remained effective till the mid 1960's.

2. During the 1970's, Pakistan accommodated her enemies by adopting a nonaligned course to seek outside support from countries like China, Saudi Arabia and France. This course of policy required more autocratic security policies in several respects; most notably her effort to achieve a nuclear weapon capability.

Even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan these two policies are still open. Although the Pakistani elite (especially the army) tend to remain pro-West, their feelings about the United States are mixed like any other U.S. ally in the region. These feelings are mainly the

result of the shock Pakistan received from the U.S. embargo on military equipment during her war with India in 1965 when she was solely dependent on the U.S. Moreover Pakistan has been observing closely U.S. policies in the region after the Vietnam War and has not been impressed either by American power, relative to the Soviet Union, or by Washington's consistency of purpose. (20:188)

The price of the second option is substantial after the invasion of Afghanistan. The continuous presence of Soviet forces on her Western borders will pose a continuous threat to Pakistan's security if she refuses to adopt Soviet policy in the region. The Soviets can trigger serious political problems inside the country. If Pakistan recognizes the communist regime in Afghanistan and tries to seal her border with that country in order to reduce Mujahidin activities, it will result in the eventual consolidation of communist rule in Afghanistan and improve's Moscow's long run position in Southwest Asia. (20:188)

Pakistan's choice between the two strategies has been largely determined by her relations with Washington. Pakistan, as a result of the new situation, expressed her preference for a U.S. pledge for assistance in the form of a full-fledged treaty in case of Soviet aggression, but the United States was not willing, and only offered a congressional reaffirmation of the 1959 Executive Agreement.

Alternatively Pakistan sought military and economic assistance to provide them with real capability against the Soviets. (20:188)

In 1980, Pakistan, therefore, was given 3.2 billion dollars in aid over a period of six years by the Reagan administration. The package was almost equally divided between military and economic aid, and was quite substantial in comparison with the 400 million dollars offered by the Carter administration. However, once it is seen in the light of high cost of the modern weapons, it still does not seem to be very impressive. Out of this, 1.1 billion dollars will go to the purchase of 40 F-16 aircraft. Additionally, Pakistan's Army and Navy will also buy some equipment from the United States. The military equipment was to be purchased through FMS credits under the standard terms for sales of this type, with no element of concession. Pakistan was particularly insistent on not receiving grant aid for military goods, and funding will be supplemented by her other friends, most likely Saudi Arabia. (20:189)

Even the purchase of this equipment does not guarantee the security of Pakistan against foreign threats. This can be seen when the strength of Pakistan's first line aircraft is compared with India, (see Table 5-1). This includes weapon systems that either have already been or will be acquired by India from different sources, especially the Russians. (20:190)

TABLE III

India and Pakistan: First Line Aircraft

	<u>India</u>		<u>Pakistan</u>	
	400	MIG-21	40	F-16
	150	Mirage 2000	45	Mirage III
	85	Jaguar	70	Mirage V
	8	Harrier		
	8	MIG-25		
	---		---	
Total	651		155	

Congressional approval of the aid package, and waiver of the Symington amendment, has given Pakistan an opportunity to modernize its armed forces. This will enable her to adopt a relatively independent foreign policy, but will be subject to following three conditions. (20:191)

1. The first concern is its nuclear ambitions. As a result of Pakistan's total isolation after its 1971 war, and India's nuclear detonation in 1974, Pakistan tried to acquire a nuclear capability to meet her security requirements. However the situation changed after getting the latest military equipment from the U.S. If Pakistan opts for nuclear options it would face the following consequences.

(a) It will adversely affect her present relations with the United States, which could result in the total cancellation of a huge amount of economic aid and military equipment she is getting from the West.

(b) Moreover, India will also avail her option for further progress in the field and is likely to be ahead of Pakistan in the near future; but Pakistan is now in a better position to defend her security with conventional weapons.

(c) It is impossible to rule out the possibility of an Israeli type of strike, by India, on Pakistan's nuclear plant, as a more extreme measure to deal with the emerging nuclear threat from Pakistan.

2. Pakistan's ability to handle its broader relations with India. In spite of American aid to Pakistan, India will remain, by far, the stronger country, and the one that will retain many options against its neighbor. However, Pakistan does have a margin of choice in how it deploys its weapon systems procured from the United States.

3. The final factor which affects the future of Pakistan's external relations will be its ability to avoid domestic instability. If Pakistan maintains its present level of economic performance, she may be able to overcome the upheaval in the country. A strong case can be made that Zia's government has been more sensitive to the concerns of ethnic groups, like the Baluch, than its predecessor. The present government's ability to continue to do so will have many implications not only on Pakistan but also toward the policies of the superpowers in the regions.

When comparing the military capabilities of the two countries, there are many other factors which must be kept in mind. Pakistan has an available fleet of more than 200 Chinese aircraft like F-6, FT-6, A5-III, FT-5, and proposed purchases of 100 A5-III and 60 F-7 (Chinese aircraft have been reportedly equipped with U.S. Sidewinder missiles). Although these aircraft are not first line weapon systems, the experience gained by Pakistanis over the decades makes them very useful and reasonably effective, especially in a defensive role. Pakistan is also planning to buy 60 more F-16s, and 2 E-2C Hawkeye, and has some of the latest air-to-air, air-to-ground, ground-to-ground and surface-to-air missile systems, i.e., Magic R550, Sidewinder(AIM-9B and AIM-9L), AM-39 Exocet, AGM-G5 Maverick, Cobra 2000, TOW and Crotal, in its inventory. These weapons provide Pakistan with reasonable defense power. (23)

The accumulation of petro-dollars in the Middle East has led to a large scale build-up of sophisticated arms. After the loss of Bangladesh, Pakistan turned to the Middle East to balance Indian dominance in the Subcontinent. Pakistan is a member of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), along with Iran and Turkey. Pakistan sponsored the Islamic summit conference to generate solidarity and unity among Muslim states and is pushing for an Islamic defense pact. Pakistan also has a very close military relationship, especially with rich Arabs states and there are about 30,000

Pakistani troops deployed in Middle Eastern countries. India is afraid that during the break out of any hostility, Pakistan will receive support from these countries, which will enable Pakistan to reinforce its air capability on short notice from the air forces in West Asia. Moreover, the military connection with countries of the Middle East, give Pakistan an opportunity to maintain extra forces at the expense of those countries, while their soldiers are getting experience operating multiple weapon systems. Also, the arms build up in the Middle East and Pakistan's close links with these countries does create inhibitions in Indian minds which they consider an extended threat to their country.

