The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat? (ASPP).
Abstract
This report documents the results of individual research undertaken by the author during a one-year assignment to the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) as their Distinguished Visiting Analyst for 1985-86. The author is a senior member of the staff at the Rand Corporation, specializing in the formulation and analysis of strategies. One of the several agreed tasks of the DVA program at CAA is to undertake individual research projects of mutual interest to the analyst and CAA. This research into the role of the Army in the strategic planning process was suggested by CAA s Director and endorsed by the Army Staff (DAMO-SS). It involves an exploration of the definition and significance of strategy, a comparative analysis of the military services on various aspects, but particularly in their approaches to strategy, and an analysis of the Army's unique problems and opportunities associated with strategic planning. It should be of interest to all military and defense planners concerned with understanding the distinctive behavior of the several military services in their approaches to the planning of future forces for combined, joint, and coalition warfare. This paper entails an examination of the Army's role in strategy as compared to the roles of the Navy and Air Force.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA175761
Entities
People
- Carl H. Builder
Organizations
- Center for Army Analysis