(21:40) (24:246) (25:93)

India, much like Pakistan, is also surrounded by enemies. None of India's neighbors wants India to become a dominant power to exercise hegemony in the region. India had a border conflict with China in 1962, and since then both countries have maintained strained relations. China does keep a certain number of army divisions in its southern region of Tibet which can be quickly reinforced from Sinkiang, Sechuan, and Chingai provinces. Chinese has also constructed all-weather airfields in Tibet, and their road system in Tibet runs along the Indian border, with all of these roads having branches leading to passes in India. India deploys about 10 of her divisions, partially, in the mountain region on Chinese borders. India also has to

deploy 2 to 3 divisions on her northeastern border because of unrest in Burma. China provides arms and munitions through northern Burma, to Nagas and Mizos, the tribes constantly fighting with the Indian government. India deploys about 17 divisions on the Pakistani border. These divisions, because of constraints on the availability of living accommodation for the troops, are deployed in southern and central India, and need about a week to ten days notice before they can be deployed on the Pakistani front. On the other hand, the Pakistan Army can be deployed within 72 hours, because of the location of cantonment.

(24:271)

Before drawing any conclusions it seems relevant to note that the strength and weaknesses of Pakistan and India are inversely proportional to each other. The past history of the Subcontinent plays a basic role in the relationship between states. A few hundred years ago there were generally many states in the Subcontinent. The Subcontinent was brought under one ruler, to some extent, during the Muslim period. It received actual unity during the later period of British rule, which was a factor of the Hindu-Muslim rivalry. Later on it was divided into five countries, i.e. India, Pakistan, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. Pakistan was further divided into two countries, one of which became Bangladesh. In India the strong communal identity binds the members of each religion. The most significant rift divides

Hindus from Muslims. The other particularly strong group is the Sikhs, who are extremely vocal. Religion provides identity to groups in India. (44:158)

There are two more important factors, language and geography, which run parallel to religion and must be taken into account very carefully. There are about 826 different languages (major dialect) spoken in India and there are as many as 14 official languages in that country. The introduction of Hindi as an official language created serious problems. The enforcement of Hindi has been opposed by many provinces of the country because of cultural prestige. (26:882)

India is a very thickly populated country, with about 15 percent of the world's population and only 2.4 % of the world's land area. (26:482) It has a very low per capita income of U.S. \$250, which may become a serious political problem in the future. Although industrialization, in the area which now comprises India, started during British rule in the 19th century, the country has not been able to come up to the level of even a semi-industrialized state. Its economic progress has been below average. (27)

There are a number of very strong secessionist movements in India, like the movement in seven Eastern states, movement for a free homeland for the Gorkhas, Nicsal Barhi in West Bangal, Struggle for Nagaland, problems in the province of Kashmir, and a ferocious and bloody movement in

eastern Punjab for a separate homeland for the Sikhs. These movements may have a serious effect on the security and integrity of that country in the near future. Trouble in two provinces of India, which lie on the Indian eastern border adjacent with Pakistan, do have a bearing on the relations between Pakistan and India i.e. Kashmir (which has already been addressed in previous chapter), and the movement of Khalistan in the Indian province of Punjab. The secessionist movement in the Indian province of Punjab is a very strong movement which is based on a demand by the followers of the Sikh religion for a separate homeland. It started from demanding more autonomy for the province of Punjab which is adjacent to the Pakistani province of Punjab, the home of about 12 millions Indian Sikhs. The movement became violent in the late seventies.

The Sikhs hijacked many Indian airliners to Pakistan. However everytime, due to the efforts of Pakistan the hijackers were either overpowered or pacified through negotiation, and every hijacking ended without any casualty. The movement gradually moved into the hands of the extremists and one of their leaders, Jernal Singh, settled himself inside the Golden Temple in the city of Amratsar. The city and the Temple has the same sentimental value for the Sikhs as does Jerusalem for the Christians, or the city of Mecca for the Muslims. In May, 1984, he started a violent movement, from inside the Golden Temple, against

India for a separate homeland for Sikhs. When the Indian government saw the situation getting out of control, they took military action and used tanks, about 10,000 soldiers, and 500 commandos. Hundreds of people were killed in the operation. (28). This came as a shock to the Sikh community and they threatened to take revenge from all those who were involved in the planning of the attack on the Golden Temple. Even the Prime Minister of India admitted that the Sikhs has been deeply hurt by this attack. (29) The Sikhs threatened to kill (late) Prime Minister of India Mrs Indra Gandhi and her son (the present Prime Minister of India) Mr Rajive Gandhi, President of India Giani Zail Singh (who is a Sikh himself), Chief of Army Staff, and the commander of troops who lead the attack. This also resulted in the revolt and desertion of Sikh soldiers from the Indian army. At any rate, the situation was finally brought under control with great difficulty.

The Sikhs took out their first revenge within few months of attack on the Golden Temple, by killing Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi in October 1984. Her killing was celebrated openly by the Sikhs in and outside India. However, this act of assassination resulted in racial violence against the Sikhs throughout India, in which thousands of Sikhs were killed. Most were burned alive, and about 20,000 were forced to live in shelters (31,31). The Sikhs also tried to kill Mr. Rajive Gandhi during his visit

to the U.S. in 1985, but did not succeed. In August 1986, the Sikhs killed the retired general who was the Chief of the Indian Army when the troops stormed the Golden Temple. Before the killing, the General had received several death threats from Sikh extremists. The Sikh extremists accepted responsibility and threatened to kill three more generals. In the meantime, demonstrators burned shops owned by the Sikhs. The General was the most prominent official killed by Sikhs after they assassinated Mrs. Indra Gandhi in 1984 (32,33), but the Sikhs also destroyed a Boeing 747 of Indian Air Lines over the Atlantic in 1985 killing 329 persons. The Sikhs have also been charged by a Canadian court with the attempted murder of Punjab Planning Minister, Mr. Malkiat Singh, on 25 May 1986, in Vancouver, Canada.

Violence has become a matter of daily routine in that province. A survey of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, from January 1986 to August 1986, reveals that there has not been a single day when violence has not been reported in the Indian state of Punjab. The violence includes killings, encounters with armed force's police, paramilitary services, and other activities. Imposition of curfew is a daily affair. It has now reached the point where it has become impossible for these two communities to live together in peace. India, as is common in the Subcontinent, has blamed Pakistan for giving training to militant Sikhs. This has always been denied by Pakistan,

and, as stated by the President of Pakistan, there are about 400,000 Sikhs in Punjab which are ex-serviceman, and therefore, don't need any training from outside agencies. The President of Pakistan further stated that India is making this propaganda to put pressure on Pakistan, at the instigation of Russia. Similarly after two years the new Prime Minister of India, Mr. Rajive Gandhi, canceled his visit to Pakistan on the plea that Pakistan is providing help to the Sikhs who thus want to destroy the unity of the country.

(34, 35)

Innocent people from each other's community are dragged out of buses and trains and assassinated in cold blood. This generates a non-ending cycle of violence. The Hindu population is moving out and the Sikhs from all over India are migrating to Punjab. Law and order is out of control and the central government of India is thinking of taking control of the state. Perhaps the takeover of the state of Punjab has become indispensable for the Government of India to check Punjab separatism or secessionists in other states which may be encouraged to challenge New Dehli's rule.

(36:32)

The proximity of the province of East Punjab to Pakistan makes it very important strategically because most of the fighting during any war between India and Pakistan has been carried out in this area which has become

extremely hostile toward the Indian government. The outcome of this struggle will have far reaching effects on the future of India.

Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan

Background to the Soviet Invasion. From Alexander the Great in 331 BC, to the Soviet invasion in December 1979, as many as 25 dynasties have ruled Afghanistan---from the Achaemenian of Cyrus and Darius in the sixth century BC, to the Muhammadzia, the last of whom put an end to monarchy in Afghanistan in 1973. This coup was a catalyst for the beginning of the end for Afghanistan's independent status. However, this coup could not have been made possible without the knowledge, if not the concurrence, of the Soviet Union. It may have been basically the ambition of Daud, and an understanding by the Soviets that he would be a pro-Soviet ruler; but after taking over, Daud started taking a pro-Western tilt which was not liked by the Soviets. That resulted in a bloody coup in 1978 in which Daud's whole family was killed and a Marxist government, under the command of Nur Muhammad Taraki, took charge of Afghanistan. In spite of complete Soviet support, the new government could not effectively control the country. The authority of new government was challenged in almost all 28 provinces of Afghanistan. The response against the government started with non-cooperation and individual acts of terrorism. In

retaliation, a large number of people started migrating to Pakistan. Nur Muhammad Taraki was killed and the Hafiz Ullah Amin took over, but the change did not bring any change in the situation in Afghanistan. However the Russians, thinking that situation was getting out of their control, ultimately moved in with their forces, on 25 December 1979, and installed their most trusted person, Mr. Babrak Karmal, as head of state. Since then the Soviets have been fully involved in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is not the first Muslim country to be taken over by the Soviets. It is the seventh Muslim state to be so occupied since the Communist revolution in 1917. Three of these states are situated in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmanistan, Uzbekistan); two on the frontier with China (Tadjikistan and Kirghistan); and one Azerbaijan, is situated close to the border of Turkey. (22:127, 128) The occupation of Afghanistan by the USSR rocked the entire region which immediately understood the possible ramifications of the Soviet move. It directly affected the geo-strategic situation of Pakistan. Pakistan no longer has the benefit of having Afghanistan as a buffer against the Soviets. Pakistan now faces Soviet troops on her 1300 miles Eastern border. (22:128)

Soviets Aims of Occupation. In 1717, Peter the Great, was the first ruler to focus his attention on Southwest Asia. He stressed the Soviet need to have access to the

warm water of the Indian Ocean. As a result, the Soviets are now the world's largest state, occupying one-sixth of earth's land mass, an area of 8,647,250 square miles. Two-thirds of the territory conquered during last four centuries lies in Asia. To its south, the Soviets are bordered by Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, China, Mongolia, and North Korea. Of these six countries only three; Turkey, Iran and China are outside the Soviet orbit. Pakistan, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, has also become a country bordering Russia and is struggling hard to remain outside Soviet influence. (22:130) (37)

Russia, after occupying Central Asia, stopped for sometime because of two reasons; to consolidate their position and because of the British army in the region. (37) However, they never gave up their struggle to reach the Indian Ocean warm waters. Finding the situation favorable, the Soviets attacked Afghanistan and occupied it in December 1979, which brought them as close as 400 miles to warm water. Pakistan is now, perhaps the only power between the Soviets and their objectives. There are three possible reasons for Soviet takeover of Afghanistan.

1. The Russian states of Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, and Uzbekistan have a large Muslim population. These areas have been the centers of Muslim art and cultures in the past. Historically these areas have had very rich and advanced culture of their own. The people of these Russian states,

even after the occupation of Czarist Russia during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have kept their deep association with their old culture based on Islamic values. The Soviet Union feared that the revolution in Iran and the resurgence of Islam in the region would spread to Afghanistan, and from Afghanistan to the Soviet Central Asian Republics which has centuries old links with Afghanistan.

2. The (late) prime minister of Afghanistan, Daud, who had overthrown the King Zahir Shah in 1973, started improving relations with Shah of Iran, who was a strong U.S. ally. At the same time Daud started decreasing relations with Russia. The Soviets therefore arranged his departure and introduced a communist regime in Afghanistan. This new regime could not win the support of the Afghan people, but the Soviets, once committed, could not withdraw their support without a loss of prestige. Therefore, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could be an extension of their first miscalculation of supporting the coup in 1978.

3. The invasion of Afghanistan is a further step in the fulfillment of last testament of Peter the Great, in which he advised his successors to continuously try to probe southward for a warm water port. The occupation of Afghanistan has placed the Russians in a very advantageous position with respect to Southwest Asia. They can influence future events in the region and can take advantage of any opportunity which may arise in the future.

Whatever the reason, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan has turned that buffer state into a Russian satellite, and the Russians are busy consolidating their positions in Afghanistan. They have extended their railway link to Afghanistan across the river Oxus, and are busy building new barracks, warehouses, and bridges, and are improving the highway system. They are building a huge air base at Shindand in Afghanistan which probably will have missiles with strategic range, and have fortified the base with minefields.

Pakistan is one of two states (the other is Iran) which lie between Soviet dreams of reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. If the Soviets slice through Pakistan with or without the consent of Pakistan, the consequences for the free world are grave. The Russians can then disrupt the fuel supply to Japan, Europe and the U.S. by physically blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Soviet gunships and airborne divisions are well poised in Afghanistan for sallying out toward the Indian Ocean. Further Soviet move depend on the stability of the situation in Afghanistan and action taken by the peripheral states. (22:132) Otherwise the Russian foothold on the coast of the Indian Ocean in the Southwest Asia will turn the ocean into a private Russian lake which will have the following consequences: (22:132)

1. A breakthrough of strategic dimensions for the Soviets.

2. Moscow would complete the encirclement of China.
3. Russia would have easy access to the Middle East.
4. Russia would be in a position to threaten NATO's Southern flank.
5. Russia would also be in a position to overcome its major vulnerability to nuclear attack from U.S. submarines which are now moving freely in the Indian Ocean.
6. An extended Soviet presence would enable them to generate enormous political, social, and cultural influence in major parts of the world.

Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, her relationship with Afghanistan has not been, by and large, satisfactory, except for the period when Afghanistan President Daud tried to improve her relations with Pakistan and Iran, in 1977. Afghanistan has been a monarchy for many centuries and the participation of the common individual has never been significant in state affairs. During the British period of Indian rule, the English fought three wars with Afghanistan to bring them under their control, and at least to make the country a buffer state between British India and Russia. During these wars, the British used the Indian forces against them; but the tribal people of the region now in Pakistan sided with Afghanistan because of their ethnic and religious ties. This resulted in an agreement of boundaries demarcation, commonly known as the Durand Line, which serves as an international border between Pakistan and

Afghanistan. But the point to be noted in this is that the tribes who fought against the British in the favor of Afghanistan, were still on the eastern side of the Durand line. It is important that the NWFP joined Pakistan through a referendum; however the ethnic issue has been used by some pro-Russian political leaders in Pakistan as a political stunt during elections. The Afghanistan government has claimed its right over this province on several occasions; but the point worth noting is that when Pakistan was engaged in war with India in 1948, there were thousands of Afghan volunteers who joined the Pakistan army to fight against India for the liberation of Kashmir. During this time, the government of Afghanistan had good relations with India and had voted against Pakistan's entry into the United Nations. The people of both the countries have centuries old religious, cultural and social ties with each other. Afghanistan was the source of power for the Muslims in India during an early period of conflict between the Muslims and Hindus, and during the British rule over India. This underlying natural affection has been mentioned by Asghar Khan, the ex-chief of Pakistan Air Force and a now prominent opposition leader and an Afghan by birth, when referring to the 1965 India-Pakistan war:

Afghanistan active intervention [against Pakistan] was not likely until a complete collapse had occurred in Pakistan and until India had made spectacular advances in the Punjab. It is true that our Northwestern borders were very lightly held. In that difficult country, however, even

lightly equipped forces could have offered effective resistance. Moreover, the Pakistan Air Force could operate even more effectively against Afghanistan than it had against India. (38)

According to Mr. Asghar Khan, the general political philosophy of Afghanistan and their ethnic and religious ties with Pakistan proved more relevant than military considerations.

It would be difficult by any Afghan government to rouse enough enthusiasm for a war against Pakistan when we were engaged in a war for survival with India. The reaction of the Afghan to the war in Kashmir in 1947, when a large number of Afghan volunteers came to fight along with Pakistanis in what many considered a holy war against injustice and tyranny would certainly have been remembered in Kabul. (39:92)

However, since the invasion of Afghanistan the situation has taken a sharp turn, and Pakistan is now a home for the struggle of the Afghan people against an unpopular and Russian sponsored regime in Kabul. Pakistan is vigorously supporting the Afghan refugees, which, although supported by the majority of the world, brings the following dangers for Pakistan, as summarized by the Fukuyama. (39:98)

1. The Soviet and Afghan use of artillery and aircraft to attack refugee camps in Pakistan, thus pushing them back, demoralizing the guerrillas, and preventing their incursions into Afghanistan.

2. The Soviet seizure of Pakistan territory along the Durand line, provoking Pakistan to counter attack. If the Soviets control the mountain passes into Afghanistan, it may mean an end to guerrilla activity across the border.

3. India attacks Pakistan's eastern flank with a view to destruction of Pakistan's armed forces or seizure of a sizeable portion of terrain. This would serve India's political goal of assertion of hegemony over South Asia and the achievement of dominant power status in the region.

4. A coordinated attack made by India in the east and the Soviets in Afghanistan from the west, with the purpose of totally dismembering Pakistan. Moscow's goal would be to achieve access to the sea and to control Afghanistan southern border; India's goal would be to undo the partition once and for all.

5. Possible long term Soviet support for the Baluchs against Pakistan.

Pakistan is aware of the gravity of the situation, and the consequences and effects of superpower involvement on her security, and is trying to achieve a political settlement to the problem. Pakistan is working through the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Non-Aligned Movement to settle the issue peacefully. However Pakistan has been firm for the last six and half years on the following four principles which have the support of the vast majority of the world. (19)

1. Immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.

2. Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and non-aligned status of Afghanistan.

3. The right of the Afghan people to determine their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion or coercion.

4. Creation of a condition for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homes.

Agony in Afghanistan. The tyranny and cruelty demonstrated by the Russians in Afghanistan is worth mentioning. Russia's lack of concern should not be a matter of shame for the Russians only, but should also be a matter of great concern for the rest of the world. The degree of Russian cruelty is an indicator of their long term planning. The attitude of the rest of the world is also a reflection of the inability of the free world to handle and respond to a situation like Afghanistan. The following are but a few allegations, as they have appeared in the Western press, of Russian atrocities in Afghanistan:

1. "The Soviet killing is going on right now. An entire nation is dying, while we in the West seal our eyes to the horror." (40:133)

2. An Afghan Doctor said, that what is the point of all this? People should know by now. There are no human rights in Afghanistan. They burn people easier than wood. (40:134)

3. An Afghan told a CBS television producer,

Russians held a child over the fire while they asked questions about the Mujahidin. A

freedom fighter told that how Russians came, tied dynamite to the backs of two brothers--age 90 and 95 years and blew them up. (40:134)

4. A french doctor told that how the Russians punished an entire village.

They tied them up and piled them like wood. Then they poured gasoline over them and burned them alive. They were old and young, men, woman and children. Forty people were killed. (40:135)

5. As reported by Michael Barry, an expert on Afghanistan, between April 27, 1978 (the date of the pro-Soviet coup that preceded the invasion), and January 5, 1980, a total of 27,000 people were executed in only one concentration camp located six mile East of Kabul. These are not the estimates, but a simple addition of the names of the victims posted in public places to discourage the families from crowding around the gates of the prison with packages of clothing and food. According to one French humanitarian organization, the infant mortality rate caused by malnutrition reached 85% in the Panjsher Valley in the winter of 1985. (40:137)

Over four and half millions Afghans have fled their country since 1978, mostly to Pakistan. This means that nearly one of every two refugees on this planet today is an Afghan. By 1984 about half a million resistance fighters had been killed. If put together in another way, about 35% of the total population of 15 million people is either in exile or dead. (40:137)

Such atrocities are becoming commonplace, yet one sees little about them in Western media. Information on Afghanistan is scarce. One source has suggested the following reasons for the voluntary ignorance about Afghanistan by the free world. (40:135)

1. Desire to interpret the invasion as an accident of Soviet policy.

2. Experts in the West suggest that any assistance to the freedom fighters will provoke the Soviets.

3. Human rights violations by the Soviets in Afghanistan are so widespread that Western governments are afraid even to raise the question, knowing very well that Moscow will, in its usual humiliating manner, refuse to discuss the issue.

The above reasons may be a very simple reflection of the Western mind and their reaction and approach to a problem in a region far away from their own. It reflects the inability of these nations to react to major situations like Afghanistan, but it does take on a different dimension when compared with other situations around the world. "The Nawa-i-Waqat", is a right wing moderate widely distributed daily, and a favorite newspaper of politically mature people in Pakistan. This paper, while criticizing American policies toward the situation in Afghanistan, noted that the U.S. has provided four times more aid to Soviet-controlled Ethiopia, than the food and financial aid given to the Afghan Mujahidin.

Israel and the Islamic World

The Arab-Israel conflict, is the major issue in the Southwest Asia which hinders the development of a strong relationship between the U.S. and Islamic countries of the region. The U.S. has been consistently committed to the security of Israel, and insuring the supremacy of Israel in the region as a symbol of America's prestige. The conflict has its roots in the past history of the Jews and two other major religions, i.e., Christianity, and Islam. The severity of the danger which exists in the region, is proportional to the conflict between the basic faiths of these three religions. These basic differences have been further fueled by periods of colonialism, and what has happened in the region during the 20th century.

It is, therefore, relevant to look into the background of the problem which began with the emergence of Israel.

The Birth of Israel and the Palestinian View

On 14 May 1948, the Jewish leader Mr. Ben Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the new state of Israel. President Truman, as soon as he heard the news, announced that the US would recognize the new state de facto. (1:195) It is worth noting that at the time when Israel declared itself an independent state, it had only 6 percent of the area of Palestine.

Since then Israel has fought three major wars with the Arabs. The Israel occupation of Jerusalem by Jews in 1967 was a matter of great concern for the Muslims of the whole world because it is one of the holiest Muslim shrines. During the war Israel was extensively supported by the U.S. (14:154).

From a Palestinian view, problems in the area began with the formation of the state of Israel and current hostilities are the result of the brutality of the Jews. As quoted by at least one western source, when the Jews occupied Palestine, Arab villages were systematically destroyed with their houses, garden walls, and even cemeteries and tombstones, so that literally a stone did not remain standing. By the end of 1969, a total of 7,554 Arab houses were razed, and by August 1971, 16,212 houses has been demolished. (41:14)

In early 1965, the Palestinians formed a resistance movement, Al-Fatah, having Al-Asifa as its military arm. The following were the main reasons for starting their armed struggle:

1. Israel had started acquiring atomic technology.
2. An Israeli project for the utilization of Jordan river water, which would have increased Israel's capacity to absorb more Jewish immigrants.
3. Internal division among the Arabs.

4. Frustration about Israel becoming a fact of life.

The Palestinians still look to the Arab countries as their guardians, and depend on Arab countries for freedom of action. All Arabs and Islamic countries have come to believe that until the U.S. stops supporting Israel, it will not be possible to get the occupied territories back from Israel. Therefore, most Arab and Islamic countries have started promoting the idea of recognizing Israel. The President of Pakistan said that keeping in view the support given by the U.S. to Israel, and all other developments which have taken place during this time, it is unrealistic to deny the existence of Israel. Correspondingly, Israel must recognize the PLO, and the Palestinians should be given a homeland. (42:30) (42). The recent visit of the Israeli Prime Minister to Morroco suggests a new trend in the Middle East. (43:26) (42:27). However, Israel has maintained that:

1. They will not recognize the PLO.
2. They can not evacuate from occupied territory.
3. They will not talk about Jerusalem.
4. They will not withdraw from occupied territories.

The United States, in early 1986, used its veto three times against the Muslims in the Security Council of the UN, when other countries took up a case to condemn the Israelis over their desecration of Muslim holy places. Both the Jews and the Muslims are sensitive about their religious faiths.

In consideration of these differences, it becomes evident that any compromise between the two would be extremely difficult. Any power like the U.S., which has interests in both Israel and the Muslim countries, must be very careful in formulating its policies toward the region, and compromises may have to be worked out keeping in view the sensitivity of issues.

VI. Findings, Analysis, and Recommendations

Introduction.

This study has examined those areas where the U.S. and Pakistan either have a consensus of opinion or have overlapping interests. This research has also identified those areas where both nations do not have common interests, and in some cases, even have opposing national interests. Relations between Pakistan and the United States have been cyclical in nature, and efforts were, therefore, made to examine the impact of past relations on the future. This chapter analyzes and summarizes some of the key findings of this study, and concludes with several recommendations for further study.

Analysis of Past Relations.

The history of relations between Pakistan and the U.S. is unique. It is an interesting study of the success and the failure of the influence of a superpower (U.S.) on a third world country (Pakistan). Relations between any two countries stem from common interests and joint fears shared by both. In both the United States and Pakistan, there seem to be a general absence of shared perception of common interests. Even though both countries have been entwined in a joint policy for defense, the fear felt by each is not identical with that perceived by the other. The U.S. seems to be concerned with restricting Chinese and Russian influence only, whereas Pakistan, in addition

to this, is more concerned about the direct threat to its national security from India which does not seem to be appreciated by the U.S. It has been extremely difficult for the U.S. to balance its policy between the two regional rivals i.e., India and Pakistan. During the 1970's, uncertainty and indecisiveness in U.S. policy ultimately damaged relations between the two countries. Despite the preponderance of power and asymmetry in its favor, the range of options available for the U.S. seems to be limited, and Pakistan has succeeded in circumventing the pursuit and exercise of influence by the U.S. in a number of ways. For example,

1. Because of divergent threat perceptions, the U.S. has not been able to exercise its influence on Pakistan on key security issues.

2. Because of reciprocal needs for each other, Washington has not been able to press its influence too far for fear that such pressure would jeopardize its access as well as its presence in Southwest Asia.

3. Because of the competitive nature of the international system, the U.S. has not been able to influence Pakistan as might otherwise have been the case under different circumstances. As a result, the USSR in the 1950s, the PRC since the early 1960s, and the oil producing Islamic countries since early 1970s have emerged as a second source of assistance for Pakistan.

4. U.S. and Pakistan relations have also suffered from the absence of interaction between institutional channels within each country. Relations have ranged from periods of great receptivity when key personalities in each country were friendly, to periods of marked indifference or open dislike when they were not.

5. U.S. economic aid did not really provide influence over Pakistan for two reasons.

(i) Pakistan's basic need for the U.S. emerges out of its security problem.

(ii) Pakistan measures U.S. aid by comparison to the aid given to India, since India is perceived as a major threat to Pakistan's security. India, during 1955 and 1965, received four times more aid than that provided to Pakistan, who was an ally. This disparity shows a lack of appreciation of the national problems of an ally, and total failure to judge the intensity of problems between India and Pakistan.

6. Military aid is indeed more effective than economic aid in providing influence for the U.S. in Pakistan. Pakistan's need for U.S. aid stems from its overriding concern for the development of its military. The U.S. cut military aid and continued economic aid after 1965, but this aid did not really gain any influence for the U.S. over Pakistan. Any influence which the U.S. gains in Pakistan seems to be directly proportional to the quantity and

sophistication of weaponry provided. This seems to be even more true under the present conditions, where Pakistan has developed alternative sources of economic aid from the oil producing countries of the Middle East and China.

7. It is not possible for the government of Pakistan, because of strong pro-Islamic sentiments in the nation, to act openly at any time, at any level, against any Muslim country in pursuit of U.S. policies in the region.

The Republican governments of the U.S. have been more inclined toward Pakistan. This may be a factor of perception of the situation in Southwest Asia or may be an outcome of internal U.S. politics.

Other Factors

The U.S. appears committed to Southwest Asia and a Presidential declaration in 1980 stated that, henceforth, the Persian Gulf area is of vital interest to the United States. The U.S. does have vital interests in the region, but it lacks adequate physical resources to preserve its interests if challenged by the Russians.

The region is unstable and the situation changes regularly, which is a factor of evolution after gaining independence from their colonial masters who were, by and large, their earlier historical rivals. The area was dormant during the colonial period. The mental progress of the people stopped the day they were subject to foreign rule

because they were not allowed to take part in state affairs. People got their freedom through fighting and demonstrations. They were promised big hopes and the return of old glorious periods, which did not materialize because of a lack of physically exploitable resources.

Improvements in communication and education have played an important role, and is increasing the participation of the people in national affairs. The leaders who took over the government after the departure of the colonial powers, were the descendents of old ruling families and to rule the countries was considered an inherited right by them. The leaders who were sincere, while fighting against the colonial powers, could not change their thinking according to the changing environment. Another factor in the instability of the area, has been the struggle between the aspiration of the people and the efforts by present rulers to maintain their rule. Therefore, the instability observed in the area is not really dangerous to anyone else but to the ruling families. The United States does not have any links with the people of the area and, therefore, is too dependent on the ruling junta. As a result, whenever there is any change in government, the U.S. has generally made the wrong decision, and has been losing its allies with which it has had close relations for decades.

The U.S. Government seems to be unable to comprehend the reasons for hatred against the West, and the true nature of so called "Islamic fundamentalism."

U.S. support will be continuous and consistent for Israel. U.S. support for Israel does create a negative effect and creates hatred among the peoples of the region against the U.S. The U.S. which is a close ally of the most of the countries of the region, either becomes the first enemy (in the case of Arabs against Israel) or stays neutral (as in the case of Pakistan against India) when they have to fight to achieve their national goals.

The way Israel was created is considered a classic example of Western and Christian powers cheating the Arabs and the whole Muslim world. The deep hatred which exists between the Muslims (specially the Arab Muslims), and the Jews, has its roots in the history and religion of the area. Given the present situation, there is no hope for a solution to the Arab-Israel problem in the near future. Recent moves by a few Arab leaders to have peace negotiations with Israel appear have been either to seek U.S. support to maintain their rule, or motivated by frustration emerging out of their inability to obtain the occupied areas from Israel because of U.S. support for Israel. Both these approaches are based on negative foundations and, therefore, will result in a negative outcome which will not provide the basis for a lasting peace.

U.S. interests in the area seem to be economic in nature and, therefore, do not have any attraction for the idealistic people of the region. This ideological void, coupled with economic problems, may be filled with more radical ideologies.

Because of the close alliance between the U.S. and Europe, the U.S. is considered, in the mind of the people, to be an extension of old Western colonialism. Other factors contributing toward this impression are the English language and U.S. continuous support, along with many European countries, for the apartheid government of South Africa; which is predominantly a government of Anglo-Saxons.

Pakistan is facing the worst energy crisis of its history. The people do not have electricity for many hours because of load scheduling resulting from difference between supply and demand. The country's effort to acquire nuclear energy has been termed as an effort to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Pakistan's efforts to acquire a re-processing plant from France became a major issue during the U.S. presidential elections of 1976. The tolerance shown by U.S. and other Western nations over the nuclear capabilities of South Africa and Israel is considered an attempt to deprive the whole Islamic World from acquiring this latest technology. It is interesting to note that it is not the Russians who are actively trying to stop Pakistan from acquiring technology, but the U.S. which seems to be

willing to go to any extent to stop Pakistan from going nuclear. Nuclear technology is necessary for the economic progress of Pakistan and perhaps may be necessary for the defense of the country.

The U.S. is gaining more allies in the region but at the same time is operating in hostile environments. This indicates that (1) governments of the region try to gain the support of the U.S. to maintain their rule, but (2) the society as a whole has a hostile attitude toward U.S. This is due to differences between basic goals of the nations of the region and U.S. policies. It also indicates that the U.S. has no links with the people and has preferred to deal at the government level only. This attitude of the society can be exploited against the U.S., by any radical leader.

Most of these countries have not been benefited from their alliance with West, except for getting state-of-the-art weapons, which also are not much when compared with their regional rivals. The West is reluctant to transfer the technology, and they seem to want to keep the region continuously dependent on the industrialized nations for perpetual economic exploitation.

The southern portion of Russia and the Warsaw pact countries of Eastern Europe, are predominantly Muslim and Christian areas. These people could be exploited on religious basis to get rid of their Soviet masters, but it would be long term process and need continual political and moral support.

The U.S. policy in Southwest Asia is erratic and predictable, which results in the US being considered an unreliable and selfish friend by the nations of the region.

Pakistan and Turkey are the two most important nations in the region, and have the potential to pose stubborn resistance to the Soviets if they can be assured that they will not be left alone to bear the consequences of a conflict with the USSR. Economic power is an important part of national might. If Turkey and Pakistan, who number five and six in the world in the numerical strength of their defense forces, do not develop their infrastructure to support and promote their economies, they will have to think about revising their priorities and distributing their resources between military and economic fields.

Both the U.S. and Pakistan have economic interests in the regions. Since it is clearly an Islamic region, therefore, Pakistan has some historical and religious responsibilities, and shares many aspirations with other nations of the region which do not necessarily match with the U.S. style of handling affairs in Southwest Asia.

After gaining independence from their colonial masters the nations of Southwest Asia are undergoing an evolutionary phenomenon, which takes a revolutionary form because of delay in attaining their genuine status among other nations. Religion plays an important role in establishing the

centuries old friendships and enmities. The division of the countries, specially in case of Israel and India, has added fuel to the political fire of the region.

Asia as a whole, including the connected region of Africa, is predominantly Muslim. It is in the interest of any outside actor to accept and appreciate this fact and formulate long terms policies accordingly. The area has successfully resisted the dominance of communist ideaology, in spite of being a very fertile region for the socialist system because of prevailing poverty, turbulent political conditions, and close proximity to the dominant communist giants. Even the close relationship between the Soviet Union and countries like Egypt, Syria and Iraq, could not make them the communist states. Iran, who is posing herself the staunch enemy of the U.S., and who is involved in a war with Iraq, and needs the support of a superpower, has not gone to the Russian camp. This is a good indication that the countries of the region have ideologies and systems of their own which can fulfill the economic, spiritual and intellectual needs of the people.

Problems between Pakistan and India have their roots in the past and the solution to their problems also lies in the historical process. The Indian Subcontinent has been a region which has attracted people from all over the world, who here, in turn, established their rule after dominating local people. The migration of the Aryans and the emergence

of Islam in the region are two major and prominent events in the history of the Subcontinent. The migration has resulted in the creation of groups of peoples having different and conflicting interests. The Subcontinent is clearly heading toward a division of its society based on the local inhabitants in the south, and foreigners which migrated during last few thousand years. Foreigners are further divided on the basis of religion, languages, and other factors. The unity seen in the region during Muslim rule or during British times was forced with power and was not the result of a natural process. The partition of Subcontinent which took place in 1947, still can not be considered natural because it was carried out under the shadow of a dominant foreign power. Therefore, it remains to be seen what will happen in the future. Religion, geography, history, language and culture do play very important role in society. More than 300 million Muslims, which are for the time being divided at three places (in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India), when seen in the background of common culture, and to some extent a common language (Urdu), will play a far more important role than is reflected by their total numbers. But still, only the future will tell what set of factors will dominate society and thus shape the geographical boundaries of this area.

Political disturbances in Pakistan are part the country's evolutionary process, and should be analyzed in

the right perspective, keeping in view the effects of the last 5,000 years and tragic period of British occupation.

There is no solution to the Arab-Israel problem in sight. The U.S. is considered a party to the whole issue, which may have a negative effect on developing close relations between Pakistan and the U.S. and, in a larger sense, between the U.S. and forty-five Islamic countries.

There are feelings among the people and rulers of the Muslim world that they are being obstructed by the West, in their process of industrialization and attaining their genuine status in the community of the world.

Any Soviet move in Europe would be a step toward an open conflict which neither of the superpower wants. The real danger to U.S. interests, is Soviet moves in the third world which involve less danger of direct conflict with the U.S. and can be carried out through proxies and political infiltration over the long term. Such moves will not only affect the U.S. credibility, but will also affect the economic interest of the U.S. This problem becomes more critical when seen in the light of the process required to get the approval of Congress for any stern action required, to check the Soviet moves throughout world. It is, therefore, important for the U.S. to build a chain of reliable friends around the world, and support them consistently, so that they become part of U.S. strategic forces in the area. Since the Soviets will not risk a conflict in Europe, a part

of U.S. forces should be withdrawn and the saving spent on upgrading the defense and industrial capabilities of Pakistan and Egypt. The combination of military and economic support is more suited to winning the support of the people of the region, and will also help in reducing bias against the U.S.

It is in the U.S. interest to encourage the development of relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This would bring the following benefits for the United States:

1. Sidesteps the issue of maintaining a U.S. physical presence in Saudi Arabia, which has become more difficult because of Saudi Arabia ruling family's sensitivity to any such presence. However, since the Pakistani troops are non-Arab, Muslims of mainly the Sunni sect, they are preferred by the Saudi Government and not opposed by the Saudi people.

2. Provides a chance for putting the United States relationship with Pakistan on a new footing, i.e., taking it out of the Subcontinent where India has been, and is likely to remain a major concern, and moving it to the Southwest Asia, i.e., placing it in the Saudi context. If this shift could be achieved, then perhaps officials in Washington would be more willing to offer U.S. political and military support to Pakistan whose borders with Afghanistan are in serious trouble.

The above mentioned scenario has the following problems, which can be avoided if their existence is recognized by both the sides:

1. Any attempt by Washington to explain to the Indian government that as Pakistan has become a "front line " state, and needs U.S. support, will not necessarily be welcomed by the Indians. India's inability to appreciate the presence of the Soviet threat makes it impossible to accept the very basis on which U.S. policy in Southwest Asia is built. If Indian concurrence is to be the prerequisite of a sustained dialogue with Pakistan, there are bound to be difficulties.

2. Whenever the U.S. program for Pakistan is fashioned primarily with India in mind, it is unworkable. The United States must face the fact that Pakistan will not live with a package that seemingly gives India an overriding veto. If India is to remain the primary focus, it would have been, indeed, preferable not to have proposed any aid package at all.

The U.S. must recognize that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran require a long range response and not trivial fixes. In the past, the United States policy has often alienated friends and raised questions regarding its reliability. Dealing with this problem requires not only military presence, but also a psychological buildup of the relationship, a high level of dialogue, and a certain amount of hand-holding of regional countries. This can be achieved only if the United States considers Pakistani integrity to be of importance to its vital policy

in Southwest Asia. A careful reassessment of this commitment, has to be made by Washington since it is even more appropriate today than it was in the past.

(4) Considering the fact that Pakistan's integrity is vital, then it would be in U.S. interests to make Pakistan a key part of its Southwest Asian strategy. Such a move does make geographical sense and offers the possibility of disengaging U.S. policy toward Pakistan from its baleful Indian context. The difficulty of constantly balancing the two, which has plagued U.S. policy in the past, can thus be avoided. Any separation of Pakistan from Southwest Asia would be construed by the former as signaling a lower priority, which would make it difficult for the U.S. to obtain any closer cooperation for its policy goals.

(5) As terrorism has replaced human rights as the primary concern of the Reagan administration, some thought needs to be given by long range planners in the State Department as to how this development will impinge on internal terrorism in Pakistan, i.e., covert external assistance to Baluchistan or overt external terrorism either by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in concert with India or by India alone.

(6) The United States must be aware that efforts to press nuclear proliferation have had little success in Pakistan. In the past, Pakistan nuclear efforts were erroneously linked to support from Qaddafi. In the future,

if the Saudi-Pakistani relationship evolves satisfactorily, Pakistan's nuclear options may possibly be considered by the Saudis to be a positive factors enhancing their security. If that were to happen, it will effect U.S. policies in the region.

(7) The United States should carefully weigh its options and policies before getting involved in Pakistan. To do otherwise will serve neither country. Changes in the government may affect Pakistan's relations with the U.S., but the U.S. should not let any political party exploit the past history between Pakistan and the U.S. This can be achieved by increasing the amount of economic aid which should be sufficient enough to be appreciated by a common individual in Pakistan. The aid should be focused in the industrial sector because the development of new industries can provide direct benefit to the lower middle class in the form of more opportunities.

Recommendations. Keeping in view the findings of this research, the following areas are considered to be the basis for development of relations between Pakistan and United States.

1. Pakistan and the U.S. have common economic interests in the Middle East. The economic interests of Pakistan are, however, a subset of its overall interests which have three dimensions (i.e., religious, historical and economic).

2. A common struggle against Russian dominance in the region. Both nations do share the view that Soviet expansion in the region is shaping up to a dangerous level and should be checked. This should be a major factor in developing a better understanding between the U.S. and Pakistan.

3. Both, have a common interest in the Middle East and seek a peaceful environment in that region. Therefore Pakistan could be useful for enhancing peace among the Arabs and Israel. If Jerusalem could be brought under some sort of international control, this could help to maintain peace in the region until some lasting solution can be found.

4. Pakistan has always been very close to Iran. Muslims in the Indian Subcontinent share a common history and religion with Iran. Pakistan has maintained good relations with Iran even during the early turbulent days of the Iranian revolution. The U.S. needs to have a good relationship with Iran to check Russian advances and to maintain peace in the Middle East. Pakistan could help by becoming a mediator between the U.S. and Iran at sometime in the future.

5. Pakistan, by positioning military personnel in moderate regimes in the Middle East, could contribute to internal stability of the region.

6. The U.S. needs facilities for effective use of the RDJTF, which could be provided by Pakistan who has a large defense structure; but this depends on the level of support provided by the U.S. to Pakistan.

7. The security of a Pakistan is in danger from the Soviets in the west and India in the east. India may act against Pakistan, on her own or at the instigation of Russians, as a Russian proxy. The security of Pakistan is vital to U.S. interests in the region, and therefore, any danger to Pakistan would impact U.S. interests as well. Therefore Pakistan must be assured of its defense against any aggression. Such assurance would create a harmony of thought between the U.S. and Pakistan, and would definitely help in developing a real relationship, and Pakistan then, would be less inclined toward having nuclear weapons.

8. The U.S. must help China in her modernization program. This will reduce the level of U.S. involvement in the region, and will help in the defense of Pakistan.

How These Common Desires Can be Achieved. The sources of cooperation which have been mentioned can be achieved through a package of diplomatic, political, psychological, and military options. A well integrated combination of all these options could be useful to achieve the overall goal of strengthening relations between these two countries.

Diplomatic Options. The U.S. may have to take the following approach on diplomatic level:

1. The U.S. should try to seek a political solution to the Afghanistan problem through different channels. i.e. bilaterally, as well as through the European Economic Market, the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference.

2. The U.S. should continue to hold back recognition of the present Soviet sponsored regime in Afghanistan. In the meantime, the U.S. must support the struggle of Afghan freedom fighters and propagate a greater awareness of the Soviet Union as a country opposed to national liberation.

3. The U.S. policy in Afghanistan should be integrated with a policy toward Pakistan and Iran.

4. To reduce pressure on Pakistan, dialogue between India and Pakistan should be encouraged.

5. The U.S. should encourage efforts by Pakistan to develop its ties to the Islamic movement in recognition of many shared U.S.-Islamic objectives.

6. India may have to be convinced that U.S.-Pakistan relations are not directed against India. At the same time, it should be made clear to India that they should restrict themselves from acting as a proxy force for the Russians in attacking Pakistan.

7. Iran should be assured of her territorial integrity through the resumption of dialogue.

8. The US should remain neutral and also convince the Soviet Union to remain neutral in the Persian Gulf war. The U.S. should also support the efforts of OIC and UN to end Iran Iraq war.

9. Encourage West European trade with Iran.

10. Efforts should be made to increase U.S. understanding of fundamentalism and Arab nationalism in the region. Differentiation should be made between political influence and military presence, and the former should be given preference over the latter.

Political Options. The following actions could be taken by the U.S. and Pakistan to strengthen their mutual relations.

1. Pakistan could be persuaded to become a member of a Southwest Asian strategy.

2. The distinction should be clearly made between Pakistan and U.S. interests in the region, so that the ambiguous relations of the 1950's are not repeated.

3. A more flexible approach to the Afghanistan problem should be adopted by opting for alternative solutions. The Afghanistan problem should be advertised extensively in the world press. The U.S. should maintain a dialogue with the USSR on withdrawal, but at the same time demonstrate high cost to the USSR of continued military occupation of Afghanistan.

4. Develop an impression that the U.S. is deeply interested in the integrity and solidarity of Iran.

5. Support the regional efforts of cooperation, like Gulf Cooperation Council.

Economic Options. The following economic options are available to U.S. in the region.

1. Apply sanctions on trade with Afghanistan with the cooperation of the Organization of Islamic Conference and European Common Market.

2. Help develop a badly needed infrastructure in Pakistan. This would be greatly appreciated in Pakistan and would provide an opportunity to establish links with U.S. business circles in the country. These links with Pakistan society would be an asset to long term U.S.-Pakistan relations, and would go a long way toward reducing misunderstandings between the people of Pakistan and the U.S.

3. Pakistan should be assisted through PL480, economic support and development funds. Debt rescheduling should also be provided to through "Aid to Pakistan Consortium". Allies in Japan and Europe and other countries in the Gulf should be urged to increase their aid to Pakistan.

4. Increase the level of cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

Psychological Options. On this front the following techniques may be adopted:

1. A commitment to Pakistan security should be demonstrated over a period of years, because most of the misunderstandings have come from a fluctuation in relations.

2. The morale of the Mujahideen should be boosted by recognizing their role in Afghanistan.

3. Increased propaganda should be targeted at Muslims in Soviet occupied central Asia and Muslim countries, exploiting fundamentalism in that region.

4. Indicate that the U.S. is not anti-Islamic which would further help in eliminating bias against the Western world.

Military Options. The following approaches may be adopted in the military field:

1. Military support for the Mujahidin should be increased and more countries should be involved in providing aid to the freedom fighters. The capability to protect themselves from the attacks of Soviet gunships should be provided to the Mujahidin along with some anti-aircraft capability.

2. Substantial military aid should be provided to Pakistan, and maximum numbers of Pakistani defense officers should be trained through the International Military Education and Training (IMET), which is a good way to establish contact with the military personnel of Pakistan.

3. Maintain an embargo on military supplies, to both Iran and Iraq to encourage an early ending to the Gulf war.

Recommendation for Further Study

Southwest Asia has become the focus of world attention; a region which possesses the potential for a major war. Oil, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism have attracted everyone's attention. As a result, the entire region deserves exhaustive study. The alliance between Pakistan and the U.S. also depends largely on what happens in the region. Based upon the results of this study, I recommend the following areas for further study:

(1) The impact of religion and the petro-dollar on society in Southwest Asia, and what is "fundamentalism?"


(2) The long term affect of the Arab-Israel conflict on the West.

(3) An examination of the affects of past history and conflicting religious beliefs in the area on relations between the West and Southwest Asia. How can these centuries old biases be reduced to counter a common enemy--Communism?

(4) What are the basic causes of terrorism. How does it effect the new generation, as well as the norms and practices of international politics?


(6) Are these latest trends in Southwest Asia an indication of a desire to improve the status of these countries among the other nations of the world, notwithstanding with their physical resources?

Appendix A: Pakistan and Its Neighbors




PAKISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS

Appendix B: Southwest Asia



Appendix C: Statistics of Al-Fatah Guerilla Activities



Note: Number and dates of operations as announced in 53 published al-Fatah military communiques.

Sources: Palestine Arab Documents, volumes for 1965, 1966, 1967 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies); The Arab Documents, volumes for 1965, 1966, 1967 (Beirut: Political Studies and Public Administration Department, American University of Beirut); both series in Arabic.

FIG. 4. Guerrilla Military Operations Carried Out by Fatah, 1965 to May 1967

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) AFIT/GLM/LSM/86S-62		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION School of Systems and Logistics	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) AFIT/LSM	7b. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code) Air Force Institute of Technology Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-6583		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NOS.	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) See Box 19		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT NO.
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Ranjha Maqbook Ahmad, B.S., Sqn Ldr, Pakistan Air Force			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT MS Thesis	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Yr., Mo., Day) 1986 September	15. PAGE COUNT 180
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB. GR.	
05	04	Military Strategy Southwest Asia International Relations Pakistan	

ABSTRACT

Southwest Asia is predominantly a Muslim region and is the birth place of the world's major religions. Its strategic location and petroleum resources make it important and attractive to the major powers. The U.S. has vital interests in Southwest Asia, and Europe and Japan depend on oil from the region.

In the 1950's and 1960's, Pakistan was a close ally of the U.S. and played a key role in containing communism in the region. Pakistan has once again become important to the U.S. after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. needs the support of states in the region to counter Russian advances in Southwest Asia.

This research focused on finding common interests which could become the basis of an alliance between Pakistan and the U.S. in Southwest Asia. Despite differences, both countries do have common interests in the region, for which an alliance with each other could be beneficial. Any alliance should be established on well defined mutual interests, appreciating each other's differences and limitations, so that subsequent frustrations emerging from ambiguities can be avoided.

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